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REPORT

OF

THE COMMISSIONERS

APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE

ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY;

TOGETHER WITH THE

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ac

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

AND APPENDIX.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.

LONDON:
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PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1859.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

	Page
COMMISSION	v
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS	ix
KEY TO THE EVIDENCE	xvii
ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE	xix

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE :—

	Page
Lieutenant-General Sir George Pollock	1
Major-General Low	11
Colonel John Welchman	16
Lieutenant-Colonel Wyllie	18
Colonel Becher	22
Major Sir David Baird, Bart.	30
Captain G. F. S. Browne	32
Sir George Clerk	38, 191
Lieutenant-Colonel T. L. Harington	46
Major W. L. Merewether	52
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert A. Master	59
Colonel Orlando Felix	62
Major-General Sir Scudamore W. Steel	69
Major-General Robert Alexander	73
Mr. John F. Thomas	83
Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Thomas Wilde	89
Colonel John T. Leslie	92, 282
Colonel John Hill	94
Colonel James Sinclair	97
Colonel Michael Willoughby	102
Sir Charles E. Trevelyan	105
Colonel Skeffington Poole	115
Major-General Julius George Griffith	119
Major-General the Hon. T. Ashburnham	121
Major-General David Capon	125
Colonel Edmund Wintle	130
Major-General Sir Robert J. H. Vivian	134
Major-General Sir Edward Lugard	146
Colonel James Holland	150
Major-General Sir T. H. Franks	160
Charles Renny	162
James Ranald Martin	165
Colonel Sir Alexander M. Tulloch	178, 260
General Sir Willoughby Cotton	187
Colonel George Campbell	198
Major-General Thomas S. Pratt	200
Major Balcarres Dalrymple W. Ramsay	208
Colonel Henry M. Durand	213, 312
Major-General Sir Archdale Wilson	244
Major-General Sir Frederick Abbott	249
Dr. John McLennan	257
Mr. John Pollard Willoughby	267
Mr. Charles Raikes	284
Earl of Ellenborough	288
Major-General Sir Charles Yorke	299
Mr. Edward Francis Elliot	301
Colonel Robert Blucher Wood	306

CONTENTS OF THE APPENDIX.

I.—PAPERS LAID BEFORE THE COMMISSION.

II.—RETURNS LAID BEFORE THE COMMISSION.

III.—PROCEEDINGS IN INDIA IN CONNEXION WITH THE RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

IV.—ANSWERS BY THE COMMISSIONERS TO QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE NATIVE AND EUROPEAN ARMY.

I.—PAPERS.

	Page
No. 1. Conditions on which the officers of the East India Company's armies have accepted service, as respects pay, promotion, furlough, retirement, and the funds	1
No. 2. Answers received from Lord Ellenborough to questions regarding the native army; and the proportion and amount of force hereafter required for Bengal	4
No. 3. Answers of Lord Ellenborough to the questions regarding the European force to be in future maintained in India	7
No. 4. Answers of Major-General Tucker to questions regarding the native army	8
No. 5. Answers of Major-General Tucker to questions submitted to him as to selection of officers for commands	11
No. 6. Memorandum of Major Merewether on the constitution of the Sind irregular horse, referred to in answer to question 1724	11
No. 7. Notes by Colonel Holland on certain proposed improvements in the native army of India	12
No. 8. Estimate of the cost of converting a sailing 80-gun ship into a screw steam ship for the conveyance of troops, Referred to in answer to question 4529	16
No. 9. Memorandum by Major-General Malcolm, on special duty Egypt, as to the feasibility of despatching troops through that country	16
No. 10. Memorandum regarding the strength, number, and composition of the police corps in India	17
No. 11. Mr. Elliot's scheme of a proposed organization of a police for the Madras presidency	17
No. 12. Establishment of native infantry for Bengal suggested by Colonel Wood	19
No. 13. Memorandum of Colonel Baker on the organization of the native sappers, Bengal	19
No. 14. Orders issued regarding the "general enlistment" of natives	20

II.—RETURNS.

	Page
No. 15.—Return of the Military Force in India, European and Native, from 1852 to 1857. (Reprinted from Return laid before Parliament, April 1858)	21
No. 16.—Return of the Number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the Local European Troops in India, from 1843 to 1856	23
No. 17.—Return of the Number of Troops serving in India, immediately before the Mutiny	23
No. 18.—Strength of the Troops of Her Majesty's Regular Army on the Indian Establishment, October 1858	23
No. 19.—Strength of the European Local Force in India in 1858	23
No. 20.—Effective State of Cavalry and Infantry Regiments of the Line serving in India, September 1858	24
No. 21.—Return showing the Number of Regiments (Line and Local) serving in India, distinguishing the Civil from the Military Corps (August 1858), and List of Irregular and Police Corps in India at the same date	24
No. 22.—Return showing the Number, Caste, and Country of the Native Officers and Soldiers of the Regular and Irregular Regiments of each Presidency, September 1858	26
No. 23.—Return showing the Employment of the Officers of the Bengal Native Infantry Regiments, and of the Bengal Artillery, in 1858	28
No. 24.—Return of the Number of Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry Cadets appointed and embarked for India, from May 1857 to December 1858	28
No. 25.—Return showing the Number of Regular Regiments and Battalions (European and Native) of Her Majesty's and the East India Company's Armies at each Presidency before the Mutiny; the total Number of European Commissioned Officers of each Service and Presidency; and the Proportions in which the Established Divisional and Brigade Commands were allotted, at the same date	28
No. 26.—Return of the Number of Courts-martial held on Her Majesty's Officers and Soldiers in India and elsewhere, from 1849 to 1854	29
No. 27.—Return of the East India Company's Regiments of European Infantry in each year, from 1843 to 1852	29
No. 28.—Return showing the Number of European Non-Commissioned Officers and Soldiers on the Town Major's List at each Presidency, and the Number employed in each Department, Civil and Military, December 1858	29
No. 29.—Return showing the comparative Amount of Casualties in the Queen's Regiments of Infantry on the Indian Establishment, and the European Infantry of the East India Company's Service, from 1843 to 1852	30
No. 30.—Return showing the Number of Men who volunteered in India, from 1843 to 1852	30
No. 31.—Return showing the Strength and Number of Deaths of Non-Commissioned Officers and Men of Her Majesty's Forces serving in India in each year, from 1843 to 1857	31
No. 32.—Return showing the Number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File belonging to Regiments serving in India, who have purchased their Discharge in each year from 1843 to 1856	31
No. 33.—Return showing the Number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the East India Company's Troops, who purchased their Discharge during the same period	31
No. 34.—Return showing the Strength and Number of Deaths during the first year of service in India, in such of Her Majesty's Regiments as have arrived there from Australia and the Cape of Good Hope, from 1843 to 1857	31
No. 35.—Return showing the Number of Deaths during the first year of residence, in Eight Regiments which have proceeded direct to India from Great Britain	31
No. 36.—Return showing the Number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the *Ages* specified, that composed at the time of embarkation the Six last Regiments of Her Majesty's Army sent to India, previously to the War with Russia	32
No. 37.—Return showing the Number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the *Ages* specified, that composed the First and Second European Regiments at each Presidency, on the 1st January 1856	32
No. 38.—Return showing the Number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the *Ages* specified, that composed Two of Her Majesty's Regiments in India, in each Presidency, after ten to fifteen years' Service in India	32
No. 39.—Return showing the Number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the *Service* stated, that composed the Six Regiments of Her Majesty's Infantry last sent to India, previously to the War with Russia	32
No. 40.—Return showing the Number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the *Service* stated, that composed the First and Second European Regiments at each Presidency in 1858	33
No. 41.—Return showing the Number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the *Service* stated, that composed Two of Her Majesty's Regiments of Infantry in each Presidency, after ten to fifteen years' Service in India	33
No. 42.—Return showing the Strength and Number of Deaths of Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File in the East India Company's Army at each of the Stations in the three Presidencies, from 1843 to 1857	34

Page

No. 43.—Return showing the Strength and Number of Deaths in the East India Company's European Forces in India, from 1843 to 1857 - - - - - - - - - 37

No. 44.—Comparison of the Strength and Deaths amongst Her Majesty's and the East India Company's European Troops, from 1843 to 1855; and Observations thereon, by Colonel Sir A. Tulloch - - - - - - - - 37

No. 45.—Establisnment of Royal Artillery in India, per Army Estimates, 1858-59 - - - - - - - 39

No. 46.—Detail of a Six-Pounder Troop of Royal Horse Artillery for Service in India - - - - - - - 40

No. 47.—Detail of an European Troop of Bengal Horse Artillery equipped for Field Service - - - - - 41

No. 48.—Detail of a Nine-Pounder Field Battery of Royal Artillery for Service in India - - - - - - 42

Page

No. 49.—Detail of a Horse Field Battery on the Bengal War Establishment - - - - - - - - - - 43

No. 50.—Return showing the Expense incurred on account of Troops and Invalids of Her Majesty's and the Company's Services, proceeding to or returning from India, from 1843-44 to 1857-58 - - - - - - - - - - 44

No. 51.—Details of the Expense of a Regiment of the East India Company's European Infantry on full Batta in Bengal, if complete to its full Establishment - - 44

No. 52.—Details of the Expense of a Regiment of Her Majesty's Infantry on Full Batta in Bengal, if complete to the present full Establishment - - - - - - 44

No. 53.—Observations by Sir A. Tulloch on the above Details of the Expense of Corps, and Replies of Colonel Baker, Military Secretary, India Office, thereto - - - - - 46

III.—PAPERS RECEIVED FROM INDIA.

Page

No. 54.—Proposed Formation of a Commission in India, and Minutes of the Members of Government thereon - - 51

No. 55.—Memorandum of Governor-General, Lord Canning, on the Re-Organization of the Indian Army - - - 57

No. 56.—Minute of Governor-General, dated 9th August 1858, on the Bengal Artillery - - - - - - - - 60

No. 57.—Minutes of Governor-General, dated 13th and 14th September, 1858, on the Madras and Bombay Artillery - 62

No. 58.—Replies of Commander-in-chief in India, Lord Clyde, to Questions relating to the Re-Organization of the Indian Army - - - - - - - - - - - - 63

No. 59.—Replies of Commander-in-chief in India, Lord Clyde, to Questions regarding the Bengal Irregular Cavalry - 71

No. 60.—Minute of Lieut.-General Sir James Outram on the Governor-General's Memorandum relating to the Re-Organization of the Indian Army, dated 30th September, 1858 . 74

No. 61.—Replies of Major-General Birch, Military Secretary to the Government of India, to Questions relating to the Re-Organization of the Indian Army - - - - - 77

No. 62.—Replies of Major-General Sir Wm. Mansfield, Chief of Staff, to Questions relating to the future Organization of the Indian Army - - - - - - - - - - 95

No. 63.—Military Letter from the Governor-General, dated 8th July 1858 proposing the Conversion of all the Regiments of Bengal Native Cavalry into European Light Cavalry - - - - - - - - - - - - - 118

Page

No. 64.—Answers of Lord Harris, Governor of Madras, to Questions relating to the Organization of the Army - - 115

No. 65.—Answers of Lieut.-General Sir Patrick Grant, Commander-in-chief, Madras, to the Questions regarding the Re-Organization of the Indian Army - - - - - - 120

No. 66.—Minutes of Sir Patrick Grant, on Army Subjects; General Staff of Madras Army; Artillery; European Force required, &c. - - - - - - - - - - - - 137

No. 67.—Views of Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, as to the Numbers and Organization of the Military and Police Force to be maintained in Bombay - - - - - - 142

No. 68.—Lord Elphinstone's Replies to Questions regarding the native Infantry - - - - - - - - - - 151

No. 69.—Replies of Lieut.-General Sir Henry Somerset, Commander-in-chief, Bombay, to Questions relating to the Organization of the Indian Army - - - - - - 153

No. 70.—Précis by Colonel Durand of the Answers received in India regarding the Proportion of European to native Troops to be maintained in India - - - - - - - - - 166

No. 71.—Précis by Colonel Durand of Answers regarding the Re-organization of the native Infantry of Bengal - - 179

No. 72.—Précis by Colonel Durand of Answers regarding the Irregular Cavalry, Bengal - - - - - - - - - 208

IV.—ANSWERS BY THE COMMISSIONERS.

Page

No. 73.—His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge:—
1st Series - - - - - - - - - 219
2nd Series - - - - - - - - - 221

No. 74.—Marquis of Tweeddale:—
1st Series - - - - - - - - - 224
2nd Series - - - - - - - - - 228

No. 75.—Viscount Melville:—
1st Series - - - - - - - - - 231
2nd Series - - - - - - - - - 232

No. 76.—Lieut.-General Sir Harry Smith:—
1st Series - - - - - - - - - 232
2nd Series - - - - - - - - - 234

Page

No. 77.—Lieut.-General Sir George Wetherall:—
1st Series - - - - - - - - - 237
2nd Series - - - - - - - - - 238

No. 78.—Major-General Montgomerie:—
1st Series - - - - - - - - - 241
2nd Series - - - - - - - - - 242

No. 79.—Colonel Burlton:—
1st Series - - - - - - - - - 243
2nd Series - - - - - - - - - 245

No. 80.—Colonel Tait:—
1st Series - - - - - - - - - 248
2nd Series - - - - - - - - - 251

No. 81.—Correspondence between Major-General Hancock and the Secretary - - - - - - - - - - 252

COMMISSION.

Victoria, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Queen, Defender of the Faith.

To Our right trusty and well-beloved Councillor Jonathan Peel, Major General of our Forces, and One of Our Principal Secretaries of State, having the Department of War;

Our dearly beloved Cousin and Councillor George William Frederick Charles Duke of Cambridge, Knight of Our Most Noble Order of the Garter, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight of Our Most Illustrious Order of Saint Patrick, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, General Commanding-in-Chief Our Forces;

Our right trusty and well-beloved Councillor Edward Henry Stanley, commonly called Lord Stanley, Our Commissioner for the Affairs of India;

Our right trusty and right entirely beloved Cousin and Councillor George Marquess of Tweeddale, Knight of Our Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, Companion of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, General of Our Forces, and Colonel of Our Thirtieth Regiment of Foot;

Our right trusty and right well-beloved Cousin Henry Viscount Melville, Knight Commander of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Major General of Our Forces and Colonel of Our One Hundredth Regiment of Foot;

Our trusty and well-beloved Sir Henry George Wakelyn Smith, Baronet, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Lieutenant General of Our Forces;

Our trusty and well-beloved Sir George Augustus Wetherall, Knight Commander of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Lieutenant General and Adjutant General of Our Forces;

Our trusty and well-beloved Patrick Montgomerie, Esquire, Companion of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Major General in the East India Company's Service;

Our trusty and well-beloved Henry Hancock, Esquire, Major General in the East India Company's Service;

Our trusty and well-beloved William Burlton, Esquire, Companion of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Colonel on the Retired List of the East India Company's Service; and

Our Trusty and well-beloved Thomas Forsyth Tait, Esquire, Companion of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Colonel in the East India Company's Service, One of Our Aides-de-Camp,—Greeting.

Whereas We have deemed it expedient that a Commission should issue, for the purpose of inquiring into the organization of the Army at present serving in the Pay, and under the control and management, of the Honourable the East India Company, and that the said Commission should report to Us what changes it may be expedient to make in the existing system.

Now know ye, that We, reposing great trust and confidence in your zeal, discretion, and ability, have nominated and appointed, and do by these presents nominate and appoint, you the said Jonathan Peel, George William Frederick Charles Duke of Cambridge, Edward Henry Lord Stanley, George Marquess of Tweeddale, Henry Viscount Melville, Sir Henry George Wakelyn Smith, Sir George Augustus Wetherall, Patrick Montgomerie, Henry Hancock, William Burlton, and Thomas Forsyth Tait, to be Our Commissioners for the purposes aforesaid.

And We do hereby authorize and empower you, Our said Commissioners, or any five or more of you, to obtain information thereupon by the examination of all persons most competent, by reason of their knowledge, habits, or experience, to afford it; and also by calling for all Documents, papers, or records, which may appear to you, or any five or more of you, calculated to assist your researches, and to promote the formation of a sound judgment upon the subject.

And We do hereby command and require you, or any five or more of you, to report to Us, under your hands and seals, with all convenient speed, your Opinion upon the following questions:—

1. The terms on which the Army of the East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown?

2. The permanent force necessary to be maintained in the Indian Provinces respectively, after the restoration of tranquillity?

3. The proportion which European should bear to Native Troops, in Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery respectively?

4. How far the European portion of the Army should be composed of Troops of the Line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service, and how far of Troops raised for service in India only?

5. In connexion with this question, the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter?

6. Whether it be possible to consolidate the European Forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other; and what Regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all Officers now in the service of the East India Company?

7. Whether there should be any admixture of European and Native Forces, either Regimentally or by Brigade?

8. Whether the Local European Force should be kept up by Drafts and Volunteers from the Line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?

9. Whether it would be possible to raise any Regiments in the Colonies, either for temporary or permanent service in India?

10. Whether the Native Forces should be Regular, or Irregular, or both; and if so, in what proportions?

11. Whether any Native Artillery Corps should be sanctioned?

12. Whether Cadets sent out for service with Native Troops should, in the first instance, be attached to European Regiments to secure uniformity of drill and discipline?

And We will and command, and by these presents ordain, that this Our Commission shall continue in full force and virtue, and that you Our said Commissioners, or any five or more of you, may from time to time proceed in the execution thereof, and of every matter and thing therein contained, although the same be not continued from time to time by adjournment.

And, for your further assistance in the Execution of these presents, We do hereby authorize and empower you to appoint a Secretary to this Our Commission, whose services and assistance, We require you to use from time to time, as occasion may require.

Given at Our Court at Osborne House, Isle of Wight, the Fifteenth day of July One thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight, in the Twenty-second year of Our Reign.

By Her Majesty's Command.

(Signed) J. PEEL.

REPORT.

TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

We, the Commissioners appointed by Your Majesty for the purpose of inquiring into the Organization of the Army lately serving in the pay, and under the control and management, of the Honourable East India Company, have carefully investigated the subjects referred for our consideration; and we now beg humbly to lay before Your Majesty, Minutes of the Evidence which we have taken, and the result of our deliberations thereon.

With reference to the first point suggested in Your Majesty's Warrant, viz. "The terms "on which the Army of the East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown," Your Majesty's Commissioners observe, that the 56th Clause of the Act for the better Government of India, assures to the forces which now belong to Your Majesty's Indian Army, "the like Pay, Pensions, Allowances, and Privileges, and like Advantages as "regards Promotion and otherwise, as if they had continued in the Service of the said "Company." 21 & 22 Vict. cap. 106., Aug. 2, 1858.

The privileges and advantages thus referred to, are detailed in the Appendix, but may be briefly stated to consist in a prescriptive right to rise strictly by seniority to the rank and emoluments of colonel of a regiment, with the option of retiring before attaining that position, or after various periods of service, on a scale of pay, or pension, considerably higher than that granted to officers of Your Majesty's Army of the Line. No change, therefore, can be made, which would in any way disturb the system of promotion by seniority, as affecting officers now in the service, or interfere with any of their existing privileges; but the 57th section of the above-recited Act, gives to Your Majesty full power to frame new regulations on this, and all other points, to be applied to the case of officers and others, who hereafter may enter the Indian Army. No. 1, p. 1.

The second question, viz., the "permanent force necessary to be maintained in the "Indian Provinces respectively, after the restoration of tranquillity," does not appear to Your Majesty's Commissioners to admit of a reply, in a definite numerical form, as the amount of force must depend on the probability of either internal disturbances or external aggression. The estimates of force given in the evidence are most conflicting, ranging from 50,000 to 100,000 Europeans; and there can be no doubt, that it will be necessary to maintain for the future defence of India, a European force of much greater strength than that which existed previous to the outbreak of 1857. The amount of such force should, in the opinion of Your Majesty's Commissioners, be about 80,000; of which 50,000 would be required for Bengal, 15,000 for Madras, and 15,000 for Bombay. This amount and distribution, however, must always be affected by the political exigencies of the country; the introduction of railroads, and river steam navigation; the establishment of fortified posts, and other military considerations. 1571. App. 70. p. 175. No. 55. p. 58. 1150. 3056. 5723.

As regards the third question, the proportion "which European should bear to Native "corps in Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery respectively," Your Majesty's Commissioners are of opinion, that the amount of Native force should not, under present circumstances, bear a greater proportion to the European, in Cavalry and Infantry, than two to one for Bengal, and three to one for Madras and Bombay respectively. 322. 445. 535. 1862. 2266. 2437. 2687. 2964.

The evidence before the Commissioners is unanimous, that the Artillery should be mainly a European force, and they agree in the opinion thus expressed, exceptions being made for such stations as are peculiarly detrimental to the European constitution. 103. 1909. 323. 2443. 628. 2836. 2718. 3394. 5614.

In connexion with this question, Your Commissioners observe, that Military Police Corps have been formed, or are in course of formation, throughout India. They see in this Force, in its numerical strength, and military organization, differing, as it does, in no essential respect, from the regular Sepoy Army, the elements of future danger. 6738. App. 11. p. 17.

They would, therefore, recommend that great caution be used, in not giving to this Force a stricter military training, than may be required for the maintenance of discipline, lest a new Native Force be formed, which may hereafter become a source of embarrassment to the Government.

On the fourth question, as to "How far the European portion of the Army should "be composed of troops of the Line, taking India as part of the regular tour of "service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only?" Your Majesty's Commissioners are unable to arrive at any unanimity of opinion; and it will be found, on reference to the Minutes of Evidence, and to other papers in the Appendix, that the sentiments of many distinguished men, who have been examined, or have recorded their views on the subject, are no less divided than those of the Commissioners themselves. The latter can, therefore, offer no recommendation as a body, and must confine themselves to a report of the opinions of the Majority and Minority.

The Majority observe that a double European Army, such as that now established, has had its origin in the double government, which has hitherto existed;—the authority of the East India Company having been distinct from that of the Crown, though derived from it, and subordinate to its general control.

The original formation was thus anomalous, and exceptional; and as the transfer by Parliament of the Government of India, from the Company to the Crown, has not carried with it the total amalgamation of the European portion of the two Armies, it has become necessary fully to consider the subject.

3911. 5180. 6082. It does not appear that any case in history can be adduced, of the co-existence of two distinct armies supplied from the same sources, both as regards officers and men, serving the same Sovereign.

3967. 4025. 4536. 4274. 4759. 4542. 4975. 5654. 5661. They observe that, on the contrary, the great object of legislation in all civilized countries has been, so to organize the military forces, and resources of the State, as to produce unity of feeling and interest, under one supreme authority, throughout the whole body. That it is impossible to arrive at these ends, in the case of two separate armies, not amenable to the same authority as regards discipline and organization, however closely assimilated in other respects. That nothing could be more unfortunate, not to say dangerous, than so to organise the armed forces of the State, as to sow the seeds, and form the ground-work, of professional jealousies and heart-burnings—the inevitable result of a double system,—the consequence of which would be, that no selection for appointment could be made, from either service, which would be judged on its own intrinsic merits, but would be viewed rather with reference to that branch, whether line or local, from which the officer was selected.

2567. 4042. App. 62. p. 101. App. 67. p. 143. 4011. 5035. 4220. 4384. 4385. 4522. 4527. App. 44. p. 38. That, however good the Local Force of the late East India Company has proved itself to be, still it is the opinion of the Majority, that a Local Force deteriorates more than one, which by frequent relief, has infused into it fresh European notions and feelings, and a vigorous system of European discipline; and that this would more particularly be the case in a climate like that of India, where according to the statistical statement of Sir Alex. Tulloch, backed by the professional opinion of Dr. Martin, (himself an advocate for a local army) and others, the European constitution can never be said to become acclimatized, but, on the contrary, deteriorates, gradually and surely, in increasing ratio.

3901. 4670. 4739. 4746. 5762. That the resources of the State, as regards Imperial purposes, would be crippled, by having a large body of its troops placed solely under the control of the Government of India.

4759. App. 67. p. 143. 5686. That the very fact of the Local troops not being enabled to share in the battle fields of Europe, is a great disadvantage to them, and may lead to a feeling of inferiority on their part, which would be extremely prejudicial to their general discipline; and that, while the Crown ought to possess the advantage of giving to its Army the most extended sphere of action, the very nature of a double army would, in a great measure, deprive the Line Army of the valuable experience it would acquire in India, whilst the Local Army would, in like manner, be debarred from all the benefits of field service in Europe.

4670.

4700. That no Government, under any circumstances, would ever venture to withdraw from India the troops necessary for its defence. The question as to the force to be maintained in that Country, must be always decided by the Home Government, responsible to the Sovereign, and to the Country, through Parliament.

That regulations could be drawn up, for retaining in India officers of the Line Army, whose services might be required by the Local Government; and that officers of the Line would, undoubtedly, qualify themselves for employment in India, if such employment, and all the advantages attending it, were open to them; and so far from the resources of the Governor-General being curtailed by such an arrangement, it would, on the contrary, afford him a much larger field for the selection of able and useful officers. 6892. 3998. 4253. 4002.

That in a financial point of view, Line Regiments ought not to be, and with due regulations, as regards transport and organization, would not be, more expensive than Local corps; but, even if they should be to some extent more costly, greater vigour would exist in their ranks, and the wisest economy consists in having the best organized body of troops the State can supply. This is more particularly the case in a vast Empire such as that of India, in which the European Army must ever play so conspicuous a part; and where, consequently, whatever tends to the greater efficiency of that Army, must at the same time add to our power, and secure most effectually the safety of Your Majesty's Indian Possessions. 5983. App. 51, 52, 57, p. 44.

That the Local Army of India, as now constituted, is more expensive than the Line in its non-effective charges. 6014. 4993. App. 1. p. 4.

That a double system of recruiting, the natural result of a double army, would operate most injuriously on recruiting in general; and that it would be next to impossible to carry it on satisfactorily, or with good results, if worked by two distinct authorities. 3881. 4299. 6632.

That England cannot raise, and maintain permanently, very large armies by voluntary enlistment; and therefore the best troops must be supplied, at even an increased cost, if necessary, in order to compensate by their efficiency and vigour for their numerical inferiority.

Should it, however, be ultimately decided, contrary to the strong and sincere conviction of the Majority of your Majesty's Commissioners, that, with a view of leaving undisturbed present vested interests, a Local European Force is to be maintained for service in India, they recommend that the amount of such force should be limited to that now authorized by Parliament to be raised and maintained out of the revenues of India. It is admitted, even by the witnesses in favour of a double army, that the Local Force is greatly benefitted by the example set to it by the Troops of the Line; and that it is most *important*, and, indeed, absolutely necessary, to retain a proportion of Line Regiments in India. *To diminish* the relative proportion of Line Regiments to Local corps, would render the Line *auxiliaries* to the latter,—a fatal error, which must, inevitably, tend to lower the position of the Line,—*by* rendering it numerically, and, consequently, morally, inferior to the Local or larger force. 31st clause of 16 & 17 Vict. cap. 95. App. 61. p. 90. App. 65. p. 125. 3781. 4067. 4549. 4552.

These views of the Majority are supported by the valuable opinions of the following civil servants, and officers of the Army, all of whom have great Indian experience:—Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, and late Governor of Madras; Sir George Clerk, Under Secretary of State for India; Sir Charles Trevelyan, appointed Governor of Madras; Sir Archdale Wilson, 39 years in India; Sir Edward Lugard, 26 years; in India; Major-General Pratt, 25 years; Sir Willoughby Cotton, 16 years; Sir Sydney Cotton, 30 years; Sir Thomas Franks, 15 years; Sir A. Tulloch, and others.

The Minority take an entirely different view of the question at issue. They entertain a strong conviction, that the maintenance of a powerful Local Army, European as well as Native, is essential to the efficiency and permanence of British rule in India. They fear that to replace a large body of officers, accustomed to the habits, and acquainted with the language, of the country in which they serve, by others, doubtless of equal ability, but who, during their comparatively brief residence in the East, would have neither time, nor possibly inclination, to qualify themselves in the same manner for administrative duty, would seriously impair the power and curtail the resources of the Governor-General, and Governors of the several Presidencies. They regard the anomaly, which has been referred to, of maintaining two separate armies under one Sovereign, to be necessarily incident to the connexion (in itself one of the greatest of anomalies) of England with her Indian Empire. They consider that late events have proved the benefit of having distinct armies for Bengal, Madras, and Bombay; and that to dissever the Native, from the Local European, forces, by the fusion of the latter with the Line Army, would be to deteriorate the position, and destroy the *esprit de corps* of officers, serving with Native troops, who would feel themselves reduced to a level below that of their brother Officers of the Line. 6107. 6169. 4074. 4164. 5236. 5180. 5253. 6065.

The Minority, bearing in mind the limited amount, and inelastic nature, of the revenues of India, the present financial difficulties of its government, and the great additional burthen, which they conceive the system advocated by the Majority must impose, object earnestly, on economical and financial grounds, to an arrangement, which, in their opinion, would practically diminish the control of Her Majesty's Secretary of State, and of the Government of India, over the application of its revenues. The Minority do not admit the validity of the unqualified objections raised to double recruiting, neither do they concur in the opinions expressed, as to the alleged deterioration of Local European troops, subjected to like discipline and organization with the Line, or the crippling of the available resources of the State, by the existence of a Local European Force in India. They consider such a Force to be a wholesome check on the precipitate withdrawal of European troops from India, in cases where the Home Government might happen to find itself under the pressure of political emergencies in Europe; and they feel confident that the transfer of the Indian Armies to the Crown will prove a source of present and future security to Her Majesty's Empire in India, in proportion as radical and organic changes are few, and the weight and stability of the Local Armies are maintained by largely, but economically, increasing their European element.

6065. 6121. 3801. 5120. 4106. 5157. 3800. 3812. 3783. 4126. 4067. 5126. 5722.

The Minority will not add to the length of this Report, by entering into any further discussion of the opinions of their Colleagues, as embodied in previous paragraphs, neither do they deem it necessary to set forth any more detailed exposition of their own views on the subject, or to recapitulate any of the powerful and, to them, most convincing arguments, by which the expediency (not to say necessity) of maintaining a purely Local European, as well as Native force, for the protection of our Indian possessions, has been manifested and upheld in the evidence adduced before Your Majesty's Commissioners. In support, however, of the views, which the Minority take of this question, they would wish to call special attention to the evidence (vivâ voce or written) of the Governor-General of India, of the Earl of Ellenborough, of the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief of Madras, of the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, the Military Secretary to the Government of India, Sir John Lawrence, and the Punjab Commissioners, Sir James Outram, Sir R. H. Vivian, Sir Frederick Abbott, the Adjutant-General of the Bengal Army, Colonels Holland and Durand, J. P. Willoughby Esquire, and others, as containing irrefragable arguments, and powerful reasons, for maintaining the policy, which they advocate. There are, it is true, some able men who espouse the opposite side of the question; but it will scarcely fail to be remarked, that, with two or three exceptions, they are of much more limited Indian experience than those, who concur in the views of the Minority of the Commission, and comprise only three officers, Sir George Clerk, Sir A. Wilson, and Sir Charles Trevelyan, of the late East India Company's service, the remainder, with the single exception of the Governor of Bombay, being all officers of Her Majesty's Army of the Line. It may be added, that the Minority of Your Majesty's Commissioners are quite agreed, that a portion of the European force to be maintained in India hereafter, should be supplied from the Army of the Line, to the extent, perhaps, of one fourth, or even one third, of the whole.

3866. 5119.

On the fifth question, "The best means of providing for the periodical relief of the "former portion, and securing the efficiency of the latter," Your Majesty's Commissioners observe, that if it be determined, that the European Force be partly of the Line and partly Local, the periodical relief of the former portion may be effected, as has hitherto been done; but, they strongly recommend, that the tour of service in India should not exceed twelve years. The efficiency of the latter may be secured by the establishment of depôt battalions, composed of the officers of one company from each regiment, having a double proportion of non-commissioned officers attached, to which, all newly appointed officers, and all recruits should be sent, and thoroughly instructed in their duties, previous to proceeding to India; the depôt battalions to be disciplined under the orders of the General Commanding-in-Chief, and to be considered available for service within the United Kingdom, in cases of emergency.

3973. 4316. 4221. 4522. 6043. 4989. 5589. 4060. 6583. 6638.

The establishment of a convalescent station at the Cape of Good Hope, for the invalids belonging to European regiments serving in India, is worthy of consideration.

4053. 4776.

With reference to the sixth question, "Whether it be possible to consolidate the "European Forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the "other; and what regulations would be necessary and practicable, to effect this object, "with perfect justice to the claims of all officers, now in the service of the East India "Company," Your Majesty's Commissioners are of opinion, that, although there are many difficulties in so amalgamating the Local European Forces, with those of the Line,

6892.

such an arrangement would be advantageous, if it could be effected without prejudice to existing rights. 5112, p. 215.

There is no obstacle to at once allowing the officers of the junior ranks, (second lieutenants, cornets, and ensigns,) to exchange from one branch of the service to the other; but there is a great difficulty in the higher ranks, arising from the seniority system of promotion, which exists in the armies of India. If no other interests were concerned than those of the two officers who proposed to exchange, the question might be settled between them, but it is obvious, that in a seniority service, the interest of every individual, junior to the exchanging officer, must be affected for better or for worse, by every exchange that took place, unless (which is next to impossible) the ages, or rather the value of the lives of the two parties, could be ascertained, and proved to be exactly the same. Much difficulty would also arise, from the complicated nature of the arrangements, under which officers and their families hold beneficial interests in the funds maintained by themselves, and aided by the Local Government of India. 4941. 5378. 5602. 5609. App. 79. p. 246.

Your Commissioners see no means of removing this difficulty, except by the Government taking upon itself the management of the funds, and guaranteeing all their liabilities, past, present, and future. 5381. 6892.

Officers hereafter entering the Service may do so under such regulations, as Your Majesty may prescribe, as already stated; but if the Government should not take on itself all the liabilities and engagements of the funds, it will be necessary to continue the present system, of requiring all officers to subscribe to them, from their first entering the Army, or the insolvency of these admirable institutions, and their consequent inability to keep faith with their present and future annuitants (widows and orphans), must be the eventual and inevitable result. 3952.

On the seventh question suggested for inquiry in Your Majesty's Warrant, viz., "Whether there should be any admixture of European and Native Forces, either regi- "mentally or by brigade," the preponderance of evidence is, that any admixture of the two forces, regimentally, would be detrimental to the efficiency and discipline of both, but that the admixture, by brigade, would be most advantageous. 489. 527. 431. 1708. 614. 2404. 3207.

Your Commissioners concur in this opinion.

On the eighth point, "Whether the Local European Force should be kept up by drafts "and *volunteers* from the Line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in "Great Britain," Your Majesty's Commissioners are of opinion, that the European Force, if Local, may be partially kept *up by* volunteers from regiments of the Line returning to England; and that the recruiting in *England*, should be carried on under the same authority, and regulations, as for regiments of the Line, *officers of the* Local Force being employed on that service. 3937. 4060. 4874.

As regards the ninth question, Your Commissioners consider that it would not be advisable to raise any regiments in the Colonies, composed of men of colour, either for temporary or permanent service in India. App. 55. p. 59. App. 70. p. 148. 1346.

With regard to the tenth point, "Whether the Native Force should be regular or "irregular, or both, and if so, in what proportions," Your Commissioners are of opinion, that the irregular system is the best adapted for Native Cavalry in India, and recommend that it be adopted. 725. 1634. 1765. 1960. 2302.

That the number of European officers, attached to an Irregular Cavalry regiment should be—

One commandant,

One adjutant,

One European officer per squadron, and a medical officer.

Your Commissioners also recommend, that the pay of the Irregular Cavalry be increased to such an extent, as will enable them to purchase and maintain horses and arms of a superior description, rendering them in every respect more efficient. 738. 1187. 1627. 1291.

In the Regular Cavalry at Madras and Bombay Your Commissioners would, for the present, make no change, but recommend, that the existing interests, both of the Native officers and men, be most carefully respected; and if hereafter, the irregular system should be extended to those Presidencies, Your Commissioners suggest, that the change should be introduced gradually, and with caution. App. 55. p. 55. App. 60. p. 74.

469. 649. 962. 2300. 1944. 3208.

That the Native Infantry be mainly regular, but that such number of regiments be maintained and organized on the irregular system, as the Governor-General and the Governors of the Presidencies may respectively recommend for the sanction of Her Majesty's Government.

The number and organization of irregular regiments, being thus left to the discretion of the Local Authorities, Your Commissioners are unable to fix a proportion between them, and the regular Native Infantry, but are of opinion, that the regular regiments should preponderate.

On the eleventh point, "Whether any Native Artillery corps should be sanctioned," Your Commissioners would refer to the opinion already expressed in reply to the 3d Question.

Your Commissioners, however, submit, that every consideration should be given to those corps of Native Artillery, which have proved their loyalty during the late events in India.

Your Commissioners are of opinion, with regard to the twelfth point, "Whether "cadets, sent out for service with Native troops, should in the first instance be "attached to European regiments, to secure uniformity of drill and discipline," that such officers, should be thoroughly drilled, and instructed in their military duties in this country, as recommended in the reply to Question 5, before they are sent out to India.

Your Commissioners, having disposed of the questions specially referred for their inquiry, beg to submit the following recommendations on certain important points, which in the course of examination of evidence have come under their notice.

352. 1193. 501. 2132.

1. That the Native Army should be composed of different nationalities and castes, and as a general rule, mixed promiscuously through each regiment.

772. 2341. 1622. 2474.

2. That all men of the regular Native Army, in Your Majesty's Eastern possessions, should be enlisted for general service.

App. 60. p. 127. 2415. 2354. 3209.

3. That a modification should be made in the uniform of the Native troops, assimilating it more to the dress of the country, and making it more suitable to the climate.

357. 2841. 3145. 2714. 1936.

4. That Europeans should, as far as possible, be employed in the scientific branches of the service, but that Corps of pioneers be formed, for the purpose of relieving the European Sappers from those duties which entail exposure to the climate.

250. 789. 994. 2056. 1252.

5. That the Articles of War, which govern the Native Army, be revised, and that the power of commanding officers be increased.

2378. 416. 3051. 514. 3089. 5501. 7050.

6. That the promotion of Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, be regulated on the principle of efficiency, rather than of seniority, and that commanding officers of regiments have the same power to promote non-commissioned officers, as is vested in officers commanding regiments of the Line.

2344. 2355. 3200.

7. That, whereas the pay and allowances of fficers and men are now issued under various heads, the attention of Her Majesty's Government be drawn to the expediency of simplifying the pay codes, and of adopting, if practicable, fixed scales of allowances for the troops in garrison or cantonments, and in the field.

4907. 6673. 6897. 6925.

8. That the Commander-in-Chief in Bengal be styled the Commander-in-Chief in India, and that the General Officers commanding the armies of the minor Presidencies be Commanders of the Forces, with the power and advantages which they have hitherto enjoyed.

1092. 1053. 1604.

9. Your Commissioners observe, that the efficiency of the Indian Army, has hitherto been injuriously affected by the small number of officers, usually doing duty with the regiments, to which they belong.

2196. App. 65. p. 137.

This evil has arisen from the number withdrawn for staff and other duties, and civil employment.

App. 69. p. 165. 714. 1399. 2335.

All the evidence before Your Commissioners points out the necessity of improving the position of officers, serving regimentally. For the attainment of this object, and for the remedy of the evil complained of, various schemes have been suggested, viz.:—

2336. 4715. App. 65. p. 142. 5890. 2918. App. 60. p. 75. 3100. 6894.

1st. The formation of a Staff Corps:

2dly. The system of "seconding" officers who are on detached employ, which exists to a certain extent in the Line army:

3dly. Placing the European officers of each Presidency on general lists for promotion.

Your Commissioners, not being prepared to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion on this point, without further reference to India, recommend that the subject be submitted without delay, for the report of the Governors and Commanders-in-Chief at the several Presidencies, with a view to the framing of regulations, which will ensure the greater efficiency of regiments.

Previous to closing their Report, Your Majesty's Commissioners would respectfully beg to state, that they have felt themselves precluded from entering into minute details, on many subjects referred to them for inquiry, from an apprehension of fettering the free action of the authorities in India, on points of a purely local nature, which, they conceive, must ultimately be decided in that country.

J. PEEL.
GEORGE.
STANLEY.
TWEEDDALE.
MELVILLE.
H. G. SMITH.
G. A. WETHERALL.
P. MONTGOMERIE.
WILL. BURLTON.
THOS. F. TAIT.

R. B. WOOD, Secretary,
Office for Military Boards, 7th March 1859.

I have signed this Report as a matter of duty, and, speaking generally, concur in its recommendations.

There are two points, however, on which I am at issue with my colleagues, and I desire therefore to state *in this* form, that I still adhere to the opinions which I recorded in my Minutes of the 11th of *October* and 30th of December last, as to the proportion which European should bear to Native Troops *in India*, and that I look with much apprehension to the number of the latter which is contemplated, or may be considered as sanctioned by the terms of the fifth paragraph of the Report.

I am also of opinion that the proposed measure of requiring all men of the regular Native Army, without exception, to be enlisted for "general service" (including embarkation on board ship), is one not only of very doubtful expediency, but, in the case of the Bengal Presidency especially, highly calculated to produce serious detriment and difficulties, with comparatively small advantages to the public service.

The arguments by which I support these views will be found in No. 79, p. 245, of the Appendix, and I abstain, therefore, from any recapitulation of them here.

WILL. BURLTON.

KEY TO THE EVIDENCE.

Witness.	Evidence extends from Question.	Question.
Lieut.-General Sir Geo. Pollock	1 to	315
Major-General Low	316 to	438
Colonel Welchman	439 to	528
Lieut.-Colonel Wyllie	529 to	615
Colonel Becher	616 to	854
Major Sir David Baird	855 to	941
Captain G. F. S. Browne	942 to	1122
Sir George Clerk	1123 to	1353 and 4670 to 4805
Lieut.-Colonel Harington	1354 to	1543
Major Merewether	1544 to	1724
Lieut.-Colonel Master	1725 to	1857
Colonel Felix	1858 to	2093
Major-General Sir S. Steel	2094 to	2258
Major-General Alexander	2259 to	2424
Mr. J. F. Thomas	2424 to	2572
Lieut.-Col. A. T. Wilde	2573 to	2679
Colonel Leslie	2680 to	2748 and 6318 to 6395
Colonel John Hill	2749 to	2830
Colonel John Sinclair	2831 to	2959
Colonel M. Willoughby	2960 to	3051
Sir Charles Trevelyan	3052 to	3210
Colonel S. Poole	3211 to	3361
Major-General Griffith	3362 to	3428
Major-General Ashburnham	3429 to	3557
Major-General Capon	3558 to	3679
Colonel E. Wintle	3680 to	3778
Major-General Sir R. Vivian	3779 to	3962
Major-General Sir E. Lugard	3963 to	4064
Colonel Jas. Holland	4065 to	4210
Major-General Sir Thos. Franks	4211 to	4301
Surgeon-General Chas. Renny	4302 to	4377
Surgeon J. R. Martin	4378 to	4516
Colonel Sir A. Tulloch	4517 to	4582 and 5983 to 6059
General Sir W. Cotton	4583 to	4669
Colonel G. Campbell	4806 to	4874
Major-General Pratt	4875 to	5013
Major Balcarres Ramsay	5014 to	5104
Colonel H. M. Durand	5105 to	5545 and 6995 to 7068
Major-General Sir A. Wilson	5546 to	5714
Major-General Sir F. Abbott	5715 to	5919
Physician-General McLennan	5920 to	5982
Mr. J. P. Willoughby	6060 to	6317
Mr. Chas. Raikes	6396 to	6496
Earl of Ellenborough	6497 to	6693
Major-General Sir C. Yorke	6694 to	6726
Mr. E. F. Elliott	6728 to	6890
Colonel R. B. Wood	6891 to	6994

ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE.

POLLOCK, Lieutenant-General Sir GEORGE, G.C.B.

Is Lieut.-Gen. in the Indian army, 1.—Has been in the service since 1803, 2.—Belongs to the artillery, but has had commands embracing all arms of the service, 5.—The proportion of European to native troops in India to be permanently maintained hereafter should be as 1 to 4, 11-14.—A great deal, however, would depend on the efficiency of the police, 14.—The above proportion is exclusive of the contingents, 15.—Artillery should be entirely European; some few lascars might be allowed for each battery, to clean the guns; but they should not have anything to do with the loading of the guns, 20.—There might be, perhaps, 15 to a battery, 30.—Would not recommend a police force in substitution entirely of native troops, 32.—There might be 50,000 sepoys, 32, 33, 34.—Sepoys have hitherto performed duties which ought to have been done by the police, 38.—Would transfer all civil duties to the police, 40.—Would have in Bengal 14 or 15 regiments of European infantry of 1,000 strong each, 46.—About 8 or 10 regiments of European cavalry, 63.—The proportion of 1 to 4 refers only to infantry and cavalry; the artillery should be additional, 71, 72.—2 brigades of horse artillery and 12 battalions of foot, 88.—All artillery should be European, 103, 104.—There should be 2 guns for every 1,000 men, that is, 120 guns for an army of 60,000 men, 97, 98.—Native force in Bengal should be on both the regular and irregular system, 109.—Is not prepared to say in what proportion, 114.—The irregular cavalry not as efficient for service as the regular; in a charge the irregulars would fail, 112.—Native gentlemen more likely to serve in the irregular, 115.—An irregular trooper has 25 or 30 rupees a month, and he finds his horse, arms, and everything, 116, 128.—Some corps have a fund from which, if he loses his horse, another is found him; a sort of tontine, 117, 118.—Would extend the irregular system to the infantry, 120.—Irregulars are more easily fed, and travel more easily, than a regular regiment, 122.—They feed themselves, but beyond our own provinces they draw rations from the commissariat, 126, 136.—Irregular cavalry are as efficient in the field for certain duties as the regular: not so as respects a general action, 137, 138.—Sappers and miners should almost all be Europeans; a few natives must, however, be allowed, 142.—Europeans would suffer greatly if not assisted by natives, 143.—Europeans should be in all arsenals assisted by natives; but the latter should not have anything to do with the ammunition, or the preparation of percussion caps, 147.—This work has been hitherto done by natives, 148.—Bengal native army should be of different castes. If men could be got from the Cape or elsewhere, it would be desirable, 150.—Men of the West India regiments might be mixed up with the others; could not exchange them, 152.—Indians could not be induced to go to other colonies, 153.—Some low-caste men are as brave as high-caste men. Half-castes might be introduced into the ranks with advantage, 158.—A great many of the drummers in regiments are half-castes, 159.—Sees no objection to the formation of regiments composed partly of natives, partly of Europeans, 161.—Would have the two flank companies Europeans, and the rest natives, in the proportion of 1 to 4; considers the experiment worth the trial, 162.—Does not consider that the Europeans would deteriorate if divided into such small bodies. They can always be assembled, as was done in 1809-10, when the light companies of different regiments were united at Cawnpore, 163, 164.—Native companies of a regiment so composed should have the same proportion of European officers as the European companies, 167.—Europeans should have the best arm that is made, a rifle. The natives should have a somewhat inferior weapon, 168.—Separate ammunition might be kept for the Europeans and the natives, 170.—Being mixed up in the same regiment with natives would not be distasteful to the European; it is so now in the artillery. With European officers to lead them, natives will go anywhere, 176.—Natives should be enlisted for general service, to do anything, 180.—Would enlist every one for "general service," irregulars also, 181, 182.—Objections of natives to going to sea, how they arise, 185.—Thinks the Bengal code sufficient for all purposes of discipline. Going to sea and working in the trenches might however be entered in Articles of War, and made part of the duties, 196.—Would not recognize caste, but would not do anything to offend it, 200.—Bengal sepoys always expect leave of absence each year. They would consider themselves much injured if they did not get it, 216.—In time of war they have never complained at being deprived of this leave, 217.—A portion of their pay is always deducted during such leave, 218.—Feasts and holidays need not be interfered with, 221.—They could not be prevented without occasioning discontent, 223.—Commanding officers respect the feelings of their men in all matters not opposed to their duty, 227.—Sees no advantage to be derived from a division of the Bengal army, 233.—There has been an advantage in having the separate armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, 235.—The grade of native commissioned officer should be continued, although, perhaps, the number of such officers might be reduced. With regard to their promotion, seniority should have the preference if the man is capable of doing the duty. Selection leaves too much power to commanding officers, and it might be abused, 240.—Seniority should be the rule and selection the exception, 241.—Many in Bengal are now unfit for their position; they are of a very advanced age, 247.—Commanding officers should have more power to punish and reward. A commanding officer in the present state of things does not command his regiment, 250.—It has not always been so. When he commanded a regiment it was not so, 253.—Present system emanated from a circular from the adjutant-general's office, 255, 256.—In irregular corps commanding officers have more power, and in this respect the system is better, 258, 259.—As respects admixture of Europeans and natives, would prefer it should be by brigades; but sees no objection to their being joined in regiments, 263.—Believes a commanding officer cannot make a havildar without reference to Government, 264.—Stringency of the rule depends on the commander-in-chief, 265, 266.—Would not mix civil with military punishment for offences, 269.—A man sentenced to hard labour on the roads never rejoins his regiment, 271, 272.—Corporal punishment was done away with by Lord William Bentinck, but restored by Lord Hardinge. It still exists, 273, 274.—It is a national punishment, 276.—Present establishment of European officers for a regular native regiment is sufficient if they are kept complete, 281.—All the captains should be with their regiments. They are the very essence of regiments, 282.—Each company should have a captain not to be taken away for other duties, 283.—Young men now joining a regiment learn the language in order to be removed to staff; they have not the interest of their regiment at heart, 287.—Officers should undergo examination as to their military acquirements before they are appointed to staff situations, 289-293.—Has known captains commanding regiments frequently, with six or eight officers with them, 295, 296.—It would be desirable to have a staff corps, but does not quite understand how such a corps is to be formed, 297.—Each regular native infantry regiment should have a lieutenant-colonel, a major, a captain to each company, with a lieutenant and an ensign, 298.—The same establishment as a European regiment, 299.—Present system has, perhaps, a tendency to produce most intelligent officers, 301.—In time of war officers do join their regiments, 302.—There is seldom a major with a regiment when there is a lieutenant-colonel, 310.—Sees no good reason for the transfer of majors from regiments, as well as lieutenant-colonels; it would interfere with promotion, 311.

Low, Major-General, C.B.

Has been in the service 53 years, 317.—About 40 of that period in India, 318.—Belongs to the Madras presidency, but has served principally in Bengal, 319.—Would like to see 1 European to every 2 natives in the regular army, 322, 325.—There should be no native artillery. Natives should never load a gun, 323.—They might be employed as gun lascars, 324.—Would have irregular infantry regiments, with a few selected officers, 327.—For some time to come 45,000 European troops are necessary for Bengal, 328.—When the country is settled a reduction might be made, 329.—This should be done by reducing the strength of regiments rather than their number, 329.—A regiment 800 strong has as much moral effect in peace as a regiment 1,000 strong, 329.—45,000 Europeans and 90,000 natives will be sufficient for Bengal hereafter, 330.—This to

include irregulars, but not police, 331, 332.—One-twelfth should be artillery; 50 or 60 men in every European regiment should be instructed to work field guns, 333.—All the artillery to be European, 334.—Thinks two guns to every 1,000 Europeans more than necessary, 336.—Excepting the corps that have continued faithful, the native force should be irregular. In a native regiment much more depends on the qualities of the officers than on their number, 338.—Sees a difficulty, if the regular native corps are abolished, in providing well-qualified officers for the irregular corps, but it must be got over, 341.—Would transfer Queen's officers, subject to an examination. It is now done, 343, 344.—Native gentlemen would take service in the irregular infantry, 347.—On political grounds, would not exclude any tribe or race. Would mix all up as much as possible, 352.—Would acknowledge caste in a due proportion, 354.—Sappers and miners could not all be Europeans, but the natives should not be taught the scientific branches, 357.—Has the same view with respect to their employment in arsenals, 359.—The Bengal native army should be composed of different nationalities and castes, but no rule can be laid down, 360.—Companies of different tribes are to be preferred, 362, 363.—Present code of enlistment must be altered, 366.—There should be minor punishments as well as punishments by court-martial, 367.—Would not object to the rattan, which is a summary punishment, 368.—Present code is not attended to, 371–373.—Native troops should be required to serve beyond sea. This not the cause of the recent revolt, 377.—Power of commanding officers has been too much curtailed of late years, both for reward and punishment, 379, 380.—System of punchayet should be continued, 394.—System described, 395–403.—Irregular troops are amenable to articles of war, 404.—Thinks the Bengal army should not be divided, 405.—Division of the other armies has been beneficial, 408.—In course of time the Bengal army might be divided, but not now, 413.—Merit and fitness should be more consulted in the promotion of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, 416.—They are now too old before they are promoted, 418.—Would not altogether put aside seniority, 419.—Has served in all three presidencies, 428.—In Bombay younger men are promoted, 430.—European and native forces should be mixed by brigade rather than regimentally, 431.—Would not attach Europeans to natives in small bodies, 433.—Would arm the natives well, but not give them the Enfield musket, 434.—Present number of native officers in regiments is unnecessarily large, 438.

Welchman, Colonel John, C.B.

Commands 1st Bengal European Fusileers, 440.—Has been thirty-eight years in the service, 442.—European proportion of force should not be less than one-third, 445.—No native artillery should be allowed, 446.—The artillery should be independent of this proportion, 447.—One-third of the infantry and cavalry should be Europeans, 448.—The scientific branches should be kept distinct, 449.—Would take away artillery from all contingent forces, 450.—And not allow native princes any artillery at all, 452.—Strength of native army depends much on the police to be employed, 454, 455.—It is a question whether the troops could not be paid by native bankers, and thus relieve the troops from escort duty, 454.—No such thing as a bank note in Upper India. The relief from escort of treasure is most material, 456.—Would not take the police into consideration in fixing the proportion of Europeans to natives, 457, 458.—If India were disarmed, as it ought to be, the strength of the army might not be so considerable, 459.—The police should not have a musket, merely a tulwar. It should be more civil than at present, 460, 461, 462, 463.—Has no idea of amount of police required, 464.—Would not have them in battalions, 465.—Future strength of the army will depend on the disarming of the natives and introduction of railways, 468.—Prefers, for economy, an irregular native army, but the regular army cannot be entirely dispensed with, on account of the regular regiments supplying officers for the irregulars, 469.—Would not extend such selection to officers of Queen's army, 471.—Sees no objection to the selection as regards the interests of the country generally, if fully qualified; but sees objections otherwise, 472.—Would increase the proportion of officers allowed to irregular corps, 473.—Has commanded a local regiment, a regular native regiment, and a European regiment, 475.—The native officer at the present time is an incumbrance to the army, in both regular and irregular infantry. They never reach that rank till superannuated, 477, 478, 479.—In the irregular cavalry they are not so generally promoted by seniority. Promotions in regiments should only be to ranks of naiks and havildars. If there are to be native officers, they should be native gentlemen not belonging to a regiment. These should be army promotions, 481.—If there are not to be native officers, would place European non-commissioned officers at the head of companies, 482.—This could not be done in irregular regiments, 483.—Would have two European non-commissioned officers to each company in native regiments, 484, 485.—There are now only two to a regiment, 486.—Their employment would check intrigue and conspiracy, 487.—From being much more with the men than the European officers, they might, perhaps, have prevented the late combination, 488.—The European non-commissioned officers would not live with the men, but they would tend to maintain discipline, and the natives in a short time would look up to them, 489.—European soldiers now learn the languages to get employment with native corps, 490.—If a non-commissioned staff officer misconducts himself, he is sent back to his regiment, 491.—The moment a soldier is selected for service on the staff of a native corps he is struck off the regiment to which he belongs. If native gentlemen could be induced to enter the service, they would have more power over the men, 492.—If they had such officers there would be less danger of mutiny, as they have an interest in the country, 493.—A certain portion of native sappers will be necessary, but not for employment in the scientific branches, 494, 495.—The system of teaching native soldiers gunnery is very mischievous. Every sepoy regiment, in consequence, furnished some really good gunners, 497.—Strongly objects to the mixture of Europeans and natives, even by companies, 498.—A mixture of caste as much as can possibly be effected is very desirable, 499.—Such mixture should be general. Nationalities should not be preserved in companies, 501.—Present code of enlistment is sufficient. Every sepoy is now enlisted for general service, 504, 509.—Standing orders of the army are not acted up to. The recommendations of commanding officers are not attended to, 505–507.—Their authority was first undermined by Lord William Bentinck, 508.—Though the power of flogging exists under the articles of war, it cannot be inflicted except in particular cases. A confidential circular on this subject was sent to every commanding officer in 1852, 510–512.—Standing orders, though good, are not acted up to. In promotions of native commissioned officers in nine cases out of ten the commanding officer's recommendations are neglected. Promotion by seniority the bane of the army, 514–516.—In the non-commissioned ranks it does rest with the commanding officer, 517.—Never permitted the practice called "weekly guards." If allowed, it must be the fault of commanding officers, 518, 519.—It is not the fault of the men; they perform their duty well, 522.—Division of the Bengal army would be advantageous, 523.—Commanding officers should have more power of reward and punishment, 525.—The circular referred to was issued by Governor-General, 526.—Mixture of Europeans and natives should be in battalions. Discipline would suffer by any other plan, 527.

Wyllie, Lieutenant-Colonel.

Is lieutenant-colonel on the retired list of the Bengal army, 529.—Was 27 years in the service, of which 25 years were spent in India, 530, 531.—Has held several staff appointments, and for the last seven years and a half was in the military secretariat of the Government of India, 532.—Thinks 40,000 European troops, and not much more than an equal proportion of native, exclusive of the police, will hereafter be sufficient for Bengal, 534.—Would have 30,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 5,000 artillery, as respects Europeans; and 60,000 regular and irregular native infantry. Would have some native cavalry, probably 10,000 regular and irregular, 542, 543.—Doubts whether the whole artillery could be European. There are the contingents, 544.—We should not have less than 6,000 artillery, 546.—Means gunners, or actual fighting men, 548.—In Central India the native artillery of the contingents has often been called out for field service in the hot season, 553.—It would be an advantage to have this artillery European, 555.—Would have regular and irregular troops combined, 556.—Would not have less than 200 European sappers, 557.—Would not teach the natives the scientific branches of engineering; but doubts if Europeans could entirely perform the duties, 559.—Not even the scientific duties, 560.—The greater number of castes in each regiment the better, 562.—Would disperse nationalities throughout regiments as respects natives; would not mix Europeans with natives, 563.—Would take Africans, Malays, and even East Indians, 564.—The greater variety of nationalities and castes the better, 567.—They should be dis-

persed throughout regiments, 568.—Practically men of low caste are not enlisted. Preference is given to high-caste men, 572.—This is not by order, but by practice, 573.—Considers the Mussulman sepoy a better soldier than the Hindoo, but sees little superiority as regards the Hindoos over each other, 575.—Never knew caste brought forward as a plea for the nonperformance of duty, 578. —Sees no advantage in the division of the Bengal army, 583.—Native troops should not be kept too near their homes, 584.—As respects reliefs, the usual practice is not to keep a native regiment more than three years at the same station, but it has been impracticable to carry this out of late, 585.—When adjutant, would not enlist a very low-caste man, but now thinks he was mistaken, 591.—Rules as respects the promotion of non-commissioned and commissioned officers are good if they were carried out, but they are not carried out, 593.—Each company of a regular native regiment should have two European sergeants, 594. —Native officers under Bengal system useless, 595.—Increase of pay for length of service was given to prevent disappointment in being passed over in promotion, 597.—Commanding officers are afraid to exercise their authority, 598.—How this is occasioned. Commanding officers are afraid to pass over a man in promoting, 600.—Non-commissioned officers can be promoted by them according to the regulations, 602.—Sepoys have been permitted to petition the commander-in-chief direct, 608.—Such petitions are sent to the commanding officer for explanation, 611.—Would not allow admixture of Europeans and natives in regiments, but by brigades, 614, 615.

BECHER, Colonel, C.B.

Is captain and brevet-colonel in Bengal army, 616.—Been nearly 25 years in the service, 618.—Belongs to the infantry, but has been on the staff, 621.—Is quarter-master-general of the Bengal army, 622.—European force should be as one to three, 625.—Artillery should be European, 628.—Taking into account the artillery, the European force should be not less than one to three, 630.—A properly organised military police force will reduce the necessity of so large a native army, 643. —Everything is police just now, 644.—Native force of Bengal should be both regular and irregular. Infantry must be principally regular, 649, 650.—Prefers irregular cavalry, if not too large a force, 652.—Irregulars are not supplied with carriage and other requirements like regular troops, but they have rations in cases of necessity, 655,656. —Require the same arrangements for their food on foreign service as the regulars, 663.—Native officers of the irregular cavalry are of great service, 669.—They are men of rank, money, and means, 670.—They represent the gentry of the country, 672.—They bring men with them to the corps, 673.—Some regiments have troops of separate countries, Affghans, for instance, 674.—It is better they should be mixed up altogether, 676.—Promotion in regular native army is made by seniority, 677.—Native officers, too old, 678.—Still their removal altogether would have a very bad effect, 696.—European non-commissioned officers should not be attached to companies, 707.—No company should be without a European officer of experience, 708.—Lieutenants are quite equal to the charge, 709.—Present establishment of officers sufficient if too many not withdrawn for the staff, 711.—A staff corps should be formed, 713.—A European officer has sometimes charge of three or four companies, 716.—All cavalry should be on the irregular system, 721.—Would have no regular native cavalry, 722.—Regular native army was well disciplined as far as parade duties went, 729.—But they had not a loyal spirit, 731.—Horses in the regular cavalry cost Government 400 or 500 rupees, 735.—Irregular cavalry pay too low, 738.—Natives should be employed as sappers and miners, 739.—Copper caps are made entirely by Europeans, 744.—Would have a corps of pioneers as well as sappers and miners, 748.—Native army should be of mixed bodies, without reference to caste, 759.—They should be distributed promiscuously throughout the regiments, 760.—No caste should be excluded but Brahmins, 761.—Caste on service has never seriously interfered with the performance of duty, 763.—Six regiments only are "general service" corps, 765.—If foreign service is required, volunteers must be invited, 766. —Every native soldier should be required to enter for unrestricted service, 772.—Regular and irregular, 773.—A great evil is, that men cannot be pensioned unless on report of a medical committee of unfitness, 778.—Would not divide the Bengal army, 779.—The separate armies should be maintained, 780.—Commander-in-chief should be allowed to establish his head-quarters where most desirable, 788.—Commanding officer should have more power to reward and punish, 789.—Of irregular corps, have more power, 792.—By the articles of war the commanding officers of both have the same power, 795—But in an irregular regiment matters are settled in the regiment, 796.—Three articles of war are in force in India, 801.—The articles of war for the native troops have been lately revised, 802.—They are not revised annually, 803. —A sepoy can appeal against his commanding officer, 804.—If commanding officers had more power they would be more looked up to by their men, 807.—Privilege of appealing by soldiers too great, 809.—The appeal is not required to pass through the commanding officer, 810.—Military codes of the three presidencies are all different, 814. —Articles of war are the same, 815.—A large magazine is forming at Ferozepore, 818.—Mixture of Europeans with natives should be by distinct regiments, 821.—It would lower the European to have natives with him, 823.—Would not for many years give the most effective arms to natives, 824.—Percussion musket is as good a weapon as they require for Indian service, 829.—It would not do to meet a European foe, 831.—Native troops should be made to feel they are subordinate to Europeans, 836.—Africans might be introduced into the ranks, 838.—Malays might be advantageous, 841.—Colonial regiments might be brought; West Indian, for instance, 842, 843.—In Bengal and Bombay armies are now occasional cases of Africans, 845.—Would prefer having Africans and men of West Indian regiments as artillerymen to natives of India for some time to come, 850.—Ceylon rifles are Malays, 851.—Corporal punishment is inflicted in Bengal, though very rarely, 852.—Is not aware of any circular on the subject, 853.

BAIRD, Major Sir DAVID, Bart.

Is brevet-major and captain in 98th foot, 855.—Went out as aide-de-camp to Sir Colin Campbell, 856.—Would not have more than 2 natives to 1 European; would rather have them divided equally, 858.—Prospectively it might be 1 to 3 or 4, 859.—80,000 Europeans will be required in India altogether, 868.—50,000 in Bengal, 869.—Artillery should be all European, 871.—No natives should be allowed to serve the guns, 873.—Irregular cavalry of India are the best in the world, 875.—Native trooper is a better horseman and uses his sword better than a European, 881.—Has greater command of his horse, 882.—Their system is to scatter not charge, 895. —All artillery duties might be performed by Europeans, 903.—Punjab irregular corps are officered by Europeans, 920.—These officers suffered more than other regiments by exposing themselves more, 921.—Does not think the Bengal army should be divided, 922.—Thinks head-quarters should be fixed in Central India, 924.—Commanding officers have not sufficient power, 926.—General discipline of native troops was good, 931.

BROWNE, Captain G. F. S., 24th Madras Native Infantry

Has served in India above 15 years; six years in the North-west, 942, 943.—Has recently been serving at Agra, 944.—Hereafter one-fourth of the troops in Bengal should be European, the larger proportion being with the artillery and infantry, 945.—Would have no natives for artillery except as gun lascars, 946.—Half-castes serve uncommonly well, 947.—40,000 Europeans will hereafter do for Bengal, 948.—200,000 in all, European and native, including the police, 949.—Would arm the police with muskets, 952.—Native troops should have the percussion musket, with a rifle company in every regiment, 954.—To have the ordinary rifle, 955.—Native force should be both regular and irregular, 960.—But no regular native cavalry, 961.—Five European officers should be attached to irregular regiments, 963-669.—In Colonel Coke's regiment there are separate companies of different tribes, 971.—This answers well, 974.—No more European non-commissioned officers are required with native regiments. They do not get on well, 980.—Present class of native officers are entirely inefficient, 987.—On account of age, and to promotion by seniority, 988, 989. —Commanding officers should have more power, 994. —Native officers should be selected, 995.—And undergo an examination, 996.—Numbers of the elder ones cannot read or write, 998.—Queen's regulations are acted on at Madras as to mounting guard, 1000.—Such is not the case in Bengal, 1001.—Men there are allowed to take off accoutrements to eat. This is not allowed at Madras, 1002.—Was in Saugor in 1851, 1009.—Men of Seikh regiments are most efficient, 1010.—They bear us no goodwill, 1012.—Will hereafter be fully as dangerous as the Bengal sepoy, 1012.—Looks for safety of India to prohibition of importation of sulphur. It would deprive natives of the use of fire-arms, 1013.—Would not take railroads so much into account, a quarter of a mile could be dug up in a night, 1014.—Would enlist every man for general service. Men raised in

the north should serve in the south; and men raised in Oude in the Punjab. More than two regiments raised in the same locality should never be allowed in the same garrison, 1015.—Madras troops might do duty in Bengal, 1018.—Would make it a tour of foreign service, 1019.—A Bengal Brahmin will not eat food until he has bathed, but he will do it in Madras, 1022.—This is owing to discipline and custom, 1025.—State of the Bombay army is not sound, that of Madras is, 1026.—The mass of the men is from Southern India, about one-third Mahomedans, 1026, 1027.—Prefers the Hindoo to the Mahomedan, 1029.—Four-fifths of the men in the Madras cavalry are Mahomedans, 1030.—Madras troops are getting batta in the field now; when they cross the water they get extra batta, 1032.—On service in Bengal they get full batta, but not provisions, 1034, 1035.—Objects to enlistment of Malays, but not Africans, 1038.—Would not object to Hottentots, 1039.—Thinks their appearance in India would be beneficial, 1040.—Would not divide the Bengal army. Commander-in-chief should be in some central position, 1041.—No man should be made lance naik of above five years' standing, 1042.—Commanding officers should be allowed to promote to havildar, and should have power to degrade a non-commissioned officer, 1043.—At Bombay they promote very young men to be native officers, 1046.—Would introduce native gentry as officers into irregular corps, 1048.—Native officers are promoted too young at Bombay, 1050.—In Bengal men are 50 or 60 when promoted to jemadars, 1054.—They are 40 when made naiks, 1055.—Men cannot be discharged until declared unfit by a medical committee, 1056.—At twenty years they can receive a pension if unfit, not otherwise, 1059, 1060.—Flogging has not been re-introduced in the Bengal army. At Madras they flog frequently, 1063.—A circular on the subject was issued, 1062–1067.—There should be an efficient European officer in every company, 1068.—A number should always be present in addition, learning their duties, 1069.—There is no real reason why regular regiments should have more European officers than the irregular, 1072–1075.—There is only one field officer to regiments in Madras, 1076.—Senior captain mounts on parade, 1077.—Young lieutenants have held charge of three or four companies for months together, 1079.—Eight or ten have often been away on staff from the Bengal army, 1082.—Officers qualify to get away, 1085.—Would not limit the tenure of staff appointments, 1087.—Service suffers from officers returning to command corps after long absence, 1092.—Would have a staff corps, 1093.—An officer on the staff should have the option of rising in the staff corps or working his way up in his regiment, 1094.—Madras troops in the Straits used to get free rations, also Bengal troops, 1097, 1098.—All but military staff officers should be removed from their regiments and placed in a staff corps, 1103.—They should commence regimentally, and be afterwards appointed to the staff corps, 1104, 1105.—They should pass an examination previously to being promoted to staff corps, 1106.—Native infantry officers should undergo European drill in all arms of the service, 1108, 1109.—They should be attached to corps in India, not in England, 1110, 1111.—Cadets sent to European corps before posting to native corps are much better up in their drill than others, 1112.—A Madras regiment on foreign service is free from all incumbrance of families, 1116.—It is equipped as lightly as a regiment can be, 1117.—In the Bengal army it is the same in the general service regiments, 1119, 1120.—In these the men are enlisted for life, 1122.

Clerk, Sir George, K.C.B.

Has served in different parts of India, and been a good deal in camps. Was latterly Governor of Bombay, 1123.—Resided about twenty-seven years in India, 1124.—Taking the whole force, regular and irregular, would consider one European to four natives ample for Bengal, 1126.—This is exclusive of police, 1127.—The Punjab force must be separately considered, 1129.—A European sapper and miner corps would be a secure measure, but it would appear like weakness to exclude natives altogether from scientific departments, 1133.—Would not abolish native artillery, 1135.—Native artillery should not be detached by themselves, 1145.—Native troops might be armed with the Enfield rifle; they are indifferent marksmen, 1146, 1147.—50,000 European troops are required for the Bengal presidency, including Burmah, 1149.—Artillery included, 1151;—and 200,000 natives, 1155;—exclusive of police, 1156.—Would have two troops of European to one troop of native artillery, 1158.—30,000 Europeans will be required for Bengal and the North-western provinces, 1167.—Would endeavour to reduce the natives raised in the Punjab from 82,000 to 30,000, 1170.—There should be 20,000 Europeans in the Punjab and 30,000 natives, exclusive of police, 1171.—Loyalty of the Sikhs is to be attributed to their lust of plunder, 1172.—A large Sikh force is dangerous, 1173.—Punjab has been kept tranquil by its strong garrisons of Europeans, 1175.—Proposed force might be reduced hereafter, 1179.—Would make over Bundlecund and Saugor to Madras army, 1180.—The proposed force might be 50,000 Europeans to 150,000 natives, 1182;—of which about 10,000 would be artillery, 1184.—Native force should be both regular and irregular, 1185.—Irregular cavalry are very useful if properly paid, 1187.—They have not been disloyal without cause, 1188.—Men of the line have proved the worst, 1189.—Would not regard proportions of castes in enlisting. Would take a good soldier wherever found, 1192.—Castes should be mixed throughout the regiments, 1193.—There is no reason for not trying it in companies, 1196, 1197.—No caste should be excluded, 1201.—A regulation should be made, forbidding employment of too many Brahmins, 1203.—Caste must, in some instances, be attended to with native soldiers, 1204.—General enlistment desirable, 1211.—Cause of revolt not the number of Brahmins and Rajpoots, 1214.—No particular class should predominate in a regiment if it can be avoided, 1215, 1216.—Ghoorkhas will not enlist in numbers, 1219.—How they came to enlist, 1220.—Would move Madras troops into Bengal, 1221.—Eight or nine officers present with a regular regiment sufficient, 1227. Native gentlemen prefer irregular corps, 1229.—Has always advocated the system of reserved battalions as affording positions for native officers of rank, 1232.—Would maintain some regiments regularly organized, 1234.—There is no selection for command from the lieutenant-colonel down to the subidar, 1236.—There is less authority trusted to officers commanding regiments and companies than there used to be, 1237.—Incompetent officers should be got rid of, 1239.—Commanding officers would then be invested with due authority, 1240.—Sepoy battalions should be reduced to 600 men, 1242;—they are too large now, 1243.—Commanding officers should be selected, 1244.—Native officers also, 1250.—Commanding officers should have greater power to reward and punish, 1252.—Native gentlemen might be admitted into regiments at once as officers, 1257.—There is a want of communication between European and native officers, 1259.—European officers are too exclusive, 1261.—Regulations might remedy this, 1263.—More communication between European and native officers would be productive of good result, 1265.—This is the case in irregular corps, 1267.—In former years there was more association, but it arose from causes which no longer exist, 1270.—Native festivals might be recognized in *some* way, 1273.—An officer should be obliged *to speak* the language before he joins any *corps, 1275.*—Gentry of the country must be *employed* in both civil and military service, 1278.—They will not enter the infantry service, 1285.—System of reserve battalions, 1288.—Irregular cavalry in Bengal are under-paid, 1291.—Bengal army should not be divided, 1292.—Enlistments should be for general service, 1294.—Would introduce the Bombay and Madras armies into Bundlecund, Saugor, and Rajpootana, 1302.—Madras and Bombay armies have been overworked, 1309.—Bengal army has been held up as the pattern army, but this is now ended, 1312.—Nagpore and Saugor should be under Madras, 1314.—Native troops on foreign service should have additional allowances, but not on service in India, 1316.—European officers might do duty with European corps before being appointed to native regiments, 1323.—Native promotions should go by selection, 1328.—Seniority should be the rule, selection the exception, with power always to select, 1331.—Appeals of native soldiers not passing through the commanding officers most objectionable, 1339.—When India is settled, there will be no need to resort to other colonies for troops other than European, 1346.—Native troops of India may be trusted hereafter, 1351.—But on annexing fresh territories, the army, European and native, must in future be increased, 1353.—There should be a considerable native army; that army should be a local army, 4670.—If the recent act would admit of it, the European portion of the army should be a general army, not local, 4670.—It should be one European army, all having the advantage of employment in India, 4671.—Great advantages would result to India also, 4672.—Native armies of the three presidencies should be separate, 4673.—European army should be furnished from the line and be under the Crown; the native army should be under the authority of the government of India, 4674–4676.—The Indian army, by the recent act, has all its privileges guaranteed to it, 4679.—As respects those who are now in it, 4682.—There should be separate Commanders-in-chief in India as there are now, 4684.—They should have authority over

the troops of the line in the several presidencies, but not be independent of the Commander-in-chief in India, 4685–4689.—If a necessity arose for calling troops from India for service elsewhere, their place would, of course, be promptly supplied, 4698.—Local troops would be liable also to be withdrawn on an emergency, 4699.—By having an increased Royal European army there would be more troops available, and the system of periodical relief and transport might be matured, 4700.—Troops should be stationed some time at the Cape on their way to India, 4701.—On withdrawal of troops from India the Governor-General would always be consulted, 4702.—Recommendations for honours from India should come to the Secretary of State in the first instance, 4707.—Secretary of State would have entire control over everything involving expense, 4711.—Native army would be provided for as now, by appointment of officers from England, 4713, 4714.—Would advocate the formation of a staff corps, 4715.—If officers were withdrawn from Queen's regiments for the staff, their places should be supplied, 4718.—The tendency of all late measures has been to bring officers home as often as you can to Europeanise them, 4726.—The scientific corps would not be the worse by being amalgamated with the Queen's engineers and artillery, 4727.—In some respects it would be benefited, 4728.—Officers of Her Majesty's service have hitherto had no inducement to qualify themselves in the languages, 4730.—Amount of troops to be withdrawn from India should be dependent on the approval of the Governor-General, 4732.—Sees no advantage to be derived by having troops raised exclusively for service in India, 4738.—There is no such thing now as the feeling of having no views beyond India. Altered furlough system has destroyed this, 4740, 4741.—Wealth cannot now be accumulated in India by public servants, 4746.—Services of valuable staff officers would be lost to the empire if you have exclusive local armies, 4746.—Advantages of service in India to the line army are very great, 4747.—Hereafter a considerable reduction may be made in the European force in India, 4748.—Locating troops upon the mountains of India is a false measure. With good barracks in the plains they would be more healthy than in the West Indies, or in many other colonies, 4755.—With two armies jealousies must exist, 4759.—Local European regiments of India are admirable, but not better than the line, 4763.—A Sikh army is a dangerous weapon, 4764.—Officers of European and native corps might be allowed to exchange, 4766.—Native army might be officered from the line but for the patronage, 4768.—All cadets ought to go through a military college, 4769.—Cape of Good Hope should be made a depôt for reliefs of regiments, 4774.—Regiments should remain there three or four years before going to India, 4775.—There should also be a depôt for invalids at the Cape, 4776.—A regiment that has been three or four years in Caffraria is in the best possible condition for service anywhere, 4778.—Transport of troops should be by the Cape, not Egypt. They should be landed on the west of India, 4781.—The place of a regiment taken from India for service elsewhere should be supplied by one from home, 4784.—Exchanges should be permitted between the two armies, 4793, 4794.—European force should be kept up by both recruiting and volunteering. 4800.—Is aware there is a difference of expense in recruiting for the line and the local army, 4804, 4805.

HARINGTON, Lieutenant-Colonel THOMAS LOWTH.

Belongs to 5th Bengal native cavalry, which regiment has not mutinied, 1354.—Has been 31 years in the service, 1355.—One-fourth of the force in Bengal should be Europeans, 1359.—No native artillery should be allowed, 1361.—100,000 natives would be sufficient, regular and irregular, 1362.—60 regiments should be regular, 40 should be irregular, and 20 should be veteran battalions, 1363.—Would have 30,000 European infantry, 1366.—About 10,000 cavalry, 1367.—About the same artillery, 1374.—Would not allow artillery with contingents, 1375.—Native sappers might be employed in digging, sapping, &c., 1377.—Would have regular cavalry, 1387.—Irregular are not so well horsed, 1391.—Number of European officers with a native regiment could not be reduced, 1394.—It is not necessary to have one to a troop, 1398.—Would have a staff corps, if practicable, 1400.—All men should be enlisted without reference to caste, 1410.—Nationalities should be preserved in regiments, 1411.—There should not be more low caste men in the Bengal cavalry, 1414.—The others would not like to associate with them, 1416.—Has never heard of caste interfering with duty, 1421.—Irregulars are allowed to draw on the commissariat on account of their horses, on foreign service, but they are never supplied with tents or carriage, 1428.—In our own territories they supply themselves, 1429.—They are not so efficient in action as the regulars. This is owing to the larger number of European officers with the latter, 1431.—Irregulars should have more officers on service, 1434.—Pay of the privates should be increased to 25 rupees a month; and the regimental banks abolished, 1439.—Would have a squadron of regular cavalry with European dragoons, but would dispense with entire regiments of regulars, 1441.—Would give the native cavalry the same carbine, only lighter, 1445.—Regular cavalry is too expensive in horses and arms, 1451.—Relative cost of a regular and irregular trooper, 1451.—More power should be given to commanding officers, 1454.—Would not enlist for service beyond sea, 1455.—Allowance should be made for the objections to this, 1456.—Natives would be of little use beyond India and China, 1459.—They should be required to serve everywhere in India, 1462.—Bengal army should not be divided, 1465.—Would not recommend the promotion of native officers by selection; it is liable to abuse, 1474.—Reasons for the late revolt, 1477.—There should be more intercourse between the European and native officers, 1493.—Commanding officers have had no power since Lord W. Bentinck's time, 1497.—They have no power to reward, 1500.—Corporal punishment was stopped by a circular, 1512;—About three years ago, 1513.—Except for theft and disgraceful conduct, 1513.—Native officers all joined in the mutiny, 1522.—There should be no native officers in regular regiments, 1524.—Would not attach more European non-commissioned officers to native regiments, 1528, 1529.—Mixture of Europeans with natives should in the cavalry be in regiments, in the infantry in brigades, 1542.

MEREWETHER, Major W. L.

Has been 17½ years in the service, 1545.—Belongs to Bombay army, 1547.—Has been 15½ years with the Sind horse, 1548.—Considers 32,000 European troops sufficient for Bengal presidency, 1552.—There must be a good native army. European troops are not necessary to overawe the native army, 1556.—System must be improved, a moral power introduced, 1566.—Commanding officers must have increased powers, 1567.—For all India 50,000 European troops are sufficient, 1571;—Exclusive of artillery, 1572.—Native force should be irregular, 1575.—System of Sind horse, 1576, 1577, 1578.—Commanding officers of irregulars have more power than those of the regulars, 1584.—Native officers in Sind horse go through the ranks, 1592, 1593.—All soldiers should be enlisted for general service, 1622.—System of remounts in Sind horse, 1623.—Pay of irregular cavalry should be raised, 1627.—Regular cavalry are comparatively useless; they cost about 82 rupees a month per man, 1634.—System in Sind horse is punchayet not court-martial, 1637.—Corporal punishment is only administered for disgraceful crimes, and after dismissal from the regiment, 1648.—Regiment was recruited from Delhi, 1658.—Artillery should be European, with some few natives for certain stations, and some gun Lascars, 1667, 1671.—Sappers and miners should be European, with Lascars attached, 1671.—The same arm should be given alike to Europeans and natives, 1672.—Men should be enlisted without regard to caste, 1674.—Castes should be distributed indiscriminately, 1691.—Enlistment should be for general service only, 1696.—Present articles of war are a mistake, 1697.—A fourth presidency might be made and the Bengal army divided, 1700.—Commanding officers should be selected, 1704.—Would have a general list, from which officers for native army should be selected, 1705.—Mixture of Europeans with natives should be by brigade, not regimentally, 1708.—System of Sind horse might be introduced into infantry, 1713.—Would have no regular corps, cavalry, or infantry, 1717.

MASTER, Lieutenant-Colonel ROBT. A.

Has been 33 years in the service; in Bengal, 1726, 1728.—Has served in both regular and irregular regiments, 1730.—40,000 or 50,000 Europeans will be required in Bengal, 1733.—To 60 regiments of native infantry, 1734.—No native artillery should be allowed.—There might be native sappers, 1735.—Irregular system preferable for native army, 1741, 1743.—Sees no objection to attaching a squadron of native cavalry to a European cavalry regiment, 1762, 1763.—Is decidedly opposed to regular cavalry, 1765.—Irregular cavalry supply themselves, except when they cannot provide food, it is then furnished them by the commissariat, 1773, 1783.—Name of caste should not be admitted into an army, 1786.—There are too many Brahmins in corps.—In the infantry three-fourths are Brahmins, 1790.—Would not allow nationalities in corps, 1794.—Enlist-

ments should be for general service, 1796.—A less quantity of Brahmins might enlist, 1801.—Enlistment has been for general service for the last two years, and there has been no falling off in recruits, 1803.—Flogging is only resorted to in great crimes, 1805.—Punishments are insufficient, 1806.—When in command of a corps was not interfered with from head-quarters, 1808.—Commanding officers might have a little more power, 1809.—Promotion of native officers should be by merit, 1814.—A complaint against him as commanding officer was sent to the Commander-in-chief without being submitted to him, 1818.—Native soldiers are between 40 and 50 when made jemadars, 1843.—Would not mix Europeans and natives in regiments, 1848, 1849.—Commanding officers have no power to grant leave of absence to men, except between musters, 1851.—Proportion having leave, 1854.

FELIX, Colonel ORLANDO.

Is colonel in Her Majesty's service, 1858.—Has been deputy quartermaster-general to Her Majesty's forces at Madras, 1859.—Was 18 years in India, and private secretary to two Governors, 1860.—There should be two natives to one European in Bengal, three to one in Bombay, and four to one in Madras. Taking all India, the proportion should be three to one, 1862.—This only applies to regulars, 1863.—Estimate of force required when the country is settled, exclusive of police, for a peace establishment, 60,000 Europeans and 180,000 natives, 1864–1870.—Considers the number of the corps more important than their strength, 1871.—A large police force should be employed for escort duties, 1879.—Would not put a rifle into any native's hand, 1881.—The old percussion musket only should be given, 1889.—A large native army cannot be dispensed with, 1902.—No natives should be employed as artillerymen, 1909.—Would not allow a gun to go into the hands of natives, 1910.—The native artillery at Madras and Bombay should be allowed to die off, 1919.—The artillery of the contingents also, 1928.—None but Europeans should be scientifically employed in arsenals, 1931.—Would have no native sappers in Bengal, but would keep them up in Madras and Bombay, 1935.—They should not be scientifically taught, 1936.—Native infantry should be regular, the cavalry irregular, 1943.—With irregular cavalry regiments there should be six officers, 1945.—If a squadron were detached it could then be commanded by a European officer, 1946.—The full fixed establishment of officers should be always present with the native infantry regiments, 1947.—Inconvenience has arisen from their absence, 1953.—Irregular cavalry are more generally serviceable than the regular, 1960.—Nizam's are irregular, and very good, 1961.—There is no irregular cavalry in the Madras army; there is the Mysore Horse, but they are merely police, 1964.—More officers have been away from regiments in Bengal for staff than at the other presidencies, 1966.—Native officers should be encouraged to learn English, 1967.—A knowledge of it should be a qualification for promotion, 1968.—In Madras English is freely spoken by the native officers, 1971.—A native officer arrives at that rank at about 50 years of age, 1983.—Castes and nationalities should be mixed up as much as possible, 1995.—Caste should not be recognized, 1996.—Men should be enlisted for general service, 1998.—And for limited service, 1999.—Would not increase the pay, but the pension, 1999.—At Madras the men's families are with them; in Bengal they are left in their villages, 2002.—Having their families with them, a great security, 2003.—Madras soldiers never refuse to go on any service, 2008.—Would abolish good-conduct pay; the pension is a greater inducement, 2012.—Would give a pension after 21 years without report of a medical committee, 2014.—Madras army almost all low-caste men, 2016.—They have no objection to going to sea, 2021.—Would select native officers, 2024.—Madras sepoys, when at sea, are entitled to rations, 2027.—Would divide the Bengal army by joining Scinde to the Punjaub, and having a fourth presidency, 2032.—Madras army should hold Saugor, and the Bombay, Mhow, 2035.—Separate armies a great advantage, 2036.—Would give the same pay for the same appointments at all the presidencies, 2043.—Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers should be promoted entirely by selection, 2048.—Commanding officer should recommend, 2050.—Native commissioned officers at Madras are selected from the non-commissioned, 2053.—Commanding officers should have more power to reward, 2056.—Mixture of European with native forces should be by brigade, but four companies of natives might be attached to European regiments in Bengal; native and Europeans, when placed together, become good friends, 2078.—The natives might take the day and police duties, 2080.—There might, however, be an objection to this plan in regard to the two sorts of ammunition, 2086.—The natives would be under the command of the commanding officer of the European regiment, 2090.

STEEL, Major-General Sir SCUDAMORE W., K.C.B.

Served in India uninterruptedly for 50 years, 2096.—At Madras, 2097.—Has been 40 years on the staff in all ranks and grades, 2099.—Europeans should be to natives in Bengal as one to three, 40,000 Europeans to 120,000 natives, 2102.—This is exclusive of the police, 2107.—When the country is settled, 160,000 to 200,000 troops will be necessary, exclusive of artillery, 2103.—Native force should be both regular and irregular, 2104.—Police should perform the gaol and escort duties, 2111.—Natives should not have the Enfield rifle, 2117.—No native artillery should be allowed in Bengal, 2118.—Nor in either of the armies, 2119.—Natives make most efficient sappers, 2121.—They should be men of low caste, 2125.—Europeans should be in the nature of superintendents, 2126.—Natives should not be employed in the manufacture of percussion caps, and such scientific duties, 2129.—Half-castes might be so employed, 2131.—Nationalities and castes should be diversified as much as possible in regiments, 2132.—Sepoys should be enlisted for general service, 2133.—Some allowance must be made for caste, 2135.—Caste very often interferes with duty, 2136.—Madras troops undertake to serve wherever ordered, except on board ship, 2148.—They always volunteer to go to sea, if required, 2142.—Practically, they do not object to go, 2153.—They could be enlisted for general service, 2158.—And should be so, 2160.—That is to say, to go anywhere in India, anywhere to the Eastward, and to Persia, 2161.—Madras sepoys are entitled to rations when on board ship, 2165.—Usages of caste are more acted up to in Bengal than in Madras, 2167.—Sepoys are more indulged in Bengal, 2172.—Bengal army might be divided; it is so very large, 2181.—They should be under the same Commander-in-chief for India, 2187.—It might be of advantage to have the separate armies of India of nearly equal strength, 2190.—The late combination of the Bengal army would not have been so general had it consisted of two separate armies, 2191.—Does not see how a staff corps could be arranged, 2197.—One European officer to a company should always be present, 2201.—Present establishment of officers, if kept complete, quite sufficient, 2202.—Officers selected for staff appointments should be struck off the roll of their regiments, 2211.—Promotion in non-commissioned and commissioned ranks at Madras is made by selection, 2219.—It should be the same in Bengal, 2215.—Corporal punishment is constantly inflicted at Madras under sentence of courts-martial, 2233.—Natives and Europeans should not be mixed in regiments, 2249.—Great difference of system in Bengal and Madras armies, 2251.—Discipline in Bengal is less severe, 2253.—It would be more advantageous for the men in Bengal to have their families with them, 2256.

ALEXANDER, Major-General ROBERT.

Was adjutant general, Madras army, 2260.—Was about thirty years in active service, 2261.—Was adjutant-general ten years, 2264.—The proportion of European to native troops over all India should be one European to three native regiments, 2266.—And three European batteries to one native battery, 2270.—Europeans and natives should be armed alike with the best arms that could be made, 2274.—There should be no European sappers except as non-commissioned officers, 2276.—Troops in India have been too much scattered about in small parties, 2281.—They should be concentrated at certain fixed stations, 2281.—There should be for Bengal 25 to 30 European infantry regiments, five or six of European cavalry, 2285.—How they should be distributed, 2286.—When India is tranquil, European regiments should not be more than 800 strong, with a reserve of 400 men in this country, 2291.—Would have four guns to every 1,000 men, 2294.—Artillery in India is inadequately manned and horsed, 2295.—And inadequately officered, 2296.—Batteries should have eight guns, 2298.—Irregular corps are necessary. The regular army should remain as it has always been, 2300.—Would have cavalry, regular and irregular, 2301.—Advantages of the latter, 2302.—Local corps are in some parts indispensable, 2305.—As respects one European to three natives, this applies to the regular army, 2306.—Armies of India should recruit all descriptions of natives, 2307.—Caste is recognized and respected in Madras army, but it is never allowed to interfere with any military duty, 2309.—Discipline in Madras is more efficient and soldierlike, 2313.—Discipline might overcome any caste difficulties in the ex-

cution of military duty, 2314.—When he commanded a regiment, the Hindustani men were among the best in the regiment, 2322.—Native troops now have duties to do which they should not have to do, such as duties at goals, duties over treasuries, and many escort duties, 2329.—Present number of officers for regiments quite sufficient, 2330.—Commissariat department should not be a draught on regiments. Civil staff duties should be discharged by officers not physically equal to active duties, 2331.—A staff corps would be very useful, 2336. —After a certain time officers in civil appointments should have the option of leaving the army, 2339.—One concurrent cause of the late mutiny in Bengal was that men were enlisted to go on foreign service beyond sea, 2341. —Very few Hindustanis in the Madras army, 2342.—An improved pay code might be formed, 2344.—Difference of discipline in past times and the present, caused by not conciliating native opinions, and a harsher line of feeling between European officer and native, 2346. —Pension is of the greatest importance, 2347.—A new pay code should be framed. Pay of the native army is insufficient, 2348.—It should increase with length of service, 2351.—Native gentlemen might enter in the regular army without going through the ranks, 2358.—Bengal army was ill-composed and ill-disciplined, 2362.—High-caste men have been too much pampered, 2363.—Duties were carried on in a lax way, 2365.—Some Bengal officers frequently brought up before Courts of Requests for debts. This is a rare thing at Madras, 2368.—Raising the status of native officers would not prove dangerous, 2373.—Native army should be organized by mixing races and nationalities, 2375.—Bengal army should not be divided, 2376.—There should be three armies, and the paramount authority should be vested in a military minister of war, a member of the Supreme Government of India, 2376.—Promotion in the native grades should be by selection, 2378.—System in practice at Madras, 2380.—Age does not constitute incompetency, unless it involves weakness and inefficiency, 2385.—At Madras, a native commissioned officer would be 50 years of age when promoted, 2386.—Thinks it better that European officers should learn the native languages rather than the natives the English, 2392.—If strict discipline had been maintained, the Bengal army might have been brought to the highest standard of efficiency, 2393.—Instances of misconduct in the field have been few, the men have generally followed their officers nobly, 2393.—Native regimental schools should be improved, 2394.—Late mutiny a calamity which might have been guarded against, 2395.—*Madras* men have complained and asked for the privileges allowed in *Bengal*, 2399.—Commanding officers in Madras have sufficient *power to* reward and punish, 2401.—Thinks a mixture of *Europeans* and natives in regiments would be fatal, 2404.—Contrary to order to receive petitions from natives, 2407.—Has not served in Bengal, 2410.—Present mode of dress objectionable, 2413.—There should be an oriental costume, 2414.—Cantonments are badly laid out. The barracks are traps in which the European might be destroyed in the event of a sudden outbreak, 2415.—Secunderabad affords an instance, 2417.—Artillery should be increased, and the condition of the European officer considered, 2418.—Clothing of European troops might be further improved, 2424.

Thomas, Mr. John F.

Belonged to the Madras civil service, 2424.—Served for 39 years, 2425.—Was in both the revenue and judicial departments, but for the last ten years of his service was chief secretary to the government, and a member of the government, 2426.—Proportion of European to native force must depend on the police and other considerations, 2429.—A police corps was formed in Malabar with European officers, 2430.—It was proposed to put some European non-commissioned with it, but this was overruled, 2431.—It was armed with rifles, 2435.—In Madras, one European to three or four natives would suffice, including police, 2437.—This proportion would not do if Saugor be included, 2440.—Would not give the natives as efficient a weapon as the Europeans, 2443. —Artillery and the rifle must be kept in the hands of the Europeans, 2443.—Sappers and miners might be natives, 2445.—Proportion of castes in the Madras army, 2446.—Native soldiers at Madras are not liable to be sent beyond sea against their will, 2448.—Practically they have been in the habit of going, 2449.—No case of a regiment declining to embark on account of caste, 2453.—Individuals have; they take their discharge, 2454.—Men should be enlisted for service beyond sea, 2473.—There would be no difficulty in this at Madras, 2475.—At Madras there are no irregulars, 2477. —Rule as to absentees from regiments on staff has been kept with a rigidness at Madras unknown in Bengal, 2479.—An European officer should be present with each company, to make a regiment efficient, 2483.—There are more detached appointments in Bengal than at Madras, 2484.—A regular police corps is now being organized at Madras, 2485.—There are several duties done by the native troops, which do not require soldiers; still this depends very much on the country, 2486.—Treasury guards in the provinces are all native guards, 2487.—Would allow the native artillery at Madras to die off, 2491.—Native army should be composed of different nationalities, and the larger the body of low-caste men, the better, 2493.—Civil employment in high appointments might be open to natives, but not military, 2494. —Prefers, for reasons of safety, the promotion of natives by seniority, 2496.—Reasons why the natives should not be rendered as effective as the Europeans, 2499.—Would like European non-commissioned officers with native regiments, 2504.—Some to each company, 2507.—They would form a better channel of communication between the natives and the European officers than the present native officer does, 2509.—Present communication is not sufficient, 2511.—Native officers during the recent mutiny in Bengal have in no case given information, 2512. —They have an interest distinct from the European officer, 2512.—52 native regiments are sufficient for Madras, 2517.—Europeans should be as one to four, 2518.—There should be 12 European regiments in Madras, 2520. —Exclusive of artillery and cavalry, 2522, 2523.—Native cavalry, being principally Mahomedan, will not act against Mahomedans, 2524.—Horses are obtained from the Gulf, and latterly from the Cape, 2532.—There is no stud at Madras, 2533.—There is an agency at Bangalore, and the dealers bring horses thither, 2534.—Predominant caste in the infantry is the Sudra or common Ryot, 2536. —About 35 per cent. of Mahomedans, 2537.—European influence over the native greater at Madras than in Bengal, 2543.—High-caste men in Madras have done what in Bengal they have refused to do, 2550.—In the southern part of India no man carries arms, 2556.—Would not withhold the use of arms from the respectable portion of the natives, 2559.—European local troops when ordered to embark on foreign service have kept Madras in a state of disorder and siege, 2564.—In the field they fight admirably, 2565.—They are not under the same discipline as the Queen's troops, 2567.—Would rather the Europeans should come and go; but there are opposite considerations too, 2568.—Men of the local troops form marriages, and become attached to the natives, 2568.—Better state of discipline in Queen's regiments caused by purchase system, 2570.—Mixture of Europeans and natives should not be by companies, 2571.

Wilde, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Thos.

Has been 20 years in the service; in India the whole time, 2574, 2575.—Belongs to Madras army, but has been nine years in the Punjaub irregular infantry, 2577.—One European to four native soldiers should be about the average; a purely European force, however large, could not hold India, 2580.—Above proportion includes all arms, but not the police, 2581, 2582.—Would have some native artillery, say half, in the troops and batteries, 2583.—Would employ them as drivers, 2585.—25,000 Europeans to 100,000 natives would suffice for Bengal, 2590.—Irregular system for both cavalry and infantry preferable, 2598, 2599.—Would have all irregular, 2604.—Reasons, 2605-2609.—Men of Punjaub irregular force are amenable to articles of war, 2620.—Native officers are appointed by selection; they are not necessarily required to go through the ranks, 2622-2624.—Would abolish the native articles of war, 2628.—Occasional introduction of native gentlemen as officers, answered wonderfully, 2644.—Six European officers are required in irregular regiments, 2636. —The men are enlisted for general service, and receive the same pay wherever serving, 2637.—They are entitled to discharge after three years, 2638.—A man refusing obedience would be immediately flogged, 2644.—There are 20 native commissioned officers with the Punjaub regiments, 2649.—Commandants have magisterial powers; they can imprison, dismiss, flog, or fine, 2652.—Caste is never set up as a plea for not performing duty, 2665.—Prefers having caste mixed up in companies, rather than companies of separate castes, 2673.—Enlistments should be for service everywhere, 2676.

Leslie, Colonel John T., C.B.

Served in India 20 years, 2682.—In the Bombay artillery, 2683.—At present the proportion of Europeans to natives in Bengal should be as two to one, 2687, 2688.—There should hereafter be a larger proportion of Euro-

pean troops than there has heretofore been, 2689.—Would have native artillery in the proportion of one native to four Europeans, 2690-2692.—Would not trust the natives alone with the guns, 2697.—Would arm the natives the same as the Europeans, 2700.—Native artillerymen should be always with the Europeans, 2704.—Infantry should be regular, cavalry irregular, 2707.—Sappers and miners, for scientific work or overseers, should be European, and for labour, natives, 2714, 2715.—The more castes are mixed up the better, 2721.—Enlistment should be for general service, 2727.—Promotion of native officers should be by selection, 2734.—Would attach native companies to each European regiment, 2739.—An increase of artillery wanted in Bombay, 2744.—Considers the Bombay detachment system of artillery the best, 2748.—Recruiting has lately gone on most favourably; number sent to India, 6319.—There has been no limit to recruiting since the disturbances, 6324.—Men are recruited for the different arms, not for the presidencies, 6325.—They are sent to the presidencies according to the proportions at the depôt, 6328.—Services of the men are confined to India alone, 6329.—It is so considered, 6331.—Their understanding is that they are to belong to an army, the head quarters of which are in India, 6334.—It is a local army for service to the east of the Cape, 6336.—Discipline at Warley under Her Majesty's Articles of War, 6337.—The courts-martial are held at Chatham, and confirmed by the Commander-in-chief, 6338.—Time men remain at the depôt very uncertain. It used to be four or five months, 6339.—They now go out to India before they are drilled, 6341.—Warley can only accommodate 12,000 men, 6341.—Recruits go to India as non-commissioned officers, 6343.—On arrival their rank is lost, 6346.—Expense of a recruit for both services the same, 6349.—Returns of number of recruits are sent weekly to War Office, 6353.—Inspecting field officers of the line pass all recruits, 6355.—On going to India they have the same clothing as the line, 6357.—They will soon have the light clothing also, 6358.—They are provided with every thing, and receive 19*s.* 10*d.* on arriving in India, 6363, 6364.—Men should be kept at the depôt for four months, not longer, 6369.—If kept longer desertions increase, 6369.—Very many men desert from the line and enlist for Indian service, 6371.—They receive the double bounty, and then desert again, 6373.—Recruits use the Enfield rifle at Warley, 6375.—But they are not armed till they join their regiments, 6376.—If local force were increased, the accommodation at Warley must be much increased, 6379.—Ten or twelve per cent. would be the proportion in depôt to the force in India, 6380.—Staff serjeants do the duties of officers, 6383.—It has answered admirably, 6384.—They are chiefly pensioners from Her Majesty's service, 6386.—The uniform of the recruits is supplied in India, 6391.

Hill, Colonel John.

Entered the service in 1834; was 24 years in India, 2750.—Belonged to the Bombay engineers, 2753, 2754.—Considers one-third European to natives sufficient, 2757.—European dragoons are not efficiently armed, 2759.—There should be an irregular native army, 2762.—Including this, the Europeans might be one-fourth of the whole, 2766.—Would have a considerable body of native artillery, 2769.—And by far the larger portion of sappers and miners natives, 2771.—Commanded the Bombay sappers from 1855 to 1857, 2773.—In Bombay, caste is never urged as an objection to duty, 2781.—There is no difficulty in getting men to enlist for general service, 2784.—Has known Bengal troops refuse to work on the plea of caste, 2789, 2790.—At Moultan they did no work whatever in the trenches, 2796.—There should be a fair proportion of the various castes in a regiment; but caste should never be alluded to, 2798.—Would not have castes by companies, they should be mixed in regiments, 2799.—Promotion of native officers should go by selection, 2808.—Native officers of Bombay army are young, active, intelligent; in the Bengal they are generally the contrary, 2812.—Discipline of Bengal army very much inferior to that of Bombay, 2816.—Mixture of European and native troops should be by brigades, 2817.—In Bombay there should be eight companies of native sappers to two of European, 2818.—Considers the European sappers of the Company superior to the Royal sappers, 2820.—In former years the pay of the native sappers was higher, 2825.

Sinclair, Colonel James.

Is a colonel in the Bombay artillery, 2831.—Has been 41 years in the service, 34 of which in India, 2832, 2833.—Proportion of force should be one European to two natives, 2835.—There should be in Bombay, artillery 5,000, cavalry 2,400, all European; would have no native artillery or regular cavalry, 2836, 2837.—European infantry 6,400, 2839.—Sappers and miners should be both European and native, 2840.—Scientific work in the arsenals should be confined to Europeans, 2842.—Prefers irregular to regular native cavalry, 2849.—Scinde Horse the model of a cavalry regiment, 2851.—Would have in Bombay about 14,000 Europeans and 28,000 natives, 2853.—There should be with the artillery a guard, irrespective of the men required to work the guns, 2853-2855.—Police should be entirely distinct from the army, 2867.—Natives should be armed with the most efficient weapon, 2869.—Enlistment of native troops should be confined to their own presidencies, and castes mixed up, 2870.—All should be enlisted for general service, 2874.—Irregular corps should be local, 2874.—Artillerymen were chiefly enlisted in Hindostan, 2879.—Caste is never allowed to interfere with the performance of duty in Bombay, 2884.—Under proper discipline it would not interfere, 2890.—Pay of native artillery should be increased, 2893.—Present establishment of artillery at Bombay insufficient, 2895.—Royal establishment better for batteries than the Indian, 2896.—But would have native drivers and followers, 2898.—For horse artillery, the drivers should be European, 2901.—The establishment of a troop or battery is fixed at one captain and three subalterns, but this has been constantly reduced, 2909.—Causes of this reduction, 2915.—And proposed remedies, 2918.—Officers drawn away for staff should be "seconded," 2918.—Thinks a staff corps would not work in India, 2919.—No change required in Bombay as to promotion of native officers, 2929.—Power of commanding officers too much circumscribed, 2933.—If a man is flogged he is turned out of the service, 2943.—In Bombay, each captain commands a battery as if it were his own regiment, 2944.—Bengal army should be divided; it is too large, 2948.—Division of the armies has been of great advantage during the recent crisis, 2949.—Each army should have its own Commander-in-chief, 2951.—As respects the Europeans, there should be but one system for all the presidencies, 2953.—Would not alter the terms of enlistment or the pay of the regular native army, 2954.—Artillery system and matériel should be the same at all the presidencies, 2955, 2956.

Willoughby, Colonel Michael, C.B.

Belongs to the Bombay artillery, 2960.—Has been 37 years in the service, 2961.—With an adequate proportion of artillery, one European to three natives would be sufficient, 2964.—The regular native cavalry should be done away with, and European cavalry substituted, 2965.—For the cavalry, the proportion might be the same, the native being all irregular, 2966-2970.—There must be some native artillery; an European battery should always have the support of a company of European infantry, 2971.—Natives must be armed with the same arms as the Europeans, 2974.—Reduction of the pay of the native artillery in 1840 was most injurious, 2975.—This service is not looked up to as it was, 2976.—This applies to the sappers also. Pay of both should be restored to the former rates, 2978, 2979.—Native artillery should be merely auxilary to the European, 2982.—Six batteries of native artillery sufficient for Bombay, 2984.—Present European artillery insufficient, 2985.—Reserve battalion lately raised has not officers, 2985.—Present establishment of officers of artillery, 2991.—It should be raised to that of the Royal establishment, 2995.—Artillery officers are employed on the staff, 2997.—Native army should be composed of different castes mixed up as much as possible, 3003.—Would enlist throughout India, 3004.—Caste does not interfere with duty at Bombay, 3005.—Enlistment should be for general service, 3010.—System of promotion in the Bombay army is good, it rests with the commanding officer, 3013.—Commanding officer should have more power, 3016.—In Bombay a native becomes a commissioned officer at about 33 years of age, 3024.—Mixture of Europeans and natives should be by brigade, not regimentally, 3029, 3030.—Would divide the Bengal army, it is too large, 3033.—The appointments and allowances at the three presidencies should be assimilated, 3034.—Establishment of officers for a native regiment sufficient, 3037.—A staff corps might be advisable, but it would be very difficult to carry out, 3041,3042.—Appointment to the command of regiments should be by selection, 3043.—Transfers of lieut.-colonels are made so that there may be a field-officer in command of every regiment, 3049.

Trevelyan, Sir Charles E., K.C.B.

Was in India from 1826 to 1838, 3052.—Held various appointments connected with the residency at Delhi,

&c., and was deputy secretary in the political department at Calcutta, 3,053.—Aggregate force in India, and the proportion between Europeans and natives, depends on arrangements other than military, 3055.—Native army has been too much employed on civil duties, 3056.—Railroads, and a proper arrangement for disarming the country, will diminish the necessity for so large a native army, 3056.—About 40,000 European troops, and double that number of natives as an auxiliary force, will hereafter be sufficient for Bengal, 3057.—Police should be civil, but with a *quasi* military organization, 3058.—Numbers stated are what would be required in the ordinary state of things in India, 3063.—Magazines should be in fortified places at the principal stations, and should be entirely under the charge of Europeans, 3068.—Troops should be massed in large bodies, and at each station there should be a fortified post, 3069.—A much smaller number of military stations will be necessary hereafter, 3072.—Native force should be organized on the irregular system, and be clothed according to the native fashion, 3073.—It should have the best equipments and the best arms, 3074.—Diversity of practice in the native army a great advantage, 3077.—It has hitherto been too much assimilated to the English, 3078.—Officers with native regiments should be few in number, should have large powers, and should be personally very efficient, 3079.—Native officers should be appointed by merit, 3081.—They should all be promoted from the ranks, 3082.—There is more scope for the employment and promotion of natives in the civil than in the military branch, 3086.—Their promotion in the army will be hereafter according to qualification and merit, 3089.—It has been thus at Madras and Bombay, but not in Bengal, 3090, 3091.—Connecting link between the European officer and native soldier should be maintained by the instrumentality of the native officer, 3094.—Superior native officers should have additional advantages, 3095.—Present pension to the soldier sufficiently liberal, 3098.—European infantry, cavalry, and artillery should belong to the royal army, and have regular reliefs, 3099.—The engineers might be local, 3099.—Carefully selected cadets should be appointed as supernumeraries to the European infantry in India to serve at least a year, 3099.—All officers for native corps, and all staff officers, should be borne on one list, and be recruited by selection from the above, 3099.—Officers from this general staff corps might be told off for the different duties, 3100.—The utmost freedom should be reserved of transferring officers from one branch to another; from the cavalry to the infantry for instance, 3100.—Promotion should be entirely according to conduct and qualification as respects actual employment, 3103.—Promotion might be of two kinds on the general list, from rank to rank, and from one appointment to another, 3104-3107.—Native infantry regiments should have a lieutenant-colonel, a captain, and two lieutenants, 3109.—As a general rule, the proposed arrangement should apply only to new appointments, 3110.—The main principle of promotion from rank to rank should be seniority, 3111.—In every case of admitted deficiency an officer should be passed over, 3111.—Qualifications required from officers would be a check on favouritism, 3121.—Proposed general list, how to be formed, 3123.—The officers of the native infantry, cavalry, and staff should all be of one corps, 3127.—Candidates for commissions should be instructed in this country in the elements of military science, and of the native languages, and there should especially be a probation of his moral qualities, 3133.—They should all go through a military college for a short time, 3135.—The limited auxiliary native army should be enlisted for general service, 3137.—Would not allow exchanges into the Queen's army according to the present arrangements. Purchase should be excluded from the Indian army, 3139.—An officer entering the Indian army in a superior rank could not have had experience of native troops, 3142.—Management of the natives is the business of a life, and requires early appropriation to the duty, 3143.—Purchase in the Indian army is merely a mode of retirement, 3144.—Artillery should be all European. Scientific matters in arsenals should be also entirely in the hands of Europeans, 3145.—The staff, having special reference to Indian business and Indian habits, should be officered entirely from the native army. The general military staff should be composed of officers drawn from both services, 3150.—All the nationalities that can furnish efficient soldiers should be represented in the native army, 3151.—Nationalities and castes might compose companies or regiments. In the latter case they should be employed in parts in which they were not recruited, 3152.—So far as military service is concerned, caste should not be mentioned, 3153.—It should not be tolerated as an objection to the performance of any military duty, 3155.—Undue deference has been paid to it in the Bengal army, 3156, 3157.—Code for the native army should be simplified, 3160.—Recruits should be enlisted for general service, 3161.—Number of Sikhs now in pay should be diminished, 3164.—The Bengal army should not be divided, 3165.—As a general rule, the army of each presidency should be employed within that presidency, 3169.—Punjab and Sind should be erected into a lieutenant-governorship for civil purposes, 3171.—Head quarters of Commander-in-chief should be at some central station, 3172.—At Allahabad or Agra; and, in the cold season, he should make a tour of inspection, 3173.—System on which the Bengal army was constituted was defective, 3178.—Management of the native troops at Madras and Bombay was very preferable, 3185.—Different results at the three presidencies; how to be accounted for, 3187.—System in force in Bengal was quite irrespective of the extent of the command, 3190.—The functions of the Commander-in-chief in India, as Commander-in-chief, greatly preponderate in public importance over his functions as member of the Government, 3194.—Rates of pay, to a certain extent, have been higher in Bengal, 3197.—A higher standard of expenditure has been established there from the first, 3198.—The general government of India should be more completely separated from all the local governments, 3199.—As close an approximation towards equality of allowances should be made as possible, 3200.—Pay of staff officers should be in proportion to the duty and responsibility, and also to the expenses of living, 3203.—Europeans and natives should not be mixed in the same regiment, 3207.—Tendency of opinion is in favour of irregular native troops, 3208.—They should be dressed according to their nationality and religion, 3208.—European saddle for the native cavalry should be done away with. Irregular cavalry preferable. They should not be dressed like Europeans, 3209.

POOLE, Colonel SKEFFINGTON:

Was about thirty years in India, 3211.—In the Bombay cavalry, 3213.—Has served in the field with Bengal as well as Bombay troops, 3215.—As respects Bombay, one European to four native soldiers sufficient, exclusive of artillery, 3222.—There must be some native artillery, but it should be as small as possible, 3224, 3225.—Sappers and Miners must, to a great extent, be natives, 3227.—But under the superintendence of Europeans, 3228.—The natives should be allowed to do as little scientific work as possible, 3229.—Force in Bombay should be on the regular and irregular system, combined in certain proportions, 3235.—Both cavalry and infantry, 3236.—For actual service the regular cavalry is much better than the irregular, 3242.—The irregular are not as well mounted, 3244.—Would enlist all castes, and they should be mixed up in companies as they are now, 3246, 3247.—Native army should be clothed more according to native ideas, 3248.—Does not object to the English saddle, 3250.—Discipline of an irregular regiment in charging in line, not equal to that of a regular regiment, 3256.—Has known regular regiments do well with only three or four officers; and native officers conduct the duties just as well on parade, and command a troop, as the European, 3262.—Does not attach much importance to the number of officers with regiments, 3263.—A smaller number of highly qualified officers make a regiment more efficient than a larger number not so qualified, 3264.—No change in the code of enlistment necessary, 3265.—All classes should be enlisted for general service, 3266.—Caste does not interfere with duty in Bombay. Has seen it do so in Bengal, 3271-3275.—This arises from the difference of system, 3279.—Everything appears to be caste in Bengal, 3281.—Promotion of natives is by seniority in Bengal, 3285.—In Bombay it is by selection, 3289.—Native officers in Bombay would not fail to give information of anything going wrong, 3298.—Two Brahmins of the 21st native infantry did so, 3300.—And others have done so, 3301.—In Bengal they gave no information, 3302.—Promotion by selection better than that by seniority, 3304.—Native officers at Bombay when promoted are about thirty-five years old, 3310.—Native gentlemen should not be introduced into regiments as officers without passing through the ranks, 3312.—No more European non-commissioned officers required in regiments, 3315.—If a native officer of his corps were sick he would visit him, 3317.—System of Bengal native cavalry was very bad, 3323.—In Bengal native troopers do not clean their own horses; in Bombay they always do so, 3331.—Europeans and natives should not be mixed in regiments, 3333.—European and native lines are always kept apart, 3336.—Petitions are sometimes re-

ceived from men that have not gone through the commanding officer, 3341.—Commanding officers should have much more power, 3351.—In some cases they cannot confirm the sentences of regimental courts-martial, 3357.—The discipline of a regiment depends much on the power of the officer commanding, 3360.—Particularly with native troops, 3361.

GRIFFITH, Major-General JULIUS GEORGE.

Was upwards of thirty-six years in India. Belonged to the Bombay artillery, 3362.—Commanded it for ten years, 3363.—Proportion of Europeans to natives should be one in four, 3368.—This refers to the regular army alone, 3371.—Many of the duties now performed by native troops might be transferred to the police, 3372.—From 30,000 to 35,000 troops are required for Bombay, 3377.—Native force should be both on the regular and irregular system, 3382.—Native cavalry should be entirely irregular, 3384.—No native artillery should be allowed, 3388.—A few gun lascars should be in every troop or company, 3390.—Not a single native should be trusted with a gun, 3394.—Native regulars should have the Enfield rifle, 3396.—All scientific sappers should be Europeans. There might be a few native pioneers, 3398.—Caste should not be acknowledged in any way; all should be enlisted, 3401.—Under proper discipline, caste does not operate against the performance of military duty, 3406.—Code of enlistment should be simplified, 3408.—Enlistment should be for general service, 3409.—Promotion of natives should be entirely by selection, 3412.—Commanding officers should have more power, 3413.—Has known petitions received without going through the commanding officer, 3418.—Europeans and natives should not be mixed in regiments, 3424.—Native officers should all go through the ranks, 3427.—Except in the irregular cavalry, 3428.

ASHBURNHAM, Major-General the Hon. T., C.B.

Is a major-general in Her Majesty's service. Has served about twelve years in India; ten in the Bengal and two in the Bombay presidency, 3429-3433.—Considers that there should be one European to two natives in the army, 3434, 3435.—If Sikhs are employed, a larger proportion of Europeans will be required, 3436-3439.—Employment of police or local battalions would be desirable, 3440.—Would not arm natives with the Minié rifle. Would make no change in the clothing of the regulars, but would clothe the irregulars more in accordance with the native dress, 3441-3443.—Considers that an army of 40,000 Europeans and 80,000 natives, exclusive of irregulars and the police, will be required for Bengal. The native cavalry to be on the irregular system, part of the infantry to be on the regular, and part on the irregular system, 3444-3464.—The artillery to be all Europeans, 3465.—Would employ as few natives as possible as sappers and in the arsenals, 3466-3469.—Must enlist in the army much the same description of persons as has hitherto been the case. The castes should be mixed promiscuously throughout the regiments, 3470-3473.—Has known difficulties to accrue from caste, but they ought not to do so, 3474-3476.—The troops should be enlisted for general service, 3478.—No advantage would be gained by dividing the Bengal army, 3479-3482.—If the Commander-in-chief were in a more central position, it would obviate the necessity for any such division, 3483, 3484.—It would be advisable to increase the Madras and Bombay armies, 3485.—Change much required in the system of promotion. Would not have any native commissioned officers in regular regiments, 3486-3491.—It would be a good arrangement to have two European serjeants attached to each company, 3492.—The native commissioned officers of the Bombay army are superior to the native officers of Bengal, but considers that native officers are not required. A native officer of inferior caste is less respected in his regiment than a Brahmin recruit, 3493-3498.—Native officers are required in irregular corps, because there are fewer European officers. In regular regiments, a native officer is in an anomalous position, 3499-3503.—If the number of European officers in the regular regiments were reduced, the native officers would equal those of the irregular corps. Every officer in excess of the number required for the performance of duty is an injury to the service. That excess encourages idleness. A few officers selected for superior qualifications would render a regiment more efficient than a large number not so selected, 3504-3513.—Much larger powers should be given to commanding officers of regiments to reward and punish, 3514, 3515.—It would be highly beneficial to have permanently attached to European regiments in India certain native companies. They would always move with the European regiments, and be under the command of a major or captain, who would be responsible for the interior economy and discipline of the corps, 3516-3536.—Does not think the arming the Europeans with a superior arm to that given to the natives would be any objection to his plan. At Gwalior the Queen's regiments had the percussion musket, while the native troops were armed with flint and steel, 3537-3545.—It is just as well that natives should not be taught to fire at long distances. If told that their arm is effective at 1400 yards, they are very likely to keep at that distance, 3546-3550.

CAPON, Major-General DAVID, C.B.

Is a major-general in the Bombay army; has been 48 years in the service; has served in the field with Madras and Bengal troops, 3558-3561.—If the Bengal army is kept up in the same state of undiscipline as that in which he saw it, a large proportion of Europeans (one-half) will be required, 3562.—One-fourth in the other presidencies will be sufficient, 3564.—Would let the Europeans have a superior arm to the natives, 3566, 3567.—Should like to see the army and police force totally distinct, 3569.—Included the police in the proportions he has given of Europeans and natives, 3571.—Europeans are required to keep both the sepoys and police force in check, 3573, 3574.—A much smaller native army will now be required for Bengal. The Bengal army has been indulged; four men are allowed for one sentry in Bengal, and only three in Madras and Bombay, 3575-3579.—Cannot form an opinion as to the European force required for Bengal, 3580.—Should think that 12,000 Europeans, exclusive of artillery, will be enough for Bombay, 3582.—The Bombay and Madras native artillery might be kept up, 3585.—Would not have native horse artillery, 3586.—Would not approve of native artillery for Bengal, 3587.—If a well-disciplined native army was established in Bengal, one-third instead of one-half of Europeans would suffice, 3588, 3589.—The system of the Bengal army is so lax it cannot be depended upon. Has seen the sentry at the tent of the officer commanding a division at Moultan, lounging about only half clothed, 3590-3594.—Would have the cavalry on the irregular system, 3595.—The infantry also, 3597.—The present number of European officers with native regiments would be sufficient if they were present, but they are not, and great inconvenience arises, 3598, 3599.—Has commanded a brigade and division, but generally a regiment. When he first went to India there were twenty-six European officers with his regiment. Has lately had only eight or ten present, and many of them undrilled; this has had a bad effect, 3600-3604.—Regimental officers are taken for staff appointments from their regiments without the commanding officer being consulted, 3607.—Promotion of native non-commissioned officers should be made by selection, 3608-3610.—Under the seniority system the men do not care for their officers, 3611.—Ever looked to the native officers as responsible for the interior economy in the men's lines, 3612.—The native officers should not be put under an ensign who does not know his work, and for that reason the irregular system the best, 3613, 3614.—Would give three or four companies to native, the rest to European officers, 3614.—System of promotion by selection entails communication between the European and native officers, and is therefore preferable to the seniority system, 3618.—There ought to be at least four European officers in a regiment of irregular cavalry, 3620.—With a native infantry regiment, fifteen, 3621-3623.—Should not like to see the regular regiments done away with altogether. Infantry regiments with only a few officers would not have a mess, and a regiment of infantry without a mess would degenerate, 3627.—Officers of the irregular cavalry are kept more on active service than the officers of an infantry regiment stationed for two or three years in a cantonment, and do not, therefore, require a mess so much, 3628-3630.—Would not introduce into the army the native gentry as officers, 3631.—Caste ought not to be acknowledged, except in the embarkation of troops, when dry provisions are laid in for the high-caste Hindoo, 3632-3638.—Enlistment should be for general service, 3641.—The Bengal army overgrown. If half the army was for Lower Bengal and half for the Punjaub and Upper Provinces, it would be an advantage, 3639-3648.—Three years not too long to keep a regiment at the same station, but five is, 3650.—Cantonments of 5,000 men would be better than small detachments, 3652.—The powers of a commanding officer in Bombay are sufficient, 3653.—Never heard in Bombay of petitions being sent direct to the Commander-in-chief. Such practice strikes at the root of all discipline, 3654-3656.—Natives and Europeans should be raised only by brigades, 3659.—Sent up to the adjutant-general the names

of those havildars only whom he recommended for promotion, 3660-3663.—Never sent any names that a choice might be made, 3662.—Never had any complaints from men passed over, but it is beneficial to have officers of experience in command of companies; if all were boys the system might be abused, 3665.—No major is removed from the command of a regiment, but the lieutenant-colonel, under whom the major may be serving, is moved to the command of a regiment in which no field officer is present, in order that the not transferable major may obtain the command of his own regiment. It would be an improvement to remove the majors. Has himself been sent to three or four regiments in two years, 3666-3670.—The removal of majors was stopped in Bombay by orders from the Supreme Government, 3672.—Some of the native officers in the Bombay army were more efficient than some of the younger European officers, 3673.—They manœuvre a battalion very well, 3675.—The Bengal native officers appear to be much older than they ought to be, 3679.

WINTLE, Colonel EDMUND.

Has been thirty-nine years in the service, thirty-four of which in India. Belonged to the Bengal presidency, 3680-3684.—Taking all branches of the service, Europeans should be in the proportion of one to three, 3688.—Would have regular and irregular native infantry, 3691.—Promotion among the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers in Bengal goes by seniority, 3695, 3696.—Commanding officers of native regiments have not sufficient power, 3701.—Men appeal from them direct to the Commander-in-chief, 3701-3705.—Artillery should be European only, 3707.—Natives should not have the Minié rifle, 3709.—Powers taken away of late years from commanding officers described, 3715.—There must be native sappers and miners for the manual labour, 3720.—Castes should be distributed throughout regiments, 3723.—Inconvenience arises from the necessity of attending to caste in some matters, 3725.—Believes caste is not so much attended to at the other presidencies as at Bengal, 3732.—Practice of weekly guards is now going out, 3744.—Natives should be enlisted for general service, 3749, 3750.—Promotion of natives should be by selection, 3757.—Commanding officers have very little power in granting leave of absence, 3758.—Rule for granting it, 3759.—Establishment of officers sufficient, 3761.—Officers try to get on the staff, but not in civil appointments more than in military, 3766.—Native officers are of little use, 3769.—Would rather be without them, 3772.—Native gentlemen would not enter the line, 3774.—Would not put more European non-commissioned officers to native regiments, 3775, 3778.

VIVIAN, Major-General Sir ROBERT J. H., K.C.B.

Is a major-general on the Madras establishment; has been about 38 years in the service. Was adjutant-general of the Madras army five years, 3779, 3780.—Is in favour of a large body of European troops raised for service in India alone. It is essential that there should be likewise a large body of troops of the line. The bulk of the troops should be local, because troops of the line are liable to be withdrawn from India to meet emergencies elsewhere, 3782.—Troops raised for service in India would be only withdrawn under most extraordinary emergencies; the same emergencies would not arise if there are two separate forces, as there would be more troops at home; and if it was necessary to withdraw some troops from India, it might be done without the same risk, because there would be a fixed portion of troops there for service, 3782-3787.—Is aware that the European force is limited by Act of Parliament, 3788.—This force should be increased, 3789.—The advantage of a local force over regiments of the line, in a very great measure depends upon the liability of the latter to be removed, 3790.—Considers it is an advantage to instil fresh blood into India, but it does not meet the disadvantage of the troops being withdrawn on any great emergency, 3791, 3792.—The local European troops in India are equal to any troops in the world; no difference in their discipline or efficiency, 3793.—There always has been, and always will be, a certain amount of jealousy, 3794.—It is the object of military organization to prevent jealousy if it can be prevented, 3795.—Emulation exists in different regiments, but it exists to a greater extent when the services are distinct, 3797.—Though the whole of the European troops in India will be under Her Majesty, if the two armies are kept really distinct, there will be jealousy, 3798.—As a question of discipline and military organization, it never occurred to him when in India to make distinction between the two services, 3799.—Believes that regiments in India are ordinarily in as fine a condition as regiments kept in England, 3800.—Advocates a local European force on financial grounds; employment must be provided for the officers whose services are at the disposal of the Government, in consequence of the mutiny of the native army;—the cost of the European officers of a regiment to and from India amounts to 11,000*l.*, and if the whole force now required in India were composed of troops of the line, there would be from 6,000 to 7,000 men continually on the seas, 3801.—If the existing officers were all accepted into regiments of the line, his argument on the ground of providing employment would drop, 3804.—The expense of a regiment in each service is nearly equal, 3805.—Independent of the regiments sent out as reliefs, draughts would be necessary for both services, 3806.—Presuming that regiments of the line are to form the European force in India, their reliefs will be an extra expense to the Indian finances, 3807.—The draughts are the same either way, 3808.—There would be a downright saving to the State by the force being local, 3809.—A European local corps is quite as efficient as a regiment of the line, 3812.—Would bow to the Duke of Wellington's opinion, but does not consider the local troops in India inferior, 3813-3815.—Has seen differences in Queen's regiments; all regiments cannot be kept up to the same state of discipline, 3816.—A European officer of the Indian army, after certain service, may retire on a pension, which is a charge on the resources of India, while no pension is paid to the Queen's officers; so far, the Indian finances would be relieved, 3820-3826.—A large increase to the establishment at Warley would be necessary, but even then the expense of a local force would not be the same, 3828.—Knows no reason why a recruit should cost the Indian Government more than he costs Her Majesty, 3830.—Has heard that Lord Hardinge recommended a frequent relief of the Royal troops, 3833.—Local corps desirable, because they have more experience of the climate, 3834.—Is surprised that regiments from Australia suffer more than regiments arriving from England, 3837.—Regiments on first arrival in India are subject to greater mortality than they are afterwards, 3838.—Local experience is of great importance; instanced by the case of Her Majesty's 71st regiment, 3839.—Considerable relief might be given to the recruiting at home by the admission of Indo-Britons into the local force, 3841.—They might also be introduced into the line. Pensioners from the local force select India for their place of residence, 3842.—Men discharged from the line do not stay in India, 3843.—The larger the local force, the larger will be the body of veterans and pensioners, 3845.—Veteran companies are not open to men of the line, 3847.—Local corps is the natural source from which the men required for the public works department are taken, 3848.—A local regiment quite equal to a regiment of the line, 3849.—The men of the local force fraternise and intermarry more with the natives than the men of the line, 3850.—Advocates a local force on account of the number of officers without employment in Bengal, 3852.—Does not think there is more than sufficient to officer 100,000 men, 3854.—If all these officers are employed by being attached to regiments of the line, the argument on the point of expense falls to the ground, 3855.—Was not aware that the local regiments have been invariably below their establishment 3850.—From the return of the military forces in India, the European foot artillery of the Company was, in 1852, 5173, and in 1857, 4390. These numbers in each year are more than the establishment. The European infantry regiments in 1852 had 449 supernumeraries; in 1853, 500. They were wanting to complete in 1854, 2125; in 1855, 933; in 1856, 545; and in 1857, 357. Recruiting fell off during the Crimean war, but increased again in 1856-57. Return of the recruits embarked for India from 1851 to 8th October 1858 inclusive, 3857.—Previous to 1853 the Company had the power of raising only 12,000 Europeans to be kept in India and 2,000 at home; in 1853 this power was increased to 20,000 men in India and 4,000 at home; in 1857 there were only 357 wanting to complete. Recruiting has been recently suspended because there were not barracks for the men, and the men have been sent out in a manner in which they would not ordinarily be sent, 3859-3865.—One-fourth or one-third of the European force in India should be regiments of the line. It is quite impossible to have in India less than from 60,000 to 70,000 Europeans, 3866.—Would have fewer regiments of the line than formerly because of the expense, 3867.—Contemplates raising this additional local force in the same manner as the force is now raised; attaches great importance to the local army, both officers and men, 3869-3875.—The establishments here must be increased. Recruiting for a large army in India and here is a difficult thing, but the

establishments would be able to raise them, 3875–3878.—A large majority of the 8,000 recruits sent out being only 5 ft. 2 in. does not prove the facility of recruiting, 3879.—Has no doubt that recruiting for two services may have the disadvantage of increasing desertion, but thinks that it might easily be checked, 3881.—Although there was 783 fewer foot artillerymen in India in 1857 than in 1852 they had supernumeraries to the last, 3882.—In 1852 there were 5,173; in 1857, 4,390; the establishment was 4,252, 3883.—Is not sure whether the half-castes are permitted to enlist, 3886.—At present there is a feeling against half-castes, because they have not the requisite stamina, 3889.—Would not disband regiments of the line to form local corps, but in lieu of sending out a regiment to relieve any regiment going home, would raise a local corps, 3890.—The pensioners of the Indian army not to be considered as part of the local force, two-thirds of any European force to be kept in India should be enlisted for local duties. There should be local artillery, cavalry, and infantry, both the armies to be Royal armies, 3892–3900.—The only change to be that the army is to be called a Royal army instead of being the army of the Company. Her Majesty is, through certain instrumentality, to exercise the same authority over both armies, 3901–3906.—Sees no objection to one army being responsible to the Secretary of State for War, and Commander-in-chief, and the other to the Secretary of State for India, 3907–3908.—Knows of no parallel case to the position the Government now holds as regards India, 3911.—Considers the Act definitive, that all the charges of that army are vested in the President in Council, 3913.—Sees no difficulty with regard to discipline in two armies, 3915.—Is not aware of any inconveniences which has arisen from the present arrangement, 3916.—The local army must be under the authority of the Governor-General, 3917.—It would detract from the prestige of the Governor-General to withdraw from him the supreme control of the army, 3918.—If the authority of the Commander-in-chief was established over the local army there might be conflicting opinions between him and the Council, 3920.—Measures might be proposed by him which the Council would not carry out, 3921.—Thinks that there would be collision between the Commander-in-chief and the Council of India, 3922–3927.—While there is a large native army the Governor-General should have over it the supreme authority, 3928.—Has never known an officer of Her Majesty's service appointed to superintend a court-martial on native troops, 3929.—Considers local knowledge and experience of the highest importance, 3932.—Competition in recruiting may be objectionable, but cannot conceive what difference it will make if parties are permitted to recruit for India, treating it as part of the same army, 3933.—There is objection to depending entirely on volunteering for keeping up the local establishment, 3935.—Volunteering to a certain extent advantageous, 3937.—If the bulk of the European force be composed of the line, the expediency of a transport service might be considered. Is doubtful whether it would be advantageous to have a depôt at the Cape, 3938–3940.—With reference to the claims of the officers now in the service, considers a consolidation of the two services impracticable, 3941–3949.—There can be nothing unfair in a prospective arrangement. If the army in India is to be composed entirely of regiments of the line the sooner that arrangement is made the better, 3950.—If any portion of the army is continued a local army, and the military funds were allowed to drop, it would be a most fatal error, 3952.—The funds may to a certain extent encourage early marriages, 3953.—No advantage to the public service would accrue from exchanges, 3954.—The Government contribute largely to the funds, 3955.—The contribution of Government is less than the pensions would amount to if these funds were abolished, 3958.—Would encourage volunteering from the Queen's into the local force. The nucleus of a new corps to be attached to a Queen's regiment until officers and men become acquainted with their duties. Officers of native infantry regiments would require some such training, 3961.—Although a young officer is more likely to be thoroughly initiated in his military duties in a European than a native regiment, is not favourable to the system of attaching all cadets to European corps, 3962.

Lugard, Major-General Sir Edward, K.C.B.

Has been in the army since 1828, and served in India 26 years; the staff appointments he has held 3963–3965.—The whole of the European troops in India should belong to the line, 3966.—This would be advantageous for imperial purposes, for discipline, and efficiency, 3967.—A tendency to a looseness of discipline in India, 3968, 3969.—A regiment too long in India deteriorates; after 12 or 15 years, it suffers from the climate, 3970–3983.—The efficiency caused by reliefs would counterbalance the expense, 3984, 3985.—Strongly objects to increasing the local force, 3990, 3991.—The local force does not mix more with the natives than does the line, 3992–3994.—The interpreter at head quarters for many years was a Queen's officer, 3995–3997.—If a career was opened to line officers, they would study the language, and the Government would have a larger field from which to select officers, 3998–4002.—If there was a large line army in India, many officers would devote their lives to India, 4003, 4004.—Many soldiers of the Queen's regiments speak the language, 4006.—The local regiments generally below their strength; Queen's regiments have been above their strength, 4007.—Local corps more lax in discipline than line troops, 4011–4019.—A regiment coming from England, brings with it an improved system, 4024.—A great army should have one interest, 4025, 4026.—Would make service with native troops a superior service, 4028.—Would raise the pay of the officers of native regiments; they will then take an interest in their corps, 4029–4033.—Advocates one European Queen's army, 4034.—The officers for the native corps should be selected from the European regiments, 4036.—For many years the discipline of the Bengal army has been very lax, 4039.—A local force is always inferior to a line force, 4040–4048.—Some reliefs should be sent direct from England, others should take a tour, 4050.—Recommends a steam transport service round the Cape, and 300 soldiers being sent viâ the Red Sea every month, so long as that route is open, 4051.—The Cape an advantageous climate for soldiers returning form India, 4052.—Cannot suggest any arrangement by which exchanges between officers of the two services could be effected; the amalgamation of the services must be prospective, 4056.—Exchanges would be desirable if they could be effected, 4057–4059.—Volunteering from regiments leaving India should be encouraged; recruits should be drilled before they go out to India, 4060.

Holland, Colonel James.

Is colonel on the retired list of the Bombay establishment. Served 32 years in India, principally on the staff. Was for the six last years quartermaster-general of the army, 4065.—A portion of the European force for India should be from the line, and a portion raised for service in India only, 4067.—Local European force should be strong enough to be self-dependent, and should be a powerful body as compared with the line, 4067, par. 2.—Beyond having more officers, can detect no superiority in the line over the local force. On the other hand, the officers of the local force have the advantage of local information and experience, 4067, par. 3.—If the local force were increased more officers would be available for staff, and the number withdrawn from regiments would be reduced, 4067, par. 4.—Increase of the line officers would place in the superior commands in India a body of officers without experience of the country, 4067, par. 4.—No European regiment is acclimatized till after a residence of two or three years, 4067, par. 4.—One-half only of the European force, cavalry and infantry, should be of the line, 4067, par. 5, 4068.—All the sappers should be local, 4067, par. 5—Entire establishment of artillery should be supplied by the local army, 4067, par. 6.—60,000 Europeans will hereafter suffice for the garrison of India, 4069.—About 24,000 of these should be of the line, 4070.—Line force should not be larger than before, 4071.—A local force could not be withdrawn from India, 4073.—Opinions of Governors-General on this point, 4073.—In India the army should be mainly at the disposal of the local authorities, 4079.—Governor-General should have at his disposal a large body of officers trained from youth in India, and with no views beyond India, 4074.—Reliefs for the line could be effected much as at present. Reliefs cannot now be carried out as frequently as is desirable, 4075.—Line regiments should not be kept in India too long, so as to become localised, 4076.—Officers by long service in India become more efficient for their duties there, but not for duties elsewhere, 4077.—A large body of experienced men is necessary for India, 4078.—Many line officers after serving years in India, leave the country with little knowledge of it, 4080.—In the event of a war in Europe a line officer would throw up his appointment in India, to join his comrades in Europe, 4081.—The officers from the Company's armies, who were in the Turkish Contingent, were on leave, or had retired from the service, 4083.—Officers should adopt India as their country, 4084.—That is the great hold we have on India, 4085.—A minimum number of officers should be fixed to

be always present with regiments. Quality of officers of far more importance than their number. Field officers and commanders of regiments should be selected. Useless and incompetent men should be compelled to retire. Government should have the power of dispensing with their services when they are entitled to a pension, 4086.—They have not that power now, 4089.—Cadets might be appointed in England to the European or native branches according to their qualifications or choice. They should be equally eligible as now for staff employ, 4096.—Commander-in-chief of the three presidencies should be independent of each other, 4096, par. 2.—No Commander-in-chief or divisional general should be nominated to an Indian command who has not had local experience, 4096, par. 2.—An amalgamation of the two services most undesirable, 4096, par. 3.—It could not be effected without seriously compromising the prospects of the officers of the Indian army, 4096, par. 3.—Local force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, 4096, par. 4.—Large line force now in India might be reduced gradually, or be transferred by volunteering, 4103. And the officers placed on half-pay, 4104.—Recruiting for a local force would not materially interfere with the recruiting for the line, 4106.—Local force has not been kept to its full strength, owing to financial considerations, 4109, 4111.—Line regiments cost more because of the cost of reliefs, 4112.—A regiment newly landed and sent into the field loses men from their not being acclimatized, 4114.—Discipline in local regiments as good as in the line, 4120.—It is an advantage to the royal service to have royal artillery in India, but it would be disadvantageous to the public service to have any considerable portion of it there, 4124.—If the local governments had the power of altering the dress of the Enropean soldier, it would be beneficial, 4130.—Uniform is not suited to the climate of India, 4134.—Troops in India wear light clothing during the hot weather, but not sufficient, 4143.—Officers of the line are always liable to be re-called from India, 4165.—Lieutenant-colonels in the Indian army are available for general service, and are constantly brought into contact with natives, 4170.—Line officers would not have the abiding interest in India that the local officers have, 4171.—If it be wished to get for the Indian service the greatest number of efficient men, the main body must be a local force, 4171.—Officers do not associate so much with natives as formerly, 4174.—Local force should be increased, otherwise they will not carry much weight, 4176.—Very great advantage arises to the English army from having troops of the line in India, 4177.—Local force must be recruited in England, 4181.—There might be the army of the east and the army of the west, 4183.—With one exception there is no instance of a commander-in-chief in India being selected from the local officers, 4184.—Officers of the line have much the greater proportion of commands, 4184.—The chief honour falling to officers holding superior commands, it follows that the line officers reap those honours more than the local officers, 4187.—Local army should be irrespective of the control of the Commander-in-chief here, 4190.—Native army could not be efficiently officered by line officers, 4193.—If there were only a native local army it would be looked down upon, 4195.—Company's officers have not their full proportion of honours, 4204.—Number of officers holding divisional and brigade commands, 4206.—Queen's troops in India should be auxilliary to the Company's troops, 4208.—Proportion between the Queen's and Company's troops in Bombay, 4209.—Native officers should be retained, 4200.

Franks, Major-General Sir T. H., K.C.B.

Has served in India fifteen years, 4212.—Recently commanded a division in the field, 4213.—European force in India should be wholly composed of troops of the line, 4214.—Reasons for this opinion, 4215.—Such a force more efficient, 4216.—Regiments coming fresh from England an advantage, 4218.—After a lengthened service in India discipline deteriorates, 4220.—Twelve or thirteen years service long enough, 4221.—Nothing can surpass the gallantry of the local force, but it is not equal in discipline to the line, 4222.—As respects discipline a great deal depends on the commanding officer, 4224.—Has known regiments in first-rate order after a long service in India, but these are rare exceptions, 4229.—In sixteen years his regiment, the 10th foot, has had 1,200 casualties of all kinds, 4231-4233.—Local experience is of the greatest advantage, but it could be acquired in five or six years, 4235, 4236.—One of the causes of the local force not being in such good discipline in quarters is the paucity of officers, 4238.—Company's officers generally made more efficient staff officers than the line; but recently Her Majesty's force in India has produced numbers of first-rate staff officers, 4240.—Making them eligible for staff employ has created the difference, 4242.—Until lately very few staff appointments were open to them, 4244.—They have not had an undue proportion of high commands, 4245, 4246.—If employments were open to them they would prepare themselves for them, 4253.—The two services have not equal claims to employment on the staff, 4254.—Supply of light clothing in India is regulated by an order of the Commander-in-chief in India, 4259-4262.—It is paid for entirely by the men, 4265, 4266.—The uniform is regulated by Her Majesty's warrant, 4268.—Is in favour of sending troops by way of the Cape of Good Hope, 4270.—A regiment should not be kept in India beyond twelve or thirteen years, and for three years of that it should be cantoned at a hill station, 4273.—Does not see how exchanges between the two services are to be carried out; but the advantages would be great, if it could be so arranged. Under the present system the army cannot be efficient, 4274.—Two separate armies, with different discipline, very objectionable, 4275.—Native troops should be the same as the colonial corps, 4276.—Officers with them would not be looked down upon, 4277.—Line officers would go into them, 4278.—An officer could not command a native regiment without speaking the language, 4286.—Any system of exchange must apply to officers hereafter entering the service, 4289, 4290.—The claims of officers now in the service being duly considered, the question is a simple one, 4292.—Force should be kept up by recruits from England. System of volunteering is most injurious, 4297.—Unless there is one united army in India, there will never be a perfectly effective one, 4298.—Recruiting for two separate armies is a great disadvantage, 4299.—Is strongly opposed to filling up vacancies in any regiment in India, line or local, by volunteering, 4301.

Renny, Charles, C.B.

Was surgeon-general and member of the medical board in Bengal, 4302.—Was forty-four and a-half years there, 4303.—Is of opinion that troops should be raised for service in India only, 4306.—Health of local troops has been as good as that of the line under considerable disadvantages, 4307.—The best men are withdrawn from the local regiments for staff appointments, 4312.—A European soldier should be efficient for at least fifteen years, 4315.—Considers this the limit, 4316.—European troops should be located in stations as elevated as possible, and well and carefully selected, 4321.—Reliefs should arrive in India in October or November. They should be sent viâ the Cape in steamers, 4322.—Loss of men would be greater by the Overland route, 4324.—Clothing of the troops in India is too thick and warm, 4329.—It is said they are not permitted to wear the light clothing they have, 4331.—Owing to regimental regulations, 4336.—Indian medical service is a military branch, but a portion is employed on civil duties, 4347.—Force could not be kept up by volunteering alone, 4349.—Company's recruits are rather inferior, 4351.—New barracks are better than the old, 4355.—They are somewhat raised, and the more recently erected have upper rooms, 4356.—Regiments in first going out suffer much from cholera, 4359.—Arrack most detrimental to health, 4360.—Beer has a beneficial effect, 4363.—Hospitals are much improved, 4364.—In Bengal the average mortality is about 5 per cent. per annum, to strength, 4373.—At Bombay about the same; at Madras 3 per cent., 4374.

Martin, James Ranald, F.R.S.

Belonged to the medical staff of the Bengal army; was twenty-two years in India, 4378.—Is the author of a work on the influence of tropical climates on European constitutions, and of various reports on the sanitary condition of the army of India, 4380.—Submits the result of inquiries as to the effect of tropical climates on the constitution of Europeans, officers and soldiers, 4383, (1).—No advantage in the way of acclimation has hitherto been derived from length of residence, 4383, (4).—Annual mortality after certain periods of residence, 4383.—Reasons for the large mortality in regiments on first arrival in India, 4383, (7).—Suggestions with respect to securing the efficiency of European troops in India, 4383, (1).—They should be removed to the mountain ranges, 4383.—A man who has suffered severely from the serious diseases of India is generally injured for service in a tropical climate, and should at once be sent home, 4383, (6).—As to the period at which British soldiers should be relieved, it should depend on the state of their health after a service of ten years, 4383.—Statistical reports much required, 4383.—As regards the preservation of European health in India, due selection of locality is the first considera-

tion, 4383.—A series of careful examinations should take place of the lower and medium ranges of hills throughout India, and a medical officer of health should be appointed at each presidency. Suggestions for the investigation of mountain climates in India, 4383.—Prolonged residence in India leads to physical degradation, 4385.—Reliefs should be frequent, 4386.—Climate of the hills will prevent disease, but will not cure it, 4388.—Men sent home owing to acute tropical disease will recover so as to be able to do duty in another climate, 4390.—Men are unwilling to acknowledge illness owing to the heavy hospital stoppages, 4397.—Troops when sent to the hills have been hitherto carried to too great an elevation, 4398.—There are other elevations which have been overlooked, but which would be of extreme value. Names of these, 4401.—Troops should be brought from the hills for exercise from November to March, 4406.—Mortality is always greater among young officers and soldiers, 4415.—Middle-aged officers and soldiers have always far outworked the younger, 4418.—Physically, there is no such thing as acclimation, 4423.—Had never seen a good barrack in India, 4424.—The one in Sind, erected by Sir Charles Napier, is said to be very fine, 4424.—Cholera invariably attacks the dissipated, 4428.—Soldiers inhabiting the lower ranges of barracks suffer more than those in the upper rooms, 4430.—Barracks in tropical climates should be raised on arches; they should be two stories high, and the roof should be double, 4435.—They are generally built on the ground in India, 4436.—Average age of a British regiment may be set down at 26 years; a Company's regiment the same, 4439, 4440.—Present clothing suitable only for the cold season, 4445.—Soldiers should not be called on for their utmost exertion till they are 23 years of age, 4451.—Under proper regulations, a soldier may serve many years in India, 4452.—Spirit ration an injury, but a dram after dinner does no harm, 4453.—In the morning it is deleterious, 4454.—Establishment of convalescent hospitals, a great desideratum, 4461.—Army of India should not be composed exclusively of troops of the line. Soldiers should be raised for service in India only. There should be model battalions of the Queen's army. The two armies should be maintained as separate and distinct bodies. Has not been able to arrive at any scheme of exchange from one branch to the other. Opinion of the Duke of Wellington quoted, 4462. Competition more important than unity of action, 4463.—Never saw or heard anything but a good feeling of emulation between the two services, 4446.—Immense advantage, no doubt, would result from the interchange of eminent officers, 4468.—There is a double staff in India. On the plea of competition this may be an advantage. Is not aware of any disadvantage from this beyond the expense, 4474, 4475.—The local force should be more than the half, 4477.—Soldiers who have served in India are averse to European service afterwards, 4480.—There is little difference in the sickness of a line and a local regiment, 4485, 4486.—Any plan of exchange leaving out the relative condition of age between officers would be prejudicial, 4489.—Company's regiments not so smart as those recently arriving, but this has never detracted from their efficiency in the field, 4494.—Regiments coming from home will always be held up as patterns, 4498.—No difference in recruits sent out. Those for the artillery fine, 4504.—Drafts should arrive the first or second week in November, 4505.—Discharged men from the Company's service re-enlist, 4506.—Good discipline is a most powerful element in the health of a regiment, 4512.—Permanent regiments are more agreeable to the natives than regiments coming and going, and this is advantageous, 4515, 4516.

TULLOCH, Colonel Sir ALEXANDER, K.C.B.

Is at present attached to the statistical department, War Office. Served four years in India, 4519.—No object can be attained by the employment of a local force which cannot be gained as well by the employment of troops of the line. All the duties could be performed as well or better by the line. Bounty should not be allowed on volunteering in India. Facility of volunteering gives to the soldier all the advantages he could obtain in a local force, without its disadvantages. All military legislation for the last twenty years has been opposed to prolonged tropical service. In the West Indies the term of service has been reduced from eleven or twelve years to three or four years, with the greatest benefit. Mortality at every age among troops for seven years, in every climate, as illustrative of the influence of age in the climates, 4522.—The longer stay in India, the more likely is health to be deteriorated, 4525.—Loss in regiments relieved every ten years must be less than in regiments permanently resident. As respects expense of reliefs, an important change will be made in the local force by the Limited Enlistment Act now coming into operation. If the men wish to come home, they must be discharged at the end of ten years. In the event of a European war, second battalions could be raised for the line force, and the first battalions brought home. Some question of pay, or other coveted advantage, might induce a local force to mutiny. Such a case has arisen. If this happened in a line regiment it could be immediately removed. The larger the army the greater this danger. Whatever force may be employed, the large establishment which will be required in future can only be kept up by a much greater economy of life. Table of mortality for forty years. Proportion invalided, &c. Average number of recruits raised in the United Kingdom annually, 4527.—Selection of healthy stations no longer a matter of choice, but necessity. Abstract sickness and mortality at stations in the Indian presidencies from 1817 to 1836, and 1838 to 1856, 4527.—Comparative estimates of the cost of reliefs by the Cape and Red Sea. Arrangement by which the latter route might be made the cheaper. Forces might be consolidated so as to admit of exchanges from one branch to the other. The officers of the Bengal presidency are in a different position from the others. There the native army no longer exists. Those under the rank of field officer should be liable to be transferred to the new European corps to be formed, and if they decline, should be placed on retired list. At Madras and Bombay they should only be transferred at their own request. Value of their claims on the funds could be calculated, and this should be repaid to those leaving the native army. Great advantages would arise to both armies by the interchange of officers, 4529.—All regiments of the line raised for India might be non-purchasing corps. Local force would be kept up by both recruiting and volunteering, as at present, 4529.—6*d.* a day is stopped from the men's pay on board ship, 4534.—One system under one head would add to the strength of the nation, rather than diminish it, 4536.—Officers of the local force coming home have nothing to do. Line officers are available in both countries, 4539.—Emulation of corps in one army is a different thing from the emulation of two armies, 4541.—If there is to be a large European army it should be entirely local, and all line regiments be withdrawn, 4552.—The two combined would not be good. Regular army derives advantage from service in India, 4553.—Having had a portion of it in India has produced good effects, 4555.—Would prefer 60,000 or 70,000 of the line and a few battalions of the other, if they must be had, 4559.—Present local regiments, and those to be raised, should be numbered as regiments of the line. Officers should be removed to them according to their standing, 4561.—It rests with those who say there should be two armies to show the reasons for it, 4568.—If the whole were a local force, it might involve a serious question as to discipline, 4569.—Expense of reliefs in future will be much the same for both forces, owing to the Limited Enlistment Act, 4572.—Soldiers for the local corps enlist now for ten years only. They do not go out intending to remain more than the others, 4580.—About 2½ per cent. now come home annually, 4581.—Indian Government should repay to officers exchanging from the local force their contributions to the funds, 4582.—Estimate of the cost of converting a sailing 80-gun ship into a screw ship for the conveyance of troops, 4582.—Relative cost of a regiment of the line and of a local European corps, 5983.—Queen's officers returning from India do duty with the depôts. East India Company's officers have none to go to, 5987.—A great number of the civil appointments in India might be filled at a cheap rate by persons from this country, 5995.—A Queen's officer coming home is replaced from the depôt, and the officer coming home goes there, 6002.—Local European corps have more officers with less men, 6009.—Explanation respecting the relative cost of the Cape and Red Sea routes for relief of troops in India, 6011.—Value of a soldier's rations on board ship on 1st May 1858, 6011.—Purchase system provides for one half of the Queen's officers. They cost the public nothing on quitting, 6013.—Cost of retiring pensions in the Queen's and Company's services, 6014.—Value of all the commissions in the army about 7,000,000*l.*, 6016.—2,870 pensioners from the Company's service are paid here, 6021.—These have all very nearly completed 21 years' service, 6023.—They do not remain in India so much as formerly. Reason for this, 6025.—Regiments on embarking for India have a great many men discharged from it as unfit for the service, others are left at the depôt, 6035.—Few of the men are 30 years old, 6037.—Expense of drafts for the two

services about the same, 6038.—Men of local force after serving ten years will now return home, 6039.—On a regiment returning all the efficient men are permitted to volunteer to corps remaining, 6044.—The regiment comes home a skeleton, and a perfect regiment goes out, 6045. —On completion of ten years' service men should come home, 6046.—Men of short periods of service come home, 6048.—Explanation as to the deaths in India between 1815 and 1855, 6051.—Greater portion of that loss might have been saved, 6052.—Health of troops in India equal to that of troops in England, if located on elevated table land, 6057.—About 2,800 feet above the sea the most eligible elevation, 6059.

COTTON, General Sir WILLOUGHBY, G.C.B.

Went to India with the rank of full colonel in 1821, 4584.—Commanded the Madras troops employed in Burmah in 1825-26, with the rank of brigadier-general, 4584.—Has held staff appointments in India, 4584.—Commanded the Bengal troops employed beyond the Indus in 1838 to 1840, 4584.—Was Commander-in-chief at Bombay from 1847 to 1851, 4584.—As India is now under Her Majesty's government there ought to be but one European army, and that called a royal army, 4591.—It should be recruited wholly in England, but regiments coming home should give volunteers to it, 4591.—Period of service in India of a regiment should not exceed fourteen years, 4591.—It should be a general Queen's army. Great difficulties will arise with respect to the European officers, but they are not insurmountable, 4592.—The Company's European officers should be blended by exchanges with the Queen's army until the whole becomes one system, 4593.—The whole army in India should be formed of Queen's troops from England, 4605.—It should be one army under the Commander-in-chief at home, 4606.—But the authorities at Madras and Bombay should have the power of moving troops, 4607.—Each presidency should still have its Commander-in-chief, 4610.—In the field it is not possible that there should be a more efficient force than the Indian artillery, 4618.—Better staff officers than the Indian army has produced it is not possible to have, 4619.—Europeans and natives have behaved in the most gallant manner, 4620.—Commander-in-chief in England should have the supreme control over the European army in India, 4632.—Local European troops have always behaved remarkably well in quarters, 4649.—Always opposed the withdrawal of more officers from a regiment, if the prescribed quota were already on staff employ, 4651.—Relief of regiments should be effected by large steamers, viâ the Cape of Good Hope, 4660.—It is conducive to discipline and health to have a whole regiment together on board ship, 4661.—Formation of rules regarding the exchanges between officers of the two services most difficult, 4664.—If the difficulties could be got over, such exchanges would be most desirable, 4665. —And an advantage to both services, 4666.

CAMPBELL, Colonel GEO.

Commands the 52nd regiment. Has been in India about four and a half years, 4806, 4807.—Has been latterly on field service at Delhi, 4809.—And commanded a brigade at Lucknow, 4810.—The local force, if it be necessary to have one, should not exceed one-fourth of the number of the troops, 4812.—Would rather the whole European force should be a royal one, 4813.—In the local force the discipline is inferior, 4816-4819.—Officers of European regiments should go out as formed officers, 4823. —Climate would not deteriorate discipline if it were properly looked after, 4832.—Has only seen one line regiment in India in a low state of discipline, 4839.—Relief of troops can only be effected from England, 4845.—Any previous residence at the Cape of no advantage; a depôt for invalids might be formed there, 4846-4849.—Cape route is better than the Egypt route, 4849.—12 years' service in India at the outside should be exacted from regiments, 4850.—Retaining them after a certain period acts disadvantageously, 4854.—Men dislike India most the first two or three years, 4857.—Sees no objection to men exchanging from regiments ordered home to regiments remaining, 4860, 4861.—Exchanges of officers would not be desirable for the local force, 4865.—Local force should be kept up by recruiting and volunteering, 4872-4874.

PRATT, Major-General THOS. S., C.B.

Has been 25 years in India. Was deputy adjutant-general in Her Majesty's forces at Madras, from 1844 to 1856, 4875-4879.—Served in Bengal for nine years, 4880.—And three years in China, 4881.—European force in India should be, if not all together, at least the greater part, composed of troops of the line, 4883. —Reliefs should be effected by troop-ships of the royal navy, both by the Cape and the Red Sea, 4883.—Good feeling and harmony will never be perfect until the armies serving in India cease to be separate bodies, 4883.—All future European troops for service in India, should be regular troops of the line, 4883.—Compulsory subscriptions to the funds for the future, is a question now to be considered, 4883.—Would permit exchanges in all ranks of the two services, 4883.—In native regiments, they would only be admissible in the very junior ranks, 4883.—European force should be kept up solely by recruiting; system of volunteering very objectionable, 4883.—55,000 or 60,000 Europeans ample after tranquillity is restored, 4885.—Would like to see one distinct army in India under one Commander-in-chief, with deputies in the other presidencies, and one set of pay and audit regulations, 4907.—Present powers of Commanders-in-chief at Madras and Bombay, 4908.—Case of a soldier of the 4th regiment convicted of attempt to murder, 4911.—There should be but one army in India to do away with all jealousies, 4912.—Does not think the fact recently of some of the troops not being mutinous was caused by the division of the armies, 4919.—The Madras army was in an admirable state of discipline. Discipline and interior economy of Her Majesty's troops there were nearly perfect, 4924.—Division into three armies has led to a most injurious result, 4927.—Cases where inefficient officers command regiments are isolated cases, 4932.—Exchanges in the junior grades might be effected without injury, 4941.—Officers appointed from England to the native army would not be looked down upon, 4943.—Native army should be small and well armed, 4946.—With the Enfield rifle, 4948.—120,000 natives to 60,000 Europeans ample, 4954.—Would not arm police in the same way, 4957.—System of a local European force should not be perpetuated, 4972.—All new enlistments should be for general service, 4972.—Faith must be kept with the officers now in the service, 4973.—As respects exchanges, the funds make a difficulty; they should not be perpetuated, 4978-4980.—Subscriptions to them should no longer be compulsory, 4985.—Under the 10 years' enlistment Act, soldiers of the local force can claim to come home at the expiration of that period, 4989.—With regard to reliefs for the local force, an expense is incurred in the transfer of individuals if not of a body, 4991.—Officers of the local force have large retiring pensions, 4993.—This expense would be saved by employing a line regiment, 4994.—If men were near their discharge, they would not be sent to India, 4998.—Supercession of Her Majesty's colonels by colonels of the East India Company's service, under warrant of Her Majesty, 1854, 4999.—Proportion of commands in India ordered not to be interfered with by local governments, 5007.—Having one army would do away with jealousies in every possible way, 5011.

RAMSAY, Major BALCARRES DALRYMPLE WARDLAW.

Is brevet major, 75th foot. Has served in India on three different occasions, 5014.—Had charge of the adjutant and quartermaster-general's department at Calcutta, 5015.—The European army in India should be entirely line, 5016.—A double staff most objectionable, 5016.—Quartermaster-general of Queen's troops could not carry into effect the orders he received as to those troops, 5018.—There have been uncomfortable feelings between the officers of the two services, 5021.—This would be rather heightened in future, 5022.—If the officers of the local force were transferred to the line they would consider themselves in a better position, 5025.—Power of exchange would, in a great measure, do away with any feeling of inferiority, 5030.—In all armies a uniformity of feeling is a great advantage, 5032.—Most of the junior officers of the local army would desire to be incorporated with the line, 5034.—The local European corps are decidedly inferior, as respects discipline, 5035.—There is great want of discipline among the Company's invalids, 5037.—The local European corps have comparatively few officers, 5040.—Want of discipline attributable to this, 5041.—Invalids are sent down for embarkation without officers, 5044.—Want of unanimity among the staff would be obviated by having one army only, 5051.—If there is to be a local force, exchanges should be permitted, 5053.—It should be under the Commander-in-chief at home, as respects discipline, 5055.—Subject as now to local orders, 5056.—Officers of native regiments should have extra pay, 5057.—Native army should be officered from the general body of officers, 5058.—Would not make a difference in the arms of the natives, 5061. —Would train them equally well, 5062.—Superior number of appointments held by Company's officers had

something to do with the feelings of jealousy, 5067.—If appointments were thrown open, all would qualify for them, 5068.—Service in India would be far from unpopular, 5069.—Appointments at home should also be thrown open to both, 5070.—Officers of the line appointed to native corps would conciliate the men, 5072.—There has been a careless feeling of late among young officers of native regiments, 5073.—Officers remaining long in India imbibe strong prejudices, 5074.—Good feeling between Her Majesty's line regiments and the native troops, 5076.—Young officers of the present day do not associate with the natives as formerly, 5077.—All the officers of the late Company's service could be employed in India advantageously, 5084.—Has not served with local European corps, 5088.—Natives should be employed away from their homes, 5095.—Drunkenness in a regiment at Calcutta arose from want of proper arrangements for its reception, 5103.

DURAND, Colonel HY. M., C.B

Belongs to the Bengal engineers; has served 28 years in India, 5105, 5107.—Appointments he has filled, 5108.—Was directed to deliver to the Secretary of State the general views of the Governor-General on the organization of the Indian army, 5110.—His own opinions coincide with those of the Governor-General, 5112.—Considers that 45 battalions of European infantry will ultimately suffice for Bengal, and 12 for Madras, and about the same number for Bombay, 5113–5118.—Two-thirds of this force should be local, and one-third of the line, 5119.—A large local force is necessary, upon the principle of economy, for the purpose of affording employment for the officers of the Bengal army, in order to get rid of the useless expenditure of having a large number of officers who have no corps. The military expenditure in 1856–57 was 7,000,000*l.*; for 1857–58, it is estimated at 11,000,000*l.*; also, because a body of officers are required in India, who look upon India, for the greater part of their lives, as their homes, 5120.—The native army is 30,000 in excess of what it was previous to the mutiny; a great number of the officers are temporarily employed in command of these levies, 5121–5124.—The withdrawal of the line regiments will be a slow operation, because the raising the local corps will take time. There would therefore be no inconvenience from the return home of those line regiments which have been raised for this service, 5125.—It is absolutely necessary that India should be free from the danger of a sudden recal of a large body of European troops, in consequence of a European war, 5126.—The responsibility of the withdrawing the troops rests with the Government, but the home pressure will not be withstood, 5128.—In the event of a European war, public opinion, which influences every government here, would be concentrated upon the European difficulty, and the risk to India would be overlooked, 5131.—It takes time to get over the technical difficulties of moving a local force to and fro; the Government would consider the matter before they stripped the Indian empire of that force, 5132–5134.—For the future, India must be held by well balanced forces, and a large permanent European force will always be required. The object of paramount importance is England itself; but that paramount importance is perilled by endangering India, if India be suddenly stripped of troops, 5135–5140.—The local force would be available for service in Europe in case of extreme emergency; but there would be a useful check to its employment in Europe, to the danger of India, without mature considerations, 5142–5146.—The distance of India from this country renders the immediate services of the local force unavailable, 5147.—A large force at home for the purpose of relieving the troops in India, would add to the military power of this country with respect to Europe, but would not give stability to our Indian empire. If the natives see our army always changing, it will have a great political bearing on them, 5148.—The natives are aware that an extreme exertion was made to meet the late Indian emergency, 5149.—They will regard officers unaccustomed to the country as a transient body, and as another element of instability, 5150.—Never observed any difference in the discipline of the local force, as compared with that of the line, 5151.—Not much difference in the discipline of all three armies, 5152.—As the amount of European force to be maintained is the minimum required for India, there should be a check against its recal by its being local, 5153–5156.—Does not consider the local service as a competing force in recruiting against the line. It is all under the Crown, and to all intents a royal army, 5157–5159.—The views and interests of both should be the same, 5160–5162.—The local army is under the Government of India and Secretary of State for India, acting, he supposes, with the advice of the Commander-in-chief in this country, 5163, 5164.—Considers it of great importance that the Governor-General of India and Secretary of State for India should have great powers for India; that country cannot be managed otherwise, 5165–5167.—The armies of India, by the 56th clause of the Act, are directed to continue in their actual position, 5168.—If the local force is increased, the principle upon which the Government of India has been conducted is not altered, 5170, 5171.—Does not consider an increase of the local force would be detrimental to Great Britain, 5172.—Not aware of any injury having resulted to the public service from there having been two armies, 5173, 5174.—Understands the Act for the time being to limit and define the status of the local Indian army, 5175–5179.—Cannot adduce an instance of two armies serving one country under two heads. There is no parallel case to India, 5180.—The two services do not involve a difference of interest; they serve the same executive, 5181–5183.—The home Government on any emergency would not at any time be able to withdraw more than the proportion of line regiments proposed by Lord Canning, 5184, 5185.—The field of India is of great advantage to the officers of England; therefore, would not close that field to the line by having the whole force local, 5186–5188.—The number of colonels of the local force being reduced, the officers of the line would have their proportion of commands, 5189, 5190.—Lord Canning wishes to guard against the risk of the local force being looked down upon by the line by providing for exchanges, 5191–5196.—Exchanges may be regarded in a politic and a personal point of view. Politically, it is desirable that there should be the power of exchange, and if two officers can satisfy their own executives that the exchange is proper with reference to the individuals, it must be a question of pecuniary arrangement between them, 5197–5203.—The strength of the artillery before the mutiny was altogether 78 companies, including contingents, 5204.—The number of officers of artillery unemployed, 5205–5223.—The artillery was under-officered; the cry was always for more officers, 5224–5227.—The raising the local force will be so gradual a process that the disembodiment of the line troops now in India will not throw any number of officers on the country at once, and the advantages of having a local army would overbalance the temporary disadvantages, 5230–5232.—The one is a temporary inconvenience, the other involves the safety of India, 5234.—Because if there was no check on the withdrawal of troops from India it would be very likely to cause the loss of India, 5235.—Because a body of officers accustomed to the country are required who are not liable to be relieved, 5236.—India was in a different state during the Peninsular war to what it is now, 5237, 5238.—If allowed, a portion of the line regiments now in India would volunteer for the local corps, 5239.—Does not consider it an equal hardship to the officer of Her Majesty's service to be unemployed, as it is to the officer of the local service, because the former entered the service liable to be placed on half-pay, and the other on certain conditions which have lately been assured to him by the Act, 5240–5244.—It is to the advantage of the Government to employ the officers accustomed to the country, 5246.—The relative feeling between the officers of the two services, 5248–5253.—Too much care cannot be taken in keeping the armies of the three presidencies distinct. The amalgamation would tend to fuse the three armies together, 5253.—The local European forces of the three armies cannot be amalgamated without fusing all the armies into one, 5254.—The European officers of the local force and the native army have the same interests, 5257.—Instances have occurred in which they have shown a disposition to defend their own interests, 5258.—Not necessary to keep the Line army in preponderance, for the purpose of balancing that interest, if both armies are treated alike, 5261–5264.—Amalgamation would strip the Governor-General of authority by introducing into the local service a system of promotion which would be in no respect under the local government, 5265, 5266.—Considers a local army, looking to the Governor-General and local Commander-in-chief as its immediate superiors, far more closely connected with India than any portion of the general service army, 5265–5275.—Lord Elphinstone's opinion on this point, 5276.—Always looked upon the native portion as auxiliary to the European portion of the army, 5277, 5278.—If political considerations be excluded, one army under one control would be advantageous, 5280.—The discipline of the army in India is brought through the Government of India before the Government here, who consult the Commander-in-chief, 5281.—The Commander-in-chief in England should not exercise direct action upon the local armies without reference to the local governments, 5284.—Because none but the local governments

are competent to deal with the complex regulations, 5285.—This state of things unavoidable where there are three distinct armies, 3286.—It is almost impossible for one government to write instructions exactly to another upon anything which involves these regulations, 5288.—This creates no advantage to the Europeans, but the amalgamation of the European branches would lead to the fusion of the native troops, 5289.—The tendency to assimilate and centralise has been carried too far, the powers of commanding officers of native troops should be increased, 5290 5292.—It has been mainly the Commanders-in-chief who have adopted this centralising system, 5293.—Has heard that jealousies existed between the commanders of the Bombay and Bengal armies, 5295.—Nothing should be done to diminish the power of the local governments; the Commander-in-chief here should not have direct control of the armies in India, everything should be done through the Secretary of State and the Government, 5296–5299.—Considers the Indian army as belonging to the Crown; does not know the working of the Cabinet, 5300–5303.—There is no danger of a small numerical force of the general service army in India being looked down upon by reason of its smallness, whereas there is a great danger of a small local army in the presence of a preponderant line force being regarded as an inferior service, 5304–5306.—As regards the services getting on well together, has not seen any difference, 5307, 5308.—The two services have not been placed exactly on an equal footing by the home authorities, 5309, 5310.—The political advantages of having a local European force overbalances the minor disadvantage of jealousy which may exist, 5311.—A permanent local European force preferable to a system which involves rapid changes and direct action from home upon the armies, 5312.—The position of the Governor-General would be lowered in the eyes of the natives if he had not control of the armies, 5314.—Would give a consultative power to the Commander-in-chief here, to be exercised over the Indian army through the Secretary of State and Government of India, but no direct authority or control over the local Commander-in-chief, 5315–5317.—Not the same advantage to the local artillery in the royal artillery going to India, 5318–5329.—If all the European troops in India were of the line, there must be a large increase to the civil list, because there would not be a sufficient number of officers qualified for the civil appointments, 5330.—Does not consider the presence of the royal artillery in India necessary as an example to the Indian artillery, which as a scientific body are unequalled, 5336.—The officers of a local force look to the local government for promotion, 5339, 5340.—A good commanding officer of a native regiment will most likely make a good commanding officer of a European regiment, 5341.—There is nothing in the habit of dealing with native troops which should preclude the officers of the native infantry doing well with European troops, 5344.—Apprehends a difficulty in obtaining non-commissioned officers; volunteers might be received from the line, 5345–5349.—Some officers prefer serving with natives, others with Europeans; it is an advantage for officers to be trained to both, 5350–5352.—Exchanges between officers of the two services desirable; they would produce a satisfactory feeling, 5353–5356.—Would trust the respective heads of the two armies to protect the forces which they represent against bad bargains and to the personal interest of the two individuals to arrange what either of them should pay, 5358–5361.—If there was no local European force in India, the chance of long and frequent service in India would have a tendency to diminish the number of men of rank and wealth entering the army, 5362.—Would limit the power of exchange to the case where the value of the lives of the parties were equal; the officer exchanging from the local service must satisfy the funds and his own government, and the officer from the line must satisfy his. The Commanders-in-chief and the managers of the funds would arrange it, 5363–5370. The officer exchanging must do whatever is found necessary, in order that he may be a just equivalent for the man he replaces, 5371–5376.—Exchanges would seldom take place except in the junior ranks; the adjustment of the claims would be difficult, but not impossible, 5378–5380.—It would facilitate the arrangement if the Government undertook the liabilities of the funds, 5381–5383.—The sympathy of the people is against us in that part of the country where the military operations are being carried on, 5385.—The preponderance of the Punjaubee element in our present native army very dangerous, and on this account Lord Canning urges that the views of the Home Government should be sent to him without delay, and that a local Bengal army should be immediately placed on a footing which will permit the Government at once to proceed to reduce this Punjaubee element, 5386.—Lord Canning proposes to raise some local European battalions, and augment the artillery, 5387.—Comparative advantages in augmenting the local artillery to sending to India more royal artillery, 5388–5411.—There has been an assimilation of the grades of officers of the Indian with the royal artillery, but no augmentation, 5413, 5414.—No want of employment for artillery officers; there is a deficiency of officers, 5415–5420.—Would not change the Bengal organization on account of the expense, 5421–5427.—Artillery in India should always feel that it has European horse and foot for support, 5428.—The detachment system, comprising more men than the Bengal system, is the most efficient for service; but it would not be advantageous to put the whole of the artillery in India on that system, 5430.—In a military point of view an increase to the establishment would be advantageous, but not in a financial one, 5431–5437.—Believes that batteries have often been left with only one officer, 5439.—The The Indian artillery is under officered, 5441.—The materiel of all the artillery should be of the same pattern, 5442.—Until a local army is formed the Government in India is exposed to the chance of the European troops being withdrawn from emergency at home. No time should be lost in forming this force, 5497.—It would take eighteen months to form a regiment, 5451.—The effect of European recruits being sent out is important on the people, 5452.—A body of trained men would have a greater effect as regards military efficiency in the field, but a local force would have more moral influence, 5453–5456.—Advocates a local army because officers and men become acclimated, 5457–5465.—The order directing commanding officers to be selected, emanated from home, 5469.—Great stress is laid on the necessity of increasing the powers of commanding officers; it is therefore a matter of great moment that the officers who join the army should be officers of higher attainments than youths of sixteen usually are, 5470.—The power of selection must be exercised with wisdom and discretion, 5474.—As far as his experience goes the appointment for brigade and divisional commands has been by selection, 5475.—Officers have repeatedly been transferred from the command of natives to the command of Europeans, 5479.—The Punjaubee levies are not under the Articles of War; commanding officers can dismiss for misconduct, and the board of administration can increase or diminish the force, 5480–5484.—The commanding officer of a native regiment should have great power, 5487.—Would not limit the Crown in the selection of the Commander-in-chief, 5491–5493.—The position of the Commander-in-chief in India if selected from the local force, 5494–5497.—The army, both European and native, must be subordinate to the Government of India, 5499.—Reasons for retaining the commissioned grades in the native army. Promotion should be made for merit combined with seniority, 5500–5507.—Grounds on which the Governor-General advocates having 10 small European cavalry regiments, rather than five large regiments, 5508–5510.—Would divide the Bengal army, but keep them under one command, 5511–5514.—Equalizing the three armies would not have the same effect. Very desirable to keep the presidential armies distinct, 5515–5517.—Would confine the Madras and Bombay troops to their respective presidencies, 5518–5520.—Grounds on which separate armies are advocated, 5521–5529.—The Bombay army should not be increased more than is recommended, 5530–5533.—The rule for appointment to command is one of selection, with preference to the claims of seniority if not unfit, 5535–5538.—Not aware that the Government has come to any decision as to the constitution of the Bengal army, 5540–5545.—In appointing officers to responsible positions, public interests are the main thing considered. It is not purely personal, but general, motives which gives seniority a claim for consideration. It is equally undesirable to adhere rigidly to the rule of seniority, or to treat with disregard the claims of seniority, 6995–7009.—The local Commanders-in-chief should retain their powers intact, 7014.—The disadvantages attendant on dividing the command of Bengal army greater than the disadvantages arising from the extent of the command, 7015.—As to the expediency of disarming the population of India, 7016–7020.—The police institution must depend on the social state of the people and their feelings towards the Government, 7021–7024.—Native troops should be trained as the European troops, but not armed with the Enfield rifle; all improvements in the small arms should be kept to the Europeans, 7025–7038.—An inferior arm would be perfectly efficient for any service the native army would be called upon to perform, 7039.—The police should not have military training to

the same extent as native soldiers; a marked distinction should be kept up between the two, 7047, 7048.—As far as the commissioned grade the merit of the soldier should predominate in every way. When once a native officer it would be proper to give more consideration to seniority, 7050.—As a general rule regiments should confine their recruiting to particular districts, 7052.—The Bengal sepoys had been led to think themselves of greater value to the state than they ought to have been, 7053–7056.—The extent to which the powers of commanding officers should be increased requires much consideration, 7057.—Opinion is unfavorable to native courts-martial, 7058.—Would prefer European courts, 7059.—A well understood covenant contract with native soldiers sufficient, 7062.—Opinion as to pensions and limited enlistment, 7063–7068.

WILSON, Major-General Sir ARCHDALE, Bart., K.C.B.

Has been 39 years in India, 5547.—The whole time in the Bengal artillery. Commanded the artillery with Wheeler's force in 1849, and the force before Delhi in 1857, 5548.—All the European force in India should be composed of troops of the line, 5549.—There would otherwise be jealousies, and constant supercession of the local officers, 5550.—One system of discipline a decided advantage. In the scientific branches the materiel and equipment should be assimilated, 5551.—A system of relief for these branches advisable, that they may learn improvements at home, 5552.—The royal artillery brought a number of improvements to India, 5553.—Difference between the royal and Bengal artillery, 5555.—There is a difference between the systems of Bengal and the other presidencies, 5557.—The first troop of Bengal artillery was raised to go to Egypt, 5559.—Bengal artillery never had sufficient officers, 5563.—The establishment is not sufficient, 5567.—Non-commissioned officers are much taken away for civil employment, 5570.—The vacancies are not filled up. Corps has always been short of men, 5574.—Bengal artillery would be improved by having the detachment system, 5575.—All the artillery in India should be assimilated, 5577.—This was ordered, but not carried out, 5573-5583.—Having royal artillery in India an advantage to both services, 5585.—Reliefs should go viâ the Cape, 5588.—A European should not serve in India more than 12 years, 5589.—They should be relieved after that time, 5590.—Officers now in the Company's service would not wish to exchange, on account of the pensions they would have to give up, 5591.—Regiments now existing should be maintained, until the present generation of officers is absorbed, 5593.—A local officer exchanging should forfeit all advantages as to funds, &c., 5594.—All hereafter entering the service should come in by purchase. 5597.—It should be on the same footing as the royal army, 5600.—Officers should not be called on to subscribe to the funds, 5601.—There could be no exchange into the local army, 5602, 5603.—If, however, the officer came in junior of his rank, there would be no objection, 5604.—Local officers should be allowed to remove out of the army, but none should be taken in their places, 5608.—All arms of the service should be amalgamated with the royal army, 5610, 5611.—They should be kept in battalions, as now, 5612.—No native artilleryman should be allowed in the service, 5614.—Bengal native regiments may be kept up in name, and the officers employed as thought best, 5617.—They may be employed in any way, provided their rights are secured, 5619, 5620.—If the population are disarmed, 25,000 Europeans would suffice for Bengal, 5625.—Excluding police, would have an equal number of Europeans and natives, 5626.—No native should be allowed the Enfield rifle, 5631.—Present local battalions should be numbered as Queen's regiments, 5638.—Officers, if called on to serve away from India, should not draw Indian rates of pay, 5643–5645.—Those now in the service might be retained in India, unless they preferred to take their share of duties elsewhere, 5647, 5648.—Generally, the wish of the Bengal artillery is to be amalgamated with the royal, 5649.—The two corps have lately served very amicably in India, and both have benefited by working together, 5652.—In time of peace jealousies might arise, 5653.—There is much jealousy between the Queen's and Company's troops, and must be, 5654–5661.—Colonial regiments are looked down upon by the line, 5662.—Officers of colonial corps can exchange, 5668.—No want of efficiency in the royal artillery on landing, 5672.—Stud horses are used in Bengal with the artillery, 5681.—Course of instruction of artillery recruits, 5684.—They should not be trained before going out, 5685.—Fresh companies would take a twelvemonth before they could be fit for any duties in the field, 5689.—Royal artillery has syces and grass cutters, 5691.—No difference of expense between the two corps, 5694, 5695.—Magazines of one presidency are useless for another, owing to want of assimilation, 5701.—Detachment system preferable; it is more perfect, 5711, 5712.

ABBOTT, Major-General Sir FREDERICK, C.B.

Belonged to the Bengal engineers, 5716.—Served in India from 1822 to 1847, 5717.—All the European force for India should be enlisted for local service there, 5720.—A portion of the line might occasionally be sent to learn their duties, 5721.—Reason for having a local force, 5722.—Between 40,000 and 50,000 Europeans only required for India, 5723.—One European to two natives would be a fair proportion, 5724.—Recruiting should be in England only, 5725.—Regiments proceeding to India should be made over to the Commander-in-chief there, 5731.—They are, as it were, lent to India, 5732.—The regiments lent should be an additional force, 5740.—They would be sent chiefly for the benefit of Great Britain, and partly for that of India, 5741.—Their expense should be borne by both, 5743.—India has been acquired chiefly by the aid of the sepoys, 5746.—A certain number of troops should be attached to the soil to guard against India ever being denuded of troops, 5750.—There has been one case of mutiny in the local force, 5754–5755.—This is a contingency not necessary to be taken into account, 5757.—Local force should not be removed beyond the Indian territories. It should be so enlisted, 5759.—Recruiting depôts should be formed on a scale sufficient to enlist the men, 5766.—Recruits in depôt here would be under the Commander-in-chief, 5769.—China and Persia a European question, 5770.—Troops have been suddenly sent to India with danger to Great Britain, 5776.—Safety of England could not depend on troops 10,000 miles off, 5779.—More attention would be given to the wants of England than of India, 5780.—Troops were taken from India for Persia, 5781–5782, and for China, 5783.—By increasing the bounty there would be plenty of men, 5790.—The same number of men will be required whether enlisted for general or local service, 5792.—Safety of India should not be entrusted to Parliament, 5794.—Difficulty of recruiting for a line force would be increased, owing to the reliefs; 8,000 men would be constantly on the voyage, 5799.—Many troops arriving with European ideas shock the natives, 5802.—The prejudices of the natives are not respected or consulted, 5804.—New arrivals cannot take care of their health, and are more likely to come into collision with the people, 5806.—Men think they are in Europe a long time after they are in India, 5808.—Offence is given without the person being aware of it, 5813.—In a local force half the expense of reliefs would be saved, 5814.—Retiring allowances of officers are greater than in Her Majesty's service, 5817.—If the regiment were a moveable one this would be saved, 5818.—Low caste natives should be raised, 5820.—They should not be enlisted for a lengthened period, 5821.—If they desert they do not take their arms or uniform, 5826.—Police should not have fire arms, 5830.—The treasuries should be at large stations, 5837.—European regiments should have only 500 men each, 5838.—Small regiments have as much moral effect in India as large; they have also other advantages, 5839.—Number of regiments should be multiplied instead of strengthening each, 5848.—They would brigade more easily with natives, 5853.—There should be no small detachments in India, 5855.—Local European regiments of 500 men should have about the same number of officers as the native regiments, 5859.—By recruiting from the army, you get better men for the civil service, 5863.—After serving a certain time these officers might be struck off their regiments, 5865.—Non-commissioned officers also must be so withdrawn, 5867.—There would be very little study of the language, if civil appointments were not open to officers, 5872.—It is a great stimulus in every way, 5873.—If it were not for the prospect of civil employment, people would prefer entering the Queen's service, 5877, 5878.—Best regimental officers are not withdrawn for staff, 5881.—Regiments have been under-officered, 5885.—After a certain number of years' civil service, an officer should not be allowed to return to military duty, 5889.—Present system of recruiting does not affect that for Her Majesty's service, 5896.—Indian army too far separated to be united, 5899.—No inconvenient jealousies between the two services, 5902, 5903.—Since staff appointments have been thrown open to them, Queen's officers, to a certain extent, acquire the languages, 5913.—Local officers are excluded from appointments in the colonies, 5916, 5917.—Any system of exchange impossible, 5919.

MCLENNAN, Dr. JOHN.

Belonged to the Bombay medical service, 5920.—Served 32 years in India, from 1822 to 1855, 5922.—Line and local

troops equally good, but men of the line are more carefully recruited, 5924.—A man may serve in India well and efficiently 16 or 18 years, 5925.—Average would probably be 10 to 13 years, 5926.—Volunteering should be allowed to the greatest possible extent, 5928.—More depends on the selection of the men than on any previous service elsewhere, 5928.—Men have been not unfrequently sent to India who were unfit for soldiers, 5928.—This refers to the infantry, the local artillery have been well recruited, 5928. —There should be lock hospitals, and a clergyman with each regiment, 5929.—The men of the different forces might be consolidated, 5930.—As respects the officers there are difficulties, 5930.—They do not, however, appear to be insurmountable, 5930.—Local European force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, 5932.— Such volunteering was formerly permitted, 5932.—Acclimation exists, but men are worn out sooner in India than in Europe, 5933.—A residence of from three to five years renders a man more efficient, 4934.—By residence in India a man's habits change, not his constitution, 5936, 5937.—Less mortality among men of three or four years' service, than among new arrivals, 5938.—That men coming from Australia or Mauritius are better fitted for service than men landed at once in India, doubtful, 5940. —Beer is less injurious than arrack; water is best, 5941. —No man should be sent to India under 22, 5943.—Growing boys are more susceptible of disease, 5945:—Location on elevated ranges, a very great advantage, 5946.—Troops in India are too much burthened with clothes, 5963.—No general rule on the subject can be laid down for the whole of India, the climate varies so much, 5963.—Is not aware why lock hospitals in India were abandoned, 5981.

Willoughby, Mr. John Pollard.

Is a member of the Council of India, 6060.—Belonged formerly to the Bombay civil service, 6060.—Served continuously in India for upwards of 30 years, 6061, 6062.— Was Secretary to Government of Bombay, and afterwards member of the Government, 6063.—European force in India should be partly local, partly line; three-fifths of the cavalry and infantry, and the whole, or three-fourths of the artillery, should be local, 6065.—Reason for this opinion is, it is impossible to do without a native army; India could not be kept by European troops alone, 6066.—A larger proportion of Europeans, than hitherto should be kept, 6067.—Local European force would be recruited in England, 6070.—Present recruiting establishments do not compete against each other. They are both under the Horse Guards, 6072.—East India Company were always anxious to increase their European force, but could not gain assent to it, 6073.—Such assent was very recently refused, 6077.—No difficulty hitherto in recruiting for a local force, 6079.—Doubts that the interest of the imperial army would be damaged by recruiting for a larger local army, 6081.—By emulation means a wholesome rivalry between the two forces, 6082.—This is one of the effects of a double army, not a reason for maintaining two armies, 6086.—Advantages of a local army, 6089.—It is equal to the Queen's army in the field, 6090.—Both benefit by serving together, 6091.—A fresh regiment in India has a great deal to learn, 6093.—Local soldiers pensioned more frequently marry natives and settle in India, 6097.—Number now there, 6098.—Acquaintance with the habits of a people a great advantage, 6098.—It is possessed by both officers and men of the local army, but in a greater degree by the officers, 6100.—They have great advantages thereby over the line, 6103.—Officers of the line, as a general rule, would not study the languages, 6106.—There is no reason now why any pernicious jealousy should exist, 6111.—Privileges recently conceded to the local armies, 6111.—Interests of the empire are no doubt paramount to every other consideration, 6115.— The interests of the empire and of India are identical; the loss of India would be grievously felt, 6116. The local force has been frequently employed out of India, 6117.—The authorities at home should not have the power to withdraw troops without the consent of the local authorities, 6117.—Troops raised for service in India would volunteer to go elsewhere if required, 6119, 6120.—Finances of India would not bear the expense of an army, unless a large portion of it is local, 6121.—The expense of the transport would render it impracticable, 6123.—Government at home might very often recal troops against the opinion of the local authority, 6128.—Two cavalry and two infantry regiments were withdrawn during the war in the Crimea, 6129.—Knows of no other instance of the withdrawal of troops, 6132.—Service in India not popular with Her Majesty's officers, 6144.—They cannot feel the same interest in India as the officers of an army specially raised for service there, 6143.—Another great reason for a local army is, that the troops become inured to the climate, 6147.—Regiments so inured stand field service and the climate better than a recently arrived regiment, 6148.—Cases of mortality in newly arrived regiments, 6148.—The only difference between the two armies is, that the head quarters of one is in India, and of the other in England, 6152. — The Persian war was proclaimed by Her Majesty's Government, 6154.—There is much less probability of local troops being withdrawn during a war than line troops, 6161.—India cannot afford to keep up a larger force than is required for her own defence, 6162. — Officers trained from youth in India must be more efficient for high appointments than others, 6169, 6170.—Two armies for the sake of emulation not necessary under ordinary circumstances, 6176. — Still such emulation is beneficial, 6177. — Armies of India cannot be controlled by a distant authority in the same manner as the army of England is controlled, 6181.— Under the existing system everything is provided for, 6186.—All situations in India should be filled up by the local authority, 6197.—Double staff is expensive, but it could not be got rid of. There must be a staff for the native army, 6209. — The more appointments placed in the hands of the government of India the better, 6213.— Officers for divisional commands are sometimes appointed from England, 6216. — Governor-General has the power of selecting for commands, his arrangements are final, 6232, 6233.—Commanders-in-chief in India recommend, and the Governments appoint, 6239. — Seniority system used to be pushed to an extreme; this is now remedied, 6243.—At Bombay some of the best native officers are of low caste, 6244.—In reliefs the first point to be attended to is, to take care they are sent out at the proper season, 6245.—They should arrive from the beginning of November till February, 6246.—If a local army is determined on, the recruiting establishments should be enlarged, 6247.—They are now under the Commander-in-chief at home, 6248.—Establishment at Warley is not under him 6252.—No difficulty has arisen from the present system and there would not be any should the force at home be enlarged, 6256.—In a case of emergency the men could be available for service here, 6263. — The only difference would be, that the order would be given by the Secretary of State, 6266.—Soldiers do not deteriorate after a few years residence in India. Cases of mortality in regiments arriving at a bad season pointed out, 6269.—A degree of seasoning and acclimatization is required, 6275. — Regiments of the line arriving in India are not so efficient for two or three years as the local regiments, 6277.—Recruits for local corps do not suffer so much, 6279.—The overland route should only be resorted to for the despatch of troops in times of great emergency, 6284.—About 60,000 troops have been recently sent to India at a cost of upwards of two millions, 6284, 6285.—Rates at which they are being conveyed, 6285. — A Government system of transport not advisable, 6287. — Local force should be recruited as at present, 6297. — System of volunteering might be extended to it, 6298. — Local army a very popular service, 6299.—Does not see how the system of exchange could be introduced, 6300. — Under the purchase system India would suffer, 6301.—Local officers can now be employed by Her Majesty, 6302.— Secretary of State in Council has the power of dismissal and restoration, 6303, 6304.—Bounty money of a line and local recruit is the same, 6307. — Average cost of the latter, 6308.—If there be any difference of expense it might be equalized, 6310.—One reason for an increase of the local force is, that the unemployed officers might be attached to it, 6311.

Raikes, Mr. Charles.

Belongs to the Bengal civil service, 6396.—Has been 27 years in India, chiefly in the North-western provinces, 6397.—Has also been commissioner at Lahore, 6398.— Civil police in India very inefficient. It should have a military organization. Civil duties should be taken from the army and transferred to the police, 6400.— Native army should be reduced in the same proportion as the police are organized, 6402.—The police should have light muskets, 6403.—They should have military training, 6406.—There should be one-third Europeans. Artillery in our hands, India is safe. There should be companies of castes in regiments, 6408.—Police would be under the civil authority, 6415.—Police should have the same pay and pensions as troops of the line, 6425. —Commanding officer should have absolute power, 4627.—For North-west provinces, 8,500 cavalry and 20,000 European infantry sufficient, 6434.—For Bengal, 8,100 horse, and 32,400 foot police sufficient, 6441. —Including the civil police, 52,000 altogether, 6449. —There should be one officer to 100 horse and 400 foot,

6455.—The service would be highly popular, 6458.—They would not be more dangerous than the native army, 6459.—Policemen must be able to speak the language of the country in which they are employed, 6460.—But they should be brought from a distance, 6461.—They might be employed in war, 6464.—Discipline, how to be conducted, 6485.—Civil treasuries should be under the charge of the military police, 6494.

ELLENBOROUGH, Earl of, G.C.B.

It is necessary that there should be two armies in India, 6497, 6498.—That one force should be balanced against the other, 6499.—A reserve of 5,000 men at Chatham always ready for embarkation for India desirable, 6501, 6502.—If the establishment is reduced to the minimum, it would be a serious inconvenience to detach any troops from India; the decision would rest on the responsibility of the Government, 6504, 6505.—There should be royal as well as local artillery and cavalry, 6506.—The royal artillery more expensive than the local artillery, 6507–6510.—During a European war troops could least be spared from India, 6511.—Artillery not more likely to be withdrawn, than cavalry and infantry, 6512–6516.—The best education for every civil servant in India is service in the native army; plan for drawing the civil service through the army, 6518.—No advantages in dividing the Bengal army, 6519–6524.—The patronage as regards appointments in India should remain with the Indian authorities, 6525.—Appointments to divisional commands, 6526–6530.—The importance of fully qualified officers being placed in those commands, as well as in command of regiments and brigades, 6531–6541.—System of appointing officers between the Commander-in-chief and the Governor-General, 6542–6545.—Channel through which the recommendations for rewards should be made, 6546, 6547.—The relations between the local army of India and the Secretary of State and Council should be the same as those which existed between the army of India, the Board of Control, and Court of Directors, 6549.—The civil government must be superior to the military authorities, 6550.—Desires that there should be two distinct armies, two interests, and two feelings, 6551–6556.—The local army should remain as they now are, 6557.—Formerly he objected to an increase of the local European force, but now advocates it for the purpose of preserving the balance between the two armies, 6560–6564.—Appointments to be open equally to the officers of both services, 6566–6568.—Many officers of the royal army would qualify for appointments, which by affording the Government a larger field for selection would be a great advantage, 6569–6574.—The local force should be under the same articles of war as the line, 6575.—The Secretary for War should have the entire disposal of the local troops so long as they are in this country, 6576–6579.—Anticipates no inconveniences from raising a local force for India of 60,000, as it is a popular service, 6580.—Recruits are sent to India too young, 6581.—Advantageous if the depôts at home were on a larger scale, in order that the men sent out might be more trained, 6582–6584.—Officers should go out young, 6585.—If the native regiments are organised on the irregular system the young officers must do duty at first with European corps; plan for drawing the civil service from the army, 5586–6588.—Intercourse between the Commander-in-chief at home and the Commander-in-chief in India, when the latter is an officer of the Indian army. The Queen's army in India an allied subsidiary force; the Indian army a national army, to which the Governor-General stands in the same relation as the Crown stands to the royal army, 6589–6598.—The local army would prefer remaining under its own head, 6601.—Relative position of the Governor-General and Commander-in-chief in India towards the home authorities and the Commander-in-chief in England, 6603–6616.—The Secretary of State and Commander-in-chief in England should always communicate and act together, not by law, but by the necessities of political daily life, 6617–6619.—As to the eligibility of an officer of the local force being appointed Commander-in-chief of the line force serving in India, 6620, 6621.—The prerogative of the Crown to be the same towards both armies, 6622.—The men of the local European force to be trained in England, 6623, 6624.—The esprit de corps not more easily maintained in a line than in a local force, 6626, 6627.—The control exercised by the Commander-in-chief at home over the army serving in India, 6628–6630.—Recruiting of the local force, 6632.—Thought at one time that the European force of the Company was too large for the purpose of preserving the balance; that opinion modified by recent events, 6633–6635.—Does not think that officers of the local force would qualify themselves for the duties of Commander-in-chief, 6636, 6637.—In cases of emergency the local force training in England to be by law placed under the same authorities as the line, 6638–6640.—More necessary if the force is increased, 6641.—The discipline of the local force to be carried on by the Council of India, 6642.—The transfer of the force to the Commander-in-chief to be made only in case of emergency, 6643.—The bounty to be the same for both armies, 6644, 6647.—Not aware that any change would be necessary in the organization if the local force in this country be raised from 1200 to 10,000, 6648–6650.—The balance between the officers of the two armies, 6651–6657.—Line officers to be eligible for police corps, 6658.—The organization in Bombay and Madras not altered, 6659.—No necessity for a large increase to the local force of Madras and Bombay if the native armies remain the same, 6660–6664.—One European regiment requires two native, 6665–6666.—Police corps to have inferior training and inferior arms. A lower rate of pay, 6667–6671.—Relative positions of the Commanders-in-chief at the minor presidencies and the Commanders-in-chief in India, 6672–6678.—The Governor-General to select the best men for appointments irrespective of the service to which they belong, 6679–6683.—No difference in the efficiency of the local European force and the line, 6684–6685.—The field of India for the army an enormous advantage to the State, 6686, 6687.—The efficiency of the Indian army and the Duke of Wellington's opinion, 6688–6693.

YORKE, Major General Sir CHARLES, K.C.B.

Power of the Commander-in-chief at home over the Commander-in-chief in India, is confined to matters of discipline and promotion, 6694.—There has never been any interference as to the movement of troops, 6695.—Commander-in-chief in India has the power of approving general courts-martial, even to the dismissal or cashiering of officers; and the power of life and death. The proceedings are sent home to the Judge Advocate-general who lays them before the Commander-in-chief, 6696.—Should there be any irregularity, the attention of the Commander-in-chief in India is drawn to it, 6697.—Sentences of courts-martial are carried out in India, 6698–6700.—The Queen can remit the sentence, or interfere, as far as the Articles of War authorize interference, 6701.—This power is seldom exercised. Cases are considered to be decided on the spot, 6702, 6703.—Any informality only, would be noticed, 6705.—If a sentence were irregular or disproportionately severe, the Queen's power would remain to do justice in the case, 6706.—In cases of courts-martial in this country, the Queen's pleasure is taken before the sentence is carried out, 6707.—In India the Commander-in-chief approves the sentence on the spot, 6708.—Should there be any violation of the regulations, the Commander-in-chief here would give a direct order on the subject to the Commander-in-chief in India, 6713,6714.—No orders are issued to the army in India except through the Commander-in-chief there, 6715.—There is no direct official communication between the Commander-in-chief here and the Commander-in-chief in India, except on questions of discipline and promotion, 6717–19.—Commanders-in-chief at Madras and Bombay cannot confirm sentences of capital punishment, 6721.—The Crown only can alter the regulations of the service, 6725, 6726.

ELLIOT, Mr. EDWARD FRANCIS.

Was formerly in the royal engineers. Has been employed for many years at the head of the police at Madras, 6728, 6729.—The police of the town of Madras was a purely civil body, 6734, 6735.—Scheme of police suggested for the Presidency of Madras. There should be a chief commissioner, and each district should be under the charge of a military officer, 6738.—It is now being carried out, 6738.—A European superintendent should have 1,000 or 1,200 men under him, with two deputies, Europeans, 6744.—Such a police will reduce the amount of native troops required, 6750.—They should be armed with a small carbine, 6752.—The Irish constabulary should be the basis of a police for India, 6758.—Officers withdrawn from their regiments to serve with the police should have the benefit of regimental promotion, 6761–3.—At the capitals the police should not be thus armed, 6764.—The police should be dressed as natives, not as Europeans, 6795.—They could not easily combine, 6799.—A regularly trained and good policeman is worth ten soldiers not properly trained; for his special duties, 6807.—A good policeman would prove the best of soldiers, 6809.—The police should be under military control and superintendence, 6813.—European non-commissioned officers are not required, 6818.—All classes and castes of natives should be taken, 6819.—At Madras the Europeans to natives might be as 1 in 5, including the

police, 6824, 6825.—If the police is efficiently trained and handled, every information would be obtained, 6828.—Instance of this in 1838-39, 6831.—There should be a detective police, the talliaris or village watchmen, are such from caste, 6837.—The present police peons should be done away with, 6840.—The men should not be employed in their own immediate country, amongst their relatives, 6846.—Mahomedans and Hindoos should be mixed together, 6847.—Chief commissioner should have power of dismissal, 6849.—There should be three classes of privates with different rates of pay, 6849.—And superior native officers, 6855.—There should be no European constables in the provinces. At the presidencies they are necessary, 6856.—Much persecution has hitherto existed in consequence of the police peons being employed in the collection of the revenue, 6869.—If a policeman is discharged it does not effect his caste, 6879.—Should Madras be denuded of troops a well organized police would be most valuable, 6882.—They might be used as a local militia, 6884.—Will furnish a copy of the proposal submitted by him respecting a police force, 6889, 6890.

Wood, Colonel Robert Blucher, C.B.

Has been 24 years in the army. Was seven years secretary to Lord Hardinge. Has been lately deputy-adjutant-general in Ireland, 6891.—Principle of promotion for service might be adopted, in lieu of by regimental succession, 6892.—Indian army might at once be made a branch of the royal army, 6892.—Patronage might remain as now, 6892.—Administration of the Indian army would be carried on by the Commander-in-chief instead of by the Council of India, 6892.—Relative positions of the Commander-in-chief and Secretary of State for India, 6892.—Officers at present in the service must continue to be employed in India, 6892.—Supernumeraries, should there be any, might be attached to European regiments, 6892.—Patronage of all appointments should rest with the authorities in India, 6892.—Commanders-in-chief should correspond direct with the home authorities as respects European troops, 6892.—Memorandum regarding the consolidation of the European forces, 6892.—The three armies should remain distinct, 6893.—Promotions in the European regiments would go regimentally, 6894.—There would be a list of the officers employed with the native army at each presidency, 6895.—Exchanges could take place, 6896.—Commanders-in-chief at each presidency would be in direct communication with the Commander-in-chief in England, 6897.—They should confirm courts-martial, subject to the home authorities, 6905.—Commander-in-chief at home has not the power of confirmation, 6915.—It rests with the sovereign, 6916.—Commander-in-chief in India has this power, 6918.—Appointments affecting officers of European regiments made in India should not be considered final until approved by the authorities at home, 6927.—There should be no local European force, 6928.—Native force should be on the irregular system. There should be fewer officers, and all selected, 6935.—They should be looked on as staff appointments, 6938.—Officers with native corps must be placed on the Indian list, 6936.—A step of rank should be given after fixed periods of service, 6942.—Officers on this list should be taken out of their regiments, 6946.—And be promoted on this list, 6948.—It would be for consideration whether service in India should count as two years for three, 6952.—There will be but one army list for all officers, 6956.—An officer on the Indian list could return to a European regiment in the same way as an officer is now brought from the unattached list to full pay, 6963.—Prospectively the whole army of India should be amalgamated with the line, 6969.—Officers now in the service should be promoted in the regiments to which they belonged, 6970.—Cadets would be appointed under the new regulations, 6973.—They should be appointed on the same pay and allowances as heretofore, 6981.—There should be no local artillery, 6986.—These arrangements are all intended to be prospective, 6986.—Every officer now in the service should by seniority rise to the emoluments of a full colonel, 6987.—Officers in civil employ should be withdrawn from the combatant list, 6989.—Those in political appointments should be eligible for military commands, 6991.—They should be placed on the Indian list, 6994.

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE

THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO

THE

ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

Tuesday, 10th August 1858.

PRESENT:

Major-General the Right Hon. J. PEEL, M.P.
The Right Hon. Lord STANLEY, M.P.
Major-General Viscount MELVILLE, K.C.B.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir GEORGE A. WETHERALL, K.C.B.
Major-Gen. HENRY HANCOCK.
General H.R.H. the Duke of CAMBRIDGE, K.G.
General the Marquis of TWEEDDALE, K.T., C.B.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir HARRY G. W. SMITH, Bart, G.C.B.
Major-Gen. PATRICK MONTGOMERIE, C.B.
Colonel WILLIAM BURLTON, C.B.

MAJOR-GENERAL PEEL IN THE CHAIR.

Lieutenant-General Sir GEORGE POLLOCK, G.C.B., examined.

1. (*Chairman.*) What rank do you hold in the Indian army?—That of lieutenant-general.

2. How long have you been in the service?—Since 1803.

3. How many years of that period have been passed in India?—In 1827 I came home with a medical certificate from Burmah, and was at home three years; the remainder of the time I have been in India, until 1847, when I was again driven home from severe illness.

4. In what Presidency have you served?—In Bengal.

5. In what arm of the service?—The artillery. I belonged to the artillery; but I have had command embracing all arms of the service.

6. You have been, I conclude, associated in the course of your service with both European and native troops?—I have.

7. Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion which the European should bear to the native force in the Bengal Presidency?—Hitherto I think that the proportion has been about one to seven or eight; supposing the whole force to have been about 100,000 strong, with all the auxiliaries and contingents. There were about 8,000, I think, of the Queen's troops, except when there was a difficulty, such as in the case of the Affghan war, or the Punjaub war, and then they were increased; but that was the general proportion.

8. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The normal state was 1 to 7 or 8?—I should think so; somewhere thereabouts; but then we had our own European regiments; there were two Company's European regiments in Bengal when I was there; the number has since been increased.

9. But including all the European troops, artillery, and others, was that the proportion of Europeans?—I should say there were 11,000 or 12,000 altogether; these were the infantry only, of course.

10. (*Chairman.*) The Commission wish to know the proportion of native troops to Europeans; that would include all Europeans, both in the Queen's service and in the Company's service?—I cannot exactly speak about that. I do not exactly recollect the number of cavalry.

11. (*Colonel Burlton.*) What number do you think there ought to be of Europeans to natives?—I should say about 1 to 4.

12. (*Chairman.*) Your opinion is that 1 to 4 would be the proper proportion?—It would be quite enough, I think.

13. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Do you mean now?—Not now.

14. (*Lord Stanley.*) You are speaking of what would be permanently necessary for India, and not of what would be rendered necessary by the exceptional position of the present moment?—Of course; and even then a great deal would depend upon the efficiency of the police in India. If the police is very efficient, of course you will require fewer troops.

15. (*Chairman.*) Would the proportion which you have mentioned be exclusive of authorized contingents, or do you mean the proportion of 1 to 4 to apply to the native troops, including the authorized contingents?—I should think that 1 to 4 would be about the number, excluding the contingents.

16. (*Lord Stanley.*) Can you state any grounds upon which you have fixed on that particular proportion, or do you give that proportion merely as the result of your general experience?—I give it from my general experience, from what I have seen; that is what I think would be the proper proportion hereafter when things are settled.

17. You think that the moral force of such a number as you propose would be sufficient, having regard to the larger number of native troops?—Yes.

18. I suppose that for a great part of the duty which is to be performed in time of peace, Europeans during the hot weather are almost unserviceable?—I should think they are. They take their own duties in their own lines in a great measure, but they are assisted very much by sepoys who take day duties. The Europeans are kept from the sun as much as possible.

19. Duties involving great exposure to climate without the excitement of actual service are very prejudicial to the health of the European soldier, are they not?—I think they are; and I think that a man is less affected when he is on service than when he is idle and has nothing to do, if exposed.

20. In stating the proportion of 1 to 4 as that which you consider desirable, have you estimated at all whether that proportion should be the same in all arms of the service, or whether the strength of the European force should be chiefly in one arm rather than in another?—With regard to the artillery, I

Lieut.-Gen. Sir G. Pollock, G.C.B.

10th Aug. 1858.

are some batteries also in the Punjaub which are manned by Sikhs or Punjaubees, and there are also, I think, two mountain batteries in the Punjaub which are likewise manned by Punjaubees or by Sikhs, and to each of the batteries I think there is only one officer attached.

94. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) I understand that the question which you have been answering is not only military but political, namely, what amount of force would be required in Bengal after the country is settled ?—I think that that is political.

95. Supposing that a change took place in the magazines, and that instead of being at Calcutta they were removed to the other side of the peninsula, would not that very much alter your opinion with reference to the number of troops necessary to be kept in Bengal. If the magazines and all the material connected with the army were removed to the other side of the peninsula and magazines were established there, say at Bombay or at Baroda, or in that direction, would it not diminish the number of troops which it would be necessary to keep in Bengal ?—I should think that it would not make any difference in the estimated number of troops for the Bengal Presidency.

96. (*Lord Stanley.*) In point of fact no large portion of the troops now maintained in the Bengal Presidency are maintained for the defence of Calcutta ?—No, certainly not.

97. Therefore the question of the seat of Government being changed, does not in any degree affect your calculations ?—No. With reference to the question about the number of batteries for a certain number of men, 60,000 men, I mistook in saying a battery to each thousand ; two guns are the proportion generally laid down for every 1,000 men. I ought not to have said a battery ; I ought to have said two guns to every 1,000 men.

98. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That is 120 guns ?—Yes.

99. (*Major-General Montgomerie.*) Are these field guns only, or batteries of heavy guns ?—Field guns.

100. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then you would make provision for battering besides ?—Yes.

101. In the whole calculation that must come in, you must include those companies in your calculation of artillery ?—They are included ; those which I call reserve companies are the companies intended for the battering train.

102. Then, in short, you think that your estimate of 7,000 men would give a sufficient number for the field artillery which you require, and for the reserve train in addition ?—I have not made that calculation ; what I have said is, that these men are what are now in the service, but I think that two battalions more ought to be raised for the Bengal artillery. I think that they are deficient at present.

103. (*Major-General Montgomerie.*) Have you taken into consideration the guns which are employed with the contingent forces ; there have been artillery attached to the Gwalior contingent and to some of the other contingents,—have you taken into consideration their artillery, in saying that there should be Europeans for the whole of the artillery ? —If they are supplied, they certainly ought to be Europeans, but I do not know the number of batteries which there are. Whatever artillery we have under us, I think that they ought all to be Europeans.

104. (*Major-General Haneock.*) Do you mean that no native artillery should be allowed in the case of any of the native princes throughout India, or of the contingents which have hitherto been kept up ? —If we supply the contingents I think that we should supply the artillery.

105. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) The field guns in the Bengal artillery are stated by this return to be now 210 ; would you reduce that number of field guns ?—No.

106. You would have 210 field guns still, exclusive of the siege train ?—Does that include the contingent ?

107. It does not include the mountain battery, that is all. It includes 13 troops of horse artillery and 21 light field batteries drawn by horses, and there is one light field battery drawn by bullocks, amounting in the whole to 210 guns. Do you not think it necessary that those 210 guns should be at least maintained exclusive of siege artillery or foot artillery ?—Certainly. Are the reserve companies included in that list ?

108. No. The field artillery now consists of 210 guns ?—I have no paper to refer to.

109. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the native force of the Bengal Presidency should be on a regular or an irregular system, or both combined ?—I think that it should be both combined.

110. What is the difference of cost between a regular and an irregular troop ?—That I cannot say.

111. What has been the proportion existing between the regular and the irregular infantry ?—The regulars have been 74,000 men ; but I do not know what the irregulars have been, there have been so many regiments raised in the Punjaub. I suppose there must be upwards of 30 or 40 regiments irregular corps, cavalry and infantry, but I do not know how many there are ; there are a great many I know.

112. Do you consider the irregular cavalry as efficient for service as the regular ?—No ; I should think not. I should think that when you came to the charge, the irregulars would fail.

113. Do you consider that the present organization of the irregular cavalry requires any alteration ?— I cannot say ; I am not acquainted with that part of the subject.

114. But you answer generally that you consider that the force ought to consist of regular and irregular troops combined ?—Yes ; but in what proportions I am not prepared to say.

115. (*Lord Stanley.*) Is there not a difference as regards the natives between regular and irregular cavalry ; will not native gentlemen serve in the one who will not in the other ?—I think that that is very likely ; that they will serve in the irregular but not in the regular cavalry ; but I do not know that it has been tried : they are more likely to do it.

116. Is not the system of paying men in the irregular cavalry entirely different from that in the regular cavalry ?—I believe that it is entirely different ; they take so much per man, 25 or 30 rupees, and he finds his horse.

117. He has, therefore, a stronger interest in taking care of it ?—Yes. But then there is another thing ; the question is whether he will be so free to go into action with the liability of losing his horse ; but some of the corps have a fund from which, if a man loses his horse, they give him another.

118. (*Colonel Burlton.*) A sort of tontine ?—Yes.

119. (*Lord Stanley.*) I believe that an irregular force has less difficulty with regard to commissariat arrange ments ?—I do not know. I never knew them at all in any difficulty, and I have had many of them under my command.

120. (*Chairman.*) Would you extend the irregular system to the infantry ?—Yes ; I think they are very useful.

121. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Is there not a bazaar to the irregular as well as to the regular troops where they get their food ?—If there is, it is their own bazaar ; they keep it themselves ; it is not interfered with at all ; it is not under the Government ; the Government do not interfere in it.

122. Do the Government interfere with the bazaar of the natives where they purchase their rice ?— There is a kind of establishment for the bazaars of the regular troops, there is a cutwal and a man who weighs out the grain and all those things ; the cutwal accompanies the bazaar, but there is nothing of the kind with an irregular regiment, so that they are easily fed and travel much more easily than the regular troops do.

123. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Am I to understand you to say that if you took the field with an army, of

which a portion was irregular, you would not take any account of the irregulars at all?—No, they take care of themselves.

124. Entirely?—Yes.

125. And has the commissariat department nothing whatever to do with the feeding of them?—I believe nothing whatever.

126. (*Colonel Burlton.*) When they are out of our own provinces they must be fed just the same as the camp followers?—Yes.

127. (*Viscount Melville.*) Did you never find it necessary in campaigning to order the commissariat to supply the native irregular troops with rice or grain?—I should have no hesitation in doing that.

128. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) The irregular cavalry soldier supplies his horse and his arms and everything belonging to him?—Yes.

129. If you were to extend that irregular mode of equipment to the infantry, the irregular infantry soldier would have to find his arms and his clothing. We have no such thing, I believe, as an irregular infantry in the line at present?—We have not.

130. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In your advance into Affghanistan had you any irregulars at all?—Yes, I had the Third Irregular Cavalry.

131. Did you take no steps to supply them in any respect?—No, never.

132. Not even when they were across the border of the Presidency?—No; it is 300 miles beyond.

133. Does not that lead to armies in the field plundering to an extent which will become very serious?—I never met with the case of their plundering at all.

134. How, then, are they supplied?—They are supplied like camp followers; the camp followers go into the bazaars and buy, and they are never provided for at all.

135. Would not that produce a great drain upon bazaars which were supplied merely for the regular troops?—It certainly would.

136. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Do you not happen to remember that during the whole time your force was beyond the Indus every camp follower in it, as well as the irregular troops, drew rations from the commissariat?—Yes; I believe it was so beyond the frontier.

137. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) Do you consider that the irregular cavalry is as efficient in the field as the regular cavalry?—For certain duties.

138. We are talking of fighting in a general action; are they as ready to go into action?—I do not know as to that; I think, that, when the irregular cavalry are led by European officers they are much more efficient than by themselves.

139. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are they good troops in line, or are they mere auxiliaries, flankers, and for out-post duties?—I should think they are more for the latter duties. In charging I should rather doubt the charge of a regiment without officers, or with few officers; I have, however, seen them behave very well.

140. But their legitimate duties are outpost duties, the conducting of convoys, and duties of that description?—Yes, and there they are extremely useful.

141. (*Chairman.*) The next question is, should native artillery be allowed in the Bengal artillery; that you have answered that you think not?—Yes.

142. With regard to sappers and miners, would the same answer apply?—I should think that a few natives must be allowed to them, but, that generally speaking, almost the whole of them should be Europeans. I cannot, however, speak very positively as to that point, because I do not quite understand it.

143. Would Europeans be able to perform all the duties now required of the native sappers without great sacrifice of life and great exposure?—I should think that they would suffer a great deal unless they were assisted by natives.

144. (*Duke of Cambridge*). Would you then have a company of sappers with a certain proportion of natives attached?—Yes.

145. (*Chairman*). Natives might be employed in some of the more laborious duties without being taught the more advanced sciences of attack and defence?—Yes, I think so.

146. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Of course the arsenals would be included under the head of artillery?—Yes.

147. Would you have Europeans employed in all the arsenals, as far as practicable, with the assistance of natives, but not allowing the natives to do any of the intricate and delicate and scientific works in an arsenal?—Certainly, that is exactly what I would have. The natives should have nothing to do with ammunition at all; and with regard to the preparation of caps, I would not allow a native to have anything to do with it. All these things are done under cover, and there can be no objection whatever to Europeans performing them.

148. What is the system which has hitherto existed in that respect?—The work has been done by natives.

149. And you would wish that system altered?—Decidedly, there is no question about it.

150. (*Chairman.*) The next question is whether you consider that the Bengal native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so in what proportion?—Certainly of different castes; but the proportion must depend upon the number of men that you are able to get of each caste or of each nation; so that it is impossible here to lay down any rule, but I would have them of different castes, and if men can be got from the Cape or any of those places it it very desirable.

151. What proportion should you consider desirable?—The proportion must depend entirely upon circumstances.

152. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you like to have any of the men composing the West India regiments?—I should think it very desirable if they could be mixed up with the others.

153. Would it be desirable to make any exchange, to have some Indians go to other colonies and to take the subjects of other colonies to India?—No; I do not think that you would get Indians to go.

154. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Is there no danger of a jealousy being created between the natives and the Africans in the event of the native army being composed of partly Africans and partly natives of India?—I should think not; I would have them mixed up with any men who are capable of bearing arms and who are good soldiers. I should think that they might be introduced into the army without the least difficulty.

155. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are you aware whether any such system has ever been tried?—No. Though in the artillery the Europeans and the natives mix together, they go to parade together, they work together at the same gun, and are constantly together; they do not live in the same barracks, the Europeans live in their barracks, and the natives live in their lines, but they go to parade together, and they work at the same gun.

156. Is not the European looked upon as the dominant race, and would the same feeling which exists towards the European exist towards a man of any other nation who might be introduced into India, subordinate to the European?—I should think not with regard to any other nation, so far as Europeans are concerned the natives certainly do look up to them and consider them superior, but I do not think, that with regard to the rest there would be any fear; it is, however, a mere matter of opinion.

157. (*Lord Stanley.*) You fully recognize the importance of having a variety of races and castes in the native portion of the army?—Decidedly.

158. Have you any opinion as to the relative merits, as soldiers, of high caste and low caste men? do you think that there is a difference between them or not?—Some of the low caste men are just as brave as the high caste men, I think that it would be a very good thing if we could introduce the half castes into the army, they are a very good class of soldiers.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir G. Pollock, G.C.B.

10th Aug. 1858.

159. Have any of the half-castes a turn for military service?—A great many of the drummers in the regiments in India are composed of half-castes, and a number of them were murdered at the time of the mutiny in consequence of their being half-castes, or perhaps Christians.

160. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The drummers are Christians principally?—Yes; and many are the sons of soldiers by native women. There are native drummers also.

161. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Do you think that it would be desirable to form regiments composed partly of natives and partly of Europeans?—I do not see the slightest objection to it.

162. In what proportion would you have them?—I would have them, as I said before, in the proportion of about 1 to 4; that is to say, I would have two flank companies of Europeans, and the rest natives; the experiment would be worth the trial.

163. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that the Europeans would deteriorate greatly if they were cut up in such small bodies?—No; I should hardly think they would. You can always assemble them.

164. In what way can you assemble them if they belong to the regiments?—They can be assembled as was done in the following instance:—I forget who was the commander-in-chief at the time, 1809–10, who gave the order, but he ordered the light companies of eight different regiments to unite at Cawnpore, and they were formed under Major Mansell, a Queen's officer, and they became as good a light regiment as I ever saw in my life.

165. But would the ordinary barrack duties and the ordinary duties of peace be well performed by Europeans if they were scattered over the country in such small bodies as two companies to a battalion of natives?—It would depend upon the officers commanding.

166. I am talking of the principle?—I think that they ought to be well performed. I do not see any objection to it.

167. If you had a regiment so composed would you have the native companies of such a regiment with the same proportion of European officers as the European companies?—Yes.

168. Three to each company?—I do not know that I would arm them exactly the same. I would give the natives an inferior piece to the Europeans. I would give the Europeans the very best piece that you could get—a rifle—and I would give the natives a somewhat inferior one.

169. Would you not get into great difficulties as to double ammunition; no, not at all, they could always be kept separate.

170. But must there not be the same calibre. Going into action is it not a known fact that unless the calibre of an army is as far as practicable the same, most serious and dangerous difficulties occur?—It may be so; but I do not see any difficulty about keeping ammunition separate for the Europeans and for the natives.

171. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Are you not aware that several years ago, when the Court of Directors wished to diminish the weight of the musket there was a committee appointed to try guns for the sepoys, at Woolwich, and that there were two calibres, and that the Duke of Wellington protested against it and put a stop to it, for the reasons which the Duke of Cambridge has stated?—I was not aware of it, but I do not see why there should be two calibres at all, although there might be a different piece altogether; I would not give the natives a rifle.

172. (*Chairman.*) Would it not interfere very much with the efficiency of your army if you had three-fourths of it armed with a less efficient weapon than you could procure for the others?—No; I merely mention that because I would not put the natives quite on the same footing as the Europeans.

173. (*Lord Stanley.*) Do you think that it is good economy when you go to the expense of employing a soldier, to arm him with an inferior weapon?—It is a weapon which is quite as good as we ever had until the Minie rifle was introduced.

174. (*Chairman.*) With respect to the nationalities which you would introduce, would you recommend them to be introduced in the shape of regiments and companies, or would you recommend the different castes to be distributed promiscuously?—I think that that would be a question for the local government to determine.

175. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think it would have a very unfortunate effect if the Europeans and natives were mixed in regiments, and that it would lower the pride of the natives if they were to be in the same regiment with the Europeans, they having an inferior arm to the Europeans; would not that effect be much greater if the Europeans and the natives were in one regiment than if the natives were separate as a corps, and the Europeans were separate as a corps?—I cannot say that I think so.

176. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not think that it would be excessively distasteful to the European soldier to be regimented with a native?—No, I do not think so at all; I say that merely from the circumstance of the artillery being entirely so, the Europeans and the natives are entirely mixed up in the same battery, and with the same duties to perform.

177. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But are they not still separate to this extent, that you have batteries of Europeans and batteries of natives; and, therefore, though they may be mixed up still they are separate?—Yes, but then again they have companies of natives and companies of Europeans; the Europeans are not mixed up in the same company, they are quite separate. The thing is a mere idea altogether; but I would have them merely as flank companies, they should not be mixed up at all with the companies, but should be entirely separate companies.

178. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Suppose you have a battalion of infantry under your command composed of Europeans highly armed and natives inefficiently armed, and you ask them to storm a hill, the natives will stop and say, "You have a good gun, but I have "not, and I will not go"?—They might do so; but I think that whenever they have European officers to lead them they will go anywhere.

179. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Could you call upon the same troops to perform the same duties, one man having a superior arm and another with an inferior arm, would you be justified in doing so?—I do not know about being "justified," but I should not have much hesitation in doing it when they had European officers to lead them.

180. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the native army of Bengal should be enlisted under a new code, that they should hereafter be enlisted to undertake to serve beyond the sea, and for general service?—To do anything.

181. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would enlist everybody for general service?—Yes.

182. Would you include the irregulars in that?—I think that it would be just as well if they were included. With regard to being on board ship, the sepoys have hitherto had great objections to it, but I never knew them object to do anything else. When I went to Jellalabad I found the buildings all round the fort, and to a great extent very dangerous, because the enemy might come upon us unawares, being hid. Immediately upon my arrival, I ordered out working parties of Europeans and natives, and I never heard a word of objection, they went on duty daily for so many hours, they worked at the buildings and razed the whole.

183. (*Chairman.*) You say that the natives have an objection to going to sea?—Yes; I believe they have, unless it is in a marine regiment, with a marine regiment they would go anywhere.

184. At present, if a native soldier dies abroad beyond seas, is not the family entitled to a pension, even though he may die within the territories of the Company?—I do not know.

185. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are you aware what the objections are which the natives have to going to sea?—The circumstance of the inconvenience of their feeding, and their bathing, they bathe constantly and very frequently, and when they go on board ship they cannot cook their victuals in the way that they usually do, and they are obliged to eat parched rice or grain, or something of that kind.

186. Have they any objection as regards the water?—Yes; that is another thing.

187. What is the objection on the score of water?—Because it may be touched by something or other which may affect them; but they generally have the water brought on board ships in vessels which they themselves have, and they alone have access to them, so that there can be no valid objection.

188. (*Colonel Burlton.*) The Hindoo always goes and gets his own water?—Yes.

189. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) If he has a long voyage, there may be a difficulty in procuring water?—Of course there would then be a difficulty.

190. I apprehend that they would not drink distilled water. Are you aware that now in troop steamers we distil water for the troops on board?—No.

191. I presume that the natives would not take that water?—I suppose not.

192. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you know whether going to sea is considered by the sepoys as entailing loss of caste?—I think not, if they have their own food; but they carry the drinking of water and of pure water to such an extent that I have seen a Hindoo who would refuse to drink water out of his own lotah, which he had had filled by his own servant, because it was cooled with ice which had been made in the ice pits, and Europeans had handled it.

193. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Have you any experience in regard to the natives on board ship refusing to drink distilled water?—No.

194. I ask the question, because in the troops that I had to deal with in India it was only the distilled water that the high-caste men would drink, and the reason was, that no human being had touched the water, it was all done by machinery?—I was not aware of that.

195. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) In the military code we have allusion made to the re-formation and enlistment of the Bengal army, having for its object crime, punishment, and pension. Are you of opinion that such a code is necessary, or that the punishment already in our power is sufficient?—I suppose that it is sufficient. I thought that with regard to the code the question was entirely with reference to going on foreign service.

196. Is the Bengal code, in your opinion, sufficient for all the purposes of discipline?—I think it is; although it is some time since I have seen it. But with regard to going on board ship, and working in trenches, that ought to be entered in the articles of war.

197. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And made a part of the duties?—Yes.

198. Is not that the case at present as regards working?—It is not mentioned, but I never knew them object, and I have tried them two or three times.

199. (*Lord Stanley.*) Does not the question of their objecting or not objecting depend very much on the way in which the commanding officer goes to work with them?—I think it is very likely, but I never knew them object at all.

200. (*Chairman.*) Should you recommend the continuance of the practice of recognizing caste?—No, except that I would not openly do anything to offend a man as regarded his own tenets, whatever they were; but I would not allow caste to interfere with duty in any way whatever.

201. (*Colonel Burlton.*) If a man should refuse to obey a legal order, saying that it was contrary to his caste, would you dismiss him from the army at once?—I think that he ought to be dismissed.

202. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Does that power exist now?—No.

203. You think that it ought to exist?—Yes.

204. To that extent it would be altering the code?—So it would be. The question is whether everybody is to be trusted with that kind of power.

205. Suppose that such a power was put in a guarded form; suppose that it could not be done without superior authority?—I would not do it without the authority of the commanding officer of the division.

206. (*Lord Stanley.*) To what extent is caste at present recognized in the army. I inferred from the question which was put, and from the reply which you gave to it, that there were some cases in which the refusal to obey an order would not be considered punishable if the refusal were grounded upon an objection on the score of caste; is that so or not?—Yes; I should say that if the thing really affected the man's caste, I would not urge it upon him; but then you ought to take no man who would refuse to do a thing of that kind.

207. That is not quite an answer to the question which I put. I ask whether at present a soldier is held justified in refusing to obey any order on the score of its being contrary to his caste?—I should think that he is justified, certainly, because nobody has a right to ask him to do anything which is contrary to his caste. If you engage a Brahmin, and know him to be a Brahmin, and he comes into the service as a Brahmin, you must treat him as a Brahmin.

208. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you consider that hereafter, seeing what experience we have now acquired by the recent proceedings in India, there should be anything introduced into the Mutiny Act or the Articles of War which should oblige a man to do any legal service which he might be called upon to perform, whether it was against his caste or not?—Certainly; but then of course you would not entertain those men who would not conform to those things. I certainly would have that introduced into the Articles of War.

209. (*Lord Stanley.*) Practically is that a case which often occurs. Perhaps you can state from your experience what are the occasions on which it most frequently occurs that a man's caste comes into conflict with his duty as a soldier?—I have never, to my recollection, met with anybody who has refused to do his duty. Of course I should never ask a man to do anything that was offensive to his religion in any way, but as far as duty has gone I have always found him do his duty well.

210. (*Viscount Melville.*) Have you never found a high-caste sepoy refuse to dig, for instance, or to work?—I never did find such. In the case which I mentioned respecting Jellalabad I never interfered with the interior detail of the officer commanding a regiment, but I ordered certain parties to go and raze the walls which were round the place and to level the ground.

211. It did occur at Moultan that a man said, "I "am a sepoy and not a cooley"?—So I have understood.

212. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I understand you, that having left those details to the officers of the regiments, it is probable that the sepoys did not work?—I never asked about it.

213. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Do you not consider that, according to the rules and regulations of the Bengal army, a native soldier is bound to perform all the duties which a European is bound to perform?—I do not know as to that, but everything connected with his duty as a soldier I should say that he is bound to do.

214. Have the sepoys of the Bengal army leave of absence during the year?—Yes, always.

215. When they go away do they receive their full pay?—No, there is a deduction, but I don't know what it is.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir G. Pollock. G.C.B.

10th Aug. 1858.

216. Do they consider it their right to go on leave?—I do not know as to right, but they would consider themselves very much injured if they did not get their leave of absence.

217. Is not that one of the cases where they think that they have a right; do they not think that they have a right to go whether the commanding officer chooses or not, because it is not the season for drill?—I can only say, that on some occasions they have not had the leave of absence in consequence of war, or of some things which have detained them in particular places, and they have never complained.

218. Have they not said that they had a right to go, and that the proof of that right was the deduction of a portion of their pay?—A portion of their pay has always been deducted, I believe, but I don't know what that portion is.

219. (*Lord Stanley.*) As I understand you, it stands upon this footing, that the men expect to have this leave of absence, unless there be war, or imminent danger of war, or other urgent cause?—Yes.

220. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Has the fact of their not getting their leave produced any bad feeling amongst the men where it has taken place?—No, I think not. I have not experienced anything of the kind.

221. (*Viscount Melville.*) When you say that caste ought not to be recognized, do you think it possible altogether to prevent it upon the occasions of the large feasts and holidays which they keep?—You need not interfere with that, I think.

222. But you are obliged to sanction the ceremony?—Yes.

223. Do you think that it would be possible to prevent that without discontent?—I do not think that you could prevent it.

224. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) As the subject of caste is a matter of the utmost importance to the future army of India, I should like to ask you this question. Is it not the case that if a company or a battalion are cooking, and an order of picket comes on, they will throw away their victuals and will not cook again that day?—They may not cook again that day, but they go to their muskets. I am quite sure of that.

225. It once happened to me that I lost my baggage, and the three regiments under my command lost their lotahs and their cooking pots. I got plenty of provisions for them into the camp; they had had nothing for twenty-four hours; they were very hungry; but they would not one of them touch the provisions, because they had not their own cooking pots, and they would not cook in the cooking pots of the others. I was in a dilemma. I called the commanding officers of the regiments, and asked them to allow men of similar caste in the other regiments to invite my men to their camp, otherwise they would have had nothing to eat that day?—I was not aware of that.

226. (*Chairman.*) Do I understand you rightly with regard to caste, that if a man alleged that caste interfered with the execution of duty you would not consider that as a valid excuse?—Just so.

227. (*Lord Stanley.*) And that is perfectly consistent with a wish on your part, and on the part of every commanding officer, to respect the feelings of the men in all matters where absolute necessity arising out of their duty does not compel you to go against those feelings?—Decidedly.

228. (*Chairman.*) I understand that at Jellalabad you ordered a certain work to be done by them, and that it was done, and therefore you made no inquiry about it; but if the commanding officer had reported to you that caste interfered with the execution of that duty, you would not have considered that as a valid excuse?—I should not.

229. (*Viscount Melville.*) You are aware that in campaigning the sepoy has to find his own wood, cooking, and everything?—Yes.

230. And in long marches there are occasions on which he cannot do so. Do you not think that it would be always advisable that in a campaign the commissariat should find the wood for the natives as well as for the Europeans?—It would involve a very great deal of carriage for the commissariat to carry wood in that way.

231. But the cooking of a native is a four hours' business?—It is a long business, but they can pick up sticks, and all sorts of things.

232. I have been at places where they could not get wood, and they went four days without anything but parched grain, and never got a meal the whole time?—I never met with a case of that kind.

233. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the Bengal army ought to be divided into two or more armies?—No; I do not understand what advantage there could be in dividing it into two or more armies. If it is with reference to the different classes of men who are to be in different corps it would not be at all necessary. For instance, we will say that in the Punjaub you would have a certain class of men, in Upper India another class of men, and in Bengal Proper a third class. I do not think that it is at all necessary to separate the army; you may have them under the same commander-in-chief, but quite distinct, so as not to come into each other's provinces; that is to say, the Punjaub people would be kept up in the Punjaub, and the others would be sent to their different places; but I do not see the necessity of making distinct armies.

234. If they were separated, would you have separate staff establishments, or would you have them all under one?—I would not have any separate staff establishment more than the commanding officers of divisions and brigadiers. I think that is quite sufficient. They report to the commander-in-chief, and they could report to the commander-in-chief just as well as commanders of divisions as in any other way.

235. (*Lord Stanley.*) It has been thought that there was a political safety in the division of the Indian army into three armies, the Madras, the Bombay, the Bengal?—There was an advantage in that decidedly.

236. Do you not think that the same advantage might be increased by a further subdivision?—I do not see the advantage to be gained by it; you might have different classes of men, but I do not see why there should be another army.

237. I presume that if it were thought desirable at any future time to create a separate presidency of the North-western provinces and the Punjaub, you would consider that that separate presidency should have an army of its own?—I have not considered that point, but it does not seem to me to be necessary. They have had a separate presidency even hitherto in the North-western provinces; it has been under a separate governor.

238. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Militarily you see no advantage in any increased separation of the army?—No.

239. If, therefore, it is desirable, it would only be as a political and civil question, and not as a military question?—Yes. The commander-in-chief has commanded the whole army, and I should think it just as well that he should still continue to command the whole army.

240. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?—It has been by some thought that perhaps it might be as well not to have native commissioned officers, but I do not think that that would be right. Perhaps the proportion of the native commissioned officers is too great now; there are a subahdar and a jemadar to each company of native infantry,—that perhaps might be reduced; but I think that unless the native has something to look up to beyond the rank of a havildar, you cannot get on so well. They have very little command; even a serjeant-major commands them on the parade, although they have nominally a commission; and I think that it would be as well to

continue the commissioned officers, but perhaps it might be as well to reduce the number; there are now a great number of them. I think, with regard to the promotion, that, generally speaking, seniority ought to have the preference, if a man is capable of doing the duty; and it should not be invariably by selection, because it leaves a great deal in the power of the commanding officer, and it may be abused. I think that, generally speaking, the gradation list should be attended to; that is to say, that the senior man should be promoted to be jemadar or to be havildar, or whatever it is, if he is fit for the situation; if not, on no account promote him.

241. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In fact, you mean that seniority should be the rule, and selection the exception?—Yes.

242. (*Chairman.*) In Bengal has not the system been that of seniority?—Yes; there have been exceptions, but very few.

243. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Upon the general average, at what age does a native officer arrive before he is made an officer, 40 or 50?—I am afraid that he arrives at a very advanced age.

244. (*Chairman.*) That system of seniority commences in the ranks, does it not? He is promoted from the ranks?—Yes; and he rises up to the rank of jemadar and subadhar.

245. And therefore necessarily he must be of a certain age?—Yes.

246. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that there is a great disadvantage in a man being placed in so high a position so late in life?—Certainly; and if the man is not fit for his position, I would either invalid him, or in some way get rid of him.

247. Do you not think that, as a rule in life, a man who has been a long time in a subordinate position is not fit for a higher position if he has attained a certain age, say 40?—I know very well that a great number of them are very unfit for their situation; they are of a very advanced age.

248. Are they decrepid and worn out?—I do not know about their being decrepid; I have seen some men very strong healthy fellows.

249. (*Colonel Burlton.*) And comfortably fat?—I do not know as to that.

250. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the commanding officers should have more power than they have now to reward or punish?—Most decidedly; I think that a commanding officer in the present state of things does not command his regiment.

251. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Why not?—Because he has no power to reward, and he has no power to punish.

252. Why is that?—I cannot say why.

253. Has that been of late years, or was it always so?—It has not been always so, because when I commanded a regiment I know that it was not so.

254. Since when has that system been introduced, and on what account has it crept in; has there been any reason for it?—I do not know of any reason for it, but I think that it is the case without question. I think that at the present moment, if a commanding officer were to say to a sepoy, "You have been committing a fault, you will go to drill for seven days;" the man would have power to turn round and say, "I will not go to drill for seven days, I will be "brought to a court-martial;" and the commanding officer has not the power to prevent it. I say, that with a system like that, it is impossible to command a regiment.

255. Would not that imply an absolute necessity to alter the code?—But there is no code for it; I do not believe that you will find it in the code. I have not been in India for some time, but as far as I can understand, that system obtained by a circular, and it is not upon record except as a circular.

256. (*Chairman.*) A circular, from whom?—From the adjutant-general's office.

257. (*Major-General Montgomerie.*) Do you allude to the Indian army generally, or to the Bengal army only?—I am speaking of the Bengal army only.

258. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that the system established in the irregular corps is in that respect superior to that in the regular corps, because the commanding officers of the irregular corps have more power?—They have more power.

259. Do you think that on that account the irregular system is better than the regular?—In that respect I certainly think it is.

260. You think that the men of an irregular corps look up more to their commanding officer as their friend as well as their superior because he has power over them?—I think so.

261. (*Chairman.*) Does the system which you have mentioned extend to the European portion of the East India Company's service?—No; there are only three regiments of Europeans. It is a long time since I commanded a native regiment; a man in my regiment was brought to a court-martial; he was charged on 17 counts, and each of those counts was a disgraceful business, it was either pilfering from his comrade or something of that sort; but from some informality in the proceedings the general officer of the division pardoned him. I felt very much for my own regiment, and I discharged him; he went to the adjutant-general, and I was ordered to re-enrol him with his service and standing, and he came back to my regiment after having been tried on 17 counts, and every man in the regiment knew what he had been guilty of.

262. I think you have already expressed an opinion upon the last question in our list, namely, whether there should be any admixture of European and native forces, either regimentally or by brigade. I think you mentioned as your opinion that you saw no objection whatever to it?—I see no objection.

263. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But would you prefer the admixture by brigade or regimentally; would you prefer it by brigade, that is to say, a regiment of Europeans with two or three regiments of natives as a brigade, or would you prefer two or three companies of Europeans with each battalion of natives?—I think that the brigade would be, perhaps, the better of the two; but I do not see any objection to the other.

264. (*Viscount Melville.*) Can you state the system which prevails now in Bengal as regards the promotion of non-commissioned officers; can a commanding officer make a havildar without reference to the Government?—He cannot, I believe; I am not quite sure about it.

265. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Does not the system which you speak of, whereby commanding officers are deprived of a due share of authority and power, depend entirely on the will and pleasure of the commander-in-chief for the time being?—Yes.

266. One commander-in-chief can make the rule more stringent, and another less so?—Yes.

267. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) With regard to the punishments, have you not heard it complained of by the soldiers of the Bengal army that they are made to work on the roads with men whom they think very inferior in character and caste to them?—No; I did not know that they did work on the roads.

268. I believe I may state that the decision which Lord Hardinge came to, reverting to corporal punishments, was given in consequence of a letter which I wrote to him on that subject. When one of the generals of divisions was inspecting a native regiment, one of the finest young men, a Brahmin, stepped out of the ranks and said that he wished to get his discharge; the general referred to the commanding officer of the regiment, he said "That is one "of the best men in the regiment." The general asked for an explanation. He said "My father and "uncles have been officers in this regiment. I have "never misconducted myself. I have the highest "character which can be; but such a thing might "happen as that I might commit a crime, and for "my crime the court-martial might send me to work "on the roads, and I might be chained on the roads "to some half-caste man or other?"—That relates

Lieut.-Gen. Sir G. Pollock, G.C.B.

10th Aug. 1858.

to the question of punishment; I did not so understand it.

269. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then you would say that you would not mix the civil punishment with military punishment?—Yes.

270. You would keep military punishment as distinct as possible?—Yes; which it is now, I think.

271. (*Viscount Melville.*) You are aware that the fact of a man being sentenced to work on the roads as hard labour entails dismissal from the service?—Yes.

272. He never rejoins his regiment?—No.

273. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is corporal punishment now existing or not?—It is.

274. Was not it for some time done away with?—It was done away with when Lord William Bentinck went home. I believe he had left Calcutta and sent up the order. When Lord Hardinge came to India we had a long discussion on the subject of corporal punishment. I told Lord Hardinge that I saw not the slightest objection or the least danger in reverting to the old system of corporal punishment. Many officers objected to it, and the adjutant-general was one, General Lumley. However it was carried, and there was not the slightest difficulty in it. The fact is, that the good men of the army knew very well that they would not be punished, and it was only what they call the budmashes who would be likely to object to it.

275. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Is not corporal punishment a punishment which has existed from time immemorial in the country generally, both civilly and militarily?—Yes, I believe so, excepting after the time of Lord William Bentinck.

276. I mean as a national punishment?—Yes.

277. (*Major-General Montgomerie.*) Have you known any instance of corporal punishment being inflicted upon a sepoy of the Bengal army by sentence of court-martial since Lord William Bentinck's order for doing away with it?—I dare say there have been instances, but it is very rare. I commanded a native battalion for seven years, and I do not think that I punished two men.

278. Have sepoys in the Bengal army been subjected by sentence of court-martial to corporal punishment subsequently to Lord William Bentinck's order?—They are now liable to it.

279. But have you ever known any instance of their being punished by it?—No, it has not come within my knowledge. I never punished them at all, except for theft, but not ordinarily. Sepoys are very seldom liable to anything of the kind.

280. Is it entirely done away with?—I dare say not entirely, because the order was given for it in Lord Hardinge's time.

281. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you conceive that the establishment of European officers to a regular native regiment is sufficient?—Yes, if they are kept complete.

282. You conceive that the establishment, as in the army list, ought to be complete with the regiment, irrespectively of other employment?—Yes; and above all, the captains should be with their regiments. I think the captains of regiments are the very essence of the regiments. The captain leads his company into action, and it is of the greatest importance that he should be with his men; that they should know him.

283. Do you think that it would produce a better feeling in the men, from their having somebody to look up to, if each company had a captain of its own not taken away for other duties?—Certainly.

284. (*Chairman.*) You think that for other duties there should be supernumerary men?—Yes; where men know that they have their captain, they go into action with much more pleasure than if they have a young lad who has just joined, and who knows nothing of them, or they of him.

285. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You are aware that upon the present establishment there is not a captain to each company?—I am.

286. Do you think that it should be increased to the extent of a captain to each company?—Yes.

287. (*Lord Stanley.*) Admitting the force of your argument, does not it occur to you that the opening of civil offices to regimental officers has a tendency to induce able men to enter the army who might perhaps not be so willing to enter it if they knew that they should be exclusively confined to regimental duty?—As to employing the officers in civil duties and other duties of that sort, a young man now joins a regiment merely with the view of learning the language, in order that he may at some time be moved away; he has not the interest of his regiment at heart.

288. (*Chairman.*) He does not look to his military position?—No, he looks to acquiring the language and getting an appointment.

289. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Would you require an examination of the officer's knowledge of his military duties to take place previously to his being appointed to a civil situation?—They cannot get a civil situation until they have passed their examination in languages.

290. I am talking of a military examination. My object is that when that officer returns from his staff appointment to his regiment, he should be known to have been thoroughly conversant with his military duty previously to his having received his staff appointment?—It might be desirable.

291. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Does such an examination take place now?—No.

292. Do you think that it should take place?—I think it should. I have known an instance of an officer joining his regiment, and the Marquis of Hastings inspected it. He was the colonel, and he went up to the Marquis of Hastings and told him that he had been in civil employment for about the last 20 years, and that he could not manœuvre the regiment, but that the major would do so. The Marquis did not remove him, but he put a colonel over his head.

293. Do you think that an army can thrive under such circumstances?—No.

294. (*Chairman.*) Does not the command of regiments, or of companies particularly, devolve very often upon the younger officers, in consequence of the older and more experienced officers being engaged in civil service?—Yes.

295. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In your experience, what is the largest number of officers that you have known absent from a regiment employed in civil occupations, and leaving only a few subordinate officers for the regiment?—I have known captains commanding regiments frequently.

296. With how many European officers with them, approximately?—Six or eight officers with them.

297. Do you see any difficulty in having a staff corps, and making such arrangements as that officers should hold civil appointments and yet be able to revert to regimental duty if they should wish it or if it was thought advisable?—I think that there might be something of that sort, but I do not quite understand how a staff corps would be formed. I think that it would be very desirable to have a staff corps, and to let all the officers who were on the staff be supernumeraries, or to have all their places filled up, because a regiment can never be effective without the complement of officers.

298. What is your opinion as to the number of European officers that ought to be attached to a regular infantry native regiment?—A lieutenant-colonel, a major, a captain to each company, with a lieutenant and an ensign.

299. In fact, the same establishment as in a European regiment?—Yes.

300. (*Viscount Melville.*) You are aware that now, on a war taking place, staff officers are always ordered to join their regiments?—Yes.

301. Do you not think that the present system, notwithstanding some drawbacks to it, from the prizes which are held out in the way of staff employment and civil employment, has a tendency to

produce a class of as intelligent officers as you can find in any other country?—That is very likely; I dare say it has been so; but still, whenever they are employed, I think that their places should be filled up by efficient officers.

302. But in war time the officers do join their regiments?—Yes. I know very well that when Lord Gough went up to the Punjaub, officers joined their regiments who had been absent for ten and twelve years. I dare say Sir Harry Smith has seen that himself.

303. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) You have stated very good reasons for officering a regiment of native infantry; you have given the field officers, and so many captains, and so forth; you have also said that you would introduce into the line irregular regiments as well as regular, that you would mix them,—is not the only difference between a regular regiment of infantry and an irregular one, the establishment of officers, an irregular regiment having only one field officer and one adjutant. How do you reconcile those two opinions?—I have never looked upon an irregular regiment in the way that I have upon a regular one. I have never looked upon the two regiments in the same light.

304. Still you say that the Bengal army should be composed of regular and irregular, both infantry and cavalry?—Yes.

305. You have also stated the necessity of a regiment of infantry having a certain number of officers?—Yes.

306. How can you consider an irregular regiment so efficient as a regular regiment, the one having only two officers and the other 25?—I would not place dependence upon them, if we were going to charge the enemy.

307. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) I think your opinion as to whether the present military code of Bengal is sufficient for the discipline of the army stands rather evasively. In the first instance, I think you said that you thought it was sufficient, but upon being further questioned you said that you did not think it was sufficient, which do you positively mean?—There are 460 pages to it, and I can hardly speak positively on the point.

308. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You first said that on the whole you considered the code satisfactory as it stood now, but afterwards you said that you thought it should be revised?—I alluded more particularly to the time when you are enlisting a man for the service.

309. (*Lord Stanley.*) Is there any suggestion or observation which you would wish to offer in addition to what you have already stated?—Not that I recollect.

310. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Have you not found in the course of your service a difficulty with regard to the majors of regiments not being transferable?—There is very seldom a major with the regiment when there is a colonel.

311. Would it not be an advantage that you should be able to transfer a major as well as a lieutenant-colonel?—I do not see any good reason for it. The reason why they are not transferred is that it is a gradation service, and the major goes out of the regiment and rises, and it gives promotion to that regiment. If you were to transfer them, then the senior major would come in, perhaps, to a regiment which had already got a step, and the step would then go twice in the same regiment.

312. One of the greatest grievances which I saw was that a very old major could not, by the rules of the service, be transferred to a regiment where there was a young major commanding?—No, because it would give promotion to that regiment to which he would be transferred, and it would interfere with the officers of different regiments. It would come to his turn with the regular line of majors.

313. It would not interfere if both officers were kept in their own regiment?—There is a regular list for the majors, and they are promoted in succession; after which they may be posted to any regiment.

314. The majors cannot be removed from one regiment to another?—No, for the very reason that I have mentioned.

315. Would it be an advantage and a justice to the service if such could be the case?—It might perhaps be so. You might get a smart major into a regiment where he might be required, but you must alter the system altogether as to the promotion of majors, because they are now in one list.

The witness withdrew.

Major-General Low, C.B., examined.

316. (*Chairman.*) What rank do you hold in the Indian army?—I am a major-general.

317. How long have you been in the service?—I have been in the service 53 years.

318. How many years of that period have you served in India?—Just about 40. I have been about 13 years in Europe, Africa, Java, Persia, and other countries.

319. In what presidency have you served?—Chiefly in Bengal, though I have belonged to the Madras army. I was for the first 14 years of my service in camps and other places belonging to my own presidency, then I went round to Bengal, and from that time I have been constantly serving in Bengal, except when I was on furlough.

320. In what arm of the service have you served?—Infantry.

321. Of course you have been associated with both European and native troops?—I have done duty with both Europeans and natives.

322. Will you have the kindness to favour the Commission with your opinion as to the proportion of European to native force which should be maintained in the Bengal presidency?—I should say that, considering all that has passed within the last 18 months, and the change in the character, I may say, of the natives towards us, for they have now felt their own power, of which they had no idea a few years ago, I should like to see one European to every two natives in the regular service. I do not reckon the police, because it is so uncertain what number you have, and on what footing they may be placed, which depends upon the local civil government. I put them out of the question; but I say that in the regular service of the State, and which will be now the Queen's local army, there should be one European to every two natives for several years to come; at any rate, I should be sorry to see a smaller proportion of Europeans.

323. Do you consider that there ought to be any native artillery, or not?—I should say not any, excepting men to bring shot, and to work like coolies rather than like scientific men. I would never let natives of India in our service load a single gun.

324. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would employ them as gun lascars?—Yes.

325. (*Chairman.*) Would you make the proportion two to one, exclusive of the artillery, or would you include the artillery as a proportion of the European force?—I should say that, taking the whole European force of all branches, if you had one European to two natives, you would be in a safe position; and as a great portion of the infantry are on a footing so much cheaper than the regular army footing, I should hope that you would be enabled to have the European strength half that of the native force.

326. (*Lord Stanley.*) Speaking roughly, I think one European costs as much as three natives?—Yes, I should think so generally, taking the passage out and the passage home, and all other circumstances,

Major-Gen. Low, C.B.

10th Aug. 1858.

327. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then I apprehend that you would have the army reduced so much from what it was before the outbreak that it would cover the expense of additional Europeans in proportion to the natives?—I do not know that it would precisely cover it, but it would approximate very closely to it; it is with that view that I say so. I would have so many irregular infantry, with a few selected officers, who are so much cheaper than a regiment with the full complement of officers, that the one thing would counterbalance the other, or would approximate to it. At all events I think it desirable, on political grounds, to have that amount of European troops for some years to come.

328. (*Chairman.*) What amount of force do you think it advisable to keep in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled?—It is rather difficult to answer that question. The Bengal presidency is so enormously extensive that for some years to come I should like to see 45,000 Europeans of all branches.

329. (*Lord Stanley.*) Are you speaking now of a permanent or a temporary force?—Not exactly permanent. I think that some few years after the country shall be settled you might gradually reduce the European strength by 5,000, or 6,000, or 10,000 men, down to, say, 35,000 men, and that I would do by allowing each particular regiment to become less in strength, rather than by reducing the number of regiments. For instance, a European regiment of 800 strong has the same moral effect in a cantonment, and generally for maintaining peace in a district, as a regiment of 1,000, though it will not be equal to a regiment of 1,000 in actual fighting. I would reduce them in that way for two reasons; one is, that you would thus at all times keep up the appearance of a great number of European regiments, and it would be easy afterwards, if it should be deemed advisable, to increase the number of men, by additional recruiting in each regiment.

330. (*Chairman.*) Then you contemplate an army of 45,000 Europeans and 90,000 native troops?—Yes, for the whole of the Bengal presidency. We have hitherto had 74 regiments of native infantry in Bengal, then we have had so many irregular corps, both of infantry and cavalry, especially in the Punjaub, that they amount to an enormous number; and I should say that 45,000 Europeans with 90,000 of all classes of natives would do the duty after the country is settled.

331. (*Lord Stanley.*) Your estimate of 90,000 includes irregulars?—They are called irregulars, but they are in fact well armed and drilled, many of them as efficiently as the corps of the regular army.

332. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But it is exclusive of police?—Yes.

333. (*Chairman.*) In what proportion would you divide the European force as to cavalry, artillery, and infantry?—I should say that there ought to be about one-twelfth at least of the whole amount artillery, or even a little more. I am very partial to artillery; and besides adding greatly to the present strength of our regularly organized artillery forces in India, I am of opinion that it would be an advisable measure to have fifty or sixty men in every European regiment of cavalry and infantry instructed how to work field guns, so that on any emergency, when the regular artillery were overworked or too much reduced by casualties, you would have a supply of men at hand who could render effective aid to that important branch of our forces.

334. The whole of your artillery are to be Europeans, according to your view?—Yes.

335. Therefore you must take the artillery in connexion with the whole force?—Yes; and therefore you must have it large.

336. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What proportion of artillery would you have there for the whole force, European and native; would you have two guns to 1,000 men?—I think that, one time with another, it is scarcely necessary to have quite so much; it is of course safer to have that proportion.

337. (*Chairman.*) That would be 260 guns. You are taking your European force for the whole thing, therefore, if you still continued the proportion of 45,000 to 90,000, you would reduce your proportion of European cavalry and infantry very much below that of the native troops?—That ought not to be done. I would rather meet the expense by reducing a few of the natives.

338. Do you consider that the native force in the Bengal presidency should be on the regular or the irregular system, or both combined?—I think it is impossible to avoid the combination of both. We have now, for instance, six corps to my recollection which have done us excellent service upon the old footing; you must not disband those men, you must continue them on; but the main body I would have (on account of the cheapness and other things which I can mention) on what is called the irregular system, that is to say, with a few selected officers, and I would arm them well. But my doctrine from all my experience is, that a native regiment much more depends upon the *qualities* of the officers than upon the number of them. I have seen again and again in our regular army in a cantonment, a corps with a very few officers better managed than when 25 were present. Of course, the presence of many European officers in an actual battle is a great advantage, but I am speaking of the management of the men one time with another; therefore, I am partial to the idea of having a great portion of the new Bengal army irregular corps, but furnished with selected officers from the regular army. Both good feeling and good order, in every respect, have prevailed in our irregular corps of infantry, with few European officers, who were always selected. One reason for this is, that the same officers almost always remain many years with those corps. The officers don't wish for any change of position, as they are better paid and more agreeably situated than they could be with their own regiments. Another reason is, that the native subahdars really command and take an interest in the good order of their respective companies; they are not liable, as they are in the regular army, to be superseded by the arrival of young European officers.

339. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) If the system to which you refer is to be established hereafter, and if you largely diminish the regular native army, where are you to find the officers from whom to select for the irregulars?—You will soon find them, I think.

340. As I understand the system, at present the best officers are selected from the regular regiments to command the irregulars?—There is no other way of doing it.

341. If that is so, and you very largely diminish the regular native corps, where are you to get sufficient means to find valuable men for the irregular corps?—You will then require to have fewer men remaining with the regulars, unless you increase the whole establishment. That is a difficulty which must be got over in some way or another. I see the difficulty; but there is another greater difficulty, namely, that if you had them all regulars you could not find the money to pay them, in addition to the very large European force which must henceforth be kept up in that country.

342. Would there be any other means of meeting that difficulty?—I am not aware of any other means of meeting the difficulty beyond that of taking them from the regular army. You might select men not in the army at all, but I should not have the same confidence in them. I would extend it to Queen's regiments, taking men who passed an examination in the native languages; they are now occasionally appointed to duties of that nature.

343. Would you extend it to officers of the Queen's army, if they were willing to be transferred to those irregular corps?—Certainly I would.

344. Of course subject to an examination?—Yes, and to the discretion of the local Government. There are a number of officers now of the Queen's army with whom that has been the case; within the last 18

months there has been a great number appointed to staff situations.

345. But it was not usual before ?—No, it was not usual, but there was no interdict ; there were a very few exceptions in old times.

346. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you think that it would be possible and would be advantageous to introduce into the irregular regiments of infantry, as native officers, the same class of persons as you get in the cavalry regiments ?—I see no objection at all.

347. You think that gentlemen would take service in the infantry ?—Certainly, to command a company.

348. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is that the case now ?—To a certain extent.

349. But you think that it might be further extended ?—Yes.

350. You think that there would be no difficulty in it ?—No.

351. And that militarily it would be a great advantage ?—Yes.

352. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Would you trust Mussulmans with that position ?—On political grounds I would not exclude any one tribe or race. I would mix them up as much as possible. I think that if you excluded either Brahmins or Mahomedans, you would then set the whole mass of that tribe throughout the country systematically intriguing against you at all times.

353. (*Chairman.*) If you would not exclude them, would you acknowledge caste ?—The question of *acknowledging* caste is a very difficult question to answer ; there are certain usages by which they go ; the natives themselves differ much from each other as to what is against their caste. I have never seen any purely military duty refused by Brahmin sepoys.

354. You have said that you would not exclude an officer because he was a Brahmin ; if he comes to you and says, "I am a Brahmin ; will you take me ?" and you take him, you to a certain degree acknowledge his caste ?—If that is what is called acknowledging caste, I would acknowledge it ; that is to say, I would not refuse them in due proportion. I would not do as we have done in the last fifty years in Bengal,—have such masses of Brahmins, but I would have a few of that caste.

355. Having so far acknowledged his caste, could you put that man in a position which you knew to be contrary to his caste ?—I have served in all three presidencies, and have been on board ship, and have been in various positions with sepoys, and I hardly ever recollect a military duty which was said to be against caste, with one exception ; Lieutenant-General Wetherall, perhaps, recollects it also. I remember that at Java on one occasion the men who had been killed were lying near our bivouac, and an order was given, as usual, to have the corpses carried off and buried ; but the officer commanding the Bengal pioneers said that his men *being of high caste* could not touch a dead body ; it was put to rights in a moment, by the commander-in-chief of the expedition, who said to the officer commanding the pioneers, "If those men "are not buried within one hour, I will send you "back under arrest to India." How the officer commanding the pioneers reconciled his men to the duty I did not see, because I was obliged to pass the spot on duty ; but I know that the dead bodies were immediately buried.

356. (*Colonel Burlton.*) The Bengal volunteer regiments all mutinied afterwards, did not they ?—I believe they did, but I don't know it ; the occurrence, whatever it was, took place after I had returned to India.

357. (*Chairman.*) You have already answered the question as to native artillery, that you do not consider that any native artillery should be allowed in the Bengal army. Do you give the same opinion with regard to sappers and miners ?—With regard to sappers and miners, I do not see how you could possibly have them all Europeans, because you could not afford to have Europeans enough for all that sort of work ; but I would not teach the natives what they have been latterly taught, which is all the scientific part, in making gabions and fascines, and how to cut fuses, and other scientific duties.

Major-Gen. Low. C.B.

10th Aug. 1858.

358. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would not allow the native sappers and miners to be taught any scientific work ?—No ; I would merely use them as pioneers and assistants to the engineers.

359. I apprehend that you would take the same view as regards their employment in the arsenals ?—Yes.

360. (*Chairman.*) With regard to the Bengal native army, do you think that it should be composed of different nationalities and castes, and if so, in what proportion ?—Undoubtedly of different nationalities and castes ; but the proportion I think it is absolutely impossible to lay down as a rule from this country, and I will state why. By the last accounts which I have from India, upwards of 50,000 men have been engaged in the Punjaub.

361. (*Lord Stanley.*) 57,000 ?—I was not aware that there were quite so many. That is undoubtedly too many for one province ; but they have served us uncommonly well, and I would not disband those men ; therefore you cannot at present lay down the proportion.

362. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I have seen it suggested that they should be amalgamated by companies, that you should have one company of one caste and another of another caste ; that you should have eight or ten of these different castes in companies composing a regiment ; do you think that that would be a good system ?—We have mixed them up in the Madras army ; and I have seen a Brahmin stand next to a Chumar constantly, and he has never objected to it. But it has struck me, on reflecting upon it, that companies of different tribes would be better.

363. If each of the eight companies composing a regiment were of a different tribe, would that be advisable in your opinion ?—I think so.

364. (*Lord Stanley.*) Is not that the system which has been followed in Lumsden's irregular corps ?—I do not know.

365. (*Chairman.*) Upon the question whether nationality should be preserved in the shape of regiments and companies, or whether the men should be distributed promiscuously throughout the regiments, I understand you to say that you think it would be better to have them in companies ?—Yes. I think that there would then be a degree of emulation which there would not be if you mixed them all up of all kinds ; and I think that you would be equally free from intrigue.

366. With regard to whether the native army of Bengal should be enlisted under a new code or not, what is your opinion ?—The code, as it stands, must be altered in several points, one point particularly ; I have seen, within the last 24 or 25 years (and different commanders-in-chief and governments have sanctioned it), there has been gradually a degree of independence allowed to the natives of the Bengal army which never existed before, and it has worked very badly. For instance, a non-commissioned officer may be sulky, he may neglect his duty, even on a public parade, and an officer may go up and tell him, "You shall have a couple of days' drill for "this ;" he can tell the officer, "I prefer a court-"martial." You can make nothing of a court-martial. A court-martial cannot judge of the insolent looks of a man when the commanding officer only saw them ; that is a degree of liberty which is not extended to the Queen's army.

367. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that there should be what we call minor punishments as well as punishments by courts-martial ?—Undoubtedly.

368. Which minor punishments are now inflicted by officers commanding European regiments to the extent of seven days' cells ?—Yes ; and I do not object to the rattan, which is a summary punishment.

369. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What you have just stated has only existed within the last few years ?—Yes.

Major-Gen. Low, C.B.

10th Aug. 1858.

370. Was it by general order or by a circular ?—By a circular from the commander-in-chief ; I forget which commander-in-chief it was.

371. But you are aware that under the articles of war for troops, there is full power to award minor punishments ?—I will relate an anecdote. Colonel Michell, who has lately retired from the army, and who is a very distinguished officer, told me at Calcutta that he had been at home on furlough for a few years, and that after his return a non-commissioned officer was very sulky one day on the parade, and would not take up his points properly, and was determined to have his own way instead of that of the commanding officer ; Colonel Michell ordered him to four days' drill, and the adjutant went up to the colonel, and saluted him, and said, "Since you have been at home, "colonel, this has been all altered ; that man has a "right to choose whether he will take your punish- "ment or have a court-martial." Colonel Michell told me this only a few months ago.

372. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That is not according to the code ?—Not at all.

373. Why is the code not attended to ?—That is for the commander-in-chief in India to answer.

374. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are not you aware that they have a punishment in the native regiments of what they call cross-armed drill, to which the commanding officer sentences the men for misconduct, and to which they submit ?—Yes, I think they have that.

375. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is that prescribed in the code ?—No, I think not ; but I am not acquainted with these details about the military regulations, having for a good many years past been employed in a civil and political capacity.

376. (*Major-General Montgomerie.*) But the circumstance which you have mentioned, as I understand you, related to a non-commissioned officer ?—Yes, it did.

377. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the native troops hereafter to be enlisted should undertake to serve beyond the sea ?—Yes, I think that it would be very desirable. I beg leave here to mention a fact which I now remember distinctly—namely, that some time previous to the revolt a public regulation had been passed, whereby every recruit for the regular Bengal native infantry was enlisted for "general service." I remember, also, that the present governor-general having heard, after the insurrection had commenced, that in the opinion of some officers, that the new mode of enlistment had been one of the various causes which had produced alarm and discontent among the sepoys, his Lordship had made inquiries into the matter, and he had been assured that native recruits for all the regiments at Barrackpore, most of them being relatives of old sepoys in those corps, had been as ready and anxious to enlist *after* that new regulation as they ever had been in former times.

378. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That they should be enlisted for what is called general service ?—Yes ; I think that it would be very desirable.

379. To revert to the other question, do you think that the power of commanding officers has been a good deal too much curtailed of late years ?—Yes.

380. Both for good and for ill ; that is to say, for reward and for punishment ?—Yes ; I have become aware of that effect from my constant association with officers in command. The situation of a commanding officer of a regiment has been very greatly lowered in the estimation of the men.

381. He is not looked up to ?—No ; it is totally contrary to all Asiatic notions that a man commanding 1,000 men should be obliged to refer to a distant authority as to whether he can reward or punish a man.

382. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) What was the power of a commanding officer when you entered the service ?—It was very different ; it was much greater than it is now.

383. Was there not also a difference with regard to his pay ?—I do not think the pay was ever touched.

384. Had he not an allowance for receiving native officers and other officers ?—No, not in my time.

385. (*Major-General Montgomerie.*) Was not there a bazaar allowed ?—That was done away with just as I came into the service.

386. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) As the army is now constituted, when regiments are sent beyond the districts of the different presidencies, they receive a sum of money called batta ; do you think that that ought to be continued under any new code which may be enacted ?—If merely because it is beyond a certain frontier, it is an undesirable practice.

387. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) It is only of late years that enlistment for general service has taken place ?—It is very recently, except in two or three regiments, which were called general service corps.

388. Formerly it was only for their respective presidencies ?—Yes ; and if you wanted them for foreign service, you had to ask them whether they were willing.

389. Even without going across sea ?—No.

390. Take the campaign of Affghanistan ?—No question was asked then.

391. But for China they were asked ?—Yes ; because they had to embark.

392. Was it the same with respect to Persia ?—Yes, because of the embarkation. The objection is to embarking on the salt water, which some of them say is against their caste.

393. But the words "general service" would include everything ?—Yes.

394. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you think that the system of *punchayet* ought to be continued ?—Yes ; it is a very favourite system, but it is difficult to combine it with our regulations.

395. (*Chairman.*) What is the system ?—It is a sort of trial amongst themselves ; they appoint a certain number of judges amongst themselves.

396. It is the same as what we used to call a company's court-martial in our own service ?—Yes.

397. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is that the practice now ?—It is very much the practice in the contingent forces, in the irregular corps of cavalry for instance ; but I do not see how you can mix it up with our regulations.

398. Is it tacitly admitted ?—I do not think that it is ever *ordered* in the regular service.

399. Is it by order, then, in the irregular service ?—Yes. If there is a question of difficulty, a matter of debt or anything else, they desire it to be tried by punchayet, that is, by a court consisting of five persons selected amongst themselves.

400. (*Colonel Burlton.*) It is merely a private court amongst themselves ?—Yes.

401. (*Lord Stanley.*) Am I to understand that that is recognized only in the irregular regiments ?—I think so.

402. The term means merely a native jury ?—Yes.

403. But it is strictly analogous to what exists in civil life ?—Yes.

404. (*Major-General Hancock.*) The irregular troops in Bengal are of course all amenable to the articles of war ?—Yes.

405. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the Bengal army ought to be divided into two or more armies ?—I do not see any material advantage in it, and I see some objections. It would require a large increase of staff establishment to manage it, and it would hamper the Government in making use of them, I think. It strikes me that it would be better to continue them as one army.

406. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are not the troops of the Madras and Bombay armies quite in the power of the Government of India to employ them anywhere ?—Yes ; they always go wherever they are wanted.

407. Then there would be no difficulty if the Bengal army were divided in the same way ?—There would be no difficulty, but I do not see any present

advantage in it, and there would be an increase of expense.

408. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you see an advantage in keeping up the three presidential armies?—Yes; we have seen the benefit of it.

409. You think that the one has neutralized the other?—Yes.

410. (*Chairman.*) Would not that advantage exist if the Bengal army were divided?—Probably it would; but it would take some time to establish that feeling. You would require to have a great many changes to carry the thing through.

411. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Setting other considerations on one side, would it not very much diminish the danger of an extensive combination, such as we have lately had, of 100,000 men banding together?—I do not see that it would, because if you have no other mode of enlisting them, it is pretty much the same, whether they are called the same army or not.

412. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Still you have said that you think there has been an advantage in the Madras and Bombay armies being separate. If that be so, would not the same hold good in Bengal?—It may.

413. (*Lord Stanley.*) Is not it true of the Bengal army, that though it is in name a single army, yet it is in reality composed of separate bodies, having very little to do with each other; for instance, the forces in the Punjaub being of a different race, and rather a hostile race to the natives of Hindostan?—Yes. In course of time it might do to divide the army; but it does not strike me that there would be any great advantage in it at present.

414. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that the difficulties of carrying it out would be very great?—Yes. I think that it would hamper the Government a little in the use of the army.

415. (*Lord Stanley.*) In the event of its being determined to create a new presidency, composed of the Punjaub and the north-western provinces, in that case would you not say that the new presidency ought to have a new army?—It would be feasible in that case, and looking to the future, it would probably be advantageous also. You must then, I suppose, make over a part of the Bengal army, and call it the Punjaub army.

416. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?—I would merely lay down as a general rule that merit and fitness should be much more considered than they have been in the Bengal army. I do not think that you can do more than that.

417. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Hitherto they have not been considered at all?—Hitherto in the Bengal army a man by mere seniority has secured his promotion so long as he has avoided any public crime, and that, I think, is very bad.

418. (*Chairman.*) And the necessary consequence of that has been, that the men have been too old before they have arrived at that promotion?—Yes.

419. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you give up altogether the system of seniority?—I think not. I would leave a great deal to the commandant of the regiment as to who ought to be promoted, interdicting the promotion of very old men.

420. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Under the existing regulation, is not there a compulsion to take the senior private in the regiment, unless there is any thing against him?—Yes; and if the officer does otherwise, he runs a great risk of being told that he is wrong."

421. And the same system prevails throughout the non-commissioned grade?—Yes.

422. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is not the recommendation of the commanding officer always taken in such cases?—It has not been so of late years.

423. You think that it ought to be taken?—Yes.

424. You think that he ought to have merely the recommendation, but still that the recommendation, except there is some real ground against it, ought to be accepted?—Yes.

425. (*Chairman.*) I think you have already answered the question whether you consider that the commanding officers ought to have more power than they now have?—Yes, I think so.

426. (*Viscount Melville.*) Can you state the exact system which now prevails in making naiks and havildars?—It depends upon the will of the commanding officer.

427. Can the commanding officer make a naik or a havildar without referring to the adjutant-general?—I cannot answer the question, because I have been employed in a civil capacity for a good number of years, and I do not know it myself, and do not recollect having asked the question of any of my friends.

428. You say that you have served in the different presidencies?—Yes, I have served in all three.

429. Can you state the system which prevails at Madras, and that which prevails at Bombay, in the promotion of non-commissioned officers?—No; it is upwards of 20 years since I served in either of those places.

430. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But the system is different?—Yes, particularly in Bombay; they promote younger men a great deal in Bombay than they do in either of the other presidencies. That I have seen myself, because I have had Bombay troops under my orders only four or five years ago.

431. (*Chairman.*) What is your opinion generally as to mixing European and native forces, either regimentally or by brigade?—I think that by brigade is a much preferable mode of mixing them than regimentally.

432. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is it not your opinion that the Europeans would deteriorate if they were attached to natives in small bodies?—I would never do it; I would much rather put a couple of companies of natives to a regiment of Europeans, to do the work which destroys Europeans in hot weather.

433. Do you not think that the European discipline would be destroyed if the Europeans were cut up into small companies?—I would not do it on any account.

434. Would you recommend any distinction between the arms of the men, as was recommended by Sir George Pollock?—I think that I would not give Enfield rifles to the natives; otherwise I would arm them well. You cannot get good service out of any man who is not well armed. The Enfield rifle is a scientific kind of thing, which I should like to keep to ourselves.

435. (*Viscount Melville.*) You are aware that in Bengal, in all native lines, they have what they call bells of arms?—Yes.

436. Are you aware that in Bombay there is no such thing; that the sepoy keeps his arms in his own possession, and that there is no difficulty?—He does not keep them in his own hut, I suppose.

437. He does so; they are kept in their own lines, just as in a European regiment. I never saw an instance in Bombay all the time I was there and all the time I was campaigning, in which the Bombay sepoy did not invariably have his musket in his own possession. In the Bengal army, even in campaigning, the arms were collected in front of the companies' tents, and there was a sentry over them?—I was aware of that.

438. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) In your opinion ought the present number of native officers in each regiment to be maintained, or should the number be reduced?—It is unnecessarily large, I think.

The witness withdrew.

Colonel J. Welchman, C.B.

10th Aug. 1858.

Colonel JOHN WELCHMAN, C.B., examined.

439. (*Chairman.*) What rank do you hold in the army?—Lieutenant-colonel regimentally and brevet colonel.

440. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Of the Bengal Europeans?—Yes.

441. The 1st?—Yes, the 1st Bengal Fusileers.

442. (*Chairman.*) How long have you been in the service?—Thirty-eight years.

443. How many of those years have been passed in India?—Between thirty-five and thirty-six.

444. Of course you have been associated with both the European and the native troops?—Yes.

445. Will you favour the Commission with your opinion as to the proportion of Europeans to native troops which should be maintained in the Bengal presidency?—That is a question which, from the very short notice I received of my attendance being required here, I feel some little diffidence in speaking about; I certainly coincide fully with what I heard General Low express. I had not time previously to coming here to give full consideration to the question; but I do not think that the European proportion ought to be under one-third.

446. Do you consider that there should be any native artillery allowed?—Certainly not; I think it is unadvisable. With the proportion of Europeans which I have mentioned, I cannot see that any serious results could arise in future; but still it is a question deserving very great consideration, I think.

447. Would you make the artillery independent of the proportion which you have mentioned, or would you include the artillery in the one-third?—Certainly not. I would have them totally distinct.

448. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would have one-third of the infantry and cavalry Europeans?—Yes.

449. And you would have all European artillery besides?—Yes; the scientific branches I should keep distinct.

450. (*Viscount Melville.*) How do you propose to deal with the contingent forces; would you take away the artillery which they now have in the Gwalior contingent and the Hyderabad contingent?—I certainly should. I would draw the tooth of every artilleryman in India.

451. Then you would not attach any European artillery to those contingents?—I cannot see the necessity of it. I certainly would not do it.

452. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you mean that the native princes would not be allowed to have any artillery at all?—Certainly not.

453. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Not in those contingents?—Not in those contingents. As far as treaties go, of course you could not infringe upon them; but in other cases I would not have any artillery.

454. (*Chairman.*) Have you considered at all how far police might be made to supersede the necessity of native troops?—I think the strength of the army depends very much upon it, and it is a question for consideration how far native troops ought to be in any way put in such a position (that is, as police). It depends entirely upon that, I think, as to the strength of the native army hereafter. It is a question whether the whole monetary transactions of the country, as regards the payment of the troops, could not be done through the native bankers by a small per-centage being given to them; they are always very ready to make money, and I have no doubt would carry on the whole of that business, and relieve the army from the most harassing duty which it has hitherto had to perform.

455. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And a duty most injurious to discipline?—Yes.

456. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Has not a portion of that duty been removed; is not one-half of the revenue allowed to be collected in bank notes and the other half in bullion?—Not in Upper India; we have no such a thing in Upper India as a bank note. Upon that point (the relief from escort duty) in a measure hinges the strength of the army, I think very materially.

457. (*Chairman.*) Would you take the police into consideration at all in fixing the proportion of Europeans to natives?—I think not.

458. Exclusively of the police, you would have one-third of Europeans to two-thirds of native troops?—Yes.

459. (*Viscount Melville.*)—Do you not think that this police force would to a certain extent amount to a military body?—No; I would not allow that. One great point, I think, to be taken into consideration when regulating the strength of an army is, that we must not lose sight of the circumstance of disarming India from beginning to end. I think that upon India being disarmed, as it ought to be, it would not be necessary to bring the strength of the army to that numerical point which would otherwise be indispensably requisite.

460. You are aware that Scinde is disarmed, and so is the Punjaub, but still the police there is to all intents and purposes a military body?—I think it is much more as a civil police than as a military police.

461. It is civil in name, but the men are armed like soldiers?—Yes; but I would not allow a single man to have a musket.

462. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then how would you arm the police?—I would merely give the man a tulwar.

463. (*Chairman.*) You would make the police more civil than it is at present?—Yes.

464. (*Viscount Melville.*) Have you any idea what amount of police would be required?—I cannot say that I have.

465. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you have them in police battalions?—No; it might be done, but it has been hitherto so purely a civil police, that I would not do so.

466. Was not there a period at which that was the case?—Yes; but it was given up.

467. Are you aware of the system of the constabulary in Ireland?—I cannot say that I am.

468. (*Chairman.*) Can you give any approximate idea of what amount of force would be required in Bengal after the country is settled?—I think that that depends very much upon, first, the general disarming the natives, and then the general introduction of railroads; these are points which I think will materially affect the requisite strength of the army.

469. Do you consider that the native force in the Bengal Presidency should be on the regular or the irregular system, or both combined?—I prefer, with regard to economy, the irregular native army, but I do not see that by any possibility you can dispense with the regular army entirely. I do not think that it can be done, simply from the circumstance of its giving rise to the question, where are your officers to come from for the irregulars?

470. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You must have materials from which to select your officers?—Yes.

471. Would you extend it to the officers of the Queen's army going into the irregular army?—I cannot say that I should.

472. (*Colonel Burlton.*) But if they passed an examination in the languages, would you permit it?—If they are fully qualified, I do not see any objection to it as regards the interest of the country generally; and that is a point for consideration. But I do see objections otherwise.

473. (*Chairman.*) Would you increase the proportion of European officers in these irregular corps?—I must say that I think it would be desirable to increase it. It is said that three officers do good service; so they do, but the unfortunate circumstance is that an officer may be sick, or an officer may be killed, and if the three selected do good service I think half a dozen would do better service.

474. (*Colonel Burlton.*) I think you once commanded an irregular regiment?—Yes.

Colonel J. Welchman, C.B.

10th Aug. 1858.

475. Did you ever find any difficulty ?—No ; but then I once only marched with it on service. I have had a local regiment, a regular native regiment, and a European regiment.

476. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Was your irregular corps in cavalry or infantry ?—Infantry.

477. Do you think that the class of native officers is what it ought to be, or that you might introduce a class of gentlemen,—a superior class ?—I think that the native officer, at the present day, is an incumbrance to the army.

478. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you mean both in the regular and in the irregular corps ?—Yes ; in both the infantry.

479. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Why ?—They never arrive at that rank until they are superannuated.

480. Is it so even in the irregular corps ?—In the irregular corps it is equally bad. With relation to the native infantry, I had a very strong proof of it the other day, meeting with my old regiment ; and to my surprise I found non-commissioned officers, who were nearly at the top of the list when I left the regiment ten years ago, still there ; the remark was made, "Men are not transferred to the invalids now, "though they are perfectly worn out, and consequently we get no promotion."

481. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) In the irregular cavalry are there not very young officers ?—Yes ; because they are not so generally promoted by seniority. I should say with regard to the native officers in the native army, if there are to be such, that I would only have promotions regimentally up to the non-commissioned grades, that is to say, I would have naiks and havildars promoted regimentally ; and if it is decided to have native officers in the regiment, they should be the relations and sons of native gentlemen who have a stake in the country, and should not belong to a regiment ; those should be army promotions.

482. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You say, "*If* you had native officers," do you mean by that to say that you would not have any native officers ?—No ; perhaps the "if" in that case was wrongly applied. I was going to say that if that did not answer, I would place European non-commissioned officers at the head of companies, instead of native officers.

483. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That you might do in the regular regiments, but you could not do it in the irregular regiments ?—Certainly not.

484. Do you think that it would be advisable to have European non-commissioned officers to companies in native regiments ?—Yes.

485. What number would you have ?—Two to each company.

486. What number have they now ?—Only two to a regiment. I think that it would be attended with a very beneficial effect.

487. (*Viscount Melville.*) In what respect ?—They would ensure the discipline of the regiment, and they would tend to check intrigue and conspiracy.

488. We find that European officers have not been able to prevent the late combination and intrigue ; how do you think that European non-commissioned officers could do so ?—From being much more with the men ; it might, though I do not say that, in the late case, the non-commissioned officers could have done it, as there was never anything conducted with such skill and secrecy.

489. The European non-commissioned officers would not live any more with the men ?—No they would not live with the men ; but still, as regards discipline in particular, I think that it would tend very greatly to improve it ; and it might or might not act with reference to detecting anything that was wrong in the spirit of the men ; but I must say that I think it would tend greatly to the maintenance of discipline and the efficiency of a company ; and I think, moreover, that in a very short time the natives would look up to them very much, care being taken in the selection.

490. How are these men to acquire the use of the language ?—I did not find any difficulty with men in my own regiment ; in fact, it was what I considered the greatest bane (I used to rail against it most strongly) that every smart young soldier, who came into the regiment, or who was desirous of bettering himself by removal, immediately set to work to study the language, and requested that his name might be put down, as they facetiously call it, for the blackies.

491. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You have two staff non-commissioned officers to a regiment; suppose one of them misconducts himself, and is tried by a court-martial ?—He is sent back to his regiment.

492. Is he struck off the rolls of his regiment ?—Yes. The moment he gets nominated to the non-commissioned staff of the native army, he is placed on what is called the town-major's list, and performs duty as non-effective ; but when returned to it, he then falls back to his former position ; I think at the same time, that if native gentlemen, or the sons of native gentlemen, could be induced to enter the service, having a stake in the country, they would be much more likely to preserve the character of their men free from stain and intrigue than the Europeans could possibly do.

493. Is it not the fact that the men have had no leaders, in consequence of the mode in which native officers have hitherto been promoted. Would not the result of having gentlemen and high caste men as native officers be, that in the case of a mutiny the men would have leaders ?—I think not. In the case of a mutiny, of course it might be giving them a better description of men ; but mutiny would be less likely to be entered into by those men who had themselves an interest in the country.

494. (*Chairman.*) Do you extend the opinion which you have given with regard to the artillery to the sappers and miners, namely, that there should be no natives ?—No ; I think that it would be absolutely necessary to have a certain portion of native sappers; but it should be in the more laborious part of the duty.

495. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Not in the scientific part ?—Not in the scientific part.

496. You agree in what has been said as to the scientific portion ?—Yes.

497. It has been the system hitherto at Roorkee, as I understand, to teach them everything ; that you disapprove of ?—Yes ; as I do the system of teaching our native soldiers gunnery. Of course one could not have anticipated anything of the kind which has happened ; but in consequence every sepoy regiment furnished a certain number of really good gunners.

498. (*Major-General Montgomerie.*) Do you think that a battalion of infantry could be formed with a proportion of Europeans ; say one company of Europeans and one of Sikhs as the groundwork of a native battalion ?—No ; I should very strongly object to mixing Europeans and natives together.

499. Even by companies ?—Yes.

500. (*Chairman.*) In your opinion, should the Bengal native army be composed of different nationalities and castes ; and if so, in what proportion ?—I decidedly think so, as much as it possibly can be ; if it were extended to a dozen, I think it would be so much the better.

501. Should the nationalities be preserved in the shape of regiments or companies, or should the distribution be promiscuous ?—Promiscuous. I think it would otherwise create a jealousy between companies, and would give rise to it very likely with the officers themselves.

502. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is it not established in some of the recent levies by companies ?—I cannot speak to that.

503. (*Chairman.*) Your opinion is, that it is better to disperse them without any reference whatever to their distinctive caste ?—Yes.

504. Do you think that the native army of Bengal should be enlisted under a new code ?—No ; I think that the present code is sufficient, if strictly carried out. Every sepoy now enlisted in the native army is enlisted for the general service.

Colonel J. Welchman, C.B.

10th Aug. 1858.

505. That is since the year 1856?—Yes; and as regards the standing orders of our army, if those standing orders had been strictly acted up to, I do not think commanding officers would have had any just ground of complaint.

506. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are they not acted up to?—No.

507. Why have they not been acted up to?—I cannot say; but it has ever been a ground of complaint on the part of commanding officers that their recommendations have not been attended to.

508. How did that originate?—I cannot say; the authority of commanding officers was undermined in the first instance by Lord William Bentinck in his administration.

509. You think that the code as it exists, if fairly carried out, would be perfectly sufficient for all that is required?—I think so.

510. But you think that it should not be opposed by circulars which render it nugatory?—No. At the present moment, when flogging is acknowledged to exist, a circular is in the possession of every commanding officer, enjoining him to consider that a dead letter; except in particular specified cases, you cannot flog a man.

511. Though it exists in the code?—There are one or two cases which are laid down, but with those exceptions flogging does not exist, strictly speaking, though, as laid down in the articles of war, you can inflict punishment to the extent of 50 lashes. A confidential circular on the subject was, as far back as 1852, sent round to every commanding officer of a regiment.

512. (*Viscount Melville.*) Is not that circular conformable to the circular which exists in the Queen's army?—I think not.

513. There are certain offences in the Queen's army which you cannot punish by flogging, although the articles of war sanction it?—I think that in the native army the exception did not extend to more than four offences for which you could punish a man by flogging, and it was deemed advisable that even in those cases it should be inflicted as little as possible.

514. Are you aware that the standing orders of the Bengal army are remarkably good, while, at the same time, they are never acted up to?—I think they are very good.

515. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are they acted up to?—No.

516. Why are not they acted up to?—Why, I cannot say, and can simply state the fact, that in promotions, in nine cases out of ten, the recommendation of the commanding officer is questioned and very frequently set aside. The great bane of our armies has been in promoting by seniority.

517. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you limit your statement to promotion in the commissioned grades?—Yes; with the non-commissioned officers it does rest with the commanding officer.

518. (*Viscount Melville.*) Can you explain the origin in the Bengal army of things, called weekly guards, every man taking off his accoutrements the moment he is off guard, getting into bed, and that sort of thing, which is sanctioned; do you know how that has crept in?—It certainly has crept in, but I must dissent from it, as a general rule. I have commanded a native regiment, and I did not permit it.

519. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How comes such a system if it is not in the regulations?—It is, no doubt, the fault of the commanding officer, and of the officers of brigades and divisions.

520. (*Viscount Melville.*) When I commanded as the first officer of Peshawur, I had a very angry correspondence with the commanding officers of the regiments of the Bengal army in consequence of my insisting that they should mount guard exactly as the Bombay native army did. They referred me to the list of rules and orders. I asked them to show me the standing orders; they admitted that they could not do so, but they felt it a very great grievance that they were forced to mount guard daily, and that they were prohibited from having the weekly guards. How do you explain the fact of the commanding officers making the complaint to me, that they were not allowed to have weekly guards?—It certainly was not the case in my own regiment, and I consider all other than daily guards as highly objectionable, and consequently cannot state the ground of their complaints.

521. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And it is not a regulation of the service?—No.

522. But yet the system exists; it has crept in?—Yes; but I am perfectly satisfied that it is not the fault of the men; they can and do perform their duty well on guard. Often and often have I been stopped by my own sentry, and though I have tried by every possible means to evade giving the password, or to get past him, I never could do it; and they are generally ready enough to pass a commanding officer.

523. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the Bengal army ought to be divided into two or more armies?—I must say that I think that a division of it would be advantageous.

524. The next question is, do you think that any change is required in the system of promotion, as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers; that question you have answered?—Yes; I think that it ought not to go beyond non-commissioned officers.

525. And you have stated very strongly your opinion that commanding officers should have more power than they now have, both as regards reward and punishment?—Certainly.

526. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you know whether the circular to which you have alluded was issued under the authority of the Government of India?—Yes, I believe it was; though, of course, it came from the commander-in-chief.

527. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) There has been a question put as to the mixture of Europeans and natives, whether it should be regimentally or by brigade, that is to say, whether there should be two companies of Europeans to six companies of natives, or whether they should be by battalions, natives and Europeans, which do you prefer?—By battalions, certainly.

528. Do you not think that the discipline of the European would deteriorate by the other plan?—Both would suffer materially, the European character alike with the native.

The witness withdrew.

Lieut.-Col. Wyllie.

Lieutenant-Colonel WYLLIE examined.

529. (*Chairman.*) Will you have the kindness to state your rank in the army?—Brevet lieutenant-colonel on the retired list of the Bengal army.

530. How many years have you been in the service?—Close upon twenty-seven years.

531. What portion of that time have you spent in India?—Nearly twenty-five years. I was a little more than two years at home upon furlough.

532. Of course you have been associated in the course of your service with both European and native troops?—Yes, as regimental officer, I was six years adjutant of the regiment. I was then brigade-major at Cawnpore, with a very large mixed force of European and native artillery, of European and native cavalry, and of European and native infantry, for many years. I was afterwards assistant adjutant-general to the same division, then assistant adjutant-general at head-quarters, and for the last seven and a half years I was in the military secretariat of the Government of India, so that my entire employment

was military in India during the twenty-seven years that I was in the service.

533. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) When did you return from India?—In 1851.

534. (*Chairman.*) Will you be good enough to favour the Commission with your idea as to the amount of force which ought to be maintained in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled?—I ought to mention, in justice to myself, that I only got my summons to attend this Commission in time to arrive from the remote parts of North Devon about five minutes before coming into this room; I had very imperfect information with me in the country, and have not had time since coming to town to get more perfect information; but from the information which I have I find that up to the annexation of Oude, and I think subsequently, our force in the Bengal presidency was, three regiments of Queen's cavalry, and, I think, fifteen Queen's infantry regiments. We had three Company's European regiments and horse artillery and foot artillery, making altogether a total of 23,850, in round numbers, of European troops. I think that, with reference to the introduction of railways into India, looking at the rapid way in which you can thus move your troops, and having regard also to the rapid communication of orders by means of the telegraph, we probably should not require so very large a force as recent events in India might lead one to suppose, if the troops were judiciously disposed and placed in considerable bodies within easy reach of the railway lines. The impression upon my mind is, that if we maintained 40,000 European troops in the Bengal presidency (and my proportion would come very nearly to what General Low was saying), we should not require very much more than an equal proportion of native troops, exclusive, however, of police corps.

535. Then your proportion would be one-half?—Above one-half, I should say. I have divided the 40,000 European troops as follows; the infantry I have put down at 30,000, I have put down the European cavalry at 5,000, and the artillery at about 5,000; but that would not be nearly sufficient if we are to have no native artillery. Before the late occurrences in India I calculate that we had only about 3,000 European artillery, and as nearly as possible the same number of natives. With reference to the infantry, if we had 30,000 European infantry, probably 60,000 native infantry, regular and irregular, would suffice; that is, presuming that the railways will be pushed on and be availed of for the despatch of troops to the interior.

536. That is, 90,000 infantry, consisting of 30,000 Europeans and 60,000 natives, regular and irregular?—Yes.

537. Will you now take the cavalry?—My own impression is, that we should not have less than 5,000 European cavalry in Bengal.

538. Would you have any native cavalry?—Certainly, you must have that.

539. In the same proportion; that is to say, 10,000 natives?—No; I do not think you would require the proportion to be so large in the regular cavalry, and I doubt very much whether you could very well maintain it, for there is very great difficulty in getting sufficient horses for the cavalry maintained there at present, especially horses suitable for dragoons.

540. You have 90,000 infantry, 5,000 European cavalry, and how many native cavalry?—That is a point on which I feel great diffidence; I think that very much depends, as Colonel Welchman said, upon disarming the country, and also upon the amount of police force to be kept up, which I think ought to be large, both in point of economy, and also in point of usefulness, as an establishment to relieve the regular army.

541. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you put down 10,000 native cavalry, regular and irregular?—You have now, I calculate (at least you had before the mutiny) 10,000 irregular, and something under 5,000 regular cavalry.

542. Supposing you put it at 10,000 altogether, regular and irregular, would that do?—Yes, I think it would be sufficient.

543. Making 10,000 natives?—Yes.

544. (*Chairman.*) That makes 105,000 men, and you would have the whole of the artillery European, I suppose, in proportion to that number?—I very much doubt whether you can have the whole of your artillery European in India. We have a considerable artillery force scattered over the Bengal presidency in the different contingents, and I do not see how you can do away with that altogether.

545. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You are not of opinion that there should be no native artillery?—I think it very desirable that there should not be any if it could be managed; but I do not think that, practically, it could be carried out; I most undoubtedly consider it desirable.

546. What proportion would you have of artillery to the army altogether?—If I am correct in my information, we had only about 3,000 European artillery before this *émeute*, and about 3,000 native artillery; that would be 6,000 altogether; I do not think that you should have less.

547. Ought you to have more; is that, in your opinion, a correct proportion judging from your experience?—I think that we have always had too few guns, with reference to our infantry and cavalry in India, and that 6,000 or 7,000 European artillerymen would not be too many for the Bengal presidency.

548. (*Viscount Melville.*) What I now put into your hand is a statement of the artillery before the mutiny?—This includes drivers and non-combatants. I speak only of gunners, or rather of actual fighting men.

549. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider the proportion of two guns to 1,000 men, which has been stated by Sir George Pollock, to be a fair proportion?—I do.

550. Say about 200 guns?—Yes.

551. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then there would be a proportion of reserve companies for the siege train, I apprehend?—Yes; that would follow as a matter of necessity.

552. (*Major-General Montgomerie.*) If I understand you rightly, that is exclusive of those required for the contingents, if they are to be kept up?—I calculated that 5,000 European artillery would be about sufficient if those others were to be kept up, or supposing that on economical or political or other grounds a small native artillery were still maintained.

553. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think it desirable generally in India for the maintenance of our rule that there should be native artillery?—I think that it is not desirable; but in Central India, for instance, the artillery of these contingents has often been called out of late years for field service in the hot season.

554. Could not that be done by Europeans as well as by natives?—Undoubtedly.

555. Would it be an advantage to have them natives, or to have them Europeans?—As I said before, I think most decidedly that it would be an advantage to have them Europeans.

556. (*Chairman.*) I think you have answered the next question by expressing the opinion that there must be both regular and irregular troops?—I think they must be combined.

557. Can you give an opinion with respect to the sappers and miners?—I am not at this moment aware of the number, but I believe that we had not more than 60 or 80 Europeans in our sappers. I certainly should not have less than 200 Europeans.

558. There is a much larger number than that, I think?—I have no late information on the subject, and therefore I should rather hesitate to mention any number.

559. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Without mentioning any number, do you think that the scientific duties performed by sappers ought to be performed by natives, or exclusively by Europeans; would you, in

Lieut.-Col. Wyllie.

10th Aug. 1858.

fact, teach the natives the scientific branches?—I think it most desirable not to do so. At the same time, I doubt very much whether you will get the duties performed entirely by the Europeans in that climate.

560. Even the scientific duties?—Even the scientific duties.

561. (*Chairman.*) In fact your answer is much the same as with regard to the artillery, you think it very desirable to confine it to Europeans if practicable?—Decidedly so.

562. What is your opinion as to the Bengal native army being composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion?—I think most decidedly that it ought to be so, and that you cannot have too great a number of castes; the smaller the number of each caste in each regiment, that is to say, the greater the number of castes you have, the better.

563. Then you would not keep up the nationality in regiments or companies, but you would disperse them promiscuously?—I would decidedly disperse them throughout the regiment as far as natives go. I would not mix up Europeans with natives.

564. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that it would be desirable to have any foreign nationalities in the native army. I am not talking of Europeans but of colonial nationalities, such as Africans or Malays, or anything of that sort?—Yes, I think so, decidedly; and I think that the East Indians in India itself might, as far as mounted corps go, be very usefully employed. I do not know that you would get a very great many of them to enlist; but still I think you would get some, particularly in the mounted branches.—Physically they are scarcely fit for infantry, having never been out of India.

565. (*Lord Stanley.*) Is it not notorious that the East Indians have never shown any liking for military service, that their preference is almost entirely for sedentary pursuits?—Not universally. We have a number of half-castes, for instance, in our native corps as drummers.

566. (*Colonel Burlton.*) They are quite exceptional cases?—Yes, but we have them as drummers and buglers in our native infantry corps, and in our artillery corps, and in fact in all our regiments there is a mixture of these half-castes as musicians.

567. (*Chairman.*) I understand, that in your opinion, the greater the variety of nationalities or castes the better?—I think so.

568. And that instead of their being kept up or maintained as such, they should be more promiscuously dispersed?—Yes, there has never been any inconvenience found from a high caste man and a low caste man standing in the ranks together, or being hutted together, and, I think the more of them you have the more politic it would be.

569. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you mix them all up, or would you have them by companies?—I would mix them throughout the regiment.

570. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the Bengal native army ought to be enlisted under a new code?—I think that in the last few years an order has been passed in India that no man shall be enlisted into the native army except for general service. I am not aware that any other alteration is required, excepting that all castes should be admitted for service.

571. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is that not so now; is any caste excluded?—There was a declaration on the part of the Government, in Lord William Bentinck's time, that the public service should be open to men of all castes.

572. You have stated that if it were open to all castes, it would be desirable; that would lead one to infer that some castes were excluded.—Because, practically, commanding officers have not enlisted men of low caste; they have given the preference to the higher caste.

573. Not by order, but by preference?—Certainly, by practice. Of late years, and ever since I entered the service, I have not known a commanding officer who did not prefer, when he could get them, having high caste men to men of lower caste.

574. You think that a disadvantage?—Certainly so.

575. (*Lord Stanley.*) Is that preference justified by any physical superiority on the part of the high caste men?—I think that we have all had a prejudice in favour of high-caste men in the Bengal army, but I now think that it is quite a mistaken one. I think that, physically, the Mussulman sepoy is a better soldier than the Hindoo; but as regards the Hindoos themselves, I am not aware of any physical superiority in one class over another; they all eat pretty nearly the same food, and all live in pretty nearly the same manner.

576. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Supposing you command a regiment, and you take the high-caste men by preference, you must have some reason for taking the high-caste men by preference; what is that reason?—I think that the feeling in commanding officers is, that you have a more respectable man, in the same way as in our own country you would rather have a farmer's son than a man taken from the streets.

577. Then it is more from the man's position in society than from any physical superiority?—I think so.

578. (*Chairman.*) Have you experienced any practical inconvenience arising from the caste of men in India?—None whatever. In six years service as adjutant I never knew caste brought forward as a plea for the non-performance of any military duty whatever. It is usual in the native army, when their holidays come round, both the Mahommedan and the Hindoo, as a matter of course to give them a holiday; that is to say, to have no drill on that day; they perform their duties all the same, unless, indeed, any inconvenience should arise from it; but so far from ever finding their caste or their religion urged as a plea for the non-performance of duty, I have myself, as adjutant, often got them to attend parade regularly morning and evening, without the slightest murmur, during their holidays, when we have been preparing for our annual inspection.

579. (*Lord Stanley.*) They expect these holidays as a general rule?—Yes.

580. But they are willing to give them up if any cause is shown, if they see that the refusal of them arises not from mere caprice?—Yes; I think that with a little management you could get them almost to do anything, in the days when I was with a native corps.

581. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How long do these holidays last? What is the longest period?—I do not at this moment recollect; sometimes one day and sometimes two days or three days.

582. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) One lasts ten days?—Yes, but you never give them the whole time; it is only on the great days of their feast that they are excused from duties.

583. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the Bengal army ought to be divided into two or more armies?—I have been considering that question very much, and I confess that I do not see that there would be much advantage in it. I think that, being a seniority service as regards the European officers, it would be very difficult to divide the Bengal army into two or more armies, and that such division would be attended with inconvenience; and it is, in my opinion, desirable that the native troops should be moved from one province to another, and not always located near their homes. I think you would find a disadvantage in dividing the army and in confining the up-country and Punjaub men, for instance, to their own immediate provinces.

584. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Has it been usual hitherto for the native regiments to be often moved or not?—Sometimes very often, and at very great expense to themselves, but I believe only when the exigencies of the service have required it.

585. Has there been no system of reliefs?—The usual system is not to keep a native regiment more

than three years at one station, but practically it is almost impossible to carry that out, there being so many changes in India.

586. (*Chairman.*) You recognize the advantage of having the Madras and Bombay presidencies with separate armies, do you not?—Decidedly; and I think we have lately seen the advantage of it.

587. But you do not think that that advantage would be experienced in Bengal by dividing its army?—I confess that I do not see that it would.

588. (*Lord Stanley.*) Have you not found complaints of the great distance to which native troops are now moved from their home?—Yes; for instance, since the Punjaub has been annexed, men have felt it very inconvenient to be liable to be sent away to Peshawur on the extreme north-west frontier; and, on the other hand, to be liable to be sent down to the remote corner of Bengal (Chitagong), which is an immense distance.

589. Is not that an inconvenience which would be removed by the division of the Bengal army?—It would.

590. (*Colonel Burlton.*) What occasion is there for these long marches now; it must be a matter at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief and the Government?—According to the answer which I have given, I contemplate the employment of police corps, which would very much lessen the duty of the regular army.

591. (*Viscount Melville.*) Did it ever happen to you, or did you ever know it occur, that a commanding officer attempted to enlist a man of a different caste into a regiment, and that the other men objected till the objectionable man was discharged?—I have occasionally heard of instances of that kind, but I acted for six years in my regiment as adjutant, and I never knew any objection to any man that I selected; I always selected them without reference to their caste. I would not take a very low caste man, and the men of my regiment would not bring him to me; but there I now think I was mistaken.

592. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then virtually it came to the same thing?—Perhaps it did.

593. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that any change is required in the system of promotion as regards the commissioned and the non-commissioned officers?—I do not think that any change is necessary. I think that the rules which we have are very good if carried out, but practically I believe they are not carried out.

594. Do you agree with Colonel Welchman in thinking that a greater proportion of European officers, and even of European non-commissioned officers, in the irregular troops would be an advantage?—I quite agree with Colonel Welchman; and I believe it would be very desirable to have a couple of European serjeants with every company of regular native infantry. I think they would be found very useful, and a very great assistance to the European officers, who ordinarily live some distance from the men's lines.

595. Do you agree with Colonel Welchman in thinking that if the native gentry could be got to go as officers into the irregular troops it would be an advantage as compared with being promoted by seniority?—I have not given much attention to the point, and it is so contrary altogether to the past practice in Bengal that I should hesitate to speak approvingly of it. I quite agree with Colonel Welchman that our native officers under the Bengal system are, generally speaking (there are of course exceptions) perfectly useless. I regard them as merely having been promoted as a reward for their long services rather than for any practical good that they do in corps; for they have little or no influence over the men, and but seldom exercise authority over them; they are generally nearly worn out before they attain to that rank, and, generally speaking, are useless. There are exceptions where the commanding officers have promoted younger men.

596. Then I take for granted that you consider that promotion strictly according to seniority ought to be done away with?—The rule of the service now is, as ordered by Sir H. Fane, I think, that seniority should not be observed; that is to say, that where seniority and merit were equal, the promotion should be given to the senior of the two men, but only in that case.

597. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) But the commanding officer must give his reasons for passing over the senior man?—Yes, in his recommendations to head-quarters; but I think that one of the objects in giving the higher pay for length of service was to do away with any disappointment that the native soldier might have in being passed over in consequence of inefficiency; that you would reward him pecuniarily for his long service, without the service suffering from the promotion of an unfit man.

598. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the commanding officers should have more power to reward and punish than they have now?—I cannot go the length which Colonel Welchman goes, in saying that they have practically no power at all now, for I think that if the regulations of the service are enforced they have power; but I quite agree with him, that they have been in one way and another so much interfered with that they are afraid to exercise their authority, and that practically it is not exercised from some cause or another.

599. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You were in the adjutant-general's office, were you not?—Yes.

600. Can you explain in any way why the commanding officers have been so hampered?—I think that it was occasioned a good deal in this way. When the Queen's system of inspection was introduced into the Indian army, that is to say, those returns which are required to be filled up at inspections of corps, one of the requirements was that the inspecting officer should put the question to the troops whether they had any complaint to make. I believe that, generally speaking, that was unknown in the native army before, and I think that, having been regarded as an invitation to complain, it was abused, and was the first step towards the petitioning system which got into the Bengal army; when a man was passed over he fancied he had only to complain, or petition the commander-in-chief. His petition was almost invariably sent down through the general officer to the regimental commanding officer to be inquired into, and in many cases, to my knowledge, after the commanding officer had declared that there was unfitness for promotion, for instance, the commander-in-chief has listened to the complaint, and promoted the man after all. Commanding officers were really afraid to pass men over.

601. As you were in the adjutant-general's office, perhaps you can tell us upon what ground that was done?—I was only a very few months in the adjutant-general's office, and I cannot say that any case of the sort occurred while I was there.

602. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not think that the promotion of the non-commissioned officers ought to be left entirely to the commanding officer of the regiment, as it is in the Queen's regiments?—According to the regulations, the promotion from sepoy to naik, and from naik to havildar is left to the commanding officer of the regiment; it is only in the promotion from havildar to jemadar, from jemadar to subahdar, and from subahdar to subahdar-major, that a recommendation is required and a reference to the adjutant-general.

603. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Practically, not even the non-commissioned officers are now promoted without the consent of the general officer?—I am speaking of the service as it was when I left it in 1851.

604. (*Viscount Melville.*) Is it not the case now, that a commanding officer cannot make a havildar without reference to the adjutant-general?—He can, by the regulations, promote a man to havildar without reference to any one.

605. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Is he bound to promote the senior man or may he make a selection?

Lieut.-Col. Wyllie.
10th Aug.1858.

—I must observe that the method, as regards promotions in the non-commissioned grades, adopted in each of the branches of the Bengal army, in the same way as in Madras and Bombay, has been defined by regimental standing orders, and that according to the best of my recollection, by those standing orders seniority is only to be considered with reference to efficiency; the regulations of the service do not require you to promote a senior merely because he is a senior, unless you are perfectly satisfied he is the fittest man for it; practically, however, that is not done.

606. (*Major-General Montgomerie.*) The commanding officer is afraid of a petition going from a soldier who is passed over up to head-quarters, and that he will be found fault with?—It has been so.

607. That is what keeps him from acting upon the regulation of the service?—I firmly believe it.

608. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Were the sepoys of the Bengal army permitted to petition the commander-in-chief directly?—I have known many instances in which they have sent their petitions direct.

609. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have they not been sent back?—They have been sent back for explanation.

610. Have they not been sent back unopened, it being said, "These petitions cannot be accepted "unless they come from the commanding officer?"—It has been quite a common thing when the commander-in-chief has been on tour for these petitions to be presented to the commander-in-chief; His Excellency hands them over to the adjutant-general, and he asks for explanation.

611. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) He sends them back to the commanding officer?—He sends them back to the commanding officer for explanation.

612. (*Major-General Hancock.*) That is the commander-in-chief invites complaints. If the commander-in-chief inspects a regiment he very often inquires whether there are any complaints?—I have heard of very many instances of the sepoy sending his petition direct to head quarters without the commander-in-chief coming to inspect.

613. That is permitted?—It has been permitted certainly.

614. (*Chairman.*) Have you any opinion whether there should be any admixture of European and native forces, either regimentally or by brigade?—I should certainly never advocate the mixture in regiments of Europeans and natives. I should keep the Europeans entirely separate from the natives, decidedly.

615. By brigades?—Yes; I think it would tend very much to injure the estimation in which the European soldier is now held and the manner in which he is looked up to by the native soldier, if they were regimentally amalgamated, their habits and feelings being so very different.

The witness withdrew.

Adjourned to To-morrow at Twelve o'clock.

Wednesday, 11th August 1858.

PRESENT:

Major-General the Right Hon. JONATHAN PEEL.	Lieut-Gen. Sir HARRY G. W. SMITH.
General H.R.H. the Duke of CAMBRIDGE.	Lieut-Gen. Sir GEORGE A. WETHERALL.
Lord STANLEY.	Major-Gen. MONTGOMERIE.
General the Marquis of TWEEDDALE.	Major-Gen. HANCOCK.
Major-Gen. Viscount MELVILLE.	Colonel BURLTON.

Major-General PEEL in the Chair.

Colonel BECHER, C.B., examined.

Colonel Becher, C.B.
11th Aug.1858.

616. (*Chairman.*) What rank do you hold in the Indian army?—I am a brevet colonel and captain in the Indian army.

617. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Are you senior captain of your regiment?—No, the second.

618. (*Chairman.*) How long have you been in the service?—Nearly 25 years.

619. What portion of that period has been passed in India?—The whole of it, excepting a short absence of about 18 months at the Cape.

620. In which presidency have you served?—In Bengal.

621. In what arm of the service?—I belong to the infantry, but I have been on the staff.

622. What position did you hold on the staff?—In the quartermaster-general's department; I am the quartermaster-general of the Bengal army.

623. (*Duke of Cambridge*). How long have you held the position of quartermaster-general?—About seven years.

624. (*Chairman.*) Of course during that period you have seen service with both the European and the native troops?—Yes, a good deal.

625. Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion of European to native force which ought to be maintained in the Bengal army?—I do not think that it should ever be less than four to one, or three to one, if possible, for some years to come, that is to say, three to one for our standing army.

626. What is your opinion as to the native troops, whether any native artillery should be allowed in the Bengal army?—Not as horse artillery or in charge of field guns, certainly; not solely in charge, such as our native batteries and native troops of horse artillery have been. I presume there must be natives attached to European batteries and European troops more or less, but not as an effective force of the artillery at all.

627. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Not as the foundation of a battery?—No.

628. (*Chairman.*) You consider that the artillery should be European?—Most decidedly so.

629. Do you consider the artillery as a part of that proportion which you have mentioned of one to four?—Yes, I think you may take that as a general principle if our army is to remain as it has been without augmentation at all.

630. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) It will make a difference as regards the proportion if you have no native artillery, and have all European, there must be a large proportion of the European troops artillery; do you take into account that proportion at all when you say one to three or one to four?—Under those circumstances it should not be less than one to three.

631. Including the artillery?—Yes.

632. That would reduce the proportion of European infantry and cavalry to the native troops?—Yes; that is supposing the artillery to be much augmented.

633. You say that you would rather have no native artillery?—Yes; at least not native horse artillery.

634. You have native artillery at present?—Yes.

635. You must, therefore, make that native artillery good in some way?—Yes.

636. Then you must increase the European artillery, under any circumstances, if that view is correct?—I mean that Europeans should man all the guns which have hitherto been manned by natives, field batteries as well as the troops.

637. (*Chairman.*) What proportion of the infantry do you consider ought to be European, as compared with the native troops?—I should say about the same proportion.

638. That is to say, one-fourth?—Yes; one to three in infantry.

639. And cavalry in the same proportion?—Yes; about the same proportion of European cavalry to the native cavalry.

640. If you have the same proportions with regard to the infantry and cavalry, and all the artillery are Europeans, it will make the proportion of Europeans to the whole force larger than that which you have mentioned?—I mean that, in the aggregate, that proportion would be sufficient.

641. Have you formed any opinion as to the amount of force which will be required in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled?—A good deal, I presume, would depend upon what the Government propose to do with regard to the occupation of the territories which have, since this mutiny, become, as it were, under our military rule, portions of Oude, for instance, which were never properly occupied, and Bundelcund, and other districts which now require to be brought more directly under our occupation. Until all these things are settled, it is impossible to say what amount will be necessary.

642. Do you imagine that the police force may supersede the military?—A great deal, for many purposes.

643. For what purposes?—For guards and all civil duties and many detached duties which have devolved upon the native regiments of our army within the last few years; since the extension of territory, the native troops have taken duties which in former times they never performed. I think that a properly organized military police force will in a great measure reduce the necessity of so large a native army.

644. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What is the police force at present composed of?—I am hardly able to say, for it has been so altered and augmented, everybody raising police battalions, and the whole system has been so changed since I left India, and also during the last year, that I can hardly say what it is. It appears to me that everything is police just now.

645. Before the mutiny, in the normal state of the country, what was the police?—It was only a civil police, excepting in the Punjaub, where there was a military police, which was found very effective and in every way to answer the purposes. It was a regularly organized military police, under superintendents.

646. But in Bengal proper the police did not assist the military at all?—Certainly not, in Bengal proper.

647. (*Chairman.*) When you fix the proportion between the European and the native troops, do you take into consideration at all the contingent forces?—They have all more or less passed away I think. You have hardly any contingents now existing excepting the Punjaub irregular forces. What we call distinctly "contingents" have almost all ceased to exist. They have mutinied more or less. I mean of the Bengal presidency.

648. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you like to see them re-established?—No, certainly not.

649. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that the native force of the Bengal presidency should be on the regular or the irregular system, or both combined?—Both combined, to a certain degree; but I am in favour of a regular force for a large body such as our army must be.

650. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) For the infantry?—Certainly.

651. Do you include the cavalry?—No, probably not.

652. (*Lord Stanley.*) Then I understand that you prefer an irregular force for the cavalry?—To a certain degree, if the cavalry is not too large; but if it is to be a very large cavalry force, I certainly would not have it generally an irregular force. I think that irregular troops are superior in many ways, and very advantageous as a small body; but not to make the whole of our army in India an irregular force.

653. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the present organization of the irregular cavalry requires any alteration?—I am hardly competent to say, beyond the fact, which is pretty well known, that they wanted more pay. I think they were not able to support themselves properly, and to do all that was required of them by the Government, on their former rates of pay.

654. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You were quarter-master-general of the army; of course, therefore, you know a good deal about supplying these troops. Is it the fact that the irregulars are not at all supplied on service by the Government, but entirely supply themselves?—They furnish their own carriage, but they draw on our bazaars. In the camp there is in general what is called a Sudder bazaar, which is for the supply of the whole army, regular and irregular. Each man, perhaps, carries a day or two's food of some kind, which renders him independent in some degree of what he can obtain on the spot.

655. In the arrangements for the army the commissariat department would take the feeding of the irregulars into account?—Yes; they must expect to be fed in the country just the same as the regular force; but they are not supplied with carriage and with many of the requirements of the regular troops.

656. (*Chairman.*) Do you supply the rations regularly?—No, not regularly, only in cases of necessity. If they do not choose to buy in the bazaar they may buy wherever they like.

657. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would not that induce plunder to a great extent?—I think not.

658. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Beyond the frontier, for instance?—It is necessary that their wants should be taken into consideration, and they have been. The aggregate number of fighting men and registered followers, whether regular or irregular, is considered before arrangements are made by departments.

659. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do they give the irregulars forage the same as the regulars?—No; they do not supply them with grass cutters.

660. Can they buy forage in the bazaar?—Yes, generally can. Every man very probably keeps a servant of his own to procure grass. They go into the bazaar for what they wish to purchase, or into the village, wherever it may be cheapest.

661. (*Colonel Burlton.*) It is precisely the same thing with our regular troops beyond our own provinces?—Yes.

662. Are they not on the same footing when they go on foreign service?—Yes.

663. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are the irregular troops on the same footing as the regular troops on foreign service?—They have no claim on the Government, but they must require the same arrangements for their food as any other registered follower or fighting man.

664. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You must feed them?—Yes. Everybody attached to the camp more or less, camp follower or soldier, draws upon the camp. He draws upon the supplies furnished by the civil authorities or the commissariat, or whatever mode is adopted; the civil authorities, of late years, have furnished the supplies in our provinces.

665. (*Chairman.*) But he draws upon those supplies by paying for them?—Yes.

Colonel Becher, C.B.

11th Aug. 1858.

666. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Reverting to your reply as to the proportion of Europeans and natives, do you state it as your opinion that, including all native forces, regular and irregular, one in four should be European?—Yes, I do. I have only the data of our former army. Such is my opinion.

667. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Was not your answer one to three?—Yes, one to three, especially the infantry.

668. (*Chairman.*) Are the irregular troops officered in the same manner as the regular native troops?—No, certainly not; they have a very small proportion of officers; they have only a commandant, a second in command, and an adjutant.

669. Do you consider that any alteration should be made in the native officers in the irregular cavalry?—I think, as the irregular cavalry is now established, the native officers must remain. It is a very important thing; the native officers of the irregular cavalry are of great service.

670. How are the native officers of the irregular cavalry appointed?—I have not served in the irregular cavalry; but I think they are chiefly men of rank, and money and means, who come forward on the raising of a regiment, or else they are draughts from some other regiment. They are generally selected men.

671. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) They are not men who rise from the ranks?—Not so much in the irregular cavalry. The irregular cavalry is comparatively a new service, and the promotion is not so far back as in the regiments of the line; but I believe they are generally men selected for some superior qualification or other.

672. In fact they represent the gentry of the country?—They do.

673. (*Colonel Burlton.*) And they generally bring in a certain number of men with them?—Yes; and have an influence in a district which enables them to keep up their troops.

674. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is a regiment of irregular cavalry formed of the same class of men, or are they of different nationalities?—They are of different nationalities; but in some regiments I believe it has been the system to have separate troops, especially in reference to Affghans.

675. For instance, with reference to the native officers bringing men, probably they would bring a whole troop?—They might furnish a whole troop. They would gradually get in their particular lot as a troop.

676. Has that system been found to answer well in a regiment, of having troops of the same caste?—I am not competent to say in the irregular cavalry, but in the infantry I think not. I understood that the classification of Sikhs (in introducing a certain proportion into our native infantry), was not popular. But I think that they would be better mixed up in the end. For a time there is a great deal of unpleasant feeling, perhaps, but I consider it is desirable that they should be mixed up.

677. (*Chairman.*) How are the promotions in the regular native troops made?—By seniority, generally; in the regular army it has hitherto been a system of seniority.

678. What effect has that as regards the age of the officers?—They are generally very much too old for efficiency.

679. Do you consider promotion by selection preferable to promotion entirely by seniority?—Not entirely, I think; but that a just admixture of both would be very beneficial. That continuous good conduct and other qualities rendering a man fit for promotion should be taken into consideration, and not the strict seniority system, although I think that it has been lucky for us that we have had the seniority system. The native officers have not been able to do much as leaders of mutineers.

680. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that you could do without native officers in the regular regiments?—I think it is a hope for the men to look forward to their pay and pensions as native officers when they retire, and their credit and position in the regiment I think is maintained.

681. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Do you not think that it would be better, when a man is old and worn out in that manner, to make him an officer, and that he should retire rather than to keep him on when he is useless?—I think that a change in our system is very much required as a means of getting rid of old and inefficient officers of one kind or another.

682. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have you any suggestion to make as to how that could be accomplished?—Not just now, nor has my practical experience in a regiment enabled me to do so; but there are many points which I think might be considered; and it is the general opinion of the army that it can be very much improved.

683. Would you like to see the introduction of native gentlemen and the same class of native officers for the regulars as now exist for the irregulars?—No, I think not. I think that they should look to their European officers solely in India hereafter; that the Europeans should be the influential men and not native officers.

684. Do you think that that might have had a very serious effect in such a mutiny as we have lately had in producing men to lead?—Unquestionably.

685. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Upon what do you ground your opinion that in the irregular cavalry in future native officers are of importance, such not having been previously the case?—It has always been the case that native officers in the irregular cavalry have been of great importance. I think that the native officers of the irregular cavalry have very great weight and importance; in fact, I think, virtually they often command the regiment.

686. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) With the regulars, if you had a really proper proportion of European officers, would it not obviate the necessity of having so many native officers?—Probably it would; but I have not served with a native regiment for a good many years, and am not competent authoritatively to speak of the internal working of regiments; still I think that the native officer, as he has been in our service, is certainly a cypher, and has not been of any benefit to the service, at the same time it would be very little satisfaction to a man to enter our service unless he had something to look forward to, and if more rapid promotion than has hitherto been the case could be introduced, I think the rank of native officer would be beneficial in many ways.

687. Does not the fact of having native officers make the European officer less anxious or careful of his men, and cause him to look after them less than he would do if there was not that intermediate grade?—No, I think not, generally; I think there are many other reasons, perhaps, which make the European officer not do it, but not the presence of a native officer. Indeed I think it would be a very proper link between the officer and his men if the native officers were of a proper stamp, and capable of keeping up that intercourse.

688. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Why might not native officers be made as valuable in the infantry as in irregular corps?—I am not an advocate for an irregular army at all as a general service. I think that in the irregular branch of the service, such as our irregulars were when they were first instituted, those men have had a very great and good influence; but I consider that it will be better for us not to have such a body of influential native officers with a large army, such as our standing army in India must be.

689. You say that you think them very valuable in the irregular cavalry?—Just in a small body of men. Our irregular cavalry, considered in relation to the army generally, was but a very small proportion, and employed in very hard work, and in many ways where you require a man to have a certain degree of pride and influence in his regiment, and in duties which do not fall to the regular troops of the line.

690. Do you not think that the apparent uselessness of native officers in the Bengal army has been owing to their having been so very old, and never having been intrusted with the separate command of a company or troop?—I think so.

691. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) If you were to improve the class of native officers as you now suggest, would you not form that very description of men which you think might be dangerous hereafter?—Not if you kept the native regiments sufficiently officered by Europeans.

692. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Was there any rule in the army formerly whereby it was necessary that a commissioned native officer should be able to read or write?—Not that I am aware.

693. Are there not many so ignorant that they can neither read nor write?—To the best of my belief, there are.

694. (*Lord Stanley.*) Do you not consider, on the whole, that a very serious blow would be struck to the native army if the men enlisting in that army were to be deprived of the reward to which they look forward for long and faithful service?—Certainly.

695. In your opinion would not that disadvantage more than counterbalance any real or supposed benefit which might arise from the employment of Europeans in their place?—Possibly; but I do not quite understand "the employment of Europeans in their place." Do you mean by superseding altogether the rank of native officer?

696. Yes.—I think that you cannot have too many Europeans, and that the native officer as well as his men should consider the European as his superior in every way; still I think that it would have a very bad effect on the native army if there were no such position as that of native officers.

697. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Could any means be devised by which these men enlisting might have a good retirement to look forward to which would be tantamount to their being raised to become native officers?—I do not see much advantage in that; there would be the same expense to the Government of their retiring pensions, and without the credit and reputation and position of the superior grade in their regiments.

698. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Supposing that they were all enlisted with the understanding that they should not hold regimental rank beyond that of havildar, and that on attaining a certain age, and being unfit for active service, they should then be promoted to the rank of jemadar or subahdar, with a title of rank and a pension; would that do?—I think it might; they look to attaining that position. And I have no doubt that with natives the inducement is what they have to fall back upon.

699. Would they not greatly prefer the *otium* without the *dignitas* in your opinion?—I dare say they would. I do not think that they hold a very satisfactory position now.

700. (*Viscount Melville.*) If you reduce the native officers, how do you propose that the duties which they now take are to be performed, because European officers could not take the duties which the natives do now, such as the guards and escorts?—A native officer does not take a guard under 40 men generally. A subahdar has 40 men.

701. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) What was the object in originally appointing native officers?—I suppose it was to give the men something to look forward to. In those days our European officers were fewer; and I believe in former days the native officers were much more influential and useful than they are now.

702. Was not it also in order that the European officers might be informed of what was going on in the ranks?—Yes; to be a sort of link of communication with the men.

703. Has not the fact of not doing their duty in that respect been a cause of mutinies taking place without the Europeans being aware of it?—Undoubtedly, they have been most culpable. They knew it, I have no doubt, but were too weak to divulge it.

704. (*Chairman.*) I understand your opinion to be, then, that native officers, as now selected and appointed, are inefficient?—Yes.

705. But that you consider that they would be efficient if properly selected?—Yes; unless such a proposal as Colonel Burlton suggests could be carried into effect, namely, that the men could be removed with the same honour and advantage to themselves as if they remained effective; but I do not think it is practicable.

706. Do you think it desirable that European non-commissioned officers should be attached to each company; have you them to each company?—No.

707. Do you think it desirable to have more than you have at present?—No, not if there is a European officer to each company.

708. How many European officers do you consider it always necessary to have with a native regiment?—No company should be without an European officer of experience.

709. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Should each company have a captain?—No, I think not; I consider most of the lieutenants are quite equal to the charge of companies.

710. Does a company not look up to a man in the position of captain more than it does to a man in the position of a subaltern?—No; I think if an officer serves with his company a certain time if he is in charge of that company, and feels that it is his home, the company looks up to the man more than to the rank.

711. What number of European officers do you think should always be the establishment of a regular regiment?—I think that the establishment as it stands now is quite enough if there are not too many withdrawn for staff employment.

712. You think that if the establishment now existing were kept up, and if all the officers were present, it would be sufficient?—Quite so, if not more than sufficient.

713. (*Chairman.*) Would it not be a great advantage if staff officers were withdrawn or made supernumeraries?—Yes, I think it very desirable to make some kind of staff corps.

714. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think it is practicable?—I am not prepared to say that; but it is a matter which has been very often talked of, and a number of schemes have been suggested for it. I think that the system of staff employment in India has been one of the causes of rendering the native army more neglected. I do not think that officers remaining with their regiment look to their regiment as they did when they felt it was their home. All officers are looking forward, more or less, to the chance of being withdrawn for staff employment.

715. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And they look upon their regimental duties as quite secondary?—Yes; I have known some men who would stick to their regiment, but I am afraid it is a minority.

716. (*Viscount Melville.*) Does not it happen that now a European officer has charge of three or four companies?—Yes.

717. Does he pay the men of those companies?—They are all paid in his presence; the men are marched up to the officer's quarters, or they are paid upon the parade of the company.

718. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) When you speak of the establishment as it exists now, have you taken into account that a proportion would always be upon sick leave, and have you also reckoned for casualties?—Yes; I think those contingencies might always be taken into consideration; it is the withdrawal of almost an unlimited number for staff employment which destroys the effective force.

719. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you aware that the present establishment has been fixed with the view of furnishing six or seven officers for staff employment?—Yes; but there is always a number absent from sickness or some other cause.

Colonel Becher, C.B.

11th Aug. 1858.

720. (*Chairman.*) Is there any limit now to the number allowed to be away on staff employment?—Yes, but certain reasons and circumstances make it not a law of the Medes and Persians.

721. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not think that the irregular service is more popular among the natives than the regular service, and particularly in the cavalry, inasmuch as the native prefers wearing his native dress and riding in his native saddle to the European?—Certainly; the native cavalry was not as efficient a branch as the irregular cavalry, and I would have all cavalry in future on the irregular system, unless our cavalry is very much increased, and I do not see the necessity for increasing it very much numerically.

722. You would have no regular native cavalry at all?—No.

723. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You think that the irregular cavalry, without the same number of European officers, have been more efficient than the regular cavalry, with the full complement of European officers?—I think so.

724. Then it would seem that the larger number of European officers does not increase the efficiency of the corps?—I would not have a very large irregular force at all; but if there is to be a larger force of infantry or cavalry, I think they should be, the majority of them, regular. As the cavalry branch of the service stands now, I think that it is better that they should be irregular.

725. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you of opinion that irregular cavalry would brigade with British dragoons and fight with them?—Yes; I believe they have done so.

726. (*Viscount Melville.*) The irregular cavalry brigaded at Gujerat?—Yes, and the Scinde horse charged with the dragoons.

727. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I suppose your opinion is that the advantage of the irregular cavalry is more for outpost duties and duties of that description?—Yes; they have very few other duties to take.

728. In line, do you think that the irregular native cavalry would be equally good in a charge with the regular cavalry?—Yes; I do not see that our present light cavalry have any advantage, in their materiel or discipline, or anything else, over the irregular.

729. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Was not the Bengal army, previously to its dissolution, considered to be in a very high state of discipline, as far as parade and brigade duties, and other military duties of that description, went?—Yes; I have every reason to believe so.

730. And at that time they had the same paucity of officers of which we are now complaining?—Certain regiments had that paucity. Some were not so deprived of their officers. As a body, I think that the native army was in a well-disciplined state, as far as regarded its efficiency on the parade and the outside qualifications of a soldier.

731. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But it is not your opinion now that they were in a good state of discipline?—No; there is no doubt that there must have been an opposite spirit existing for some long time previous, and there have been signs which have exhibited themselves for some years, showing that there was not a very loyal spirit among the men towards their Government or their officers.

732. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) But as far as the military duties went, they were considered to be in a good state of discipline. I am not talking of the political feeling?—I should say that generally they were; that is to say, they were able to take their place in brigade and to manœuvre, but the more European officers there were present on a field day, or on any parade day, the more efficient [redacted]giments were. The native officers have not [redacted]themselves qualified in any way to take the [redacted]Europeans with companies, in my opinion.

[redacted]*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you consider [redacted]egular corps of cavalry were in a better [redacted]cipline than the irregular corps?—As far as their "discipline" was concerned, I think the one as good as the other; that is, as good as could be expected. You cannot make a native trooper a first-rate dragoon.

734. Are you aware of the amount of compensation given by Government for the horse of an irregular cavalry soldier?—I think it is about 120 rupees.

735. And what is the Government price paid for a horse in the regular cavalry?—The horses cost the Government, I believe, about 400 or 500 rupees each.

736. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have you any idea of the difference of expense of an entire regiment of irregular cavalry as against an entire regiment of regular cavalry?—I do not know; of course the latter is very much greater in every way.

737. I presume the difference is merely from their having more European officers, not as regards the men. Taking all the contingencies into account, what you have to allow for wear and tear of horses, and so on, would the expense be much greater in the one case than in the other?—Yes, I should think so.

738. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not think that if your view were carried out,—your view of having all the native cavalry irregular,—it would be advisable and in fact necessary to pay the irregular cavalry higher than is done now?—Yes, certainly. I think that that has been a grievance and a want. Colonel Tait could tell you, if he were here, that when we were last together at Calcutta it was a question upon which General Anson and the Government were consulted to raise the pay of the irregular cavalry. I know that they were very much embarrassed and in debt.

739. (*Chairman.*) You have expressed an opinion that the artillery should be principally if not entirely European; do you extend that opinion to the sappers and miners?—I hardly think it possible to have an entire European body of sappers and miners; but I think that there should be a certain proportion of scientifically trained natives as sappers or miners.

740. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you have scientifically trained natives in the arsenals?—You must have a certain number of workmen.

741. Why must you?—To do the labour which cannot be done in the climate of India by Europeans.

742. What scientific labour could a European not do?—I believe that in the laboratories and arsenals it is performed more or less by Europeans. It is under the management of European warrant officers as well as subaltern officers. Perhaps the manual labour may not be done by them, but the entire supervision of the laboratories is taken by them.

743. Would you object to see the actual making of a copper cap in the hands of natives?—Yes; I think it is just as well not to permit it.

744. Are they not made by natives now?—Of course there must be native workmen, more or less, employed. The doubts and difficulties about the copper caps have only arisen since this mutiny. They were supposed to have been made at Delhi and other places, but they have failed everywhere. I think that the mystery of the copper cap-making in the presidency is entirely confined to Europeans at Dumdum. There is only that one place on our side of India where they are made.

745. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) The natives are employed in the chemical process?—I presume they must be to a certain degree, but it has never transpired that they were able to make the copper caps, and nobody has come forward in these times to make them. I do not know whether they were kept under surveillance at Dumdum.

746. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What have they been using then as arms?—Copper caps in great abundance; but they got them from our magazines. At Delhi I was present during the whole siege, and we used to have reports that the copper caps of the enemy were running short, and that they were trying to make more; and I employed dozens of spies to look after it; but neither myself, nor General

Wilson, nor others, that I am aware of, have ever been able to ascertain that useful and effective copper caps were made by the enemy. They had a very large stock in their regimental magazines and in the different magazines which fell into their hands.

747. How would you form the corps of sappers and miners if you had to give an opinion ?—I would not have so large a body of sappers as there has been hitherto. I think a useful body of pioneers would be advantageous, as they were until within the last few years. The engineer corps naturally wished to have them of a superior class, and got them again embodied as sappers.

748. Then you would have a distinct corps of pioneers and of sappers and miners ?—Yes.

749. One chiefly European and the other entirely native ?—I think you must have some natives in the sappers. I do not think you can expose Europeans to the hard work of all kinds required in a siege operation in India, but you need not have so large a body of sappers as formerly.

750. (*Viscount Melville.*) Is not there a corps now of pioneers, as well as of sappers ?—No ; two or three years ago they were remodelled again, and I think the designation was changed to sappers and miners.

751. (*Major-General Hancock.*) They were called pioneers in October 1857 ?—I was not aware of it.

752. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Are not our engineers as much civil as military ?—They are too much so, I think.

753. The military engineers are employed in building bridges and other works ?—Yes, that is a portion of their duty, as well as barracks and other so called military works.

754. Are not the natives employed under the engineers in superintending the works ?—There are native agents everywhere.

755. I mean as conductors ; what we call foremen ? —Yes, they are chiefly native agents who are so employed. There are a certain number of non-commissioned officers of the sappers who are made assistant engineers, or superintendents of roads, or whatever other designations they have ; but a great deal of the superintendence is under native management.

756. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are natives educated at the establishment at Roorkee ?—Yes, they are qualified for those duties.

757. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you know what was the establishment of sappers before the outbreak? —I think it was 12 companies entirely native, with the proportion of four serjeants to each company ; they were non-commissioned officers. I think they were all corporals or serjeants ; there was no body of European sapper privates in India.

758. Would you have none hereafter ?—Yes, I think it very desirable, if you have to carry on military operations, but still they could not be the large majority.

759. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the Bengal native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion ?—Decidedly so. I think that it should be a mixed body, without reference to caste in any way.

760. You think that the nationalities should not be preserved in any of the regiments or companies, but that they should be distributed promiscuously ?—I think so.

761. (*Major-General Hancock.*) And that no caste should be excluded ?—I would make the greatest veto against Brahmins, but beyond that I think that no caste should be excluded ; at least that no man should be excluded solely because he is of one caste or of another.

762. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do not Brahmins very often conceal that they are Brahmins ?—Very often, I believe.

763. (*Chairman.*) Have you found caste at all an interference with the performance of military duties in Bengal ?—Not in the actual performance of them. They have made objections, and difficulties exist and arise when duties are more or less imposed upon natives of a high caste. For instance, nothing could exemplify it more than in the late cartridge question. But still in the end, on service, I have never found that caste has seriously interfered with the performance of duty. I think it is an objection to have the possibility of men bringing forward their caste as in any way interfering with duty.

764. Is caste recognized at all as a valid objection to the performance of any duty ?—In the case of foreign service for instance, those regiments which have not enlisted for foreign service, or service beyond the seas, of course state that they are Hindoos, and that they cannot go abroad ; but I do not think generally that on service in the presence of an enemy it has ever affected a regiment's courage or discipline.

765. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you know how many infantry regiments of the Bengal native army have enlisted for general service ?—There were up till the present time only six what are called "general service" corps.

766. Then, if the Government require foreign service from others, are they obliged to take volunteers ?—Yes.

767. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you of opinion that Mussulmans are to be equally trusted with Hindoos ?—I would not trust anybody, but I think that they must be entertained.

768. Mussulmans would not fight against Mussulmans, would they ?—Yes, I think so. I never saw a regiment refuse to fight anywhere. The great thing is not to have too many, so as to give any one particular class or caste too much power.

769. (*Viscount Melville.*) Had any of the Bengal regiments Christian drummers ?—Yes, many of them.

770. What became of them ?—They were married, many of them, to native women. Some went over, and some remained and escaped. A great many of them were found as prisoners in Delhi, for instance. They were saved by some strange influence ; almost all the Christian drummers and band-boys of the 38th native infantry were found after we got possession of the palace of Delhi.

771. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are the native infantry soldiers in Bengal obliged to serve anywhere throughout India, or do they enlist for service within particular limits ?—They enlist for any service in India.

772. (*Chairman.*) The next question is, do you consider any alteration necessary in the code under which the Bengal army is at present enlisted ?—I think, most certainly, that every sepoy or soldier who hereafter enters our army should enter it for general and unrestricted service.

773. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Regular and irregular ?—Yes.

774. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you think that they will do so ?—You may have difficulty for a time, but I think it will be all the better. You will get men in the end.

775. (*Chairman.*) Do they enlist for life ?—I believe there is a period after which they can retire ; they are entitled to a pension if unfit for further service.

776. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What is that period ? —I forget ; it is in different grades.

777. Is it 10 years ?—It is not so limited as that. I think it is 15 or 16 years.

778. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you not aware that no native officer has a right to a pension until he is reported as unfit by a medical committee, even if he lives to 100 ?—Yes ; that is, I think, a very great evil.

779. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that it would be of any advantage to divide the Bengal army into two or more armies ?—No, I do not think so. I would have no exclusiveness from one end of the land to the other. I would make the army equally available in one part as in another.

780. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You would not amalgamate the armies which are already separate ?

Colonel Becher, C.B.

11th Aug. 1858.

—No, I think that that distinction might be of advantage.

781. Do you not think it advisable to divide the Bengal army into two, supposing a fourth presidency to be established?—No; as long as they can march or get to it, all our soldiers should be under the same obligation. I do not know what would be the advantage of it; it would only increase the staff, which would be necessary.

782. (*Major-General Montgomerie.*) Do you not think that it would have the same effect as it has apparently had in the case of the armies of Madras and Bombay, which armies have not taken any part in the mutiny?—There certainly has been a marked beneficial effect in having the Madras and Bombay armies separate; but they are a different class of men.

783. If the Bengal army were divided into two, might not it also have a beneficial effect as regards the Bengal army?—I think not, if there is no particular caste or nationality established throughout the army. I do not myself see the advantage of dividing the army of Bengal into two separate armies; it would lead to extra expense.

784. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not think that if there were a fourth presidency, the dividing of the army would facilitate the carrying on of duty?—If it is a fourth presidency, it becomes an entirely separate army.

785. Since so much territory has become annexed, do you not find any inconvenience in carrying on the staff duties, from the delay which takes place in correspondence between Calcutta and Peshawer?—If we were in Calcutta we certainly should; but we have not found it when the head-quarters have been established in a central position.

786. Was not General Anson ordered to stay in Calcutta?—Yes, for one season, but he left it.

787. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Where is the proper place for the residence of the commander-in-chief in Bengal by regulation at present?—I think at the presidency; at all events, by a late order of the Court of Directors, they required General Anson to remain there. There was a correspondence about it, and I think Lord Dalhousie's opinion was that he should be with the council, and give the council the benefit of his experience, as he was a paid councillor.

788. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would not that create the difficulty which has been spoken of as to the correspondence?—To keep him permanently anywhere I think is unadvisable. I think that he should have the free use of his legs; that he should be able to take up any position without restriction or limit.

789. (*Chairman.*) I think you have already expressed an opinion as to the system of promotion of the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers? Do you consider that the commanding officers should have more power than they now have to reward or punish?—Yes, I should say most unmistakeably. I have not been a regimental officer for some time, but I have universally heard it to be the opinion of the officers connected with the native army, that the restrictions and the centralization of power at head-quarters, and withdrawing it from commanding officers, have been in a great measure the cause of the present disaffected state of the native army. I think it is very essential that that power should exist in commanding officers.

790. (*Viscount Melville.*) Is the power of the commanding officer of a native regiment in the Company's service more restricted than that of the commanding officer of a European regiment?—I do not know that it is; but then the circumstances are so different.

791. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that the same military code which holds good for Europeans is good for natives?—I think on a broad principle it is.

792. Is that the code by which the irregular regiments are controlled and disciplined?—I think not. I am not versed in the system of irregular cavalry, but I think that a great deal of power is vested in the commanding officers and the native officers of regiments.

793. Do you think that that has anything to do with keeping them in a better state than the others?—It may to a certain degree with a small body of men. I think that for irregular cavalry or irregular troops, in a small proportion to a large standing army, the irregular system is as good as it could be; but I would not wish to see it extended to the general force of the whole of India.

794. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Do we try the irregular cavalry by court-martial in the event of any serious delinquency?—Yes.

795. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are not the powers vested in the commanding officers of regular and irregular troops by the articles of war precisely the same?—Yes.

796. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But by custom there is a difference?—Yes; in an irregular regiment matters are settled in the regiment.

797. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you mean that the officers commanding native regiments are not allowed to exercise the powers vested in them by the articles of war?—Perhaps they are; but I think that their influence in a regiment, from not having more power in their own hands, is impaired.

798. You have said, I think, that the commanding officers of native regiments should have more power to punish as well as to reward. What punishments would you add to those contained in the articles of war?—I am not versed in the articles of war. My experience in a regiment is very small practically; but I know that it is generally the opinion that the commanding officer of a native regiment has not the same power as he had in old days, and that everything more or less is referred, and that complaints can be made against his acts, which did not exist formerly.

799. The powers of reward vested in a commanding officer are those of promotion, and I understand that under the Bengal system promotions are made uniformly by seniority. Is not the system at fault? If a commanding officer is obliged to promote a man by seniority, how can he reward?—I do not know that he is obliged to do so.

800. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Practically he is?—It is recommended.

801. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are there not three codes or articles of war in force in India, one for the Queen's troops, one for the Company's European troops, and one for the native troops?—Yes, I believe there are.

802. How often are the articles of war for the Company's troops and the native troops revised?—I do not know; I think they were revised some few years ago, and Colonel Young has lately revised the native articles of war within the last three or four years.

803. But they are not revised annually?—No, I believe not.

804. (*Major-General Hancock.*) I find the following provision in the Bengal regulations:—"In all ordinary "cases vacancies are to be filled from the seniority roll "of the regiment, without advertence to the particular "troop or company in which a vacancy may occur."—Yes; that appears to be the rule. A sepoy can appeal against his commanding officer. He does not now feel that his commanding officer has supreme authority. I cannot specify what is wanted exactly, because I have not had practical experience.

805. Is not the absence of power in the commanding officers to reward the consequence of the system of promotion obliging them to promote by seniority?—Of course it is.

806. What other power can you give a commanding officer to reward if you exclude him from that of promotion?—I do not think that it should be taken by seniority only, whether a man is qualified or not. I do not consider the present seniority system is desirable at all; though, of course, claims of continued

good service should have their due weight, they should not be the sole ground of promotion.

807. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Your opinion is, that the officer commanding a regiment, if he were known to have the power of reward and punishment, would be more looked up to and more regarded by his men than he is now?—Certainly.

808. And you think that that is not the case at present?—I think that it is not the case at present, as far as my own information goes. I have not been a commanding officer, nor have I had practical regimental experience; but I know that it is the cry of all concerned that they have not now that influence in their regiments which they should have.

809. (*Chairman.*) With regard to punishment, cannot a soldier always appeal from the commanding officer and demand a court-martial?—Yes; that power of appeal is too ready and too great in my opinion.

810. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Can the appeal be direct to the superior authority without passing through the commanding officer?—Yes; by petition. It ought not to be so, but it is.

811. (*Major-General Hancock.*) By the articles of war the native soldier has to apply to his captain, and if he fails to obtain redress from his captain, he is then authorized to apply to the commanding officer of his regiment?—However that may be, practically it is as I have stated; that the military secretary receives unlimited petitions and complaints against commanding officers.

812. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) By whom are the military codes of the three presidencies drawn up?—As far as the Bengal presidency is concerned, a committee was appointed.

813. Are the codes the same?—Certainly not.

814. The codes are all different?—Decidedly, different in every way. Ours was not issued complete more than two years ago.

815. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You are aware that the articles of war are precisely the same in the three presidencies?—Yes, I believe so; it is only the regulations and details which are different.

816. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Do you think that the depôts or magazines at Calcutta which supply the troops in the north-west are in the best situation for that purpose? Does not the matériel of the army proceed from Calcutta?—In Calcutta; it is in Fort William.

817. Is there no other position to which they could be taken more easily?—Not than Calcutta, I think.

818. Would not the other side of the peninsula, Baroda, or some of those places, be better?—There is a large magazine being established at Ferozpore, which is a very good position, which is designed for a larger fortified magazine than any that we have in the Bengal presidency.

819. That is by the Indus?—Yes, upon the Sutlej, on the route of the Indus.

820. Is not that too much on the frontier to be safe?—Stores coming up from Kurachee would pass through a portion, not of an enemy's territory, but of an allied state.

821. (*Chairman.*) You have stated it as your opinion that there should be 1 in 4 of European to native troops; how would you mix them? would you do it in regiments or by brigade?—As long as the natives are in the same garrison with European troops, I think that they will be better kept as distinct regiments by themselves. A European regiment marching up the country always has a native detachment with it to take all the bazaar guards and duties to which you could not put Europeans; but as a general principle I think that the natives garrisoned with Europeans had better be distinct in regiments.

822. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that the discipline of the Europeans would be better kept up by being in distinct regiments?—Yes; it would not certainly advantage the European to have the native with him.

823. Would it not rather lower the position of the European?—I think it would.

824. (*Chairman.*) Would you make any distinction in the arms which you would give to the European and to the native troops?—Yes; I would not for many years give the native troops the most effective arms.

825. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not think that whatever native troops are kept up, it will be necessary for the Government to give them their full trust?—Yes; you should not have a soldier without trusting him.

826. If you make a difference in the arms, will it not imply a distrust?—I do not know that; I would arm the native as a soldier, but not to the same extent of efficiency as a European.

827. Supposing you had a European and a native regiment on field service, the one having an arm carrying 800 or 900 yards and the other not 80, would that be fair?—It would be politic not to arm the natives too efficiently for some years to come.

828. (*Viscount Melville.*) Had the native regiments before the mutiny the Minié rifle?—Not as a body; they were not in India to issue.

829. (*Lord Stanley.*) Does not your opinion come to this, that three-fourths of the army which you propose to have should be armed in a comparatively inefficient manner?—I do not consider that they were armed in an inefficient way before. I think that the percussion musket is quite as good a weapon as they can require for anything like the services which the Indian army would be called upon to perform.

830. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The arms which they would carry would be a match for the arms which they would meet?—Certainly.

831. But they would not be arms to meet a European force?—No.

832. I suppose that you would wish that the same calibre should exist throughout the army as far as possible?—It would be convenient.

833. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Would not it render native soldiers unfit to be employed on foreign service if you armed them with an inefficient weapon?—If it is considered that the percussion musket is an inefficient weapon for ordinary service, it would certainly.

834. I allude to service beyond the continent of India?—Of course it would be better if they could be put on an equality; but I do not think that they are equal to the use of the most effective weapon, or that in a general way they could appreciate it, or that it would be found advantageous.

835. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you not of opinion that with all armies it is an advantage to arm them with the best possible weapon, without reference to whom they are to oppose. One man armed with the Minié rifle is as good as three armed with a less valuable weapon, and in a greater proportion, looking to numbers?—That may be the case hereafter. I do not think that at present, and for some years to come, we should make our native army feel that it is what it has been, namely, paramount in India.

836. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You wish by that to give proof that they are subordinate to the Europeans?—Yes, most unmistakeably.

837. And that is the object you have in view?—Certainly.

838. Are you of opinion that there would be advantage in introducing any other nationalities into India of non-European troops, such as Africans, Malays, Kaffirs, Hottentots, or such like?—I think that in the Madras presidency they have recruits from different parts of the coast. I do not know the Africans, but I should think in every way they would be well suited for it.

839. Would it produce any bad feeling in the mind of the natives of India?—I should not consider that under any circumstances. I think that we must in a great measure set aside those ideas for the future;

Colonel Becher, C.B.

11th Aug. 1858.

that we must not let them rule India. We are going to rule India.

840. (*Major-General Hancock.*) In the event of any native artillery being considered necessary hereafter, might it not be an advantage to use that class of men for the purpose, in preference to the natives of India?—I think that the native artillery, up to the present time, have proved themselves and have been considered almost equal on service to Europeans; but the danger of mutiny, of course, would be less if you had strangers than if you had men of the country.

841. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you think that the Malays would be more trustworthy than Sikhs?—Being of a foreign country, they would not be able to do anything by combination. That would be the only advantage of them.

842. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you think it an advantage to introduce such regiments or not?—Yes; I think if you could get colonial regiments of any sort to serve in India it would be advantageous, as it would prevent the predominance of any one particular native tribe.

843. For instance, you would see no objection to a West Indian regiment?—Certainly not.

844. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) In what part of the Madras presidency are these colonial troops?—I did not mean that there are colonial troops, but I believe they recruit the Malays.

845. In what part?—I do not allude to any particular portion of the Madras presidency. I understood that they took a recruit without reference to his being of the province of Hindostan or any other. In the Bombay army and in our army we have occasional cases of Africans.

846. You are quite right with regard to there being Africans in the Nizam's territory. When I have been asked what number of Europeans were necessary there, I have said that it was necessary to have a certain number of Europeans to watch those very people; and it is not confined to me, but I know that the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, was of the same opinion?

847. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Supposing it feasible to introduce Africans, or persons of that class, might it not be expedient to have a certain portion of artillery of that class to save Europeans in unhealthy climates in special descriptions of service?—It might. What I started with was, that I would not trust the natives of India with the guns, especially field guns.

848. Your only reason for that is your distrust of them in consequence of the late mutiny?—Yes.

849. Were it not for that, you would advise having a portion of native artillery?—Yes; the native artillery in every army, of our enemies as well as our own, has always been distinguished.

850. In the event of the Government of India deciding not to have any native artillery, might it not be possible to obtain the services of Africans and Malays, and others of that class, to serve in that capacity?—Yes; I do not know the qualifications of Malays as artillery soldiers. I believe that the African and West Indian regiments are bold and well suited as soldiers; and it would be preferable to have that class of men in charge of the artillery, if natives are to be so employed, to having for some years to come natives of Hindostan, as has been the case.

851. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you know anything of the Ceylon rifles; are they not Malays?—I believe they are. I believe they are well suited for light infantry work. I do not think that the Malays generally would make very good soldiers.

852. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you aware that the officers commanding regiments in the Bengal army have for the last eight years been deprived of the power of inflicting corporal punishment?—I do not think so; it is very rarely resorted to.

853. You are not aware of any circular having been issued with that object?—No.

854. (*Col. Burlton.*) It would not be in your department?—No.

The witness withdrew.

Brevet-Major Sir D. Baird, Bart.

Brevet-Major Sir DAVID BAIRD, Bart., examined.

855. (*Chairman.*) What rank do you hold in the service?—Brevet-major and captain in the 98th foot.

856. You went out, I believe, with Sir Colin Campbell as aide-de-camp?—Yes; I was with him not quite a year, namely, from his first going out till the 4th of June, when I left him. I was out in India before with a regiment in Madras.

857. For what length of time and at what date?—For twelve months. It was in 1854.

858. Have you been able to form any opinion as to the proportion of Europeans to native troops which ought to be maintained in the Bengal presidency?—I think that three or four to one certainly we could manage very well with; but I think, from what we have seen, that if we have a large native army, we must also have an army there to keep it in order. I should say that now we ought to have one to one or two to one at the outside, and I think, after you go beyond that, you are almost keeping an army there to keep the other army in check. I think that there should certainly not be more than two natives to one European. I would rather have it divided equally, if possible.

859. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But prospectively, you think there might be about one to three or four?—We could stand three or four to one easily.

860. After the country is settled?—Yes; but we can never trust them again, I should think, after what we have seen.

861. (*Chairman.*) What proportion has there been there of native troops to Europeans during these campaigns?—We have had many more Europeans than natives at any time that I have ever been out.

862. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Did you find that Europeans could perform the duties which natives have been in the habit of performing?—Yes; they have done it occasionally, taking guards and marches, rear-guards, and everything; that was in the best time of the year. I have no doubt they could not stand it for any time.

863. (*Chairman.*) How were the native troops employed under Sir Colin Campbell?—In taking rear-guards on the line march, in action they were often in the front rank, and all that sort of thing. Some of them have behaved very well, not the regular sepoys; we have had nothing to do with them. We have had all Sikhs, as nearly as possible.

864. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Were the Europeans and the natives mixed in the rear-guards?—Yes; we always had a certain portion of Europeans, I think.

865. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Was there any feeling of alarm as regards the number of Sikhs enlisted?—No, I do not think so. We thought that they held their heads very high, but behaved wonderfully well on every occasion. We had nothing to fear from them there.

866. But prospectively, do you think that there is any ground for apprehension?—People talk of it, that they may not be to be trusted some day.

867. But you are not aware that there was any actual expression on the part of those Sikh troops which would give ground for the expectation that the day would arrive when they would be unfaithful to us?—I have heard it from other people at home, but I never heard anything of it myself on the spot.

868. (*Chairman.*) Were you able to form any opinion as to what amount of force will be required hereafter in the Bengal presidency?—I should think very little under 80,000 Europeans would be the lowest that we should have in India all together.

869. What portion of that number would be in the Bengal presidency?—I should think 50,000, as nearly as possible.

870. Had you any native artillery during the time of the campaign?—Yes, we had artillery from Madras. I do not think that we had any of the old artillery from Bengal; we might have had some of the men mixed up with them, but we had the Madras artillery natives.

871. Do you think that it would be advisable to have native artillery in future, or to have them all Europeans?—All Europeans, I think.

872. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you have any natives attached to Europeans for duties more of a menial character, such as washing the guns, and that sort of thing?—Certainly.

873. But none to serve the guns?—None to serve the guns.

874. And none to act as drivers?—The Madras men have taken their guns into action, and ridden as well as Europeans would ride; they have behaved wonderfully well; but I think it is advisable not to have them.

875. (*Chairman.*) Are you able to form any opinion as to the relative merits of the regular and irregular troops in the native corps?—I have seen very little of them; but the irregular cavalry are the best in the world, I suppose; better than our own.

876. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In a charge?—They are just as good or better, I believe. Each one man is a match for any one of our men, I believe, and more than a match; he rides better.

877. Then how do you account for one regiment of Europeans riding over thousands of natives?—Charging in a body, we can beat them certainly, but each one man of theirs is more than a match for a man of ours in a single combat; he is a better swordsman and a better rider; in a body, our men could ride through them.

878. Would you like to see everything irregular, and no regular corps at all?—I think it is dangerous to have too many regular cavalry. I think that it requires a large number of Europeans to keep them in check also.

879. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Had you any Madras regular native cavalry with the force?—No, I think not.

880. Nor Bombay?—No.

881. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) In what does the superiority of the native soldier to the European consist?—I think that he is a better horseman, and knows the use of his sword better.

882. (*Colonel Burlton.*) He has a much greater command of his horse?—No doubt of it.

883. He has wonderful command of his horse?—Yes.

884. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Of course, in respect to the horse itself, it is a very inferior horse to that of our cavalry?—I do not know that; they use the horses more; they are always riding them.

885. (*Chairman.*) How is the native soldier armed, comparatively to the English dragoon?—Some of them are armed with spears and some with swords, but the spear they like best, and the spear we find to be the most useful weapon.

886. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You prefer the lance to the sword in India?—Certainly. The 9th lancers have got a new lance latterly.

887. (*Viscount Melville.*) Did you never see a lancer thrown off from his horse by his own lance?—I have no doubt there are exceptions of that sort.

888. (*Chairman.*) But the natives were more afraid of the lancers than of the others?—Certainly; I have always understood that.

889. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Have you ever observed what use our dragoons make of their swords?—I hardly ever saw them use their swords.

890. You do not know whether they cut or point?—They point, I have always understood.

891. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Have you ever been in a position personally to observe the superiority of the irregular calvalry over the British dragoons?—I saw a charge the other day made by our dragoons in a body, and the irregular men came forward in line, and they both pulled up; I believe the majority of the cavalry we engaged in Rohilcund were our old regular Bengal cavalry with a certain number of the irregulars; they both turned round and went away; neither would face the other.

892. What were they charging?—They were charging our cavalry at Bareilly; they charged within 200 yards of each other, and they both pulled up; our cavalry fired a few shots, when the enemy galloped off, we then came away; we did not follow them up; they were in immensely superior numbers.

893. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Did you ever see the irregular cavalry charge a square of infantry?—No; they seldom formed at all; they never waited charge; they scattered and broke up.

894. Did you ever see them charge in a body without scattering?—No.

895. Is it not their system to scatter?—I think it is.

896. (*Chairman.*) What was the character of the native artillery who were opposed to you?—They were very good indeed.

897. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) As soldiers, the natives are very good artillerymen?—Yes; at times they have been as good as could be, at other times they have not even fired off their guns. There is no accounting for it. Sometimes they have conducted themselves remarkably well, and at other times they have not fired a shot.

898. (*Chairman.*) How was their fire? Did they keep up a good fire, and was it well directed?—Yes.

899. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And the guns have been well served?—Yes; at other times they have not stood to their guns at all.

900. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Were not the mutinous sepoys that you were opposed to chiefly the Bengal artillery?—Yes.

901. Not purely native artillery?—They disappeared when we got there.

902. (*Viscount Melville.*) Did you not find that the natives fired without laying their guns properly?—They very often made first-rate practice—as good as we could make. They generally had their guns in a good position when we arrived.

903. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that there are duties in India which it would be impossible for artillery to perform unless they were natives?—No, I think not.

904. Such as going into very unhealthy portions of the country, jungles, &c.?—No, I think not.

905. (*Chairman.*) Had you any portion of natives attached to the artillery during the time of the campaign?—I think nothing but Madras men. There might have been a few others, but I do not think there were. We had, I believe, only Madras natives.

906. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Were there no gun lascars, as they are called, attached?—I believe there are lascars.

907. Do you know in what proportion?—I do not.

908. (*Major-General Montgomerie.*) How was the battering train drawn, the heavy guns?—By bullocks principally.

909. Those drivers, of course, were natives?—Yes, those were just drivers of the cattle.

910. But the heavy guns were drawn by bullocks?—Yes, and elephants. We had the 68-pounders latterly drawn by elephants—Sir William Peel's guns.

911. (*Chairman.*) What quantity of sappers and miners had you with you?—I do not know; a very large number.

Brevet-Major Sir D. Baird, Bart.

11th Aug. 1858.

912. Were they all European ?—No, not all European.

913. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Was a large portion European ?—We had a very large number of natives too. I do not know the number or the proportion, but I should say that there was not a greater proportion of Europeans than of natives, from what I remember. I am, however, not certain of that. There were an immense number of native sappers and miners. I think from Madras, also, there were native sappers and miners.

914. (*Viscount Melville.*) Were the European regiments able to maintain their camp followers in the late mutiny, or did they desert ?—I think they remained with them.

915. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) All the regiments had camp followers ?—Yes.

916. And a sufficient supply ?—Generally speaking, I believe a sufficient supply.

917. You are not aware of their having deserted when they came near the enemy, or anything of that sort ?—No ; I have heard that some men have gone away, but it has never been thought to be serious.

918. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Were the tents pitched by natives ?—Yes, in some of the regiments, not I believe at first ; I think they were generally pitched by natives.

919. (*Chairman.*) Are there any other of the questions which were given to you upon which you can favour the Commission with any opinion ?—One question is, whether the Bengal native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes ? I always hear that it should be divided into as many castes as possible, and with the same number of each, as far as possible.

920. (*Viscount Melville.*) How are the irregular regiments which are raised in the Punjaub officered ? —By Europeans.

921. How many Europeans to each regiment ?—I think they are varied ; the more the better. It was remarked that they, the officers, suffered more than other regiments, and I suppose it was because they exposed themselves more.

922. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that any advantage would be derived from the Bengal army being divided ?—I fancy not.

923. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You did not hear during the recent campaign, opinions expressed that it would have been an advantage if the army had been divided into two, that one part would have neutralized the other more than it did ?—No, I never heard it.

924. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are there any means of knowing the commander-in-chief's opinion as to which would be the proper place to be established permanently for the head-quarters for Bengal ?—I had an idea that he thought somewhere in Central India, but still to move about the country, occasionally to be where the governor-general was.

925. (*Chairman.*) I suppose you had no opportunity whatever of forming any opinion as to the composition of the native regiments, the manner in which they are officered, or whether any improvements could be made in them ?—No, I do not think that I had.

926. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have you ever heard an opinion expressed that the commanding officers of native regiments have not sufficient power ?—Yes, I have often heard it talked of out there, that the commanding officers have not sufficient power.

927. Are you at all aware how that has arisen ?—They want more power ; I do not know in what way, but I have always heard that they are interfered with ; they have not sufficient power.

928. Are you aware that there has been a great deal of petitioning going on on the part of the natives to the commander-in-chief direct, without passing through any intermediate channel ?—I have heard it talked about.

929. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Did you ever hear any Bengal commanding officer complain of having the power of inflicting corporal punishment taken away ?—I do not remember hearing complaints of that.

930. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are you aware whether corporal punishment has been made use of with the native troops during the recent operations ? —I do not remember any case with us.

931. (*Chairman.*) Was the general discipline of the native troops which were with you good ?—Yes.

932. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) To what native troops do you allude ?—The Sikhs.

933. The newly raised levies ?—We had very little to do with them ; they have scarcely ever been in action.

934. Then what are the native troops that you allude to ?—The Sikhs or some of the regulars that we had.

935. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Were not they newly raised levies ?—Yes. I understood at Question 933, that the last raised levies were meant.—They are raising others in the low country ; they have never been out.

936. Are you aware upon what principle they are raising them ?—From low caste men, what they call sweepers and water-carriers, but there are great doubts whether they will fight at all ; they have given them muskets.

937. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Have they not been fighting at all ?—Not those men.

938. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How are they officered? —By old officers in the sepoy regiments.

939. Does there appear any difficulty in getting those low caste men to come forward ?—No, I believe there is no difficulty.

940. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you know how the native commissioned ranks have been filled in those corps ?—I believe they are filled from well-behaved men who have stuck to us. I have seen them with their regiments drilling them.

941. (*Chairman.*) Are there many European officers disposable ?—Yes, I believe so.

The witness withdrew.

Captain G. F. S. Browne.

Captain G. F. S. Browne, 24th Madras Native Infantry, examined.

942. (*Chairman.*) How many years have you served in India ?—Over fifteen.

943. In what presidency ?—In Madras ; but I have been serving for the last six years up in the north-west in civil employment.

944. In the course of your service, I suppose you have seen service both with the European and with the native troops ?—I saw service the other day at Agra with both Europeans and natives.

945. Have you been able to form any opinion as to the proportion of European and native forces which ought to be maintained in the Bengal presidency ?—I should say that one-fourth, when things are settled, should be European on the aggregate, giving a larger proportion of infantry and artillery to the Europeans compared with cavalry.

946. Would you have any native artillery at all ? —I see no reason why the half-castes should not be used as drivers. I think they would be very good drivers. I would have no natives, excepting as gun lascars.

947. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have you any reason to think that the half-castes are likely to be faithful ? —I saw them serve uncommonly well at Agra in the militia there, and fight very well. Their interests are very much bound up with ours ; they are of the same religion and feelings.

948. (*Chairman.*) Are you able to form any opinion as to the amount of force which will be required hereafter in the presidency of Bengal?—I should say 40,000 Europeans when things are quiet.

949. That would make 200,000 men?—If you take into consideration the police, we should have that number.

950. Then you consider the police as a portion of the whole?—They have proved themselves to be a portion of the Bengal army. They were taken from the same sources, and they sided against us at once. The police were a part of the men who were arrayed against us.

951. Then your estimate of one-fifth of Europeans includes the police?—The police battalions; they are raising police battalions now. They will be equipped and armed as the line.

952. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is it your opinion that the police battalions should be armed?—I would arm them, but in an inferior way. I would make them serviceable against any internal enemy only.

953. Would you give them a musket?—Yes; it might be a question whether I would give them a percussion musket at present or not. As the whole population of India will be disarmed, the enemy which they would have to oppose would be a very insignificant one.

954. (*Chairman.*) Would you make any distinction between the native troops and the police, as to the arms which you would give them?—Yes; I would arm the native troops with a percussion musket, with a company of rifles in every regiment.

955. Would you arm them the same as the Europeans?—No, I would not give them the Enfield rifle; I would only give them the ordinary rifle.

956. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are you not aware that they cannot use the ordinary rifle?—I commanded a rifle company in Madras for many years, and I never saw better practice anywhere; the practice at 150 and 200 yards was first-rate with them. We tried all sorts of experiments. The multigrooved rifle would have been better, no doubt, on account of the difficulty of loading the two-grooved.

957. Are you not aware that in the Sutlej campaign the rifle companies of the Bengal army threw away their rifles, and demanded to have back their matchlocks?—Yes, I have heard that mentioned.

958. (*Chairman.*) But does that arise from the fault of the ammunition or of the rifle?—From its being a two-grooved rifle, I think; the ball is too large.

959. That is the fault of the ammunition then, and not of the rifle?—Yes; the ball is decidedly a size too large.

960. Do you think that the native force ought to be regular or irregular, or both combined?—I would have a mixture of both.

961. In what proportion?—About one-half of each; but I would have no regular native cavalry.

962. Would you have irregular infantry?—Yes, with the same proportion of officers as they are now posting into the Punjaub regiments.

963. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How many is that?—A commandant, a second in command, and an adjutant, and two officers doing duty in case of contingencies.

964. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that the discipline of a native regiment is materially affected by the number of European officers attached to it?—I think in the field the more European officers the better; but as to discipline on the parade ground, I never saw native troops that could beat the Gwalior contingent on the parade, and they were officered merely with three officers,—the commandant, the second in command, and the adjutant.

965. (*Viscount Melville.*) But have not those men all mutinied?—I say on parade merely.

966. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You recommend six European officers then for an irregular corps?—Five; two officers doing duty.

967. Only in the field?—At all times.

968. (*Viscount Melville.*) There are no European officers in command of companies in the regiments which you speak of?—No, they are doing duty, and they draw staff allowance for it. I think it is 150 rupees a month.

969. Who command the companies?—The native officers, just in the same way as if these two officers were not there.

970. Who pays the men?—They should be paid before the adjutant in the irregular regiments. All irregular corps are paid in the presence of the adjutant; sometimes he and the commanding officer divide the regiment between them.

971. How are the native officers selected for the irregular infantry of which you have spoken?—I do not know how they have been selected at all in most of the regiments. I saw Colonel Coke's regiment of Punjaub rifles the other day. He selects the native officers pretty much as he likes, I believe, for general efficiency and intelligence; but then he has his men divided into separate companies. He has his company of Affghans with their Affghan native officer, and a company of Patans with their native officer, and Sikhs with their native officer, and others with their native officers, and each individual company has to look up to its own particular native officer.

972. Do they ever act as a regiment?—They have been serving all throughout the campaign.

973. As a regiment or as detached companies?—As a regiment. It is merely that the different castes and tribes are kept entirely distinct in the different companies.

974. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that that answers?—I think so.

975. Better than mixing them all up?—Yes, I think it prevents combination. The men are more strangers to one another in that way.

976. Is it not also found to create emulation?—Yes, and the men, I think, got on better together. Each native officer understood his own company better from its being of his own caste and tribe.

977. It had the effect of making native officers have more influence over their men?—Yes, and they were selected as men of intelligence.

978. Did it produce jealousies at all?—I never heard of it, and I made particular inquiries as to that point.

979. Is there any other corps established upon that principle?—I am not aware of any other.

980. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that European non-commissioned officers would be beneficial in the native regiments?—I think not more than at present. I think they do not get on well in the regiments. I think two are very useful; one as a drill instructor, and the other in charge of the stores.

981. (*Lord Stanley.*) Has not the plan of having each caste or tribe in a separate company been pursued in forming the irregular corps of the Punjaub?—No.

982. Is it not the case in the guides under Lumsden?—I do not think they are separated into companies or tribes in the guides; they may be in the cavalry, perhaps.

983. (*Viscount Melville.*) Were Coke's men differently organized from Lumsden's guides?—No; they are very much upon the same system; the whole thing was very much taken from Lumsden's guides, but I am not sure whether the guides are separated as Colonel Coke has separated his men into companies or not.

984. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is it not probable that they are, as the two were established on the same design?—It is very probable; I know that the men of that regiment always call themselves the younger brothers of the guides.

985. Should you be afraid that native officers, having that influence which it appears these officers have over the men of their own caste, would, in the event of a mutiny hereafter, play a more conspicuous part than natives have hitherto done?—Of course, the greater intelligence there is in a native officer the

Captain G.F.S.Browne.

11th Aug.1858.

greater the danger if he turns faithless; but the native officers that I have ever had any experience of are utterly useless. I have never known above one or two in a regiment that really had any influence in their companies at all.

986. What are the duties which a native officer is supposed to perform?—He should be the link between the European officer and the men; he should watch the men in their lines, and he should understand anything that goes on in the lines, where of course the European officers cannot interfere or pry, and he should be the go-between in all matters or references upon questions of caste or religion. The native officer should be expected to suggest to the European officer how any little difficulty may be smoothed over in such cases.

987. (*Chairman.*) But I understand that in your opinion the present class of native officers are inefficient?—I think perfectly inefficient.

988. (*Major-General Hancock.*) From what cause?—From reaching so great an age before they are promoted.

989. What is that in consequence of?—In consequence of the seniority system. I am speaking both of the Madras and the Bengal armies. You must promote the senior havildar to be a jemadar on a vacancy, unless you can show very good reasons to the contrary. General age and failure of mental qualities are not considered a sufficient bar to promotion.

990. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) So that if you commanded a regiment, and assigned that as a reason for not promoting a particular individual, you would be ordered to promote him?—Yes, I have seen that rule prevail when I was adjutant in my own regiment.

991. (*Viscount Melville.*) Does the rule of promoting havildars to be jemadars prevail to the same extent in Madras as in Bengal?—It does not prevail to the same extent in making havildars; but when a man is made a havildar, he must be promoted to be a jemadar unless he is grossly unfit. In the grade from naik to havildar the commanding officer can pass over a man merely by stating that the man is not a smart naik and is not likely ever to make a smart havildar. In Madras the roll goes in once in three months, and then, unless the reason is given why the senior naik is not appointed as a havildar, a reference comes back for an explanation.

992. (*Major-General Montgomerie.*) Is that the senior in the company?—No, the senior in the regiment; but all promotions are made at headquarters to the native commissioned ranks.

993. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You mean by the Government?—Yes.

994. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the commanding officer should have more power than he has at present to reward and punish?—I think so, certainly.

995. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Would you introduce the system of selection in all the promotions of the non-commissioned grades, and from havildar to the commissioned grades?—Yes, I would do so, certainly, when a man proves that he has not a sufficient knowledge of his general duties and of reading and writing.

996. Would you have them undergo an examination?—Yes.

997. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have they to do anything of the sort now?—Not in the native commissioned ranks.

998. Do you know any instances of their not being able to read and write?—Yes; numbers of the elder ones cannot read and write. Of late years there have been no havildars made unless they could read and write, and that, of course, has rendered the number who cannot do so fewer.

999. Do you conceive that the position of the native officer is essential, and that you cannot get on without it?—I think that if you have a good one he is a most useful man, and that if you have a bad one he is worse than if he was not there, because the men have influence over him.

1000. (*Viscount Melville.*) In Madras, what is the system of carrying on duty in the way of mounting guard?—We always took the regulations for the Queen's army as the model, and worked up to it as strictly as we could. The men were never allowed to take off their accoutrements in the 24 hours when on guard.

1001. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is that the case in Bengal?—No.

1002. Is it according to the regulation in Bengal?—Yes; the men in Bengal were always allowed, one-third of them, to take off their accoutrements to eat. We never allowed that in Madras, and though we entertained Bengal sepoys, we never permitted that practice.

1003. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are not the Madras men allowed to go from their guards home to eat their dinner?—Yes, from ordinary guards one-third are allowed to go away.

1004. (*Major-General Montgomerie.*) During certain hours?—Yes; after saluting hours are over.

1005. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that such a system as that in Bengal, the men performing their duties in that loose and irregular way, is very detrimental to discipline?—Most undoubtedly.

1006. Do you think that it has had any effect generally, amongst other things, in producing the laxity of discipline which appears to have existed?—Yes; I think the men got into the habit of taking great liberties, and they certainly gave themselves much greater liberties than I would have submitted to in my own regiment. If the men asked for leave, and have been told that it was not convenient for them to get it, they have said, "It is my right to "have leave, and if I do not have it I will appeal."

1007. Was that expression taken notice of?—No.

1008. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Were you up in Saugur?—Yes, I was up there with my regiment, and then got into civil employment.

1009. In what year was that?—I was there in the beginning of 1851.

1010. (*Viscount Melville.*) Had you any opportunity of forming an opinion of the new Sikh regiments?—Yes; I took a great deal of notice of them. They struck me as being most efficient men. I saw a regiment up at Moultan, where I was staying some days on my way home, which had only been raised a couple of months, and it performed wonderfully well on parade.

1011. Had you any means of knowing what the feeling of the Sikhs was?—Yes, I have heard many officers talking and saying that the Sikhs have said, half in joke and half in earnest, "The time will come "when we will settle with you; we hated the Hin- "dostanees and have killed them." They have said, "The Raj will be yours to-morrow, but who can say "whose it will be in another two years?" I do not know whether it has been in jest or in earnest. I have talked with Sikhs myself, and they have said that it has always been a matter of chance who has had the upper hand.

1012. You do not think that they bear us any good-will?—I think not. I think they merely serve us from its being a good service with good pay, and plenty of plunder, and from a bitter feeling towards the Bengal sepoy; but I think that when things settle down, in four or five years, we shall find them fully as dangerous, if not more so, than the Bengal sepoy; and I think that the rising of any chief in the Punjaub might bring those men into arms against us.

1013. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Holding that opinion, do you think that one European in five would be sufficient hereafter for the holding of India?—I look for the safety of India to another precaution, namely, the preventing the importation of sulphur. You would then deprive them of the use of fire-arms.

1014. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I suppose you would also take railroads into account?—I would not so much take railroads into account, because labour is

so very readily obtained in India that they would dig up a quarter of a mile of railroad in a night. I think you might find your troops placed in a very difficult position, with probably the enemy strongly entrenched in some position, and a quarter of a mile of the rails taken up.

1015. (*Chairman.*) Would you have any alteration as to the manner in which the native army is enlisted now?—I would enlist every man for general service and for service in foreign countries, and would as much as possible keep the regiments in which the preponderance of men had been raised from the north down towards the south of India, and those men who had been raised from Oude I would keep pretty much up in the Punjaub, and I would never allow more than two regiments raised in the same locality to be in the same garrison one with the other. It would be very undesirable to have men who came more from one part of the country than from the other.

1016. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Could not that be prevented?—It would require, I think, very great care to prevent it; it would very soon be known that there was a prohibition against too many men coming from one part of the country, and if a man said, "I "come from Rohilcund," whereas he really came from Oude, he may deceive you in that way.

1017. (*Major-General Montgomerie.*) You could not mistake a Sikh?—No.

1018. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Would you have the Madras troops do duty up in the Bengal country?—I see no reason against it.

1019. How would you manage the families?—I would make it a tour of foreign service; they do not take their families on foreign service now; the regiments go over now in turn, and as the turn comes round they are shipped off, and their families are left behind them. Bengal sepoys go whose brothers will not cross the water; they enter our regiments, and are shipped off without saying a word.

1020. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How do you account for that?—Merely from the difference of discipline. I have known cases in my own regiment where we have had a Bengal sepoy a man from Oude whose brother has been serving in some Bengal regiment; the man in the Madras regiment is shipped over the water as soon as his turn comes, and he fares like all the other men.

1021. (*Major-General Montgomerie.*) Are you not aware that they eat their food in a different way, supposing, for instance, a man is a rajpoot?—Yes.

1022. So much so that sometimes a boat is put astern for the purpose, even in a Madras regiment?—Yes; but I think that there is a great deal of nonsense in it. I do not believe that there is any such real prejudice. No Bengal Brahmin will eat his food until he has taken off his clothes and bathed; but they will do it in Madras.

1023. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Why?—Because they see all the rest around them do it.

1024. Men of the same caste who make an objection in one case do not in the other?—Yes.

1025. That is discipline again?—That is discipline and custom.

1026. Without referring to any other cause, do you not think that the system of discipline in the armies of Madras and Bombay kept them sound, probably, when the Bengal army was shaken?—I do not look upon the Bombay army as having been at all sound. The Madras army, I think, was sound, having a different description of men altogether; we have quite a different description of men. The mass of our men are from Southern India.

1027. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are there not a large proportion of Mahomedans in the Madras native infantry?—We have generally about one-third in every regiment.

1028. Have they all behaved very well during this mutiny?—I believe they have.

1029. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you trust the Mahomedans as much as the others?—I prefer the Hindoo to the Mahomedan; I know no more dangerous man than a religious Mahomedan.

1030. Would you have no Mahomedans at all?—I do not say that; but I would not allow them to preponderate in any regiment as they do in the Madras cavalry corps. I suppose four-fifths of the men there are Mahomedans, and taken from one particular class.

1031. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Are they not a different class of Mahomedans from the infantry; would not you designate the Madras cavalry as the high-born Mussulmans?—They come from the same parts, Arcot, Vellore, and Trichinopoly, and we enlist from the same locality for the infantry.

1032. (*Viscount Melville.*) When Madras troops go beyond the presidency and their families are left behind, do they get extra batta?—They are getting batta in the field now, and when they cross the water they get extra batta.

1033. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) Full batta?—Yes.

1034. (*Major-General Montgomerie.*) When the men serve in Bengal it is considered as foreign service and they get extra rations, do they not?—They get full batta.

1035. And provisions?—No, I fancy not.

1036. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do not all troops 200 miles from the presidency get extra batta?—Not the men; that applies to the officers.

1037. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do not all the Madras soldiers get on foreign service extra batta?—On foreign service they get what is called full batta. They used to get extra batta over at Penang in the Straits, and at Burmah.

1038. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you be afraid of the admixture of colonial troops with the rest of the Indian army?—I should not object at all to the Africans; I should not like to see the Malays in India, they are very bigoted Mahomedans.

1039. Would you object to the Hottentots?—No.

1040. Do you think that their appearance would have a bad effect upon the native army of India?—I do not think so; I think it would be beneficial to the native army, as showing that we could get other native troops to serve us. They have now an overweening opinion of themselves.

1041. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that any advantage would be derived from dividing the Bengal army into two armies?—I do not think so, provided the commander-in-chief was in a central position. I think that at present, from Calcutta being very far off, great delay is necessary.

1042. What change should you propose in the system of promotions as regards the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers who, you say, at present are inefficient?—I would make a lance naik of no man above five years' standing. He would probably run through the lance naiks in three years, and upon passing an examination he would be a young man by the time he became a havildar.

1043. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Would you not allow selection for havildars?—Yes, for special services in the field, and as a special promotion; I would leave that to the commanding officer. I also think that the commanding officer should be able to lower a non-commissioned officer in his grade for offences.

1044. That is not possible in the Queen's army?—No; but I think that the European is such a different material altogether to deal with that a difference might be made.

1045. (*Viscount Melville.*) Have you ever seen the Bombay army?—I have.

1046. Are you aware of the system which prevails there in the promotion from havildar to jemadar?—They promote very young men to be native officers.

1047. Do you know how it is done?—I do not; but I have always understood that they go into the opposite mistake, and select the very junior men.

1048. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you like to see the introduction of any gentry of a superior class

Captain G.F.S.Browne.

11th Aug.1858.

as native officers in regiments in regular corps?—Not in regulars, but I think it might be done in irregulars.

1049. Why not in regulars?—Because I think that it would be such a total change, and that it would produce discontent, the other two armies of Bombay and Madras not having any system of that sort.

1050. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not consider that in the Bombay army, from the mode which they adopt, they get the most intelligent native officers?—I have seen very young men,—men of 10 or 12 years' standing,—promoted as jemadars, and I am not quite sure that injury was not done to their seniors, who were quite as efficient men.

1051. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not consider that in the system of seniority, the circumstance of passing over a man causes jealousies and heart-burnings, which would not be the case in the system of selection?—I think that under the present system, where every man considers that he has a right to promotion from the day he becomes a lance naik, it is a grievance if he is not promoted.

1052. And by the other system there is no grievance?—No; if a man enlists with the understanding that he is never to rise higher than his qualifications and merits entitle him to rise, there can never be any grievance.

1053. (*Chairman.*) You would make that a condition on enlistment?—Yes.

1054. What do you consider the average age of the native officers under the present system when promoted?—I suppose they are verging on 60, or between 50 and 60, when promoted to jemadars.

1055. (*Major-General Hancock.*) How old are the private soldiers when they are promoted to the first grade, that of naik?—I suppose they are 40; they are grey-headed men.

1056. (*Viscount Melville.*) To what age do they retain men in the ranks in the Bengal army?—As long as they are efficient for duty, until a medical committee declares them unfit for further active service.

1057. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not think that such a system takes away a great stimulus on the part of all ranks to good conduct?—I think so; I have had young men who have exerted themselves to learn English and to make themselves accountants, and they have come and said, "What is the use of "my doing all this? I cannot rise. I shall be an "old man before it comes to my turn for promotion."

1058. (*Viscount Melville.*) What is the earliest period of service at which a man can get a pension?—After 20 years' service.

1059. Then if he is not unfit he still goes on?—He must go on; he has no right to claim his pension until he is pronounced unfit by a medical committee.

1060. But at 20 years he can receive a pension if he is unfit?—Yes.

1061. (*Colonel Burlton.*) It used to be 15 years in Bengal?—I think it is 20 in Madras.

1062. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you aware that the officers commanding regiments in the Bengal army have been during the last eight years prohibited from carrying out sentences of corporal punishment?—I have heard it very often mentioned that after the order was promulgated, a confidential circular came round to the officers commanding regiments, telling them to hold the order in abeyance, and not to inflict corporal punishment; I have heard that mentioned repeatedly.

1063. Do you think then that no native soldier of the Bengal army, since the articles of war issued in 1847, has been flogged?—I think that the order for flogging was issued in 1850, that is to say, the last one re-introducing flogging; I do not think that flogging has ever been re-introduced into the Bengal army; it has been in the Madras army; we have flogged frequently.

1064. Did you ever see the circular?—No; I saw the circular which came round in the Madras army, but it was not prohibiting flogging, for we frequently flog.

1065. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Was it limiting it?—It was merely limiting it. It was more a letter of advice and caution than anything else.

1066. But the other was prohibiting it?—I have always understood so.

1067. But you have not seen that letter?—No.

1068. (*Chairman.*) What number of European officers do you think it necessary to have in the native troops?—An efficient officer for every company. I think very few officers are efficient or able to manage a company who have not been three years with the regiment.

1069. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In order to have a proper supply of efficient officers, you would require to have an additional number learning the duties?—Yes.

1070. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that any inconvenience arises from the number of European officers who have civil appointments?—I think not.

1071. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What is the establishment now altogether?—Seven captains, eleven lieutenants, I think, and five ensigns.

1072. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Why do you consider more European officers necessary with the regular native regiments than with the irregular native regiments, where you recommended only six?—They are rather on a different system; more is left in the hands of the native officers.

1073. Why should not that be done with the regular regiments?—It might be done with a different class of native officers, but not with the present class of native officers. I think that the more a European officer can look to his company now, and the less he trusts to the native officer, the better it will get on.

1074. Provided the regular and irregular native officers are equally efficient, you see no reason why there should be more Europeans in the one case than in the other?—No; excepting that in action you cannot have too many European officers.

1075. Does not that apply equally to both?—Yes.

1076. (*Viscount Melville.*) How many field officers are there to a native regiment in Madras?—Generally only one present.

1077. Do you not think it better to have a second?—The senior captain always mounts on parade.

1078. But he gets no allowance for it?—No; and that I think has been a cause of heartburning.

1079. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not believe that there are many regiments which have not got a European officer to a company, whether regular or irregular?—I have known cases where young lieutenants have been holding three and four companies for months together.

1080. Do you think that that is a good system?—Certainly not.

1081. What has produced that?—A greater draft of officers away for the staff than should be allowed, and from a large number being away on leave, going on furlough or private affairs.

1082. You said, as I understood you, that there was no objection to the present staff arrangement?—Not limiting it to six; but there have been very often eight or ten officers away.

1083. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What army are you now speaking of?—I am speaking of the Bengal army.

1084. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is that the case at Madras?—No; they are very particular indeed. I was myself kept out of a staff appointment for a year merely because there was one officer too many away.

1085. Do you not think that the feeling of an officer joining a regiment in India is to get through his drill, and so on, as rapidly as he can, in order to qualify himself for a staff appointment as soon as possible?—I do.

1086. Do you think that that is an element which can work well as regards the discipline and control of a regiment?—I do not think it does; but I think

that most men of active mind or body very soon get tired and wearied of the monotonous life, and, in fact, the utter *requiem* that there is in commanding a native company in a regiment. There is nothing whatever to do except looking after your company, which, if you once get it into order, should not give you further trouble.

1087. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not think that placing a limit to the period for which an officer was allowed to be away from his regiment on staff employment, and obliging him to return after a fixed period to his regiment, would obviate the difficulty?—I think that it would create a great deal of inconvenience; you must put in new men. Take the adjutant-general's office, if you withdrew every man after five years you must put in another and a fresh man.

1088. Take brigade majors and other military appointments?—You would probably get rid of a very efficient officer, and get in another who would not learn his work under some months.

1089. He would become efficient after he had had the same opportunity?—Yes; after a time.

1090. Then the army would gain by having a large number of efficient staff officers?—Certainly.

1091. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would not the experience which those officers gained on the staff be advantageous on their falling back to their regiments?—I think they would feel very discontented. They would not know what to do with themselves.

1092. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do not you think that the public service now suffers very great injury from officers remaining ten, fifteen, and twenty years away from their corps, and afterwards taking command of them?—Certainly.

1093. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How would you obviate that?—By a staff corps, which would prevent it.

1094. Would you propose that a man once getting on the staff should be placed on the staff corps?—I would give him the option, on getting on the staff, whether he would rise in the staff corps, or work his way up in his regiment to the command of it.

1095. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Do you happen to be aware that in the Bengal army there is a regulation which limits the number of officers who shall be upon the staff?—Yes, I know that.

1096. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) When the Madras troops go beyond sea they get their full batta?—Yes.

1097. And they get free rations, do they not?—They used to get them at Penang, in the Straits. I do not know whether they get them now or not.

1098. Did the Bengal troops, when so employed, get free rations?—Yes.

1099. To the same amount?—Yes.

1100. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Have not there been instances of the Bengal army getting garrison pay, when a regiment of the Madras army on the same station has been getting batta and rations?—I know of no instance of the kind.

1101. A sentry standing at the door of the Governor of Bombay on the one side is receiving batta and rations, and on the other side that man has been receiving garrison pay?—I am not aware of any such rule obtaining in Madras.

1102. (*Major-General Montgomerie.*) Do you know whether the men of the Madras army at this moment serving under General Whitlock in Hindostan get different pay from the men who embarked at Madras as a brigade to go to Calcutta?—I imagine not; under the regulations of the service, unless any particular indulgence was allowed, they should be both getting the same.

1103. (*Viscount Melville.*) With reference to the number of officers serving with their regiments, how would you propose to furnish officers for civil employment and for the staff?—Excepting for purely military staff, I would remove them altogether from their regiments, and put them into a staff corps.

1104. An officer in commencing the service should commence regimentally?—Yes.

1105. And be promoted afterwards to the staff corps?—Yes.

1106. Then would you propose that a regimental officer selected for the staff corps should pass an examination before being promoted to the staff corps?—Yes.

1107. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Would you give the governor or the commander-in-chief that power; he might take half a dozen away?—It certainly might be liable to that abuse; but I think that in the instruction of all young officers going out to India a great benefit might be gained if they had to pass through a course of instruction in all three branches of the service, either at home or when they got out to India.

1108. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that the European officers attached to the native regiments would be benefited if they first underwent European drill?—Yes.

1109. Both in cavalry, infantry, and artillery?—Yes.

1110. (*Viscount Melville.*) Then would you propose that all cadets nominated to the Company's army should be sent to Chatham, Canterbury, or some garrison, in the same way as the engineers are now sent, in order to go through their course of drill and instruction; you are aware that the engineers are now all sent to Chatham?—Yes; I think it would do them more good if they were sent out and attached to European corps in India, than giving boys the liberty of running about in a garrison town.

1111. (*Colonel Burlton.*) They might employ themselves in learning the languages also?—Yes. I think it would be better if they were attached to regiments in India rather than in England.

1112. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not find that you have literally no school for a European officer joining a native regiment in India, because he joins at once a native regiment?—Yes. It very often happens that we have what they call supernumerary cadets, who are unposted for some months, and are sent to European regiments to learn drill. As far as my experience goes as adjutant, I have always found that when those men joined native regiments they were better up in their drill than any others.

1113. In fact they knew their drill before they joined?—Yes.

1114. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Since you have been in the Madras service, have you known any difference in the duty done by a native, in comparison with that done by a Queen's soldier, with regard to the orders, rules, and regulations?—The aim has been to copy the Queen's regulations, as far as drill and discipline went, as closely as possible.

1115. Do you know of any distinction?—I do not know of any particular distinction.

1116. When a Madras regiment is on foreign service, is it heavily equipped, or is it free from all burthen?—It is free from all burthen of families whatever.

1117. You consider that it is equipped as lightly as a regiment can be?—Yes.

1118. There are no incumbrances?—No incumbrances whatever.

1119. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is that the case with the Bengal army?—Yes, when they are shipped for foreign service; just those few regiments which will go on foreign service.

1120. They are enlisted for general service?—Yes.

1121. (*Major-General Hancock.*) And for an unlimited period?—Yes.

1122. For life?—For life.

The witness withdrew.

Adjourned to Tuesday, the 24th instant, at Twelve o'clock.

Tuesday, 24th August 1858.

PRESENT :

Major-Gen. the Right Hon. JONATHAN PEEL.	Major-Gen. Viscount MELVILLE.
General H.R.H. the Duke of CAMBRIDGE.	Lieut.-Gen. Sir HARRY G. W. SMITH.
Lord STANLEY.	Major-Gen. HANCOCK.
General the Marquis of TWEEDDALE.	Colonel BURLTON.

MAJOR-GENERAL PEEL IN THE CHAIR.

Sir G. Clerk, K.C.B.

24th Aug. 1858.

Sir GEORGE CLERK, K.C.B., examined.

1123. (*Chairman.*) Will you have the goodness to state to the Commission what opportunities you have had, by residence in India, of forming an opinion upon the questions which have been submitted to you ?—My opportunities have been such as were afforded by my service in different parts of India, and I have been a good deal in camps. I have been occasionally residing at the head-quarters of the army in different parts of India, and latterly I was the Governor of Bombay.

1124. What was the length of your residence in India ?—I was about 27 years in India.

1125. Up to what period ?—I left India ten years ago.

1126. Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion which the European should bear to the native troops in the Bengal presidency ?—If there is to be a regular native sepoy army, as it is called, I should say that the presidency would require one European to three natives, or taking the whole "regular" and irregular, if you compose it in that way, one to four would be ample.

1127. Do you include among the natives the police ?—No.

1128. It is exclusive of the police ?—Exclusive of the police, but including the regulars and irregulars.

1129. Do you take into consideration the contingent forces ?—I should suppose that very few of those remain in the native states. I do not take into consideration the Punjaub force, for nobody knows what that is at present ; that, I think, must be separately considered ; but taking Bengal and Hindoostan Proper up to the Sutlej, I should say that that would be the proportion with which it now might be held in security.

1130. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Of course, even up to this moment, there have been more Europeans in the Punjaub comparatively than in Bengal Proper ?—Yes ; and more than there ever have been in any other province in India.

1131. Therefore you do not take those into account ?—No ; especially with reference to what may now be necessary in the Punjaub ; they may require still more in the Punjaub than they even did before. It was only the day before yesterday that I heard from a member of the Council of India, who is in the best situation to judge, that in his opinion they will require 20,000 Europeans for the Punjaub alone, to hold in check its native army ; therefore I think that should be considered separately from the north-western provinces and Bengal.

1132. Then for Bengal and the north-western provinces you think that the proportion should be one to four ?—Yes.

1133. (*Chairman.*) Would you have any native artillery or sappers and miners ?—It would be a secure measure to have a European sapper and miner corps, and no natives ; nevertheless, there would appear to be inconsistency and weakness in excluding them altogether from the scientific departments when we are educating the people in the higher branches of European literature and science. They are very apt to learn, and they will learn ; we may depend upon that ; it is rather our duty to keep ahead of them, I should say. But the line at present of course could be drawn to exclude them from the laboratories by introducing there nothing but Europeans.

1134. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would do that at present ?—It is generally considered now to be a measure of safety, and I believe that it would be generally advocated. I am not altogether of that opinion myself.

1135. (*Chairman.*) I believe that the previous witnesses whom we have examined have been perfectly unanimous upon the point that they would have no native artillery whatever, that they would not entrust the natives with guns or allow them to be drivers, with the exception of gun Lascars to assist ?—That I think shows very little confidence in ourselves. Their artillery when served by themselves in this rebellion, was, I believe, found indifferent compared to that served by European officers. The most formidable artillery which we have encountered, I believe, was that which had been formed by French officers across the Sutlej, and still that could not resist British artillery inferior in numbers. I believe that at present every brigade of horse artillery, for instance, has one troop native and two troops Europeans. I do not see why that proportion should not be continued ; you could always annihilate the native portion.

1136. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) From the fact of the artillery being a very powerful arm, would it not be more dangerous to give such a weapon to a population in whom you have not full confidence ?—I do not consider that any danger has hitherto arisen from it excepting that which is owing to our want of ordinary precaution in allowing the natives to occupy walled towns and arsenals, and to blunders of that kind. Of course if we do that, no measure will be safe.

1137. Is it not almost an admitted fact that religious fanaticism has had a great deal to do with the recent rebellion ?—Certainly.

1138. Would not the result of that be that if a body of men had the means of artillery to carry out their religious fanatical views, they would be far more dangerous than infantry or cavalry with a very inferior arm ?—Certainly.

1139. In that point of view, do you not think that it would be hardly reasonable, at all events till the country has quite reassumed its original tranquillity, to entrust the power of artillery to native hands ?—Not if the proportion was small. I should say, for instance for horse artillery six-pounders, there could be no danger in having a troop of natives as you have now in every brigade ; and after all, their religious fanaticism has arisen from our interference with their religion. They are people of some discernment, and if that interference is to be continued, no precaution of that kind only will suffice ; you must pour in a vastly larger amount of European artillery than we have there now. But if that cause of irritation is removed the danger is not likely to recur ; they will not rush with any less provocation into rebellion, and sacrifice good pay, and pensions, and the means of purchasing land which they value almost more than their lives. When provocation is at an end, there will be an end of the insurrection.

1140. Still have they not done so this time to a great extent ?—Yes.

1141. More than could ever have been anticipated by those who had the greatest experience there ?—No ; I should imagine that all those who had taken a dispassionate view of the native character and cir-

cumstances must have anticipated that this mutiny would have occurred at any time within these last fifty years if the same causes had been in operation; it could not have been otherwise. There would have been the same desire to rise and to resist; there would not have been the same means of resistance, because you have never before left Hindoostan Proper so denuded of troops as you have lately done; that afforded success to the insurrection.

1142. (*Lord Stanley.*) If I understand you, you think that there would be no risk in having a native artillery, provided it formed a small proportion of the whole?—Just so.

1143. Provided the European force was everywhere in a majority?—Yes.

1144. (*Colonel Burlton.*) How would you provide for artillery at the outposts?—You would not furnish native artillery to the outposts; you would have a larger proportion of Europeans. I would not detach native artillery at least until you find that confidence is restored; but I do not see why they should not again serve as they have served for half a century, when confidence is restored. The fact after all is that they have lost confidence in us, and we in consequence have lost confidence in them.

1145. Would you consider it safe to detach a troop of native horse artillery or a light battery of foot artillery by themselves to any of the small outposts?—I think the period will come, I would not do so at present.

1146. (*Chairman.*) Would you arm the native troops with the Enfield rifle, the same efficient weapon with which you would arm the European troops?—I should not object to do so, because I should reckon on the European troops always keeping ahead of them, whatever arms were put in their hands; the former will always be cooler and better marksmen, and always be superior, whatever the weapon was. I believe the natives have done no mischief yet with their Enfield rifles.

1147. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that there would be in the native mind a bad feeling produced if you were to trust the natives less by giving them a worse arm than the Europeans?—No; I should not attach much weight to that. I do not think that they would feel it. They are generally indifferent marksmen with all European fire-arms.

1148. (*Lord Stanley.*) Does not it appear to you that it would be a piece of bad economy when you are at the expense of employing a soldier, whether native or European, not to make him as efficient as possible for the purposes of war?—I think so. I would let the native have the best rifle which was to be procured, and I believe that the European would still be always superior to him.

1149. (*Chairman.*) Can you form any opinion as to the amount of force which will be required in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled?—In considering that subject lately, it seemed to me that 50,000 European troops are required for the Bengal presidency, including Burmah.

1150. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Does that include the Punjaub?—Yes; 50,000 Europeans kept up to strength for what is called the Bengal presidency.

1151. And including artillery?—Yes.

1152. (*Chairman.*) Then you would have 150,000 natives, according to your proportion?—Yes; regular and irregular regiments.

1153. (*Lord Stanley.*) That would not necessarily give 150,000 natives, according to your estimate, because from that estimate you expressly excluded the case of the Punjaub?—But then I gave a smaller proportion.

1154. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You said one to four?—Yes.

1155. (*Chairman.*) There would then be 200,000 natives if you had 50,000 Europeans.—Yes; with the addition of the several levies it cannot be less, that is, during disturbances and until you recover the country.

1156. (*Viscount Melville.*) Is that exclusive of police?—Yes.

1157. (*Chairman.*) I think you stated that you would have a much larger proportion of European artillery than of native artillery?—Yes.

1158. What proportions would you have?—I am afraid that I am not a competent judge on that point. But, as formerly in the brigades of artillery in Bengal, I would have two troops of European horse artillery to one troop of native.

1159. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that that might be the proportion?—Yes, about that proportion.

1160. (*Major-General Hancock.*) The proportion hitherto in Bengal has been 3,000 Europeans to nearly 5,000 natives?—That includes foot artillery; I merely was referring to the horse artillery.

1161. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would recommend that the Europeans should be two to one?—Yes.

1162. (*Chairman.*) It has been stated by previous witnesses that the present allowance is two guns to 1,000 men; that would give 500 guns for these 250,000 men?—Yes.

1163. You would have a large proportion of European artillery?—Yes.

1164. Then you would leave the native infantry and cavalry with even a much larger proportion than four to one?—I do not propose to exclude natives from the artillery.

1165. (*Lord Stanley.*) I do not understand you to have stated at any time that you thought that 200,000 were necessary?—Not of regular and irregular regiments exclusive of local levies.

1166. I understand that from your estimate of 50,000 Europeans required for the Bengal presidency, you exclude the Punjaub. I think you said that 20,000 European troops would probably be required for the Punjaub?—Yes; but while there are peculiar circumstances now affecting our military position in the Punjaub, I include in the 50,000 the 20,000 which it is said are at present required for its security.

1167. That is to say, you think that altogether about 30,000 Europeans would be required for Bengal and the North-western Provinces?—Yes.

1168. Then your estimate of four natives to one European would be based upon that lower calculation of 30,000 Europeans being required for Hindoostan and Bengal, making 120,000?—Yes, regular and irregular regiments and native artillery.

1169. (*Chairman.*) What proportion of natives would you have for the 20,000 Europeans?—You have already 82,000 raised in the Punjaub, a great proportion of whom I believe are still there.

1170. Would you retain those 82,000?—No, by no means; I think that that is one of the most difficult questions; I would endeavour to reduce them to 30,000.

1171. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then you would have 20,000 Europeans to 30,000 natives in the Punjaub?—Exclusive of policemen. In assigning 20,000 Europeans to the Punjaub, I am rather stating what is reported from India to be required for that province than what I consider our position in the Punjaub to be.

1172. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) From your great experience in the Punjaub, to what cause do you attribute the loyalty of the Sikhs to our government?—Their lust of plunder. They want to plunder Hindostan. They have vowed to do so, sooner or later.

1173. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then you think that it would be a considerable risk to run to keep up a very large Sikh force?—An enormous risk.

1174. The risk might be even greater than the risk has been before?—Certainly greater, that I believe; and that it may warrant the estimate which I saw yesterday, from Calcutta, of 20,000 Europeans. I had not, perhaps, estimated it so high, but I know that they have always had 13,000 in and on the Punjaub ever since they have commenced the levelling system of government there.

1175. And the result of that system has been proved in this instance; for when the mutiny broke out, the Punjaub alone was kept in good order?—

Sir G. Clerk, K.C.B.

24th Aug. 1858.

Not by Sikhs, but by being, in proportion to the extent of the province and the amount of population, very strongly garrisoned.

1176. But by a large proportion of Europeans ?—Yes, and so might India Proper have been held ; and so the insurrection would have been averted, if there had been anything near the same proportion of European troops.

1177. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Upon what do you base the statement which you have made with regard to the number of troops, European and native, which you think would be necessary for maintaining the peace of the Bengal presidency ?—I have no better grounds to go upon than what I feel would be about the number that I should like to spread over the country, if I were responsible for bringing it back to good order. There is an enemy on foot now which has arisen since the first outbreak of the rebellion, namely, the plunderers ; you must suppress all that entirely, and continue in great military strength until it is done.

1178. You are speaking of the present condition of things ?—Yes.

1179. Not of the future ?—No, I should look to reducing that army hereafter ; in the course of three or four years, I think, it would be disgraceful to us if we could not make some reductions.

1180. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Ultimately, if things come right again, as we may hope, what do you suppose the force ought to be ?—That, I think, is connected with questions regarding Madras and Bombay. I think that a great deal of territory which is now said to be occupied by the Bengal army, ought to be placed under Madras. First of all it is due, I think, to that army for having served so well during this crisis. In the next place, it would be a proper and lasting punishment to the Bengal army to abandon its old recruiting ground. I would make over Bundelcund and Saugur, and other provinces in that direction to the Madras army ; and, of course, a proportionate reduction in Bengal follows.

1181. Would not it require an increase to the Bombay and Madras armies ?—Certainly.

1182. (*Chairman.*) The distribution which you have now made of the 50,000 European troops, has reduced your comparison to one to three, I think ; that is, 50,000 Europeans to 150,000 native troops ?—Yes.

1183. That would be 200,000 troops altogether ?—Yes.

1184. Taking what has been calculated by every previous witness who has been examined, namely, about two guns to every 1,000 men, there would be about 400 guns ; therefore that would make 10,000 of these 50,000 Europeans who would have to be in the artillery ?—Yes, I suppose about that.

1185. Do you consider that the native force in the Bengal presidency should be on the regular or irregular system, or both combined ?—I would combine them. I would have both experimentally, but differently composed. Such a lesson has been given from recruiting all of one caste, that every commanding officer will be weaned from that ; they will recruit the men more as they are recruited in Madras and Bombay, where there are more workmanlike battalions.

1186. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Would you have both infantry and cavalry on the irregular system ?—Yes ; though not exclusively irregular. I would have some regular infantry also.

1187. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) What is your general opinion as to the irregular cavalry ? Do you place great confidence in their utility ?—Yes, I think they are very useful if properly paid; but in the Bengal presidency they never have been adequately paid. You get some of the best soldiers in India to enter it.

1188. You can speak with some degree of confidence as to their loyalty ?—No doubt of it ; they always have been loyal until within these last few years, when there have been causes in operation to make them otherwise, which would have made any people or any army in the world disloyal. Nevertheless they did not take the lead in the rebellion, but the men of the line and the regular cavalry. I would punish them heavily in all future time by enlisting few of them hereafter. I would have fewer of the Gangetic rajpoots and fewer regular sepoy regiments.

1189. The object of my question was to ascertain, as it is generally considered that there is an idea of difference between the regular troops and the irregular troops, whether upon the late occasion they all combined together, and whether one was just as good or as bad as the other ?—I think that the men of the line have proved the worst of the native soldiery.

1190. Still the irregulars went with them ?—There was not a Hindoo, I believe, in the party which first broke into open mutiny. They were Mahomedans of the 3rd regiment of regular cavalry.

1191. But the irregulars immediately joined the revolution ?—Yes.

1192. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the Bengal native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion ?—I should not be very particular as to proportion. I should recruit a good soldier wherever I found him, whatever might be his caste ; some of the high-caste men are very good soldiers.

1193. Would you preserve the nationalities in the shape of regiments or companies, or should the men be distributed promiscuously throughout the regiment ?—Promiscuously, I think. It has been proved. It works well in Madras and Bombay, and I do not know why it should not work well elsewhere.

1194. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are you aware that in some regiments latterly they have tried the system of having separate companies of different clans or nationalities, and are you aware whether that system has answered or not. For instance, there is Coke's corps ?—Anything that has answered well I would try again. I was not aware that the corps was formed exactly in that manner.

1195. When you were in India it was not a custom ?—No.

1196. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You think that it might be desirable to try both systems ?—I think everything should be tried which experience has shown to be useful.

1197. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You see no reason against trying it ?—Certainly not.

1198. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you inclined to place as much confidence in the Mahomedan levies as you would in the Hindoos ?—Yes.

1199. You would not have fewer Mussulmans in a regiment or company than you would have Hindoos ?—In the infantry you will always have fewer Mahomedans, excepting in certain localities where the bulk of the population are Mahomedans. As for Coke's corps, I take it for granted, from the position where it is recruited, that the men are nearly all Mahomedans. The guide corps, which has been recruited in the Peshawur valley, I suppose is chiefly Mahomedan, with a few Sikhs.

1200. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Would you exclude Brahmins from our ranks altogether ?—No.

1201. You would have no exclusion ?—No ; I think it looks like weakness in the Government to have to exclude any class from our army. There are good Brahmin soldiers.

1202. (*Major-General Hancock.*) In fact, you would throw the native army open to all castes and all nationalities ?—Yes ; every colonel commanding who looks after his corps would, I think, avoid having a large number of any priestly caste, Brahmins or what not.

1203. I take for granted that you would not leave that to the officers of corps, but that you would make it a matter of regulation ?—Yes.

1204. (*Chairman.*) When you say that you would enlist men of different castes, would you recognise caste at all after a man has enlisted ?—Yes, you must

do so in some instances, at least, that is the way in which the native army of India had been wisely handled when required to take and securely to hold wide dominions for us.

1205. Would you allow caste to be pleaded as an excuse for the non-performance of duty ?—Not in obvious matters of duty. In enlisting a recruit I should take care to ascertain that he did not object to a particular line of duty on the ground of caste.

1206. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You would simply explain to each recruit what his duty was, and if he objected you would not enlist him ?—Just so ; I think those points should be well ascertained in the first instance.

1207. (*Chairman.*) And afterwards you would not allow the question of caste to stand in the way ?—Certainly not.

1208. (*Lord Stanley.*) You would take care that the recruit should not be able to say that he had been entrapped into the army, and that something had been put upon him afterwards to which he objected ?—Certainly.

1209. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would think it very detrimental to the army if caste were allowed, and put forward as an excuse for not performing military duty ?—Yes, specified military duty.

1210. (*Chairman.*) How would you make this understanding so notorious as always to be able to show that the understanding had taken place ?—By the form of enlistment. Formerly sepoys were not required to serve beyond sea, now I believe they are required to serve beyond sea. Let either Hindoo or Mahomedan enlist on any well understood terms, and should he become troublesome for no other reason than because of these terms, he would get no sympathy from his comrades. They would jeer him and laugh at him ; you would then turn him out of the regiment ; there would be nothing unfair in it, it would create no bad impression among his comrades.

1211. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That is to say, if it was clearly understood when he enlisted ?—Yes.

1212. General enlistment you think desirable ?—Yes.

1213. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You would think it expedient, I suppose, not to allow any one nationality or caste to predominate very greatly in any one corps; I mean that you would not allow the Brahmin class, for instance, or any leading class, to predominate ?—I would not allow Brahmins to predominate ; but there is a class now very much identified with the Brahmins. People talk of the Bengal army having revolted because it was composed of Brahmins ; but it is composed principally not of the Brahmin class, but of the second class, the fighting class, and if you excluded it, it would be very much like excluding Irishmen from the British army ; you would lose the very pith of your martial races, therefore I would not object to a proportion of the men being of high castes ; I would not have a great preponderance of them, but I would not be alarmed at having a good proportion of them.

1214. Do you not think that the large preponderance of Brahmins and Rajpoots in the Bengal army was one of the principal causes of the combination, or one of the principal things which facilitated it ?—It was not the cause of revolt. It may have facilitated combination ; but so it would if you had a large predominance of any inferior caste.

1215. You would avoid having a predominance of any particular class in the same corps ?—Yes ; a large predominance.

1216. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you have it laid down as part of the regulation under which men enlisted that there should be no regiment in which any one particular class should predominate ?—Yes ; I think so, that there should be no large predominance. I speak guardedly on that point, because, for instance, in raising men in the valley of the Indus, if on an emergency you have to raise regiments, they must of necessity be very much of one faith. If the Affghans were coming down upon you, of course you would have to take your money bag, and go and enlist other Mahomedan tribes entirely.

1217. Take a station in Bengal Proper ; if you regularly recruited there, could you avoid any predominance of a class ?—Certainly.

1218. And that you would think an advantage ?—I think so ; trusting to Ghoorkas and trusting to Sikhs is to be avoided of course.

1219. You think that Ghoorkas are as little to be trusted as Sikhs ?—You cannot get them ; they will not enlist. You are safe on that one point in our relations with the Ghoorkas.

1220. The 66th is an exclusively Ghoorka regiment, is it not ?—There are no Ghoorkas in it ; there is not a genuine Ghoorka in the regiment. The men from whom they are descended were Ghoorkas. At the termination of the Ghoorka war in 1817, on first acquaintance with these men, the British Government found them to be such smart plucky fellows that it was resolved to raise two regiments of them. The Nepaul government heard of it, and they consulted whether it should be allowed or not, and they considered that it would suit very well. They said :—"It is time that we should keep ourselves informed "of the military organization of this English nation ; "they wish to enlist two regiments, and they shall "do so, and they will be paying for our espionage." They kept themselves well informed of all our proceedings by having those men in our service, but they never allowed us to recruit more than three regiments.

1221. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Would you allow the sepoys of the different presidencies to exchange, namely, that the Madras men should be in Bengal and the Bengal men in Madras ?—I have never considered the question ; I would move more Madras troops up to the west of the presidency of Bengal, to hold other territories.

1222. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But then you would give up those territories to Madras, you would make a different territorial arrangement ?—Yes.

1223. Therefore it would be part of the same army ?—Yes.

1224. (*Chairman.*) There is a different proportion of European officers in the regular and irregular native regiments, is there not ?—Yes.

1225. Would you make any alteration in that respect ; would you give more European officers to the irregular regiments than it has been the habit to do ?—I do not think it necessary ; they have proved to be remarkably good troops on service ; and in quarters very orderly, wonderfully so, considering they are Mahomedans.

1226. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that the regular native regiments have a sufficient number of officers ?—Yes ; I think they have.

1227. That is, I suppose, according to the establishment ; but do you approve of there being so many absent at the same time ?—Yes ; I think there are enough present when they have eight or nine officers with the regiment.

1228. So that you do not attribute what has happened now to the great want of officers with the native regiments ?—Certainly not ; perhaps the reverse may be the case, but certainly that is not the case.

1229. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think that a necessity exists for having more European officers with a regular native regiment than with an irregular regiment ?—Yes ; I think you ought to have some regiments formed as regular regiments. One motive for retaining irregular regiments with few European officers is that the native gentleman likes that service better. If you increase the number of European officers the service is less attractive to him. He loses authority and privileges.

1230. In the Bombay presidency very few are native gentlemen, but they have all gone through the ranks ?—Still they rise to the rank of native gentlemen if invested with adequate authority.

Sir G. Clerk, K.C.B.
24th Aug. 1858.

1231. Might not that be done with the native infantry regular corps, would you not admit native gentlemen there?—If you had few European officers, of course you would.

1232. Do you think it expedient to do so?—I think so with certain battalions. I have always advocated the system of reserved battalions on purpose to have suitable positions for native officers of rank.

1233. Do you not think that there is an advantage in the irregular regiments over the regular regiments in having selected officers for their commandants, seconds in command, and adjutants?—Yes.

1234. Could not that system be extended to the regular service?—It might be extended very considerably; still I think it might be better to retain some regiments regularly organized.

1235. Still do you not think that greater advantage would accrue to the service from having a selected commanding officer and an adjutant?—Certainly; I attribute entirely the circumstance that all authority has been withdrawn from commanding officers to the fact that you cannot select.

1236. Does not that pervade the regular army throughout?—From the colonel of a regiment down to the subahdar.

1237. The man who succeeds to a lieutenant colonelcy must be placed in command of a corps, unless there is anything against him?—Yes; an officer, even if incompetent, must be placed in a responsible position; therefore his authority is curtailed; it goes down the whole scale; the authority of all is curtailed, and pride and zeal in the service are less felt than formerly by those who are competent. There has been less authority trusted to officers commanding regiments and to officers commanding companies than there used to be. They have less means of promoting natives or conceding privileges to them.

1238. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Which you think very objectionable?—It must strike every commander-in-chief as very objectionable, but then he finds himself in this difficulty, that he cannot get rid of an incompetent colonel, and therefore of course he curtails his authority.

1239. Do not you think that there should be means of getting rid of an incompetent officer?—Certainly; I would devise means, but they have never existed.

1240. You think they ought to exist?—Certainly, and then of course every commander-in-chief would invest his officers with due authority.

1241. In the evidence which we have had there was a case quoted, in the time of Lord Hastings, where a lieutenant-colonel was found incompetent, and he was superseded by another officer, but he was retained in his position?—I was not aware of it. I merely speak of what I have observed. I have heard the subject spoken of by the commanders-in-chief. I speak with great diffidence as far as my own opinion goes. But he sees that an officer is not fit to command a regiment, and he proposes to get rid of him, but the adjutant-general says "You cannot."

1242. (*Chairman.*) You consider that not even a European officer to each company is necessary in the regular native regiments?—When I said that seven or eight officers are sufficient for a regular regiment of sepoys, I supposed that battalions would be reduced to 600 men.

1243. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that they are too large now?—Yes, for discipline of that class.

1244. (*Chairman.*) And you would consider that the promotion should be by selection?—Yes, for commanding officers.

1245. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The system is the seniority system?—Yes; selection would be preferable.

1246. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Might not the commanding officer be appointed by selection in this way; for instance, if the field of lieutenant-colonels were sufficiently increased to leave room for the selection of, say 25 out of 100, could not it be carried out?—Certainly.

1247. And under that arrangement there would be no stigma?—No; but of course a commander-in-chief would keep in view the officer's seniority, provided he was also competent; if he is incompetent and has failed to qualify himself to command, I should not care about his feeling the stigma of being superseded.

1248. If the system be as at present, that every officer must be promoted to lieutenant-colonel in his turn, and if promotion to that rank entitles an officer as a general rule to the command of a regiment, does not a stigma necessarily attach to a lieutenant-colonel who may be specially excluded by the commander-in-chief from that command?—Yes.

1249. And under the system which I propose to you as possible, there would be no stigma attached. The officer would get his promotion to lieutenant-colonel just the same: he would have no grievance?—Just so, and he would not be retained in command.

1250. Would you extend the principle of selection to the native officers as well as to the European officers?—Certainly.

1251. Throughout the whole promotions of the regiment?—I think so.

1252. Would you give the commanding officers of regiments greater power than they have now, either to reward or to punish?—Yes; I would.

1253. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You ascribe the reason of power having been taken out of the hands of the commanding officers, which in recent years has been the case, to the fact there are some commanding officers who are not competent to their positions, and to guard against that the commanders-in-chief have taken the authority into their own hands?—There are some such cases; and even if one case occurs in the course of a twelvemonth, of course it strikes the commander-in-chief of the army that he must do something; he no sooner turns his attention to it than he finds he is powerless. I should have mentioned, that the invalid corps was a resource.

1254. (*Major-General Hancock.*) That was by gentle compulsion?—Yes; and then again, it was held very naturally that, in the constitution of that invalid corps, it was intended as an honourable retirement for disabled officers, but it has been used for those who could not be got rid of by other means.

1255. And of course commanding officers are very averse to attaching a stigma merely for incompetence to any individual officer whose character has been generally respectable?—Naturally.

1256. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The real fact is, that you cannot get rid of an incompetent man, who has not committed himself, without giving him an equivalent in the shape of retirement?—Yes.

1257. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) It has been stated here that the native officers, in consequence of their age, become incompetent; that they do not keep up that communication between the sepoys of the regiment and the European officers which they should. Would there be any objection to their being pensioned, and native gentlemen being appointed as officers in the same way that our European gentlemen are appointed to be officers in the Queen's army, pensioning off the old men, and having native gentlemen appointed in the same way that our young gentlemen are appointed to the Queen's commissions, without going through the sepoy rank?—I see no objection to it if you can obtain the supply; but of late years the civil government has been bent upon extirpating the race of native gentlemen in the interior of India.

1258. I mean for the encouragement of the natives and for securing a communication between the sepoys and the European officers?—I do not think that the latter will follow necessarily. The European officer who is not selected for his knowledge of native character, and whose education may render him a better style of man than the native officer, will probably look down upon that native officer more,

from the circumstance of his calling himself a native gentleman.

1259. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that there has been any inconvenience in the fact that a very young European subaltern has invariably the command of a regiment, a detachment, or corps, over the heads of all the old native officers; do you think that that has been much felt by the natives?—It may have been felt in some degree, but what is more felt is that there is very little sympathy between that subaltern officer and the subahdar of greater age.

1260. You think that there ought to be more communication?—Yes; the subahdar would sink all the rest, provided there was a more cordial feeling existing between them.

1261. You think that the European officers are too exclusive?—They are too exclusive, and the larger their number the more society they have among themselves, and the more averse they are to devote their time and their thoughts to native soldiers.

1262. Is not the difficulty of caste somewhat in the way?—Not at all; you see the reverse of all that in the irregular cavalry. It is not necessary that European officers should eat and drink with native officers or adopt native habits. Without that, officers of irregular corps ever have found, and still do find means of obtaining an extraordinary degree of influence over their men of every rank.

1263. Could not the regulations for the regular native army be so arranged as to oblige the European officers to be more associated with the native officers?—Certainly.

1264. You think that that ought to be done?—Unquestionably; and I think that some regulations might be adopted, from which it would necessarily follow that officers would be disposed to know more of their men, for instance, by which they would be qualified to speak to their men. Diffidence and bashfulness prevent many a young officer from obtaining information from his subahdar, when that subahdar, though he has served 30 years, would be delighted to be talked to by a young educated Englishman, though so much his junior.

1265. And you think that if the native officers were talked to and associated with, the European officer would have more power with his native officers and with his men, and would feel more interest in them?—Infinitely.

1266. And that has been the result of experience in the irregular portion of the army?—Yes, as far as my experience goes.

1267. Perhaps that has been the cause in your opinion why the irregulars have been superior to the regulars?—Yes. It has been one of the principal causes.

1268. (*Chairman.*) You state it as a fact, that there is more communication between the European officers and the native officers in irregular than in regular corps?—Necessarily. A regiment of irregular cavalry, for instance, is at an outpost; not another soldier there, except that corps, 700, strong with three European officers. I have known these cases, and no European troops within a week's march. Did not those officers keep themselves well informed regarding everything concerning their men, discipline and good feeling could not possibly be secured.

1269. (*Lord Stanley.*) From that point of view, a larger number of European officers, so far from being a benefit would be a disadvantage as diminishing the responsibility and diminishing therefore the interest which each man would feel in the state of the regiment?—Yes; I think that that will be found to have been the case. I think that that will be found to be combined with other causes to change that spirit which once attached the sepoys with so much devotion to the British cause.

1270. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Are you of opinion that in former days, going back some twenty or thirty years, there was a much more intimate association between the European officers and their men than there has been in the last ten or twelve years?—Yes. That association was not a preference. Formerly the officer had fewer comrades, the civilian no associate. Their duties were more pressing and uninterrupted. They therefore found more objects of interest in attending to those duties. They had not everywhere large stations, with a variety of permanent English society, with its amusements and connexions of every sort. There were not reinforcements of European troops close at hand. There were not daily importations of their own race from England. The necessity of knowing the native soldiers and the people was imposed on them in order to continue our dominion. It was not the adoption of native habits, though it is the conceit to say so. There were exceptions. There are such now. But generally Englishmen were as English then as they always are everywhere. There existed the necessity, which latterly has been so disregarded, that we should be on every side guarded and circumspect.

1271. Probably you recollect that in former days the officers used to attend the religious meetings of their men?—Out of compliment to the native officers, they attended, I believe, on some festive occasions, though considering it a tax upon their time.

1272. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Has that been discontinued of late years?—Very much.

1273. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think it an advantage that that should be the case?—I think that there is no harm done in showing the natives some attentions, from which we now superciliously, and from motives of personal convenience, abstain.

1274. We have been talking of the difference between the regulars and the irregulars, and that the fact of the irregulars having but few officers attached to them gave them a greater insight into the feelings of their men, and that there was more harmony. Do you not think that the fact of those three officers being always selected officers makes a considerable difference?—Certainly. And if favour, not qualification, has put an officer there, he soon finds that his time is his men's, not his own, and so he soon comes to be full of intelligence, vigilance, and resource.

1275. Would there not be considerable difficulty in selecting officers if a greater proportion of the army were irregular? You now have a large field. You take the European officers from the native regular army and put them into the irregulars. Supposing you have not a large regular native army, from whom are you to select?—I would extend the field, by having more qualified officers; for instance, an officer should be obliged to speak the language before he joins any corps.

1276. In the examination for his commission?—Yes; that is not now the case.

1277. Is not an officer compelled to know the language now before his appointment?—No. If you improve the qualifications of the whole body, you have a greater choice for the irregular corps.

1278. (*Viscount Melville.*) With regard to the question of the introduction of native gentlemen into the regular regiments without going through the sepoy ranks, do you not think that if we mean to retain possession of India we must, both in the civil service and in the military service, employ the gentlemen of the country?—Certainly we must.

1279. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And in the army in a greater proportion than we have done?—You have increasing field for their employment in irregular corps. I do not know that you could improve it in the estimation of the native yeomen, excepting in point of pay.

1280. Do you run no risk that in the case of any outbreak you will find leaders if you raise highly the military position of the gentlemen of the country. Is it not a fact that lately there have been few native leaders of position, and would there not be more risk on a future occasion if the course you recommend were adopted?—I believe they have had leaders on this occasion, as they always have had before our time.

Sir G. Clerk, K.C.B.

24th Aug. 1858.

1281. From amongst the men who have been officers?—No doubt of it. They have had leaders out of the sapper corps in Delhi, and they have had leaders in the artillery, but they have had no public press to publish them.

1282. You say from the sapper corps and from the artillery; those are scientific corps, men highly educated?—Yes.

1283. If you were to educate the gentlemen and the men more highly, which you think there would be no objection to, would you not run more risk of creating leaders on a future occasion?—Then you must be strong enough to encounter the disadvantages of their being educated. It is the great boast of our Government at present, that you are advancing them to a high state of education, and how you can reserve one department or another from their knowledge I cannot see.

1284. Excepting that a civilian probably would be less dangerous in that respect than a military man, if he had been taught military science?—I thought that Lord Melville's question pointed more to position in regiments. Sir Henry Lawrence made an observation which he published upon the subject, regarding the sepoys. He said it was painful to see a gallant and deserving native officer passed over because he had not received some English schooling as some of the younger ones had, and that it applied to some of the best of the native officers. His expression was, "Do not educate them beyond their position."

1285. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you think that the native gentlemen would enter the infantry service in the same way as they now enter the irregular cavalry?—No; you must alter the costume to begin with.

1286. The cavalry service is more popular?—Yes.

1287. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I think I heard you say that you thought a good deal of having reserved battalions?—Yes.

1288. What is the meaning which you attach to that?—That a battalion which could be almost exclusively officered by native officers whom you wished to reward, would be advantageous as a reserve battalion used for certain duties, whilst the other battalion should be rather organized for active service.

1289. Without any Europeans at all?—No; I would have one or two European officers with it—retired officers. That battalion could take up many duties; they could also prepare recruits for the regiment. I would try it as an experiment, 20 or 30 regiments.

1290. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you not of opinion that giving authority in the military and civil service to the native gentlemen at this period of the revolution would be regarded as weakness and concession?—I would not immediately devolve more authority on native officers.

1291. (*Viscount Melville.*) You said that you thought that the irregular cavalry were insufficiently paid; what pay would you propose?—I speak with some doubt. I have inquired since I left India. The pay then was only 25 rupees a month, and it ought to have been 30. I have heard lately that in the Punjaub, which is the granary of Upper India, and has been for these 50 years past, they have 30 rupees, whilst all the old regiments of irregular cavalry remain upon 25 rupees, and that is not sufficient for a man to find him in all he has to provide in that branch of the army. I now take it for granted that they will all be brought up to the higher pay.

1292. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that any benefit would be derived by dividing the Bengal army into two or more armies?—No; I do not.

1293. (*Lord Stanley.*) In the event of the Punjaub and part of the north-western provinces being erected into a separate presidency, you would then think it expedient that the army should be divided, would you not?—No, I do not think that it need necessarily be divided.

1294. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that any alteration should be made in the code under which the native army of Bengal is now enlisted?—I believe that at present it is a general service enlistment.

1295. You would enlist for general service?—Yes; perhaps some points might be introduced regarding caste, such as were alluded to just now.

1296. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would alter the code to a certain extent?—Yes.

1297. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not think that the Government have derived great advantage from having the Bombay and Madras armies separated from the Bengal army during the late mutiny?—Very great indeed.

1298. Would not the same advantage have accrued to the Government if the Bengal army had been only half its size, and there had been a fourth presidency; if there had been a combination of 50,000 or 30,000 men instead of 100,000?—If the army is properly organized and officered, I do not see why it should be too large for one command.

1299. Then do you see any difficulty in the whole being made a national army?—Yes; that would be unwieldy.

1300. What is the objection?—I think that the extent of dominion is so vast, that the head-quarters offices would be too distant.

1301. Do not you think that the Bengal presidency, including the Punjaub and Oude, is too large to constitute one presidency; is there any advantage to the Government from having it so disproportionate in size from the Madras and Bombay presidencies?—The Bengal presidency in its military charge should be considerably reduced.

1302. Do you think it of no advantage to the Government to have the armies of the three presidencies equalized in any way by a different distribution of the territory?—I do not see any great advantage in it, excepting that I would introduce the Bombay and Madras army into such parts of the Bengal presidency as Bundelcund, Saugur, and Rajpootana.

1303. The effect of that would be to reduce the Bengal army?—Yes.

1304. What would be the advantage of increasing the Madras army and reducing the Bengal army?—I would not confide to the sepoy of the districts on the Ganges so much territory as before, and I would almost abandon that recruiting ground.

1305. For the same reasons, would you not reduce the recruiting ground on the western coast?—I see no necessity for that.

1306. Suppose there is a fourth presidency along the line of the Punjaub down the Indus?—That is not exactly where I would have a fourth presidency. Of course, if there were formed a fourth presidency lying so far over to the westward, you might in time require a detached army for it.

1307. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But you do not see any advantage in it?—Not at present. There is a political and difficult question involved there.

1308. I am talking militarily?—I think that the Punjaub and Scinde should be allowed to develop themselves for a few years, and be combined hereafter. It might be a proper occasion then to revise the establishment of the armies.

1309. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not think that the Madras and Bombay armies have been at a disadvantage in many respects from being smaller armies. Do you not think that the Bengal staff officers have had much higher pay?—That I am not informed of; but I think that the Madras army has been greatly overworked, and has not been in sufficient numbers to undertake its duties, and the Bombay army the same, and principally because the Bengal army was averse to undertake duty, for instance in Burmah, in Scinde, &c. The other armies have admirably discharged those duties.

1310. Have not the armies of the minor presidencies been at a disadvantage in this respect, that the Bengal army has formed the standard by which everything proposed in the minor presidencies has been regulated?—Not in my estimation, because I have looked upon the others as the standard for efficiency.

1311. Are you aware that the answers from the Government of India have not uncommonly been, that no such system obtained in Bengal?—Yes; I believe that there has been a great deal of that.

1312. In fact the Bengal army has been regarded as the pattern army by which the other two armies have been regulated?—Yes; there is, however, an end of that.

1313. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you think that any advantage would attend a suggestion which has been made by Sir Patrick Grant, with the view of obviating the necessity of raising the Bengal army to its former strength, namely, to transfer certain districts to Madras and Bombay?—Yes; I have previously stated that there are certain territories in Central India which I would transfer to Madras and Bombay; perhaps Sir Patrick Grant alludes to those.

1314. He proposes to transfer the Saugur district and some others?—Yes; Nagpoor and Saugur should be under Madras. They have held it during this insurrection in a most satisfactory manner.

1315. (*Chairman.*) When you say that you would for the future enlist for general service, would you abolish all allowances made for going out of any particular district?—If you send troops to the eastward by sea, I believe you must allow additional batta. It is unnecessary, I think, to give them additional batta going northward or to the north-west, because they get into the cheaper countries.

1316. (*Major-General Hancock.*) The existing rules are that there shall be extra rations for foreign service; that means, beyond the continent of India?—The proper line, I think, would be that there should be additional allowances for foreign service beyond the continent of India, not internally.

1317. (*Chairman.*) Why should the troops receive an extra allowance for going beyond India?—Their expenses are considerably enhanced, they have to leave their families and provide remittances for longer periods, and to prepare supplies for going across the sea. The Hindoos are put to considerable expense in going to sea.

1318. What difference do they receive now; take, for instance, the troops now at Canton?—I cannot state.

1319. If they were placed in the same position as other British troops as to pay and rations, that would not be sufficient in your opinion?—I should think so, if it equalled their present rates of allowance on such service.

1320. (*Viscount Melville.*) I do not think that the regiments going to Burmah take their families, but they get extra pay?—Yes.

1321. (*Chairman.*) Would you under the new system retain all these allowances?—Yes; it is a great inducement to general enlistment.

1322. Do you consider that any admixture of European and native forces should be regimentally or by brigade?—I once suggested the organization of some native battalions with flank companies of Europeans in each. It was the recommendation of General von Gügern after his tour of inspection in Java. But I have found our military authorities in India opposed to it.

1323. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What advantage did you anticipate from it?—That aide-de-camp said that it worked well in Java; I thought it might perhaps improve the discipline of the native portion of the army, and that officers could pass through the European companies to the native companies, and so forth. I still think that officers for the native army might advantageously be passed through the European regiments first before taking up their duties with native troops.

1324. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) So as to get thoroughly disciplined?—Yes.

1325. In fact there is not an opportunity for an officer to get the discipline required, unless he goes through a European corps?—No. What is wanted is exact discipline and a knowledge of the language of the country.

1326. (*Chairman.*) I think you have answered the question as to promotion?—As far as is consistent with a due regard to seniority, I would have it by selection.

1327. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What do you consider a due regard to seniority?—I mean in selecting for the command of a corps.

1328. We are speaking of the non-commissioned native ranks?—I would regulate it by selection.

1329. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You are aware that in Bengal now it is all by seniority?—Yes.

1330. You are against that?—Yes.

1331. Would you make seniority the rule and selection the exception, or would you make it purely selection?—I think that seniority should be the rule and selection the exception, with power to select always.

1332. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) What would you do then with those who were passed over?—They would be passed over on account of disqualification for the higher grade, and they must be content to remain in the lower.

1333. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you introduce any regulation by which those men could retire or be got rid of?—I would dispose of some of them in reserved battalions.

1334. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you allude to the native commissioned and non-commissioned ranks or to private soldiers?—To the native commissioned and non-commissioned ranks.

1335. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would it not be a very dangerous thing to put a number of discontented men, who had been passed over, into a reserved battalion where you would have very few Europeans indeed; would not it cause great discontent in the battalion itself?—Not if they felt their disqualifications. I would encounter that. You have to do it for efficiency in other departments.

1336. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What objection do you see to making the system that of selection for merit and qualification, without any reference to seniority, and leaving the commanding officer perfectly free to give that consideration to seniority which he thinks due?—I think that it amounts to the same thing. You require more than respectability for active service, and I think that a man in command who is shy of encountering anything which places him in an invidious position, is himself not fit for command. He must encounter the discontent of those from whom he makes a fair selection.

1337. You would leave his hands free?—I should not mind encountering the feeling of discontent if the selection was just.

1338. You mean, that if the principle of selection were fully carried out, you would not be afraid of encountering the discontent?—No.

1339. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that looking at the character of the native mind, it is very objectionable to countenance the power which the sepoy now has of going direct to the head authority with a complaint by petition, without its passing through his commanding officer, the captain of his company?—Certainly.

1340. Do you not think that, particularly in eastern nations, it has a very lowering effect upon the authority and position of his commanding officer?—I do.

1341. Are you aware that that has been a good deal the practice of late?—I am.

1342. Do you not think that it is very objectionable?—Very objectionable.

1343. And do you not think that it should be done away with by regulation?—Yes.

1344. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you aware that one of the great complaints of officers commanding Bengal regiments is alleged to be that they have not sufficient power to reward and to punish?—I am.

1345. Is not a system under which seniority is the rule for promotion one of all others which would deprive them of that power?—Yes.

Sir G. Clerk, K.C.B.

24th Aug. 1858.

1346. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you see any objection to the introduction into India of Africans, such as West Indian regiments or troops raised in other colonies?—When there was a great paucity of troops in India, early in the present outbreak, I recommended your Royal Highness being applied to on the subject of the West Indian regiments. I felt sure that they would take up the garrison duty at Fort William or Bombay, with great advantage to the State, releasing to that extent the Europeans. But when India comes to be settled again, I really think that there are sufficient classes and castes of every description there, martial races, to give us a very workmanlike army, with the assistance of Europeans, rendering it unnecessary to go elsewhere abroad for men.

1347. Would you see any objection to an exchange, such as a West Indian regiment being sent to India, and an Indian regiment being sent for general service to the West Indies or to the Cape?—I think the time has scarcely come for that. It might hereafter be salutary to change them about, but not yet. I think it would be attempting too much at once. The first great thing is to restore confidence in India throughout all classes.

1348. If confidence was restored probably the fact of their being moved into other portions of the empire would act rather as a link of connexion?—Yes; it might be so in time. The Kaffirs have been spoken of, but I should think that they could not be used to any good purpose in India.

1349. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not think that if you were to introduce these troops into India it would cause great dissatisfaction in the country?—I think it would if you introduced them permanently there, nor do I think that you require them.

1350. (*Lord Stanley.*) Practically, do you think that there is the slightest necessity, if India is governed as it ought to be, to introduce barbarous races from all parts of the world to keep down the Indians?—I think not.

1351. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You think that any native army must be fully trusted by the Government?—They need not be trusted, if you can furnish Europeans enough to coerce them; but that they may be trusted again, I am satisfied.

1352. And you think that they may be employed in all branches of the service?—Yes, if you withdraw the causes of irritation; otherwise you will never get zealous service from them, and you will not have the country restored to order even with far larger European forces than you have there now.

1353. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Then you appear to me to be of opinion, that when things have once settled down from the present moment of irritation, India may hereafter be carried on upon the same principles as it has been heretofore with a native army, without introducing barbarians and others?—Yes, provided you are more guarded—provided you adopt ordinary military precautions, that is a necessary proviso; and provided when you annex territories your native army is allowed to benefit by it. The rule has latterly been to annex territories, and not to increase the army. On annexing territories, the British army, European and native, must be adequately increased.

The witness withdrew.

Lieut.-Col. T. L. Harington.

Lieutenant-Colonel THOMAS LOWTH HARINGTON examined.

1354. (*Chairman.*) What rank do you hold in the Indian army?—I am a brevet lieutenant-colonel and major in my regiment. I am in the Fifth Bengal Cavalry, a regiment which has not mutinied.

1355. How long have you been in the service?—Thirty-one years.

1356. How many years of that period have been passed in India?—Twenty-nine.

1357. You have served in the Bengal presidency?—Yes.

1358. Of course you have been associated, during the period of your service, with both European and native troops?—Yes.

1359. Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion which the Europeans should bear to the native troops in the Bengal presidency?—I think we want one-fourth Europeans. In service we ought to have one to three.

1360. You mean three natives to one European?—Yes.

1361. Would you have any native artillerymen and sappers and miners?—Certainly not artillerymen, native sappers and miners I do not object to. I have seen many military officers in this last year, and they are all averse to native artillerymen. The natives place great dependence upon that arm.

1362. Have you been able to form any opinion as to the amount of force which will be required in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled?—I had never given any consideration to that subject until I received the Commissioners' letter the other day. I should think about 100,000 natives would be sufficient, regular and irregular.

1363. Then you would have about 30,000 Europeans?—I am speaking of infantry now. I would have sixty regiments of foot native regular, and forty irregular, and twenty what I call veteran battalions, (which Sir George Clerk called reserve regiments,) men unfit for active service, to be transferred to those battalions before they were invalided; these corps would do to take garrison duty, to escort treasure, and to guard the gaols, and to receive net pay without batta.

1364. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you put them on the regular or the irregular footing?—On the irregular. Officers unfit for active service and wounded might have the command of these regiments.

1365. Are you of opinion that 30,000 Europeans would be sufficient for the Bengal presidency, including the Punjaub?—I think that twelve more regiments of infantry added to the force out there before the outbreak, viz. 18 regiments of foot, would be sufficient.

1366. You would have 30,000 infantry?—Yes.

1367. What number of cavalry?—About 10,000.

1368. And how much artillery?—The same as now, two guns to 1,000 men.

1369. I understood you to say that you did not wish to see any native artillery?—Certainly.

1370. Therefore does it not result from that, as there has been hitherto native artillery, and as you propose an army of 100,000 natives, that you must have a much larger proportion of European artillery than you have hitherto had?—Certainly.

1371. Then you would have the Europeans that you have at present and add to them the portion which was native before?—Yes, to make up the number.

1372. That would be about 10,000 artillery, I apprehend?—There are only four troops of native horse artillery and two battalions of native foot artillery (that is to say, six companies in each battalion). I do not include the artillery of the contingents.

1373. You would have 5,000 additional, according to the present return?—Yes.

1374. That therefore would amount to about 10,000 European artillery?—Yes.

1375. Would you have any of the contingent artillery as it is at present, or would you not allow the native princes to have any?—I would not allow them to have any; they might have a gun or two just to fire salutes, but there should be no force of artillery.

1376. (*Viscount Melville.*) If you deprive the native princes in that way, how will you hold or govern the country?—I should not care about the

native princes at all. I do not think they are worthy of it. Look at the Gwalior contingent, how badly they behaved, and all of them. The Sikh Rajahs of Puttialah and Jheend are exceptions.

1377. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you have European engineers or native ?—I see no objection to the sappers and miners being native, doing merely digging, sapping, and mining.

1378. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Would you let them into the laboratories ?—I do not think they are let into the laboratories now.

1379. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) If they are, you would not admit them into the laboratories ?—No.

1380. And you would not admit the natives into the arsenals for scientific purposes ?—Certainly not.

1381. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Is your objection to native artillery founded simply upon distrust of their loyalty ?—No, certainly not ; but I think the natives place such dependence upon that arm, that no body of men would fight unless they had artillerymen, and had guns with them. I think they are just as loyal as the others.

1382. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that the irregular or the regular system of native troops is the best ?—You must have both.

1383. Would you have a larger number of irregular troops than you have hitherto had ?—No, certainly not.

1384. Would you introduce the irregular system into the infantry ?—They have that already.

1385. To a very small extent ?—To a large extent. The following are irregular infantry corps, viz.:—

1 Khelat-i-Ghilzie ;
3 Ghoorka Corps ;
4 Sikh Local Infantry ;
2 Sikh Corps (Loodianah and Ferozepore) ;
6 Corps Punjaub Irregular Infantry on the North-western Frontier ;
1 Guide ;
5 Oude Locals ;
6 Gwalior ;
1 Hurriaŋah Light Infantry ;
1 Bhaugulpore Hill Rangers ;
1 Ramgurh Light Infantry ;

and some six or seven others.

1386. You would continue that system ?—Yes.

1387. Would you have any regular cavalry at all ? Yes.

1388. There has been a good deal of evidence upon that point ; I believe you have commanded regular cavalry ?—Yes.

1389. The evidence has been rather the reverse, namely, that the native infantry should be regular and irregular, but that the native cavalry should be all irregular ; why would you think it necessary to maintain the two ?—I think that, for purposes of active service, the regular cavalry are very superior to the irregular. In the first place, irregular cavalry will save their horses in action ; I have seen it. A dismounted trooper, if unable to mount himself within a given time (the exact period I do not recollect), has his pay reduced from 20 rupees to 5 rupees (I think) a month ; on service it is often difficult to procure a good horse. The men are exactly the same ; and in many of the regiments raised in 1846–47, inferior. In former years the irregular horsemen were enlisted from the cavalry of the armies of native chiefs, Mahrattas, &c., engaged in constant warfare, and trained to the use of arms from their birth. On the defeat of these native powers by the British, these men took service with us. Such were the men that formed the famous regiments of Skinner's, Gardner's, and Roberts' horse. Since then they have been enlisted, and from the same class of men as the regular cavalry. The commanding officers of several of these corps have introduced a system of spoiling the irregulars by aping the dragoons,—making the men purchase Nolan's bridles, shabracques, brass-mounted pouch and belt, and a larger and more expensive description of horse. The consequences are, that these corps are greatly involved in debt to their regimental bankers. A regiment disbanded at Peshawur (for mutiny) last year owed nearly 10,000*l*.

Lieut.-Col. T. L. Harington.

24th Aug. 1858.

1390. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Does not the Government grant a fair remuneration for horses lost in action ?—Yes ; sufficient to purchase a horse fit for irregular cavalry, but not to meet the cost of horses that some commanding officers of irregular cavalry wish to mount their men on. Every man contributes a monthly subscription to the horse fund ; the sum allowed from this fund for the purchase of a horse is (I believe) from 120 to 150 rupees. Anything above that sum must be paid by the soldiers, and is generally borrowed from the regimental banker. This must make the men dissatisfied.

1391. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you of opinion that the irregular cavalry are as well horsed as the regular ?—Certainly not.

1392. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Suppose that the Government gave them a remunerative price which would enable them to supply themselves with equally good horses ?—A very considerable increase would have to be made to the pay of irregulars to enable them to purchase horses equal to the regular cavalry. Our horses sometimes cost 400 or 600 rupees. The Government horses are very superior horses, and are mostly stud-bred.

1393. (*Chairman.*) What number of European officers do you consider it desirable to have with a regular and an irregular regiment ?—On all services on which they have been employed latterly, they always had officers taken from the line. I have spoken to many officers in the cavalry and infantry, and they all wish for more officers. In an action there are more European officers killed and wounded with native soldiers than with the same proportion of European soldiers. Unless the officers are before, the men will not follow.

1394. Therefore you do not agree with Sir George Clerk in the opinion that it would be rather advantageous than otherwise to reduce the number of European officers attached to a native regiment ?—I do not see how they could otherwise supply the irregulars. I do not think you could reduce the number of officers, so many go away sick to England.

1395. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think the present establishment sufficient ?—Yes.

1396. Do you think that too many are taken away for staff employment ?—Yes, in my own regiment the average number with the corps during the last ten years has been six, not including commanding officers and staff, six officers always on staff employ.

1397. How many do you think sufficient ?—Five or six for ordinary cantonment duty in excess of commanding officers and staff. I speak of my branch, for a cavalry regiment of 500 sabres.

1398. You do not think it necessary to have one to a troop ?—No.

1399. Do you object to the present system of having a certain number of European officers from the regiment on the staff ?—I do ; because every young officer who comes out now says, "My father is a director," and so and so ; "directly I have passed my examina-"tion, in a couple of years I shall be off, and care "nothing for the regiment." And no wonder, when the threat of being sent back to one's regiment is held out as a punishment for misconduct or misbehaviour. Regimental officers are constantly taunted with the remark "that the best and most intelligent officers "are selected for the staff." Officers *are* selected : but the *rule* is interest, and merit the *exception* that guides these selections. There are just as intelligent and excellent officers in every respect remaining with their regiments as those on staff employ. A captain, than whom a more gallant officer never lived, who had had two chargers shot under him in action, and was so severely wounded in the Punjaub campaign of 1848–49 as obliged him to leave the service, passed in this country for the engineers with the "highest "credit" (he received a cavalry cadetship, as no engineer appointments were available that season). In India he passed the interpreter's examination. This

Lieut.-Col. T. L. Haringtn.

24th Aug. 1858.

officer could never obtain staff employ; whereas another officer of the same corps, a man notorious for dishonest conduct in many pecuniary affairs, had never seen a shot fired—had not passed in the native languages, was, from interest, appointed adjutant to a corps of irregular cavalry. Commanding officers are seldom or ever asked the character or fitness of an officer for staff employ. The large increase of allowances is, of course, another great inducement for staff employ.

1400. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that all staff officers should be made supernumeraries in their regiments?—I would have a staff corps.

1401. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think a staff corps practicable?—That is the difficulty.

1402. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do not you think that they might have the means of exchanging back into their regiments if they chose?—I would not have that system.

1403. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that the present system leads an officer to be always looking out for staff employment instead of its leading him to take the interest which he otherwise would in his regiment as a regimental officer?—I am certain of it, it is the first thing which they think of when they come out.

1404. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that the regular native cavalry would have a greater *esprit de corps* and be more efficient if their dress was more assimilated to the native dress?—I have never heard any objection to the dress urged by the two regiments which I have served with, the 3rd and the 5th. For appearance sake, the natives certainly would look far better in their own dress. As to horsemen, I think they are superior to any that I have seen, either Europeans or the Hindoostanee horse; they are first-rate horsemen. Recruits are never wanting; the service is a favourite one.

1405. Do you think that the regular cavalry ride as well as the irregular?—Most certainly, and they manage their horses better. It is no uncommon thing to see a corps of irregulars, after a charge, spread over the parade like a flock of sheep, whilst the regular regiment pulls up in compact order.

1406. (*Colonel Burlton.*) The irregulars are never taught?—Now they are. I have seen half a dozen of them tumble off on a field day, and not one of our men has done so.

1407. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Do you see any objection to Mahomedans being enlisted into the cavalry?—Certainly not; the cavalry are, most of them, Mahomedans.

1408. I am talking of the regular cavalry?—Both in the regular and irregular the Mahomedans predominate.

1409. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the Bengal native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes; and if so, in what proportion?—I think that any man fit for a soldier should be enlisted.

1410. You would enlist them without any reference to caste?—Yes.

1411. Would you maintain the nationality in the shape of companies or regiments, or should the men be distributed promiscuously?—Some men, such as the Sikhs, will not serve in Bengal; and directly they cross the frontier they desert in great numbers. I think it is better to have them by regiments. There might be just a few regiments of that sort for men like the Sikhs and the Punjaub Mussulmans; but the rest, I think, should be as they are now, of all castes. I may observe that the Sikhs have an objection—a religious one—to cut hair or beard.

1412. (*Major-General Hancock.*) In Bengal they are exclusively of one or of two castes, Rajpoots and Brahmins, are they not?—Mahomedans, Rajpoots, and Chuttry (Brahmins) form the chief number.

1413. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In your regiment, namely, the 5th Regiment, of what nationality were the men composed?—About one-fourth Mussulmans and two-thirds Brahmins, of the fighting class, and the others a lower class.

1414. Do you think that we ought to have more low-class men?—No, I do not advocate having more low-class men at all.

1415. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Have you ever had them in any number in your regiment?—No. A carpenter enlisted in my regiment, and he formed a smart man, and became a drill havildar.

1416. Upon what do you ground your objection to low-caste men?—I do not think the natives themselves would like to associate with them.

1417. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You said that your regiment had not mutinied?—It has not.

1418. Where was it situated?—At Peshawur.

1419. Was it disarmed?—Yes.

1420. If it had not been disarmed, might it not probably have mutinied?—Yes, if it had been down the country, for the men were of the same caste, country, and feeling as the other corps of regular and irregular cavalry which mutinied and murdered their officers in the Doab, Oude, and other stations in the provinces.

1421. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you allow caste to interfere at all with the performance of duty?—No; I have never heard of its doing so. The men have swept up the dung of the horses and cleaned their horses themselves, and never once murmured.

1422. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) If your men were cooking and you wanted them to fall in abruptly, the enemy appearing in the neighbourhood, would they cook again that day?—They would throw away that food, but they would mount.

1423. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Would you consider a man an efficient soldier who threw away his meat in that way?—That is his own look-out; he is only hungry a little longer. They buy their own food and they cook it themselves; it is only a little flour which they make into chuppatties and bake over a wood fire; a little parched gram will satisfy them for days. After Chillianwallah, for three days, on account of heavy rain, they could not cook. The men of my corps took only parched gram and sweetmeats; I never heard a murmur of discontent.

1424. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) It is their ration?—Yes, and we never interfere with their food at all; they may eat or not as they like. Some live upon sweetmeats for days together.

1425. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Who supplies them?—They supply themselves.

1426. Is there no commissariat?—Yes; the regimental bazaars are supplied by the commissariat, and then they purchase from the regimental bazaars.

1427. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The difference between the regular soldier and the irregular consists in one furnishing everything himself and the other not. Does not that make a great difference in the commissariat arrangement?—On foreign service I should say it did not. There was an officer, an old friend of mine, Colonel Alexander, now dead, who commanded the 4th irregular cavalry in Lord Keane's army; they wanted to come upon the commissariat, and Lord Keane refused it to them upon the ground of their being an irregular corps, and they lost more than a fourth of their horses, because they could not supply themselves; this was at the commencement of the campaign, afterwards they were allowed to draw on the commissariat.

1428. So that is no saving of expense or trouble in an irregular regiment compared with a regular regiment on foreign service?—No; except that the irregulars are not supplied with tents and carriage (camels).

1429. But in their own territory they supply themselves?—Yes.

1430. In line in any advance or charge, do you think that an irregular regiment would have the same chance as a regular one?—No.

1431. To what would you ascribe that?—To European officers. I know of no instance, from the Cabul campaign of 1842 to that of the Punjab of 1849, of a regiment of irregular cavalry being opposed to or charging any body of enemy, horse or foot, of equal

strength or numbers. A squadron of the 1st irregular cavalry, during the last campaign, on camel graze guard, fell in and cut up a small body of Sikh horse, some 18 or 20 in number; other similar small affairs may have occurred, but nothing has been done by this branch to merit the high encomiums passed on it; a searching inquiry into the services of regulars and irregulars would prove this.

1432. (*Chairman.*) Then you attribute their efficiency in service to the European officers?—Yes; I think the officer is the soul of it.

1433. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And still you think five officers enough?—Yes, to manage them.

1434. Even on service?—They ought to have more on service, certainly.

1435. What number ought there to be on service?—I think if kept on the present footing it would be quite enough.

1436. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What number do you understand that to be?—Four cornets, eight lieutenants, seven captains (which is one too many), one major, and one lieutenant-colonel. I speak only of my own service, a regiment of 500 sabres.

1437. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Have you ever observed the effect of artillery on irregular cavalry in action?—Yes; only once.

1438. What is the effect?—The irregular regiment was on the left flank of my corps and was steady.

1439. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) For out-post duties and those kind of duties, I apprehend that the irregular cavalry is very valuable?—I do not object to the irregular cavalry at all, because I think they are very good men; but only keep them irregular cavalry, and do not follow the present system of rising higher and aping the dragoons, and making them wear expensive dresses. The dress of both officers and men should be fixed by regulation, and not allow the whims and fancies of commanding officers to make alterations; the style of dress, arms, and horse appointments should be in conformity to native and not European taste. The pay of the privates should be made up to 25 rupees a month, and the regimental banks abolished.

1440. In short you would have a certain proportion of real irregular cavalry?—Yes.

1441. And a certain proportion of native regular cavalry; would you increase the proportion of regular native cavalry, or would you diminish it?—I would propose having a squadron of regular cavalry to the European dragoons; as an entire regiment of regulars, I would do away with them. I would have three squadrons of European dragoons, and one squadron of natives.

1442. And you think that that admixture would not be objectionable?—I think not. I have heard the opinion of many other cavalry officers upon the same point, and they think that it would answer. At Peshawar last year, to the two troops of European "Peshawar Light Horse," Major-general Cotton attached a troop of my corps; these men lived in their own quarters, but took their share of duty on guard with the Europeans, and at field exercise were formed upon the flanks of the European squadrons, (the corps for exercise being divided into two squadrons). The system worked well.

1443. What advantage would there be in it?—In hot weather duties the natives would save much exposure to the Europeans.

1444. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Would not that be the case also with the native artillery?—No. I object to native artillery.

1445. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Supposing that system were adopted, and the Europeans had a really good Minie carbine or Enfield carbine, would you give the natives an inferior arm?—No; I would give them the same carbine, only lighter.

1446. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) What is the opinion of the people of the country respecting the regulars and the irregulars; do they consider that the irregulars plunder more than the others?—No.

1447. They supply themselves, do not they?—Yes; it is merely that they are permitted to wear their own country dress, and the horses being their own property.

1448. Have you not heard complaints of their plundering when they are upon service?—Yes, when they are by themselves they do plunder sometimes.

1449. (*Colonel Burlton.*) And so would the regulars, I suppose?—Yes; it is in the nature of natives to do so when they have the opportunity and away from European officers.

1450. They are the same men?—Yes; relatives and villagers serve in both services.

1451. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) If you say that you think the regular cavalry very valuable, why do you wish to do away with the regular regiments altogether?—I think that they are very expensive in horses and arms altogether, that the horses are too expensive for the men whom you put upon their backs. The irregular cavalry answer quite well enough for native cavalry; for six years the regular cost the state upwards of 200*l.* and the irregular 144*l.* Thus:

Cost of an irregular and regular trooper for six years.

Irregulars.			
20 rupees a month, including every charge to the state - - - - -	1,440	0	0
Regulars.			
Cost of horse (to last six years) -	600	0	0
Nett pay, at 9*r.* - - - -	648	0	0
Groom, 1. 5. 4, one for three horses	96	0	0
Grasscutter, 3. 8 - - - -	252	0	0
Gram, 4½ seers, at 30 seers the rupee -	328	0	0
Contract for shoeing; stable gear, &c., &c., 3*r.* - - - -	216	0	0
Saddle, cost of - - - -	30	0	0
	R.2,170	0	0

Clothing, arms, tents, pensions to syces (grooms), grasscutters, not included.

1452. Then it is a matter of economy?—Yes; I think that if the natives were properly dealt with they would be almost equal to dragoons in service, as they have hitherto proved themselves to be.

1453. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you of opinion that a squadron of native dragoons amalgamated with a regiment of British dragoons, and got into a right good milling match, would stick by the white faces?—Yes, I think they would; there has been a very good feeling indeed between the men. I really think that it would work well.

1454. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that any alteration should be made in the code under which the native army of Bengal is enlisted?—I certainly think so; that much more power should be given to officers commanding regiments; they have no power at all now; they can only reprimand a havildar serjeant once or twice, and the third time bring him to a court-martial.

1455. How would you enlist the men under the code; would you enlist them for general service, for instance?—Not for service beyond sea. I would call for volunteers for service beyond sea.

1456. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that a soldier is worth anything if he will not do anything or go anywhere that he is told?—Certainly a soldier should obey all orders, but a native of India has a great objection to the sea, and allowances should be made for this prejudice.

1457. Is not it the root and foundation of discipline and everything else, that a soldier does what he is ordered?—Certainly; in going to Affghanistan and all those places they have never objected to it at all.

1458. Should it be a question; should there ever be a doubt?—I think, as to beyond sea, there should be; they have a great antipathy to going beyond sea.

1459. (*Chairman.*) As it is to be for the future the Queen's army, do you not think that it ought to be

Lieut.-Col. T. L. Harington.

24th Aug. 1858.

liable to serve anywhere in the Queen's dominions?—I do not think that you would find them of any use beyond India and China. I think that is one of the reasons of the discontent.

1460. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) What are the objections to the sepoys serving beyond sea?—Their relatives and friends, the Hindoos, do not receive them well when they return.

1461. You think the objections insuperable?—Yes, I would certainly call for men to volunteer for foreign service beyond sea.

1462. (*Chairman.*) But you would make them all liable to serve in any portion of India?—Certainly, in Affghanistan, or anywhere within or beyond Her Majesty's Indian dominions when they have not to cross the sea.

1463. Without any additional allowance?—The present allowance is very handsome; if a man dies on foreign service the man's family gets a pension.

1464. You think the present allowances sufficient?—Yes, certainly.

1465. Do you think that any advantage would be derived from dividing the Bengal army?—No. I would not divide it.

1466. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that the State places itself under obligations to its army when it calls for volunteers to go on service beyond sea?—No; I think not as regards the natives of India.

1467. (*Chairman.*) Should you recommend any and what change in the system of promotion as regards the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?—That is a very difficult thing; there are many good men, but who cannot read or write; very worthy men, and who prove themselves good soldiers, but who perhaps are a little slovenly, or do not look well, and they have been passed over; and when a man is once passed over he hangs his head, and does not seem to care for anything afterwards. I have seen those very men who have been passed over afterwards promoted, and become very good non-commissioned officers.

1468. That is because the present system is by seniority?—Yes. With natives I do not think the non-commissioned officers exert the same authority over their men that European non-commissioned officers do.

1469. Does not that perhaps arise from that very circumstance?—No. I think caste has something to do with it. I knew a native officer who happened to be a bunya, that is to say, a caste of men who sell grain; he was threatened with the licking of the shoe as soon as he went out of the cantonment to his own house.

1470. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What did the commanding officer do?—The native officer was afraid to report it, because the man who threatened him was a Brahmin.

1471. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And yet you do not object to having Brahmins in your regiment?—No, because they are good soldiers.

1472. Does not it strike at the root of all discipline that because a man who threatens a native officer happens to be a Brahmin or a man of high caste he is not reported?—True; but duty is still carried on and has been so for years in the native army.

1473. How are you sure that those men will do duty?—Because they always have done so; they will not object to do anything.

1474. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Is a man always passed over in promotion in the Bengal army if he happens to be of that caste which you have mentioned?—No; I would not myself recommend selection, because I think it is open to abuse. Some young men of the sepoys get the length of the commanding officer's foot and obtain promotion, and that is the system which is adopted in the irregulars, that young men are promoted.

1475. Do you think that abuse would be the rule and not the exception?—I think so.

1476. (*Chairman.*) Under the present system, what is the age at which the natives become officers?—Forty or forty-five.

1477. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) What do you think was the cause of the revolution among the sepoys?—It was caused I think by many things. The annexation of Oude was perhaps one cause. Then there was the withdrawal of pensions from many widows and others, the reason given in general orders that such and such person had been proved to be the aunt, sister, or some other relation not entitled to pension, the evidence given by informers might or might not have been true, for natives think nothing of giving false evidence. The witnesses who had given evidence before the Pension Committees had their pensions forfeited. The government were not to blame for this.

1478. Did religion form no part of the revolution, in your opinion?—Ill affected men towards the British rule may and I believe did stir up the sepoys, by the plea that their religion was to be interfered with by government; we never interfered with them. They always had their native holidays.

1479. We are speaking generally?—I never saw any interference with their religion, either regimentally or in any other way. The sepoys were treated in the most liberal manner; tents were lent to them and gunpowder given for their festivals; the government has ever shown the greatest consideration for the religious feelings of the sepoys.

1480. (*Viscount Melville.*) In what way did the annexation of Oude cause the revolution among the sepoys?—It deprived them of the great advantages which they before had. Formerly if a man had any complaint to make in Oude, that man's complaint was forwarded by the commanding officer to the resident at Lucknow, who made it over to the Prime Minister, and it was immediately listened to, free of all law charges, &c. When Oude was annexed, it became as other British provinces, governed by regulations, and the men had to appoint attorneys, petition on stamped paper, &c., and their plaints filed and settled in due course, which took months. The soldiers had no advantage over the other natives; this was not injustice.

1481. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Upon the question of religion, were the natives impressed with the idea that we desired to make them Christians?—I never heard a man hint such a thing.

1482. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not think that the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the Bengal army would have been much more efficient had they been appointed by selection?—I do not think that they would have given more information to their officers of what was occurring in the ranks; certainly not.

1483. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What is the particular duty of a native officer; is not it his duty to report everything that happens in the ranks to the European officer?—Yes.

1484. Do you think they did that?—No.

1485. Why not?—Because there was a clanship amongst them; they preferred adhering to their own countrymen to informing against them to foreigners, as they consider that we are.

1486. Has that irregularity crept in in modern times, or has it existed from all time during the whole of your experience?—I think that it has been so in all times. Officers had other sources of information in former days which they have not now.

1487. Do you not think that the special duty of the native officer ought to be to give that information?—Certainly.

1488. Do you know of any regulation which could be introduced into the army which would render that a duty?—Nothing, except dismissal; to dismiss the man at once, if he did not give that information.

1489. (*Colonel Burlton.*) I believe there have been a great many native officers on the late occasion brought to a court-martial for not giving information?—Yes; I have heard so.

1490. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You partially heard the evidence of Sir George Clerk?—Yes.

1491. Did you hear him say that there was not sufficient communication between the European and the native officers?—Yes.

1492. Is that your opinion?—Not in the cavalry. The European and native officers walk up and down twice a day at stable duty, and converse freely.

1493. You think that it would be an advantage that there should be a good deal more intercourse?—Yes.

1494. Should you think that there has been less of it in the army in India than there ought to have been?—Yes.

1495. (*Chairman.*) With regard to promotion, your general opinion is in favour of seniority?—Yes, provided the man is fit for it.

1496. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have the powers of the commanding officer been very much trenched upon lately?—Certainly; he has no power whatever.

1497. Since when has that been the case?—Since Lord William Bentinck's time; he commenced it.

1498. That is not according to regulation, but by circulars?—By circulars.

1499. Then you think that if the regulation was strictly carried out it would not be the case?—The circular is now introduced as a regulation of the army.

1500. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What are the powers which the commanding officer of a regiment in Bengal possesses to reward?—None.

1501. What powers do you think that he ought to possess?—There are no powers of reward to give him. I do not know what reward he might give a man.

1502. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think it a reward to promote privates to naiks and havildars?—Yes; that is, if you adopt selection.

1503. But you would not have that?—No, not as a rule.

1504. (*Major-General Hancock.*) In fact your rule deprives officers commanding regiments of the only power of reward which they could possess?—Yes, as far as regards promotion certainly. That might be objectionable.

1505. (*Viscount Melville.*) How are the men selected for promotion to naiks and havildars?—The senior man, if he can write and is a well-conducted man, and there is nothing against his character, is promoted.

1506. The privates do not go by seniority, do they?—Yes; they take seniority on the roll.

1507. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What is the average age of a man when he is promoted?—I am sorry to say that he generally fulfils twenty years' service before he becomes a non-commissioned officer.

1508. What age is he when he becomes an officer?—fifty-five or sixty.

1509. Surely a man of that age is not fit for an officer?—He ought to be removed and put into a veteran battalion.

1510. (*Chairman.*) Is not that a sufficient objection to the system?—I think it a very unfair thing for a man who has behaved well to be passed over.

1511. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that a man of fifty-five is as fit as a younger man?—No.

1512. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Have commanding officers of regiments in Bengal been left free to exercise the powers vested in them by the articles of war in carrying out corporal punishment?—No; that has all been stopped by circular.

1513. How long ago?—About three years ago; we are not allowed to punish the men except for theft and other disgraceful conduct.

1514. (*Chairman.*) Are these circulars addressed to regiments or merely to commanding officers?—They are written confidentially, but they are just like a general order.

1515. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Have you seen the circular?—Yes.

1516. Was it issued under the authority of the Government?—No; from the Commander-in-chief.

1517. Have officers commanding regiments in Bengal been left free to exercise the powers vested in them by the articles of war as regards punishments for slight offences?—There is no punishment at all except ten or fifteen days' drill. Confinement in quarter guard and such light punishment.

1518. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) I understand that it is considered that the native officers ought to keep the European officers acquainted with the feelings of the sepoys in their regiments?—Yes, they ought to do so.

1519. Upon the late occasion in the Bengal army that seems to have failed; does it occur to you that there is any other means of keeping up that communication which is so desirable between the native sepoys and European officers?—No; except you have spies. The native officers fail in their duty, and they ought to be punished by dismissal if they are found out.

1520. In what way have native officers failed in their duty?—It was an understood thing that this was a well-concerted mutiny, and not a single native officer of the corps which I commanded, either commissioned or non-commissioned, ever came to me, or hinted or gave information upon the subject.

1521. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Was there a single instance throughout the army of a native officer doing so?—I do not know; not at Peshawur, I know.

1522. Did they not all join in the revolt?—Yes.

1523. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Is there no means of getting the information?—On other occasions when a man has behaved disorderly in the ranks the native officer has come forward. In my own regiment, I know as a fact, that on the late occasion not a single native commissioned or non-commissioned officer or sepoy ever came to me and told me of this revolt. They have from first to last denied it; they said that it was not premeditated, and that they knew nothing about it.

1524. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Having this serious mutiny before our eyes, and legislating for the future, do you think that we should be justified in leaving matters exactly as they were before, and that we should leave the native officers exactly in the same position to do harm as they have done?—Certainly not. I would not have native officers in the regular regiments; they are, I think, the very bane of the army. I would have no man above a havildar, a serjeant.

1525. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Do you not think that it is an object that the havildars should have something to look to superior to their rank in the way of pension when they are are too old for service?—No; I think the pension established is ample for them. You can appoint them to one of the police or veteran battalions as native officers, to be promoted from the line and transferred to these corps.

1526. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In that state of things where would be the line of communication which is so necessary as you admit, and as we all think?—The havildar should be lowered to the ranks again if he did not give the information.

1527. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Then would they not fail just in the same way?—I think not; they are more dependent upon their own men. As non-commissioned officers, they could be reduced to the ranks, flogged, or imprisoned for gross neglect of duty. The commissioned officer could only be dismissed the service.

1528. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that a European non-commissioned officer, a serjeant and corporal, should be attached to every troop?—No, I think not. I do not think it advisable at all; it would be of no use.

1529. There are two non-commissioned officers in a regiment?—Yes, two European non-commissioned, staff serjeant-major and quartermaster serjeant, and that is enough.

Lieut.-Col. T. L. Harington.

24th Aug. 1858.

1530. (*Chairman.*) I understand you to say that individual misconduct the native officers have reported ?—Yes.

1531. But for general mutiny they have not ?—No. They gave no information on the late general mutiny.

1532. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) As commanding a regiment, what is your ultimate power short of a court-martial to punish a serjeant who has misbehaved himself ?—A reprimand to the serjeant. I should recommend dismissal and flogging.

1533. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Is flogging a native punishment ?—I believe so ; both native officers and non-commissioned officers have often expressed their opinion, that flogging should be allowed, stating that so and so, naming some bad characters in the corps, well deserved a beating.

1534. Are you not aware that it has been from time immemorial the great punishment of India ?—No ; I think putting to death is the great punishment.

1535. Are you not aware that flogging is one of the most refined things in India. That when a person has committed a crime equal to murder, he is flogged on his bare back. That if he committed a crime less than that in former days, cloth used to be put between, and that the thickness of the cloth was increased according to the smallness of the crime ?—That may be a fact, but I never heard of it. I know that in all the gaols they flog well. I think there should be flogging, and subsequent dismissal if that is not sufficient.

1536. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are you aware that there has been a practice introduced, not by regulation, of allowing men if they have a grievance, to go direct with petitions to the commander-in-chief, and that their petitions have been listened to, even if they have not gone through the proper channel, namely, the commanding officer of their troop and regiment ?—I know that it has been done.

1537. Do you consider that very detrimental to discipline ?—Of course it is.

1538. Has it been done to any extent, do you think ?—Never with me.

1539. Is there any circular on that subject ?—No.

1540. (*Chairman.*) Can you tell what were the former powers of commanding officers ?—When I first entered the service I saw a man dismounted on parade, and a good flogging given him, if he did not trot his horse, and men could be turned out of the regiment if found unfit. Now every difficulty is thrown in the way of getting rid of bad characters.

1541. Corporal punishment could then be inflicted without a court-martial ?—Yes. The man was dismounted, and a trumpeter called from the ranks, who laid on with a cane a dozen or so cuts, and it had the very best effect.

1542. What admixture of European and native forces would you recommend ; should it be regimentally or by brigade ?—As far as the cavalry is concerned regimentally, but as far as regards the infantry by brigade.

1543. (*Viscount Melville.*) Why would you make a difference ?—I cannot well say why there should be a difference. In the cavalry I think it would act better. I do not know that it would in the infantry, it might be tried. I have not paid that attention to the infantry branch of the service that I have to the cavalry. I think that a native squadron attached to the dragoons would be efficient, and take off a good deal of the hot weather duty from the Europeans, and I know that they work well together.

The witness withdrew.

Major W. L. Merewether.

Major WILLIAM L. MEREWETHER examined.

1544. (*Chairman.*) What rank do you hold in the Indian army ?—Brevet major.

1545. How long have you been in the service ?—Seventeen and a half years.

1546. How many years of that period have you been in India ?—All the time till the last three months.

1547. In what presidency have you served ?—In Bombay.

1548. In what arm of the service ?—First of all in the 21st regiment of native infantry, and afterwards entirely with the Scinde horse, fifteen and a half years with the Scinde horse, and two years with the 21st native infantry.

1549. Of course you have had opportunities of seeing the European and native troops act together ?—Yes.

1550. Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion which the Europeans should bear to the native force in the Bengal presidency ?—I think that question cannot be answered proportionally for this reason, that the number of Europeans must be decided according to the locality, according to the climate where they can be best placed, and according to the purposes for which they may be required. For instance, in the Punjaub and the north-western provinces there will always be more Europeans required than in any other part of India.

1551. The question refers to the Bengal presidency alone ?—Yes ; but I suppose that the Punjaub is included in that question, therefore I mention it now. The north-western provinces, the Punjaub, and Lower Scinde are especially adapted for locating European troops ; the stations are healthy, you can place them in spots where the loss of Europeans will be very small indeed, and yet they can be readily moved to wherever they are required. Therefore I do not think that you can say proportionally, with regard to Bengal, what the number should be.

1552. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Still, speaking generally, taking into account the localities, taking into account that the Punjaub is healthier than other parts, and that there would be a greater proportion of Europeans to natives there, and that Bengal Proper is unhealthy, what would you say the amount of force should be in the whole of the Bengal presidency ?—For Bengal I should say that 12,000 Europeans would be ample. For the Punjaub and the north-western provinces, including Scinde, which I should propose joining to the Punjaub, you would require 20,000, that would be 32,000 for those two presidencies. I propose afterwards making two presidencies of them.

1553. (*Chairman.*) What number of native troops would you recommend ?—With regard to the native troops the presidency would be divided again, and I would propose the number of native troops to be equal to what the Bengal army and the Bombay army are now together, divided into three equal parts, one part for Bombay, one part for Scinde and the Punjaub, and the other part for Bengal.

1554. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then if I understand you rightly the proportion of natives to Europeans upon your calculation would be a greater proportion of natives to Europeans than has existed before the outbreak ?—No, it would be the same, I think.

1555. If you had only 12,000 Europeans for Bengal and 20,000 for the Punjaub, and you divided the three armies equally, I think the proportion of Europeans would be rather less than it had been before ?—It would in Bengal, certainly.

1556. Is it your opinion that that should be so, after what has occurred ?—Yes. I do not think the proportion is less than it has been, but about the same. My opinion is that we must have a native army, and a good native army, one in which we can place implicit confidence. We do not require, therefore, the European troops to overawe the native army ; if we require that, I consider that our hold in India is gone ; that

is the essence of my opinion. For that reason I do not consider that any great increase to the European army is essential for permanent maintenance in India.

1557. (*Chairman.*) I understand you to say that you do not consider a European army necessary at all to keep the native army in subjection?—No; but merely for supervision. I entirely think so.

1558. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You think that no increase is required for that purpose?—That is my opinion.

1559. (*Chairman.*) Would you have the European army kept merely as an example to show the natives superiority of discipline?—That is certainly one of the principal reasons; and also to work with them whenever service requires; we know that the European troops are necessary for that.

1560. The native army I take for granted you would have officered by European officers?—Certainly, that is to say, in the principal positions in the army, but not in such large numbers as hitherto. This will be shown hereafter.

1561. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Are you of opinion that the revolt of last year could have proceeded to the great lengths to which it did if there had been double the number of Europeans in the Bengal presidency at the time that it broke out?—I think not, certainly.

1562. Does not that rather go against your opinion that you do not require Europeans to keep the natives down?—No; I think not, because my opinion is that we must treat our native army upon a different principle, not by force; that a moral power must be substituted. By an increase and continued use of physical power we shall do more harm than good.

1563. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) An increase of physical power as to what—as to the dominion of India?—Yes; and using physical force to overcome the natives in place of a better application of moral power.

1564. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In what way has the physical power been used hitherto; where have there been any symptoms of physical power being used?—It is being used at this moment in India.

1565. But before the outbreak?—Not before it, certainly; nor was moral power properly. It was the neglect of the proper use of moral power that rendered the application of physical force necessary.

1566. I thought you said that it had an effect in making the army mutiny?—No; I did not mean to say that. What I said was with regard to the future treatment of the army, that if you increased the number of Europeans it would be applying physical power and not moral power; that to prevent a similar outbreak we must improve our system.

1567. (*Chairman.*) In what way would you improve the system?—By making the native army really an army of soldiers; by giving the officers who have command in that army increased powers, so that the men may look up to them as their benefactors and their leaders in everything; and by the changes which are necessary to carry out that policy.

1568. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What changes would be necessary to carry out that policy?—They will all come, I think, in reply to the questions which have been furnished to me.

1569. (*Colonel Burlton.*) It appears from your former answer that the want of European soldiers, in other words, the absence of sufficient physical force, led to a considerable extension of this outbreak which might not otherwise have occurred?—Yes; it enabled the natives to do what they did, but surely was not the cause of the outbreak.

1570. Still you say that although the absence of physical power led to the extension of the horrors which we have witnessed, you would not have that physical power hereafter?—I am speaking now (and I suppose the question refers to it) of the state of affairs after the rebellion has been suppressed; I say that to prevent a similar outbreak we should not use physical power, but have a better system. We have suppressed this outbreak; but to prevent our next army falling into a similar state, we should have a different system from that which has been hitherto adopted; it should be controlled morally, and not by physical force.

1571. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) The question which I asked you a little while ago had not allusion to the occupation of India by European soldiers for the purpose of overawing the native army. Our object is to frame the future organization of the Indian army for the possession of the country of India, without reference to whites or blacks at all?—For the whole of India, my opinion is that 50,000 European troops are sufficient.

1572. (*Viscount Melville.*) Does that include artillery?—No; there should be a proportion of artillery with that, but it includes cavalry and infantry.

1573. (*Major-General Hancock.*) That is after the restoration of tranquillity, of course?—Yes; but the difficulty in the question is with respect to the Bengal presidency, determining the proportion for the Bengal presidency. I can speak more clearly of all India than I can with regard merely to that particular locality.

1574. (*Chairman.*) Do you agree with Sir James Outram that it is impossible to take into consideration the Bengal army in relation to that question without taking into consideration the whole of the Indian empire?—Quite so; it is an imperial question, not a local one, I think.

1575. Do you consider that the native force in the Bengal presidency should be on the regular or the irregular system, or both combined?—The irregular as it is called now, but with as much regularity as in the best disciplined regiment in Her Majesty's service. I am speaking of both infantry and cavalry.

1576. (*Viscount Melville.*) With the view of elucidating that question, will you be so good as to state the system of organization which prevails in the Scinde horse?—I shall be most happy to do so. There are at present three regiments of Scinde horse, and there are four European officers to each regiment; the commanding officer, the second in command, the adjutant, and assistant-surgeon. That is the only European element with the regiment. The regiments are each 800 strong; these are divided into four squadrons and troops as usual; each troop is commanded by a native officer.

1577. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What do you call him?—A russuldar or russaidar. The principle of the system is, that the commanding officer is a person who teaches the soldiers to look up to him for everything; he has his second in command and his adjutant to assist him in the interior economy of the regiment. With regard to the native officers he makes them feel, first, that they hold important positions, and next that they are strictly responsible to him for the due performance of all duty, and that any neglect of that duty will meet with immediate punishment through his means. Under those circumstances you have a good regiment, a well disciplined regiment, and men who are thoroughly attached to the service, because they find that when they do their duty they are highly honoured, and when they neglect it they are immediately punished.

1578. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) What is the immediate punishment to which you allude?—I do not think that the power is sufficient at present, but the punishment to commissioned native officers as it is conveyed now is a representation made to head-quarters to the commander-in-chief in Bombay, which is almost immediately listened to. The knowledge of this exists, and it is known that it is a certainty. The commanding officer reports the case to head-quarters, and the man is summarily dismissed the service.

1579. (*Chairman.*) On what system is the promotion of native officers in these regiments carried on?—Entirely by selection and merit.

1580. Not by seniority?—No.

1581. Who has the power of selection?—It has been allowed to General Jacob, and to me after him,

Major W. L. Merewether.

24th Aug. 1858.

in commanding the Scinde horse; but I believe it is an exception to the general rule.

1582. The power is given to the commanding officers?—Yes.

1583. I am speaking of the promotion of the native officers?—The promotion is by merit exclusively; they are selected by the commanding officer.

1584. Therefore it would appear that the commanding officers of those irregular regiments have much more power than those of the regular regiments?—Yes.

1585. (*Colonel Burlton.*) They only recommend, do they?—They select the officers, and recommend them to the commander-in-chief, who confirms the recommendation.

1586. (*Major-General Hancock.*) As regards promotion from the ranks, and all the way up, the non-commissioned grade, the officer commanding the Scinde horse has it all in his own hands?—Yes.

1587. He is never interfered with by the commander-in-chief, or by any authority?—Never.

1588. As regards the native commissioned rank, what is the system in the Scinde horse?—The commanding officer selects the man whom he thinks best qualified; he sends the name up with a recommendation through the adjutant-general to the commander-in-chief, and that recommendation is invariably listened to.

1589. (*Chairman.*) That is not with regard to seniority, but entirely by selection?—By selection. With the promotions from the senior non-commissioned rank to the commissioned rank, there never has been any interference; the recommendation has been invariably attended to.

1590. How are these native officers originally appointed? is it by promotion from the non-commissioned ranks?—They are promoted from the non-commissioned ranks for merit. When a promotion takes place the senior non-commissioned ranks are examined as to their efficiency; these, called kote duffadars in the Scinde horse, answer to the troop sergeants in a regiment of cavalry; these men are examined both on parade and as to their general character by the commanding officer, and one amongst them is selected to fill the vacancy. Should there be be more meritorious men in the next grade, among the duffadars (serjeants) they are also taken out to compete; the best is selected.

1591. Then it is necessary to rise through the ranks before a person can become a native commissioned officer?—Certainly, from the lowest grade in the ranks.

1592. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In no instance in the Scinde horse have you made a native officer who has not passed through the ranks?—Never.

1593. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Then all the gentlemen pass through the ranks?—Yes. We have several sons of native officers of the old school, who entered in the lowest rank.

1594. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What is the result of that; do you get the gentry of the country to pass through the ranks in order to become native officers or not?—We have some few; there are not so many now as formerly, for the same reason Sir George Clerk mentioned, namely, the smallness of the pay.

1595. (*Chairman.*) Would it, in your opinion, be possible to get a superior rank of native officers if they were promoted directly without going through the ranks?—I do not think it advisable, excepting in very particular cases.

1596. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you aware that in the Bengal presidency irregular corps of horse are formed by the gentlemen of the country riding into the camp with thirty tolerably well-conducted men and offering their services?—Yes; I do not approve of it; I entirely object to it; it is totally against all proper system and discipline.

1597. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How were the Scinde horse originally formed?—They were originally formed from a squadron of the Poonah horse doing duty in Kutch, at Bhooj. On the advance into Affghanistan it was necessary to form a regiment of irregular cavalry in Scinde; that squadron was handed over as a nucleus; on that the regiment was formed.

1598. Did they come in by masses brought by an individual, a superior man, or did you enlist them as you would ordinarily?—Individuals were sent to all parts of the country, and the men were enlisted in the same way as you would enlist troops in England; no person brought in large bodies.

1599. (*Chairman.*) Are they upon the same system as the other irregular cavalry, finding their own horses and provisions?—Yes, that is the system; the soldier receives a certain sum of money from the State, and receiving that sum of money he supplies himself with horse, arms, accoutrements, and everything, and is prepared to go to any part of the world at that rate of pay.

1600. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What is his rate of pay?—Thirty rupees a month.

1601. Five rupees more than the Bengal pay?—Ten rupees. I think Sir George Clerk made a mistake in that respect; the Bengal pay is 20 rupees. When they went to Scinde they were given 7 rupees extra, making 27 rupees, foreign service batta, as it was called. When they were serving with us at Peshawur, Lord Melville was commanding there, they were increased to the same rate as ourselves, namely 30 rupees; but when they went back to the provinces they went back to the 20 rupees.

1602. (*Chairman.*) Have you found any hesitation in them as to exposing their horses to be killed?—Never since I served with them, and I have been in considerable service with the Scinde horse.

1603. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Did you ever charge any of the enemy with them?—250 of the Scinde horse charged, broke, and dispersed about 4,000 of the flower of the Affghan cavalry at the battle of Goojerat.

1604. And you have had them under the fire of artillery, have you?—Yes; as Lord Melville witnessed at Mooltan and at Goojerat. At the battle of Meeanee the Scinde horse were drawn up and exposed for some time to a heavy artillery fire, while the army was being formed up behind them.

1605. (*Viscount Melville.*) Will you state the mode in which the Scinde horse are armed?—The principle of the system, as I said before, is that the Government pays a certain sum to each soldier; with that sum originally they were allowed to supply any kind of arms they pleased; they got bad swords, bad matchlocks, and bad spears. General Jacob, when he joined the Scinde horse, determined to improve this system. I must mention that the discipline in those days was nothing; he insisted upon discipline being maintained. After he had got that effected, he proposed to arm them in the most efficient way that he could, and for that purpose he wrote to England, and obtained what were then supposed to be the best style of carbines, and afterwards the best swords that could be made. These are paid for entirely by the men; the arms are got out to India, and during the time that they are being made and sent to India a monthly stoppage is taken from each of the sowars which they agree to pay, and by the time the arms arrive in the country, or shortly afterwards, a sum of money is ready to pay for them. These arms were at first single-barrelled carbines, but we found that the effect of the carbine would be doubled if the barrel was doubled; so the single-barrelled carbines were done away with and double-barrelled carbines were got out, and three regiments, each 800 strong, are now armed with a double-barrelled carbine, and a very good curved sabre made by a firm at Birmingham.

1606. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And you see no reason why the whole of the Bengal irregular cavalry should not be organized and armed in the same mode?—I see no reason whatever.

1607. (*Viscount Melville.*) Did not the men gladly exchange the native sword for the European one when it was first sent out?—Very gladly indeed, and they are as proud of it now as if they had made it themselves; it is the same as the old dragoon sabre used to be,—the curved dragoon sabre, and they delight in it.

1608. But it is worn in a wooden scabbard covered with leather, and not in a steel scabbard?—Yes. The edge is thus kept from being blunted.

1609. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Did you ever see any execution done with that carbine for which they have so nobly subscribed?—Yes. I was once engaged where my party consisted of 132 men and the enemy were 700; they resisted stoutly and would not surrender for some time; the single-barrelled carbines were used freely amongst them.

1610. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And with good effect?—Yes; only 120 at last surrendered out of the 700. The remainder, with the exception of a few mounted who escaped, were all killed. This success was mainly due to the efficiency of the arms.

1611. (*Chairman.*) It has been stated by one or two witnesses that the natives are much more afraid of the lance than of the sword; do you find that to be the case?—No, I think not. I think the lance a useless weapon in war.

1612. (*Viscount Melville.*) The natives gladly took the sword instead of the lance?—Gladly.

1613. (*Chairman.*) For what length of time are these irregular troops enlisted?—No particular time; it is pending the pleasure of the commanding officer.

1614. (*Major-General Hancock.*) It is unlimited service?—Yes.

1615. (*Chairman.*) They are regularly enlisted?—Yes. The plan of the enlistment of the Scinde horse is this: there is always a body of expectants, as we call them, who are present at head quarters; a vacancy occurs, and these men are brought up before the commanding officer, the commanding officer personally examines them, to see that they have got good thews and sinews. Having approved of a man so far, it is then to be shown whether he has the other requisites for a soldier, namely, pluck and the capability of sitting on the outside of a horse. He is mounted bare-backed on a horse and made to ride with others over a course in which there are several sharp turnings. If he goes boldly round at a gallop, shows no hesitation, and turns the corners without falling off, he is then taken as a recruit.

1616. On what terms is he taken as a recruit?—On his being thus approved of by the commanding officer he is brought back to the orderly room, where a declaration is read out to him (a copy of which I have by me, which I shall be very happy to furnish to the Commissioners,) to this effect, that he has that day been received into the service of the Government; that he enters the regiment binding himself to obey all orders given to him, to agree to every arrangement which is made for the benefit of the regiment by the commanding officer, and to pay all stoppages regularly out of his monthly pay, which are arranged by the commanding officer; and that should he, after a number of years' service, misbehave and be dismissed the service for disgraceful conduct, he will forfeit all these stoppages.

1617. Is this period of enlistment for life?—It is unlimited.

1618. Are there many desertions amongst the cavalry?—The only cases of desertion in the Scinde horse have been where men have committed crimes and fled to save themselves the punishment of their crimes. These were two cases of murder.

1619. (*Major-General Hancock.*) They are enlisted to go wheresoever ordered?—Yes.

1620. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) They went to Persia?—Yes.

1621. Was there any hesitation about it?—No; none in the least. The regiment cheerfully endured the greatest discomfort. They were kept for weeks on board ship, dodging between Bushire and the Euphrates. Instead of returning to Scinde as first ordered, they were sent to the Deccan, and afterwards directed to march back to Scinde through the disturbed districts, viâ Malligaum, Mhow, Neemuch, and Nusseerabad to Roree on the Indus. They were present at the taking of Awah, and one squadron was at Kotah. The distance marched by the regiment was upwards of 1,100 miles.

1622. You think that all soldiers ought to be enlisted for general service?—Yes; no volunteering as it existed in the Bengal army should be allowed for a moment.

1623. (*Chairman.*) How are the re-mounts provided for in the irregular cavalry?—The men supply them. There is also an arrangement which has been approved of throughout the whole army, that of establishing a regimental fund; each man subscribes to it, and in the event of a horse dying he receives a certain sum of money from the fund, according to his subscription to it, towards replacing it. With us it is 100 rupees, which the man receives towards replacing the horse if it dies. He is then made to replace it himself. The commanding officer does not interfere in any respect whatever, except when the horse is brought before him to approve of it or not. The man goes with his money into the market, he buys a horse, he brings it up before the commanding officer; the commanding officer examines it critically, if it is fit for the service it is passed; a brand is then put on the horse, and it is admitted into the ranks.

1624. Then the commanding officer has the power of insisting upon each man being efficiently armed, and having a proper horse?—Decidedly so; and if he is not fit for the corps, the sooner he is out of the service the better.

1625. (*Major-General Hancock.*) About what is the average price paid for a horse?—Formerly it was 175 rupees, latterly it has been higher; it went up to 300 last year, owing to the great demand for horses.

1626. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that the irregulars are mounted equally, or better, or worse than the regulars?—In an inferior manner to the regulars, for the reason that they cannot afford to buy the horses.

1627. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think that the amount of compensation allowed by the Government is sufficient on a fair average of cases in the Scinde horse?—Yes, I think it is quite sufficient as it stands at present; but I would propose that the pay of the irregular cavalry of India should altogether be raised. Compensation might then be done away with.

1628. With a view to enable them to buy better horses?—Yes, and we should get a better class of men.

1629. Then, of course, if they were to buy better horses, you would raise the Government amount of compensation?—Yes. But it would be better to do away with it altogether, and to consider the increased pay as covering everything.

1630. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You could force the men to buy better horses if a larger allowance were made?—Yes.

1631. (*Viscount Melville.*) Is it within your knowledge that in 1847 I recommended an increase of pay for the Scinde horse, in order to enable them to be better horsed, and that the Government refused it?—Yes; and not only was that the case, but when the second regiment of Scinde horse was being raised in 1844, there was a very severe struggle on the part of General Jacob to get the 30 rupees' pay for the Scinde horse. There was a habit in those days of saying that everything was to be assimilated to Bengal, and they said that because a Bengal regiment was stated to be very good at 20 rupees a month, it must be put up with. General Jacob said that he considered 20 rupees not enough, and Lord Hardinge, the Governor General, was kind enough at last to agree that General Jacob was right.

Major W. L. Merewether.

24th Aug. 1858.

1632. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have you been at all mixed up with the regular cavalry of Bombay in your service?—Yes; I have been with all three regiments.

1633. The Bombay cavalry, I believe, behaved well?—Yes, particularly the 3rd cavalry last year in Persia.

1634. Do you think that there should be a proportion of regular to irregular?—No; I think the regular cavalry are comparatively useless, there is so much trouble in moving them; the necessity of a commissariat makes it difficult. They are very expensive, costing per man about 82 rupees a month.

1635. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Could you procure a better class of horse in Bombay than the one that you have at present, if you had a larger allowance?—Very much better.

1636. From what part of the country?—From the Persian Gulf. If they increased our irregular pay we would mount ourselves on the same horses as the Bombay regular cavalry are now mounted on, which are the best in the world.

1637. (*Viscount Melville.*) I believe that such a thing as a court-martial in the Scinde horse has never been known from the day when it was first raised to the present hour?—Our system is by what they call a regimental punchayet. Five native officers are assembled by the commanding officer to try all prisoners. In all my experience I have very seldom known those decisions either to be unjust or to have to be reversed. The regiment was raised in 1839; up to the present moment that has always been the system. The only two occasions on which it was diverged from, I think, occurred after your lordship left. There were two men tried for murder by court-martial of the officers of the regiment, by order of the Commander-in-chief.

1638. Has the commandant of the Scinde horse the power of dismissing a man for misconduct?—He has.

1639. Without reference to the Government?—Without reference to the Government.

1640. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How comes he to have that power when it is not used in the rest of the army; it is not the case in any other regiment, regular or irregular?—No, it is not; but the reason of it was the perfect confidence of the Commander-in-chief in General Jacob, and the perfect confidence that the means which he used for maintaining his regiments in such perfect efficiency must be right.

1641. In fact the Scinde horse is an exceptional regiment in that respect?—Yes.

1642. And in favour of a very intelligent and distinguished officer?—Yes. It is a principle which I would advocate for the whole army, that the commanding officer should have that power. The Scinde horse were placed under the articles of war some years ago; they gave commissions to the native officers, and of course when they took commissions they were amenable to the articles of war.

1643. (*Chairman.*) How are the members of the punchayet courts selected; by the commanding officer?—There is a regular roster, in the same way as you select a court-martial in the army.

1644. What do they consist of?—Always commissioned officers.

1645. Then it is in fact a court-martial, only under another name?—Yes; a regimental court-martial, but it is styled there a punchayet, and it is guided by the rules of common sense.

1646. What sentence have they the power of inflicting?—They merely record their finding, and recommend the sentence to the commanding officer.

1647. Does it go to the extent of corporal punishment?—No, that has never been given to them, that is always reserved to the commanding officer.

1648. How is corporal punishment administered; is it without any court-martial at all?—For disgraceful crimes the commanding officer takes upon himself to order the administration of corporal punishment; it would only be given for disgraceful crimes, and after dismissal from the regiment.

1649. (*Major-General Hancock.*) That is under the civil regulations as a magistrate?—It has been done on the parade ground when the man has been dismissed.

1650. No such power is vested in the officer commanding the Scinde horse by the Government or by the Commander-in-chief?—No.

1651. (*Viscount Melville.*) At the time when the Scinde horse were in Persia, or a portion of them, was there not a Bengal regiment stationed at Jacobabad?—Yes.

1652. What was its strength?—About 500 altogether.

1653. And I think it mutinied?—No, it did not; it has just returned to the Punjaub.

1654. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Was that a regular or an irregular regiment?—Irregular; the 6th Bengal Irregular Cavalry.

1655. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What are the punishments usually inflicted in the Scinde horse for minor breaches of discipline?—Punishment drill is the usual punishment given.

1656. Simply ordinary drill?—Ordinary drill and confinement in the quarter-guard during that time.

1657. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is there no imprisonment?—If a man was considered worthy of undergoing any imprisonment, he was regarded as unfit for the service, and was dismissed the service.

1658. (*Viscount Melville.*) What was the way in which the regiment was generally recruited, and in what localities?—The greater portion of the regiment comes from the immediate neighbourhood of Delhi, the very hotbed of the rebellion.

1659. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Did it affect those men at all?—Not the slightest.

1660. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) In fact you seem to think that discipline is the secret of an army being kept in order, whether it is native or European?—Most undoubtedly.

1661. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Is corporal punishment frequently had recourse to in the Scinde horse?—Very seldom indeed.

1662. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you conceive that in an army which is in good discipline mutiny is less likely than where the discipline is not good?—I should say that it was an impossibility.

1663. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) The European officers would be informed in a regiment with good discipline of everything which was taking place in the ranks?—Most certainly.

1664. (*Major-General Hancock.*) All the officers in the Scinde horse are selected officers, are they not?—Yes.

1665. During the time that General Jacob has held command, has he not been allowed to select his own officers?—Always.

1666. (*Colonel Burlton.*) What particular difference do you point out with regard to the organization and the discipline of the system of the Scinde horse from that of any other irregular cavalry regiment in Bengal?—I think that if I entered into the particulars of the system you would see the difference. The system in the Scinde horse is that of the highest state of discipline; that is to say, that it is carried on exactly the same as in the best European regiment.

1667. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that any native artillery should be allowed in the Bengal army?—I think that where you have such an expensive arm as artillery, it should be of the best, and therefore that the whole should be European, with the small exception of certain places where natives are absolutely necessary, where you cannot get on without them on account of the extreme heat of the climate. There are certain places where Europeans cannot live, but where you must have artillery, as, for instance, on the north-western frontier of Scinde. European soldiers cannot live there; but it

is necessary to have artillery, and you must have it native.

1668. Do you exclude the native artillery on account of any doubt which you have about them, or merely because you think the European artillery superior to them?—I think that the European artillery would be so superior and that it is such a valuable article that it is infinitely better to pay a higher sum and get the best, than to pay a number of small sums and get an inefficient article.

1669. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You would have so much native artillery as should be sufficient to save the Europeans from exposure on service in unhealthy climates or at particular seasons, and during the extreme heat of the monsoon?—Quite so; and those should be for certain positions.

1670. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would name the stations and keep them there?—Yes; and they should be maintained there for service in any part of the world, but they should be stationed in particular localities; for instance, in the one I have mentioned with respect to the frontier field force, it is proposed by General Jacob now that there should be three troops of native horse artillery there; they are necessary there, you cannot keep Europeans.

1671. (*Chairman.*) With regard to sappers and miners, are you of the same opinion?—Yes; quite so. With regard to the artillery, I was going to mention that of course there would be a full complement of gun Lascars to each company of artillery, and a company of gun Lascars, the old strength perhaps would be the best. 120, I think, was the complement. With the sappers and miners I would do the same, they should be European, with a full company of Lascars attached to them.

1672. Would you give the native troops an inferior rifle to the Europeans?—Most certainly not; that is a question I think of a great deal of importance. I would most certainly give the best article that I could provide to the whole army, native and European.

1673. (*Major-General Hancock.*) With respect to all the native troops maintained by the Government, would you not train them to the highest state of efficiency and utility, and give them implicit trust?—Most decidedly so; the opinion in that respect I think cannot be expressed too strongly; I always prefer high-pressure.

1674. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the Bengal native army should be composed of different nationalities and castes, and if so, in what proportion?—I would not allow the question of caste to be introduced at all; I would enlist a man for his thews and sinews, not because he was a Brahmin, or a Patan, a Sikh, or a Ghoorka, but merely because he was a good man, and looked likely to be a good soldier, and I would always teach him to be proud of himself as a soldier, and not as a Brahmin or anything else.

1675. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You would not allow commanding officers to exclude any caste whatever?—None whatever; they should take the best men they could find.

1676. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would not allow the men to bring caste forward as an excuse?—Certainly not.

1677. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You would receive a native of any caste, but could you induce him to forget his caste when he had enlisted?—I should think my right hand had forgotten its cunning if I could not. We have proved it in the Scinde horse.

1678. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Have not the highest caste men in the Bombay army, as well as in the Scinde horse, as you know, stood shoulder to shoulder with men of lower caste, and slept in the same tents and done the same service perfectly well?—Yes, over and over again. The 21st regiment of the native infantry, which mutinied the other day, when I was with it had a large number of high-caste men. They built our houses and their own barracks, and they repaired and built the fort walls at Seebee.

1679. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But they mutinied afterwards?—Yes.

1680. What made them mutiny?—The question of caste being allowed amongst them, undoubtedly.

1681. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Was not there a large predominance of that particular class; were not three-fourths Hindostanees?—I think there were more Hindostanees when I was with the regiment. I am not quite certain of that. The reason why they have misbehaved now was from the commanding officers having allowed the consideration of caste in the regiment.

1682. You mean that the European officers in that corps for many years past have had that predilection for high-caste men which has induced them to enlist a large predominance of them?—No, I mean more than that. I mean that they have actually allowed the question of caste to be conversed upon, and to be recognized, and to affect decisions.

1683. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In coming to a decision they would take caste into account, and would say, "That is a high-caste man, and therefore we "must not punish him?"—Not quite that; but they have allowed the question of caste to be brought up at orderly roll, and have entertained it and discussed it, which I say is the real reason why that regiment mutinied.

1684. (*Chairman.*) Then, as I understand you, you would not recognize caste at all in enlisting the men?—Not at all.

1685. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Did General Jacob ever call upon any of your men, whether Mahomedans or Hindoos, to do an act which they considered distinctly contrary to their caste?—I was never placed in that position, nor do I think that General Jacob was, for this reason, that we never thought whether it was likely to be discussed by the men.

1686. But you know what is contrary to caste; you know that a Mahomedan will not eat pork?—Yes.

1687. Suppose you had asked one of them to do it?—I should no more think of doing it than I would ask an English soldier to do a thing disgusting to him.

1688. But General Jacob has stated in a pamphlet which he has published, that if he asked your men to break caste they would do so. They have never been called upon to do what they consider contrary to caste?—No; but if anything were necessary to be done for the good of the State, no matter what, they would be ordered to do it, and would assuredly obey the order.

1689. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) It has been stated that when an Indian cooks, and he is suddenly ordered to mount his horse on the approach of the enemy or for duty, he throws away his ration for the day and fasts for that day, is that so in the Scinde horse?—No, certainly not; but I think that the very investigation of those little circumstances has led to all this mischief, that we ought never even to think about them or to talk about them.

1690. (*Chairman.*) Would you preserve nationalities; would you have men of one caste in the same company or regiment, or would you mix them up as much as possible?—I would enlist a man for his thews and sinews, not because he was of this or that class or nation.

1691. You would not preserve that nationality or caste by keeping them together in one particular company?—Most certainly not; but they should be distributed indiscriminately.

1692. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You would not allow commanding officers the opportunity of enlisting all of one caste, or any great predominance?—I should leave it to the commanding officers. I would make them strictly responsible for having an efficient regiment, and leave them to enlist whom they liked.

1693. Then you would place no restriction?—No restriction.

1694. Then if a commanding officer had a great predilection for the men from Hindoostan, the Brah-

Major W. L. Merewether.

4th Aug. 1858.

mins and Rajpoots, you would allow him to have Brahmins and Rajpoots ?—Certainly ; but I should think that any man of common sense would never attempt it.

1695. You would not control the commanding officer at all ?—No.

1696. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that any alteration is necessary in the code under which the Bengal native army should be enlisted ?—Certainly ; they should be enlisted for general service only.

1697. You would make them go out of the country or anywhere?—Anywhere where they are ordered ; they should be enlisted to obey orders and nothing else. I think also that the present Articles of War do not apply to our Indian army. I think that it is a mistake treating the Indians with a code which was made for Anglo-Saxons. I would apply the principle which I partially explained a little while ago, with regard to the Scinde horse, namely, that the commanding officer should have the control of the regiment in every possible way, that he should regulate promotions, enlistments, discharges, and reductions, and that he should be held strictly responsible for the performance of the duty.

1698. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In fact you would make him more patriarchal, more paternal ? — Certainly ; that is the position which the native best understands.

1699. (*Chairman.*) You would give him the entire control of punishments and rewards ?—Yes.

1700. Do you think that there would be any advantage in dividing the Bengal army into two or more armies ?—I think it advisable to form a fourth presidency, and with that view the Bengal army would be divided. The Bengal army was no doubt too large.

1701. With respect to the system of promotion, as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, I understand you to recommend the system which is now adopted in the Scinde horse ?—Yes, namely, promotion entirely by merit. Of course where two men of equal merit came together their length of service would be taken into consideration.

1702. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You are not of opinion that there should be no native officers ?—Most certainly not. I should make the native officers more responsible than they are. At present, in our regular native army in India, either the Europeans are of no use or the native officers are of no use.

1703. (*Chairman.*) I think you have expressed your opinion very strongly as to giving the commanding officers more power than they have at present ?—Yes.

1704. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Then I apprehend you think that all commanding officers should be appointed by selection ?—Certainly.

1705. And that this power could not be safely entrusted to every officer who chanced to come to the command of a regiment ?—Most certainly not. I think that upon the seniority system there would be a great evil in giving this power. I would propose one general list for the army, from which the officers for the native army should be selected.

1706. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you concur in the recommendation of Sir Patrick Grant, that officers selected for the irregular service should be struck off the rolls of the regiment altogether, and be entirely confined to the irregular service ?—Not at all. I would recommend that all should be on a general indiscriminate list, and from that indiscriminate list the officers should be selected. There should be a commandant, a second in command, an adjutant, a quartermaster, and one lieutenant as waiting officer, to fill any vacancy by sickness. Some inconvenience is experienced now by officers coming in who do not know anything of the duties.

1707. Then am I to understand that, supposing a lieutenant is taken for the second in command of the Scinde horse, and he comes by seniority to be a captain in his own regiment, he is to be taken away from the Scinde horse and to go back to the regiment ?—Certainly not. When the officers are taken away in that manner, if he is performing the office of second in command, I would give him the rank of, say, lieutenant-colonel ; I would give the commandant the rank of colonel ; I would give the adjutant and quartermaster the rank of captain. If they were removed for inefficiency in those regiments they would remain unemployed upon a reduced rate of pay, with the rank which they had obtained by gradual rise in the general list.

1708. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that, in any admixture of Europeans and native forces, it should be done regimentally, or by brigade ?—If there is any admixture at all, of course it should be by brigade. I would have no admixture of Europeans and natives regimentally.

1709. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You do not think that it would answer ?—No, I am quite sure it would not.

1710. A system which would do for natives would not do for Europeans ?—No, they would be continually clashing.

1711. It would lower the Europeans ?—Yes, and it would lower the natives too.

1712. (*Viscount Melville.*) Before you left Scinde did you know that Lord Elphinstone had given an order for two infantry regiments of rifles to be raised upon the same system as the Scinde horse ?—Yes, and I have since seen a general order to that effect.

1713. Can you state how far the system which now exists with regard to the Scinde horse can be made applicable to infantry ?—It can be made applicable in every possible respect, and would be the best. The system of the men providing their own arms can be made equally applicable to infantry by giving them a little higher pay than they get now. At present the lowest rate of pay is seven rupees for a sepoy ; that increased to ten rupees will enable him to supply his own arms.

1714. Then you propose that the arms should be supplied to these infantry regiments in the same way as they are now supplied to the Scinde horse ?—Yes ; that is, that the men should supply themselves.

1715. With English arms ?—Certainly ; the best arms that can be procured.

1716. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Have you any armourers in your corps ?—We have, I suppose, the best regimental establishment of armourers in India.

1717. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you have no native regular infantry ?—None at all, either infantry or cavalry.

1718. (*Viscount Melville.*) You would have them all irregular ?—All irregular ; that means a small proportion of European officers. Five officers I hold to be necessary, besides the doctor.

1719. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is that enough for action, do you think ?—Quite. I never found the want of more with the Scinde horse.

1720. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are not the native commissioned officers of the Scinde horse perfectly competent to command a troop or a squadron ?—Perfectly, in every respect.

1721. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In an outbreak or mutiny is there no disadvantage in that ?—Certainly not.

1722. Supposing a regiment mutinied, would it not give leaders to regiments which hitherto have not had any ?—If a regiment should be so mismanaged as to turn them into mutineers, I grant that the cleverer a man is the more dangerous enemy he is likely to be ; but I think, under the system of making the natives responsible, putting them into responsible positions, and raising their own character in their own eyes, they are less likely to mutiny.

1723. (*Major-General Hancock.*) And, above all, giving the commanding officer full power ?—Yes ; then they look up to him as their father.

1724. (*Chairman.*) Will you be so good as to furnish the Commission with the system and organization upon which the Scinde horse is established ?—See *Appendix*, No. 6, page 11.

The witness withdrew.

Lieutenant-Colonel ROBERT AUGUSTUS MASTER examined.

Lieut.-Col. R. A. Master.

24th Aug. 1858

1725. (*Chairman.*) What rank do you hold in the Indian army?—Lieutenant-colonel.

1726. How long have you been in the service?—Very nearly 33 years.

1727. How many years of that period have you passed in India?—The whole of it.

1728. In what presidency have you served?—Bengal.

1729. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What have you commanded?—I commanded the 11th Irregular Cavalry from March 1848, and I joined my own regiment, which is the 7th Light Cavalry, immediately prior to my promotion as lieutenant-colonel in 1855.

1730. So that you have served in both regular and irregular regiments?—Yes.

1731. (*Chairman.*) And of course you have had many opportunities of seeing both European and native troops?—Not many, except in the Punjaub, at least in the field.

1732. Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion which the European should bear to the native troops in the Bengal presidency?—I never gave it a thought; but I must say that, after what has taken place, a very strong body of Europeans is necessary in India on the Bengal side.

1733. In what proportion?—I can hardly judge; but I should think hardly less than 40,000 or 50,000 Europeans altogether.

1734. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) To how many natives?—I think sixty regiments of native infantry plenty. I do not know exactly what is required.

1735. (*Chairman.*) Would you have any native artillery or sappers and miners?—Certainly not; not to use the guns against their officers as they have done lately. I do not see any harm in native sappers and miners, except that they might construct mines for their own people—for the enemy.

1736. You would not teach them the scientific branch of it?—No.

1737. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You had a large number of native sappers and miners opposed to you at Lucknow, had you not?—There were supposed to be some 250; all those who came from Meerut, and also those on leave.

1738. And they proved themselves pretty good sappers, did they not?—Yes; a serjeant of the 32nd Foot, serjeant Day, himself a professional miner and the head of that department under the engineer-officers, who was there, told me they made as beautiful mines as could be made in any part of England; he said that he never saw such mines before.

1739. (*Chairman.*) Of course you consider a native army necessary?—I feel that it is absolutely necessary on account of the climate.

1740. Although you are not prepared to state exactly the proportion in which you would have it to Europeans?—No. I have never given it a thought; I should say 60 regiments of infantry.

1741. Would you have that native army regular or irregular, or both combined?—I think irregular is quite sufficient for the duties; the irregular would be less expensive to the Government.

1742. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But on principle, speaking militarily, would you have the regular or the irregular system?—Irregular.

1743. For both infantry and cavalry?—For infantry and cavalry.

1744. And the cavalry you would have irregular?—I think the irregular system is much less expensive to the Government.

1745. We have nothing to do with expense here; we are only now asking militarily which system is the best?—I should think the irregular.

1746. (*Chairman.*) How many European officers do you consider it advisable to have?—I think that the admission of three officers to an irregular corps, one European officer to command each squadron, independently of the commandant and the adjutant, would make it just as perfect as any regular native cavalry could be. A second in command I consider perfectly useless.

1747. (*Colonel Burlton.*) That would be five officers?—Six with the surgeon.

1748. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would have a commandant and four squadron leaders?—No, a commandant, an adjutant, and three squadron leaders.

1749. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you think that that would give sufficient encouragement to the native officers to induce them to do their duty well?—I do not think, from what I have seen of the irregular cavalry, that the native officers are at all adapted to command a squadron, as far as manœuvring goes; in the 11th Irregulars there were only two *really smart* native officers.

1750. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You prefer the irregular to the regular cavalry?—Yes.

1751. And you have had considerable experience in both services?—Yes.

1752. How many years in each?—I was eight years with the 11th Irregulars and twenty-two years with the 7th Cavalry, as subaltern and captain before joining the irregulars; I left them in May 1855, to join my own corps, the 7th Cavalry, when on the eve of promotion from major to lieutenant-colonel.

1753. In what respect, militarily, do you think that the irregular service of cavalry is superior to the regular service?—I think that having their own horses they take much better care of them when the European officers are not with them.

1754. We have it stated in evidence that in a charge an irregular horseman would not charge from the fear of losing his horse; are you aware of that?—I do not believe that, certainly; he would not think of it for a moment.

1755. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You think that he would do his duty and charge?—Certainly.

1756. Have you ever charged with a regiment of irregular cavalry?—We never made a charge; we were going to charge at Goojerat, but we were pulled up by a deep ravine, the whole brigade, under Brigadier Lockwood.

1757. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You propose that all the cavalry, which must be very numerous in India, should be irregular. How could irregular horsemen to that amount of numbers mount themselves, because we know that the Bengal cavalry is mounted with the greatest care and circumspection from the studs which are the finest things in the world?—I think that the Government might find most of the irregular cavalry in horses and mares which might be considered too slight for the weight of a "regular cavalry" trooper.

1758. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) If you do that you do away with the irregular principle?—The horses are not of a very good class in the irregular cavalry, except in some of the old regiments; in fact there has been such a drain in the country that they cannot get them in some parts of the country.

1759. In ordinary times would there be a difficulty?—No, I should say not.

1760. (*Colonel Burlton.*) I suppose when you speak of the Government furnishing them, you allude to the under-sized rejected horses in the studs which are not admitted into our cavalry regiments, that they might have the option of purchasing them?—They would hardly be big enough, I think, except for light weights.

1761. They are 14 hands 1 inch in height?—They are almost too small. Many of the barren mares sent every year for sale to Calcutta would answer well.

1762. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) It has been stated to-day that it would be a good thing if a squadron of regular native cavalry were attached to a regiment of Europeans of three squadrons; are you of that opinion?—I think it would save the Europeans, particularly in the hot season of the year.

Lieut.-Col. R. A. Master.

24th Aug. 1858.

1763. You would see no objection to that plan?—Not the least.

1764. (*Major General Hancock.*) Do you think that a better plan than keeping the natives separate, they would be equally available in hot seasons of the year?—I would prefer that plan to keeping a regular corps, certainly.

1765. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then you are decidedly opposed to regular cavalry?—Yes.

1766. Is there any military ground for that besides the economical one which you have stated?—No; except that I have lost all confidence in them myself.

1767. Why should you have more confidence in the irregular cavalry than in the regular, have not almost as many irregular regiments mutinied as regular?—Yes; so far, I think, that the irregulars are a better class of men altogether, and men of better family, all their children are brought up from boyhood to be soldiers, which is not the case in the regular cavalry; I mean to say that I have lost confidence in native troops altogether.

1768. You think then that as a man, the irregular soldier is a better dragoon than the other?—Certainly, from my experience.

1769. And it is upon that ground that you prefer the irregular system?—Yes.

1770. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Did the regiment under your command ever behave ill before the enemy?—They never had an opportunity; they were under the command of Major Phillips in the Punjaub in 1848 49, the only time they were ever on service since I was posted to it.

1771. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Did the 7th regular cavalry mutiny at Lucknow?—Yes; two troops mutined and killed their officers while in command in the district, and a third galloped over to the rebels in a body on the morning after the infantry regiments had mutined at Lucknow.

1772. Had you any knowledge of that previously?—Not the slightest. Two days before, Sir Henry Lawrence made me acquainted with the circumstance that a mutiny was expected. Five separate detachments had been bringing in treasure, and Sir Henry himself was very much pleased with the way in which they had conducted themselves. I went on parade as I had done before, particularly to see whether I could observe any bad feeling in the sixth detachment, and it was perfectly impossible to see anything approaching to a feeling of insubordination; the troop went off that night for the sixth time, and the next morning they went over in a body to the enemy.

1773. Is there any difficulty in provisioning the irregular cavalry on service?—At Moultan they were a little hard set for grain.

1774. How did you supply that?—They got boosa, a kind of chopped straw.

1775. Was it furnished them by the Government?—No; the men furnished it themselves; they were obliged to do so.

1776. (*Viscount Melville.*) Those were not the regular cavalry?—No; the irregulars.

1777. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) On service you never found it necessary to go to Government for supplies?—No; I believe that at Moultan they got compensation for the shortness of provisions.

1778. Do you think that that system would induce men to plunder?—I think that they are always ready to plunder.

1779. Do you think that an irregular regiment would be more likely to plunder than a regular one, for that reason?—Certainly, for food for their horses and for themselves also.

1780. (*Viscount Melville.*) Were not both the 11th and the 7th at Moultan?—The 11th regular cavalry, with the 7th and 11th irregular cavalry, were there.

1781. Was the regular regiment differently supplied with boosa from the irregular regiment?—The regular cavalry have their own grass-cutters, and the irregulars have perhaps one boy amongst three horses; when they cannot get grass they are obliged to buy boosa.

1782. Then you get no assistance from the commissariat at all?—None whatever, except when food for the men could not be otherwise procured.

1783. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) As to buying boosa with a campaigning army, it is quite as impossible as buying it in this street; the stock is exhausted?—Yes, just so; it was very scarce at Moultan.

1784. *Duke of Cambridge.* Still, in war, you would think it necessary to take account of irregular corps that were on service?—Yes.

1785. You think it advantageous that the commissariat should take account of them and lay in provisions?—Yes, in case of necessity; certainly it is not often the case that provisions are not procurable.

1786. Should the native army be composed of different nationalities and castes, and if so in what proportion?—I would have no caste whatever; I would not admit the name of caste in any way whatever; that has been the ruin of the army, in my opinion.

1787. You would not consider whether a man was a Brahmin or not; you would call upon him to do whatever duty you thought necessary?—I would not have beyond a certain number of Brahmins in each regiment certainly. They are a very intriguing, influential class of men, who will do more harm than good in every corps, from what I have seen of them.

1788. (*Viscount Melville.*) But in enlisting can you always tell whether a man is a Brahmin or not?—You can; because they always wear what they call the Brahminical thread round their bodies.

1789. But they may conceal it?—They often wear it when they are not entitled to it.

1790. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You say that you think caste has been too much considered, and that that has been very much the cause of the mutiny?—Yes; there are too many Brahmins in all the corps; in the infantry corps there are certainly three-fourths.

1791. Then would you regulate the number of Brahmins in each regiment?—Certainly.

1792. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Do you think that the Mahomedans are not as dangerous as the Brahmins?—They have proved themselves so; the Brahmin is always at the bottom of every intrigue.

1793. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Is not a due admixture of all classes and castes the best system that can be adopted?—Certainly.

1794. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have you ever heard of the system adopted of late of having nationalities by different corps?—I know it is the case in some of the irregular corps, but I would not allow it; that becomes a kind of clique at once.

1795. Would you enlist the native army of Bengal under a new code?—No; I think there is no harm in the code at all.

1796. I refer to the terms of enlistment; would you have the terms of enlistment what they have hitherto been?—Certainly not. I would enlist every man for general service, to go where he is ordered.

1797. Including the going by sea?—Anywhere, in any direction.

1798. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not think that there would be some difficulty in carrying that into effect, as regards embarking on board ship?—I dare say there might be at first, but I think that when they found that other men went they would go themselves.

1799. (*Major-General Hancock.*) There would be no difficulty if a man enlisted, engaging to go?—I should think not if he engaged to go wherever he was ordered.

1800. (*Colonel Burlton.*) They might desert?—That is very likely; Brahmins particularly.

1801. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that you would get men to enlist on those conditions?—Yes; I think a much less quantity of Brahmins would enlist, because they have a particular objection to crossing the Indus, and going on board ship.

1802. Has it not been lately the order that men are to be so enlisted?—Yes, during the last two years.

1803. Have you found any falling off in the enlistment in consequence?—Not in the least.

1804. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Still you think that when they were ordered to embark a great many of them might desert?—I think it very likely; I speak of Brahmins.

1805. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is flogging now in existence in the Bengal army, or not?—No, except in particular cases; disgraceful conduct, for theft, or cases of that sort.

1806. Do you think that the punishments in the army are sufficient for the objects in view?—Certainly not. I think that the abolition of flogging did more harm to the army than anything else. My own native officers have often said to me, "As long as that rod was "hanging over that bad man's head he was all right, "but now they do not care for the commanding officer "or anyone else."

1807. Is corporal punishment a native punishment which is used in India, or not?—Certainly, amongst themselves.

1808. (*Major-General Hancock.*) When you were in command of a corps were you allowed the free exercise of the powers vested in you by the articles of war for native troops as regards corporal punishment. Was there any interference with you from head-quarters?—Certainly not.

1809. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then, do you think that the commanding officer has power enough?—No; I think that he should have a little more power. In minor punishments the commanding officer can only give fifteen days' drill to a man; they laugh at it. A man looked upon four days' extra duty as a much more severe punishment than anything else, because he had to clean his arms and accoutrements daily.

1810. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) When corporal punishment was done away with in 1835 by Lord William Bentinck, was not there a punishment more distasteful to the natives established instead of it?—I do not recollect it.

1811. I mean the penal service of working on the roads?—If a man was sentenced to, I think, three months working on the roads, he was struck off the rolls.

1812. Was not it an objectionable punishment to the high-caste sepoy to be sentenced to penal service?—Certainly.

1813. So that he and his family lost his caste by being handcuffed along with Pariahs?—Yes, I believe they have some feeling of that sort with regard to being obliged to work with men of lower caste.

1814. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is any change required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?—I think myself that promotion ought to go by merit entirely.

1815. And not by seniority?—No. In the irregular cavalry men care less for being passed over; but in a regular regiment a man if he is passed over makes a complaint at once. He looked on promotion as his right.

1816. Is that complaint listened to?—Yes, in my own experience; a native officer submitted a complaint against me which proved to be false, and was punished with four months suspension from rank, pay, and allowance by native officers who tried him; this was in the 11th irregular cavalry.

1817. (*Major-General Hancock.*) By a court-martial?—By a general court-martial.

1818. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you mean to say that a man sent a complaint to the commander-in-chief without its going through you as the commanding officer?—It was sent direct to the commander-in-chief by the officer commanding the division.

1819. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Was that tolerated?—It was.

1820. And listened to?—Yes.

1821. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) What power, under those circumstances, had you to act?—I was not aware of it.

1822. If a native officer had come to you and said "That fellow has sent a complaint to the commander-in-chief against your decision," what should you have done?—I should have put him in confinement at once.

1823. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Did the native officer who made those complaints against you to the commander-in-chief suffer punishment by court-martial in consequence of doing so?—Charges were preferred against the native officer, and he was put upon his trial, and he was punished for it, namely, for making false charges against me. His name was Naib-Musseer Shei Alum Khan; to the best of my memory his trial took place at Dinapore in July 1854.

1824. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) If he was punished, why do you object; if it was treated as a crime, the complaint was not attended to?—I think that the punishment given by native officers, men of his own caste, was very light.

1825. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Is it the custom in the army to send petitions to the Commander-in chief against officers or against any one without sending them through the commanding officer of the regiment?—I fancy it must have been, for there was another case when I commanded the 7th Cavalry of a man who had been dismissed upon trial by his own officers in a regimental court-martial; he made a complaint in Calcutta. The man had been struck off, I think, about three months. I was called upon to give my account of the affair, and I did so; I heard nothing more of it.

1826. (*Major-General Hancock.*) That was the case, as I understand you, of a man who had been struck off the regiment who made a complaint; he was not under your command at the time?—No; the other was.

1827. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Was that native officer dismissed the service?—No, he got four months' suspension from rank, pay, and allowances only.

1828. And he resumed his position in the same regiment as an officer?—Yes.

1829. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do the regulations of the Bengal army permit native officers and soldiers to address written complaints to the Commander-in-chief direct?—I fancy so, from the fact of these complaints having being sent without my knowledge.

1830. Do you mean that that has been the allowed practice?—I presume so from that.

1831. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Has it been so in your experience?—Certainly; and it has happened in other regiments besides my own.

1832. Do you think that promotion should be by selection and not by seniority?—Not by seniority certainly with the natives.

1833. Why not?—Because there are very few fit for it. Most natives, on promotion, become careless and lax in performance of their duties.

1834. You have stated that you commanded a regiment, namely, the 7th regular cavalry, which was one of those that mutinied; were you put in possession of the likelihood of that fact before it took place?—I did not know a single word of it. I fancied that some bad feeling must exist in the army generally.

1835. Ought you not to have been put in possession of it, if the native officers had done their duty?—Certainly; I saw the subahdar major of the regiment the very day before Sir Henry told me of it, and it was his duty to have told me what he knew of any coming outbreak.

1836. Were the native officers in the habit of telling you what took place in the regiment or not?—Very seldom; they were always very willing to tell against a man who was no relation or connexion of theirs, whom they did not like, but they would not say a word about a relation.

1837. Had you ever any reason to chide any man for not informing you of what was going on?—I believe I have frequently done so; I cannot recollect the instances just now; it was not about any supposed outbreak.

Lieut.-Col. R. A. Master.

24th Aug. 1858.

1838. Do you attribute the late mutiny to a general conspiracy or to general laxity of discipline in the Bengal army?—I think the natives are afraid to tell one of another; in fact, a native officer told me afterwards that it was as much as his life was worth, and that he dared not tell me; he was an old gentleman, and died the other day at Cawnpore. I conceive the mutiny to have been a general conspiracy.

1839. What was that man's age?—About seventy-one.

1840. And he was a native officer?—Yes; the subadar major of the 7th Cavalry.

1841. Do you not conceive that the very fact of men being of that age in those positions disqualifies them from holding those positions?—He was a most wonderful man for his age, he was particularly smart, and a most excellent soldier, perhaps one of a thousand, who had his energies about him.

1842. Do you think that a man of that age is qualified to hold a position of that description?—Generally speaking, not.

1843. What is the average age at which a native non-commissioned officer would attain to the rank of a commissioned officer?—I cannot tell; some of them are between forty and fifty when they are made jemadars, and much beyond that when they are made subahdars—that is the senior rank of all in the regular corps.

1844. Have you ever superseded a senior man by another man on account of inefficiency?—Certainly.

1845. Has that been permitted?—It has been sanctioned in some instances. I was obliged to send the names of two or three senior men to the one whom I recommended for promotion, and to include their names in the roll, and my remarks for passing them over.

1846. Were those remarks admitted?—They were.

1847. You know of no instance in which they were not?—No; I only commanded the regiment for something short of three years.

1848. Do you think it desirable that there should be any admixture of European and native forces either regimentally or by brigade, that is to say, do you think it desirable to have two companies of a regiment European and the six or eight other companies natives, or would you rather have a European regiment to two or three native regiments?—The latter certainly.

1849. You would not mix the Europeans with the natives?—Certainly not.

1850. Why not?—I do not think that they would agree together; and the Europeans, generally speaking, do not know enough about the castes of the men; they give frequent annoyance in that way.

1851. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What powers have regimental commanding officers in Bengal with regard to granting leave of absence to native officers and others?—None whatever. Leave of absence commences generally in April, and it is granted to so many commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers. The commanding officer of a regiment can grant leave between musters and from the 5th of one month to the 4th of another, but he cannot grant general leave.

1852. Supposing a man requires leave in excess of that period, who can grant it?—He then gives notice to his commanding officer, and if he is satisfied that there is a real necessity for the extension of leave, then the commanding officer of division grants that man six weeks or two months, or whatever it may be, at the solicitation of the man's commanding officer.

1853. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) What proportion of sepoys have leave in the year?—Sir Henry Lawrence particularly ordered that all men wishing to go on leave should get it.

1854. But, as a general rule in the Bengal army, how many men have annually leave to go to their homes?—I think five commissioned officers and twenty non-commissioned officers; and I think last year it was ten per troop, but those generally went for half the leave; that is to say, three and a half months out of seven; and on their return, the others went, according to the distance of their homes.

1855. Are you talking of the cavalry?—It is exactly the same in the infantry, except, perhaps, that there may be a few more men per company in the infantry; there are seventy or eighty men in the infantry, and in the cavalry sixty per troop.

1856. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Have not officers commanding corps power to grant leave beyond thirty days?—Certainly not; the commanding officer of the division has that power.

1857. The extensions of leave are granted by officers commanding divisions?—Yes; if the man requiring the leave satisfies his officer that the matter is urgent, the commanding officer then applies for it.

The witness withdrew.

Adjourned to To-morrow at Twelve o'clock.

Wednesday, 25th August 1858.

PRESENT:

Major-General the Right Hon. JONATHAN PEEL.
General H.R.H. the Duke of CAMBRIDGE.
The Right Hon. Lord STANLEY.
General the Marquis of TWEEDDALE.
Major-Gen. Viscount MELVILLE.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir HARRY G. W. SMITH.
Major-General HANCOCK.
Colonel BURLTON.

MAJOR-GENERAL PEEL IN THE CHAIR.

Col. O. Felix.

25th Aug. 1858.

Colonel ORLANDO FELIX examined.

1858. (*Chairman.*) You are a colonel in Her Majesty's service?—I am.

1859. And you were Deputy Quartermaster-General to Her Majesty's forces at Madras?—Yes.

1860. What is the length of your service?—I was in India about 18 years; 4 years in Bombay, as private secretary to two Governors, Sir Robert Grant and Mr. Tavish; 12 years in Madras, as Deputy Quartermaster-General H.M. Forces, during two of which I was also private secretary to the Marquis of Tweeddale, who was both Governor and Commander-in-Chief; I was one year in Bengal, and for a short time military secretary to Lord Dalhousie, with whom I left India.

1861. Of course you have seen European and native troops?—I have.

1862. Have you formed any opinion, therefore, as to the proportion which the Europeans should bear to the native force, not only in Bengal presidency, but in any other presidency?—Yes; I think that in Bengal the proportion should be two natives to one European; in Bombay, three to one; and in Madras, four to one, making the average three to one throughout the whole of India.

1863. Do you include the police force in that proportion?—No; I speak only of regulars.

1864. Have you considered at all what amount

of force will be required in these presidencies after the country is settled?—Yes.

The Witness delivered in the following Papers:

EUROPEAN FORCE.

	Regiments of Cavalry.	Battalions, Infantry.	Batteries, Artillery.
For Bengal	–	6	8
The Upper Provinces	3	15	19
Central India	1	4	5
Punjaub and Scinde	2	12	15
Bombay Presidency	2	9	12
Madras Presidency	2	10	17
Burmah	–	4	4
	10	60	80

10 regiments of cavalry, each 500 strong	5,000
60 battalions infantry, each 800 strong	48,000
80 batteries artillery	7,000
*European force	60,000
Average proportion of natives to Europeans, 3 to 1	
Native force	180,000
Indian army	240,000

80 batteries = 480 guns, or 2 to 1,000 men.

Rough Estimate of the EUROPEAN FORCE that would be required for India after the Country is settled, with the present means of communication.

	Cavalry Regiments.	Infantry Regiments.	Artillery Batteries.	
Calcutta	–	1	1	For the protection of Bengal.
Barrackpore	–	1	–	
Dum Dum	–	–	3	
Berhampore	–	1	1	
Hazerabaugh	–	1	1	
Dinapore	–	2	2	
Allahabad	–	2	2	For the Upper Provinces.
Cawnpore	1	2	2	
Oude	1	4	6	
Bareilly	–	1	1	
Meerut	1	2	4	
Umballah	–	2	2	
Ferozpore	–	1	1	
Scinde	–	3	4	Scinde and the Punjaub.
Jullundur	–	1	1	
Lahore and elsewhere	2	2	4	
Umritsir	–	1	1	
Sealcote	–	1	1	
Rawul Pindee	–	1	1	
Peshawur	–	3	3	
Agra	–	1	1	Central India.
Gwalior	–	1	1	
Saugur	–	1	1	
Mhow	1	1	2	
Neemuch	–	1	1	
Deesa	1	1	1	Bombay Presidency.
Ahmedabad	–	1	1	
Ahmednugger	–	1	3	
Poonah	1	2	3	
Bombay	–	1	1	
Belgaum	–	1	2	
Dharwar	–	1	1	
Bellary	–	1	1	Madras Presidency.
Hyderabad	1	2	4	
Nagpore	–	1	2	
Bangalore	1	1	4	
Station above the Plain where the Railway will touch	–	1	–	
Neilgherry hills	–	1	–	
Cannanore	–	1	1	
Trichinopoly	–	1	1	
Madras and Mount	–	1	4	
Burmah	–	4	4	
Aden	–	1	–	
	10	60	80	

Strength of cavalry regiments - 500
Do. infantry „ - 800

* By adding 200 to the cavalry and infantry regiments the force might at any time be increased to 74,000."

1865. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I presume you have made that calculation upon certain data?—Yes, I went over the different stations requiring European troops. *Col. O. Felix.* 25th Aug. 1858.

1866. Knowing the presidencies well, and the requirements, you went over them, and in your mind sketched out what you thought necessary?—Yes; railways will make a great change in the number of troops required; when you have those laid down you will want much fewer troops, and there is nothing more important than establishing rapid means of communication by railway.

1867. (*Chairman.*) Your general opinion is that it would require a European force of 60,000 men, and a native force of about 180,000?—Yes.

1868. Exclusive of the police?—Quite so.

1869. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Why have you put that lower figure to what the establishment is now?—Because the barracks are bad in India. Soldiers ought not to be crowded in barracks in that country, and the force can readily be increased for service by adding 200 men to each regiment.

1870. This is for a peace establishment?—Yes.

1871. You think it is more important to have more corps than to have the corps stronger?—Yes.

1872. You think that the moral effect produced by more regiments would weigh in the mind?—Yes.

1873. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do not you think that that increases the expense without adding to the strength, and you must know that although the establishment of a regiment is 1,000, yet there is not one single regiment in India which is not 200 under its establishment?—The 43rd, when I left India, was above its establishment, but regiments are generally below it.

1874. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) When the regiments are so strong as 1,000 men, are they not very apt to send the wings away?—Yes.

1875. And has not that one of the worst effects upon the discipline of the army?—Yes, it is very injurious to discipline.

1876. (*Viscount Melville.*) If you reduce the establishment to, say, cavalry 500, and infantry 800, the practical effect will be that the cavalry will not muster 400, and the infantry very little above 600 fighting men?—You may increase the establishment, but I do not think you would do so with advantage.

1877. Do you know that taking the establishment at any strength you like, before you can muster your men on parade, you must allow for casualties to at least the extent of 200, if not 250, even supposing your regiment is complete?—The average of sick in the 15th Hussars for the 12 years I knew the regiment was 10½ per cent.

1878. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the police might be employed more generally than they have been?—Yes, I do, very much.

1879. Are you in favour of the employment of a large police force?—Yes.

1880. What duties would you propose that they should do?—The escort duties principally.

1881. How would you arm those police?—With common carbines; I would not put any rifle into a native's hand.

1882. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Your chief experience has been in Madras?—Yes.

1883. What number of regular troops do you think were employed upon police duties in Madras, upon the average?—I am not prepared to say; I had nothing to do with the police duties.

1884. I mean those duties which you now propose to hand over to the police?—The police duties were in treasure escorts; but I am not at all prepared to say how many men were engaged in them.

1885. What number of men do you suppose would be employed on such duties on the average, at ordinary times?—I have not a notion.

1886. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Supposing all those duties to be transferred to the police, what duties would remain to be done by the regular na-

Col. O. Felix.
25th Aug. 1858.

tive army?—The regular native army would have their military duties.

1887. Being available for service if required?—Yes.

1888. (*Chairman.*) How would you arm the native troops?—With muskets, as they have been armed.

1889. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The old percussion musket?—Certainly.

1890. (*Chairman.*) Would you give them the same arms as the Europeans?—No; I would not give them a rifle.

1891. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Why would you not give them a rifle?—Because I think that the superiority of the European should be kept up in every possible way.

1892. Do you not think that that is showing a great want of trust in troops, and is it not a great risk to run to raise troops and then to show at once that you distrust them?—We have not had any great proof that we can trust the native troops entirely; I should think not.

1893. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Would you adopt that rule throughout the three presidencies?—Yes; I think that it would be a good rule; I do not think that the natives would mind it; they would, indeed, I believe, prefer the musket to the rifle, but I should not humour them if it were otherwise; there was no bad feeling between regiments when we had only two rifle regiments in the Queen's army.

1894. (*Lord Stanley.*) Does not it strike you as an arrangement very uneconomical, to go to the expense of raising a native army, and then not to arm that army in such a manner as to make it as efficient as it might be?—But I think that you would arm it sufficiently for all purposes that you want in India.

1895. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Including foreign service?—Including the foreign service which you have there.

1896. To send troops to Persia, for instance, or to Burmah?—Even in Persia I think it would be quite sufficient.

1897. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You conceive that no force against which they could be employed would have so good an arm as the common percussion musket?—Just so.

1898. (*Lord Stanley.*) That is to say you would intentionally deprive your native army of a part of its efficiency in order to maintain the European superiority?—I would.

1899. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Did you hold those opinions previously to the outbreak of the late mutiny?—I did not.

1990. You would have trusted native troops with the best description of arms previously?—Certainly; I never had a suspicion of them, but since we have had this great trial I think we should be very imprudent if we ventured too much again.

1901. Do you think that a mutiny of the Bengal army would not be obviated in future by a different organization and a different system of discipline?—I do not think that we should trust to anything of the sort. We have had such a lesson that we should take every possible means to guard ourselves in future.

1902. (*Lord Stanley.*) Does not your argument rather lead you to the conclusion that there ought to be no such thing as a native army, than that it ought not to be properly armed?—If I could do without it I would not have a native army, but you cannot possibly do without it in India; you must have a native army, and a large native army.

1903. (*Major-General Hancock.*) But if the native army is not to be trusted to keep the peace within Hindostan, do you think that it would be expedient for the government to keep up a large native force to do nothing but remain in their cantonments?—But I think that the peace is kept as well with muskets as with rifles.

1904. Are not the native regiments of the line very much more expensive than the police corps?—Very much.

1905. What would be the advantage to the government in maintaining them at all if you do not make them efficient in every respect?—I would make them as efficient as necessary for meeting the enemies we have to oppose in India. We have an immense extent of territory, and must have a large native army; but as we are to maintain a European force partly for the purpose of controlling that army, it will be but prudent to give this force every aid that can secure its superiority.

1906. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You are of opinion, I suppose, that in India hereafter we must depend chiefly upon the predominating force, and more powerful element of Europeans?—I think so.

1907. Physical force, in fact?—Physical force combined with moral force. The moral effect is always more felt where you have a good physical force to back it.

1908. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would let the moral force go as far as it could, and have it backed by a good physical element?—Yes.

1909. (*Chairman.*) With your distrust of native troops, would you employ any of them as artillerymen?—No, not a man.

1910. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Would not that involve the employment of Europeans on service in unhealthy districts, where the sacrifice of life would be very great indeed occasionally?—I would not let a gun go into the hands of a native.

1911. But would not that frequently involve a very great sacrifice of European life?—No, I do not see that it would; European officers have always gone where guns have gone, I think.

1912. Not always.—There is no place which has guns where European officers would not have gone.

1913. Are you acquainted with the climate of Upper Scinde?—Yes.

1914. Would you locate European artillery or European troops of any sort there permanently; I mean from Sukkur along the frontier?—You are a better judge than I am of that. I have not been so high.

1915. Are there not districts in the Madras Presidency, where the employment of Europeans would be attended with great sacrifice of life?—Yes, but I would not send guns there.

1916. Do you think that a few companies of native artillerymen spread over the presidency would involve any danger to the state?—I have given my answer that I would not have any native artillerymen.

1917. (*Chairman.*) Do you extend that to all the presidencies?—I would not touch the other presidencies.

1918. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you keep up what they have?—No.

1919. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You would let them die off?—I would let them die off.

1920. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do not you think that that would be showing a distrust towards the natives which would damage the government and render the government of the country much more difficult?—No; we have trusted them too much and we have made them rebels. I think that in any future experiment we must not trust them too implicitly.

1921. Do you think it possible to govern a country without showing confidence in the inhabitants of that country?—I would show confidence in the way that I have said. I would arm them well with muskets.

1922. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You mean that you would make a show of trust, but maintain an utter distrust?—I would not arm them in the way that the Europeans are armed.

1923. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You mean to say that you wish the European element to be maintained as supreme in all respects?—Yes.

1924. And you think that in one respect it ought to be shown, by the natives having an inferior arm and no artillery?—That is what I mean.

1925. (*Viscount Melville.*) Considering that the subsidized states have always had a proportion of

artillery in the different contingents, do you think that depriving them of their ariillery will at all increase the confidence which they will feel towards your government?—I think that it would give you a greater security in India. In Madras the Moplahs were the most troublesome people possible; you have taken the arms from them and they have been quiet.

1926. Those were a fanatical race like the Mormons?—They are a fierce and fanatical, but a very industrious race, of Arab descent, numbering about 80,000, and settled as traders on the western coast. Occasionally a certain number will band together and devote themselves to death under the belief that if they die fighting against "unbelievers," they secure instant admission into paradise. They begin by murdering some Hindoo enemy, and then take up a strong position and wait to be attacked.

1927. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Have they not defied both the British and the Company's troops?—The native troops will not face them. Europeans are called out, and the fighting is desperate, for they refuse quarter. Their memory is highly honoured. I have seen the translation of a poem, celebrating one of these outbreaks.

1928. (*Duke of Cambridge.*)—Would you go to the extent of actually depriving the native contingents which have not revolted of the artillery which they possess?—No, but I would let them die out.

1929. (*Viscount Melville.*) Then you must make fresh treaties?—That is a diplomatic affair.

1930. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That is a political question?—That is a political question, I have nothing to do with that.

1931. Then I suppose, as a matter of course, if those are your opinions, you would not employ scientifically in the arsenals any man who was not a European?—Certainly not.

1932. You would only make the natives do the labour?—Certainly.

1933. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Would you have no native sappers and miners?—I would have them in Bombay and Madras, but I would not have them in Bengal again; Bengal is the only presidency to which I look now as the one upon which an experiment is to be tried. Bombay and Madras have been faithful and I would not touch them.

1934. But I understand you to say that, although you would not disband the native artillery already employed in those presidencies, you would let them die off?—Yes.

1935. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you let the sappers and miners die off also in Madras and Bombay?—No, I would keep them up there; they are very good men indeed, in Madras, and so long as they were faithful, I would not touch them. In Bengal I certainly would not have them.

1936. Would you teach them scientifically?—No.

1937. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What are the reasons for which you think that they may be safely maintained in Madras, and that a similar class of men may not be maintained in Bengal?—In Madras they have been faithful, and are not subject to the influence that might affect them in Bengal.

1938. Have they not hitherto been a different class of men in Bengal; have they not been enlisted all from one district, and belonging generally to one caste, namely, the higher caste of Hindoos?—Yes, certainly.

1939. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) What is the confidence which the Madras army have in the sappers and miners; do not the Madras army look upon it, that whenever there is any danger of a place being stormed, both Europeans and natives can depend upon the sappers placing the ladders?—Yes, they are most excellent troops.

1940. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Could not you make the Bengal sappers equally good?—Yes, if you took these men, and had the same system.

1941. Could not you introduce the same system into Bengal which you have for Madras?—Bengal officers would better answer that question.

1942. (*Colonel Burlton.*) The sappers and miners of the Madras presidency are all of the very lowest caste?—Yes, they are very low caste men.

1943. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the native force should be on the regular or the irregular system, or both combined?—I think both combined; infantry regular and cavalry irregular.

1944. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that the whole of the infantry should be regular?—Yes.

1945. (*Chairman.*) And the whole of the cavalry irregular?—Yes, but I would give them six officers.

1946. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That is to say, two orderly officers in addition to what they have?—Yes, six officers altogether. So that if a squadron were detached, it would be commanded by a European officer.

1947. (*Major-General Hancock.*) How many European officers would you have with the regular native infantry regiments?—I should like to see them complete.

1948. Do you mean to the full fixed establishment?—Yes.

1949. Always serving with the regiment?—Yes.

1950. Why should there be a much larger number with the native infantry regular corps than with the irregular cavalry?—Because you cannot select.

1951. Why should upwards of 20 European officers be necessary with a native infantry regiment of the line, and three or four suffice with an irregular regiment of nearly equal strength?—Because the irregular officers are selected.

1952. Do you think that the regular infantry regiments of the line have done better service?—I think so.

1953. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that any inconvenience has arisen from the want of European officers with the native regiments?—Yes, I should think so.

1954. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think the establishment sufficient, provided it is kept up?—Yes.

1955. But you would not allow so many officers to be on the staff?—I would not.

1956. Why should not the infantry do as well with six officers, or perhaps even more, say eight officers, on the irregular principle, if you think that the cavalry would do as well with six officers?—If the officers could be selected, it might do as well, but not so taking the general run of the service; and as the regular cavalry in Bengal has mutinied, I would try a new experiment.

1957. Are you not aware that the irregular cavalry have also gone over?—Yes.

1958. Then why should you give the preference to the irregular system over the regular system?—The expense is so much less. The irregular regiments are very efficient, and if a man deserts he does not carry off the horse with which the government provides him.

1959. I am talking militarily. Of course expense is a very important thing for the Commission to consider, but militarily do you see any reason for the preference?—I think that supposing you could have them really good cavalry corps, the regular system might be better.

1960. But you think that the irregular are better cavalry corps?—Yes, more generally serviceable.

1961. Have you much irregular cavalry at Madras?—Yes; there are a great many at Hyderabad; the Nizam's are irregular cavalry, and very good cavalry they are.

1962. Are they on the same footing as the Bengal cavalry?—Yes; exactly as the Scinde horse.

1963. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Which are you speaking of?—The Nizam's.

1964. (*Major-General Hancock.*) There is no irregular cavalry in the Madras army?—No; there are the Mysore horse, but they are mere police.

1965. (*Chairman.*) Has there been generally the same proportion of European officers to the native regiments in the different presidencies, or has any difference existed in that respect?—There have been

Col. O. Felix.

25th Aug. 1858.

fewer European officers in Bengal than in the other presidencies.

1966. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You do not mean that there has been any difference in the establishment?—No; but more staff appointments were given away, and more of the Bengal officers were taken from that army than from the other armies.

1967. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you partially attribute the outbreak which has taken place to the want of European officers in the Bengal army?—I attribute it very much indeed to the want of communication between the officers and the men, and I do not think you will ever break through that until you encourage the men to learn English. I think that when you make them speak your own language you will then gain their sympathy and affection, and I am glad to have an opportunity of saying that I consider this to be most important.

1968. (*Lord Stanley.*) Upon the whole, is it not easier for a small number of educated officers to learn the language of the country than for a large number of common soldiers, taken from the lowest class, to learn a foreign language?—I do not speak of the soldiers, I speak of the native officers; and I think that a knowledge of English should be a qualification for promotion; there would then be no complaint of want of communication between the European and native officer, for although an English officer dislikes to converse in a language that he knows imperfectly, all natives who speak English are eager to talk it; they have no shyness. At Madras there is a great deal of English spoken—most dragoon horse-boys know English; all the native writers and servants speak it, and these are the people who really are attached to you.

1969. Would not one effect of English being made an indispensable qualification for a native officer be, that European officers would give themselves less trouble than they do now to learn the native languages?—No, I do not think they would; besides which I think, as I have said before, that it is of the greatest importance for the natives to learn English. As long as I have been in India, I have thought that until you get them to speak your language you will never engage their sympathies.

1970. Do you think that you will turn them into Englishmen by making them speak English?—I only know that in Madras the natives about the offices, and where I have been, are very faithful and attached.

1971. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) In what language do the civil and military European officers speak to their native officers in the Madras presidency?—In English always.

1972. In what language do they speak to them in Bengal?—In Hindostanee.

1973. (*Colonel Burlton,*) Do you not think that any attempt to force the native soldiers to learn English would alarm them much more than anything which has yet been done in regard to their religion?—I would not force them.

1974. But you would not give them promotion without it?—I would encourage them in every possible way to learn English.

1975. You would not promote a man to be an officer unless he could speak English?—I would give a preference to those who did speak it.

1976. Do you not think that that would excite the greatest possible alarm?—I do not think so.

1977. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you not aware that in the presidency of Madras all the civilians and men of rank look down upon those natives who speak English, and never take a servant into their service who can speak English?—In Bengal it may be so, but certainly not in Madras; there is no such thought.

1978. (*Lord Stanley.*) Do you not conceive that requiring this qualification of speaking English for a native officer would exclude from promotion many of your most deserving soldiers?—I think most of them would learn English. I think they would be too happy to do so.

1979. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) If they would be too happy to do so, why should they not have done so before?—They had no encouragement; we learn Hindostanee; there is a law about the officers learning Hindostanee, and we go to them instead of making them come to us. If the French had had India as long as we have had it, the whole of the officials would have spoken French.

1980. (*Lord Stanley.*) Excluding private soldiers, I think the Europeon population of India is something under 10,000?—I dare say it may be; I never had the means of ascertaining.

1981. And the native population of India is loosely reckoned at between 100,000,000 and 150,000,000?—Yes.

1982. To which party is it easier then to learn the language of the other?—I only talk of the officers, as I think that it would be the way of bringing about that communication between the European and the native officers which is wanted.

1983. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Are you aware of the general average age at which a native officer arrives before he becomes an officer?—About 50.

1984. Do you think that he could begin learning then?—But you are trying a new experiment in Bengal; you are raising new men.

1985. Then you would only begin with the newly raised recruits?—Just so.

1986. How long would it be before that system came into operation?—I could not say; large sums of money are expended by Government in educating the natives in and through their own languages, and my wish would be to see an effort made to spread the knowledge of English.

1987. (*Chairman.*) Your opinion is that it would be a great advantage if the native officer was encouraged to learn English?—Yes.

1988. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Are you aware what language the new accounts of the presidency are kept in?—I think Mahratta.

1989. They are then changed into what?—Into English.

1990. And at the presidency they are all kept in English?—Yes.

1991. And all the copiers of letters are obliged to write them in English?—Yes.

1992. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you aware that in all corps of irregular cavalry the officers give the word of command in English?—Yes.

1993. Do you attach any benefit to that at all?—Not the least.

1994. None of the native irregular cavalry thereby learn English, do they?—No.

1995. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion?—I would mix them up as much as possible. I would receive a man who would take a pick-axe and would work, and would go to sea, without inquiring what he was. I would not inquire as to his caste, so long as he would do the work which the Europeans would do.

1996. You would not recognize caste?—I would not. When a man comes into the army he must take all its duties, the pick-axe duty and the going to sea, like Europeans.

1997. What alteration should you recommend in the terms of enlistment?—I would enlist the men to go wherever ordered.

1998. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) For general service?—For general service.

1999. (*Major-General Hancock.*) For limited or unlimited service?—For limited service, I should think; I would not give a native an increase of pay, but I would give him an increase of pension. I do not think that increase of pay would be so much valued by a native soldier as the certainty of having a good provision for his old age; while the hold over him which the pension gives would be an additional security for his loyalty.

2000. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not think that the having no present advantages is a great drawback, and prevents men enlisting? Is not the looking forward to 21 years before a man is to get any advantages a prospect which is not encouraging, and which is detrimental to recruiting? —In the Madras army a man's regiment is his home he has his wife and family and all his people about him, and you get as many men as you want.

2001. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) By saying that, I presume you mean that in Bengal that is not the case? —In Bengal that is not the case.

2002. What then has been the great difference between the system in the Madras native army and in the Bengal?—That is the difference, namely, that in Bengal the men's families are left in their villages. The Bengal sepoy will not have his wife with him.

2003. Do you think then that it is an advantage for them to have their families?—I think it is a great security.

2004. And you would like to see it extended?—Yes, because they are hostages; if a sepoy goes on service you have his wife and family under your care.

2005. Does not that make the movement of troops very difficult?—Yes, very clumsy; it is very unmilitary, but it has the advantage I have mentioned.

2006. Still you think that that disadvantage would be fully counterbalanced by the advantage which you would derive in having a greater hold over the men? —I do.

2007. (*Chairman.*) Would not that raise an objection to enlistment for general service?—No, for the Madras troops always go wherever they are ordered; they never doubt about where they are to go.

2008. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Have you ever known an instance of a Madras soldier refusing to go on any service upon which the government wished him to go, if he had the allowances which he had been promised given to him, so as to enable him to make out the family certificate before going on board ship, or before leaving his family behind?—Never.

2009. (*Chairman.*) I understand that for the future you would do away with all those extra allowances? —No, I would not do away with the rations when a man goes abroad, because he supplies his family with them; those are the means which he has of supporting them when he is absent, but I would do away with any increase of pay, that is to say, good-conduct pay, or anything of that sort, and I would add it to his pension.

2010. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) There is now good-conduct pay the same as in the European army?—Yes; and length of service pay.

2011. And that you would abolish?—Yes.

2012. (*Viscount Melville.*) For what reason would you abolish the good-conduct pay?—I think that a pension is a much greater inducement to a man to behave well throughout his career.

2013. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you aware that no native soldier has any claim whatever to a pension until he is reported by a medical committee totally unfit for active service?—Yes.

2014. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you allow that system to continue?—No; I would give him a pension after 21 years.

2015. (*Chairman.*) Has there been any difficulty in enlisting for the Madras army?—None whatever.

2016. You said that a great portion of the sappers and miners in the Madras army were low-caste men, does that extend to the others?—Yes; they are almost all low caste men in the Madras army.

2017. (*Viscount Melville.*) Where is the Madras army chiefly recruited?—Wherever you can pick up men. In the northern districts principally.

2018. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) And the southern? And the southern too.

2019. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are you aware that there are men in the Madras army who have relations, brothers, in the Bengal army?—Very few, I should think, in the Madras army.

2020. Still the same class of men, if there were such men (and we have had it in evidence that there are) in both armies, would do the duties in Madras which they refuse to do in Bengal?—In Madras nobody doubts about doing his duty.

2021. There is no doubt about their going to sea? —No; there never was an objection to going to sea.

2022. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You said, I think, that you would advise enlisting men for limited service. For what period would you have them enlisted? —I think for 21 years.

2023. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) With a certain pension at the expiration of that time?—Yes.

2024. Should such a system be adopted how would you get native officers, because, as I understand it, a man is not promoted to be a non-commissioned officer till he has served 20 years?—I should alter that system. I would not go by seniority; I would select the native officers.

2025. You do not think that it would render the promotion to the upper ranks more difficult if you were to have the men enlisted for only 21 years?—If you chose to re-enlist them, and they chose to re-enlist, you might do it.

2026. (*Chairman.*) You say that the Madras army has never refused to go anywhere. Is there any difference in the scale of pay between a Madras sepoy and a Bengal sepoy serving at Aracan?—I do not know.

2027. Would not the Madras sepoy have higher pay because he went by sea?—He would be entitled to rations; and the Bengal sepoy probably would not, because he does not go by sea.

2028. Therefore there would be a difference between the two?—Yes.

2029. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In favour of the Madras man?—Yes.

2030. Otherwise the rate of pay in Bengal and Madras, with the exception of going to sea, is pretty much alike, is it?—Yes; seven rupees a month.

2031. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that there would be any advantage in dividing the Bengal army into two or more armies?—I should think so. Bengal is now so enormously large, that I think it would be an advantage.

2032. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How would you divide it?—I would join Scinde to the Punjaub, taking the line of the Sutlej and Indus.

2033. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you mean that you would divide the territory into two, and make a fourth presidency?—Yes.

2034. Do you think that it would be an advantage to increase the armies of the minor presidencies, so as to make the four armies nearly equal?—I do not think you would want to increase them much.

2035. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you give the Madras army any more territory to occupy?—Yes; up to Saugur, and the Bombay army up to Mhow.

2036. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that there is an advantage in maintaining separate armies?—I think the greatest possible advantage.

2037. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) In looking at the map, does not it appear to you that placing the Madras army towards Saugur will be the most effectual means of supporting the Bengal army in the event of its being required?—Yes; the Madras force would be the support in the Saugur and Nerbuddah, and the bombay force at Mhow and Neemuch.

2038. (*Major-General Hancock.*) The officers of the Bengal army have had some great advantages, have they not, in respect of emoluments for appointments over the officers of the other presidencies?—Yes; but efforts were made of late years to equalize the advantages. Lord Dalhousie made no distinction between the different armies; it has been my duty to submit to him the names both of Bombay and Madras officers for appointments in the irregular corps of upper

Col. O. Felix.
25th Aug. 1858.

India; though from better acquaintance with the language and the country, and from claims of service, the proportion of Bengal officers employed was much greater.

2039. Do you not think that the armies of the minor presidencies have been at a disadvantage in consequence of the Bengal army having been so very much larger?—I think so. It was the most important army.

2040. (*Chairman.*) Although you would have separate armies, you would place them all exactly on the same footing?—Yes; as regards pay.

2041. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not think it desirable in all respects to place the armies of the three or four presidencies upon exactly the same terms?—Yes; as far as possible.

2042. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Still keeping up the presidential armies?—Yes.

2043. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) How would you do that as regards the appointments?—I would give the same pay for the same appointments.

2044. (*Major-General Hancock.*) If you equalized the armies I suppose there would be no difficulty in equalizing the emoluments of the appointments?—I think there would be no difficulty, if the armies can be equalized.

2045. You are aware that the principle upon which larger emoluments are annexed to staff and other appointments in the Bengal army is that of a greater responsibility attaching to them?—I am.

2046. Are you aware that the Government of India has constantly carried out the principle of equalization, when it involved a reduction of staff or other allowances, under the Madras and Bombay presidencies, and has refused to admit the principle when it involved an increase?—I have heard it so stated.

2047. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) There is no reason for it?—Not the slightest, except it be on the principle of larger responsibility.

2048. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that any change is required in the system of promotion as regards the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?—I would promote them entirely by selection. Of course, if the senior officer was the best I would promote him, but I would not bind myself to do so.

2049. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) What has been the custom in the Madras army?—Selection at first; a man is made a naik, and after that if he is fit to be promoted he is promoted; but if there is anything against him, another is selected.

2050. Would you give the promotion of the native officers to the officer commanding the regiment, or allow him to have a direct influence in their appointment, or would you leave it to the Commander-in-chief?—I would let the commanding officer recommend.

2051. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you not aware that that is the existing system?—Yes.

2052. Does not the commanding officer of the regiment in every case nominate from the non-commissioned to the commissioned ranks, and send up the name to the Commander-in-chief?—Yes.

2053. (*Chairman.*) Are all the native officers of the Madras army selected from the non-commissioned officers?—Yes.

2054. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that that is a good system?—Yes.

2055. You do not think that it could be improved?—No.

2056. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the commanding officers should have more power than they now have to reward and punish?—I think they should; promotion is the great reward which they ought to have the power of bestowing; their recommendation should always be attended to.

2057. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is that the case in the Madras presidency; have you reason to suppose that their recommendations are always attended to?—I have; but you will have better information upon that point.

2058. (*Chairman.*) What is the power which the commanding officers have with regard to punishments in the Madras army, as respects the native troops?—They have courts-martial.

2059. (*Major-General Hancock.*) They have also the power of awarding summary punishment for minor offences, have they not?—Yes; drill, and punishments of that kind.

2060. There is the same power for all three presidencies?—Yes.

2061. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) What are the courts-martial composed of, European or native officers?—Native officers.

2062. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you aware that in the Bengal presidency any restriction has been placed upon officers commanding regiments, with regard to the powers vested in them by the native articles of war, to carry out sentences of corporal punishment or to inflict minor punishments for slight offences; have they been interfered with and overruled by authority from head quarters, or from the government of India?—I am not aware of the restriction.

2063. Do you know nothing of any circular having been issued within the last eight or ten years under the authority of the Commander-in-chief, or of the Government, prohibiting officers commanding regiments in Bengal from carrying out corporal punishment?—No, I do not.

2064. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is it the system in Madras that the native soldier is permitted to present a petition to the Commander-in-chief, without its going through his commanding officer, or the officer commanding his company?—It ought not to be done; it is entirely against the orders of the army, but it is done.

2065. The orders are not enforced?—I fear not always.

2066. Do you not think that a very bad system?—Of course it is.

2067. Do you not think that those orders ought to be scrupulously attended to?—Certainly.

2068. Is it your opinion, as a military man, that that practice would shake discipline almost more than anything?—Certainly.

2069. And there is no particular reason why it should be allowed for the natives if it is not allowed, as we know it is not, for the Europeans?—There has been a great laxity in that respect; memorials have been sent home to the Court. I have known a commanding officer write a memorial home to the Court against the Commander-in-chief.

2070. Surely that would strike at the root of all discipline of any army, would it not?—Yes, but the Court of Directors have rather encouraged it; at least they have always allowed it, and I have known that case of a commanding officer writing a memorial against his Commander-in-chief to the Court of Directors.

2071. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Then he must send it through the regular channel?—Yes.

2072. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you mean a memorial against the Commander-in-chief, or against the decision passed by the Commander-in-chief?—Against a decision passed by the Commander-in-chief. This commanding officer preferred charges against one of his officers. The Commander-in-chief went into the question, found that a court-martial was not required, and settled the case, but the commanding officer refused to submit to the decision of his Commander-in-chief, and forwarded a memorial to the Court against it.

2073. (*Colonel Burlton.*) But he did it through the regular channel?—Yes.

2074. Would you deprive officers of the power of making an appeal against what they thought an unfair decision?—It is unheard-of in the Queen's army for an officer to dispute the authority of the Commander-in-chief, but it is not so in the Indian army. The Commander-in-chief decided that question,

Col. O. Felix.
25th Aug. 1858.

and I think the memorial was the most unmilitary proceeding I ever heard of.

2075. (*Lord Stanley.*) Do you not conceive that in any case of such an appeal the greatest weight would be given to the opinion of the Commander-in-chief, and that it would only be in the event of that opinion being obviously erroneous that a reversal or modification of it would be allowed?—But in this very case there was no punishment to the Officer; the answer which came from the Court was to say that he was wrong in what he did, and that was all. It was a very bad example, and most injurious to the discipline of the army.

2076. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You see no objection to the appeal, provided that if it is a frivolous one it is dealt with severity?—If such an appeal as I have mentioned be made and prove frivolous, it should certainly be dealt with very severely.

2077. But in the case to which you allude there was no severity at all?—Not the slightest severity.

2078. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that there should be any admixture of European and native forces, either regimentally or by brigade?—By brigade generally, but I have thought that it would not be a bad plan to attach four companies of natives to every European regiment in Bengal, as an experiment, with the view of bringing them together and giving them the feeling of comrades. Whenever natives and Europeans do get together they become good friends.

2079. (*Viscount Melville.*) It was proposed yesterday to attach a native squadron to each regiment of cavalry, you would put the native companies in the same way to European regiments?—Yes, I should be disposed to do so as an experiment.

2080. (*Chairman.*) Would you make any distinction in the duties done by the regiment of which those natives formed a part?—The natives would take all the day duties. In cantonments and in camps there are a great many day duties and police duties which the Europeans cannot take.

2081. In other points you would not have the natives inferior to the troops who were serving?—Not in the least; my wish would be to bring them together, to make them friendly, that is the object which I should have. I think that if you did so you would find that these natives would pick up English.

2082. As those men would form part of the same regiment if you armed them with an inferior weapon to that which the rest of the regiment had, it would require two sets of ammunition, and the very greatest disadvantage must follow; what would you do with regard to that?—I would still give them the plain musket, I hold very much to that.

2083. (*Lord Stanley.*) And yet with that inferior weapon you would call upon the native part of the same regiment to do the same duty which the European part did?—Yes, in quarters.

2084. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In action would you expect the four companies of natives whom you propose to attach to the Europeans to do the same duties as the Europeans?—I do not know whether the plan which I propose would be good or not, but in action each weapon would have its fitting use, as was the case in the Queen's army when the rifles were brigaded with other regiments.

2085. You have a doubt about it?—I only suggested whether it would be worth trying it as an experiment.

2086. But you think that there would be an objection?—I think that there might be an objection in regard to the two sorts of ammunition.

2087. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Have you not heard that between the British soldiers and the native army of Bengal there is the greatest comradeship?—I have heard that the Europeans and natives that served at Jullalabad were the greatest friends possible, and my suggestion was made with a view of fostering this feeling.

2088. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would not the same result be obtained, with perhaps less objection, if it were done, as it has hitherto been done, by brigades?—It might, but the men would not be brought so much together as if they served under the same commanding officer.

2089. Do you not think that if a real brigade system were more carried out in India as elsewhere, it would be an advantage to the service in general, and in its results might produce the effect of bringing certain regiments permanently on duty together?—Yes, it might do so.

2090. (*Viscount Melville.*) Under whose command would you place these four companies of natives?—Under the command of the officer commanding the European regiment.

2091. Then how is the same commanding officer to carry on discipline, seeing that the articles of war for Europeans are totally different from those for natives?—I do not see any difficulty in it.

2092. You are aware that the articles of war for the Queen's troops and those for the natives are totally different?—Yes.

2093. Then how is the commanding officer of a Queen's regiment knowing nothing of the articles of war for the native army to carry on discipline?—But he would know them, I conclude he ought to know them.

The witness withdrew.

Major-Gen. Sir S. W. Steel, K.C.B.

Major-General Sir SCUDAMORE W. STEEL, K.C.B., examined.

2094. (*Chairman.*) You are a major-general, I believe?—I am.

2095. How long have you been in the service?—I sailed for India on the 4th of March 1806.

2096. How many years have you been in India?—I left in April 1856. I was there all that time, nearly 50 years.

2097. In what presidency have you served?—Madras.

2098. In what arm of the service?—Infantry.

2099. Of course you have had many opportunities of seeing European and native troops?—I have been employed upon the staff for more than 40 years in all ranks and all grades.

2100. Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion of European to native troops which ought to be employed in Madras?—I have not exactly done so, because I received from the Commissioners a memorandum entirely regarding Bengal.

2101. It would be of great advantage to us if you would give us to your opinions regarding Bengal. What proportion of European forces do you think should be employed in India?—I have not considered that question.

2102. In your opinion what should be the proportion of Europeans to natives in Bengal?—One to three. I think that the number of Europeans should be 40,000 to 120,000 natives.

2103. In your opinion is that the amount of force which will be required in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled?—I should say from 160,000 to 200,000, exclusive of artillery, horse and foot.

2104. Do you consider that the native force should be on the regular or the irregular system, or both combined?—Both combined.

2105. Do you apply that both to Bengal and to Madras?—To all.

2106. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that there ought to be more irregular force in Madras for instance?—Yes, it would be useful, but they are not with the regular army; they are always with the contingents, there are some at Hyderabad, and a few at Nagpoor.

Major-Gen. Sir S. W. Steel, K.C.B.

25th Aug. 1858.

2107. (*Chairman.*) In the proportion of one to three, which you have stated as the proportion which in your opinion ought to exist between the Europeans and the natives; do you take into consideration the police at all?—No.

2108. Are you in favour of the employment of a police force for doing the duty which is now done by the native regiments?—They might do everything except that which is done by the troops as a regular army.

2109. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would give some of the duties now performed by the regular army to a police force?—A great many of them.

2110. You think that that would be an advantage?—Yes.

2111. What sort of duties would you give to the police?—The gaol duties and the escort duties, many of them.

2112. (*Chairman.*) Having a police force to do those duties, would you reduce the proportion which you have now stated of natives to Europeans?—No.

2113. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You would take the police into account?—Yes, separately.

2114. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Would you make the police military or civil?—They must be under the civil government.

2115. Would you drill them as soldiers, or make them an ordinary police force. I am speaking of the rural police?—I think they might be civil altogether.

2116. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think it better that they should be civil altogether?—I should say so if they are confined to those duties.

2117. (*Chairman.*) Taking the proportion of three natives to one European, would you make any difference in the manner in which you would arm them?—I would make an exception as to the Enfield rifle. I think that no native, either on the regular or irregular system, ought to be armed with or instructed in the use of the Enfield rifle, the Lancaster, or any other improved fire-arm.

2118. Do you consider that any native artillery should be allowed in the Bengal army?—None.

2119. Do you extend that opinion to the Madras army?—Certainly, to the whole army.

2120. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that the same system which you propose for Bengal should be, as far as practicable, introduced into the other armies?—Certainly.

2121. (*Chairman.*) Do you hold the same opinion with regard to native sappers and miners as you do respecting native artillery?—Natives are most efficient sappers and miners. The corps of sappers and miners of the Madras army wherever employed have proved themselves to possess all the requisite qualities; they are capable of great bodily exertion, are brave, zealous, and hardworking, and amenable to discipline without any scruples of caste, and under proper superintendence they are equally skilful with Europeans; they would perform an amount of labour under which European sappers within the tropics would be forced to succumb.

2122. What is the principal caste of the sappers and miners in the Madras army?—They are all of low caste.

2123. (*Colonel Burlton.*) They are the same as the old Madras pioneers?—Yes, they were transferred from the old Madras pioneers.

2124. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Have you not had great experience of the conduct of these men on service?—Yes, in Burmah, in both wars, and wherever I have been.

2125. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What would you advise as to the sappers and miners in Madras and Bombay. Would you limit the employment to men of low caste?—Yes, as sappers and miners.

2126. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you have any European sappers and miners?—Yes; but not in the same corps, except as superintendents.

2127. Would you confine the scientific duties to the Europeans, or would you allow the natives to perform the scientific duties also?—I would allow them to perform all they were capable of doing, but they would be the workmen principally, and the others would be the superintendents.

2128. Would you employ any natives in scientific duties in the arsenals?—Not of the artillery.

2129. For instance, in the making of copper caps?—No, certainly not.

2130. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You would have no native artillery whatever?—No; I would not mind their being drivers.

2131. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You would have no objection to the employment of the half coloured men, the creoles, in the arsenals in the artillery?—Certainly not; many of them are the best artificers which we have.

2132. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion?—It would be of advantage to diversify the nationalities and castes as much as possible in each regiment, so that no one caste should predominate, and natives should be accustomed to serve as far from their own homes as the service may require.

2133. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That means that you would have men enlisted for general service?—Yes.

2134. (*Chairman.*) From what you have stated before you seem to prefer the low caste men?—Yes, for sappers and miners. I do that because they have no scruples.

2135. Would you acknowledge or admit caste at all? Would you allow caste to be an excuse for the non-performance of duty?—If you have men of caste you must make allowance for their prejudices.

2136. Have you ever found caste to interfere with the performance of duties?—Undoubtedly, very often.

2137. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In what way?—Men of very high caste cannot eat their meals without undressing.

2138. (*Chairman.*) Have you found any practical inconvenience from high caste men in the performance of their duty?—Undoubtedly, on certain occasions.

2139. (*Lord Stanley.*) Will you state some of the cases in which caste has interfered with the performance of military duty? In what respect does it so interfere?—When they go on guard they cannot eat until they have stripped and washed, and they cannot cook food on board ship; they are obliged to take food not requiring to be cooked.

2140. (*Chairman.*) Have you ever found them object to going on guard or going on board ship in consequence of their caste?—Yes; to going on board ship constantly.

2141. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Your experience has been chiefly in Madras?—Yes.

2142. I thought that the Madras troops never objected to go to sea?—They sometimes do; they are allowed the option, but they generally volunteer to go.

2143. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) I dare say you recollect that during the war in which you served in Burmah in 1825 there was only one sepoy out of 25 regiments who refused to go on service?—He did not go, and he was discharged immediately. They were allowed the option, and they were allowed to fall out if they wished it.

2144. (*Major-General Hancock.*) When the Government wish to send Madras regiments on foreign service what course are they obliged to adopt; have they to ask them as a favour to go?—No.

2145. Do you mean that the Government order men to go on general service who are not liable to be sent on general service, and then wait to see whether they will obey the order or not?—No; when they were first required to go the thing was inquired into amongst the men, and they said that they would volunteer.

2146. Then the Government must communicate with the commanding officer of the corps, and ask

whether his regiment will volunteer ?—Yes ; through the adjutant-general.

2147. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Is it not expected that the Commander-in-chief will inspect such a regiment previously to the muskets being put in the chest and ascertain whether any man wishes to remain behind ?—That has been the practice.

2148. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are the Madras troops enlisted only to serve within their own presidency ?—No ; they serve wherever they are ordered, excepting on board ship.

2149. (*Colonel Burlton.*) But the unhappy man who refused to go in 1825 was dismissed ?—Yes.

2150. (*Chairman.*) I think you stated that you considered that there should be as many different nationalities and castes as possible ?—Yes.

2151. Therefore you would not recommend that the nationalities should be preserved in the shape of regiments or companies, but you think that they should be distributed promiscuously throughout ?—Yes ; no class should predominate, but one should nullify the other.

2152. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Practically in the mode of embarking regiments the Madras troops go, but they have a right to say that they will not go if they choose ?—When once they have had the option and they do not object they are then returned as deserters if they do not go.

2153. Practically it is found that they do not object ?—They do not object.

2154. (*Chairman.*) They have a right to refuse in the first instance ?—Yes; and I doubt whether a man could be punished for refusing.

2155. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) The Madras sepoy has invariably gone on service when he has been required by the Government ?—Yes ; and that has been so, long before my time. When I arrived in India in 1806 I found that men had volunteered as far back as 1796 to go to the eastern islands.

2156. When they went to Java, when they went to the Mauritius, when they went to Ceylon, and when they went to the different islands to which they have been sent, you never knew an instance except the one which I have mentioned of their refusing ?—No ; there was a demur once or twice.

2157. Do you believe that an army could be raised in India of men who would volunteer to go on service without being asked that question ?—I should say not ; that they would not go without being asked unless they were told so when they enlisted.

2158. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The question asked you is whether you could raise an army in India for general service ?—Yes ; I think so.

2159. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Men who would go on foreign service wheresoever ordered?—There must be a limit certainly. I do not think that you could ask them to go to America, or to go to England.

2160. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that there should be any alteration in the terms of enlistment ?—The code would require to be well considered. All should be enlisted for general service, and to the utmost limit to which that term has hitherto been applied in the Madras army.

2161. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What is that limit ?—That is, to go anywhere in India ; anywhere to the eastward, and to Persia.

2162. (*Chairman.*) I understood you to say that in the Madras army at the present moment they would not go without being asked ?—They will go ; but it has been the custom to ask them ; many corps have gone without any demur.

2163. You would for the future do away with even the necessity of asking the question by making it compulsory ?—I would do so ; I would not ask them the question. What was considered the limit of general service should be adopted.

2164. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Do you include China ?—Yes, anything eastward ; I would even include Persia.

2165. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Does not going beyond the continent of India come under the head of foreign service, and entitle the men to extra rations ?—It entitles them to rations whenever they go on board ship.

2166. (*Lord Stanley.*) Do you find that there is any difference between the high caste men in Madras and those in Bengal, so far as you know them, with regard to their willingness to do things which are sometimes supposed to be contrary to their caste ?—I have seen a difference.

2167. You have observed a difference ?—Yes, although they are men of the same caste, Rajpoots and Brahmins ; we have not so many Brahmins ; we have many Rajpoots ; they do not make an objection. I have known men of the same caste in Madras take their food without being allowed to undress and bathe, but they will not do so in Bengal.

2168. (*Chairman.*) From what do you suppose that difference to arise, from the difference of discipline ?—I think it is more from habit ; they see men of the same class do it in Madras, but they do not do it in Bengal, and they are ashamed, and think that they shall be accused of breaking caste.

2169. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not think that it probably arises from a greater deference being paid by the officers of the Bengal army to caste than in Madras ?—I do not think that, but that by standing out they are allowed to have their way.

2170. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then you think that it is a question of discipline as much as anything ?—Not exactly that, it is deference to caste, in fact.

2171. Is not deference to caste, if it is found practically to exempt a man from doing what he is ordered, a want of discipline ?—I think that it will not be done unless it is the habit ; that it will not be done by any one person.

2172. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Perhaps you mean that the sepoys of the Bengal army have been rather more indulged than in the other presidencies ?—Yes.

2173. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You are aware, I dare say, that almost from the origin of our possession of India the Madras army were employed against Frenchmen, and that their habits became much more soldierlike than in the lower part of Bengal, from that very circumstance ?—Yes.

2174. (*Major-General Hancock.*) The same predilection for high caste men has not obtained among the officers of the Madras army as in Bengal ?—That is so.

2175. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Do not they consider the Brahmins of Bengal a higher caste than the Brahmins of Madras ?—The highest caste of all are those of Seringum and Ramisseram near Ceylon.

2176. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that by degrees any difficulty as to the performance of duty on account of caste might be broken through ?—I think it might be by degrees, and by telling the men on their enlisting, "You will have to do this."

2177. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that if it is clearly put to a man before he enlists, you are then justified in making him do what you order, and not allowing him to come forward with caste as an excuse ?—Just so.

2178. But it must be clearly put to him ?—Yes, and he must understand it on enlistment.

2179. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Do you think that a law of that sort would at all militate against the recruiting of the army ?—It would at first, but not afterwards.

2180. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that it might be introduced by degrees ?—Yes.

2181. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that there would be any advantage in dividing the Bengal army into two or more armies ?—There might be an advantage I think in dividing it into two ; it is so very extensive. I think that the Punjaub might have one army, and the lower part of Bengal another army.

2182. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Will you explain the reason of that opinion ?—Because it is so difficult to communicate with head quarters.

Major-Gen. Sir S. W. Steel, K.C.B.

25th Aug. 1858.

2183. But supposing they put the head-quarters half way, say, at Agra or one of those places, would you then allow the command to remain under the same Commander-in-chief?—It might be done in that case; but there is a vast disadvantage in the Commander-in-chief being at a distance; we found that in Burmah, where we could not get an answer from him under three months.

2184. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*)—Do you think that it would be of advantage to have two Commanders-in-chief in the same presidency?—No; but then they must be divided into two separate integral armies, the same as in Madras and Bombay.

2185. Do you think that those two separate armies would work so well together by being under two heads as by being under one?—You would have one part do one duty, and the other the other.

2186. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Has any inconvenience that you are aware of been found from Madras and Bombay troops serving with Bengal troops?—None whatever.

2187. (*Chairman.*) Although you recommend separate armies, I suppose you would have them under the same system?—Yes, and under one general Commander-in-chief for India.

2188. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that that is of importance?—Yes. There would be four armies instead of three.

2189. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not think that it might be of advantage to make the armies nearly of equal strength, instead of allowing one army to be so immensely disproportionate to the others?—I did not calculate upon altering the system of the army.

2190. Do you not think that an advantage would be gained to the State by having armies of nearly equal strength, instead of having one army of 100,000 men and another of 30,000?—In some things I think it would.

2191. Do you not think that the late combination of the Bengal army would have been prevented if, instead of its being so large an army, it had consisted of two separate armies?—Undoubtedly; it would not have been so general.

2192. They would not have fraternized so readily one with the other?—I think not; they would not have been so connected.

2193. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider the number of European officers now attached to the native regiments to be sufficient?—If they were present they would be amply sufficient.

2194. But you consider that there is some inconvenience in having them detached for civil duty?—Not when there are only a few of them so detached, but when the number is so numerous as has often been the case, it occasions inconvenience; in some instances there have only been three or four regimental officers present.

2195. Are they not all looking forward to civil employment?—Of course they are.

2196. Does not that in some way interfere with their military duties?—No; it does, perhaps, make them look forward to something of that sort, and render them somewhat discontented.

2197. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you like to see a staff corps established to obviate that difficulty?—I am not sure that it would answer; I do not know how it would be arranged.

2198. On the principle of the engineer corps, in the mode in which the engineer officers are formed into a corps without men?—If that were established and it were known when officers were posted, it might answer, but then how would the selection be made from the present army for the staff? There would be a difficulty there.

2199. (*Major-General Hancock.*) It would involve an entire alteration of the system of promotion throughout the army, would it not?—Entirely, and it would have to be regulated differently.

2200. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Do you think it necessary that a certain number of European officers should always be with the native regiments?—Undoubtedly.

2201. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How many?—One to a company at least.

2202. You think that the present establishment if kept complete with the regiments would be sufficient?—Perfectly sufficient.

2203. Having regard to officers being sick, and so on, you would like to keep the present establishment complete?—Taking the whole number of captains and subalterns, and so on, it perhaps would give three to a company. I do not think so many are necessary.

2204. But one to a company ought always to be present?—I think so.

2205. That then would amount to about ten?—And there would be the staff.

2206. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Do you approve of the principle on which the officers are removed from the regiments for employment in the civil service?—It is to their individual advantage, but not to the advantage of the army.

2207. You say that there ought to be a certain number with the regiment. Supposing that the remainder are put on the staff, would you keep those as officers not belonging to the regiment, but on the staff, in a separate list?—I think that the difficulty would be in arranging that, making a staff corps of them.

2208. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) May I ask you your opinion as to whom you would think the most effective staff officer; an officer selected for his abilities from a regiment, or one selected from a corps, called a staff corps, who had not been in the habit of serving with soldiers?—I should say the man selected for his abilities, certainly.

2209. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you object to a system being introduced by which after a man had performed and well performed regimental duty, and was selected for staff employment, he should be put in some staff corps and struck off the roll of his regiment, his place being filled up of course by another officer?—I would not object to it. I think that he ought to have the option of giving up.

2210. Suppose that he has that option?—If it is done with his own consent, it will be for his own advantage, and he cannot object to it afterwards.

2211. Do you think that such a system would be an advantage to the service?—Yes, I do.

2212. (*Viscount Melville.*) If this officer, who is employed upon civil duty, is struck off the roll of his regiment, how do you propose that his promotion is to go on?—I spoke of a staff corps; my answer did not refer to an officer employed on civil duty, because he would then give up promotion altogether.

2213. In either case, you say that he must give up promotion?—He would give up promotion in one regiment, and get it in the other.

2214. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that any change is required in the system of promotion, as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?—The present seniority system in Bengal, which requires a roll to be kept, to show the relative position of every private native soldier, should be entirely remodelled.

2215. In what way would you remodel it?—By giving promotion in the way in which it is done in Madras, for instance.

2216. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In what way is it done in Madras?—The very lowest of all, namely, the lance-naik, who is a lance-corporal, is selected by his company officer.

2217. That is to say, that the promotion to the lower grades of non-commissioned officers goes in companies?—The first selection is made by the company officer.

2218. (*Chairman.*) Am I to understand that the promotion of the Madras army is by selection, and not by seniority?—Certainly, the first promotion is by selection, and afterwards it is by seniority, unless there is any objection, but there is no rule. The

lance-naik or the lance-corporal is made a corporal, then he is in the line of corporals, and from the corporals a man is selected not by seniority.

2219. In the Madras army the system of promotion is by selection, whereas in the Bengal army it has been entirely by seniority ?—Yes.

2220. (*Viscount Melville.*) I presume that the seniority system prevails so far much the same as it does in Her Majesty's service, namely, that where a sergeant or corporal is the senior on the list, the commanding officer promotes him if there is no objection to him ?—They can claim it, I believe, in Bengal.

2221. I am asking as to Madras ; in the Madras army, as I understand you, the company officer names the lance-naik ?—Yes.

2222. Is that lance-naik the oldest sepoy in the company ?—No.

2223. He may take any that he chooses ?—Yes.

2224. And after that the commanding officer names the most fit man to be sergeant ?—In general they keep it to the companies, but the selection is made in the adjutant's office.

2225. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the commanding officers should have more power than they have to reward and punish, for instance, the power of selecting for promotion or of punishing for crime ?—They have a certain power now ; a man can be ordered to do extra duty, and so on ; he cannot be flogged.

2226. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Why cannot he be flogged ?—Not by the commanding officer's order.

2227. (*Chairman.*) Has that power been interfered with in the Bengal army by means of circulars ?—It has been interfered with in all the armies in India, I think. In Madras it is in the same way, it is by a letter from the adjutant-general.

2228. Do you think that that matter should be restored to its original state, or that it should remain as it is now ?—I do not see any objection to its remaining as it is now, as far as I know in Madras.

2229. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In what way is it in Madras ?—It is very seldom interfered with, it is sometimes ; I have known the adjutant-general to interfere with the decision of the commanding officer.

2230. Have you known of corporal punishment being inflicted in Madras ?—Certainly not.

2231. You never inflict it ?—We never inflict it ourselves ; no commanding officer does so, except by sentence of courts-martial.

2232. By sentence of court-martial they can inflict in Madras corporal punishment ?—Yes, undoubtedly.

2233. Have they done it ?—Constantly.

2234. And it has not been interfered with ?—No.

2235. Are you aware that that has not been allowed to take place in Bengal ?—I am not.

2236. (*Chairman.*) Has a soldier in the Madras army the power of appealing from the punishment of the commanding officer, and demanding a court-martial ?—Certainly he has.

2237. Does he exercise the power of petitioning without going through the commanding officer ?—They ought not to do so, but they have done so ; they are not allowed by regulation to do it.

2238. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that they ought to be allowed to do so ?—I should have no objection to it under proper regulation. *Major-Gen. Sir S. W. Steel, K.C.B.* 25th Aug. 1858.

2239. Am I to understand that you would not object to a man appealing without going through his commanding officer ?—Yes. I would object to it without going through his commanding officer.

2240. Have they not been in the habit of doing that ?—They have done so sometimes.

2241. Do you approve of that ?—No.

2242. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Has the Commander-in-chief in Madras allowed that system ?—He has not allowed the system, but it has been done sometimes.

2243. Has he punished the men when they have done it ?—Sometimes he has not.

2244. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you of opinion that a private or a non-commissioned officer has a right to demand a court-martial ?—The right is not acknowledged.

2245. Then is it not a right ?—It is not a right.

2246. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) It is considered as a right ?—No, but it has been done.

2247. But you consider that an irregularity ?—Of course it is so.

2248. And you think it a serious irregularity ?—A man is liable to punishment for it ; he may be brought to court-martial for it.

2249. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that there should be any admixture of European and native forces either regimentally or by brigade; would you attach any proportion, for instance, of natives to a European regiment ?—Not at all regimentally, certainly.

2250. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You have served with Bengal troops, I believe, a good deal, as well as with Madras troops ?—I have served with them in Burmah in 1824-26 and 1852-55.

2251. Have you observed a great difference of system between those two native armies ?—Of course there is a vast difference.

2252. In what respect ?—In the privilege of caste and generally in the way of performing duty ; we in Madras have thought that in Bengal they were more lax in their system with the men; they allow so many more men to undress than we do, and so many more men to go away for their food.

2253. In other words you think that the discipline in Bengal has been less severe ?—Yes.

2254. Do you attribute to some extent the difference between the Madras and Bengal armies to the permission which is given to the Madras men to have their women and families with them ?—I think that that is an advantage, because it binds them so much more.

2255. Would you like to see that system introduced into Bengal ?—I dare say they would not like it.

2256. But is it your opinion that it would be an advantage ?—I think so.

2257. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You are aware that divisions both of the Madras and Bombay native armies have been serving against the mutineers in the north-western provinces ?—Yes.

2258. Do you know that they have done good service and been perfectly loyal during their employment against the mutineers in Bengal ?—As far as I know.

The witness withdrew.

Major-General Robert Alexander examined. *Major-Gen. R. Alexander*

2259. (*Chairman.*) You are a major-general in the Indian army ?—I am.

2260. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Were you adjutant-general ?—I was.

2261. (*Chairman.*) How long have you been in the service ?—About 30 years in active service.

2262. How many years of that period have been passed in India ?—Almost the whole of it, and with a very slight exception always in the Madras presidency. On first going to India I served for a short time in the Bombay presidency, but that was when I was a very young officer.

2263. In what arm of the service have you been ?—In the infantry and on the staff.

2264. And you have served as adjutant-general in the Madras army ?—Yes, for ten years.

2265. Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion which the Europeans should bear to the native troops ?—I have.

Major-Gen. R. Alexander.

25th Aug. 1858.

2266. What proportion do you consider that the Europeans should bear to the native troops?—The European troops over all India should be in that proportion, that when a force is formed for field service, it should, as a general rule, be able to take the field in the proportion of one European to three native infantry regiments; the cavalry and the artillery being relatively in their proper proportions.

2267. By that answer you would have native artillerymen?—Some, I would have. I would have about as many as they have in the Madras army; but in Bengal and Bombay, I think they had much too large a proportion. The establishments of the three armies are:—

	BENGAL.	MADRAS.	BOMBAY.
Troops of horse artillery -	13	6	4
Companies of Europeans -	24	16	8
„ of Golundauze -	18	8	12

Of the Madras horse artillery, two troops are natives; but I do not know how many native troops are in Bengal or Bombay. The native artillery have much esprit de corps and pride in their profession, and at Madras they have been distinguished by their loyalty. There are duties and occasions to which native artillery are peculiarly suited, and upon which their employment would prevent a great and unnecessary loss of European life, and greater expenditure of public money.

2268. Your first answer was that you would have them in the same proportion as the infantry and cavalry; that is, one European to three natives?—In increasing the Indian artillery I would fix the present proportion of natives that exists at Madras, as a maximum quantity not to be exceeded; all future increase being in Europeans.

2269. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Your saying that you would have "some" native artillerymen would lead one to imply that you would have fewer native than European artillerymen?—Most certainly.

2270. (*Viscount Melville.*) I understood you to say, one European regiment to three native regiments, and native artillery in the same proportion?—I would have three European batteries to one native battery.

2271. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You just invert the order as regards artillery?—Just so, as the corps now stands; but I would have its increase to be in Europeans.

2272. Do you mean that you would have one-fourth of the cavalry and infantry European?—I would have the means of putting in the field one European infantry regiment to three native regiments, or two Europeans to five natives, according to the nature and emergencies of the service to be performed. I do not think that so large a proportion of European cavalry is required.

2273. (*Chairman.*) Would you make any difference in the manner in which you would arm the natives from that in which you would arm the Europeans?—None at all.

2274. And you would give them all the best arms which you could possibly procure?—I would give them all the best arms that could be made.

2275. (*Major-General Hancock.*) And the highest military training?—Yes; we shall never find safety in the inefficiency of our army, and showing the natives that we suspect their loyalty: they will not become better subjects by merely making them worse soldiers.

2276. (*Chairman.*) Would you extend the proportion which you have mentioned to sappers and miners?—I would not have European sappers and miners at all in the Indian army, except as non-commissioned officers. They would neither be efficient in the climate, nor justify the expense. I believe that from the natives of India you can form a most efficient body of sappers and miners, equal to any duty; and that we have such in Madras.

2277. Your opinion is formed upon the sappers and miners of the Madras army?—Precisely so, but I cannot speak so confidently regarding those of Bengal.

2278. I believe they are almost all of low caste?—Yes, generally; there are Mahomedans among them, and numbers of the artizan and respectable classes.

2279. (*Lord Stanley.*) I suppose their being low-caste men in the first instance was not owing to any preference on the part of the Government for such men, but because they were the only men who would undertake to fulfil the conditions of the service?—I presume so. The regiment was originally a pioneer corps; the men were enlisted to perform every duty incidental to such an arm; many, indeed most, of which are repugnant to a man of high caste. Madras pioneers have in former wars done what Bengal men objected to.

2280. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are the non-commissioned officers of the sappers Europeans?—The sappers and miners trained in this country are sent out as non-commissioned officers to India, and attached to the sappers and miners, but they have their own native commissioned and non-commissioned officers besides.

2281. (*Chairman.*) Have you formed any opinion as to the amount of force which will be required when the present mutiny is at an end?—There I must fall back upon opinions which I have formed long since. My own impression is that our system of dealing with our troops in India has been a very faulty one; that we have scattered them about in small parties; and thus endangered their discipline; that we have harassed them with duties upon which they ought never to have been employed, and I have often, under the different Commanders-in-chief with whom I have served, brought to their consideration that there ought to be more concentration of our forces. As regards the question before me now, I would say generally that for Upper India, which I will suppose to embrace the whole Bengal presidency, north of the Nerbudda, and from Calcutta to Peshawur, the system which appears to me advisable would be to have three or four large military bases from which operations could be carried out along radii in any direction in India. I would have the principal one somewhere about Meerut, and there I would have the head-quarters of the artillery, with the principal depôts and magazines, and a force of not less than about 8,000 infantry, with cavalry in proportion. I can only state these things generally, because there is a great deal of local and topographical information required, in which I feel myself to be deficient; but, looking from thence northward, I would take somewhere about Almora as one position, and Loodianah as another. North of the Sutlej, I would have a strong force at Lahore, and posts both at Peshawur and in the vicinity of Attock. That would be the general view which I should give of occupying strategetically the country lying in the large triangle between the Himalayas, the Indus, and the Vindya range of mountains. South of that, at about Allahabad, I would have a large proportionate force with suitable depôts and artillery, having the command of both the Jumna and Ganges. Again, at about Moorshedabad, looking eastward, I would have a third grand military position, with outposts towards the Nepaul country, and further south and east as political and local circumstances might indicate. With these three great bases taken up, with railway communication, and the command of all the rivers of Upper India, your great forces would have easy communication with each other, and with the intermediate garrisons and cantonments, so that you could move out an overwhelming body of troops wherever it might be necessary, particularly towards the north-western frontiers. Calcutta, with a strong garrison, would be the entrepôt for receiving and forwarding all military supplies which could not be more conveniently sent by the Indus. Nepaul being on one flank, and the independent native states on another, other measures for the tranquillity and military occupation of India must be dependent upon political arrangement.

2282. (*Viscount Melville.*) Would you have no post between Lahore and Attock? Do not you think

that Jelum is a better position than Attock?—Very probably; it is more central, and lies better between Lahore and Peshawur. I can only give my general idea. I confess to want of local knowledge of Upper India.

2283. (*Chairman.*) What number of troops do you consider would be necessary?—At Meerut I should say certainly not less than 8,000 infantry.

2284. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) We want the number generally?—Speaking as to the whole of Upper India, I should doubt whether you could do with less than 60 or 70 regiments of native infantry, supposing that you increased the European force beyond what it was before the Crimean war in Europe.

2285. (*Chairman.*) What is the amount of European force which you would consider necessary?—I should suppose at least from 25 to 30 regiments of European infantry ought to be in the Bengal presidency, and five or six regiments of cavalry.

2286. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Including Lahore?—Yes, including the whole. In carrying on my view it would be necessary to have a fourth force north of the Nerbuddah, in the neighbourhood of Saugur, for the whole of that part of Central India; and, of course, about Mithenkote and Mooltan you must have positions held in strength. The desert which runs along the left bank of the Indus is a sufficient safeguard as far as it extends. As a rough estimate, submitted under a full sense of liability to error, I should suppose that a disposition of regiments of European infantry might be made somewhat on this scale, viz.:—At Agra, two or three regiments; Almorah, one; Loodianah, two; Lahore, two; Peshawur, one; Attock, one; Allahabad, two or three; stations around Agra, four; Moorshedabad, two or three; stations around Moorshedabad, three; Saugur, one; stations around Saugur, two; Calcutta, one; and of cavalry, at Agra, one or two regiments; at Loodianah, one; at Lahore, one; at Allahabad, one; and one at Saugur.

2287. (*Chairman.*) In your proportion of 1 to 3, do you take into consideration the police force at all?—I am supposing that in future a police force will be organized, to take from the army those very objectionable detached duties to which officers and men have been hitherto exposed.

2288. In what proportion would you have the police to the army?—That is very much of a civil question. There is nothing in which India is more sadly deficient than a system of police, and in proportion to its future good organization and efficiency may the numerical strength and location of the army be regulated. It is a most important subject, very difficult to condense in a short answer.

2289. I mean merely in reference to those portions of the duties which are now done by the army which you propose to transfer to the police.—I have never made an estimate. It would be a very difficult calculation to make in this country, because it would require a knowledge of every district, the state of the inhabitants, and what police they would require for their protection and subordination. I have the strongest conviction that our army ought to be organized with a view to ultra Indian eventualities.

2290. Between these large positions which you recommend to be taken up you would have the intermediate duty to be done by the police?—Yes; but I would also have smaller military stations where necessary. The idea which I have in my mind is, that for the military occupation of India we ought to hold it in great strength in commanding positions, having open communication with each other, and so that you can immediately come down upon any part of the country, or throw your forces forward to your frontiers.

2291. Do you imagine that your plan for the military occupation of India would render necessary a less force than there has been hitherto in India?—Gradually I think it would. My own impression is that you must take into account in India many moral considerations. A European regiment there is looked to, not as a body of so many hundred men more or less, but its influence is felt upon the natives as a foreign power which may be brought against them at any time, and the soldiers as a race of beings, in military prowess and prestige, superior to themselves. When India is quiet I would never have a European regiment more than 800 strong, but each with a reserve in this country of 400 men, from which I would send out, not raw undisciplined recruits, but trained soldiers, not one of whom should be under 21 years of age. Such a system would secure greater efficiency and a judicious economy. I also consider that a European cavalry regiment need not be more than 500 strong, with its reserve doing duty in this country ready to reinforce it.

2292. I think you stated that you considered that there would be 25,000 or 30,000 Europeans in the Bengal presidency alone, besides cavalry and artillery, which would be in a much larger proportion to the natives than the infantry, and still you think it would require not so many troops as before?—I will put it in another way, which perhaps will make my idea clearer, say that there would be from 20 to 25 or from 25 to 30 European regiments of infantry. I do not think that you require European cavalry in the same proportion, and that you do require more artillery than has been hitherto maintained.

2293. You are talking of the Bengal presidency alone?—Yes; but still I would apply these principles generally to all India. In other parts of India I do not think that you require so many Europeans. Looking to its western frontiers, I consider that Bombay requires a large European force.

2294. There would be 25 regiments of infantry in the Bengal presidency, and what proportion of cavalry and artillery?—For artillery, which I think a most important branch, and one which has been sadly neglected in India, I would have a permanent establishment of four guns to every regular regiment of infantry, or say to every 1,000 men.

2295. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is there not a very large proportion?—Not too large, if we consider the garrison defence of the country, and having a force available to take the field. Adverting to European organization of armies, and their improved ordnance, it will be barely sufficient, and certainly not too much. I know that in the late wars, so entirely exhausted was the Indian artillery, that if they had continued we could not have supplied batteries. In the Affghan war we had formed, in the Madras presidency, the very last battery that we could, with any claim to prudence, have spared for foreign service, by drawing away the gunners from other companies, and rendering them inefficient. The general orders of the Bengal army showed that the same expedient was had recourse to in that presidency. As it is now, our artillery in India is inadequately manned and inadequately horsed.

2296. (*Major-General Hancock.*) And inadequately officered too?—Yes. A royal troop of horse artillery has 236 men and 248 horses. A Madras troop has 115 men and 164 horses. A royal field battery has 236 men and 210 horses. A Madras battery, with the native drivers, has 176 men and 130 horses. The royal artillery has officers in proportion to the men.

2297. (*Chairman.*) Then do you propose to have four guns to each battalion upon the same footing as the royal artillery?—I would.

2298. (*Viscount Melville.*) How would you have the batteries, of four guns instead of six?—I would have the batteries of eight guns. There are objections to a six-gun battery. You must consider that batteries in India have to be divided, and if you have a battery of six guns there is a brigade and a half instead of two brigades of guns, which latter is a very efficient force to send with a brigade of infantry on service.

2299. (*Major-General Hancock.*) They are commonly two, divided into two guns to a station?—Yes, but I have known one gun sent on service, which is contrary to the principle laid down by the Duke of

Major-Gen. R. Alexander.

25th Aug. 1858.

Wellington. It was in consequence of seeing that mistake made of sending one gun, that in the Madras General Regulations there is an order never to send less than a brigade of guns on field service. Breaking up companies and batteries of artillery into small permanent detachments is, in my opinion, injurious to their discipline and efficiency, and ought to be more avoided than it is.

2300. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the native force should be on the regular or the irregular system, or both combined ?—The regiments of which I have been speaking, I would have all regular regiments ; but I believe that auxiliary to them, both for military and political reasons, it is necessary that you should have irregular corps. I would have the regular army as it has always been.

2301. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Even the cavalry ?—Yes, I would have regular cavalry ; I believe that in India we must always anticipate the possibility of being brought into contact with European armies, and that irregular cavalry would not do to charge against European regulars. We have weight in India in men, we have weight and blood in horses, and we have a good spirit in the men if they are properly treated ; I would therefore always have a proportionate regular service of cavalry to bring into the field against any regulars to which it might be necessary to oppose them.

2302. (*Chairman.*) Your proportion then of one in four of Europeans is exclusive of these irregular regiments ?—Yes, I would have a sufficient number of irregulars for foraging, for covering baggage, and many duties, relief from which would afford a powerful body of the regular and heavier cavalry to be brought forward in action. Many circumstances arise in India for which irregulars are best adapted, and in which their places would be very ill, if at all, supplied by European troops. The irregular cavalry is composed of some of the finest soldiers in India, and has been the favourite service of many of our most distinguished officers. The names of Sutherland, Skinner, Davis, Spiller, Pedlar, Wilkinson, Jacob, and Tait, and the brilliant services of the Hindostanee, Deckanee, Poonah, and Scinde horse are familiar to all who know the history of Indian service for the last forty years. In the present condition of India, it is also good policy to have these native officers and men in our service and pay, rather than that they should be unemployed, impoverished, disaffected, and ready for any desperate hazard of a change.

2303. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would not put them in line ?—No.

2304. You would consider them entirely light troops, and not troops for the line at all ?—Precisely.

2305. (*Viscount Melville.*) Would you have infantry irregular as well as cavalry ?—There are irregular regiments, which are raised for service in particular localities such as in hill countries, which, I think, for many reasons are advisable, and in some parts of India, indispensable. They are auxiliary to the police, and could be called into use if necessary with the line.

2306. (*Chairman.*) The native army of which we have been treating, of which you say the proportion should be three natives to one European, you consider should be all regular ?—Yes.

2307. Do you consider that the native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion ?—It should be composed of all the inhabitants of India, who are called natives, as the principle is in the Madras and Bombay armies. At Madras our ranks are open to any man physically fit, without reference to his caste ; but there is always a watch upon the recruiting ; for example, in some of our regiments we raise the men in Telingana, the greater part of those men would of course be Telingas ; other regiments would have larger proportions of Mahomedans, &c. But I think that there is no likelihood in our army of any one class obtaining a dangerous preponderance. If a regiment composed principally of Telagoos is brought into a force, such as I have been describing, it will be cantoned or encamped with another regiment, of which, perhaps, the majority of the men will be from the ceded districts, from Mysore, or Trichinopoly, or some other country; and thus we are always so far safe in our own nationalities and in our castes.

2308. Would you preserve the nationalities by keeping them in regiments or companies, or would you disperse them as much as possible throughout the army ?—A regiment wanting to recruit gets its men principally from the place at which it is raised; but it is customary to send out recruiting parties all over the country, and thus draw in men from different parts. I would have a wide system ; I would avoid anything which could draw the attention of the natives to a policy of exclusion as regarded any of them, or of preference for any of them. A great deal must be done in India by careful continuous observation, in a way which I am sure you cannot carry out by hardly defined rules.

2309. You say that you would refuse no nationality or caste ; would you recognise the caste at all after having once enlisted a man ?—Most undoubtedly; so far, that his caste should be registered in the regimental records and monthly returns, because it is very necessary to know how the army is composed. In the Madras army we recognise every man's caste as to be respected ; we never allow it to interfere with any military duty, nor do we allow any one to interfere with or intrude upon caste observances in the sepoy lines. If there was an act committed to insult or disturb a Mahomedan, a man of high or low caste, or of no caste at all, we should deal with it according to the articles of war, as contrary to good order and military discipline.

2310. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Still you would not allow caste to be put forward as an excuse for not performing any military duty ?—We never do in the Madras army.

2311. And you never found any difficulty in that respect ?—Not the slightest. The same men as those who have mutinied in Bengal do duty in our army exactly as it is done by British soldiers.

2312. How do you account for that ?—From the difference of discipline.

2313. Then you conceive that the discipline in the Madras army is much more severe than it has been in Bengal ?—I would not call it more severe ; it is more efficient and soldierlike.

2314. (*Chairman.*) You consider that discipline may overcome any difficulties which would arise from caste in the execution of military duties ?—No doubt of it, taking discipline in the highest sense of the term, both moral and military.

2315. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Do you know any case where high caste Brahmins have wished to show their superiority of caste in the Madras army over Pariahs ?—As Brahmins they would, off duty, command any respect that their fellow countrymen will yield to them. There is no interference with caste questions unless they are made a pretext for interfering with others, or, as sometimes happens, a cause of quarrel and disturbance. I have no doubt that if they had a weak commanding officer, high caste men would try it whenever they might think they could succeed.

2316. Do you recollect an instance of your receiving a petition from a high caste man through the subahdar major of the regiment, complaining of a havildar having a palanquin marriage in the lines ?—I remember the circumstance, but it came to head quarters through the officer commanding the regiment and his superiors in the division.

2317. Was not that a case in point ?—It was.

2318. Where a high caste Brahmin wished to force the Commander-in-chief to allow him to take supremacy in the lines and to prevent low caste men from so acting ?—Your lordship brings to my recollection what I have just replied to.

2319. What was the answer of the Commander-in-chief ?—The case was this. There were caste people

who wished to carry a bride in a palanquin, and the higher caste men forbad it. The Commander-in-chief's orders were, that if a palanquin and procession went quietly through the lines nobody was to interfere with it; that if there was any question of caste, they might go and settle it amongst themselves at their village or any of the pagodas; and that they might have leave of absence for the purpose; but that they were to make no disturbance in the lines. I remember that once at Penang there was a serious quarrel; the commanding officer allowed the Mahomedans and the Hindoos to get into a caste dispute about hanging bits of beef and passing through particular parts of the lines, which were common to both. The moment the knowledge of it came to head-quarters, just a simple common-sense order put down the quarrel immediately. There are often occasions of dispute between men of different, or of the same castes and persuasions, or of different regiments, which are easily disposed of if officers treat them with kind consideration and impartial justice; and the men are glad to have them so settled by an authority they feel confidence in, and respect.

2320. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That can be avoided by good tact and management?—Yes; just the same as at Woolwich or Chatham.

2321. (*Chairman.*) That seems to be more a dispute among the castes themselves than with respect to performing their military duties?—Yes. But as regards military duty, I may give, for example, that during the Chinese war, our troops ate and drank, and cooked on board their ships; but the Bengal troops insisted upon being landed every evening to cook their food. A captain of a transport killed an ox or cow on board his vessel for his crew; the Bengal sepoys objected to remain on board, and another ship was provided for them. The same thing happened on board a Madras transport, and the Hindoos disliked it, while the Mussulmans have no scruple about killing a cow; and after the Bismillah, are glad to eat the beef. There was no offence to the Mahomedans, and the Hindoos were gratified by an immediate arrangement being made, that, in future, all cattle were to be slaughtered on shore. The Hindoos remained in the ship.

2322. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And yet some of them were of the same class of men?—Precisely so. When I commanded a regiment, my Hindostanee men were among the best men I had in the regiment. I liked them particularly.

2323. In the Bengal army it was not put down by superior authority; it was tolerated?—Yes.

2324. But you would not have tolerated it?—We do not as regards the discharge of military duty and inevitable exigencies of service in the field against an enemy.

2325. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) With reference to the discipline of the Madras and the Bengal armies, do you recollect an instance of three regiments of the Madras army being sent out of the Bengal presidency because the Bengal army were such a mutinous set?—I do not. I was absent from my duty for nearly a year at the Cape of Good Hope.

2326. Do you recollect that when three regiments were ordered to Jubbulpoor a representation was made by the officers commanding the regiments that they would not be responsible for the duties done if they remained under the discipline under which they were placed?—I remember that our troops were sent up to the Saugur division. Our regulations were not generally recognized by the general commanding the division; the consequence was, that on these things being represented in Bengal, authority was given to us to send a brigadier up to command our troops at Saugur. The authorities, however, did not get on well together. The regulations for Madras bazaars and against sepoys getting into debt were disregarded; our men fell into a habit of contracting debts, and were brought before Courts of Requests in a manner which reports and correspondence showed to be a more common practice in Bengal than with us. The remonstrances from head-quarters of the army were not effectual to check that evil, nor to prevent a relaxation of the rules and standing orders established for the discipline of troops and companies. Our officers felt that it was lowering the tone of discipline and injuring the men, as regarded the duties of visiting barracks and inspecting dinners, &c.

2327. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you mean that European officers inspected the dinners of the natives?—No, of the European troops; we had European artillery there also, and our reglations were disregarded in both arms of the service.

2328. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You have stated that the troops are called upon to perform certain services which they ought not to be?—Yes.

2329. Will you be so kind as to state what those services are?—The duties over gaols, the duties over local treasuries, and many escort duties from which they ought to be exempted. Then there is a bad system of sending them out in small detachments to hold posts, merely to be stationed where there is no particular duty for them to do.

2330. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that the present number of European officers with native regiments is sufficient?—I think it is quite sufficient, I do not enter into the opinion which I have heard very loudly proclaimed, that more European officers are required. I believe in fact, that if all the officers were present, there would be more than are wanted with a native regiment. With due consideration for the number withdrawn for the staff, I think that the present establishment will supply that; but there are duties in which officers are employed which I think ought to be discharged by other persons.

2331. (*Viscount Melville.*) What are those duties?—I would organize a commissariat department which would no longer be a draught upon the regiments of the line. I would restrict the withdrawal of officers from regiments to military staff, to scientific, and to political or diplomatic duties. Civil staff duties should in all proper cases be discharged by officers of high character, who are not physically equal to the more active duties of their profession.

2332. (*Chairman.*) Do you not consider that a European officer now on joining his regiment is always looking forward to getting some civil employment?—Almost always to that or staff duty.

2333. Does not that interfere with the manner of his performing his military duties; does not it make him look more to the civil service than to the military service for his future career?—It stimulates a very praiseworthy ambition.

2334. (*Lord Stanley.*) Is it not a means of drawing into the army men who, perhaps, would not go there if they knew that they would be confined to regimental duty all their lives?—I am not aware of any who have entered the army on such an alternative; though I believe all are more or less influenced by the prospects that have hitherto been open to men of good conduct, energy, and ability. The result has been, that when officers in the army have had fair fields before them, they have qualified themselves up to every requirement. I do not remember having ever been called upon by the Government when I was adjutant-general to supply an officer for any required duty or employment, that I did not know where to put my hand upon one for it.

2335. (*Viscount Melville.*) Still, with all the advantage and stimulus given to officers in this way, is it unfortunately the case that regimental duty is considered a lower grade, and that in short a man considers that he is disgraced if he is not placed on the staff?—I do not consider that. Of course, the staff is the object of ambition, but in a well commanded regiment I believe that the officers have a great deal of *esprit de corps*, are very proud of their regiment, and some remain contentedly with it. But there is a great deal that is depressing; there is a great deal that requires entirely remodelling in the Indian army, both as regards the European officers and the natives. There is now, no doubt, a feeling of depression among the old officers, and that affects,

Major-Gen. R. Alexander.

25th Aug. 1858.

and must affect, the whole service, Europeans and natives.

2336. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that the service would be benefited if you were to introduce a staff corps, making every officer pass through his regimental duties first, but upon appointment to the staff to be placed in a separate corps of officers without men, much in the same way as is done when engineers are established in this country, from which corps he might be again exchanged into the line, either at his own option or upon the wish of the authorities?—That has been often considered. I believe that it would be very useful as regards the regiments. One objection to the present system is, that in withdrawing men from their regiments there is no means of filling up the vacancies. It very often imposes a very inconvenient restriction upon the choice of officers, and if you could remove an officer when appointed to the staff, and fill his place in the regiment, it would be very advisable.

2337. You think that such a plan would be desirable if it could be effected?—Certainly, and I have no doubt that it could be effected by those who understand the organization of an army.

2338. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Would you allow those officers to return to their regiments when their services were no longer required in their military and civil situations?—It would very much depend upon whether they were in civil or military situations. An officer in the adjutant or quartermaster-general's department acquires a much larger acquaintance with his professional duties; and attached as they are in India to forces and brigades, they learn more of field movements and tactics, and become better qualified for the higher duties of a regiment than many who have no opportunities beyond commanding a company or troop, and marching on its flank.

2339. Then you draw a distinction between civil and military employment?—Certainly; I think that after a certain time officers so employed should have the option of going entirely away from the army, letting their civil salaries be a compensation for the military service they resign.

2340. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that any alteration should be made in the code under which the army is enlisted?—In speaking of that I must speak very frankly, and seeing that the Bengal army has entirely gone, I should say let the code never be heard of again, at least, any code that I know of belonging to that presidency.

2341. What is meant by the question is, would you enlist men for the future for general service to serve in any portion of India or abroad? Would you enlist them for a limited service or for their lives, or would you make any alteration in the terms of their enlistment?—I think it is imperatively necessary for the safety of India that great alterations should be made, and for that reason it is that I mentioned just now that if the Bengal code is never heard of again I think it will be a great advantage. The present system in the native army is one which holds out very little inducement for the sepoy to remain in it, and great inducement to get out of it at as early a period as possible. I would be careful not to bind up the hands of the Government by restrictions unnecessarily imposed in the terms of service. A great objection in Bengal to enlistment for general service is the dread of going on board ship. I believe one of the concurrent causes of the late mutiny is an order that they should be enlisted to go on foreign service beyond sea. We have no such order in Madras, and though it is not on record, that any Madras regiment ever refused to go, I should be extremely sorry to see such an order issued. It is put to our men whenever we order a regiment on foreign service, that any who choose to remain may do so if they please. By degrees we wished to get rid even of that; we wanted to bring the Madras army, without offending the prejudices of the men, or alarming them, up to the very state which you now propose, namely, that they should be familiarized with the idea that they are to go wherever they are ordered, and for a short time we dropped out of the letter of instructions which is sent by the adjutant-general to every regiment ordered on foreign service, that part of putting the option to every man; thus leaving it as an unwritten custom of the service; they knew that they need not go unless they liked; the omission attracted notice in Bengal, and we were ordered immediately to put it back again. But we never have any difficulty, and although they all have the option, Mahomedans, Hindoostanees, Rajpoots, and Brahmins all go; their provisions are put on board the ship for them, according to their castes, and they see and approve of the water they are to drink.

2342. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) How many Hindoostanee men have you in the Madras army?—Not a great many. I should think that when I left India there would not be more than, perhaps, 1,500 or 2,000 in the whole army.

2343. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) In the event of a regiment saying "We do not mean to go," what is the alternative?—It never has happened. You must of course take a service with all its contingencies. When the troops were ordered to China, the whole of their war pensions and wound pensions had been reduced; the men were willing to go, but they wanted their old pensions; they did not like the idea of coming back wounded, and being turned adrift unable to work, and left to beg. I was acquainted with the opinions and feelings of the men, and there was a melancholy joke among them; they said, "Let the old sepoys who came into the service before 1837 go and fight; if they lose their limbs, they will get good pensions; but what shall we '*buchas*' (children) get?"

2344. Then you are of opinion that that difficulty ought to be obviated by a new code?—Yes; but I would not drive the blunt edge of the wedge against the minds of the people. It is a very severe thing to tell the population of India, that they are to be forced to go on board ship. I feel assured that a new pay code could be framed to render the regimental service in the army much more acceptable to officers and men, European and natives, that a judicious liberality might be extended to all ranks, and military finance be economized by reforms.

2345. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) All these questions are prospective?—I remember what was told me by General De Lacy Evans, a brother of Sir De Lacy Evans, who was one of our best officers, and was of a generation before me. He described the troops when we wanted them to go to the Mauritius and to the Isle of Bourbon; and before that, when they went to the Moluccas. Volunteering used to be proposed to the native officers; and the regiment would meet together, sit down, and quietly discuss the subject. One and another would state an objection, and at last it came to this, "Well, if the subahdar major goes, or if the grenadier company goes, I will go." It was a mere formal thing; the discipline and the whole tone of feeling in the army was different from what it is now. They invariably went; and it is well known how well they served on those occasions.

2346. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) What has caused the difference in the discipline of the army between that time and the present?—We have very much lost sight of conciliating the native opinions; there is a harsher line of feeling between the European officer and the native than there used to be; and the Government does not pay sufficient attention to the natives; we do not consider that they are feeling and thinking beings so much as we ought to do; we treat them too much as instruments for our purposes.

2347. With regard to pay and pension, has that no effect?—The pension is of the greatest importance. Before 1837, the sepoy looked forward to the pension as a retirement for his old age; he now looks upon it as an escape from a service which generally he dislikes.

2348. (*Lord Stanley.*) If you had to frame the new terms of enlistment for the Bengal army, how would you frame them in regard of this question of

general service ?—I would immediately draw up a new pay code. The pay of the native army in Southern India is insufficient; its batta has been reduced to an insufficiency; and its hutting money is insufficient; its pension is impolitic by being given too soon; it is upon fifteen years' service. You have only to go over the returns of the army, and see the men who are pensioned at fifteen years' service, to notice how many of them are for chronic rheumatism and pains in the joints, for which a man will simulate pain for a sufficient time. His malingering baffles the skill and wears out the patience of the medical and other officers, and he becomes a burden upon the regiment; but when he gets his pension, he is soon round again. In Southern India are to be seen numbers of stout hearty fellows, who turn out to be pensioned sepoys. It would evidently be better financial economy to have these men in our ranks on good pay than having to support them with pensions, and pay the sepoys who step into their places in regiments. The result since 1837 has been such as ought to have been anticipated when the period of service that entitled to a pension was diminished by one-fourth, and the amount of pension increased 12½ per cent. to a sepoy.

2349. You mean, that those men have imposed upon the medical officer ?—Yes, many of them; and it is wonderful how they will persevere and what they will endure in order to do so.

2350. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Do you not think that an increase of pay for good conduct is preferable to a pension upon discharge ?—I would adopt the European system of making the pay better according to service. What they now call "good-conduct pay," is a misnomer altogether; it is not good-conduct pay; it is long service pay; and if a man is of a delicate constitution, he is eligible to be pensioned upon four rupees a month, before he can get an increased pay of one. His object is to get out of the army; his four rupees make him a richer and greater man than most in his village. Without underrating the many substantial advantages he enjoys, the condition of a sepoy in the Madras army is in some respects worse than it was in the days of Hyder Ali. If you look back into history, you will find the sepoy worse paid now in proportion than he was in the days of the Hindoostanee empire two centuries ago; and, without the prospects open to his energy and ambition in a state service, which, though more precarious, had higher prizes.

2351. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) You recommend that the pay should increase according to the length of the service ?—Yes.

2352. Do you mean that that is the feeling of the sepoys themselves ?—The sepoys do not sit down and calculate these things as we do, but they are quite ready to receive any boon; and I am perfectly certain that the sepoys of the Madras army are looking now for boons from the Government, while they feel most deeply the reductions of their pay and batta, and the severe duties to which they have been put of late years.

2353. (*Lord Stanley.*) If I understand rightly what you suggest should be given, it is mainly this, a better rate of pay, an increased pay for long and good service, and the pension not to be granted so soon as after 15 years' service; but when it is granted, to be granted without any condition as to the man being unfit for duty ?—Not quite that. After five or seven years, I would give an increase of pay if the man had not been tried by a court-martial, nor been so many times in the defaulters' book the year before. At three periods of service, say, at 6, 12, and 18 years, there should be increase of pay. At 14 years' service, if a man was unfit for, or chose to leave the service, I would give him a gratuity and let him go; and after 20 years' service, if he was unfit, I would pension him. They now enlist at 16 years of age, which I think is two years too young. After 20 years' service, a man at the age of 36 or 38 is in a good condition to be a valuable sepoy. He would work from one end of India to the other, and if that man had ten rupees a month, he would remain with you cheerfully. I am informed that a common cooly, working on a railway, now gets eight rupees a month in Southern India, and an infantry sepoy's pay is seven, until he has served 16 years.

2354. (*Chairman.*) You would have the terms of enlistment, I suppose, the same for each of the armies ?—I would have one pay code for all; the organization the same; and I think we should attach them much more to us if we did not tighten them up in European dresses.

2355. And you would have that code perfectly and clearly understood at the time of enlistment, and no alteration made afterwards ?—Yes; at least, no alteration to the detriment of the sepoy.

2356. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) What you stated just now is, I understand, what you consider to be the feeling of the natives with regard to pay and pension ?—It is.

2357. During the discussions upon this subject, was not it an idea that the native sepoy would sooner have a larger pay when he first entered the service for reasons which I shall state, than a prospective pay for length of service. The fact which I mean to state is this: A Hindoo marries a wife, and he has four children upon the average. A Mussulman marries two wives, and he has eight children. Does not it naturally follow that the latter man requires a larger amount of pay during the time he has all these eight or ten mouths to feed than afterwards, and is not that a consideration with the natives ?—That is a consideration which I should leave entirely to the natives themselves; they are very shrewd, and understand their own affairs very well; poverty is both practically, and by the precepts of the Koran, if a sepoy should happen to understand them, a restraint upon polygamy. Give them better pay, and you will attach them to you. Give them at the end of their service the prospect of a pension, and they will be perfectly content. I believe that you may make the Indian army in all the presidencies as faithful and as good soldiers as there are under the sun.

2358. (*Viscount Melville.*) You have mentioned about our want of consideration for the natives, and that they reason and think upon different things, do you think that there would be any possibility, with a view of conciliating the natives, of introducing into the infantry service or into the regular service native gentlemen of the country without their going through the grade of sepoy ?—I have no doubt of it; but this is a very important question, and I feel great difficulty in shutting such questions up to a short answer. To answer such properly I should like to go back a little into the history of the army. Now, what the real military feeling of the natives is may be inferred from the officers and soldiers that fought for and under us in the days of Lawrence and Clive. At that time, instead of the native officer being depressed, ill paid, and without an object of ambition beyond mounting guard, and falling in under a young ensign, we had natives commanding armies, and even with bodies of Europeans serving under them; they undertook sieges, and in every way showed themselves to be not only soldiers but generals. The palmy days of the native officer, and the native military spirit, were up to the time of the fall of Hyder. After that period, and since the fall of Seringapatam, the native spirit has been restricted, and, of course, depressed; there has been no field for ambition, although there have been men in the native army capable of anything that you could put them to. I am bound to say that many of our native officers in the Madras army, in the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, have a knowledge of military tactics which would do credit to any European.

2359. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Having that opinion, in which I fully share, do you not think that if you give more power to the native you must treat him

Major-Gen. R. Alexander.
25th Aug. 1858.

differently, that is to say, that you must have more power over him if he commits himself?—The best and the only power which you can exercise over the native to any beneficial effect is that power over his affection and interest which will bind him to you.

2360. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You mean moral power?—Yes.

2361. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But that has been deteriorating of late, you say?—No doubt.

2362. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You say that the Indian soldiers are as good troops as any under the sun; to what do you attribute the recent general mutiny of the Bengal army?—Simply to this; that I believe the Bengal army was ill composed, and ill disciplined.

2363. (*Chairman.*) In what respects do you object to the composition of it?—From its not embracing sufficiently the different nationalities, and low caste men; from the way in which high caste was pampered and got the upper hand of discipline and subordination.

2364. In fact you think that the bad discipline consisted in recognizing caste?—Not in simply recognizing but in giving it impolitic exaltation, and making undue concession to it. I think that the whole army was badly disciplined, and that the whole system was bad.

2365. In what did the discipline of the Bengal army differ from that of the armies of the other presidencies?—I think in the lax way in which duties were carried on. I take as an example, that when our troops got up into the Saugur division, the officers were allowed to quit their posts when on detachment duty; to be absent from their detachments when marching; and I have already mentioned other relaxations of discipline. In the Bengal army there were, at some stations, committees or boards of officers, who judged of the credit, which is synonymous with the character, of brother officers who wished to borrow money from banks in which the members of the committees had an interest. These and other practices, I think, are injurious to military discipline and *morale*.

2366. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Have you any personal knowledge on which you found these statements?—That they are notorious.

2367. May I ask you to mention any authority which you have for them?—The official reports and correspondence of my office afford authority for the facts regarding discipline. My intercourse and correspondence with officers of the Royal, Bengal, and Bombay armies, as well as with those of my own, who have served in Bengal, are my sources of information; as well as the general orders of the Bengal army, particularly those of Sir Henry Fane and Sir Charles Napier, when Commanders-in-chief, and some of Sir Colin Campbell's. If any competent authority disproves what I have stated, I am quite willing to admit that I have been misinformed.

2368. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not know, from your experience of the Bengal army, that the European officers in that army actually considered it no disgrace to be brought before a Court of Requests, in order to oblige them to pay the wages of their servants, when in the Madras presidency an officer would have been turned out of his regiment for such conduct?—I do not know that; but speaking from notoriety, I believe there were some officers, in the Bengal army, frequently so brought up. It was a rare thing in Madras; we have had instances of debt and its demoralizing conseqnences in the Madras army, but they were more exceptional. Some, I am sorry to say, were very disgraceful; but all the offenders were not turned out of their regiments.

2369. Is there not an order from the Commander-in-chief in Bengal that every month a Court of Requests shall be assembled, at which these officers are summoced; and is it not the fact that, not only one, but sometimes ten and twelve officers in a single month are brought before these courts?—I cannot answer that question any more than that it is a standing order throughout India that a Court of Requests shall assemble at every military station every month. At Madras, most certainly, officers are not brought up in such numbers, nor in any approaching to them. It is to be remembered, that a highly honourable officer is liable to be summoned if he justly refuses to pay an account which he denies to be due.

2370. (*Colonel Burlton.*) In every presidency?—In every presidency.

2371. Is it confined to officers?—No; it is for all the sepoys—for anybody in the cantonment.

2372. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You appear, with your great experience in India, to advocate the principle of encouraging native officers, and you assert that since the days of Hyder Ali there has been no post of ambition for them. You are aware, of course, that Hyder Ali raised himself from being a captain to be a king. Are you not of opinion that if we had encouraged natives in the way that you speak of, some great native would have risen up in the late mutiny and turned us out of India?—That is a liability which you must always bear in mind. I believe that there are Hyder Alis in your ranks now. There were many circumstances in the late mutiny which were very much against any native taking that commanding position. There was not sufficient time to organize it; and although there was evidently a great deal of communication, yet they had not picked out men to be their leaders. There was no cohesion, nor concerted action, under recognized chiefs, at its commencement; and it flared up at one part after another. Evidently there were evil-disposed men who had been watching for an opportunity; but the mutiny seemed to be premature for them. Our safeguard for the future lies in the firmness and justice of our military as well as civil administration, and while we highly maintain our authority, we must leave no just grounds for complaint and disaffection, nor make undue concessions in any way. If we do the natives will gain experience by the past, and, at some future crisis, turn to evil purpose lessons which we have now opportunity to improve for their and our own best interests. It was after the hopes of the mutineers must have culminated, that Koer Sing, Ummer Sing, and others, rose out of the necessity of their circumstances to be leaders.

2373. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that the principle which you advocate, that is to say, the raising of native officers to the extent which I have gathered from what you have stated, would increase that danger?—I think not.

2374. (*Lord Stanley.*) On the contrary, you hold that, in enabling men to gratify a lawful ambition, you would find the best security against their indulging an unlawful one?—Precisely so.

2375. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not also think that the native army may be organized by mixing races and nationalities so as to render such a combination as has lately taken place next to impossible?—Yes.

2376. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the Bengal army ought to be divided into two or more armies?—I should say not. Such a division of authority would weaken a power that ought to be concentrated in one mind. I would have the three armies commanded as they now are, and a paramount authority in a military minister of war, a constituent member of the supreme government in India.

2377. Do you consider that any change is required in the system of promotion as regards the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?—The different armies have different systems; the system in the Bengal army is different from that of Bombay and Madras.

2378. Would you recommend promotion by selection or entirely by seniority?—By selection.

2379. That is the system which now prevails in the Madras army?—Yes.

2380. Is it entirely the system which prevails?—The system is this:—It is one of the principles laid

down for the discipline of the Madras army, that every grade is to exercise its own responsibility. The officer of a company has the first promotion to a lance-naik; he selects the fittest man that he thinks proper; and if on trial that man is unfit he is remanded to the ranks. When he is promoted to be a naik, that is to say, a corporal, he is brought into a general regimental list, and he rises in it if he behaves well; if not, he is brought to court-martial and reduced. So far the seniority goes on in that way, but no man is ever promoted by seniority unless he is competent.

2381. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You mean that after a man has been promoted to naik, the promotion is made from the top of the list unless the man is considered unfit?—Precisely so.

2382. (*Viscount Melville.*) What is the system in the promotion to the rank of native commissioned officers?—The same; but you will find havildars, who, from age or incompetency, would not make good commissioned officers though tolerable non-commissioned officers. These are passed over in promotion.

2383. Does the commanding officer of the regiment select the havildar who is to become jemadar, or does he submit a certain number of names from which the Government choose?—If it is the senior havildar, and he is of proper character and qualification, no question is asked; but if he passes over any, he has to send in the name of every man whom he proposes to supersede, with his reason for so doing. If the reasons were satisfactory, the Commander-in-chief ordered the promotion to be made, and the recommendation rolls went on to Government. If they were unsatisfactory, investigation was made, and if the seniors were proved to be incompetent they were passed over.

2384. What would you call incompetent?—A man may not have ability, physical or mental.

2385. Do you consider age as constituting incompetency?—Not unless it involves weakness and inefficiency. So defective, however, are the pension-regulations, that native officers will appeal to their commanding officers not to have them removed to the pension-list, so inadequate are its provisions to the condition of a native officer, while its inducement to a sepoy to get out of the service is so great.

2386. What is the average age of a man when he becomes a native officer?—He would be a fortunate man who was promoted to be a commissioned officer in 15 years. I think that generally it is 18 or 20 years; which, assuming him to enlist at 19 years of age, and to get his commission in 19 years, will, I think, give an average of above 50 years of age, and upwards of 30 years' service, for a subahdar to receive a smaller pension than is granted for shorter service to a European sergeant. I assume these numbers, not having official returns to refer to.

2387. (*Chairman.*) A native officer must pass through the ranks before he can become an officer?—Yes.

2388. Do you think that any advantage would be derived from his coming in direct?—I think that that system might be introduced. All these things require to be done with great judgment and consideration, but if you introduce such men, you must take into consideration what his Royal Highness has been asking me about, namely, that there must be for gentlemen and for men of high feeling, high appointments; you must attach them to you by such means, and no longer consider that a pension of 25 rupees a month to the native officer of highest rank, and 12 rupees a month for a jemadar (or respectively 30*l.* and 12*l.* 8*s.* a year) are sufficient rewards for the long and honourable services of men who are expected to uphold their rank and position as officers and gentlemen.

2389. (*Lord Stanley.*) You cannot bring in the lowest grade of commissioned officer without giving him a prospect of promotion to some higher appointment?—Precisely so.

2390. That which is an object of ambition to a private soldier, would be no object of ambition to a gentleman, and it would be to him simply a service in which he had nothing to look to?—That is true, partly; but it must be borne in mind that a private soldier in India and a private soldier in England have very different feelings. In the case of many a private soldier in the Indian ranks, his grandfather or his ancestor may have been a man of high rank at the courts of Aurung-Zebe, Hyder Ali, Tippoo Sultaun, the Nizam, or Nawab of Arcot. I have had a servant, a Syed, the highest class of Mahommedan, whose father was a man of high rank; and if you go among the Mussulman population, you will see men in abject poverty, whose fathers and grandfathers held high positions in the country. Their sons enter into our service, but they enter with the recollections, and with a great deal of the high feeling of their ancestors. It is in the cavalry and in the artillery that you find these men, more than in the infantry. The Hindoos have also their recollections of ancestral rank and wealth.

2391. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that any advantage would be derived if the native officer was encouraged to learn the English language?—With us the English language is very freely spoken by men in the ranks; more, however, by younger men than the native officers.

2392. Do you not think that it would tend to greater intercourse between the European officers and the regiment if the English language was encouraged as respects the native officers?—It depends upon circumstances; I believe that we have done a much better thing in our army of late years by insisting upon the European officers learning more of the native languages. That I believe brings them more together than the native officers learning the English language. None of the Bengal sepoys, as a general rule, speak English, but with us it is spoken very largely, and I have known men enter our ranks as sepoys well educated in English.

2393. Do you think that there has been more intercourse between the European officers and the soldiers in the Madras army than in the Bengal army?—I cannot say that; I should imagine that the Bengal officers were very much attached to their men. I think that in the late mutiny we see the confidence which they put in them, and they were very familiar with their languages. We have seen, in many instances, how nobly the men have followed their officers, while instances of misconduct in the field before an enemy have been few. The histories of the various Indian campaigns, and particularly of the wars in Afghanistan and the Punjaub, make it evident, I think, that the Bengal army might have been brought to the highest standard of military efficiency if its caste prejudices had not been so much pampered, and if strict discipline had been maintained.

2394. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think it desirable to have English more introduced, or not?—I would leave it to find its own way for the present. My first object would be to improve the native regimental schools, which are now in a very low, and, in some degree, a dangerous state. They might be made the means of giving sound knowledge, suitable to the sepoy's condition in life, and of beneficial influence when, after having been discharged or pensioned, he should return to the domestic community of his countrymen.

2395. (*Chairman.*) You do not attribute the mutiny at all to any want of communication between the officers and men?—I should think not generally. The mutiny appears to me to be a calamity which might have been guarded against. When it occurred, those stronger and worst passions, which are always latent in native character, were brought into action, and broke up and destroyed the mutual good feeling that had previously existed between officers and men.

2396. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You attach considerable want of discipline to the Bengal army; do you do so from personal observation or from hearsay?—I have stated before; partly from personal observation, when many years ago I saw but did not serve with a Bengal force; partly from what came

Major-Gen. R. Alexander.
25th Aug. 1858.

before me in official correspondence, as well as from what I have read in general orders, newspapers, and the information I have derived from officers of the Royal, Bengal, Bombay, and Madras armies; and from notoriety.

2397. But notoriety does not establish facts?—Of course not; but it proclaims them.

2398. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Notoriety may be disputed?—It may be.

2399. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Has it not come under your knowledge, when you have been reporting the state of certain parts of the Madras army, that the officer who commanded it in the Madras presidency said that if those men were allowed when they went on guard to do as was done in the Bengal presidency there would be an end of discipline in the Madras army, that is to say, that the guard was mounted of 12 or 14 men, and the sentries used to relieve one another and the guard took their clothes off?—I do not immediately recollect that, but the whole of their system is very different from ours, and some of our lazy fellows used to grumble and send in anonymous petitions, stating that the Bengal army were allowed to do so-and-so, and asking for the same privileges and promotion by seniority.

2400. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You speak of petitions. Is it the case that petitions are sent direct from native officers and men to the Commander-in-chief without going through the commanding officer?—Never in the Madras army; it is expressly prohibited. Anonymous letters and petitions are sometimes written, and ought always to be read and considered; they require to be dealt with with good judgment, as, notwithstanding a just aversion to such communications, it may in some instances be dangerous to disregard them.

2401. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the commanding officers of the Madras army have sufficient power to reward and punish?—I think so; I know that some make complaints and say that they have not power enough. A great deal depends upon the Commander-in-chief how much he will support them, and how he will exercise his patronage for the benefit of individuals or for the public service. For many years, in the Madras army, the Commander-in-chief took no advantage of his patronage in regimental appointments; he gave no appointment to an interpreter who was not a qualified officer, nor to an adjutant who was not recommended by his commanding officer. A good commanding officer, of course, picked out his best and smartest officer to be his adjutant, but when I was adjutant-general, I have had a commanding officer writing to me to the effect that, "I must recommend so-and-so, because he "is a senior, but I shall be very glad if you will put "in another, because he is a smarter officer."

2402. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Why must he recommend him because he was senior?—Merely because the senior looked him in the face boldly and said "Why are you going to pass me over?" The senior may also have been qualified, but not the best qualified.

2403. That must have arisen from the regiment having a man at the head of it not fit to command it?—Of a man deficient in some important qualities, though of mediocre fitness to command.

2404. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the admixture of European and native forces should be made regimentally or by brigade; do you think that there would be any advantage in mixing regimentally any of the native troops with the European troops?—I think that it would be fatal.

2405. The admixture must be by brigades?—Keep them in entirely separate regiments, as they are now, and brigade them. I imagine that it would be fatal to attempt to mix them up in that way. I have seen it proposed and should dread the experiment.

2406. (*Viscount Melville.*) It has been proposed to put companies of natives to a European regiment, and a squadron of dragoons to the European cavalry, you think that that would not do?—I think not. If you were to put the natives to Europeans, the natives would be looked upon as secondary, and feeling themselves to be degraded, would lose their spirit. As regards having a company of Europeans in a native regiment, it would never do to let the natives see more closely the drunkenness and scenes which go on amongst Europeans. Familiarity would, I fear, breed contempt on both sides. There certainly would be no safety in having one company of Europeans in such close and undefended connection with nine companies of natives, with by no means an impossibility that physical strength in individuals might be on the side of the latter.

2407. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) It has been stated that petitions have been received and acted upon by the Commander-in-chief from junior officers and soldiers of the army, without their passing through the commanding officer of the regiment—Do you know any instance of that?—It is contrary to our orders that petitions be received from sepoys. They are to make their applications and complaints *viva voce* to the officers.

2408. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) It has been stated in evidence that it has been done?—I can call to recollection some instances, which were disposed of according to the rules of the service. I remember one in which a havildar had taken advantage of a sepoy's absence on duty to seduce his wife. The sepoy not obtaining redress sent in a petition to headquarters. The sepoy's allegations were investigated, and having been proved true the havildar was punished and sent out of the regiment. Still in that instance the sepoy was admonished of what the consequence would have been had his statement been untrue.

2409. (*Colonel Burlton.*) What particular personal opportunities have you had of forming an opinion upon the Bengal army. How often have you served with them?—Never.

2410. You have never served with them in cantonments or in the field?—Never at all. My information is from our own officers who have served with them, from Bombay officers who have served with them, and from Bengal officers with whom I have had communication. I was once for a short time with a Bengal force at Nagpoor, but did not serve with it.

2411. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) How many nights have the Madras sepoys been in their beds during the week?—At this present time, and for many years, the Madras army has been worked to a degree that has produced great discontent, and it is a very dangerous state for them to be in. Their foreign service presses particularly hard. About one-fourth of the native army is beyond sea, while its duties in India have not proportionally diminished. In 1819, the strength of Madras artillery was greater than it is now, when it occupies eleven more stations than it did then. It is important to consider that the Madras sepoys being generally married men, the welfare and safety of their families gives them and their numerous relations an interest in the stability of a good government. The excellent institution of boy establishments attached to every regiment in which their orphans are provided for, with a view to their becoming sepoys if they are fit and willing at the proper age, is also a strong hold upon the attachment and good feeling of the men.

2412. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You said something, I think, about the mode of dressing the army?—Yes.

2413. Do you say that the present mode is objectionable?—I think so.

2414. How would you clothe them?—I would clothe the men more in the native style. The Zouaves afford a good suggestion for Europeans; and the French have lately clothed their native officers and sepoys at Pondicherry in an oriental costume, which, if adapted to our officers and men, would, I think, be most acceptable to the whole army. Our sepoys should not be obliged, as they now are, to pay for their regimental head-dresses, great coats, and the

sandals or shoes of the regimental pattern, which they wear when on duty and in uniform. These articles are supplied gratuitously to Europeans.

2415. You would have an entirely native dress for them?—I would have it as near as possible to the native dress, with due regard to military *esprit* and uniformity. There is another very important point which I marked down, supposing that I should be examined upon it, that is, with respect to forming cantonments. All the cantonments with which I am acquainted, or most of them, are so laid out that the barracks are merely traps in which European soldiers might be destroyed in the event of a sudden outbreak; barracks, magazines, and arsenals are placed where they are easily assailable, and without means of communication or support for a general defence. I believe that there is nothing which should occupy the minds of military men more than the question of locating the troops and laying out our cantonments. They should be so ordered, that a check might be kept upon the immense population which is always accumulating in bazaars, and occupying the ground in cantonments that ought for military and sanitory reasons to be kept clear; and every European body of troops should be located in such manner that it can defend itself if necessary. Every magazine and arsenal ought to be a fortress, and I would remove the principal ones, as well as gunpowder manufactories, from the sea-coast to central positions in the interior.

2416. (*Chairman.*) Whose duty has it been to lay out these cantonments?—It is in the department of the Quartermaster-General.

2417. Therefore the faults which you mention have arisen from the want of a proper administration of the duties of the Quartermaster-General?—It has been from a want of proper care in the first instance. Some of our principal cantonments were at first camps; by degrees houses were built, and thus they became cantonments. I would give as an example Secunderabad, our principal cantonment in Southern India. It is about six miles, with a good road, from a city that could suddenly pour out 40,000 or 50,000 armed Mahomedans. The European infantry barracks are commanded by hills, and flanked by native lines—a considerable distance from them is the arsenal, in the middle of four native regiments—across the parade-ground for the whole force are the European artillery barracks, with a native infantry regiment, and the Golundauze on their rear and flank; and the magazine within a short distance of a clubhouse. The native horse-artillery have a separate position on the left of the whole line, and the cavalry are cantoned by themselves some little distance on the flank of the foot-artillery. When I left India, the main guard was on the left rear flank of the cantonment close to the sepoys' hutting lines and amongst the bazaars and native population.

Major-Gen. R. Alexander.

25th Aug. 1858.

2418. You would recommend immediate attention to the different cantonments?—Yes. And a most important thing certainly is to bring up the artillery to an efficient and a much larger establishment than it has ever been at. The condition of the European officers requires a great deal of consideration; recent arrangements have thrown many of them out, and disappointed them just at the time when they thought they were rising to rank and command, and others are depressed by long service and supercessions.

2419. Supercessions arising from what?—For example, when the Royal artillery go out they supersede every man whom they come near.

2420. It appears to have been an absolute necessity?—The necessity was clear, but it might have been remedied.

2421. (*Viscount Melville.*) You have spoken about the clothing; would you have any alteration in the clothing of the Europeans in India?—The European clothing and accoutrements have been improved of late years; but I would carry improvement farther, and make much use of calico or other light clothes.

2422. With regard to calico clothes, are you not aware that on service it is impossible for European troops to do without cloth clothing?—Quite so. It is also required during the cold season.

2423. With a man's calico clothing, how on service can he manage to carry both?—A knapsack will carry a red jacket; on field service a red jacket, cloth trowsers, and a grey great coat are all the woollen clothing that a man can expect, and that he would carry or have on him.

2424 *a.* How would you carry the linen clothing?—That must be dispensed with in the field. The kit in barracks is very large, but on service must be reduced to what is simply required for health and efficiency.

The witness withdrew.

Thursday, 26th August 1858.

PRESENT:

Major-General the Right Hon. J. PEEL.	Major-General Viscount MELVILLE.
General H.R.H. the Duke of CAMBRIDGE.	Lieut.-Gen. Sir HARRY G. W. SMITH.
The Right Hon. Lord STANLEY.	Major-General HANCOCK.
General the Marquis of TWEEDDALE.	Colonel BURLTON.

MAJOR-GENERAL PEEL IN THE CHAIR.

JOHN F. THOMAS, Esq., examined.

J. F. Thomas, Esq.

26th Aug. 1858.

2424. (*Chairman.*) You belong to the civil service?—The Madras civil service.

2425. Will you have the goodness to tell the Commission how long you were in India?—I was there close upon 39 years, that is to say, from the commencement of my service to the termination; of course I had furlough and absence.

2426. What position did you hold there?—I was both in the revenue and in the judicial department for some time; but during the latter part of my service, the last ten years, I was chief secretary to the Government, and a member of the Government.

2427. Is your knowledge confined entirely to Madras, or do you know anything of the Bengal presidency?—I know nothing personally or practically of Bengal, but only through papers and official records.

2428. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Had you the means of knowing what was going on in regard to military matters in the army?—Necessarily, as a member of the Government and chief secretary, every military paper came before me, and it was my duty in both capacities to make myself acquainted with them.

2429. (*Chairman.*) Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion of European to native force which ought to be employed in Madras?—I certainly have formed an opinion; but it would be guided

J. F. Thomas, Esq.

26th Aug. 1858.

partly by preliminary questions as to whether you would constitute your native army as efficiently as you would a European force; and further, what would be the character of the police establishment, whether it should be a military police corps, or what it should be; in fact, what force you would have, independently of the military force, for governing the country.

2430. You consider that with the European force, not only the native force, but the police as well, must be taken into consideration?—Yes, most assuredly; I may refer to the province of Malabar as an instance, where, for 25 years, a section of the Mahomedan community was always lawless and violent. The native police and the sepoy regiments both shrank before them and were powerless. We were always under the necessity of calling in the European arm. That deranged the whole of our arrangements for European troops in the division. It was then proposed by the Government, that there should be a law passed which would give the local civil officers greater power in these particular cases. The outrages were very extensive. I may mention the last but one which occurred two years before I left India. A party of Mahomedans assaulted a family, put to death the father, the wives, and all the children, young girls, and even down to an infant of six months old, and we had no means of restraining them, they were determined to sell their lives as martyrs. The result was that the Government got a law passed which gave them greater authority, a police corps was formed, and a company of Europeans was brought down and located in the heart of the country, but they were only called upon to support the civil power in cases of emergency. Without these measures a whole corps and more than one corps of Europeans would have been required to keep that country quiet.

2431. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What sort of police force was it which you established?—There was a police corps established with two European officers, one a captain and the other a lieutenant; and Sir Henry Pottinger and the Madras Government proposed that there should be a considerable element of European non-commissioned officers with this corps. That was overruled in England; but I have no hesitation in saying, that if we had been allowed to carry out our own plan, of having a European to every fifteen or twenty natives, making a corps of 100 to 150, as found necessary, we should have had a most efficient body for restraining outrage in that country, supported as it would have been by a European company.

2432. It was a military force?—Yes.

2433. Not a civil police?—The civil one, the police of the country, remained as it was; this was an extra corps, but of course under the magistrate.

2434. Was it armed?—Yes.

2435. In what way?—They had a rifle given them in consequence of the peculiar character of the people who attacked them, and other arms too. I think that they had even revolvers; but that was not a matter into which the Government entered.

2436. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the efficiency of the native troops or police is dependent upon the number of Europeans employed with them?—In all dangerous or difficult or lawless districts I think it essential; and in all districts where there is a contest between the races (for in this Mahomedan section it was partly agrarian and partly fanatical), I think the European element is essential; it secures impartiality and efficiency and trustworthiness, which nothing else can do.

2437. What proportion of European and native troops and police should you recommend to be established in the Madras presidency?—In the Madras presidency, if you take our peaceable, quiet districts in the south of India, where the people neither use nor carry arms, I should say that one European regiment is enough for even five or six districts. I should say, generally speaking, that in the Madras presidency one to three or one to four would suffice.

2438. Do you include the police in that proportion or not?—Yes, the native army and the police; all armed bodies.

2439. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) It would depend upon the character of the population?—Yes.

2440. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you give that estimate, supposing the Madras presidency were extended; that is to say, supposing it took in Saugur and so on?—Certainly not. I conceive that the whole of the Nizam's and the Saugur and Nerbuddah country, are districts with a comparatively warlike armsbearing population. Our Madras population for the most part consists of peaceable people, neither using nor carrying arms.

2441. In case there should be any alteration in the territorial arrangement of the presidencies, and that portion to which I have alluded were added to Madras, you would not consider one to four the right proportion?—Certainly not.

2442. (*Chairman.*) Would you arm the native troops and the police in the same manner as the Europeans?—If you arm the native troops in the same manner as the Europeans you must increase the number of your Europeans.

2443. Then you would not give the natives so efficient a weapon as the Europeans?—Certainly not. I conceive that if you wish to avoid the necessity of having a very large European force you must keep the artillery and the rifle in the hands of the European alone. That would be my opinion. Upon the same principle that I refuse the native the great gun, because I have more confidence in the European, so I refuse the native the rifle.

2444. Then you would have the whole of the artillery European?—Entirely.

2445. Does that extend to sappers and miners?—Those I would have natives. The sapper and miner in Madras, and I believe it must be so throughout India, is a low-caste man; he has very little in common with the higher classes; he therefore is almost allied by his interest and circumstances to the British Government, and I conceive that there is no disadvantage nor danger in employing largely the low-caste sappers and miners.

2446. What is the proportion of low castes to the other castes in the native army in Madras?—I can get no actual data, but as far as I know from communication with the Adjutant-General's Office, and from general knowledge, I believe you will find these proportions to be about correct: 15 per cent. of higher caste men, 35 per cent. of Mahomedans, and the rest the lower classes of Hindoos, so that there would be from 45 to 50 per cent. of the lower class of Hindoos.

2447. Is caste acknowledged at all in the native army, is it any excuse for not doing military duty?—It is only acknowledged in this way: Sir Thomas Munro proposed, on the first Burmese war, to issue an order that all men of caste, and all men who on religious grounds did not choose to embark, might absent themselves, but the commander-in-chief of that day said that the order should be that any man who did not like to follow his colours was at liberty to take his discharge.

2448. (*Major-General Hancock.*) But you are aware that the Madras troops were enlisted on the terms of not being liable to be sent beyond sea?—They are enlisted on that ground, and therefore as soon as they come to the seaboard they are at liberty to take their discharge.

2449. Of course if they are enlisted on those terms the Government have not the power to send them beyond sea?—They have not the power, but practically the Madras troops have for very many years been in the habit of going beyond sea; and when they were called upon to say whether they would embark, the order went out, "Does any caste man "object?" they threw up their caps and said, "Who "cares for caste?"

2450. What is the course adopted by the Madras Government when they require troops for foreign

service?—They call upon the commander-in-chief, saying that they require such and such a force, and he issues his orders to the generals of divisions and to the adjutant-general for such and such a force to be prepared to embark.

2451. What orders are given to the officers commanding regiments?—If any man chooses to say that he will not embark, in consequence of caste views, he has liberty to take his discharge.

2452. Then, in fact, the commander-in-chief of the army orders the regiments to embark?—Yes.

2453. And if they decline to embark they are considered to be guilty of no crime?—We never had a regiment declining to embark on the ground of caste.

2454. But any individual man?—Yes, but he takes his discharge.

2455. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) On principle do you not think it a very awkward matter. Suppose a regiment said that they would not embark?—If it had ever been brought to that in the Madras presidency, the Government must have taken up their ground.

2456. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Is it not liable at any moment to come to that point?—Never, with our low-caste men.

2457. (*Lord Stanley.*) Does not that arrangement which you describe place the Government under the suspicion of calling upon those men to do that which it has been expressly promised to them that they shall not be called upon to do?—It would be so if our army was constituted of high-caste men, where there was a real palpable known objection, and an honest objection, on the ground of caste, but it does not apply to the low-caste men.

2458. I do not care whether the objection is an honest one or not, or whether it is made by high-caste men or by low-caste men; the question is, whether an engagement has not been made with the men when they enlisted, which engagement, by your description, is not strictly observed afterwards?—I should say myself that every man having the power of relinquishing the army whensoever he chooses without disadvantage to himself, the engagement is fulfilled to him. If he was subject to penalty or loss because he did not do that which the Government had engaged that he should not be called upon to do, then I should say that there was a breach of contract with him.

2459. He is subject to the penalty of being deprived of his means of subsistence?—That is to say he takes his discharge. If his regiment embarks beyond sea it is palpable.

2460. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Further than that, is not that man liable by the Articles of War to be brought to trial by court-martial, and condemned to death for disobedience to orders?—Certainly not in the Madras army.

2461. Why not?—Because the option is really given to him of embarking or not embarking without penalty or loss.

2462. Then you mean that that Article of War has no reference to the Madras army?—That question I would not answer; practically we have no difficulty.

2463. (*Chairman.*) Surely he would not be subject by the Articles of War to a punishment for doing that which he was not enlisted to do?—Certainly not; and more than that, when the Government gave every man the option, they could never bring a man to a court-martial for disobedience to orders, it would be a contradiction of terms.

2464. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then the Government is subject to the caprices of any man who does not choose to embark?—Certainly.

2465. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) When a regiment is ordered to embark, if any man or men refuse to go, and apply for their discharge and get their discharge, do they lose caste when they return to their own villages?—Certainly not. There is one peculiarity which makes the question, as regards the Madras army, so different from the question as respects another army, namely, that the Madras army are nearly all low-caste men who are married. The corps is their home, it is their village, they are all isolated from the body of the population; there is no public opinion influencing them; if the acts which they do are of good esteem in the regiment it is sufficient; their families or their relations are living with them in the regiment, and they are under no disadvantage, and no discomfort, from following out what the regiment sees to be right, therefore there is no possible objection or motive not to go.

2466. (*Chairman.*) Might not the Madras troops refuse to serve in Aracan?—I should say myself that under the enlistment every man might refuse to go across the sea as well as one man; but I imagine that if the corps said they would not go, the only thing would be to disband it.

2467. (*Lord Stanley.*) That is to say, you would punish the whole regiment for refusing to do that which it has been expressly promised them that they shall not be called upon to do?—The whole regiment might be punished for it; it would not be for not agreeing to what they had originally engaged to do, but under the circumstances of the Madras army it would be positively a species of mutiny. For there is no reason why one corps should not embark as well as another corps.

2468. That is to say, you tell a man that you will punish him, not for refusing to do that which he has been told that he shall not be called upon to do, but because you consider that his refusal shows a mutinous spirit?—Not only so, but also if there is no ground whatever for his refusal.

2469. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Why then put it in the enlistment?—That is the old usage.

2470. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think that that can possibly be a right system by which the Government breaks faith with any servant, makes an engagement with a soldier that he shall only serve within certain limits, and then orders him to go beyond?—I beg pardon, they do not order him to go beyond; they allow him to volunteer or to decline to volunteer.

2471. I understood you to say that the troops were ordered in the first instance, and were discharged if they refused?—The regiment is ordered, but an individual man of the corps may embark or not; it is an anomaly.

2472. (*Chairman.*) Do you recommend any alteration in the terms upon which the enlistment for the Madras army shall take place for the future?—Most decidedly. I should say that the ordinary principle of the Indian Government should be perfect openness, and perfect clearness, with every man in their employment.

2473. The men should be enlisted to go everywhere?—For service beyond sea; for every service for which the Government can want a soldier.

2474. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then, though practically you find that the system as it has hitherto worked has worked well in Madras, still you admit that on principle you would prefer and would recommend an alteration to the extent that a man should go where ordered, and not be asked whether he liked it or not?—Most assuredly, and no other principle is compatible with the present state of India.

2475. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you think that you could get the men to enlist easily under those conditions?—I should say that there is not the slightest difficulty in the Madras presidency. I believe that on a regiment embarking scarcely a man holds back. I only speak from general knowledge; but one would have heard of it if the contrary had been the case.

2476. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the native force of Madras should be continued on the regular system, or should the irregular system be introduced into it?—It would depend upon circumstances.

2477. What is the system?—There are no irregular corps; it is all the regular army, regular infantry and regular cavalry.

2478. What is the number of European officers attached to the native regiments in the Madras

J. F. Thomas, Esq.

26th Aug. 1858.

army ?—There are seven captains and eleven lieutenants. I think it is the same as in Bengal.

2479. What is the proportion usually present in the regiments ? Does any inconvenience arise from their being detached upon the civil service ?—Certainly ; but a rule which is distinct and express for all the presidencies has been kept at Madras with a rigidness unknown in Bengal. Over and over again we have had discussions with the Bengal Government upon that subject.

2480. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You do not allow any more than a certain number of officers to be absent ? —Never more than the regulated number.

2481. How many officers would that give present ? —With the regiment, five captains and six lieutenants. These are details with which I am not so familiar.

2482. Generally an officer to a company would be present ?—Certainly, including the lieutenants.

2483. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider it absolutely necessary, in the native regiments, to have a European officer present with each company ?—Yes, to make them efficient and safe.

2484. (*Major-General Hancock.*) There are much fewer civil, staff, and other detached appointments in Madras than in Bengal, are there not ?—Yes ; in Bengal the large number of political appointments connected with the seat of Government takes off a number of officers, which is not known much in Madras.

2485. (*Chairman.*) What is the police force which is employed in Madras ; has it been employed to any extent ?—There have been no police corps to any extent ; they are now organizing a regular police force, and have appointed two lieutenants and a captain to be superintendents of police besides the commissioner of police ; but, excepting in the small district of Kurnoul, there has been no military police of any extent.

2486. Are any duties now done by the native troops which you would recommend being transferred to the police force ?—There are several duties done by the native troops which are not necessary for troops. At the same time it is a difficult question, it depends upon the part of the country. I think that in the provinces in which I was, where the population was perfectly peaceful, the charge of the treasury and of the gaol might be given to veterans, or to any persons who received pensions, so that there was a hold upon them ; but otherwise I think it would be unsafe. The great use of the regular army in all these extra duties is, that they are pensioned and promoted, and you have a hold upon them which you have not upon a man who is on a monthly salary.

2487. (*Viscount Melville.*) In Madras are the treasury guards furnished by Europeans or by natives ?—At the treasury in the fort of Madras, and over the bank of Madras upon the beach, it is European ; but the treasury guards in the provinces are all native guards.

2488. (*Major-General Hancock.*) I imagine that at any station at which European troops are located those guards are taken by Europeans, are they not ?—I should say decidedly that we have very few Europeans. Bangalore is not within the Madras presidency.

2489. Nor the arsenals ?—No ; on the contrary, I remember that the whole of the arsenal at Bangalore was in the hands of the native sentries.

2490. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I understand you to say that you would wish all the artillery to be Europeans ?—Certainly.

2491. Of course you are aware that the Madras army has not mutined ; would you therefore allow the present system to go on and to die off (if I may so express myself) as far as the artillery are concerned; that is to say, not to enlist further natives for the artillery, or would you at once introduce a change by disbanding the native artillery and substituting Europeans for them in the Madras presidency ?—I should be sorry to have such a question depend upon any opinion which I could form, but speaking generally, and viewing the character of the native, I should prefer (seeing what they have done) not showing more distrust, but allowing them gradually to fall off, and a new and better system to be introduced.

2492. Substituting it by degrees ?—Substituting it by degrees. At the same time, if I found that military men connected with the artillery said that the thing could be well done, and that it was better to do it at once, I should defer to their judgment.

2493. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the Madras army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so in what proportion ?—Unquestionably it should be composed of different castes, and I should myself say that the larger the body of low-caste men the better, because the low-caste man has a direct interest with us ; he is kept down by the feelings and views of the higher classes. The Mahomedan never can be allied with us in feeling, although he may be very valuable. In my early days, if the question had been asked, "Will you stand faithful to the Government?" the answer of the Mahomedan would have been, "I "have eaten the Company's salt, how can I be faith- "less?" The answer the other day of the men of the 3rd Madras cavalry, when asked by their officers what they thought of the mutiny, was, "We thought "that our fellow Mahomedans were fighting for their "rights and their religion, and they were quite "right."

2494. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) It has been stated before the Commission that to elevate the natives both in civil employment and in military employment would tend greatly to the quietude of the country ; are you of that opinion ?—I am decidedly of that opinion as respects civil employment, but I cannot think that it is wise with so small a body as we are, and such an enormous population surrounding us, to give them the power of the sword, the power of the great gun, the military arm; on the contrary, I think it a plan well calculated to prevent any chance of their rising to give them full civil advantages, but I cannot think that that applies to the military arm.

2495. (*Chairman.*) What has been the system of promotion in the native army of Madras ?—By seniority after they get the junior grade of naik or the lower grade, corporal and sergeant ; it is then pure seniority in the native army.

2496. Do you prefer the system of selection to that of seniority ?—On the same principle that I do not think it expedient to make the native army a powerful, well-organized army, and formidable to ourselves; I would have the seniority system. I have seen it stated over and over again by men who have taken the opposite view, that had there been well-trained young native officers in command of the native troops, we should have had a very different state of things in India in the late mutiny.

2497. Then you are for the seniority system because you consider that it deteriorates the troops ? —If I were allowed the expression, I would say that I am for the seniority system because I think that by that means the native officer is not so efficient for the purposes of injury or the purposes of damage to the British Government, and also because I think it just to the men themselves.

2498. (*Lord Stanley.*) You consider it as a guarantee for inefficiency ?—I consider it as a guarantee for inefficiency, just as I do the refusal of the rifle or the great gun.

2499. (*Chairman.*) For what purpose do you propose employing these native troops whom you are to keep inefficient, by the manner in which you appoint their officers and arm them ?—I view the state of India at the present hour. When we first entered India there were large native powers surrounding us with their forces. The Mahratta powers and the powers in the north, and Hyder's power all originally had large well-armed bodies of troops, many of them with European discipline. It was necessary for us to raise a large military force to cope with them. The circumstances are wholly altered now, there is not a native power throughout India which can bring

any disciplined men into the field in any numbers. In order to meet an effective army in former days our troops must have been made equally effective as those troops, but we are now in totally different circumstances, we only require to garrison the country. Whether you look to Pegu, or to any part of the southern Mahratta country, there is not a native power that can bring a large well-disciplined and equipped native force against us. Therefore all I can say is, that I recommend that you should have a military force comparatively defective and ineffective compared with the European army, but effective beyond what any native power can bring into the field.

2500. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then you would have the native army organized entirely for the internal purposes of the country, and as regards the country alone, and not apply to it all the advantages of science and art which European troops have gained in modern times?—Certainly.

2501. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You would reduce the native army to a mere police force, would you not?—I would not.

2502. You would not call it that, but it would be so practically?—A police force depends upon the manner in which you would form and arm it. The constabulary police force of Ireland is an armed body thoroughly efficient; they might go into the field to-morrow, but the police force of the metropolis and of Great Britain is a differently constituted force.

2503. (*Colonel Burlton.*) If you think it advisable to have inefficient native officers, do not you think it a better arrangement to have none at all?—It appears to me that if you have a large body of 600 or 700 or 1,000 men you must have officers.

2504. What do you think of having European non-commissioned officers attached to native regiments?—I think it very desirable.

2505. Instead of the native officers?—No; there is a non-commissioned officer attached now.

2506. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would increase the number?—I would assuredly.

2507. Some to each company?—Yes.

2508. (*Major-General Hancock.*) With what object?—Two objects. In the first place, those men marry either native women or East Indians, and I think that by mixing them with the native regiments a right feeling would grow up. Further than that, where you employ your native troops, as they will be employed, in keeping the internal peace of the country, as your native army is composed partly of Hindoos and partly of Mahomedans, I think it essential and very much calculated for general peace that a European, who can have no more regard and affection for one than for the other, should be present. We did it at Trichinopoly, where there was a very severe religious contest. That arrangement itself tends to keep the peace.

2509. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Do you think that these European non-commissioned officers attached to native regiments would form a better channel of intercommunication between the natives and the European officers than the present native officer does?—Decidedly. The married woman, whether native or East Indian, lives in the bazaar, and walks about, and there is decidedly more intercourse than the European can now have.

2510. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you mean that you would make the wives of serjeants the medium of communication?—Certainly not, any more than the mistress of an officer in the Mahratta war; but we know perfectly well through what channel it was that the best information was got.

2511. (*Chairman.*) Do you then consider that the present communication between the European and the native officers is not sufficient?—It certainly is not, as a general rule.

2512. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You are aware, I suppose, that during the whole of the late mutiny in Bengal no single instance has been known where a native officer has given the European officer information of what was in operation?—Just so, and in the 8th native cavalry of Madras, which has been disbanded for disobedience, the native officer concealed the state of the regiment. He has an interest which is distinct from that of the European officer.

2513. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) With your great experience in India, admitting that the native army is formed upon the principle which you mention, half police as it were and half soldier, as being sufficient to keep the whole population in order, what resources would the Governor-General have in the event of wishing to carry on war in Chittagong, Rangoon, China, or any other place?—My opinion would be that the Eastern powers, unassisted by the powers of the Western world, are powerless against any native force armed in the manner I recommend, with British artillery to back it; there is no power equal to cope with it, not even Persia.

2514. (*Chairman.*) Have you formed any opinion as to the amount of force which will be required in the Madras presidency after the country is settled?—May I ask for an explanation of what is meant by "the Madras presidency?" The Madras presidency as managed and immediately under the Government is of a limited extent, and it is a most peaceful country; but if you apply the term "the Madras presidency" to wherever the Madras troops are sent who are paid from the Madras treasury, and who are under the orders of the Madras commander-in-chief, with his staff, it is then a very different thing.

2515. I mean that portion held by the Madras army?—The Madras army garrisons Penang, Singapore, and the Straits; it has been sent to Labuan; then all Burmah is entirely garrisoned by Madras troops; there are eleven native regiments there besides artillery.

2516. Include all those?—Then the whole of the Nizam's country, Saugur and Nagpoor, is held by Madras troops.

2517. Including the whole of that territory what force would you have for Madras?—I imagine that the present force, namely, fifty-two native regiments, would be found sufficient. I cannot conceive the Madras cavalry to be a desirable arm: they are chiefly Mussulmans.

2518. (*Viscount Melville.*) How many Europeans would you have?—I should say one to four.

2519. (*Chairman.*) According to your smallest proportion you would have ten European regiments?—Yes. If you took the Nizam's country, and part of the distant southern Mahratta country, it would be too few; but if you took the actual Madras presidency under the civil government, it would be more than ample. There everything is in order.

2520. In proportion to those fifty-two native regiments how many European regiments would you have?—I would have twelve, if the Madras army is to garrison countries with a comparatively warlike or lawless population.

2521. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Including Burmah?—Yes.

2522. (*Chairman.*) Is that inclusive or exclusive of the artillery?—Exclusive of the artillery.

2523. (*Viscount Melville.*) Is it exclusive of European cavalry?—Yes; the European cavalry is only one regiment.

2524. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What would you do with respect to cavalry?—I can only just offer a mere suggestion, of little value in itself, arising from my knowledge of what has taken place now. The Madras cavalry is, seven-eighths of it, Mahomedan, and on that account is untrustworthy. Three months with General Whitlock's force (an officer writes) have given me but one opinion respecting the Madras cavalry, namely, that it is worth nothing to us. An officer of the Madras cavalry in Bengal also wrote, that when he advanced with his troop against the mutineers, every man of the Madras cavalry left him alone, and his pariah servant hallooed out "Is that "the way you act; is that to be a soldier?" Therefore I believe, that as long as your cavalry are Maho-

J. F. Thomas, Esq.

26th Aug. 1858.

medan, when you bring them against men who are fighting for their religion, you can have no confidence in them at all, simply because they are Mahomedan. They are as good soldiers in every other respect as any other part of the army.

2525. What would you propose instead?—I have merely seen, as everybody else has seen, a proposition to have a man of light weight for European cavalry.

2526. (*Lord Stanley.*) You are clear upon the point that the fact of being a Mussulman should be a disqualification for military employment?—I am clear upon the point that a regiment being so constituted as to be seven-eighths of it Mahomedan is an evil; but if the Mahomedans were there in small proportions, I should think it an injustice to debar any part of the Mahomedan population from military employment.

2527. (*Chairman.*) How do you account for such a very small proportion of low-caste men being in the Madras cavalry, when you say that in the other branches of the army they preponderate?—We have no horsemen; it is not the habit of the country. We have only a little poney, merely an animal to carry baggage, whereas in the Mahratta country the horse has been long used.

2528. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Has there been any difficulty in recruiting the Mahrattas?—None at all. The Rissalahs in Mysore are Mahrattas, I believe.

2529. Could not many of that class be made available for the regular cavalry regiments?—I suppose they might be if they were enlisted; they are not within our own presidency, and the Mahomedans are enlisted from men of our own territory.

2530. (*Chairman.*) I understand you that the cavalry are all regular?—Yes, there are eight regiments of them.

2531. Are not the horses supplied by the Government?—Yes.

2532. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Where do they get their horses, from Bombay?—From the Gulf, and latterly a good deal from the Cape.

2533. Have they a stud?—They have no stud; they have horse agents.

2534. (*Viscount Melville.*) They always used to have a remount agent at Bombay?—There was a remount agent, but they have dispensed with that, and they have gone direct to the dealers, and an agency is now established at Bangalore, and the dealers bring them without a remount agent.

2535. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you of opinion that irregular cavalry might not be raised in the Madras presidency?—From Mahomedans no doubt, they could, but whenever you have the Mahomedan element you must allow for the natural and just feeling of every Mahomedan; if he is not an infidel in his own faith he is decidedly hostile to Christian superiority and supremacy.

2536. (*Viscount Melville.*) What is the predominant caste in the infantry?—The Sudra, or the lower agriculturists. Rules have existed not to enlist the actual Pariah of latter years, but still the predominating caste is what we should call the common Ryot or Sudra.

2537. Then are there few Mahomedans in the infantry?—About thirty-five per cent., I think.

2538. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You do not object to that?—I think the proportion is decidedly too large for safety and trustworthiness. I have asked the question if there could be any data obtained as to the present proportion, and I have been answered that there are no actual data yet framed.

2539. It has been stated in evidence before us by several witnesses that the same caste which would refuse to embark or to do certain duties on account of caste in Bengal would do those duties in Madras; that is to say, that they would do in Madras what they would not do in Bengal; is that your opinion, or are you aware from your experience that such has been the case?—We know it actually to be the case.

2540. Can you account for it in any way?—Yes, I could account for it.

2541. In what way?—It arises from the European influence over the native. In Bengal and in Calcutta the feeling has been shared to such an extent that a man like Sir Charles Metcalfe never had ham on his table, because he did not wish to offend the Mahomedan prejudices. In Bengal, a ham, or any other dish connected with pig, was brought in by the very lowest servant, and put upon the table. If my butler had objected to do it in Madras I should have sent him out of the house in an instant. When Lord Wellesley went to Bengal he ordered his bearers to pull his punka, and they declined; the same men do all that without scruple at Madras, and it was not without Lord Wellesley's firmness that after three days' strike the thing was put an end to. Why they should allow caste so largely to influence them in Bengal I am not sufficiently master of the question to say. A lady of considerable experience with whom I was acquainted lived in Bengal from 1780, in Warren Hastings' time, until very lately, and from her I knew the whole facts of Bengal society for half a century and why the Bengal people allow all this I cannot tell you.

2542. Then you think it is merely because they have given way to prejudices of caste more than the Madras people, and consequently the difference has been very great?—We have the actual fact.

2543. The result then is that European influence is greater in Madras than it is in Bengal?—I believe so decidedly over the native; then there is another thing to be said, the Madras Brahmin population will never entertain as soldiers; they are totally distinct men from the Brahmin population in the north-west.

2544. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Then from your great experience in India, you are of opinion that just authority tends to a better result than conciliation, as to the obedience of the natives?—I should only qualify that by saying that by "just authority" I mean pure, full, and ample justice, not merely authority because I order it, though it may be just in that sense; but it must be based upon principles of full and ample justice to the individual.

2545. That is preferable to attaining the same end by conciliation?—Far preferable; it is the only way which will secure us, in my opinion.

2546. (*Colonel Burlton.*) I believe that in the remarks which you have just made respecting deference to caste, regarding the matter of hams and pulling punkas and so forth, you alluded only to the Government House?—Those are the habits of society.

2547. (*Lord Stanley.*) What I understand you to mean on the subject of compliance with caste is this: you do not, I presume, object to its being respected whenever its observances do not conflict with military or other duty?—On the contrary, I should say that consideration to a man's private feelings is a bounden duty.

2548. And you hold it, I presume, to be very important to show the people of India, that where caste rules are interfered with, it is not done in the wantonness of power, or from a wish to assert the superiority of our habits over theirs, but simply because those rules which we break through stand in the way of something which it is necessary should be done.?—That is precisely my view.

2549. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then the result would be that if on a man's enlistment certain things were put before him which he would be called upon to do, and he were told, "If you cannot do these things we cannot enlist you," you would take it for granted that if he accepted that enlistment with those conditions, caste would afterwards not stand in the way of performing the duties which he had undertaken to do?—Precisely so.

2550. (*Chairman.*) And I understand you to say that under proper regulations you do not find caste to stand in the way of the performance of military duty?

—Just so ; on the contrary, in Madras high-caste men have done things which in Bengal they have refused to do.

2551. What has been the total strength of the Madras army ?—The infantry may be about 50,000, and the cavalry about 2,000 and upwards.

2552. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Natives ?—Yes, I am referring to the native army ; and then there have been the sappers and miners, 1,700, I think, and the native artillery.

2553. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Has the native army of Madras been recruited up to the full establishment ?—At one time the corps were 750, and then the Bengal Government ordered them to be increased to 900.

2554. Do you think that at any time the regiments of the Madras army have been complete according to the numbers ?—I do not believe they have.

2555. Do you know the reason ?—No, I am not aware of the actual reason.

2556. (*Viscount Melville.*) From the situations in which you have been can you say whether the natives of Madras are allowed to go about armed ?—In some of the districts, such as those bordering upon the Nizam's country and bordering upon the Mahratta country, in time of alarm they are pretty generally armed ; but in our peaceful part, in the south of India, no man carries arms ; indeed the Government were obliged to issue an order that a reward should be given to those who carried a gun so as to resist the attacks of private robbers.

2557. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you not rather see the population without arms, taking into account all that has lately occurred ?—The possession of arms is a more manly and better basis of character, than that of the man depressed and kept down as a serf.

2558. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are you not aware that Sir Charles Napier's government at Scinde ordered the disarming of the natives there ?— Scinde was comparatively a lawless country ; in Malabar in the same way the Government of Madras disarmed the population upon the same ground, and I am quite in favour of disarming all the lawless classes of our subjects ; at the same time I would always grant permission under licence to men to carry arms.

2559. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Firearms as well as others ?—Yes, under permission. Whilst I would disarm every lawless vagabond, and every warlike class, I would not withhold the use of arms from the respectable portion of the natives.

2560. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You say that you would disarm every lawless person, is it not somewhat difficult to make a distinction in an entire population ?—I believe not, the classes are so distinct in India ; the Moplar Malabar man, for instance, is a Mahomedan totally distinct from the whole Hindoo population.

2561. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Do you recollect to what extent, as to numbers, the people under one civil authority have reached ?—I had the district of Tanjore and Trichinopoly ; the one contained more than 500,090 and the other about 1,200,000, so that there were about 1,700,000 ; but that was an enormous district, and it was subsequently divided into two.

2562. (*Viscount Melville.*) Were the natives there allowed to go about armed ?—They never carried arms.

2563. (*Major-General Hancock.*) But they were free to do so if they wished ?—Yes. There was a police law, that if they carried arms they might be called upon to account for them, if anybody was found about the country with arms, but that was a mere matter of local police.

2564. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Did you make any observation with regard to the Company's European troops respecting their being in an efficient state of discipline ?—We could not help doing so. When the Company's European troops were ordered, as they have been at different times, to embark for Burmah, Madras has always been in a state of disorder and siege ; every native was in danger of being knocked down, and the very houses and places at Madras in the Black Town have been for a few days barricaded.

2565. What has been their conduct in the field ?—In the field I have always understood that they fight admirably.

2566. To what do you attribute that ?—I attribute it to the European standing up against the native.

2567. To what do you attribute their conduct when they come into large towns ?—To their not being under the same discipline as the Queen's troops are ; and they cannot be from the system which exists, namely, the system of seniority, just as it is in the native army. I also think that the European, remaining in India, being of the same ruling, dominant class as his officer, he does not look up to him to the same degree.

2568. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then you would rather have the Europeans changed ; you would rather that they should come and go ?—Certainly ; but then, again, these men form marriages in the country, become allied and attached to the natives in a way in which perhaps a corps which only comes and goes would never be. I think that there are opposite considerations.

2569. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What do you mean in saying that the system of seniority with the Company's European troops is one of the causes of the state of things you have described?—In the Company's army the officers cannot purchase over each other.

2570. Why should that be a reason for their not being amenable to discipline ?—I should say that the Queen's troops owe part of their discipline to younger men and men of energy, who buy commissions and take a great pride in their regiments, and command them as very young men, also they have a natural influence from their position ; many of the men, perhaps, come from the same county, and they know their families, and there is an hereditary influence in the Queen's army which cannot exist in a mere army of seniority. But these are questions upon which I can merely state the thoughts which have occurred to me.

2571. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You have expressed an opinion that it would be advisable to have European non-commissioned officers attached to the companies of every native regiment. Do you think it also advisable to have companies of Europeans attached to native regiments ; two flank companies, for instance ?—I am not competent to give you more than a mere off-hand opinion ; but it seems to me that there is something so distinct in the whole discipline and character of the Europeans, that it is not expedient to put them with the natives in such numbers, or to have a company; it is, however, a mere thought which occurs to me rather than anything else.

2572. (*Chairman.*) You consider that any admixture of European and native forces should be by brigades, and that they should not be mixed up regimentally ?—Not by companies, I should say, so far as I can throw out anything for consideration.

The witness withdrew.

Lieutenant-Colonel ALFRED THOMAS WILDE examined.

2573. (*Chairman.*) What rank do you hold in the Indian army ?—Brevet lieutenant-colonel.

2574. How long have you been in the service ?—20 years.

2575. How many years of that period have you passed in India ?—The whole.

2576. In what presidency have you served ?—I belong to the Madras army.

Lieut.-Col. A. T. Wilde.
26th Aug. 1858.

2577. In what branch of the service ?—The 19th Madras native infantry. I have been 11 years in the Madras army, and nine years in the Punjaub irregular infantry.

2578. You have been in the Bengal presidency ?—Yes, for nine years.

2579. Of course you have had opportunities of seeing European and native troops act together ?—Yes, frequently.

2580. Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion which the Europeans should bear to the native troops in the Bengal and Madras presidencies ?—I think one European to four natives ought to be about the average. I consider however that the real safety of our Empire in the East depends upon other arrangements. I don't believe that a purely European force could hold India however large it might be, or rather if as large as the revenues of the country could support.

2581. Do you take the police into consideration at all ?—No, not in that estimate; that is exclusive of police, but including all branches of the service.

2582. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Including the artillery branch of the service ?—Yes, the artillery, cavalry, and infantry.

2583. (*Chairman.*) Would you have the artillery exclusively European, or would you have any native artillery ?—I would have no purely native batteries or troops, but I would mix the two together. I would have some natives, probably half, in the troops and batteries.

2584. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would mix them up ?—Yes.

2585. What formation would you adopt for that purpose; would you have the natives as drivers, or partially both gunners and drivers ?—I would have them as drivers. I think that the question could be better answered by an artillery officer, but I think that they might and ought to be employed with our Europeans in serving the guns; for instance, in the reserve artillery, half of them might be natives to serve guns in battery.

2586. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You mean gunners ?—Yes.

2587. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would there be no difficulty in the interior economy of a company or troop so organized ?—I think not.

2588. Would there not, as to the means of cooking, rationing, &c., be some considerable difficulty ?—I think not; I think that any artillery officer would be able to work out that plan very easily.

2589. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Do not you think that in cases of disaffection it would afford great facility for these men mixed up with our artillery to spike the guns in the night ?—Of course there is that danger, but with European soldiers to watch them the probability of success almost, in my opinion, amounts to an impossibility.

2590. (*Chairman.*) Have you formed any opinion as to the amount of force which will be required after the mutiny is suppressed ?—It is difficult to speak without statistics; I should think for Bengal about 25,000 Europeans to 100,000 natives.

2591. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you include the Punjaub in Bengal ?—Yes.

2592. (*Chairman.*) Do you include the artillery in those numbers ?—I include all branches.

2593. What force would you recommend for Madras ?—I cannot detail the exact number required as it must depend upon political considerations.

2594. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are you aware that that proportion of Europeans is actually less than you had before the mutiny broke out ?—No, I think it must be more. I do not include Burmah and China in the Bengal Presidency.

2595. Do you consider that there should be fewer of European troops in Bengal, including the Punjaub, now, with the experience which we have had, than there were before the rebellion broke out ?—No, my intention was to have more. Not having statistics, I can only give general ideas. I do not wish to have more than four to one, and 25,000 Europeans to 100,000 natives would be that proportion.

2596. Would you think that there should be fewer Europeans than there were before ?—No, unquestionably more; we had too few at that time.

2597. (*Chairman.*) Then, as I understand you, you would reduce the proportion of natives to Europeans without expressing any opinion as to the total number ?—Yes.

2598. Do you consider that the force should be on the regular system or the irregular system, or both combined ?—I prefer the irregular myself, I think it far more efficient.

2599. (*Viscount Melville.*) Both for infantry and cavalry ?—Yes.

2600. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Have you served much in the irregulars ?—Nine years. I commanded a regiment seven years of those nine.

2601. (*Colonel Burlton.*) The Punjaub irregular regiment ?—The 4th Punjaub Irregular Infantry.

2602. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You have served with the irregular cavalry also, have you not ?—Not actually with them. I have had them under my command frequently.

2603. You belong to the infantry ?—I do.

2604. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you have any regular native infantry or cavalry at all ?—I would have none. I would have them all irregular.

2605. Will you explain why you prefer that system ?—I think that the irregular system is more in accordance with the ideas and habits of the native soldiers; you have greater authority over the men; they look up to their European officers to a greater extent than they do in the regular service; and having served under both systems I find that the irregular one is certainly the best.

2606. In what way have you more authority over the men ?—There is greater power to punish the bad and reward the good men. Men are selected for promotion according to their merits, and not by seniority.

2607. Since when has that existed ?—Since the Punjaub force was raised; we have always had the power of promotion in the hands of commandants.

2608. Is that according to the regulations of the service ?—Yes; the regulations of the irregular service.

2609. (*Chairman.*) Then you attribute the superiority of the irregular over the regular force to the greater power given to the commanding officers ?—Yes; and another very strong reason is, that the native officers in an irregular regiment are very superior to those in a regular one. The average age of my native officers was 26 years. They were actually the leaders and commanders of companies.

2610. (*Viscount Melville.*) By whom was that power which you have just mentioned given to commanding officers in irregular regiments ?—It was allowed by the civil government, Sir John Lawrence, and Brigadier Chamberlain. In fact the Punjab irregular force was originally constituted on this basis when raised under the orders of the Marquis of Dalhousie on the annexation of the Punjab.

2611. (*Major-General Hancock.*) The corps to which you are alluding are civil corps, I suppose, under the Government, not under the commander-in-chief ?—Yes they are under the civil authority.

2612. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Take the ordinary irregular cavalry of Bengal ?—That is different.

2613. That is not upon the principle which you have explained ?—No, it is separate. The Bengal irregular cavalry were under the orders of the Commander-in-chief.

2614. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are the irregular horse as well mounted as the regular cavalry ?—No, certainly not, but still sufficiently well mounted to perform all the duties of light horse, which work, owing to their equipment and organization, they performed admirably.

2615. And in the event of all the cavalry in India being irregular, how would you propose to mount so

large a number ?—I do not think that there would be any difficulty in getting horses ; we never found any.

2616. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You said that the irregular Punjaub regiments were under the civil authority ?—Yes, they are.

2617. Do you mean to say that they are not at all under the military authority ?—They were organized in this way originally. The whole of the interior economy was managed by a brigadier, who was first of all called the inspector under the civil authority ; but then came the difficulty of how the civil government was to convene a general court-martial for the European officers, or even for the native officers ; it was decided that where officers, either European or native, had to be tried, a reference to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, should be made. Every other matter, whether of promotion or of inferior court-martial, was settled by the civil authority.

2618. (*Viscount Melville.*) Then in what sense were the Punjaub irregular troops under the military, were they within the Articles of War or not ?—They were.

2619. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How could they be under the Articles of War if they were not under military authority ?—It was an anomaly, but still that was the system, and the freedom of action it gave the officers of the force enabled them to lead their men to participate in the recapture of Delhi and Lucknow.

2620. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you mean that all ranks in the regiment were amenable to the Articles of War ?—Yes; but still the civil authority of the country, that is to say, the chief commissioner in the Punjaub, formerly Sir Henry Lawrence, and subsequently his brother, Sir John Lawrence, confirmed and settled all courts-martial inferior to general courts-martial.

2621. (*Chairman.*) How did promotions of native officers take place in that irregular force ?—By recommendation to the brigadier, and the confirmation of the chief commissioner.

2622. Then they were appointed by selection, and not by seniority ?—Entirely by selection.

2623. Was it necessary for them to go through the ranks ?—No ; occasionally direct commissions were given to natives of property in the country.

2624. And you consider that that had a beneficial effect ?—Yes.

2625. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Was that the case with infantry as well as cavalry ?—Both.

2626. How did an officer learn his duty in the first instance ?—You sent him to the drill-ground, and he learnt his duty the same as a young English officer.

2627. He learnt it without objection ?—Yes.

2628. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then you would like to see the whole of the native army of Bengal upon the Punjaub system, which you have explained, and not upon the usual system of the Bengal presidency ?—Yes, I should like to see it all upon the irregular system, or an improvement upon that. I would go so far as even to abolish the native Articles of War altogether. A code, simple, intelligible, and severe, is required for our native troops ; one giving great power to the brigadiers commanding, and to the commandants of regiments. These views I have more fully explained in a paper now in the hands of the secretary.

2629. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Did the native gentlemen upon whom commissions were conferred receive the same rates of pay ?—Yes, they took their place as jemadars or subahdars.

2630. Were those rates higher than the rates given to others ?—No, they were the same rates of pay.

2631. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) They did not pass through the lower ranks ?—As a rule they passed through the lower ranks though often rapidly ; direct commissions were occasionally given ; these men merely went through the drill as a European officer would on joining his regiment as a cadet.

2632. Was any qualification necessary ?—No, it was merely the recommendation of property in the country, or influence over a tribe, if you had a number of them in the regiment.

2633. Did those men bring a number of the tribe with them ?—Yes, it was generally the condition of service that they brought thirty or forty men.

2634. Did that answer ?—Wonderfully ; those men fought and died for the native officer ; and these native officers, from the high position they held in the regiment, became much attached to the European officers.

2635. (*Chairman.*) What is the proportion of European officers in those regiments ?—We had only four.

2636. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think there should be more ?—We require six.

2637. (*Chairman.*) What were the terms upon which those natives were enlisted ?—General terms, for service anywhere ; never to be given more than seven rupees a month, under any circumstances, and that their baggage was to be carried for them. That did away with all questions of batta. They were entitled to that payment in any part of the world where they went.

2638. Was that service for an unlimited period ?—They were entitled to discharge after three years.

2639. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Therefore they did not serve for a pension ?—Yes, they were entitled to a pension after 20 years' service if pronounced incapable of performing further service by a board of medical officers.

2640. (*Chairman.*) Were they enlisted then for three years ?—Yes.

2641. (*Viscount Melville.*) And the native officers in the same way ?—Yes ; after twenty years they were entitled to a pension.

2642. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Upon the question of discipline, in the event of any portion of the irregular force under your command refusing to march, what power had you over them ; to whom did you report, to the civil authority or to the commander-in-chief ?—To the civil authorities.

2643. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What punishment could you inflict ?—We should have taken the law into our own hands at once.

2644. What would that be ?—To flog the first man that refused obedience. In any extreme case we should have taken the law into our own hands, as we always felt we should be fully supported by the brigadier and the government.

2645. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Without court-martial ?—Yes, without court-martial. I think it would be better for me to explain that during the first two years when we raised that force we had the powers of a magistrate ; the force in fact was not under the Articles of War. Our wish was to have that privilege continued to us ; however it was ruled otherwise, and we were placed under the Articles of War for five years ; we continued under those rules, and held courts-martial. On the breaking out of the mutiny when we marched to Delhi with two or three regiments, we asked the Government for our old power of magistrates over our men ; it was granted, and from that time to this we have never had any difficulty.

2646. Had you any trouble under the Articles of War ?—It was beginning ; the men began to look beyond their commandants to get their punishments reprieved or remitted, or their promotion granted.

2647. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) In other words, your discipline consisted in the goodwill of those under your command ?—I think it would be more correct to express it by saying that the discipline consisted in the men first of all fearing to disobey us ; while respecting the position of their commandant, they found it was also their self-interest to please.

2648. (*Chairman.*) What was the strength of those regiments ?—800 men.

Lieut.-Col. A. T. Wilde.
26th Aug. 1858.

2649. How many native officers were there?—Twenty.

2650. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Did you find that sufficient?—Yes.

2651. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You mean commissioned officers?—Yes; there were 100 non-commissioned officers.

2652. (*Viscount Melville.*) Did I rightly understand you to say that the commandants of these regiments were appointed magistrates as well as commandants?—For the first two years after the force was raised they had the powers of a magistrate; they could give to a man three years' imprisonment with hard labour, or simple imprisonment, or they could dismiss him from the service, or give him fifty lashes, or fine him fifty rupees.

2653. In short they had the same powers as a cantonment magistrate?—I expect they were the same; and in the last year we had the same powers restored to us.

2654. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Supposing the officer commanding a regiment had not that power which you have now explained to us so fully, would you still prefer the irregular system to the regular system?—Yes, because I should still have the power of patronage. Men look up to me for their furlough and their promotion.

2655. Is that the system in the irregular cavalry of Bengal?—No, we are talking now of the Punjaub force.

2656. If the officers commanding the Punjaub force had not that power, would you be for the irregular system of Bengal or for the regular system?—I should prefer the irregular system, for the reason I have given, namely, that you would still have the power of rewarding, and with natives that is quite as strong a hold as the power of punishment.

2657. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What power have you of rewarding under the Bengal seniority system of promotion?—Little or none.

2658. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is not that the system in the irregular cavalry of Bengal?—Not in the Punjaub cavalry, but in the irregular cavalry it was the system.

2659. Still you say that you would prefer that?—Yes, it was not so strict; the limit was broader.

2660. (*Chairman.*) Of what proportion of different nationalities or castes were these troops of the Punjaub composed?—The 800 men were composed of 400 Mussulmans and 400 Hindoos; the 400 Mussulmans were divided into 200 Affghans and 200 Punjaubee Mussulmans; the Hindoos had also a proportion of Sikhs; the whole 800 were a thorough mixture of races of different nations and tribes. The idea was struck upon by the late Sir Henry Lawrence; he first ordered us to enlist 120 Sikhs; he then increased the number up to 200, but never more, and we have kept it at 200 ever since; and in the same way with the Affghans.

2661. Have you ever found any difficulty on the ground of caste; has it been made an excuse for refusing to do anything?—Never; but it was a strong system; they dared not refuse; they would have been severely punished if they had made caste a pretence to avoid duty.

2662. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Have you ever had occasion to ask them to do a thing which was contrary to their caste; did you every try the experiment?—No; no officer would ask them to do a thing absolutely contrary to their caste. There are certain things we know they cannot do, and these we do not exact.

2663. (*Lord Stanley.*) What particular things are those which you know they will not do?—For instance, take a case which may occur any day, if the water bag in which they carry water was made of pig's skin, you would not ask a Mussulman to drink out of it; and to prevent that we always had the bags made of sheep's skin, which was just as good.

2664. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Upon the same rule, if it was made of cow's hide you would not ask a Hindoo?—Yes; precisely.

2665. (*Chairman.*) Did you ever know caste set up as a plea for not performing duty?—Never.

2666. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would not have tolerated it, I suppose, if it had been set up as an excuse?—Not as a mere unfounded excuse; if a mistake was made it would be rectified.

2667. (*Lord Stanley.*) Are you of opinion that a judicious commanding officer, who would carefully avoid unnecessarily hurting the feelings of the men, may always steer clear of the difficulties arising out of caste?—Exactly so.

2668. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) The irregular cavalry are only called upon to do certain duties which belong to themselves; they are not called upon to do duties of fatigue parties, digging trenches and so on, are they?—That is so as a rule; but on the frontier the Punjaub cavalry often used to throw up entrenchments and perform other fatigue duties with the infantry.

2669. (*Lord Stanley.*) You were ready to do any work which you were ordered to do?—Yes.

2670. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Was your regiment ordered to dig in the trenches?—Yes; at Bahadoor Khail the regiment dug the entire foundations of a fort, and carried stone for the walls of it. At Delhi they worked in the trenches with the European soldiers.

2671. And you never had any difficulty?—No; they dug out the ground and built a fort themselves.

2672. (*Major-General Hancock.*) And the high-caste men worked just as well as the others?—The Brahmins were working amongst them.

2673. (*Viscount Melville.*) Were the different castes which you had in your regiment together in the same company?—They were all mixed up in the same company. There has been a great discussion in the force upon that point. Properly speaking, the opinion of the majority of my brother officers (I am in a minority) is, that it is better to have class companies, as they call it; that is to say, separate tribes in separate companies and troops. I myself prefer having them mixed up, and in my own regiment they are mixed.

2674. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In Lieutenant-colonel Coke's regiment they are in companies?—Yes.

2675. And that has answered admirably, has it not?—Yes; but still I think there are good reasons for the other mode.

2676. (*Chairman.*) What alteration should you recommend in the terms of enlistment for the future?—To enlist for service anywhere, in any part of the world, mentioning also that the men will have to go beyond seas if necessary.

2677. Would you recommend a further period than the present one of three years?—No, I think not; they are so fond of military service there is no necessity. No man takes his discharge after three years; it is a mere nominal thing.

2678. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) They serve as long as they can serve?—Yes.

2679. That is the feeling among them?—Yes. There is one class to which that answer would not be applicable, namely, the Affghans; they come and go; they sometimes serve for five or six years and then take their discharge, and afterwards come back to us.

The witness withdrew.

Colonel JOHN T. LESLIE, C.B., examined.

Colonel John T. Leslie, C.B.

2680. (*Chairman.*) I believe you have retired from the service. What rank did you hold in the Indian army?—The rank of a captain of a regiment of artillery and brevet lieutenant-colonel.

2681. How long were you in the service?—Twenty-two years.

2682. What portion of that period was passed in India?—Twenty and a half years.

2683. In which presidency ?—In Bombay.

2684. In what branch of the service were you ?—In the artillery.

2685. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You served with Bengal troops also, did you not ?—Yes, in Affghanistan.

2686. (*Chairman.*) I suppose that you have had several opportunities of seeing European and native troops act together ?—Yes, frequently.

2687. Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion which the European troops should bear to the native troops in the presidencies in which you have served ?—I have not thought the matter over particularly. In the present day I should say that there should be two Europeans to one native.

2688. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you mean in Bengal ?—Yes ; I am alluding to present circumstances, of course.

2689. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But after the present circumstances, and with our experience, what would you say should be the proportion ?—I have not thought of the question in that way ; it would be a loose answer if I gave one ; but I should imagine that although the proportion which at present exists would be perhaps a fair one, yet in quiet times there should be a larger proportion of European troops than there has heretofore been.

2690. (*Chairman.*) Would you have any native artillery ?—Yes, a proportion, certainly.

2691. In what proportion ?—I should say about a company to each battalion of 400 strong. I say so because I think it would be a great relief to the Europeans.

2692. (*Major-General Hancock.*) That would be four Europeans to one native ?—Yes. There are about 400 Europeans to a battalion, and I should say there should be a full company of native artillery to assist in the minor duties of the gun ; for, under certain circumstances, you fall so short of European troops that it would be necessary to have some part of the duty done by natives.

2693. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would have gun lascars, I presume ?—No ; I would have them superior to gun lascars. I would have them regular native artillery, instructed in everything.

2694. (*Viscount Melville.*) In what proportion ?—About one company of 100 strong to about 400 Europeans. I say so because I feel, from the little experience which I have had, that it would be almost impossible to guard against a want of men for working the guns, if you had not some assistance of that sort; the Europeans sometimes fall so very low in numbers.

2695. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In what way ?—In the sickly season, and in many ways, from perhaps not being sufficiently recruited at the moment.

2696. Surely that is an arrangement which could be always prevented ?—It may be, but it took us a long time before we got a number of men out to fill up vacancies. In the present day they are well filled up, but in my day it was not the case ; we were frequently reduced in a company to 30 or 40 men, which ought to have been 80 or 100 strong. If you can be sure of men, I say certainly have all Europeans.

2697. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You would not trust the natives with the guns ?—By no means.

2698. (*Chairman.*) If it could be avoided you would not trust the natives with guns ?—Certainly not.

2699. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But you would not object to some gun lascars, probably ?—Just so ; I think the assistance of natives is absolutely necessary to take small detached duties, and other things, or you kill your Europeans in a short time.

2700. (*Chairman.*) Would you arm the natives with the same arm as the Europeans ?—I would if I had them at all. I would not lower them in the estimation of those about them. I would give them the same arm as the others, and put trust in them.

2701. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not think it desirable to have a small portion of native artillery to take service in unhealthy districts, such as Upper Scinde ?—Yes, provided they were with the Europeans. I would not have them separated. I think they should be with the European troops.

2702. Do you not think that there are some stations in the Bombay presidency where the European troops could only serve with a great sacrifice of life, on the Scinde frontier, for instance ?—Yes, a few stations.

2703. Would not that apply to the coast of Persia, for instance ?—Yes, European troops would have suffered very much there.

2704. Do you think that there would be any danger to the state in employing a few hundred native artillerymen in such localities as those ?—As far as my experience on the Bombay side goes I should say not, but still my opinion is that they should always be with Europeans. I would embody the native artillerymen with the Europeans.

2705. Do you mean that you would keep up native artillery but would never detach them for any service ?—That is what I mean. When I answered you before I spoke as to the Bombay side ; we have never had any distrust of them, but I should certainly prefer having Europeans if possible, or Europeans with natives.

2706. (*Chairman.*) Would you have the native force which you propose to employ on the regular or the irregular system, or both combined ?—Both combined.

2707. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Both the cavalry and infantry ?—No, the infantry I would have in regular and the cavalry in irregular corps.

2708. Would you have all the cavalry irregular ?—Yes, all the native cavalry irregular, certainly.

2709. (*Chairman.*) Do you contemplate the employment ofpolice at all ?—No.

2710. You have not taken that into consideration ?—No.

2711. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Why would you have the native cavalry irregular ?—Because in my little experience I think they were far more efficient.

2712. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In what respect ?—As light troops, as troops for general duty, they are more effective in every way.

2713. (*Chairman.*) Does your answer with respect to the artillery extend to the sappers and miners ; would you have them European, if practicable ?—Yes, if practicable ; but I would certainly say combine natives with them for utility. I think that European sappers would be almost useless in India as working men. For scientific assistants of course they are the best, but I think there should be a proportion of native sappers always with them, in the same way as with the artillery.

2714. For the scientific portion you would have Europeans ?—Certainly.

2715. And for the labour you would employ natives ?—Yes.

2716. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You would have Europeans merely as overseers ?—Yes, simply because they could not work in a climate like India, they are not suited to it.

2717. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) You are aware that a great deal of the work in building barracks and those things is done under the engineers ; would you not have the natives instructed as mechanics to assist in that work for the use of the Government ?—Yes, I see no objection to that.

2718. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you employ the natives in the scientific branches of the arsenals ?—Certainly not.

2719. You would not allow them to make copper caps and things of that sort ?—No.

2720. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You would have no objection to half-caste men ?—No, because I think that their connexion with Europeans is so close that there would be no fear from their having any scientific knowledge of that kind.

2721. (*Chairman.*) Would you have the army composed of different nationalities and castes, and if so, in what proportion ?—I think the more they

Colonel John T. Leslie, C.B.
5th Aug. 1858.

are mixed the better. I cannot say in what proportion, because it is rather a difficult question.

2722. Have you in your experience found any difficulty to arise in the performance of military duties from caste?—I have. I can instance one case.

2723. In which army was that?—I was serving with the Bengal army at the time.

2724. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Was it in the Bengal army that it took place?—There was a party of sappers ordered in front of the troop of horse artillery which I commanded; they were Bengal men. I must say that they were not the men to do the work, for they were never at the spot, and they never had their tools, and they were never willing. Whereas a company of Madras sappers, which I had occasionally, were quite the contrary. I think the Bengallees were a high-caste set of men, and they did not care about doing the work.

2725. (*Chairman.*) Did they plead their caste as an excuse for not doing the work?—Certainly not; they went about it, but they went about it in such a way that I dismounted my own men and made them do it, and put the others on one side.

2726. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Were they Europeans whom you dismounted?—Yes; I did it more than once.

2727. (*Chairman.*) Would you make any alteration in the terms of enlistment of the native army?—I should enlist them for general service, if it was possible, and I do not see why it is not. I have never known any objection on the part of the Bombay native troops.

2728. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are they enlisted for general service?—No; but they have never objected to go on general service, to go abroad, or anywhere.

2729. (*Chairman.*) But it was necessary to ask them?—Yes; I think that they should be enlisted for any service, and that there should be no exclusiveness at all.

2730. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think there would be any difficulty in finding a sufficiency of men to enlist on such terms?—I think not; certainly not on the western side of India, as far as my knowledge goes. I have a very imperfect knowledge of native troops, having always been with Europeans.

2731. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you not aware that the whole of the Bombay army are enlisted for general service?—I was not aware of that.

2732. (*Chairman.*) Then you would place the terms of enlistment for the different presidencies precisely on the same footing?—Certainly.

2733. Do you consider that any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?—I would have it the same in all the presidencies.

2734. You prefer promotion by selection to that by seniority?—Most assuredly.

2735. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What is the existing system?—The system on the Bombay side is by seniority and merit combined I believe; I have no particular knowledge of the native army, never having served with it, but I believe that to be the case.

2736. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Is it so with the native officers?—Yes, as far as my knowledge goes; I of course speak under correction.

2737. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the commanding officers of regiments in India have sufficient power to punish and reward, or would you give them more power?—I have no objection, as far as my own presidency goes, on that point. I have heard that their power is limited in Bengal, but whether or not that is the case I cannot positively say. My knowledge upon that point is imperfect.

2738. When you say that you would have an admixture of European and native forces, how would you recommend that it should take place, regimentally or by brigades?—I have thought the point over, and I should say regimentally, if it was possible to arrange it so.

2739. How would you propose to arrange it?—I would attach a certain number of native companies to each European regiment.

2740. How many?—In about the proportion which I mentioned, about two Europeans to one native in the present state of things.

2741. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would there be no difficulty in the organization of a regiment so composed?—There would be a difficulty; it is a loose thought of mine, but I think it would be as good a way as any other, unless you made them entirely independent regiments, as they were before. I am speaking of Bengal.

2742. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) What would be the advantage of forming Europeans and natives together in that way?—My principal reason for mentioning it is to save European life, to have these men under the control of the commanding officer of the regiment, in order to save Europeans as much as possible.

2743. (*Chairman.*) Have you formed any opinion as to the amount of force which will be required in the Bombay presidency after the mutiny is suppressed?—In the Bombay presidency I should say that the present army is sufficient, as far as I have thought the matter over, with an increase of artillery.

2744. What is the present force?—The present force, I think, is two European battalions and a native battalion, and a brigade of European horse artillery; they want an increase of artillery decidedly in Bombay.

2745. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What is the establishment, both European and native, of a troop and company of Bombay artillery?—The field establishment is 130 men, as far as I recollect (I have been fourteen years away), and 230 horses.

2746. Do you think that that establishment is sufficient?—Quite sufficient for the troop as it was then constituted, and twenty-four gun lascars attached.

2747. (*Viscount Melville.*) You have served with both Bombay and Bengal horse artillery; will you be so good as to say which you consider the best organization?—Of course I say my own, the Bombay side; although I must say at the same time that I saw one or two troops of the Bengal horse artillery, under Major now Colonel Anderson, and no troop could have been better, but there was the officer to be considered there.

2748. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I wish to ask you not which is the best artillery, because I consider one as good as the other, but I wish to know whether the principle of horse artillery as constituted in Bombay, that is to say, with mounted detachments, is in your opinion preferable to the principle of horse artillery as established in Bengal, which has no mounted detachments, but where the men ride on the limbers and the off-horses?—I certainly say that the Bombay detachment system is the best.

The witness withdrew.

Colonel John Hill.

Colonel JOHN HILL examined.

2749. (*Chairman.*) You have retired from the service; what rank did you hold in the Indian army?—My last rank in the army was lieutenant-colonel.

2750. How long were you in the service?—I entered the service in 1834.

2751. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) When did you come back from India?—In January 1858.

2752. (*Chairman.*) Then you were twenty-four years in India?—Yes.

2753. In what presidency have you served?—In Bombay.

2754. In what branch of the service?—In the engineers.

2755. Of course you have had opportunities of

seeing both European and native troops act together? —Yes, often.

2756. Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion which the European should bear to the native force; you know both the Bombay and the Bengal presidencies?—Do you allude to the Bengal army in particular, or the Bombay army?

2757. To both; first the Bengal, and then the Bombay, if you make any distinction between them? —I am not acquainted with the provinces of Hindoostan, but in a general way I should say that if the whole force of the European army was one-third of that of the natives it would be sufficient. I give that as a rough calculation.

2758. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you alluding to Bengal?—I mean in Bengal. In Bombay I think that it would be sufficient likewise, provided the European cavalry portion of the force was efficiently armed.

2759. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What do you mean by "efficiently armed?"—European dragoons at present are armed with only a common carbine which is useless in war, the swords likewise are not efficient in war.

2760. In what respect?—They are too straight, and the steel scabbards are objectionable.

2761. (*Chairman.*) Do you carry the same proportion of one-third European through the whole branches of the service?—Only through the regular portion of the army.

2762. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you have an irregular portion besides?—I would have an irregular native army in addition.

2763. Including that, what proportion would you have of Europeans to natives?—Then it would be considerably less than one-third.

2764. (*Chairman.*) How many irregular troops would you have, compared with regular native forces? —I would have them much as at present in the Bombay army.

2765. What is that?—There are nearly 30,000 regular native troops in the Bombay army, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and there are about 10,000 irregular troops.

2766. Then it would not much alter your proportion?—It would make it about one-fourth of the whole.

2767. You would have the Europeans about one-fourth of the regular and irregular troops?—One-fourth of the whole.

2768. Do you extend that proportion to each branch of the service, would you have the artillery three-fourths natives?—No; I do not think that at all necessary.

2769. Would you have any native artillery at all? —Yes; I would have a considerable body of native artillery, because there are many localities in which European artillery could not serve at all times; for instance, take the Bombay presidency, in Upper Scinde European artillery could not serve; they have been tried there on several occasions and failed in the hot season.

2770. Then you would have no hesitation in trusting native troops with guns?—None whatever, provided a proper system of discipline was maintained, of course.

2771. Do you extend that opinion to the sappers and miners, that you would have native sappers and miners as well as European?—I should have by far the larger proportion native sappers.

2772. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You have commanded the corps of sappers and miners in the Bombay presidency, have you not?—Yes.

2773. For how long?—I commanded them from 1855 until the end of 1857.

2774. You have served with them in garrison and in the field, have you not?—Yes, on several occasions.

2775. And in the field with Bengal troops?—Yes.

2776. At Moultan, and again in Persia?—Yes; and in Scinde on the first occupation of the country in 1839 and 1840.

2777. Is the corps of Bombay sappers composed of both high-caste and low caste men?—Yes, men from all parts of India, Hindoostan, Bombay, and Madras.

2778. Have you found all do their duty alike as good soldiers in the field on all occasions?—Yes, all have behaved excellently whenever I have been associated with them, particularly during the late war in Persia, and subsequently to that during the time that they have been employed with the field forces against the mutineers.

2779. You did not find the high-caste men offer any difficulty to the performance of any service upon which you put them?—On the contrary, the highest-caste man whom I had in the corps was left in hospital when we marched from Poonah to embark for Persia, and the day before embarking for Persia this man appeared with his company, having broken out of hospital and marched night and day to overtake his company; and when asked how it was that he appeared in Bombay, he replied that he would be disgraced if his company went on service without him.

2780. What caste was he?—He was a Brahmin from Oude.

2781. (*Chairman.*) You never found caste urged as an objection to the performance of any military duty?—Not the slightest; high-caste and low-caste stand next to each other in the ranks, sleep next to each other in the tents, and do everything just the same as English soldiers, except when they are off duty.

2782. Upon what terms were they enlisted originally, for general service, or were they merely confined to India?—For general service.

2783. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That is the practice in the Bombay presidency generally, is it not?—Yes.

2784. And you find no difficulty in getting men on those terms?—None whatever.

2785. (*Chairman.*) Should you recommend that system to be extended to all the other presidencies? —Most decidedly.

2786. You would have all men enlisted on the same terms for all the presidencies, namely, for general service?—I should enlist men to serve as soldiers, and not make any terms with them whatever; they should enlist to obey all orders, whatever orders were given them.

2787. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And provided that it is fully explained to a man before he enlists that such and such duties will be required of him, you conceive that the excuse of caste should not interfere with the performance of any duty?—Caste never interferes with the performance of any duty, whether it is cleaning the lines, or whether it is fatigue parties, or working parties of any description, or going by sea, wherever it may be.

2788. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Have you ever known it interfere with the performance of duty by the Bengal troops when you have been serving with them?—Yes.

2789. (*Chairman.*) How do you account for the difference?—I have known the Bengal troops refuse to work.

2790. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) On the plea of caste? —On the plea of caste.

2791. Was that plea attended to?—The officer commanding them, when applied to by me, by order of the general commanding the troops, for working parties, informed me that to order the Bengal troops to work on fatigue parties was tantamount to ordering them to mutiny at once, that such a thing was never heard of in the Bengal army.

2792. (*Colonel Burlton.*) What was the standing of that officer?—He was a colonel in the Bengal army.

2793. Do you know of how many years' service?— Between thirty and forty. I had some very emergent duty to perform at the time, and I asked him then to

Colonel John Hill.
16th Aug. 1858.

order his doolie bearers to be placed at my disposal and he immediately said that it could not be done; that they would all mutiny and desert if such an order were given.

2794. (*Chairman.*) How do you account for objections being raised on the score of caste in one presidency and not in the other?—It is simply the system which has been followed in the Bengal presidency, and the entire want of discipline which has ever prevailed in that army.

2795. You think that with proper discipline caste will never be found an objection to the performance of military duty?—I think that with proper discipline caste would never be found to interfere with duty in any way whatever, but it would always be preferable to have men of various castes mixed up together.

2796. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Was the occasion which you have mentioned the only occasion on which you have known Bengal troops refuse to work or hang back from working?—At Moultan they did no work whatever in the trenches. When the Bombay column joined in the siege with the Bengal troops the Bengal troops did not actually refuse to work there; they marched to the trenches and took the pickaxes and shovels in their hands, but they did no work.

2797. (*Chairman.*) I understand that you consider that native troops should be composed of different nationalities and castes, and distributed as much at possible?—Yes, there should be a fair proportion of the various castes.

2798. Would you keep them separate as castes, or would you mix them up?—I do not think that the word "caste" or "nationality" should ever be known or mentioned in a corps. The commanding officer of a corps should himself comprehend the natives sufficiently to know the men he is enlisting, and not to take more than a fair proportion of each class of men, but he should never make the slightest allusion to the men about caste.

2799. With such proportion would you mix them up or would you keep them separate?—On all duty matters they would be treated the same as if they were English soldiers; off duty they would do just as they pleased. I would mix them up together.

2800. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would not have them by companies?—No.

2801. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Would you in any way alter the organization of the existing Bombay corps of sappers and miners?—Yes, certainly.

2802. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In what respect?—For many years past the pay of the commanding officer of the sappers has been so low, when compared to the pay of officers of corresponding rank in the Public Works Department, that no officer of military talent and experience could ever be obtained willingly to perform duty with the sappers and miners. In fact, to such an extent has that been carried that the commander-in-chief in Bombay has repeatedly urged on the Government the necessity of placing the sappers and miners on a more efficient footing, and also making the commandantship of that corps such that the best talented officers would be glad to hold the appointment; but his representations have always been made in vain; he has never been attended to in any instance that I am aware of; on the contrary, when the Government have found officers imbecile and useless in the Public Works Department they have placed them at the disposal of the commander-in-chief to do duty with the sappers and miners. I knew one officer who was placed at the disposal of the commander-in-chief in that manner, who during the whole time that he was in command of the corps never once appeared on parade; and when the native officers of the corps went up to his quarters to see him he shut his doors in their face and would not see them.

2803. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Does he still remain an officer in that army, or was he removed from his position?—He was subsequently given a higher appointment in the Public Works Department.

2804. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Is it the same with regard to the adjutancy of the corps?—Yes.

2805. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that any change is required in the system of promotion as regards the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the Bombay army or in the Bengal army, if you have had an opportunity of judging with respect to the latter army?—In the Bengal army it is merely a system of seniority; in the Bombay army the system is a very excellent one indeed, namely, by general merit; but it is not in all instances carried out so well as it should be.

2806. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Why is it not so well carried out?—I do not consider that commanding officers pay sufficient attention on all occasions to the general intelligence and soldierlike qualities of the men promoted.

2807. What do they look to more?—Partiality is sometimes shown, and sufficient general attention is not given to the qualifications of the men.

2808. Still you are for the system of selection in preference to that of seniority?—The system in general pursued in Bombay is most excellent.

2809. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You would recommend that the rule should obtain of promoting by selection, but that it should be more justly attended to?—Yes.

2810. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You mean that all officers commanding regiments have not carried out the system as it was intended to be carried out in promoting men according to their merit?—Some regiments are much better commanded than others, and much greater attention is paid by some commanding officers to the efficiency of their corps than by others.

2811. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Still, as regards the system as established by regulation, you think that it is a good one?—An excellent system, and the only just system which can be pursued with regard to the promotion of natives or Europeans.

2812. (*Viscount Melville.*) You have seen the Bombay and the Bengal troops together. With reference to this system of promotion, can you state what was the effect as to the qualifications and the efficiency of the native officers in the one army and the native officers in the other?—The native officers in the Bombay army were young, active, intelligent, useful men; the native officers in the Bengal army, and the native non-commissioned officers likewise, generally were merely old women.

2813. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Did you see a marked difference in the discipline of the troops when they were serving together?—A great difference.

2814. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) In what did that consist?—I have marched with Bombay troops and Bengal troops in the same force; the Bombay troops marched in the usual orderly manner, and the Bengal troops cast off their accoutrements and hung them together with their arms on the camels and different beasts of burthen and on the camel drivers, and they went on paddling in water and plundering in fields.

2815. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you mean to say that that was tolerated?—I have never seen anything else. I have seen a Bengal cavalry regiment on the line of march, within two miles of the enemy's guns, and every horse was led by a horsekeeper, the arms and accoutrements of the men were on the horses, camels, and horsekeepers, and the men were plundering in the fields and paddling in water at the wells.

2816. (*Chairman.*) You consider the discipline of the Bengal army inferior to that of the Bombay army?—Very much indeed.

2817. Do you consider that the admixture of European and native troops should be regimentally or by brigade?—I would have them by brigades, not by regiments.

2818. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Would you have any European sappers?—I think there ought to be a large body of sappers, and for the Bombay army I would propose that there should be eight companies of native sappers and two companies of Europeans.

Colonel John Hill.

26th Aug. 1858.

2819. (*Viscount Melville.*) Have you any European sappers now excepting non-commissioned officers?—None but non-commissioned officers; but I must mention that all the non-commissioned officers who have been sent out of late years by the East India Company are a superior body of young men, and most certainly would not consent to perform the laborious duties of private sappers; they would find other employment in the numerous channels opening up in India where English skill and intelligence are required. I should say that the same thing would apply to royal sappers in India, though in time of war they would do anything and go anywhere for the sake of seeing field service, yet if they were good mechanics and intelligent men they would purchase their discharge and take employment in the numerous channels opening up in India in time of peace.

2820. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You said that these Europeans sent out by the East India Company were a superior description of men. I presume you do not mean that they are superior to the royal sappers as a class of men?—I mean that I imagine that their education is superior to the education of the men generally in the royal sappers.

2821. What makes you come to that conclusion?—Because they are all selected men.

2822. Selected from what?—Selected from the East India Company's depôt.

2823. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not think that instead of having European sappers it would be better to have an increased number of these non-commissioned officers, and to have the working men natives?—Provided that the pay of the men was increased; but if there were simply to be an addition of the non-commissioned officers to serve with the sappers on the same pay that they now get, they would not consent to do it, but would purchase their discharge.

2824. (*Major-General Hancock.*) The pay which they now get is exactly that paid to a native infantry soldiers, is it not?—Exactly the same.

2825. In former years it was considerably higher?—In former years the pay was higher. The native sapper received 3*s.* a month more pay than the soldier of the line.

2826. When that was the case you were able to get the pick of the men out of the whole army, I suppose?—Yes; we got the pick of the whole army, and a better body of native sappers than then existed there could not be; they were never employed upon any civil works, under civil officers; they were always kept ready for field service, at the head-quarters of the corps, and never moved away except for field service.

2827. (*Chairman.*) You recommend the pay of the sappers and miners to be placed on a different footing?—It must be placed on a different footing.

2828. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You mean that you cannot get eligible men for that particular service without higher pay?—You cannot; men may enlist for the sappers, but directly they have had a little education and training with the sappers they will volunteer to join the regiments in which their brethren are in the line.

2829. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) They prefer that, do they?—The duties of the line are so much easier than those of sappers, and the pay is the same.

2830. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Does not a man get working pay when he works?—The rules and regulations regarding working pay are very strict indeed, and the working pay is so small that the greatest amount of working pay which a man can get is an anna and a half a day; formerly the working pay was two annas a day; the native officers receive as working pay 1*s.* a day.

The witness withdrew.

Colonel JAMES SINCLAIR examined.

Colonel James Sinclair.

2831. (*Chairman.*) You are a colonel in the Indian army?—In the Bombay artillery.

2832. How long have you been in the service?—Above forty-one years, including my time at the military college; it is thirty-nine years and a half since I landed in India.

2833. How many years of that period have been passed in India?—Thirty-four.

2834. Of course you have had many opportunities of seeing European and native troops acting together?—Yes, several.

2835. Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion which the Europeans should bear to the native troops in the Bombay presidency?—I think that the proportion of one-third European would be a fair proportion, one European to two natives; that is, including the artillery and cavalry, and embracing the Europeans of both the British and Indian services, or as hitherto distinguished as "Queen's" and "Company's."

2836. Have you formed any opinion as to the amount of force which will be required in Bombay in future?—I should say that the artillery should be about 5,000 men, horse and foot, exclusively European. I would have no native artillery. The regular cavalry ought also to be European, about 2,400. I have estimated three regiments of 800 men each, men enlisted specially for the service, small active adult men, of a weight to be readily horsed in India, not growing youths.

2837. (*Viscount Melville.*) Would you have no native cavalry at all?—None of the description deemed "Regular."

2838. (*Chairman.*) How many infantry would you have?—Infantry, eight regiments of Europeans.

2839. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That is 8,000?—No; at 800 men each, eight regiments, 6,400.

2840. (*Chairman.*) Would you have the sappers and miners Europeans?—I should say mixed; there are many duties of a sapper which could scarcely be done by a European in a hot climate, and yet the European energy is necessary to direct.

2841. Would you confine the scientific portions of that service to Europeans?—I should say so; but I would speak with diffidence upon the question of the organization of an engineer corps. The native mind is peculiarly susceptible of instruction in the science suitable for an engineer, whether as overseer or workman.

2842. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you confine the scientific portions of the arsenals to Europeans?—Entirely.

2843. You have no hesitation upon that point?—None whatever. The controlling authority in our arsenals should be European, and European only; whether in the commissioned, warrant, or non-commissioned grades; and these should uniformly be drawn from the artillery service, so that as artillery soldiers they should feel a personal interest in the efficiency of the ordnance department, which the mere "storekeeper" cannot feel.

2844. (*Chairman.*) How many European sappers and miners would you propose?—I would rather not offer an opinion on that point.

2845. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What native troops would you have to the force of Europeans?—About twenty regiments of regular infantry of 800 men each, and I would supplement them with irregular infantry, say ten regiments.

2846. How many native cavalry would you have?—Six regiments.

2847. Regular or irregular?—The native cavalry should be irregular, on the constitution of the present Scinde horse.

2848. You say that you would prefer the irregular cavalry to the regular cavalry, why would you do so? I believe that some of the regular cavalry of Bombay have behaved very well, have they not?—Yes.

Colonel James Sinclair.

26th Aug. 1858.

2849. Then why would you prefer the irregular?—I consider that expense is an element in the consideration of this question. Merely taking the question of soldiers fighting in the field, I would have all Europeans; but the country cannot bear that expense. The irregular cavalry are very much less expensive than the European; moreover the native horseman never seems at home in the saddle as a "regular" cavalry soldier.

2850. Are they sufficiently organized to do all the duties that cavalry ought to do in the field?—I should say that the Scinde horse, as I saw them last, were as capable of doing service as any men in the world could be, whether as an organized body acting together (to the extent their physical weight and the power of their horses would allow), or as light cavalry skirmishers.

2851. Then you would take the Scinde horse as a model of an irregular cavalry regiment?—I think so.

2852. And you would like to see the same system introduced probably into the Bengal army?—As a model for all, I can imagine no better; their interior economy and discipline is admirably suited to the native character.

2853. (*Chairman.*) You would make the total proportion of the Bombay army about 14,000 Europeans and about 28,000 natives, making 42,000?—About that; and here I may remark that as the proportion of artillery which I have stated of 5,000 men for Bombay alone may be considered a large proportion, I may as well explain that my idea is that as artillery will be required at stations occupied chiefly by native troops at those stations I think it desirable that the artillery should have the means of protecting itself, for considering what has passed, I should be sorry to trust implicitly to natives; therefore I think that the proportion of men with artillery should be greater than that required merely to work the guns; the additional men would form a guard not merely to the guns but to the ammunition depôt of the station, and the detachment of Europeans thus brought together would be a more efficient body in various ways, and would be held under better discipline, if all of one regiment and under one regimental command, than if composed partly of cavalry or infantry soldiers detached from their own regiments for the occasion.

2854. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Wherever you had a European battery of artillery stationed you would require either European cavalry or European infantry to support it?—A battery may be frequently stationed where there would be no European regiment.

2855. Do you think that a good plan, distrusting the natives as you do?—It might be necessary, but I would have, as I have already endeavoured to explain, a strong guard of European artillerymen with the guns.

2856. Supposing a battery were placed in Upper Scinde at Shikapore, what support of Europeans would you give them?—I should be sorry to put more Europeans there than I could help, because it is a very unhealthy climate; but still the service may require artillery there. A full company of artillery as a guard in addition to the company required to work the battery would be sufficient.

2857. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you think it desirable for such stations as that which has been named to have some native artillery?—I think not.

2858. Your objection to having any native artillery is so great that it would be greater than the objection of a bad climate for the European?—I think so.

2859. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not think, with reference to that station of Shikapore, that the result of it would be a positive and absolute necessity in the month of March of withdrawing those troops and bringing them down to Kurachee probably, where they must remain until the following October; you could not keep them at Shikapore during the hot season?—I hope that that would not be the result. I think that if they were relieved every year they might get through the season very well at Shikapore were proper accommodation afforded them in barracks or quarters.

2860. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that it is as much owing to the badness of the barracks as to the climate?—I think the European artillerymen could stand the climate for a season were they carefully housed and sheltered and their requirements in quarters attended to liberally.

2861. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think that Europeans could perform field service upon the frontier of Upper Scinde without a very great sacrifice of human life, in the hot season?—I do not; but I think that it would be necessary to have troops at Shikapore, consequently artillery.

2862. That is merely in barracks; but do you think that they could perform field service?—Not well, nor the native either, because the native gunner would be inefficient without his commanding officer. Wherever the European officer can go the European soldier can on an emergency go also.

2863. Are you not aware that the Scinde horse have served in the very hottest season?—Yes.

2864. That they have made a forced march of thirty or forty miles?—Yes.

2865. With a European officer at the head of them?—Yes. I have known that it has been Colonel Jacob's habit to say, "Gentlemen, we will have a pic-nic to-day;" and they have mounted saddle in the heat of the day and gone 40 or 50 miles as a patrol or to visit outposts, with a squadron or so of sowars, and this in the hottest season of the year.

2866. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you of opinion that the sacrifice of soldiers' lives is of less value than the sacrifice of a few officers with the native troops?—I am not of that opinion. I could not set a direct value on the life of any human being; I should be sorry to do so; but I consider the sacrifice of a soldier's life of less consequence to the country than the sacrifice of the life of an officer; not that any officer would set a value on his own life when duty demanded the sacrifice thereof.

2867. (*Chairman.*) In the proportion of the force which you have suggested, have you at all taken into consideration the employment of the police?—I would let the police be *ad libitum*, as the necessities of the country may require, but entirely distinct from the army.

2868. Do you think that there are any duties now performed by the military native regiments which might be transferred to the police; and do you think that by that transfer you might reduce the number of the native regiments?—I would reduce the number of the native regiments as much as would be consistent with safety, and this I have done in the estimate I have given. It has not been the custom in the Bombay Presidency to employ the army in police duties, although occasionally a force may have been called on to aid the civil authority.

2869. Would you propose to arm the native two-thirds of the force which you suggest in Bombay the same as the Europeans?—Yes, with the most efficient weapon. I would arm all parties whom we employ in the service with the most efficient weapon.

2870. Should the Bombay army be composed of different nationalities and castes, and if so, in what proportion?—I would certainly confine the enlistment of the native troops to their own presidency, and encourage a mixed multitude amongst them; this arrangement would greatly tend to prevent collusion between the native troops of the several presidencies.

2871. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But that has not been the system hitherto, has it. Have you not in the Bombay presidency a great many men that come from Oude and from the Bengal presidency?—Unfortunately we have had lately. They have found favour in the eyes of some officers, because they have been sightly men; but that was a point which I always myself opposed, even in the artillery, and having the command of some batteries of artillery lately I wrote very strongly on the subject. Saying, "These Purdasees," (strangers,) as we call them,

are not so efficient for the artillery as I would undertake to make even the small low-caste men to whom I have been accustomed in the Ordnance Department, as "lascars" and labourers generally.

2872. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What was defective in the men whom you speak of?—In the first instance, the Golundaz in Bombay have lately been very much deteriorated by their pay being reduced to the infantry rate, and our consequently not having a selection of recruits; but, independently of that, I do not think that the native artilleryman from Hindostan was equal to his work; he was a large and good looking man, but still he had not the activity and intelligence that the lower caste man has, and there was this objection also to him in Western India, that the Bombay officer generally learns a different language from the Hindostan man. The dialects of India are so very different that I have frequently known a man who could communicate well with the subjects of the Bombay presidency have a difficulty in communicating with Hinnostan men, or rather in understanding them; and my repeatedly expressed feeling was very strong on the subject that the Hindostan man was not so efficient as the smaller man from our own presidency would have been.

2873. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Therefore you would prefer to see the men enlisted within the circle of the presidency?—Yes.

2874. (*Chairman.*) But of course you would enlist them for general service?—Yes; as I would form the army generally of the presidency from our own districts alone, remarking however that I think the irregular corps, both horse and foot, should be localized, and that they should be enlisted principally from the more warlike class of the province from which they would take their name, and not be, like the regular corps, of a mixed multitude. It would I think be a matter of policy to keep this branch of the service very distinct, but all of course available for general service.

2875. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would have it more a clanship?—Yes, more a militia or yeomanry; for instance, in Scinde the Beloochees would form an excellent element, and in Katteawar there is a description of men who have never yet entered our service. These Cattees would form an excellent body of soldiery, as would most certainly the Parsees could they be induced to serve.

2876. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) What is the number of natives in the Bombay service attached to a gun—I refer to the low-caste men that you talk of?—We take for our exercise the Royal Artillery book of drill, and we drill our men to that. In the field artillery we have only eight men; but hitherto these have all been high-caste men.

2877. Natives?—Natives as well as Europeans; we have made our natives do the same duty as the Europeans in all respects.

2878. And what is the number in Bengal?—I do not know.

2879. Where do you enlist your artillerymen?—They were chiefly enlisted from Hindoostan; recruiting parties were sent to Hindoostan for that purpose.

2880. You are talking of Hindoostan men when you say that there are eight to a gun?—Yes; in Bombay we had almost exclusively Hindoostan men in our native artillery.

2881. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Did you command a battalion of entirely native artillery, or was it composed of Europeans and natives mixed?—I have served with both horse and foot, both European and native, artillery. My command lately was of a division of artillery where there were both horse and foot, European and native.

2882. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you not aware that these Hindostanee men were enlisted into the artillery in such large numbers in consequence of the difficulty experienced of obtaining men within the limits of the Bombay presidency?—The idea was first of getting high-caste men for what we considered high-caste service. Volunteers of this description were called for from the infantry on the formation of the Golundaz Battalion, and were liberally supplied.

2883. Whose idea was that?—The idea among artillery officers, participated in, I am persuaded, by the army generally.

2884. (*Chairman.*) Did you ever find caste urged as an objection to the performance of military duties?—Never.

2885. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have you ever heard of it in any other presidency?—Yes, in Bengal.

2886. In what way?—That it interfered in every possible way.

2887. How do you account for the difference?—As in many cases the Bombay sepoys are of the same class of men who serve in Bengal, the difference must be attributable to the differences of system between the Bengal and Bombay armies.

2888. Do you think that it ought to interfere?—Certainly not. I would not allow it to interfere with the slightest duty; nor is it necessary.

2889. You think that without injuring the feelings of the natives there is no necessity for its interfering?—Just so. I am persuaded the native may, under judicious military training, be induced to consider his duty as a soldier his first object, and this without any offence to his religious feelings.

2890. (*Chairman.*) Under proper discipline?—Under proper discipline. I never knew it interfere.

2891. (*Viscount Melville.*) From what part of the country did the low-caste men whom you said you would prefer in the artillery come?—Our store lascars, the persons of whom I spoke, were chiefly Comata men. A class, originally coming from the Nizam's territory, Hyderabad I think, of whom a number are congregated in Bombay; they are Hindoos, small inferior-caste men. They generally perform the duty of bearers to palanquins in private service, and are active, intelligent, and strong.

2892. Have you ever had them as gunners?—Never. I was for a considerable time a commissary of Ordnance, and these men were very efficient as labourers in the Ordnance department. It is from that I judge that they might be rendered efficient as artillery men.

2893. Then would you recommend that they should be enlisted as artillerymen?—No. I would recommend no natives being taken, but if natives were taken I should say take those, or men like them, Mahrattas and others, in fact men of any caste, who possessed the requisite physical capabilities, but all your own presidency. After all, I am well assured that unless high rates of pay in comparison with infantry be given, and a selection thus ensured of recruits, an efficient corps of native artillery will never be formed.

2894. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) If you enlisted natives how many men would you require to a gun, eight being the number which you have stated of Bombay men?—I think this number would in the case of light field ordnance be able to do the duty, although more frequent reliefs might be necessary in a battery than if Europeans were employed.

2895. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think that the establishment of the Bombay artillery is sufficient, or that it should be increased to the same strength as the royal corps?—I think that it is at present insufficient.

2896. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that the royal corps is a better establishment for a field battery or troop than your establishment?—I do so.

2897. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not think that it also should extend to the European commissioned officers?—Yes; I speak of the European commissioned officers. I understood the question to refer to the European officers.

2898. No, I meant it to refer to men and everything?—I think that the constitution of a battery in India, whether of horse or foot artillery, should be essentially different from what it is at home. I would have native followers exclusively. European artificers will never be able to follow their craft on

Colonel James Sinclair.

26th Aug. 1858.

field service in India. In light field batteries served by foot artillery I would have native drivers.

2899. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that the driver of a gun is almost, if not quite, as important a man as the gunner?—He is a very important man certainly, although his importance has never been sufficiently appreciated in India, where he has not been treated liberally. As I said before, I would have all fighting men Europeans if I could, but I do not think that the finances of the country would bear the expense. A European driver, unless he were a very small man, would oppress the horse. On this subject I have had a letter by last mail from one of the best battery commanders in India, and who has been given European drivers, small men as could be picked up. He complains that they distress the horses.

2900. Might not you have a small man expressly enlisted for the purpose?—Then unquestionably the European driver is the more efficient man, but I think that the native would answer the purpose sufficiently well. We could find trustworty men for the purpose, native Christians for instance, and this is a main point.

2901. (*Major-General Hancock.*) But with your distrust of the natives would you trust a native to guide a horse artillery gun?—Not horse but foot. For horse artillery we have always had European drivers in Bombay, and I would still have it so. The system of gunner and driver in one person has in the Indian horse artillery worked well.

2902. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are you not aware that in consequence of having the European drivers in the horse artillery it is much more efficient, and that the driving is much better than it is in a battery where they have native drivers?—I have seen batteries driven by natives as well as men could drive them. I do not mean to compare the native with the European in all respects, even as a driver; but natives properly trained are quite equal to the task of driving a horse battery, and of driving it well.

2903. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Have you served at all with guns drawn by bullocks?—Yes.

2904. What is your opinion of their efficiency?—They are very inefficient for field artillery, there can be no question about it. They should never be employed with field artillery, but the transit of heavy ordnance must be effected with them mainly in the present agricultural state of India.

2905. (*Major-General Hancock.*) With regard to foot artillery, you have never had the same establishment of commissioned officers as with the royal artillery, have you?—No.

2906. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have you not the same number of European officers to a troop and battery in the European troops and batteries as in the royal artillery?—No.

2907. How many have you?—Generally a captain, and sometimes two subalterns, sometimes one—the horse artillery has, however, been generally kept better officered than the foot.

2908. Is that for the establishment?—The establishment is a very different thing from the actual practice.

2909. What is the establishment for a troop or battery?—The establishment fixed by regulations has been one captain and three subalterns with a troop, or battery, but that has been constantly reduced; for instance, Colonel Leslie went through the second Affghanistan campaign with one subaltern only to his troop, and there was a battery in that campaign commanded by a subaltern without any officer to assist him, and numerous instances of this fact may be adduced.

2910. Surely that is not a good system?—Certainly not.

2911. Do you not think that you ought to have the same number of officers that a Queen's troop has?—We ought to have an adequate proportion of officers; say 1 captain and 4 subordinates to a troop of horse artillery, 1 captain and 3 subordinates to a horse battery.

2912. (*Major-General Hancock.*) During the last ten years have not batteries been very frequently commanded by subaltern officers?—Almost always.

2913. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Can there be anything worse than such a system?—In fact those men have done the duty of captains without having the rank, scarcely the authority.

2914. Can anything be so bad as the system of subalterns commanding so important an arm as a troop or a company of artillery?—It is bad, no doubt, but unavoidable in the present constitution of the service.

2915. (*Chairman.*) What has caused this reduction of officers from the establishment?—They have been called away for other duties, and a proportion have of course been absent on furlough and sick leave.

2916. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What other duties?—For staff employment; the ordnance department, for instance, has always been officered from the artillery.

2917. (*Major-General Hancock.*) The establishment of officers of the artillery corps is calculated to allow for those appointments, is it not?—But it has not been sufficiently calculated.

2918. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What would you recommend as an alteration in that respect?—I would fix the establishment necessary to perform properly the regimental duty of the army, whether in the artillery, or the other branches of the "regular" service. I would then second, as is done in the Royal Artillery, officers drawn away for political or staff employ, duty with irregular corps, or on furlough out of India.

2919. Would you prefer that to a system of staff corps?—I do not see how a staff corps system could work in India. I have to the best of my power given the thing consideration, and I have never been able to satisfy my mind that a staff corps, as has been frequently proposed, could work in India.

2920. Why not?—It would deprive the regimental officer, so to speak, of hope; it would close to him the door of hope for employment away from his regiment.

2921. Do you think it a good thing to encourage that feeling?—I do.

2922. How can there be any feeling of *esprit de corps* in a regiment where the officers wish to get away from it?—An *esprit de corps* has been kept up notwithstanding that system. I think this matter has been much misunderstood in England, and I can fancy nothing more wretched than the prospect of a mere regimental subaltern in India, without the door of hope of employment in the staff being open to him. At home there are a thousand things to distract his mind from his position; he has friends and many objects of interest all around him; in India he is in a different position, and I should be very sorry to see the door of hope closed to the subaltern of an Indian regiment. His efficiency as a mere regimental officer would be utterly destroyed. Under the existing system there have always been good men and true doing regimental duty awaiting in hope their chance of other employ, but meantime doing their present duty well.

2923. But why should it be closed to a subaltern or to any officer because you have a staff corps; supposing that no officer could be put into the staff corps without going through whatever branch of the service he might be in, and that any officer might be put back again to the artillery or infantry whenever it might suit his convenience or the convenience of the Government, what objection could there be to that?—Then there would be a system of purchase similar to that in the Queen's service.

2924. No purchase at all; but the mere system of a record of staff officers able to be transferred to their own regiments whenever it suited either their own wish or the convenience of the service?—I may be in fault on the subject, but it strikes me that the simplest plan would be to second the officers withdrawn *ad libitum* from regiments, and to let them be

borne on the strength of their corps, and return to it under certain regulations after they have served on the staff for a certain time, or on attaining regimental promotion.

2925. Supposing you had a great many officers so seconded, how could you bring them back again?—By degrees, as they were promoted, just as at present.

2926. Would not it stop promotion altogether in the lower ranks?—I think not injuriously so.

2927. (*Chairman.*) You say that by the present system great inconvenience arises from so many officers having been withdrawn from their regiments for staff duty?—Because they have not been replaced, consequently too few officers have been left with regiments for the proper routine of duty.

2928. (*Major-General Hancock.*) How could they be replaced under the present system of promotion by seniority?—I do not perceive any difficulty in the matter. The officer removed would be replaced by promotion in the regiment, and by the nomination of another cadet to complete the *duty roll* of the regiment. Under this system, undoubtedly there would be a larger number of officers sometimes in one regiment than in another, and that might be supposed to cause inequality in the promotion in one regiment over another. I do not think this of any consequence; the evil, if evil it may be deemed, would correct itself as time wore on. The inequality of promotion has been sometimes very extraordinary in the Bombay army as unequal as it could possibly be under any system human ingenuity could devise, and this notwithstanding a strict adherence to a regimental seniority system.

2929. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that any change is required in the system of promotion, as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?—I do not think that any change is necessary in the Bombay army; they have always hitherto been promoted according to merit.

2930. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that that answers well?—Certainly.

2931. You have never heard of its being complained of as an inconvenience or an injustice?—Never; I never heard a complaint from any quarter.

2932. (*Chairman.*) You prefer the system of promotion by selection to that by seniority?—Unquestionably.

2933. Do you consider that the commanding officers of the native regiments in Bombay have sufficient power to reward or punish?—I think their power has been more circumscribed than ought to have been the case.

2934. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In what way?—They have not had power to reward and punish as I think would have been desirable.

2935. What power have they now?—They have the power of promotion; but they have not the power of punishment or discharge, as I think they might have with advantage.

2936. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the discipline of a regiment depends upon the degree of the power which the commanding officer has?—To a very considerable extent, especially in the native army; provided always care were taken to prevent any officer commanding a regiment who was not equal to the command.

2937. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you know what power of punishment the commanding officers of regiments have under the Articles of War?—I speak generally; the Articles of War change from time to time, and I have been now three and a half years absent from India, and therefore alterations may have taken place.

2938. Will you be good enough to specify the punishment which commanding officers have the power of awarding under the existing Articles of War?—I cannot do so from recollection, I have been so long absent from the mere detail of regimental duty.

2939. What is your reason for supposing that they do not possess sufficient power?—I have heard the matter discussed at messes, and among officers generally.

2940. You are not speaking from your own knowledge as to what powers they do or do not possess?—Not directly.

2941. (*Viscount Melville.*) I think that the Articles of War are specific enough, but what power do the commanding officers possess in what is called giving secondary punishments, not trials by court-martial, but drill, confinement to quarters, and that sort of thing?—I have been for many years commanding a division of artillery, and all that detail of minor punishment to the men under my command was carried on by captains of troops and companies, and it came in no way under my cognizance, except on my annual inspection of books and records; it was carried on by commanders of troops and companies, under the station brigadier, and was not referred to the artillery commanding officer at all; therefore it did not, for some years of my residence in India, come under my immediate ken.

2942. (*Major-General Hancock.*) It simply amounts to this, that you do not know what powers commanding officers of regiments in the Bombay presidency do possess?—I know that they have not the power of discharge. I know that they have the power of promotion by selection; that is in their hands exclusively, although not perhaps promotion to native officers from non-commissioned officers. That is a question in which the adjutant-general's office exercises a very strict surveillance.

2943. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have you the power in the Bombay army to inflict corporal punishment?—That is only done in the native army in the case of mutiny, or offences of grave nature, and then the man is turned out of the service. I speak under correction. I am under the impression that if a man is once flogged he is turned out of the service.

2944. (*Viscount Melville.*) Is not it the custom in the artillery in Bombay that the captain of the battery deals with the men as if he was the commanding officer of a regiment?—Yes.

2945. And that instead of going to the colonel who commands the station, and the defaulter being brought up before that colonel, each captain commands his own battery as if it was a separate regiment?—Quite so.

2946. Do you think that a proper system?—I think it is necessary to the efficiency of the service.

2947. Do you not think that where the artillery are stationed together the defaulters should be brought before the senior officer of the artillery of the station, and that each captain should not be permitted to do as he likes?—I think that each captain of a troop or battery must when detached from his battalion or head quarters, have control over his own battery, as complete as the officer commanding a regiment has over his regiment. A battery is a very important command, and the captain of it should have complete control, as far as an officer commanding a regiment has control over the men; I think that the command of a troop or battery is in some degree assimilated to that of a ship-of-war; although ships-of-war do duty together, the officer commanding a particular ship has his own command reserved to him. Where two or more batteries, troops, or companies are serving together the general and professional command should of course be vested in the senior officer.

2948. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Though you have not served out of the Bombay presidency, have you an impression or feeling that there ought to be a fourth army; that is to say, that the Bengal army ought to be divided into two; do you think that there would be any advantage in that?—I think that there would be an advantage. I should say that as it has been constituted it is too large; that it would be for the advantage of the empire were it to be broken.

2949. You think that the fact of the armies of Bombay and Madras having been separate from the army of Bengal has been of great advantage to the State in general?—Yes, of very great advantage at the present crisis.

Colonel James Sinclair.

26th Aug. 1858.

2950. And you think that that advantage would be further extended if Bengal were divided into two presidencies ?—I should say so.

2951. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Would you have two commanders-in-chief or one ?—A commander-in-chief in each presidency. I think that each army should have its own commander of the forces or commander-in-chief.

2952. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Would you have a separate staff, an adjutant-general and a quartermaster-general for each ?—I think so. There are a thousand little differences between the presidencies which it is difficult to explain, and difficult to recollect, in fact; and it is of importance that such distinctions should be kept up, and even exaggerated.

2953. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not think that there ought to be one system for all three presidencies ?—With regard to the Europeans, yes. With regard to the natives, I would leave the system to be established as much under local influence as possible, and I would have arrangements made that the native armies, even if called upon to act together, as they would be in extended operations, should be kept apart as much as possible, and should be taught that they were separate, to prevent any collusion between the separate armies.

2954. (*Chairman.*) But you would make no difference in the terms of enlistment, or the pay or allowances given ?—None in the case of the "regular" army; those deemed "irregular" I would pay according to the social habits and requirements of the clan or class from which each regiment may be formed, so as to give to each man a certain pecuniary stake in his berth (Hind., *assamee*), in lieu of the pension for mere length of service, to which the soldiers of the regular army would be entitled.

2955. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you not think it very desirable, with your experience as an artillery officer, that the whole artillery system of the country should be the same in all the presidencies ?—Yes.

2956. That the whole matériel should be the same? —Yes.

2957. You are aware that that is not so now ?—The matériel of the artillery in all the presidencies has been assimilated of late years; but our carriages differ from those used in Europe. The whole differ one from the other, and from the royal artillery, in many points of discipline and drill.

2958. Do you not think that that is a very great drawback and a very great inconvenience ?—I think it is inexpedient that considerable differences should exist. Those now existing have not hitherto operated as a drawback to efficiency; they have all done their duty well.

2959. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not think that the emoluments attached to military staff appointments should be equalized in all the presidencies, including Ordnance appointments and all others? At present you are aware that Bengal officers enjoy very great advantages over those of the other presidencies ?—Supposing the Bengal army to be divided I think that that might be done; but that is a question to which I have really never given a thought.

The witness withdrew.

Colonel M. Willoughby, C.B.

Colonel MICHAEL WILLOUGHBY, C.B., examined.

2960. (*Chairman.*) You are colonel of the Bombay artillery ?—Yes.

2961. How long have you been in the service ?—thirty-seven years.

2962. How long have you been in India ?—About thirty-four years.

2963. Of course you have seen the European and native troops acting together ?—Yes.

2964. Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion which the Europeans should bear to the native troops in the Bombay presidency ?—With an adequate proportion of artillery, one European to three native soldiers would, I think, be sufficient.

2965. As regards cavalry, what is your opinion ? —I would do away with the regular native cavalry altogether, and I would substitute regiments of European cavalry, consisting each of about 500 sabres.

2966. Would you have no native cavalry ?—None, excepting irregular cavalry.

2697. In what proportion would you have Europeans to the irregular cavalry?—It must depend much upon circumstances.

2968. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Take it generally for the Bombay presidency ?—Some of them are police corps.

2969. We are talking merely of the military corps? —Then about the same proportion as to infantry. There are three regiments Scinde horse, one Poonah, and two of the Southern Mahratta corps.

2970. (*Chairman.*) Would you still keep the same proportion of one to three ?—Yes.

2971. Would you have any native artillery at all ? —I do not think that we could do without native artillery. For there are parts of the country where it would be almost impossible for Europeans to live; and I am of opinion that no European battery ought ever be sent away without the support of a company of European infantry, or an equal proportion of reserve artillery.

2972. (*Viscount Melville.*) If the European artilleryman dies, will not the European infantry soldier die ?—For that reason I think that we must keep up native artillery for unhealthy stations. I would only have European infantry to support European batteries,

2973. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you of opinion that the Minié rifle will in a great degree do away with the necessity of having detachments of artillery in India ?—Certainly not. The moral effect of artillery in India is very great; perhaps greater than in any other country.

2974. (*Chairman.*) Would you arm the native troops in the same way that you do the Europeans?—If we are to retain India I think we must have a native army; and must put confidence in it, and arm it, if it is to take the field, as we should arm Europeans.

2975. Would you put the same reliance upon them with regard to the artillery; would you entrust them with the guns the same as you would the Europeans? —Certainly, provided the pay of the artillerymen were increased. The prestige of the corps is gone; I think from the time that the reduction of pay took place in 1840.

2976. (*Major-General Hancock.*) The men only get the same pay as the infantry ?—They do; and the duties of a native artilleryman are at all times greater than those of an infantry soldier. He is taught his many and various duties in English, which require much time and labour to acquire, without receiving any additional pay. The service is not looked up to by the natives as it was formerly.

2977. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that their having to do this in English has anything to do with it ?—No; I attribute it to the reduction of pay.

2978. (*Chairman.*) Do you extend that opinion to the sappers and miners ?—Yes.

2979. Then you would recommend that both the sappers and miners and the artillery should be restored to their former rate of pay ?—Certainly.

2980. And you think that that would have the effect of restoring the favourable feeling towards those branches of the service ?—In all probability it would.

2981. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you keep up the same proportion of native artillery to European, which you have mentioned for the other portion of the Bombay army, namely, three to one ?—I would diminish the strength of the native artillery.

2982. And make them merely auxiliary ?—Yes.

2983. (*Chairman.*) What proportion of Europeans to natives would you have in the artillery?—I think we have at present 1,700 Europeans to about 1,000 natives.

2984. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And what would you have the proportion hereafter?—Six companies, or one battalion of natives, I think would be sufficient to one brigade of horse artillery, and five battalions of Europeans.

2985. (*Chairman.*) To how many Europeans?—2,500. Our present strength is not sufficient for the requirements of the service. At present we have a reserve battalion of artillery, strange to say, without its due proportion of European officers; at this moment in the Bombay presidency, there is one battalion of artillery without any officers excepting what it can get from the other battalions.

2986. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How has that arisen?—Artillerymen were so much required when the mutiny first broke out that the local government considered it expedient to raise a reserve battalion.

2987. Europeans?—Yes; and without any officers. From the want of them, detachments of artillery with guns were sent off on important duty without their proper commanders. I have myself, at Lord Elphinstone's request, on one occasion sent off a detachment of artillery without a single commissioned officer. When the mutiny first broke out at Kolepoor, I received a letter from the governor early on Sunday morning, telling me that there was no time to communicate with the brigadier, and desiring me to make arrangements for sending off immediately two guns with artillerymen down the coast; I did so, but they were despatched without an officer in command; and, moreover, with an unselected sergeant, for we were even so reduced in strength that there were few non-commissioned officers at head-quarters.

2988. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Did any escort go with those two guns?—Yes.

2989. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How do you account for this great want of officers?—It has been pressed upon the Bengal government over and over again, that we should have an increase, not only of artillerymen, but of officers also; and had this been attended to, in all probability the mutinies would have been more promptly put down; and in many places, we may infer, there would have been no rising.

2990. What is your supposed establishment of officers to a troop or battery?—A captain and two or three subalterns; but a battery has been left with merely a captain and frequently a subaltern in command.

2991. What is the establishment according to regulation?—I think it is a captain and three subalterns to a troop; one captain and two subalterns to a battery. We have for each battalion a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, a major. When I was in India a few months ago, there were five captains to a battalion. There are now six. There are ten lieutenants and five second lieutenants.

2992. That is to how many companies?—Four companies of Europeans to each battalion and six companies of natives.

2993. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you aware that during the last ten years every commander-in-chief successively has most strongly urged upon the Government the necessity of greatly increasing the European commissioned officers of artillery?—I have heard that it has been urged over and over again.

2994. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And it has been as often refused?—I cannot say that it has been refused; but it has not been attended to.

2995. Is it your opinion that the number of officers to a European troop or battery in India ought to be equal to that in a troop or battery of the royal artillery?—Certainly.

2996. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are the artillery officers selected for staff situations, either civil or military?—Yes, the officers of artillery conduct the duties pertaining to all Ordnance matters.

2997. Is that confined to their own department?—They are also eligible for the civil as well as the general staff of the army.

2998. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are there a great many employed upon the staff?—No; very few on the general staff.

2999. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you aware that during the last ten years the commander-in-chief has constantly opposed the withdrawal of officers from the artillery for staff employment, except regimental, in consequence of the great paucity of officers?—The paucity of officers has stood in the way of their advancement.

3000. They have been excluded from their fair share of appointments, civil and military, solely on account of the paucity of officers, and of the commander-in-chief protesting against their being taken away?—Yes, that has frequently happened.

3001. (*Viscount Melville.*) Does the establishment to a troop of horse artillery allow a first and second captain, or only one captain?—Only one captain.

3002. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Has it not been the case during the last few years that even infantry officers have been placed in command temporarily of a battery of artillery?—They have temporarily commanded batteries at out-stations.

3003. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the Bombay army should be composed of different nationalities and castes, and if so, in what proportion?—Certainly; and I think that they should be mixed up as much as possible.

3004. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you wish to have them enlisted from the nationalities or castes within the boundaries of the Bombay presidency, or would you extend the enlistment of them to any portion of India?—I would extend their enlistment to any portion of India.

3005. (*Chairman.*) Have you ever experienced any inconvenience on account of caste, in the performance of military duties?—None whatever.

3006. None exists in the Bombay army?—None. I commanded a company of golanndaze for a long time at a detached station, and found no difficulty whatever. They require to be ruled with firmness.

3007. But you consider that under proper discipline no inconvenience arises from caste?—Just so.

3008. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You see no reason why, with proper discipline, caste should be allowed to interfere at all?—I see no reason whatever.

3009. Would you enlist the men for general service?—Yes.

3010. (*Chairman.*) Would you make any alteration in the code under which the Bombay army are enlisted?—None. In Bombay they are enlisted for general service.

3011. (*Viscount Melville.*) With regard to caste, does any difficulty arise at the time of any of the great feasts, in men doing their duty when those feasts are going on?—Not that I am aware of.

3012. Are they allowed to attend the feasts?—A certain proportion are usually allowed to attend them.

3013. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that any change is required in the system of promotion, as regards the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?—No; I think the system of promotion in the Bombay army is good; it rests with the commanding officer.

3014. It is by selection?—Yes, I believe it is.

3015. And you prefer that system to promotion by seniority?—You cannot get efficient men without it.

3016. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that that system, as now introduced and existing in the Bombay army, is quite satisfactory?—Yes, satisfactory. I would however, delegate more power to officers commanding native regiments, brigadiers and officers commanding divisions.

3017. (*Major-General Hancock.*) In what respect?—I would allow those officers to confirm *all* courts-martial, without reference to higher authority.

Colonel M. Willoughby, C.B.

26th Aug. 1858.

3018. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would have no district court-martial at all, but have all courts-martial regimental?—A commanding officer should have the power of convening and confirming *any* court-martial.

3019. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you mean to say that a commanding officer in the Bombay army cannot confirm a regimental court-martial?—Before the mutiny there were certain offences for which he could not try a sepoy and confirm the sentence without reference to a higher authority.

3020. It depends upon the nature of the court-martial. A general court-martial goes to the commander-in-chief, a district court-martial goes to the officer commanding the brigade or division, and a regimental court-martial the commanding officer confirms; but do you mean to say that in the Bombay army a commanding officer has not the power of confirming a regimental court-martial?—Yes, he has that power; but what I am desirous of bringing forward is, that officers commanding corps, brigades and divisions, should *always* have the same power they *now* possess of inflicting summary punishment for *any* offence; this power was obliged to be given to them when the mutiny broke out.

3021. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the discipline of a regiment depends upon the powers in possession of the commanding officer?—In a great measure it does.

3022. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And do you think that that is more the case with natives than it would be with Europeans?—I think so.

3023. According to the Bombay system, what is the average age of a man when he arrives at the grade of a commissioned officer?—They are, generally speaking, young-looking men.

3024. What do you suppose their average age to be?—About thirty-three.

3025. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Commanding officers of regiments under the Bombay presidency have full power of giving leave of absence?—Yes.

3026. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is it not so in the other presidencies?—I think not; but I will not speak positively.

3027. Is it the habit in the Bombay presidency to send in petitions to higher authority from native officers or soldiers, without their passing through the proper channel, namely, the commanding officer of the company?—I am not aware of any instance of a petition having been so received.

3028. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you aware that it is entirely opposed to the established system?—It is quite opposed to the regulations of the service.

3029. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is it your opinion that there should be any admixture of Europeans and natives, and if so should that admixture be regimentally or by brigade?—Yes, by brigade.

3030. You would not have it regimentally?—No.

3031. Have you any reason for not having it regimentally?—I do not think that native and European recruits would work well together.

3032. Do you think that there is a sufficiency of European officers for the native infantry regiments?—Yes, I think that each regiment is amply provided for.

3033. Have you given your attention at all to the idea of separating the Bengal army into two distinct bodies; in fact, having an additional presidency formed? I think it would be very desirable; the Bengal army is on too large a scale.

3034. Would it be desirable to assimilate the appointments and allowances in all the presidencies?—I think that they ought to be upon one footing; a great deal of jealousy exists now.

3035. And that, of course, is very undesirable?—Yes.

3036. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You mean, in consequence of the superior advantages enjoyed by the officers of the Bengal presidency over those enjoyed in the other presidencies?—Yes.

3037. (*Viscount Melville.*) You say that you think that the native regiments have a sufficient number of European officers; do you mean that in general terms, or that the establishment is sufficient?—The establishment is sufficient.

3038. You are aware that that establishment is very seldom present, and that when officers are upon the staff, and a campaign takes place, all the officers on the staff are immediately ordered to join their regiments. It sometimes happens that a man comes and takes command of a regiment who has not seen it for years, and has to go to campaign without knowing a single man, and knowing hardly an officer in the regiment. Do you think that a good system?—There are certainly some difficulties attending it; but I think, as a general rule, that in garrison the number of officers are quite sufficient. There is not occupation enough in a native regiment to employ more than a certain number of officers.

3039. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What number do you think should be always present?—If you had selected men, you would not require a great number. Looking at our irregular cavalry regiments, there are not more than three or four officers in each regiment, yet they have always done their duty well in the field and in garrison also.

3040. (*Viscount Melville.*) Admitting that it is necessary to take officers for the staff, which I do not deny, do you think that it is a good thing, when a man has been in the command of a regiment, and that regiment is ordered on service, and an officer who is on the staff is ordered to join that regiment, and of necessity from his seniority takes the command, that the officer who has been so long in command should be superseded at the most critical moment when it is necessary for the commanding officer to know the men?—That system is objectionable, no doubt; but I do not know how it could be remedied.

3041. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Could that objection be met by the formation of a staff corps?—Yes; it might be met by the formation of a staff corps, or officers on staff employ being seconded, according to the royal artillery system.

3042. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think that the formation of a staff corps is practicable without upsetting the whole established system of promotion?—I think that it would be very difficult indeed to carry it out.

3043. Do you not think that the system might be remedied by appointing to the commands of regiments by selection?—Yes.

3044. Supposing that the field of selection were increased by augmenting the number of lieutenant-colonels, would not that enable the commander-in-chief to provide every regiment with a perfectly efficient commander; suppose, for instance, there were 100 lieutenant-colonels, to provide commanders for 25 regiments? Do you think that that system would work well?—No doubt it would, provided the best are selected.

3045. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then that would not be the seniority system?—No.

3046. (*Viscount Melville.*) Is it not the system now that where a lieutenant-colonel and a major are both present with a regiment, the lieutenant-colonel is moved, in order to give the major the command of the regiment?—It frequently occurs.

3047. Is it not the rule?—I am not aware it is the general rule.

3048. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) It is the practice?—I do not think that in the last few years any lieutenant-colonel has been removed without some special reason.

3049. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you not aware that the transfers of lieutenant-colonels under the existing system are not made in order to place the majors in command of regiments, but for the purpose of placing a field officer in command of every regiment as far as practicable?—Yes.

3050. Is not that the rule?—Yes, that a field officer should be placed in command of a regiment whenever one is available for that purpose, superseding a captain if he is in command.

3051. (*Viscount Melville.*) But the rule is, that the man to be moved is not the major but the senior officer, the lieutenant-colonel?—Yes; formerly the major was moved, now it is the lieutenant-colonel.

Colonel M. Willoughby, C.B.
26th Aug. 1858.

The witness withdrew.

Adjourned to to-morrow at 12 o'clock.

Friday, 27th August 1858.

PRESENT:

Major-General PEEL.
H.R.H. the Duke of CAMBRIDGE.
Lord STANLEY.
Marquis of TWEEDDALE.
Viscount MELVILLE.
Lieut-Gen. Sir HARRY G. W. SMITH.
Major-Gen. HANCOCK.
Colonel BURLTON.

MAJOR-GENERAL PEEL IN THE CHAIR.

Sir CHARLES E. TREVELYAN, K.C.B., examined.

Sir C.E. Trevelyan, K.C.B.
27th Aug. 1858.

3052. (*Chairman.*) Will you have the goodness to state to the Commission the length of time that you were in India?—I was 12 years in India, from the year 1826 to the year 1838.

3053. Will you have the kindness to state what situation you held in India?—During the first six years I held various situations in connexion with the residency at Delhi, including acting as political agent at Kotah and Bhurtpore, and during the last six years I served at Calcutta as deputy secretary in the political department.

3054. Then your knowledge of India is confined to the Bengal presidency?—I have travelled through the other presidencies, and read and heard a great deal about them, but I have not served in them.

3055. Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion which the European should bear to the native troops in the Bengal presidency?—I have; but both the aggregate amount of force which will be required for general service in the Bengal presidency, and the proportion in which that force should consist of Europeans and natives, will depend chiefly on other arrangements which are not of a military kind.

3056. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What other arrangements?—The large amount at which the native army of the Bengal presidency has been hitherto maintained has been chiefly owing to two causes; one that it has been employed not only for the legitimate purpose of an army, that is, for maintaining the general peace of the country, but also in carrying on to a great extent the civil administration, in performing functions which in other countries are performed by police and others, for instance, guarding the public offices, gaols, and treasuries, furnishing treasure parties, and various other duties. If those duties were performed, as they ought to be, by a police organized on the general principle of the county police in England, a strictly local force, the demand for troops for general service would be very much diminished. Another cause of the great amount of the army was that it was necessary to counterbalance the forces maintained by the native states, Oude, the Punjaub, Gwalior, Holkar, Hyderabad, and so forth. Several of those states have been consolidated with our own dominions, other states are of a strictly national kind, depending upon Jaghiredar forces, so that nothing is to be apprehended from them; but there will still remain several which ought to be organized in a military point of view in the same manner as our own army, and, in fact, to be consolidated with our own army; and if that is properly done, that also will greatly diminish the demand for maintaining a force for general service. Then the extension of railroads, by making the same force more generally available, will diminish the necessity for making it so large. And, lastly, a proper arrangement for disarming the country, especially in reference to firearms and to the manufacture of gunpowder. If all these arrangements are properly carried out, and our civil administration is conducted in a manner which is, on the whole, acceptable to the population, the force for general service may be brought within very reasonable limits. The native force for general service will merely be that which will be necessary as subsidiary and auxiliary to the European force. I should say, therefore, that subject to these conditions a European reserve of from 30,000 to 40,000 men, with twice that number of native auxiliaries, would be sufficient for the whole Bengal presidency, including Bengal Proper, the North-Western provinces, and the Punjaub. This would re-establish our Indian finances and leave a large annual surplus available for the improvement of the country, which would further tend to diminish the necessity for maintaining a large standing army.

3057. (*Chairman.*) I understand your opinion to be that several of the duties hitherto performed by the military might be transferred to a police force, and that afterwards there would be required about 40,000 Europeans and twice that number of native troops in the presidency of Bengal?—Yes, that is my opinion.

3058. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Would you make the police military or civil?—Civil, but with a certain *quasi* military organization. In my opinion they should not be police corps, which would be only another name for a standing army, but they should be a civil force, properly organized in each district under a European officer; and a certain proportion of the police in each district should be armed with firearms, and subjected to the necessary amount of discipline, and should be employed in guarding the gaol and treasury, and other duties which have heretofore been performed by the sepoys; they would be a sort of company *d'élite* in each district out of the aggregate of the police.

3059. I understand you to say that you would have them formed like the rural police of England?—According to the general organization of the rural police; the police of each county is subjected to a regular organization under a superior officer.

3060. The principle, as I understand it, of the police of Scotland is, to have about 1 in 1,400 men, and the object is merely to be able to give evidence in the event of individuals committing a crime where there is a large mob, or a large party over which a small body of the people would have no power?—The object of police in every country is to preserve the peace, and I would propose that the police of the different districts should be maintained, with every necessary improvement, on the present civil footing, but that out of them should be selected, with certain superior advantages and with a certain amount of

Sir E. Trevelyan, K.C.B.

27th Aug. 1858.

military discipline, a sufficient number in each district to perform the civil duties which have hitherto been performed by the sepoys. We know that persons of that class are quite competent for such duties from the experience both of the United Kingdom and of India. The gaols under the convict department, for instance, are not guarded by military, but by civil persons on the footing of constables. In Ireland the police have a still more military organization given to them; but I consider that the model of the English county police, with the modification mentioned by me, is more suited to the state of India than any other.

3061. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) More so than the Irish police would be?—I think so, because they are more entirely local. In all our arrangements, of course, we should have in view exemption from such a catastrophe as has lately occurred. If a large portion of the duties formerly performed by the native army were performed by local police, we should have this security for their fidelity, that they would be locally known, and their property and families would be in the district where they served, and that, not being moveable, they would have no communication with the police in other districts, and with the exception of a limited number of the most trustworthy persons, selected for the purpose, they would not be armed with fire-arms. So that to that extent the danger which has hitherto arisen from a native army would be avoided.

3062. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You have stated in your evidence that upon certain conditions being carried out, applying especially to the civil government, a certain number of troops would be sufficient. It appears to me that those conditions which you have stated are very prospective indeed; therefore, as India is just now in a most disorganized state, it becomes our duty to consider what number of troops are applicable at this present moment. Will you be so kind as to give us your opinion upon that point?—I am not competent to give an opinion upon that point. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the number at present employed, or with the exigencies which call for their employment.

3063. (*Lord Stanley.*) You were speaking of what would be required in the ordinary state of things in India?—Yes.

3064. Subject to the condition, as I understood, of the police being employed to perform those duties which in this country are considered to belong to them?—Yes; and that the contingents should be incorporated with our army, and subjected to all the conditions of safety which the constitution of our own army will afford.

3065. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You also mentioned the disarming of the country?—Yes.

3066. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) There was another great condition which you stated, that is to say, if the government was carried on in a manner which was acceptable to the people; upon that hinges the great question of all, in my mind?—Yes; the fulfilment of that condition must be assumed.

3067. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Referring to railroads, it was stated the other day by one of the witnesses, that he did not attach much importance to railroads, for that in India it would be a very simple and easy process to destroy a railroad at any moment, that the inhabitants would be very handy in taking up the rails, and that therefore he did not take into account railroads so much as he otherwise would do; is that your opinion?—No; that objection seems to suppose that disturbance would break out in the whole country at the same time, but we know from experience that it is not so; disturbance breaks out at a particular place, where a rallying point is established, the remainder of the country remaining for the time in a state of tranquillity.

3068. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Then you think that previously to any breaking out you would have the magazines all stored with those things which were necessary to oppose an enemy in the event of a mutiny taking place?—Certainly. I consider that the magazines should be deposited in fortified places at the principal stations, and should be entirely under the charge of the European troops.

3069. You say "fortified places," that is a new view, looking at what has been the case in India before. In India before I have always understood that the great object was to have no fortification excepting at the Presidency?—Experience shows that that was a mistaken view; our policy should be, I conceive, to mass our troops in large bodies, to have as few detached posts as possible which would easily yield to an attack, always to have a due proportion of European troops at each of these large stations, and to have at each of them some kind of *place d'armes* or fortified post; I do not mean an expensive fort.

3070. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But a redoubt, or something of that sort?—Some place capable of a certain degree of defence, in which the treasury, the military chest, the records, the stores and magazines of all kinds, and the women and children might be deposited, and that this stronghold should be properly provisioned and be held entirely by Europeans, so that in case of an outbreak we should at least be secure on these main points, and the bulk of the force would be available to be employed in any direction in which it might be required.

3071. (*Viscount Melville.*) That being the case, if this stronghold is to be always held by Europeans, it will render so many Europeans incapable of service in the event of a campaign. Are you not aware that the Duke of Wellington laid it down that to hold a large country with a small army, the rule was to have as few fortified places as you possibly could maintain?—My view is this: we must have magazines and stores, we must keep them in a state of security in the event of war or disturbance, and if we had no strongholds of the kind described by me, we should have to employ a larger force of Europeans in guarding the magazines and stores than if we had such fortified posts.

3072. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) For instance, it would be your opinion that if at Cawnpore there had been a post such as you describe, probably the European force under Sir Hugh Wheeler could have resisted long enough until it had been relieved?—Certainly; and I also contemplate a much smaller number of military stations than we have hitherto had. The necessity for having such a large number of military stations has been chiefly owing to our depending upon our army for the performance of civil duties. I assume that all those duties will be performed by police.

3073. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the native force which you have mentioned should be on the regular or the irregular system, or both combined?—I consider that they should be subsidiary to the European troops; that they should bear the same relation to the European troops which the light-armed auxiliaries did to the Roman legion and the Grecian phalanx, and that they should be organized and disciplined and armed accordingly. To meet this view they would be modelled much more according to what is called the irregular than the regular force. Particular care should be taken to avoid the pedantry of European discipline; for instance, it is by no means necessary that they should be dressed according to the European fashion; on the contrary, there would be great advantages in dressing them according to the native fashion; it would make the service more popular, and it would preserve in a much greater degree the distinction between the different nationalities and races, which is a point very necessary to be attended to for our security.

3074. You said that they should be "armed accordingly," would you give them an inferior weapon to the Europeans?—No; having determined that that is to be the object of these troops, that they are to be light-armed auxiliaries, I would make them as efficient for that purpose as possible. I would give them the best equipments and the best weapons, and

in every point of discipline, exercise, and instruction I would make them as efficient as possible.

3075. You would make them as efficient as possible to perform the duties which you contemplate their doing?—Yes.

3076. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you of opinion that they ought to find their own arms. I infer from your evidence that you are not; but it has been stated before this Commission that the irregulars ought to find their own arms, and it has also been stated that that has been done under very fortunate circumstances; are you of opinion that the Government ought to arm them or not: I allude to the irregular horse?—I do not consider that a point of essential importance. I do not think it is either necessary or desirable that there should be entire uniformity.

3077. Are we to give them arms, or may they be allowed to find their own arms?—I think that generally in India we have aimed at uniformity at the expense of other more important considerations. There is often a positive advantage in maintaining diversity of practice in the native portion of the army, for it not only tends to prevent combination against us, but gives variety to our experience and enables us more easily to detect the causes of any failure. Under some circumstances it might be desirable to provide our irregular cavalry with arms from the government stores. In other cases it might be desirable to allow them to provide their own arms, and to pay them accordingly. The prevailing practice is that they should provide their own arms, and if care is taken to see that the arms are of a good kind, and in good order, there can be no objection to that.

3078. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I understand you to mean that hitherto it is your opinion that the native army has been attempted to be assimilated too much to the European fashion, and that you would propose in lieu of such arrangement that the best arms should be given to native troops consonant with the practices and habits of the country?—Yes, that is my meaning.

3079. (*Chairman.*) Would you make any alteration in the manner of officering these native troops?—Yes; I am of opinion that the command of native troops is a duty of first-rate importance, which ought to be intrusted only to officers specially selected for the purpose. I think that the officers should be few in number, and should be intrusted with large powers, and should be personally of a very efficient character.

3080. You are speaking of European officers?—I am.

3081. How would you propose that the native officers should be appointed, or would you have any native officers?—Yes; I consider that the ordinary motives which influence human conduct must be brought to bear upon the native army. The principle that the lowest European officer should command the highest native officer must be maintained, but that only makes it more necessary that our European officers should be men of tried ability and energy. The native officers should be promoted by merit, so that we may give them the necessary motives to zeal and fidelity, and that we may have tried and approved native subordinates to maintain our hold over the rest of the troops.

3082. (*Viscount Melville.*) Did you ever consider the possibility or the expediency of introducing into the native force as officers native gentlemen of the country, without their entering as sepoys and being promoted from the ranks?—Yes, I have considered it in former years. I saw a great deal of the irregular horse. I was well acquainted with Colonel Skinner, and associated with the native gentlemen at Delhi and elsewhere. I am clearly of opinion that it would not be advisable to introduce native gentlemen as officers without their passing through the ranks. They should all be promoted from the ranks, in my opinion.

3083. (*Lord Stanley.*) Will you state your reason for the opinion which you have expressed, that native gentlemen would not be eligible as officers?—I think that the power of promoting from the ranks is a great public advantage; it furnishes the strongest motive to good conduct and fidelity on the part of the whole of the troops, and it is very undesirable that we should give up that advantage. And provided promotion is made from the ranks, and the troops are properly paid and properly treated, I conceive that the native gentry will enter in the ranks, and they do so to a considerable extent; most of the officers of Colonel Skinner's irregular corps, for instance, held the position of native gentlemen, and they had for the most part risen from the ranks.

3084. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Is that so in the regular army?—No.

3085. Would it not be desirable to have native gentlemen in the regular army as officers?—No doubt as an abstract proposition it would be desirable, but I consider that to promote the most deserving persons from the ranks, whatever their original social position may have been, is preferable; and if native gentlemen were brought in at once as officers, they would be placed in an invidious position in reference to the European officers; it would be difficult for us to offer to them further promotion.

3086. But you are aware that there have been such persons as volunteers in the British army, and that they have turned out very well; that they have done duty in the first instance as privates, and that afterwards, when they have learned their duty thoroughly and have distinguished themselves, they have got promoted?—I have no doubt that if we admitted native gentlemen at once as officers, and offered them further promotion, they would many of them acquit themselves well. But our position in India is a very peculiar one; we can give much more scope to the employment and promotion of the natives in the civil department than we can in the military. And in the view which I have submitted, I assume that it will be necessary to maintain the keys of our military power in our own hands. I have stated what I conceive to be the best general system, but this would not preclude the employment of native gentlemen at the head of their retainers when circumstances rendered it desirable; and encouragement should always be given to native gentlemen to enter as privates, with a view to their subsequent promotion when they have learned their duty and have distinguished themselves.

3087. (*Chairman.*) I understand you that having appointed competent officers to command these native regiments, you would give them great power in the selection of officers, and in rewarding those placed under them by promoting them?—Yes.

3088. I also understand that you are favourable to having some military experience or some knowledge of every person, before he is appointed an officer?—Certainly; I consider that we should have experience of him in all the points of soldierlike qualities and zeal and fidelity.

3089. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You are perhaps aware that during the recent revolt there has been no single instance brought to notice of a native commissioned officer, who has been promoted on the principle which you advocate, proving either zealous or faithful to his duty. No one has ever, I believe, given information of what was in agitation amongst the men?—In the great bulk of the Bengal army the promotion of native officers was entirely by seniority; they went up by a sort of routine. They felt themselves under no obligation to their commanding officers for their promotion. I assume that promotion will be according to qualification and merit, that is to say, that only those soldiers will be promoted of whose fidelity and intelligence we have had actual experience.

3090. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And you do not think that that has been the system with the Bengal army

Sir C. E. Trevelyan, K.C.B.

27th Aug. 1858.

hitherto ?—Certainly not ; it was so at Madras, and there the army remained faithful.

3091. And it was the same at Bombay ?—It was so at Bombay also, and the disaffection in the Bombay army has been very partial, and has been chiefly confined to what may be called the Bengal element of it.

3092. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You surely do not attribute the revolt of the army of Bengal to what you have stated in the answer which you have now given as to the selection of the native officers ?—Whatever security there may be against such contingencies in holding out motives to fidelity to the native officers, and in a careful selection of the native officers, so that only those in whom we have confidence should be promoted, and also in the expectation which the soldiers ought to have of early promotion in case they acted with fidelity, we had not that security.

3093. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that it would be an incentive to fidelity ?—It would undoubtedly be an incentive to fidelity. In most even of the sepoy regiments there were some soldiers who remained faithful. If the promotion of the native officers had been according to merit, many of those faithful sepoys would have been promoted, and they would have been placed in situations of influence.

3094. Then you hold it to be of great importance to keep up the connecting link between the European officer and the native soldier through the native officer ?—Yes, that is my opinion.

3095. And you think that by what you propose that object could be secured ?—As far as it can be in our very peculiar position in India. I would give further advantages to the superior native officers, and would make their situations as agreeable and respectable as possible.

3096. In what way would you do that ?—I have not gone into the details. I mention this as a general principle. In governing a body of men you must have in view the ordinary motives of human conduct, and if we give our native troops nothing to expect, no reward to hope for from consistent fidelity and good conduct, we cannot expect those qualities from them.

3097. What do you propose to do, then, with the old soldier who is worn out in the service, and who will of course by this change not be promoted ?—I would give him a liberal pension.

3098. Do you think the pension sufficiently liberal as it is now, or do you think that it ought to be increased ?—Speaking generally, I believe it to be sufficiently liberal.

3099. I understood you to say that you would have the best European officers that you could find for the native regiments ; from what body of persons would you select them, because, as I understood, you would propose that the generality of the native army should be irregular ; how would you select the European officers for the native army ?—I have thought a good deal on the subject, and the plan which I have framed in my mind as the one best adapted to the new circumstances of India is as follows : I think that the European infantry, cavalry, and artillery should form a portion of the royal army, and should be subjected to regular reliefs. The engineers probably should be local, or should at least form a separate branch of the corps of royal engineers, owing to the peculiar circumstances under which public works in India are conducted. Then there will remain the auxiliary native force, and in order to provide officers for them I would propose the following arrangement : I consider that the least important duties which can be assigned to European officers in India are of such grave consequence that there ought to be a sifting and selection of the candidates from the very first ; and of those young men who apply for appointments in the Indian army I would select those who appear to be best qualified, according to such tests as may be thought best. I consider that the plan of appointing all those who come up to a certain standard is altogether insufficient, for there is no standard of acquirement which may not be crammed up to, and I think that the only real security is a comparative test to see who your candidates are, and to take the best of them. Then, having selected the cadets on that principle, I would subject them all to a short training at a military college in this country, in order to test their moral qualities, to teach them the elements of military science and of the native languages, and to eliminate those who turn out not to be qualified. Then I would appoint them as supernumeraries to the European infantry in India, where they should serve for at least a year. For all the native services, that is to say, for providing officers for the auxiliary native infantry, the auxiliary native cavalry, for the different departments of the staff, the military staff, the commissariat, the pay department, the audit department, stud, and so forth, I would have one body of officers, who should be borne on one list and should be recruited by selecting from the young officers serving as supernumeraries with the European regiments those who are willing to enter the local native service and are reported to be best qualified for it.

3100. A sort of staff corps ?—A sort of staff corps ; and I would tell off from this aggregate staff corps officers for the different duties, for the command of the different regiments of native infantry and cavalry, for the different branches of the staff, and so forth, according to their qualifications, assigning proper rates of pay for the different duties, and making the improvement in the position of the officers dependent upon their ability and conduct. I would reserve the utmost freedom of transferring officers from one branch to another. For instance, an officer might have been in the first instance appointed to the cavalry, and it might turn out that he had not the peculiar qualifications necessary for that branch of the service, or as he advanced in life he might become unfitted for it, in either of which cases he might be transferred to the infantry ; an officer appointed in the first instance to an infantry regiment might show that he possessed superior qualifications, and it might be desirable to transfer him to some branch of the staff, and so on. If it should be necessary to employ military officers on civil duties, they should in like manner be selected from this body.

3101. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Would you give the commander-in-chief in India this power ?—I would give the commander-in-chief the power of selection to all the military offices, but I would make proper arrangements for assisting the commander-in-chief. I would establish a proper system of military inspection, and proper means of recording the conduct and qualifications of the different officers. There should be an official organization expressly for the purpose of regulating the promotions and transfers, and noting the qualifications and services of officers.

3102. And that would do away with all the heart-burnings and the letters which appear in the press, which undermine military authority ?—Such feelings must always exist in some degree ; but the prevailing tone of the army is likely to be satisfactory when it is seen that pains are taken to do justice to the officers. They would all enter the army with the expectation that superior merit would be rewarded as it is in the law and other professions ; and as all would be stimulated to exert themselves, it would not often be necessary to pass over officers in making promotions.

3103. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What is the system of promotion which you would introduce under this plan ?—Entirely according to conduct and qualification, so far as the actual employment of the officers is concerned.

3104. Would that apply to promotion all the way up to colonel ?—The promotion would be of two kinds ; first of all they would form one body.

3105. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Like the engineer corps ?—Like the engineer corps or the artillery.

3106. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You mean of different grades ?—Of different ranks of officers ; I mean colonels, lieutenant-colonels, captains, and so

forth; and it should be quite open to the commander-in-chief to make promotion from rank to rank, even in the general body.

3107. Promotion should be made for what, for superior qualification?—Promotion on the general list from rank to rank out of the order of seniority would chiefly be for distinguished service; but the kind of promotion upon which I most rely is promotion from one appointment to another. For instance, a young man might be appointed first to an infantry regiment. I assume that there would be a much smaller number of officers in the infantry regiments than there is at present, and that they would be highly qualified, leaving more room for rewarding the native officers. We will suppose that a young man has been posted to an infantry regiment; he acquits himself extremely well; he applies himself zealously to the performance of his military duties; he is very favourably reported on by his commanding officer and by the inspecting general officer; he studies the native languages and acquires great facility of communicating with, and shows a genius for commanding and influencing natives. Under these circumstances he would probably be selected for some appointment on the staff, or if he preferred the cavalry service he might be transferred to the cavalry. That is the sort of promotion on which I would chiefly rely. It would be consistent with a certain amount of succession. For instance, if there were three or four officers in a cavalry corps, and a vacancy occurred, it would be open to the commander-in-chief to promote the junior officer to that vacancy.

3108. You are speaking rather of promotion from one appointment to a superior appointment than from one rank to another rank. Do you mean that when a young officer is reported upon as being extremely highly qualified, thereupon the commander-in-chief is to make him, if he is a captain, a major, and put him over the heads of all the others in the service?—No; I mean that there should be a limited establishment for each regiment, say three or four officers.

3109. Of what rank should those officers consist?—It should be fixed; say a lieutenant-colonel, a captain, and two lieutenants. Take the case of a young man appointed to an infantry regiment so composed; we will suppose that he has shown superior qualifications; it would then be open to the commander-in-chief either to promote him to a vacancy in the native regiment in which he happened to be serving, or to select him for any superior employment, say to the commissariat, or the pay department, or any other duty.

3110. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Do you consider that this proposed arrangement of yours could in any form or shape be made applicable to the present officers in the army, without interfering with every sort of rule and condition on the faith of which they entered the service?—In all great changes of this sort it is indispensably necessary to make a clear distinction between the prospective arrangement which will be permanently desirable and the existing arrangement; if those two things are confused it becomes impossible to make any change whatever. I conceive that the first and the most important thing is to settle what is the most desirable model as a permanent prospective arrangement; having determined upon that, the next thing will be to provide for the existing officers, including them, if possible, in the new arrangement, but at any rate keeping strict faith with them, and giving them a full equivalent for any advantages to which they may have been entitled. As a general rule the new arrangement would apply only to new appointments; the young men appointed after the establishment of the new model would enter under the revised terms of service. For instance, if it were determined to adopt a plan of this sort, the young men would be selected and instructed at home and in India in the manner I have described, and would be selected for appointments afterwards.

3111. (*Major-General Hancock.*) In the explanation which you have given you have only stated instances in which you think that the commander-in-chief should appoint an officer from a regiment to the commissariat or to the pay department, or advance him from an inferior to a superior appointment. Will you be good enough to state upon what system the commander-in-chief would make the promotions from ensign to lieutenant, from lieutenant to captain, and so upwards? Is it your plan that the commander-in-chief should make those promotions simply upon the report of a general officer that a young officer was particularly highly qualified without reference to the service which he had seen or the comparative claims of other officers; in fact, would you leave the promotion from rank to rank entirely in the hands of the commander-in-chief according to his judgment of each officer's qualifications and claims?—The main principle of promotion must always be seniority.

3112. You mean promotion from rank to rank?—Promotion from rank to rank, must always mainly depend upon seniority; but in every case of admitted deficiency an officer should be passed over, and in every case of superior good service an officer should be promoted out of his turn.

3113. But in ordinary times, when serving in garrison, suppose there are 1,000 officers, and a young lieutenant is highly reported upon to-day to the commander-in-chief, is he to select this officer and make him a captain to-morrow?—No. According to the plan which I have suggested the ordinary mode of meeting the claims of a young man who has shown superior qualifications would be by promoting him to a more advantageous appointment.

3114. Supposing you had the officers of the whole army together, how would you arrange them for promotion, and according to what system would you let them be promoted from rank to rank, setting aside staff appointments, commands, and everything else, and taking the simple question of promotion from rank to rank?—Mainly by seniority, largely qualified by superior efficiency or inefficiency, and good or bad service.

3115. If I understand you, you would allow the existing system to continue as a general rule, but you would admit exceptions, and give the commander-in-chief the power of selecting officers for superior qualifications or good service, and giving them a jump over the heads of all the others?—Yes.

3116. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I apprehend that what you mean is this, that you would have a fixed establishment of officers in the several grades, lieutenant-colonels, captains, and subaltern officers, and that you would allow promotion to go on in those grades according to the establishment, as far as practicable, by seniority, and that wherever there was great merit you would allow that merit to count, and that if there was not an opportunity by seniority of promoting a man at a period when he was very highly spoken of, you would so adjust your staff, civil, and other appointments as to promote a man without giving him a step of rank, but promoting him in position by giving him a higher appointment better paid?—Yes; I should consider the general roll of the officers chiefly as a means of regulating the relative ranks, and preserving the coherence of the body of officers. Having in that way provided for the existence of a large body of officers selected and trained as I have described, I would make their employment and remuneration depend upon their special qualifications for the various appointments connected with the Bengal army. The artillery and engineers furnish the nearest parallel. The royal artillery has a large body of officers who are variously employed. I would have the same large body of officers in India, with a further modification of the seniority principle, and a greater freedom of appointing them to different situations. The situations to which they

Sir C.E. Trevelyan, K.C.B.

27th Aug. 1858.

would be eligible in India would be more various than those to which the artillery are at present eligible, and would furnish a much greater opportunity of employing the different officers according to their qualifications, and rewarding them according to their merits.

3117. It would be a sort of graduated scale of rewards in employment; that is to say, that, without reference to military rank, you would have rewards of position in employment?—Yes. For instance, there would be so many native cavalry regiments, with so many posts held by officers of different ranks, and so many infantry regiments in a similar manner, and the same in the different departments of the staff; and officers taken from the general list would be appointed to these different posts, and be transferred and promoted according to qualification and merit. If a young officer appeared to be better qualified for the cavalry, I would appoint him to the cavalry.

3118. (*Viscount Melville.*) Suppose he did not like to go?—Then he need not go. Reasonable attention should, of course, be paid to the taste and inclination of officers.

3119. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) May I remind you that we must always begin at the beginning. Now the beginning of all armies is effective regiments, and regiments cannot be kept effective unless they are right well officered. It appears to me that the system which you advocate is that which would denude the regiments of their best officers, and injure the efficiency of the army beyond measure. I should like to hear your own opinion upon that point?—I consider that it would very much increase the efficiency of officers with native regiments constituted as I have suggested. The officers would all be selected officers, appointed to the different regiments for their efficiency.

3120. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do not you perceive that your scheme would be liable to what is known under the description of partiality, favour, and affection, and would not lead to a just selection of the officers?—I assume that proper arrangements will be made for recording the qualifications and services of the different officers, and that they will be appointed and promoted according to qualification and service.

3121. (*Lord Stanley.*) What check is there, according to your plan, upon favouritism, or, in plain words, upon jobbing?—In the first place, all the officers will be of a superior class; they will not, as at present, be appointed indiscriminately, subject to passing a very moderate examination, and the public opinion of such a body will be in itself a very important check. In the next place, I would provide the commander-in-chief with every possible facility for judging of the qualifications and services of the different officers by a proper system of military inspection, and by proper records and reports; and, lastly, the test afforded by the system of examination in languages and professional subjects which already exists in India might be much improved.

3122. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How would you get rid of those officers who were found inefficient; because, of course you are aware that in a seniority service, if five or six men stand at the head of the list of their rank, and are constantly passed over, they are worse than useless; how would you get rid of those officers; they might not have committed themselves sufficiently to be brought to trial by a court-martial for any military offence?—That is an evil which must exist to some extent under every system; but I conceive that if the candidates are in the first instance properly sifted, and if afterwards proper motives to zeal and exertion are afforded to them, the quantum of inefficiency will be reduced to a minimum; it will certainly be very much less than it is at present, when an officer's promotion does not depend at all upon his zeal and ability, provided he only performs his duties with moderate propriety.

3123. (*Viscount Melville.*) I understood you to say that you proposed to have a selected list of lieutenant-colonels, majors, captains, and all ranks, from which the commander-in-chief was to select officers for particular appointments, such as commanding native regiments, staff appointments, &c. Are those officers to remain on the strength of their regiments, or in what way are the duties of those regiments to be provided for if those officers are placed upon a select list?—I propose that there should be a general list; so many colonels, so many lieutenant-colonels, so many captains, and so many lieutenants, and that the promotion on the general list from rank to rank should be mainly by seniority, qualified to a certain extent by merit or demerit, but chiefly by proved eminent service; and the practical application of this arrangement would be that for the different branches of the native service, cavalry and infantry, and the different departments of the staff, there would be fixed establishments, consisting of a limited number of officers, and that officers would be selected from the general list for these different appointments; and that except in a case of distinguished service, in which a promotion would be made to a superior rank on the general list, the officers would look for their reward to more advantageous appointments in the different branches for which they would be eligible.

3124. Then am I to understand that the officers are still to remain on the strength of their regiments?—No. Their permanent position would be on a general list, like the artillery, the engineers, and the Indian civil service.

3125. (*Chairman.*) As I understand you the promotion is not to be regimental, but by selection from the whole body, partly by seniority and partly by merit?—The promotion from rank to rank would be as it is in the artillery on a general list, but it would not be so entirely according to strict seniority.

3126. Making these irregular regiments the same as the different battalions of artillery?—Yes. The officers would be assigned to the native regiments and other branches of the local military service as occasion might require.

3127. (*Viscount Melville.*) Then do you mean that the whole army should be one corps?—The officers of the native infantry and cavalry and staff should all be one corps.

3128. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) We will suppose that a regiment distinguishes itself, that it takes the Redan, for instance, and loses three captains and six lieutenants, who are killed on the field, and that the other fellows hold up their heads like men, how would the survivors like to have men put over their heads taken from a general list, when we look for it as a birthright to jump into the shoes of the gallant fellow who has been killed?—The first question would be whether in a case of eminent service of that sort the officers should not be promoted to the superior rank on the general list. If a difficulty occurred in doing that, the officers who so distinguished themselves would no doubt be noted for the first good appointments which fell vacant in any branch of the service for which they might be qualified. I may mention that the principle which I advocate has long been in operation in India in reference to the irregular troops, both infantry and cavalry, and to a great variety of staff and civil situations. The difference is, that the officers were selected for these various situations from the regiments, thereby diminishing the strength of the regiments and discouraging the officers who remained to do regimental duty, whereas I propose that, instead of being selected from the strength of the regiments, they should be selected from a general list. Since the mutiny a still nearer approach has been made to the system which I recommend, because the original native regiments now exist only in name, and the officers belong in reality to a general list, from which they are selected for the different irregular corps which at present compose the Bengal native army. The change therefore would be much less than at first sight appears, and would chiefly consist in regulating in a systematic

manner an arrangement which has been already brought about by the force of events.

3129. (*Major-General Hancock.*) From whence would you recruit this general corps?—I would do so in the manner I described, by selecting a young man in the first instance in England, by passing him through a year's course at a military college in this country, and afterwards posting him to the European infantry in India previously to his being transferred to the local native service.

3130. (*Chairman.*) I understand you to object in the first instance to any fixed standard of mere qualifying examination, because you say that that can always be obtained by cramming?—Always.

3131. You would select from the candidates those who showed comparative superiority?—Yes.

3132. Could not that comparative superiority also be obtained by cramming; and would it not be very probable indeed that those who were the most crammed would obtain that comparative superiority?—A good examiner will always make the distinction between solid and superficial knowledge; and even supposing that cramming applies to both, still there is the greatest possible difference between taking the best of a number and taking at haphazard those who happen to be offered.

3133. You have also stated that you consider that every candidate should have some military instruction previously to his appointment to a commission?—Yes, first of all in this country. He should be instructed in the elements of military science, and of the native languages, and there should especially be a probation of his moral qualities.

3134. So that you would have an opportunity, before you appointed him to a commission, of judging as to what his character and capabilities were?—Yes.

3135. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would like him to go to a military college?—Yes; I think that they all should go through a military college for a short period.

3136. Six months or a year?—There should be a standard course of instruction calculated to be passed in a year, and if they were able to pass sooner it would be so much the better for them.

3137. (*Chairman.*) Would you have the native Indian army enlisted for service in India only, or would you have it enlisted for general service?—The limited auxiliary native army, such as I have described, should be enlisted for general service.

3138. Therefore these officers whom you appointed would also be available for general service?—Yes.

3139. Would you allow them an opportunity of exchanging into the Queen's army?—Not according to the present arrangements of the Queen's army. I consider that purchase should be absolutely excluded from the Indian army.

3140. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Supposing that a man chose to take the option, and said, "My health does not suit India. I should like to go into the Queen's army. I will go into the Queen's army, with all the disadvantages," if you like to say so, "which attach to it," would you allow him to exchange?—In an exchange one officer goes out and another comes in.

3141. Of course the one coming in must be qualified?—But he would not have gone through all the conditions which I have described. I conceive that the conditions which I have suggested are necessary for obtaining properly qualified officers for the native Indian army. The most essential point of all is to establish a system which will secure good European officers for the army.

3142. Suppose that a man knows the languages, surely that is all the qualification which is required; then if he could go through a course of examination in the native languages, having obtained all the discipline which European troops would give him, would not that be sufficient?—He might know the languages, but if he entered the native Indian army in a superior rank he could not have had experience of native troops.

3143. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Nor could he have any acquaintance with the native customs and usages and religions?—No. The successful management of the natives of India, whether in a civil or military capacity, is the business of a life, and requires an early and entire appropriation to the duty.

3144. (*Viscount Melville.*) Alluding to the system of purchase, are you not aware that practically at this moment a system of purchase does exist in the Company's service?—Yes; but it is not open to the peculiar objection to which purchase in the Queen's army is open, namely, that an officer is promoted over the head of a more deserving officer, solely because he happens to have more money; it is merely a mode of retirement in the Indian army.

3145. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the artillery should consist entirely of Europeans, or would you have any native artillery?—I think that they should all be Europeans, and that all the services connected with the magazines, all scientific matters, such as the preparation of caps and fuzes and shells, and so on, should be entirely in the hands of Europeans.

3146. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) And the making of gunpowder?—The making of gunpowder, certainly.

3147. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Your plan for a general corps of Indian officers would entirely exclude from all staff and other appointments in India all the officers in Her Majesty's army serving in India, would it not?—There should be, in my opinion, only one military staff.

3148. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you exclude all the officers serving with European troops, whereever they were, whether Queen's or local European troops, from all staff appointments in India?—The general military staff, which would apply both to the European and native troops, should be composed of officers taken from both services.

3149. You would not exclude them?—I would not exclude them from the general military staff.

3150. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You would confine them entirely to military staff appointments?—I think that those branches of the staff which have a special reference to Indian business and Indian habits, such as the commissariat, or to Indian local regulations, such as the pay department and the audit department, should be officered entirely from the officers of the native army; but that the general military staff should be composed of officers drawn from both services, both from the European service and from the native service, subject to a proper qualification in the native languages.

3151. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the native Bengal army should be composed of different nationalities and castes; and if so, in what proportion?—Yes, I consider that all the different nationalities and castes which can furnish efficient soldiers should be represented in the army.

3152. How would you represent them in the army; would you acknowledge the caste at all when once a man was enlisted?—I think that it would be undesirable to aim at uniformity of practice in this respect. In some cases the persons drawn from the different nationalities and castes would be mixed in the same regiment; in other cases it would be convenient to compose particular companies of particular castes; for instance, there might be a company of Mairs, or of Koles, or a company of native christians; in other cases, entire regiments would be composed of a particular nationality, for instance, Sikh regiments, Ghoorka regiments, or Mahomedan regiments from beyond the Indus; and in the last case it would be desirable, as a general rule, to employ the regiments so composed in parts of the country from which they were not themselves recruited.

3153. Would you allow caste to be considered as an excuse for the non-performance of any duty?—Certainly not; the recruits should enter for the performance of all the duties required by the military service, and so far as they were required for any military service the word "caste" should not be men-

Sir C.E. Trevelyan, K.C.B.

17th Aug. 1858.

tioned. When they were off duty then they might follow the observances of their respective religions and castes.

3154. Have you known any instances of caste having interfered with the performance of duty?—I have not had sufficiently detailed experience to give instances.

3155. Under proper discipline you consider that caste ought not to be any objection to the performance of any military duty?—Certainly not.

3156. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think that any undue deference to caste has been the system followed in the Bengal Presidency?—I have no doubt that it has.

3157. In the army as well as elsewhere?—In the army certainly.

3158. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that it has been more so in Bengal than it has been in Madras or Bombay?—Certainly. I had not been ten days in India before I became aware of the difference between the Bombay and the Bengal presidencies in that respect. When I first went to India I was staying at Poonah with my brother, who was adjutant to a battalion of native infantry, and every morning after breakfast I used to go out with him to see his recruits, and I observed that they were of two different kinds, one tall, slim, well made looking men, and the others shorter and darker looking men. I asked him the difference, and he told me that the tall handsome men all came from Bengal, and that although they gave themselves great airs in Bengal and refused to perform various kinds of duty, such as handling the pickaxe and so forth, yet when they entered the Bombay army they adopted the customs of the Bombay army, and did as well as any of their low-caste Bombay men.

3159. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think that undue deference to caste has exercised an influence over the officers of the Bengal army in administering punishments, and deterred them from duly maintaining discipline? Can you speak from your own knowledge to that point?—No, I will not venture to speak from my own knowledge; but I conceive it to be a notorious circumstance that the discipline of the Bengal army has to a considerable extent been influenced and modified by feelings connected with caste.

3160. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the native army of Bengal should be enlisted under a new code, or rather under new terms of enlistment from what has been the case hitherto?—My impression is that the code should be simplified, that the plan of trying offences in all cases by native courts-martial should be got rid of, and that much greater power should be given to the commanding officer; but I am not qualified to enter into details.

3161. I do not mean so much in that respect. In Bengal I believe the men are enlisted only to serve within the presidency, would you have them enlisted for general service?—Certainly, for general service.

3162. Would you have all the presidencies upon the same terms with respect to that matter?—Certainly.

3163. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that you would have no difficulty in recruiting our army for general service?—None whatever. There are large sections of the population which would afford excellent troops which have not yet been drawn upon; for instance, the low castes in our own provinces, the aboriginal tribes in the adjoining mountainous and jungle country, and the Sikhs, to whom we are now so much indebted.

3164. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you think that the Sikhs can be fully relied upon?—We are now falling, in respect of the Sikhs, into the old error which has brought us into such trouble in reference to the Oude sepoys, it being understood that we have at present about 70,000 Sikhs in our pay, and it would undoubtedly be very desirable to diminish that number by not filling up vacancies, and to balance them by recruits drawn from other portions of the population.

3165. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that there would be any advantage in dividing the Bengal army into two or more armies?—I think not; the division and separation should be within the army itself, that is to say, in the *corpus* of the army; at head-quarters we should have nothing but unity and harmony of action. I entirely agree that the army itself should be effectually separated in the manner which I have described, by taking it from different portions of the population, and by preserving distinctions of dress, and every proper distinction which can be maintained; but the general command and arrangement of the reliefs and transfers, and of the recruiting, and of all the functions which belong to superior command, should be one and indivisible, in my opinion. If we broke up the Bengal army into two or more portions we should lose the advantage which we should otherwise have of employing the regiments drawn from one province in other provinces. For instance, Hindoostan and Oude will probably be garrisoned chiefly from the Punjaub, and *vice versâ*. If the Punjaub and Hindoostan were under separate commands we should lose that advantage.

3166. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are not the armies of the Madras and Bombay presidencies made available for service in Bengal; are there not divisions from both those armies now serving in the upper provinces of Hindoostan?—Yes; but I understand that to be an exceptional arrangement.

3167. (*Chairman.*) I thought that, for the future, you recommended that the whole army of each of these presidencies should be enlisted for general service, so that we might send them anywhere we pleased?—Yes, certainly.

3168. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Surely you do not mean that the men of one army are not to be liable to serve in any other presidency?—Undoubtedly they ought to be liable to serve in any presidency.

3169. (*Lord Stanley.*) I presume you mean this, that though they should be liable to serve in case of necessity or emergency in any part of India, or beyond it, still, as a general rule, it is desirable that the army of the presidency should be employed within that presidency, at least in time of peace?—Yes; I assume that, as a general rule, the army of each presidency would be employed within the presidency, and my answer had reference only to the supposed case of breaking up the Bengal presidency into several commands.

3170. (*Viscount Melville.*) Then you would not advocate a fourth presidency?—Not for military purposes.

3171. Would you for civil purposes?—I think that the Punjaub and Scinde should be erected into a lieutenant-governorship.

3172. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) You would keep the Bengal army united; would you make it imperative that the commander-in-chief should be always at the seat of council at Calcutta, as I understand he is obliged to be now?—I think that the commander-in-chief does not ordinarily give much assistance in the general administration of the government; it would be better if he had his head-quarters in some central position, with reference to his primary function of the command of the army.

3173. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would, I have no doubt, also think it very desirable that he should have the means of moving about and seeing the army personally?—Certainly; he should have his head-quarters at Allahabad or Agra, or some central situation, and during the cold weather should make a tour of inspection of his command.

3174. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) As a member of the Council he would then be at a disadvantage, would he not?—He would under those circumstances, but his functions as commander-in-chief are so much more important than those exercised by him as a

member of the Council, that the one should yield to the other.

3175. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not think that the great extent of the Bengal presidency, as you propose it should remain, would be much too large an area to admit of the commander-in-chief exercising that personal supervision over the different troops which is very desirable?—No, I think not, because the force in Bengal proper is small, and the bulk of the force will be stationed in the Punjaub and Hindoostan; and those two provinces, with the help of railroads, which are rapidly increasing, will not be more than might be properly commanded by a single officer. If the troops are massed at large stations, and the duties at the civil stations are performed by police, an effective military superintendence may be more easily maintained.

3176. The only disadvantage which you have mentioned as likely to attend the division of the Bengal army into two is that it would place an obstacle to the troops of the one half serving in the other half of the presidency?—Yes, that is one obvious objection.

3177. Are there any others which occur to you?—Yes; within the limits to which one man is capable of exercising the command, the larger it is the more efficiently it is likely to be exercised, because the commander-in-chief would have a larger experience, and a freer power of selecting his officers.?

3178. Do you think that that has been shown in the case of the Bengal army, which has been so very much larger in proportion than either of the others?—The system on which the Bengal army was constituted was defective in several respects.

3179. Was not that perfectly well known to the commander-in-chief in India and to the Government of India, and has it not been known for the last 25 years?—We were aware of the existence of these defects, but we none of us believed that they would be productive of such speedy and disastrous results.

3180. Has not the result shown the superiority of the systems obtaining in the other presidencies?—It has shown the necessity of changing our system in every respect in which it is defective; for instance, in recruiting our native troops from various nationalities and castes, instead of from one nation and caste, and in promoting both officers and men according to qualification and merit, instead of according to strict seniority. But the one and undivided command, according to my view, was not one of the defects of the Bengal army, but was rather an advantage.

3181. What was the advantage?—The advantages which I have mentioned, of an enlarged experience and an enlarged power of selection, which however was very much limited by the seniority system.

3182. Has not all your evidence to-day gone towards advocating the entire abandonment of the Bengal system and the entire adoption of the Bombay system?—I have recommended a considerable approximation to the Bombay system.

3183. It appears to me that you have exactly described the Bombay system from first to last?—No.

3184. In what respect does it differ?—In the Bombay system the officers are appointed in the first instance to particular regiments.

3185. I do not allude to the system of appointing European officers, but to the organization of the native army, the mixture of castes, the promotion by merit, and the great power placed in the hands of the commanding officers of regiments; in fact, to everything that pertains to discipline?—In all that respects the recruiting and management of the native troops the system of the Madras and Bombay presidencies is very preferable to the one which prevailed in Bengal, and I have suggested that the Bengal system should be closely approximated to that which now prevails in Madras and Bombay.

3186. Does not that show that the commanders-in-chief who have commanded smaller armies have exercised a much more effectual supervision, and established a much better discipline, than the commander-in-chief of the army of Bengal has been able to establish, although supported always by the Government of India?—I consider that the different results in Bengal and in the other two presidencies are sufficiently accounted for by the other circumstances more immediately affecting the native troops.

3187. Will you have the goodness to state those circumstances?—In the Bengal presidency the native troops were recruited from a single province, and from one or two castes; in the Madras and Bombay presidencies they were recruited from all castes. In the Bengal presidency they were promoted entirely according to seniority, in the other two presidencies they were promoted by selection.

3188. Was not the Bengal system established and maintained under the authority of the Government of India and of the commander-in-chief in India, with the full knowledge that different systems obtained at Madras and at Bombay?—Yes, it was; but it is not an easy thing for any commander-in chief to alter a system which has prevailed for a long period, and upon which a variety of powerful interests have grown up; even in its present state of disorganization great difficulty will be found in recasting the Bengal army on a new model; how much more when that army was still in its integrity.

3189. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Do you consider that if the army of Bengal had been smaller than it is, if the geographical limits had been less extended, it would have caused any difference in the system of recruiting and in the pay?—None.

3190. Or in the system of promotion by seniority instead of by selection?—I think not; it was a deep-rooted established system, which was quite irrespective of the extent of the command.

3191. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Surely you do not think that had the Bengal army consisted of two armies of equal size, but separated as the Madras and Bombay armies, under separate commanders-in-chief as the Madras and Bombay armies are, so extensive a combination would have taken place as has occurred with the whole united under one head, and enlisted almost entirely from one part of the country?—I think it probable that the sepoys of both armies would still have come, the great majority of them, from Oude, and that having that feeling of brotherhood, and that close sympathy they would have combined and mutinied.

3192. Are you of opinion under separate commanders-in-chief they would have been recruited from the same district, and would have been composed of the same high-caste men, Brahmins and Rajpoots, in as large a proportion?—I think it probable that they would, because the Bengal presidency proper has not been considered as capable of furnishing a sufficient number of suitable recruits.

3193. You are aware that there are a very large number of sepoys in the Bombay army recruited from precisely the same district, and that many of them have been employed against the mutineers, and have done good service against them, although of their own caste?—Yes, they have done it under a better system.

3194. (*Viscount Melville.*) With respect to your statement that you thought that the commander-in-chief's head-quarters should be in a somewhat central position, in which I quite agree, are you aware that more than one governor-general has opposed it, and has expressed his opinion that the greatest inconvenience was experienced from the commander-in-chief being absent from the seat of government?—Yes, I am aware that such objections have been made, and it is by no means a one-sided question. The commander-in-chief has at present two functions, one as a member of the government, the other as commander-in-chief. I consider that his functions as commander-in-chief greatly preponderate in public importance, and that every other consideration should be postponed to their proper performance.

3195. Then how would you propose the military communication to be maintained which the governor-general has always complained has been neglected

Sir C.E. Trevelyan, K.C.B.

27th Aug. 1858.

when the commander-in-chief was absent?—There would be a military secretary at head-quarters.

3196. So there is now, but still the governor-general always complains?—Possibly some inconvenience may arise of that kind; but the advantage of having the commander-in-chief in the midst of his army, and in close communication with all the superior officers of the army, greatly preponderates; and I think it extremely probable that the civil government itself will be removed to a central situation. Many of the arguments in favour of removing the military head-quarters to a central situation, equally apply to the removal of the civil government.

3197. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Have not the officers of the Bengal army enjoyed great advantages over those in the minor presidencies, the superior emoluments attached to the various military appointments, though identical in nature, from the circumstance of the Bengal army being a larger army, and being under the immediate authority of the commander-in-chief in India and the government of India?—The rates of pay generally, both European and native, and also the civil pay, have to a certain extent been superior in the Bengal presidency.

3198. Upon what ground?—From the first a higher standard of expenditure appears to have been established in the Bengal presidency; it applies throughout.

3199. Is that the only ground upon which the superiority of pay has been maintained?—It obtained from the first; it has been so from the time of Warren Hastings and Lord Clive; so that I cannot conceive that it is merely owing to the circumstance of the Bengal presidency having been the seat of the general government. But one of the improvements which is required in the present state of India is, that the general government should be more completely separated from all the local governments, and should be established in a central situation independent of them all, and that the distinction should be clearly drawn between the central and the local governments.

3200. Do you not consider that in respect of the emoluments annexed to staff appointments the officers of all three presidencies should be placed upon precisely the same footing?—As a general principle they ought to be; as close an approximation to equality should be made as possible; but the habits which have grown up in the course of several generations cannot be at once set aside.

3201. Do you think that they should be set aside as soon as practicable?—It depends upon a variety of considerations, partly upon the facility of getting recruits as regards the natives. I do not, however, wish to see the armies of the three presidencies practically fused into one. The absence of sympathy between them has been our great security.

3202. I am speaking of the emoluments of European commissioned officers annexed to staff appointments, such as those in the adjutant and quarter-master-general's departments, and all the other appointments of the army?—As far as the necessary differences in the expense and habits of living permit, the allowances should be equalized as much as can be.

3203. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Do you not think that it is consonant with every right principle that an adjutant-general at the head of an army of 150,000 men, or a commissary-general expending a million of money per annum, should have a higher amount of salary than an adjutant-general at the head of an army of 20,000 men, or a commissary-general who only expends 300,000*l.* per annum; is it not fair and proper that responsibilities and allowances should be somewhat proportionate?—Undoubtedly the pay should be in proportion to the duty and responsibility, and also to the expenses of living, in which are included the habits and domestic arrangements which the circumstances of the country require.

3204. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) I wish to ask your opinion upon the following point. A general officer belonging to the Bengal presidency has the command of an army in the field, there is a division of the Madras army on the one flank and a division of the Bombay army on the other flank, has that officer who commands the Bengal army, who is acting against the enemy, the power of calling in to his assistance the two other generals with their troops?—I presume that the senior officer has the power of calling in the junior officers to his aid.

3205. Is not the governor-general the only person in such a case who can command those troops to obey the orders of the officer who is in command of the force to which I have alluded; and if the governor-general is at a great distance is not that officer obliged to send to the governors of the two presidencies to get them to give the order?—This is hardly a question upon which I am a good witness. In field operations I understand that a commanding officer is selected whom all the others obey; and in the case of bodies of troops coming into connection commanded by officers holding independent commands, the junior officer would obey the orders of the senior officer.

3206. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Irrespectively of the presidency to which he might belong?—I imagine so; but it is a question which should rather be put to a military officer than to a civilian.

3207. (*Chairman.*) In any admixture of European and native forces do you consider that it should be regimentally or by brigades? Would you put two companies of Europeans with eight companies of natives, for instance, or would you have a regiment of Europeans with one or two native regiments combined with them in brigade?—The system of management of Europeans and natives is so different that it would be advisable to keep them in separate regiments. All natives of India, whatever may be their religion or nationality, can be combined in the same regiment; whatever the differences may be, they have still a great deal in common; but when you come to such differences as those which exist between a body of natives and a body of Europeans, you require two systems of management; you must keep them separate; there would otherwise be constant collision; the Europeans would beat down the natives, and you would get none but the dregs of the people in your native regiments; it would be quite inconsistent with a proper *esprit de corps* in the native regiments.

3208. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are you in favour of the continuance of the present system of regular native troops and the admixture of irregulars, or are you for having the whole of the native troops, cavalry and infantry, on the irregular system?—The tendency of my opinions is in favour of the system which is called irregular, though it is to a great extent improperly so called; but it is very undesirable to lay down a fixed rule which is not to be departed from. Under some circumstances it might be desirable to approximate our native troops to the regular native troops, but in the majority of cases they should be formed on the irregular model. In all cases they should have the degree of discipline which is necessary for their efficiency, and they should be dressed and armed appropriately, and no departure should be made from the dress which properly belongs to their nationality and religion, which can be avoided.

3209. You would attach no value to their having a special dress more of a European description?—None at all; on the contrary, I think it positively undesirable. I think that we shall have a better class of natives by making as little departure as possible from their native usages, and that the distinctive class feeling, or caste feeling, or provincial feeling, or whatever it may be, will be maintained in a greater degree; there will be more individuality in the different bodies composing the army, in which our security will to a great degree consist for the future; the Sikhs will be less likely to unite with the Ghoorkas, and the Ghoorkas with the Oude men, and the Oude men with the low-caste men, and so on. Railways and cheap postage, and the silent influence of a single administrative system, are

tending to make all natives homogeneous. The same emissaries will soon be able to see and harangue the whole Bengal army in a week. This should induce us to study and develope every available means of military security.

3210 (*Viscount Melville.*) I presume that in the cavalry you would do away with the use of the European saddle?—Yes; I am quite against it. In the cavalry, where I was able to form a clear opinion, I very much preferred what is called the irregular system to the regular. I think that it is a great mistake to dress the native horsemen in European clothes, and to set them to ride on smooth saddles.

The witness withdrew.

Colonel S. Poole.

Colonel SKEFFINGTON POOLE examined.

3211. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You have been in India for how long?—I was in India about thirty years.

3212. How many years were you in the service?—I entered the service on the 4th of January 1821, and retired at the end of 1849.

3213. In what service were you, in the infantry, cavalry, or artillery?—In the Bombay light cavalry, the lancers.

3214. You were the whole time in the cavalry?—Yes.

3215. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You have served with Bengal troops as well as with Bombay troops in the field, have you not?—Yes.

3216. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Can you give us any opinion as to the proportion of European to native troops to be maintained in the Bombay presidency, or if you have sufficient experience of Bengal, in the Bengal presidency?—I do not consider myself sufficiently acquainted to speak as to Bengal.

3217. Then as to Bombay?—It is very difficult to answer that question. There is such an immense extent of country now to what there was when I was there, that it would be very difficult to give an opinion upon that point, but I should think about one sixth.

3218. That is to say, one European to five natives?—Yes.

3219. Do you know at all the proportion which has existed hitherto?—About one to ten, I should think, including irregulars, of whom there are many thousands.

3220. (*Colonel Burlton.*) It has been about one to four in Bombay?—I was not aware that that was the proportion.

3221. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Knowing as you now do that the proportion is as one to four, is it your opinion that the proportion hereafter should be as one to five?—No, certainly not.

3222. Then what would be the result of the knowledge which you now have of the proportion being one to four, would you increase the Europeans, or would you leave the relative proportion as it is at present?—I should think that one to four would be quite sufficient.

3223. Do you include in that proportion the artillery, or not?—No, not the artillery.

3224. Would you have the whole of the artillery European, or would you have a portion European and a portion native?—I would have as much European as there could possibly be for the efficiency of the service, but there are some places where it would be almost impossible for European artillery to exist for any length of time; therefore it would be necessary to have some small proportion of native artillery.

3225. But as small a proportion as you could?—As small a proportion of native artillery as would possibly suffice.

3226. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) For that particular purpose?—For that particular purpose.

3227. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What is your opinion as to the sappers and miners, should they be natives or Europeans?—Natives, to a great extent, they must be; it is impossible that a European can stand the climate and the hard work which there is to be done.

3228. Do you think that there would be no difficulty in getting natives who would do all the work which would necessarily be performed by sappers and miners?—I do not think there would be any difficulty in getting natives to do the work, but they should be under the superintendence of Europeans.

3229. Would you allow the native sappers and miners to do any scientific portion of the work?—As little as possible.

3230. Would you allow any natives to work at the scientific portions of the work in the arsenals, such as the making of fuzes, copper caps, and so on?—I believe that a great number are employed at present.

3231. Would you have Europeans or natives?—I think that you would require some natives, because the work cannot be done by the Europeans in many cases.

3232. In what respect could the work not be done by Europeans?—It would be too fatiguing for them.

3233. Scientific work such as I describe?—Anything where there is fire; it would be too overpowering for the men to work at for any length of time; it would cause great mortality among the Europeans.

3234. Can you give us any approximate estimate as to the amount of the force, European and native, which will be required in the Bombay presidency hereafter?—No, I do not consider myself competent to do so.

3235. Would you have the force in the Bombay presidency on the regular or the irregular system, or would you have both combined?—Both combined in certain proportions.

3236. In what way would you have both combined; would you have the cavalry all irregular, or would you have a proportion irregular and a proportion regular?—I would have a proportion of each.

3237. Can you give us any reason for that?—For regular service you want men who are well drilled and used to working together. In detachment duties and outpost duties, where say a non-commissioned officer is sent with a party of 12 horses and 12 men, the horses if they are Government horses are not likely to be so well looked after as if they were the men's own horses, as is the system in the irregular service.

3238. Would you have any irregulars for the infantry?—I should say that it would be a very good plan for the same sort of work, going out to villages, where small parties are required.*

3239. Are you at all acquainted with the system in existence in the formation of the Scinde horse?—I have heard a great deal of it, but I do not know that I could speak to the interior economy.

3240. Are not the duties performed by the Scinde horse of that description that no regular regiment could perform them more satisfactorily than they do?—I think that a regular regiment could not perform them so satisfactorily for the good of the service as the irregular horse do.

3241. Then for what duties would you particularly wish the regular cavalry to be employed?—On any service where European officers can accompany them.

3242. What then is in your opinion the advantage of the regular over the irregular system?—For actual service the regular cavalry would be much better than the irregular.

3243. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You mean for actual conflict with the enemy?—Yes.

* Since giving this evidence I have remembered that there are numerous corps of this description.

Colonel S. Poole. 7th Aug. 1858.

3244. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are the irregular cavalry as well mounted as the regular cavalry?—Certainly not.

3245. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I understood you to say that as far as the native artillery were concerned you would allow only a very small proportion of natives, and that as far as practicable you would have them Europeans, and the same as to the sappers and miners?—Yes.

3246. Would you have the Bombay army composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion?—It is very difficult to get them in certain proportions, but I would have all castes entertained which were fit for service, the same as they now are.

3247. Would you have the castes mixed up in regiments and companies, or would you have them separated in any way?—I would have them all mixed together in each company, the same as they now are.

3248. Do you think that it would be an advantage if the army were all dressed more upon the system of the country, that is to say, more according to the native dress than the European?—Certainly; the tight dress is a great detriment, particularly in the cavalry; the men have not the free use of their limbs.

3249. Do they object to it?—The men in my regiment have never objected to wear any dress; they even wear the leather peak to the shako, but the head-dress is so cumbersome and so unwieldy that when the wind blows the men cannot keep their shakos on their heads when they get into motion. My regiment wore helmets for many years, and I found it the most comfortable head-dress I have ever had, and with a white cover it is a perfect protection from the sun. An improvement on this would be what is called the Solar Topee, as it is made of felt, and very light. It might be ornamented according to fancy. To be seen at 78, Gracechurch Street.

3250. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Would you recommend an alteration of the saddles in the regular cavalry, that they should have native saddles in preference to the heavy English saddle?—No; if the trees are English, and of the very best seasoned wood, they are very good indeed, and the covering is very easily done in India.

3251. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think that the regular trooper rides as well on the English saddle as the irregular trooper in the native saddle?—I should think that he does generally.

3252. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Taking troops in line in a charge, would you rather be at the head of a regular or of an irregular regiment?—I have never been at the head of an irregular regiment, therefore I cannot give an opinion with regard to that point.

3253. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Have you ever seen irregular cavalry in an action charging?—No, I have only seen them moving on parade, when they have appeared to me to work very loosely.

3254. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You did not see the Scinde horse on service at Moultan?—I have seen them on parade there only.

3255. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Not in action?—Not in action.

3256. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Do you think that the discipline of an irregular regiment would be equal to the discipline of a regular regiment in charging in line?—No.

3257. (*Colonel Burlton.*) The charge would not be so effective?—No.

3258. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not consider that the only difference as regards the irregular cavalry and the regular cavalry in a charge is the difference of the horse, the men being perfectly equal;—No, the irregular cavalry do not work so close together.

3259. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think that that arises from defective training and drill in the irregular corps?—If the drill was the same in the irregular as with the regular, I consider that the one would be just as good as the other.

3260. (*Colonel Burlton.*) It would no longer be irregular?—Just so, therefore both regular and irregular corps are required.

3261. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) If the horses and the drill and the discipline were equal, the two corps would be the same?—Yes.

3262. Do you not think that there is an advantage which the regulars have over the irregulars from the superior number of officers?—I have seen regiments do uncommonly well with three or four European officers. I have seen my own regiment for a very great length of time with only three or four European officers, and all the others native officers, and those native officers could conduct the duties just as well on parade, and command a troop just as well as a European officer.

3263. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then you do not attribute very great value to the number of European officers attached to a regular regiment as compared with an irregular one?—No.

3264. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You think that a smaller number of highly qualified officers, officers selected, for their superior qualification, would make a regiment more efficient than a larger number of European officers under the existing system?—Yes; but I do not consider an officer "highly qualified" unless he has been well instructed in the cavalry drill and field movements.

3265. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you consider that the Bombay army should be enlisted under a new code?—I do not consider any change necessary. As far as regards my own regiment we enlisted all classes of men, and they all entered alike; from Brahmins to Dobies among Hindoos; and about one third might be Mahomedans. In the infantry the castes are much lower.

3266. Would you enlist men for general service?—Yes, I would enlist all classes and castes for general service, provided they were fit for service.

3267. And that, I apprehend, is the system which is adopted at present in Bombay?—Yes.

3268. But it is not so, you are aware, in Bengal?—It is not.

3269. You have served with Bengal troops?—I have.

3270. Have you experience enough to give an opinion whether that general service system might be extended to Bengal without any detriment to that presidential army?—I should say so. I cannot see any reason why the same system should not be adopted there as in Bombay.

3271. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Have you ever found high caste interfere with the performance of the duties required from your regiment in the field?—Not in my own regiment.

3272. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In any other regiment?—Yes.

3273. In any regiment of the Bombay army?—No.

3274. But you have in the Bengal army?—I have seen it in the Bengal army.

3275. Will you explain what you did see?—When I was in command of a cavalry brigade on the left of the line, at Moultan, one evening when I was going past the lines, I saw a number of our men collected together, and there was a naik's party of the Bengal army going past. When they had passed on, I asked what was the matter, and one of my native officers said, "The naik is a lower caste man of that party than one of the privates, and the private has just said, 'We have left our lines; I intend to take command, and you go into the ranks, and you will obey me.'"

3276. Was any notice taken of that circumstance?—It was no business of mine; I could not interfere in a thing of that sort.

3277. Do you suppose that that is a solitary instance?—No; I was informed by native officers in my own regiment that it was not a solitary instance; and these were men who had connexions and relations

in almost all Bengal regiments. The man who told me was a man from their own people.

3278. Then the same caste who would make objections on account of caste in one presidency would not make those objections in the other?—Exactly so.

3279. Can you account for that extraordinary state of things?—It arises from the difference of system and the difference of discipline throughout the army.

3280. You think that it is caused by the want of discipline?—Yes.

3281. You mean to say that caste is more taken notice of in Bengal than in Bombay; that it would be accepted as an excuse in one place when it would not in the other?—Yes; everything appears to be by caste there.

3282. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Did you see any other instances at Moultan while you were serving there with the Bengal troops?—On my giving over the command of the brigade of the garrison of Moultan, before I left, our troops were relieved by the Bengal troops, and they were on the gate guard, going into the town. There was a great altercation going on about wood and supplies going into the fort. The sentry on duty was taking what is called *Dustooree* from each man who entered, that is to say, he was taking a few sticks out of each bundle and putting them down, and when he came off guard he took them away with him for his own perquisite for lighting his fire. I had just put the brigade in orders, giving over the command to the next senior officer. I went and told him what I had seen, and left immediately. I do not know what took place after I reported it. I also saw the same thing going on at the guards at other places; had I remained in command, I should have taken notice of it.

3283. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That you conceive was an evident indication of caste prejudice?—No, I relate it as a great proof of insubordination.

3284. It was want of discipline?—Yes; a man in our service would not dare do anything of the kind.

3285. Is any change required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?—As far as I know, in the Bengal army there is; from what I understand, the promotion in that army is entirely by seniority; it goes from the junior to the senior by seniority, and if a man lives long enough he must get to the head.

3286. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You are not speaking from personal knowledge?—No.

3287. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But that is the system?—That is the system, as I have always been informed by those who have served in the Bengal army, and by my own native officers, who were constantly visiting their relations in the Bengal lines.

3288. You do not suppose that that is a good system?—Certainly not.

3289. What is the system in Bombay?—In Bombay the men from the ranks are generally recommended by the officers in command and in charge of companies, and submitted to the officer commanding the regiment for his approval; those men are selected for smartness, for being good drills, and for general good conduct.

3290. How is the promotion to the commissioned ranks effected?—That is done entirely by selection. I have known a havildar promoted to be a native officer who had only been a short time in that grade.

3291. You commanded a regiment?—Yes.

3292. Supposing a vacancy occurred among the native officers of your regiment, and you had to recommend which ever havildar you thought proper, how would you make that selection?—I should select the smartest man, and the one best fitted for it; from my personal knowledge of the man's habits, conduct, smartness, and proficiency in every respect, so I should select him.

3293. What effect does such selection produce upon those native non-commissioned officers who are thereby passed over?—It is the custom of the Bombay service, and they think nothing of it.

3294. Would they continue as efficient non-commissioned officers as before?—Perfectly.

3295. And would they serve without discontent?—Yes; it is a frequent case. The last promotions before I left the regiment were those of two young havildars. It was in consequence of their both having been havildar-majors; they had been selected for havildar-majors the same as the serjeant-major of a regiment is; they had both served well in that capacity. They were the smartest men in the regiment, and they were both promoted.

3296. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Do you consult the captains of troops on these occasions?—You may consult them, but the commanding officer does not consider it in that case at all necessary to consult them; he knows himself what a man's capabilities are, and he recommends him to the commander-in-chief.

3297. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But for the non-commissioned ranks you consult the captains or the officers commanding troops and companies?—Yes, I always did so, as it makes the men look up to their officers.

3298. Do you think that native officers selected as you state, by merit, and not by seniority, would give the European officers of their regiment more information of what was going on than on the other system?—I should think that they would; I have never found any man that failed in giving information of any sort whenever I have asked for it.

3299. (*Viscount Melville.*) Suppose anything was going wrong?—I should consider that they would then give information.

3300. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are you not aware that in the recent mutiny there is no instance on record, as I believe, or hardly any, in which a native officer gave any information to the European officers?—I believe that in the 21st regiment two brahmins did.

3301. (*Viscount Melville.*) That is in Bombay?—Yes; and I know that at Nusseerabad, where the Bombay Lancers were surrounded by mutinous Bengal troops, and every inducement held out them to join, they never failed to report everything to their European officers.

3302. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But in Bengal?—I believe they gave no information.

3303. Do you think that, supposing there had been a different system of promotion, it is very probable, and more than probable, that some information would have been given?—I think so.

3304. (*Chairman.*) Your general opinion is, that the principle of selection for promotion is much better than that of seniority?—Yes.

3305. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And it is quite compatible with the general interests of the service, that is to say, that it would not injure the feelings of those men passed over?—You tell a man, "You know you are not fit for a native officer." "No," he says, "I am not; I am very lucky in having got so high as I am, and it is by the favour of the officer commanding my troop that I ever got here."

3306. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Have you been constantly with your regiment?—Yes.

3307. You have not been on the staff?—No.

3308. Supposing that you had been absent on the staff for several years, and that that staff situation had not justified your remaining after you had got the rank of lieutenant-colonel, do you think that it would have been right for you to have selected a havildar to make him a native officer without consulting the captains?—No, I should not; I think that any officer joining a regiment after a long absence would consult his juniors, or his adjutant, or whoever may be present, to know who are the best men.

3309. (*Chairman.*) Selection must always be made by perfect knowledge of the capability of the person promoted?—Yes.

3310. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you recollect what was about the average age of your native officers when promoted?—About 35, I should think.

Colonel S. Poole.

27th Aug. 1858.

3311. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do not you think that that is rather old?—No; that for a commission is rather young, that would be rather under the calculation; but there was one man who was promoted in my regiment from the ranks within two years, and I should say that he was a native officer and high up in the regiment when he had served 20 years.

3312. Do you think that it would be at all a good system to introduce any native gentlemen as native officers, without their passing through the ranks of the army?—Certainly not.

3313. Have you any reason for giving that opinion?—I think that they would be overbearing, and that it would upset the present system, which works well altogether.

3314. Would you like to see more European non-commissioned officers introduced than you have; you have two, I believe?—Yes.

3315. Would you like to see any more introduced?—No.

3316. You think that there would be no advantage in that?—Certainly not; that class of men cannot be kept under the same restraint with a native regiment that they are with a European corps, and very few behave well for any length of time. I should say from 30 years experience that 9 out of 10 take to drinking.

3317. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Do you think that there is the communication between the natives and the European officers which there ought to be in a regiment?—I can only speak for my own regiment, and I have heard that it is the same in a great many others in Bombay. The terms on which I was with my native officers were these: if a native officer was sick, on my way to parade in the evening, I should start half an hour sooner and go and visit him in his native house, and sit with him for a quarter of an hour or twenty minutes, and then go on to parade.

3318. You think that there is a sufficient communication between them, so as to enable the European officer to know everything which is going on in the regiment?—We know everything. I do not believe that a man was ever out of my lines at night without my knowing it.

3319. Was it the same with the other officers of the regiment?—Yes; generally speaking you would not go round the lines, in the morning, without finding one or two native officers up in the European officer's houses or tents, talking with them upon general topics.

3320. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) When a native has attained the rank of officer, to what more has he to look forward?—He has to look forward to being subahdar major of the regiment.

3321. (*Colonel Burlton.*) And the order of merit?—And the order of merit, and there are several titles, "Bahadoor," and "Sirdar Bahadoor," &c.

3322. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Those are complimentary?—No, not exclusively; there are pensions with them.

3323. (*Viscount Melville.*) You were at Moultan, you had an opportunity of seeing all the cavalry there; can you give any statement as to what your view was of the comparative efficiency of the native officers of the Bengal and the Bombay regiments?—I saw very little of the Bengal cavalry, they were a long way from me, they were nearly two miles off; but on the way to Cabul I saw something of them, and I knew the commanding officer well, who was the same commanding officer who was at Moultan. There was a very bad system of the horses not carrying their head and heel ropes, all those things might go one road and the regiment might march another, which did occur more than once.

3324. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Why was that?—It was the system of the Bengal service.

3325. How were they carried, then?—By the grass cutters.

3326. Then a dragoon could not picket his own horse?—No.

3327. Did not he picket his own horse?—I believe not.

3328. How was that done?—By the horsekeepers. The European dragoons did not clean their own horses, nor did the 2nd cavalry clean their horses, when we joined the Bengal army at Quetta.

3329. The Bengal cavalry did not clean their own horses?—No.

3330. (*Colonel Burlton.*) What European dragoons do you speak of?—16th lancers, from which corps we got a serjeant major.

3331. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do native troops not clean their own horses in Bengal?—I believe not.

3332. Do they in Bombay?—Always.

3333. In your opinion should there be any admixture of European and native forces, either regimentally or by brigade?—Certainly not; it would never answer in the same lines.

3334. Why would it not answer?—The natives would never be happy as long as the Europeans were close to them on account of their women.

3335. You think that it would not answer at all?—No. In all our cantonments in India you will find that all the European lines are pitched some distance away from native lines. The Europeans would never be kept from interfering with the native women, and there would be nothing but rows.

3336. (*Chairman.*) Does your opinion extend to brigades as well as to regiments; can they be brigaded together?—Yes, on parade; but their lines must be distinct. Look at the Poonah brigade; look at the Deesa brigade; look at any other brigade where there is a European regiment; the native lines and the European lines are some distance apart to prevent any interference with the women.

3337. Still native and European regiments are in the same brigade?—Yes, on parade.

3338. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The question which I asked you was whether you would wish them to be brigaded together or to be put together in regiments?—Europeans and natives should certainly not be mixed up together in one regiment.

3339. (*Chairman.*) Your answer then refers merely to their being mixed up regimentally?—Yes, on account of the women.

3340. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you have it by brigades?—A regiment in a brigade, of course.

3341. Have you ever heard of such a system existing in Bombay as that of making complaints and sending in petitions to superior authority without their passing through the commanding officer of the regiment or squadron?—Yes.

3342. Has that taken place in Bombay?—Yes.

3343. Can you give any instances of it?—Yes.

3344. What instances?—I can give an instance in my own regiment. A havildar was brought to trial for something which was very insubordinate, and he was reduced to the ranks; he sent in a petition to the commander-in-chief direct, or, rather, he got leave to go to Deesa on the plea of seeing his friends, instead of which he went direct to Bombay and laid his petition before the commander-in-chief himself.

3345. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) That was after his dismissal?—Yes; that is to say, after he was reduced to the ranks, not dismissed.

3346. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) By a court-martial?—By a court-martial.

3347. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Was any notice taken of that?—Yes; he was tried again and was dismissed the service.

3348. Do you know of any instance where such a petition has been sent in and no notice has been taken of it?—No, I do not.

3349. It was considered a great military offence, and was dealt with accordingly?—The sending in a petition without its going through the proper channel was considered a great military offence, and it was dealt with accordingly.

3350. To whom was the petition addressed in the case which you have mentioned?—That I do not recollect; but I know that it went to the commander-

Colonel S. Poole.
27th Aug. 1858.

m-chief, and it came back through the proper channel, through the adjutant-general.

3351. Do you think that the commanding officers of regiments ought to have more power than they possess at present?—Yes, a great deal more power.

3352. In what respect?—In regard to courts-martial. A man may be tried, and the sentence ought, perhaps, to be carried out immediately; but the sentence of the court-martial would have to go perhaps 200 or 300 miles to the divisional officer in command for approval, and he might not perhaps be satisfied with it when it came to him, and it might come back again for revision.

3353. (*Viscount Melville.*) Does that apply to regimental courts-martial?—Yes; with some regimental courts-martial I have known it to be the case.

3354. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In a regimental court-martial must it go to further authority?—Yes.

3355. (*Major-General Hancock.*) That was in former times?—Yes.

3356. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) If there is a regimental court-martial, and a sentence is passed, cannot you confirm it?—Not in some cases; at least it was so when I left the service.

3357. (*Major-General Hancock.*) When did you leave the service?—In 1850. I do not think that I had a court-martial in my regiment for two or three years before I left the service, not one of that kind; but when I was at Rajcote I remember perfectly well having to send the sentence of a regimental court-martial to Baroda to be confirmed. The men could not be punished for some crimes without it; corporal punishment could not be given without its being confirmed.

3358. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In what respect would you give a commanding officer more power?—I would give him as much power as is compatible with propriety, much more than there was when I was there.

3359. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you mean merely as regards bringing soldiers to trial before a court-martial?—Yes, I would give the commanding officer as much power as possible, and trust to him. The men look more to their commanding officer than to any one else; if the commanding officer has not the power to punish a man, they do not consider that he is the responsible person.

3360. (*Chairman.*) You consider that the discipline of a regiment depends a good deal upon the power of the officer commanding it?—I do; and if he cannot be trusted with that much of responsibility he had better be removed.

3361. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Particularly with native troops?—Particularly with native troops.

The witness withdrew.

Major-General JULIUS GEORGE GRIFFITH examined.

Major-Gen. J. G. Griffith.

3362. (*Chairman.*) How long have you been in the service?—I was upwards of 36 years in India.

3363. In what presidency?—In the Bombay artillery. I commanded it for ten years.

3364. Have you any knowledge of the other presidencies?—I was born under the Madras presidency, but I know nothing of that service at present.

3365. You wish to confine your evidence to Bombay?—I could speak generally to the army altogether; what is good for one is good for another, in my opinion.

3366. But your knowledge of the presidencies is confined to Bombay?—Yes.

3367. Of course you have had many opportunities of seeing European and native troops serving together?—Continually. I was on service in the Mahratta campaigns of 1816, 1817, and 1818 under Sir Lionel Smith.

3368. Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion of European and native troops which will be requisite for the Bombay presidency?—For any presidency I should say the same, one European to four natives at the least, or rather one in four.

3369. (*Colonel Burlton.*) That is less than we had before the mutiny?—I would not have less than that, but rather more, one-third.

3370. (*Chairman.*) Would you be prepared to recommend so great a proportion of natives to Europeans in Bengal as that which you have stated?—I could not speak so well as to Bengal, never having been there, but Bombay I can speak more positively about.

3371. Do you take into account any police force?—Not at all. I refer to what I call the regular army.

3372. Do you think that there are any duties now performed by the native troops which might be transferred to the police with advantage?—Yes, a great many.

3373. If those duties were transferred to the police, that of course would enable you to reduce the number of native troops?—No doubt of it; but I would keep the regiments strictly to their military duties.

3374. You think that police might be employed with great advantage to do a part of the duties now performed by the army?—Yes, but independently of the regular army.

3375. What amount of force do you consider will be required in the Bombay presidency hereafter?—I have not given particular attention to the Bombay presidency. In the questions which were sent to me my attention was directed to Bengal, and the information respecting that I could only give at second hand, having picked up the opinion of Sir Charles Napier. I do not know it myself at all.

3376. Perhaps you can express an opinion formed on your own knowledge of Bombay as to what number of troops you think requisite there?—As near as I can judge, from 30,000 to 35,000 men, which I should call a corps; above that number, an army.

3377. Does that include artillery and all branches of the service?—Yes; a corps is composed of 27,000 infantry; 3,000 cavalry; 2,000 artillery; 1,000 engineers; 33,000 total; with 10 batteries, or 60 pieces of field artillery.

3378. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think it necessary to have an increase to the existing establishment?—I do not know what the existing establishment is.

3379. (*Chairman.*) According to your proportion you would have 7,000 Europeans and 28,000 natives?—Yes; 7,000 European to 21,000 natives—one in four.

3380. (*Viscount Melville.*) You would not diminish the present proportion?—Certainly not, as far as my knowledge extends of the present day.

3381. Before the mutiny I think that the number of Europeans in Bombay was 10,000 to 40,000 natives; you would not diminish that proportion?—The proportion would be the same, one *in* four, not one to four.

3382. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the native force in Bombay should be on the regular or the irregular system, or both combined?—Both combined. My opinion is, that the whole Indian army should be reconstructed on strict military principles. The Bengal army to be divided into two corps within that presidency, and independent of the Punjaub, which should have a corps or army of its own. The regular cavalry should be all Europeans, regiments of six troops each. The native cavalry, all irregulars, formed like the corps of Skinner's horse, Gardner's horse, and Jacob's horse in Scinde, in which the aristocracy of the native states, as well as of our own presidencies, would be too glad to take service under Her Majesty the Queen, if invited to do so. The present native cavalry, regulars, of each presidency, to be absorbed

Major-Gen. J. G. Griffith.
27th Aug. 1858.

into these corps by volunteering. The European infantry should be in proportion of one to four natives, though one-third would be better. The artillery should be entirely composed of Europeans, either on the present system of formation of 23 officers per battalion of four companies each, or incorporated with the Royal service, after an equalization of ranks, according to *length of service*. The engineers in due proportion, about one-half of the artillery; the sappers and miners to be all Europeans, but the natives to be confined to the duties of pioneers, to build barracks and lines, and forming entrenchments and encampments in the field. All extra corps and contingents to be fully officered and brought into the line. *Civil* corps to be excluded, and considered irregulars, for guarding gaols, &c., escorting prisoners and treasure when necessary.

3383. You would have both, regulars and irregulars?—Yes.

3384. In what arm would you have the greater proportion of irregular troops?—I would have the irregular system entirely in the native cavalry.

3385. Would you have the whole of the native cavalry irregular?—Yes; but Europeans for the regular cavalry.

3386. And the native infantry regular?—Yes; I would not have the extra corps irregular, but all brought into the line.

3387. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You are alluding to what are called local corps?—Yes; I call all those extra corps.

3388. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that there should be any native artillery in the Bombay presidency?—Certainly not; from my experience I know that it is the most mischievous thing which could be done to keep up any native artillery.

3389. You would have the whole artillery in India Europeans?—Yes.

3390. Would you have any gun lascars?—Yes, a few; about 24 or 25 men to each troop or company.

3391. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Would you not have a few native artillerymen for going into districts where the Europeans could not go?—No; I would rather keep the Europeans at a healthy station, and send them off wherever they might be wanted for service.

3392. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Would you keep Europeans at Kurachee, and send them up to Upper Scinde when they were wanted there?—Yes.

3393. Do you think that Europeans could serve during the hot season in Upper Scinde?—For a special purpose; but I would not keep them there all the year round because I wanted them at some particular season.

3394. Would it not be very advisable to have some native artillery for service in such localities?—I would not have a single native at a gun.

3395. Why? in consequence of the late mutiny?—Yes. I say that this mutiny would never have occurred if all the artillerymen had been Europeans; they would not have dared to show their faces against us.

3396. (*Chairman.*) Would you arm the native troops, the infantry and the cavalry, in the same manner as you would the Europeans; would you give them the Enfield rifle?—If I considered them as regulars I certainly would, and I look upon what I call the army as regulars, therefore I would teach them the Enfield rifle.

3397. Although you would not trust them with the guns you would trust them with the rifle, and arm them in the same manner, and make them as efficient as the European troops?—Yes, for I would keep them in check by the artillery and European cavalry.

3398. Does the opinion which you have expressed about the native artillery extend to the sappers and miners?—The sappers and miners I would have Europeans entirely, and a small portion of what we now call native sappers and miners I would call pioneers, and I would enrol or enlist artizans of every sort, so that they might be put to roads, and building barracks, and every kind of field work; but they should have nothing to do with anything scientific or of European knowledge or invention.

3399. All the scientific branches you would confine entirely to Europeans?—Yes.

3400. You would neither admit the natives into the arsenals, nor give them an opportunity of learning how to make copper caps, and so on?—Certainly not.

3401. Do you consider that the Bombay army should be composed of different nationalities and castes; and if so, in what proportion?—I would not acknowledge caste in any way; a man is enlisted as a soldier.

3402. You would enlist anybody whom you considered fit to be a soldier?—Yes.

3403. But you would not recognize caste after he was enlisted?—I would leave the caste business entirely to the commanding officer of the regiment, and he should apportion the men as he pleased, according to the duties which they were to perform.

3404. Have you ever found any difficulty in the performance of military duties on account of caste?—My duties have been principally in the civil department of the ordnance, at least for the 30 years that I was on the staff.

3405. Have you ever known caste urged as an excuse for not performing duty?—Yes, in a trifling way, but nothing serious.

3406. But under proper discipline you consider that caste ought not to be any objection?—Certainly not; I look upon a man as a soldier, and he has to serve the state as a soldier. I would not allow caste to be mentioned. The only use of knowing the different castes in a regiment is when the commissariat have to provision; for instance, on our side of India we are always boating up and down the coast, and therefore the commissariat wish to know how many natives there are of this and that caste, so as to provision them properly.

3407. After you had enlisted men of different castes, would you endeavour to place the high-caste men in the same company, or would you mix the different castes together?—I would mix them together. I would not make any distinction whatever.

3408. Would you recommend any alteration in the code under which the army is at present enlisted?—Yes, to simplify it a good deal; there is too much refinement in our military code.

3409. You would enlist the men for general service, to go wherever ordered?—Yes.

3410. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What is the refinement in the present code to which you refer?—It is this, that the officer is just as much under the authority of the sepoy as the sepoy is under the authority of the commanding officer.

3411. In what respect?—If the officer transgresses in any way in the estimation of the sepoy he is brought up immediately; it is a kind of retaliation which the natives are quite up to, no discipline could be kept up under such terms.

3412. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that any change is required in the system of promotion as regards the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?—Yes; I should make it entirely by selection by the commanding officer.

3413. Do you think that the commanding officers of regiments require more power than they now possess?—No doubt of it.

3414. (*Major-General Hancock.*) In what respect?—A commanding officer should do everything within his lines according to his own will and pleasure. Everybody under his authority should look up to him as the father of the regiment, and the protector of the interests of everybody in the regiment.

3415. (*Chairman.*) You consider that the discipline of a regiment depends mainly upon the degree of power which is given to the commanding officer?—Entirely so. I say that the Government look to the commanding officer of a regiment as the proper instrument for conducting the discipline of the army.

3416. He is responsible?—He is responsible for every man under his authority.

3417. And therefore he ought to have the power of reward and punishment?—Yes, and nobody should interfere with him, and particularly the staff; the staff should not be allowed to say one word to the commanding officer.

3418. Have you known any instances of petitioning without going through the commanding officer?—Yes.

3419. Do you consider that a very objectionable system?—Yes, very much so. I have known instances of the adjutant-general of the army corresponding and communicating with the sepoys of regiments.

3420. (*Major-General Hancock.*) In the Bombay Presidency?—No.

3421. Will you state instances?—I cannot state instances.

3422. Upon what ground do you make the statement?—Because it was generally known; everybody knew it.

3423. It is hearsay?—No, it is fact; I speak of 30 or 40 years ago. I could mention names, but the fact is notorious.

3424. (*Chairman.*) In mixing together European and native forces, would you do it regimentally or by brigades?—I would not do it regimentally; I would do it by brigades only.

3425. Can you give any instance of any interference with the power of commanding officers?—Yes; I think that this is one. In the year 1824, a general order was issued under the presidency of Bombay to this effect, and it is now in existence; it is dated the 31st May 1824: "The whole of the officers of artil-" lery, to whatever branch of the artillery they may " be attached from time to time by the commander-in-" chief, shall continue to form one general list for pro-" motion, and continue to rise in one corps as hereto-" fore." Now that was not the case; heretofore it was not the case, but from this date it was; the practice was not in existence before the year 1824; and I find in the course of my reading that there was a Warrant published by George the Second, which is given in Symes' Military Guide, the 3rd edition, page 288, dated 1781: "Order to empower colonels " and commanding officers of every regiment in His " Majesty's service to post the subaltern officers in " such a manner as they shall think may best conduce " to the good of His Majesty's service.—G. R.

Major-Gen. J. G. Griffith.

27th Aug. 1858.

" Whereas it has been humbly presented to us that " disputes have frequently arisen amongst our forces " concerning the posting subaltern officers to troops " and companies, whereby the service hath suffered " or may suffer: We have therefore taken the same " into our Royal consideration, and have thought fit, " in order to remedy the said inconvenience for the " future, hereby to authorize and give full power " to the colonel and commanding officers of every " regiment in our service to appoint the subaltern " officers in such a manner as he or they shall think " fit, and may best conduce to the good of our ser-" vice, and the regular disciplining and due govern-" ment of the troops and companies under their " command, having regard always to the seniority of " such subaltern officers, as far as may be, to the " end that no prejudice may happen to our service " or to them; and this our pleasure the colonels, field " officers, and every other commanding officer in our " service, are to observe and pay due obedience to " accordingly. Given at our Court at St. James's, " this 22nd day of April 1736, in the ninth year of " our reign. By His Majesty's command. Signed, " William Yonge." That is a warrant of His Majesty George the Second, declaring that it is the business and the duty of the commanding officer of a regiment to post subaltern officers whenever he pleases and as he pleases, and this power was taken away from the commandant of artillery in the year 1824 by the commander-in-chief at that time. Now that was taking away the power that the commanding officer of a regiment held over the officers of his regiment, and it was at that time considered a very great grievance. It created a great deal of unpleasant feeling, and, in short, put the commandant of artillery in a position with his officers that he ought not to have been placed in.

3426. (*Colonel Burlton.*) That is the case in Bengal also, is it not?—No, there is a difference there; the commandant of artillery sends up three names, but here the power is taken out of the commandant of artillery altogether.

3427. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that it would be possible to introduce native officers into any of the native regiments without their going through the ranks previously?—No; I think that they ought all to rise.

3428. You are of opinion that no advantage would be obtained by admitting any native gentleman?—No, except in the native irregular cavalry, because he has a great deal to learn after he gets in.

The witness withdrew.

Adjourned to to-morrow, at 12 o'clock.

Saturday, 28th August 1858.

PRESENT:

Major-General PEEL.	Viscount MELVILLE.
Duke of CAMBRIDGE.	Lieut.-Gen. Sir HARRY G. W. SMITH.
Lord STANLEY.	Major-Gen. HANCOCK.
Marquis of TWEEDDALE.	Colonel BURLTON.

MAJOR-GENERAL PEEL IN THE CHAIR.

Major-General the Hon. T. ASHBURNHAM, C.B., examined.

Major-Gen. Hon. T. Ashburnham, C.B.

28th Aug. 1858.

3429. (*Chairman.*) You are a major-general in Her Majesty's service?—I am.

3430. Have you served in India at all?—I have served in India about twelve years.

3431. At what period?—I went first to India in 1842, and, with the exception of ten months, served in India till 1854.

3432. In which presidency did you serve?—Ten years in the Bengal presidency, and two years in the Bombay presidency.

3433. Of course you had many opportunities of seeing the European and native troops act together?—I had.

3434. Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion which the Europeans should bear to the native troops in the Bengal or other presidencies?—Supposing the native troops to be those which we have heretofore employed, namely, the Hindostanees, I should say that one-third Europeans would be sufficient.

Major-Gen. Hon. T. Ashburnham, C.B.

28th Aug. 1858.

3435. That is one European to two natives ?—Yes.

3436. (*Lord Stanley.*) Why do you add the qualification, "Supposing the native troops to be those which we have heretofore employed ?"—Because if we employ Sikhs I think that the proportion should be much larger.

3437. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that there should be more Europeans if you employ Sikhs ?—Yes.

3438. What is your ground for coming to that conclusion ?—I think that they are less to be depended on. They would be an infinitely more dangerous enemy than the Hindostanee soldier in a revolt.

3439. (*Lord Stanley.*) You think a larger proportion of Europeans necessary to maintain the relative superiority ?—I think so.

3440. (*Chairman.*) Have you thought at all whether it would be desirable to employ police to do any portion of the duties which are now performed by the troops ?—It frequently occurred to me that it would be well to employ police, police battalions, or what I think would be better, local battalions, something like our militia regiments, that they should have the right and time to cultivate the soil in the neighbourhood of the cantonments, where they would be situated, and that there should be a proportion always ready for duty.

3441. Would you arm the native troops in the same manner as you arm the European troops ?—Decidedly not; I would never put the Minié rifle into a native's hand.

3442. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you clothe the natives differently from the manner in which they have been hitherto clothed ?—Yes, I think so.

3443. Would you assimilate their clothing more to the dress of the country ?—I would make a difference with regulars and irregulars; I would have the regulars clothed very nearly as they have been; the irregulars I should have clothed more according to their native dress.

3444. (*Chairman.*) In the proportion which you have mentioned of Europeans to natives do you include the police ?—I do not, but only the regular army; I do not include irregulars or police.

3445. Have you formed any opinion as to the amount of force which will be required in the Bengal presidency in the usual state of affairs ?—I should think that a regular army, a moveable army of 120,000 men, would be required in Bengal.

3446. That would be 40,000 Europeans and 80,000 natives, according to your proportion ?—As nearly as possible.

3447. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Would that include artillery ?—Yes.

3448. And cavalry ?—Yes; I think that that is the minimum.

3449. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the native force of the Bengal presidency should be on the regular system or the irregular system, or both combined ?—I think combined.

3450. For what would you employ the irregulars ?—Escort duties and police duties.

3451. Would you have the cavalry regular or irregular ?—I would have all the native cavalry irregular.

3452. And the infantry ?—A portion of the infantry irregular.

3453. (*Lord Stanley.*) Do you include all those irregulars in the estimate which you have given of 80,000 natives ?—No.

3454. (*Chairman.*) I understand you to say that you would have the whole of the cavalry irregular ?—The whole of the native cavalry irregular.

3455. Therefore that would be an irregular force exclusive of the 80,000 which you have mentioned ?—Yes.

3456. Then the 80,000 which you have mentioned would be all regular native infantry ?—Yes.

3457. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The 120,000 would be Europeans of all arms and the native infantry ?—Yes.

3458. (*Chairman.*) I understand you to say that you think that there should be 40,000 Europeans, which 40,000 would include all branches of the service, and that there ought to be 80,000 regular native infantry ?—Yes.

3459. And irregular cavalry and police besides ?—Yes.

3460. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What amount of force would you require, then ?—I do not know what the limits of the Bengal presidency are.

3461. Take it as it stands now, including the Punjaub ?—We have had several irregular cavalry regiments; I should suppose that we should require at least as many; I should think that probably we should not be able to keep the European cavalry up to the mark if we had not native cavalry, therefore I should say that four or five regiments of irregular cavalry would be required in excess of what has heretofore been employed.

3462. (*Chairman.*) Would it not be very much diminishing the proportion of Europeans to natives which you thought necessary in the first instance, if you were to add these irregular forces ?—That might certainly be the case.

3463. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Your regular native infantry take 40,000 Europeans; you have no Europeans to match all the native cavalry ?—That is a difficulty.

3464. You must allow more ?—On consideration I think that the number I have assigned for native troops may include cavalry; say 25 regiments organized on the old irregular cavalry system, but to be called "native cavalry," and incorporated with the regular army. Each regiment to number 500 sabres.

3465. (*Chairman.*) Would you have any native artillery, or would you have them all Europeans ?—Decidedly all Europeans.

3466. Do you extend that opinion to the sappers and miners ?—I would do so, but I do not know what the substitute would be for native labour. I think it is very unadvisable that the natives of Hindoostan should be instructed in skilled military labour, but I do not see how to prevent it.

3467. You would employ them in the common labour, but not in the scientific ?—Yes.

3468. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And I presume that you would not have any natives employed in the scientific branches in the arsenals ?—I think that you must have some, but it should be confined to the smallest limit.

3469. (*Viscount Melville.*) Half-caste natives ?—Yes.

3470. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion ?—I believe that you will have to employ very much the same description of person in your army that you have hitherto employed, giving an opening to other castes. I am not conversant with all the castes of Hindoostan, but there have been some excluded who I believe would make very good soldiers; the *Aheer* caste, I think, has been excluded.

3471. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Cow men and shepherds?—Yes.

3472. (*Chairman.*) Would you preserve the castes or nationalities in the shape of regiments or companies, or would you distribute them promiscuously throughout the regiment ?—Promiscuously.

3473. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would not have them by companies or corps ?—No.

3474. (*Chairman.*) Did you ever experience any difficulty from caste, or did you ever know caste to interfere with the performance of military duties. Did you ever know any of the native troops object to perform any military duty, pleading caste as an excuse for doing so ?—I certainly have known it; but I do not know that I could specify instances, or that I should like to specify them. I have known difficulties accruing from caste, but it should not be so.

3475. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that it is not necessary ?—I do.

3476. (*Chairman.*) Under proper regulations you do not consider that caste ought to be any objection to the performance of military duty?—None whatever.

3477. Do you know the terms under which the native army is enlisted at present, and should you recommend any alteration in the terms of enlistment?—I am not quite sure what have been the last alterations made by Lord Dalhousie. I have had so little to do with enlistment that I am not conversant with the subject.

3478. Should you recommend that all the troops should be enlisted for general service?—For general service, certainly.

3479. Do you think that any advantage would be obtained by dividing the Bengal army into two or more armies?—I am inclined to think that no advantage would be gained by it.

3480. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not attach importance to the fact of the army having been divided into the three presidential armies?—I think it is as well that it should so have been.

3481. You would like to see that continued?—Yes.

3482. Then, if that is so, would you not like to see the Bengal army, which appears to be very large, and very extended as to the territory which it occupies, divided into two?—I think that I would rather do it by adding to the other presidencies.

3483. Do you think that it would be an advantage to have the commander-in-chief in a more central position?—Undoubtedly so.

3484. You think that it would obviate the necessity of dividing the Bengal army?—I think so.

3485. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Supposing the three armies to remain, do you think that it would be advisable to increase the Madras and Bombay armies so as to diminish, in a certain proportion, the Bengal army, and to bring them more upon an equality?—Assuredly.

3486. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that any change is required in the system of promotion as regards the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?—I think that decidedly a change is required; hitherto it has been almost entirely by seniority that the native officer has got his rank, and, as any one here knows, they arrive at an age when they are no longer fit for duty, and they are not respected by their men. What has happened in Bengal shows you that these people are perfectly useless. It is an anomaly, I think, in a regiment of regular infantry to have a native officer at all.

3487. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would not have any native officers at all?—I would not.

3488. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Native commissioned officers?—Just so.

3489. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Why is that; is it not necessary to have some medium of communication between the Europeans and the natives?—But they have never furnished that.

3490. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider the number of European officers in the native regiments sufficient. You propose to do away with native officers; would you supply their place with European officers, or would you only have the same number of European officers as there are at present?—For all the duty which the native officers do their loss will not be felt; they have no charge of companies. I have never known a single case of a native officer in charge and payment of a company.

3491. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You mean in the regular service?—Yes.

3492. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Do you think that it would answer to have two European serjeants attached to every company in lieu of these men?—I think it would be a good thing.

3493. (*Chairman.*) Supposing that the native officers were selected for merit instead of being merely promoted by seniority, do you think that that would give you a superior class?—I think so, and a useful class. I think that the Bombay native officers are a useful class of men.

3494. Therefore you do not object to the native officer, but merely to the manner in which he has been hitherto promoted in the Bengal army?—I do not think that he fulfils all the requirements of an officer even in Bombay.

3495. I understand you to say that you thought that the native officers were useful in the Bombay army?—As compared with the Bengal officer the Bombay native officer is a very superior officer to that of Bengal.

3496. To what do you attribute that, to his being selected by his commanding officer?—He is a younger man; there is more discretion allowed for selection in the Bombay army.

3497. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But even with all that superiority, and all that advantage which exists on the part of the Bombay officers, you still think that there is no necessity for the native officers?—I think that a native officer of inferior caste is less respected in his regiment than a Brahmin recruit is; he has no weight in the regiment.

3498. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think that if his position were improved in the native regiment, and he were more highly trained, he would be more respected, and become a better medium between the European and the native?—I do not think that there should be a medium. I think that he would be a valuable man in the irregular branch of the service.

3499. Why should he be valuable there, and might not be made so in the regular service?—I think that he is required in the one case, because you have a very small body of European officers; in the other case, you have a sufficient number.

3500. Is not the consequence of that that the native officer in the irregular service is a much more efficient officer than the native officer in the regular service?—I think so; but I think that our system and the general treatment of native officers in the regiments is such that they are useless; they are in an anomalous position.

3501. Are you aware that in the irregular regiments of cavalry the native commissioned officers command troops and squadrons and that they do so most efficiently?—Yes.

3502. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Why should they not do so in the regular service?—I really do not know; they are in a false position altogether.

3503. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Is it not because they are not intrusted with the same powers and responsibilities?—I think very likely; but if there is no opportunity so to intrust them, what is the use of them?

3504. Supposing the European officers in the regular native regiments were reduced to the same number as the number attached to irregular regiments, do you not think that the native officers might be made equally efficient?—Certainly.

3505. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would that be a better system?—I think that it very likely would.

3506. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Do you mean having fewer European officers and more native officers?—I think that every officer whom you have in a regiment in excess of a good officer is a disadvantage.

3507. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Is it not also the case that in the irregular service the few officers are all selected, while in the regular service there is no selected officer from the commanding officer down to the junior?—Just so.

3508. (*Lord Stanley.*) I understood you to say that every officer in excess of the number required for the performance of the duty was an injury to the service?—In excess of what you may regard as a good officer.

3509. That is to say, I suppose, that the number diminishes the sense of responsibility?—Probably; and that an increase encourages idleness and slovenly habits. I do not think that those regiments are

Major-Gen. Hon. T. Ashburnham, C.B.

28th Aug. 1858.

the best which have the most officers present with them.

3510. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You are of opinion, in fact, that a few selected for superior qualifications would render a regiment more efficient than a large number not so selected, and who might therefore be supposed to be not so highly qualified?—Yes.

3511. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Does that remark apply to officers or only to non-commissioned officers?—To officers.

3512. (*Major-General Hancock.*) To European officers?—Yes.

3513. (*Lord Stanley.*) I apprehend that what you have stated is a general rule which applies to all men in all positions, whether European or native, namely, that if you have more men than are required to do the duty imposed upon them, the sense of responsibility is diminished, and their time is not filled up, and therefore habits of idleness are generated?—That I suppose to be the reason. I only talk of the effect.

3514. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the commanding officers of the native regiments have sufficient power given to them now to reward and punish?—No; I look upon that as one of the reasons why our difficulties have begun.

3515. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Your answer has reference to the Bengal army?—Yes; I am much more conversant with that than with the Bombay army, and I know nothing of the Madras army. Much larger powers for rewarding and for punishing should be given to commanding officers of regiments.

3516. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that any admixture of European and native forces regimentally would be beneficial?—That is a thing which I have often contemplated. I believe that it would be highly beneficial to have permanently attached to European regiments on the Indian establishment certain native companies; either a whole battalion of natives or six companies of natives would be a very great advantage.

3517. (*Major-General Hancock.*) But a whole battalion would make it a brigade?—Yes.

3518. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you mix them by brigades, or would you mix them in regiments?—They might be mixed in the regiment, supposing the number to be small. If you had an equal number I should make a supplemental battalion of the natives, and they should always move about with the Europeans, but in cantonments, of course, they would never occupy the same quarters as the Europeans.

3519. Such being the case, would there not be a great inconvenience in having them in one battalion, and would it not be very deteriorating?—The locality would be the same, but the shelter afforded would be different.

3520. (*Chairman.*) What advantage do you anticipate would be derived from such an admixture?—I think that natives like it; I think that they would be proud of doing duty in European regiments, and being assimilated to them; they always try to copy regiments recently arrived from England in dress and otherwise.

3521. The advantage would be in increased communication between the native and European forces?—Yes.

3522. (*Lord Stanley.*) You do not think that the superior position and the accommodation and the general comfort afforded to the European troops, create any feeling of envy in the minds of the natives?—None.

3523. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you mean that you would have the European companies and the native companies mixed up together in one regiment, so that every other company would be a native one?—No, I would not have them dotted about. I would have them on a flank.

3524. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) If a good brigade system were established, and if on the landing of every European regiment in India, as your proportion is one in three, two native battalions were permanently attached to that regiment throughout its whole period of duty, do you not think that that would be as good a system as any which we could establish; and would it not be perhaps preferable to having the Europeans and natives mixed in regiments?—There might be stations to which they might be sent where a brigade would not be required; therefore I think that if a permanent establishment of native troops were attached to a European regiment, it would be more handy.

3525. (*Viscount Melville.*) How are these native troops to be commanded?—They would be commanded either by a major or by a captain, who should be responsible for the interior economy and management.

3526. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Not by the commanding officer of the European regiment?—No.

3527. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You have stated that the proportion of natives should be as two to one British soldier. I will place you in the command of a brigade, and you shall have two battalions of native troops and one battalion of Europeans, would you go into action with the wings of your regiments dotted like a chessboard?—No.

3528. Then why do you advocate the principle of attaching six companies of natives to one regiment?—It is not so much for service in the field as for an ordinary campaign.

3529. But all armies must have ultimately the consideration of service in the field?—The army must be told off eventually into moveable columns—field forces. You would make the best arrangement according to circumstances.

3530. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) We want to know how you would carry on the discipline and organization of a corps formed as you propose, partially of Europeans and partially of natives. Is it to be a detached corps, or is to be an intrinsic part of the body?—It would be in the same way that in your Royal Highness's regiment there are two battalions—one does not interfere with the other.

3531. You would have one battalion of natives and one battalion of Europeans?—Yes.

3532. Of course you are aware that in a regiment with two battalions there is one colonel commanding the two?—Yes.

3533. Therefore, of course, the duties and routine of every day are carried on by one person. Would you wish that one individual should carry on the duties of command of both those battalions, or would you separate them?—I think that they might be on very much the same footing as the guards are. The colonel of the regiment does not interfere with the interior economy of battalions much.

3534. Does not the lieutenant-colonel of the regiment?—I think not.

3535. Does not every order which emanates for a regiment of the guards emanate from the orderly-room in London, and go equally to one battalion as to the other?—But the interior discipline and conduct of each battalion rest with the battalion commanding officer.

3536. Under superior authority, surely?—Under superior authority; but I think that there is very little interference, as far as my recollection goes. I left the guards many years ago.

3537. (*Viscount Melville.*) You stated that you would not trust the natives with the Minié rifle; supposing you were on service, do you think that the natives would act as efficiently, if worse armed than the Europeans, as they would do if they were armed in the same way; that is to say, the one man having a Minié rifle carrying 800 yards, and the other having a firearm, which was not effective till it came within 150 yards?—He would fire away in the same way; I do not think that it would make any difference.

3538. Is there no difference between the percussion musket and the Minié rifle?—There is a great deal of difference between the two arms, but I do not think that giving Europeans one and natives the other would be any objection. The natives have founded

their objection to our rule on a cartridge introduced for the Minié rifle which was greased; we concede to their prejudices, and we give them back the old arm which they like; they would be perfectly content with it.

3539. (*Lord Stanley.*) Then you put it as a question of conceding to their prejudices and not as indicating distrust of the natives?—I think it advisable that the Minié rifle should be reserved for the Europeans.

3540. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You wish to maintain the superiority of the European element throughout?—Yes.

3541. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you wish that difference to be made because you wish to prove that the European is superior to the native, or would you do it because the native is prejudiced against the arm?—I would do it in order to give a superior equipment to the European.

3542. (*Lord Stanley.*) Could you call upon a regiment armed with an inferior weapon to go into action side by side with a European regiment armed with the Minié rifle?—I think so. When I first went to India the Queen's regiments had just got the percussion musket issued to them, and the native troops still had the flint and steel; they fought at Gwalior.

3543. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) But then they were all armed similarly. We will suppose that the Queen's troops have muskets, and that the native troops have Minié rifles, do you think that our white-faced fellows would go on half so plucky as they would if they had the arms of the others?—Probably not.

3544. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that if two men were put next to each other, the one with a superior and the other with an inferior arm, the fact of the one having a superior arm and the other an inferior arm would not give more confidence to the one than the other?—It would if they belonged to the same class of people, certainly; but I think, that the natives of India would very soon be quite content.

3545. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What is your objection to arming the native soldier with the superior weapon?—I do not think that it is likely to be so effective a weapon in his hands as it ought to be. I do not see the necessity of it.

3546. Is that the only ground of your opinion?—I think it is just as well that natives should not be taught to fire at long distances.

3547. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Do you not maintain soldiers for their efficiency, and is there any object in going to the great expense of maintaining soldiers armed with an inferior arm, when you have it in your power to arm them well?—I do not see any insuperable objection to giving the natives the Minié rifle; but considering that they have made this objection to it themselves, I think that it would be just as well that they should retain their old arm. I doubt very much whether a Minié rifle in the hands of an ordinary sepoy is any better than the other.

Major-Gen. Hon. T. Ashburnham, C.B.

28th Aug. 1858.

3548. (*Lord Stanley.*) That is a third objection which you raise, namely, that you doubt whether a native soldier, generally speaking, can do justice to the superior weapon?—Yes.

3549. (*Chairman.*) If you thought otherwise, and if you thought it necessary to give him the Minié rifle, would you then recognize that scruple of caste which he made in refusing to take the greased cartridge?—Certainly not. If I was commanding a regiment with natives attached to it, in the way that I have pointed out, and they made a complaint that they were not armed so well as the Europeans, I should say, "Remember that you made such and such an objection to those cartridges."

3550. If you thought it necessary for the good of the service that the native should be armed with the Minié rifle, you would not recognize the scruple which he made and give him back the old musket?—I would not do it now, certainly. In raising a native force I would give them the old musket. I believe that it is quite good enough for them. I think that native troops with an arm which they are told is effective at 1,400 yards, are very likely to keep 1,400 yards away.

3551. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You are aware that the first public reason given by the men for their discontent was the use of these cartridges, which they supposed were greased with hog's fat or cow's fat, the one being destructive of the caste of the Mahomedan, and the other of the caste of the Hindoo. Suppose you had commanded a station where that objection was made, what would you have done if the men had refused to use those cartridges?—I should have punished the man who first refused. I should have tried to limit the refusal to as few as possible, and should have punished those men.

3552. Suppose it had extended to a whole regiment?—I should have disarmed them.

3553. You would not have insisted upon their using the cartridge?—If ordered by the government of course I must have done so.

3554. But suppose it had been at your own discretion?—If it had been at my own discretion I think I should have withheld the order.

3555. (*Major-General Hancock.*) It was not to the particular weapon that the objection was made, was it, but to the particular ingredient with which the cartridge was greased?—Yes.

3556. (*Chairman.*) Was not that occasion one upon which caste interfered with the performance of military duty?—I believe that that was a fictitious objection altogether. I do not believe that they really had anything to say to it; it was used by designing people as an outcry.

3557. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you have dealt with that as a common case of insubordination, or would you have admitted the objection of caste in a case of that sort?—If a whole regiment refused point blank, and I had not the means of coercing them, I should give way. I should not insist. I should refer again to head-quarters reporting matters.

The witness withdrew.

Major-General DAVID CAPON, C.B., examined.

Major-Gen. D. Capon, C.B.

3558. (*Chairman.*) You are a major-general in the Bombay army?—Yes.

3559. How long have you been in the service?—I went out in 1810, and I therefore now have been forty-eight years in the service; but I have been home eight years.

3560. How many years of that period have you served in India?—Forty years, including furloughs.

3561. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You have served in the field with Bengal troops, have you not?—Yes, and also with Madras troops.

3562. (*Chairman.*) Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion which the Europeans should bear to the native force in the Bengal or other presidencies?—If the Bengal native army is to be kept up as it has been, I should say that they require a great number of Europeans in order to keep them in check, because, instead of being of any use, I looked upon them as detrimental; they were an enemy more than a friendly army, in my opinion, from what I saw of them latterly; in that case, of course, there would be a very large proportion of European troops requisite. I should think one half, if they were to be kept up in the same state of undiscipline as that in which I saw them; but that ought not to be so, certainly.

Major-Gen. D. Capon, C.B.

28th Aug. 1858.

3564. In the other presidencies what proportion should you say ?—I should think that in the other presidencies one-fourth part would be quite sufficient.

3565. One to one in the Bengal presidency, and one to three in the others ?—I think that if the Bengal system is to be kept up as I have seen it, there ought to be one-half Europeans to keep them in check, to take care of them. In Bombay or Madras I should feel that one-fourth was quite sufficient, or perhaps less.

3566. Would you arm these native troops with the same description of weapon as you gave to the Europeans ?—Certainly not, I think. I would let the Europeans have a superior arm.

3567. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Upon what principle would you do that ?—There is no likelihood of the native troops being confronted with a European enemy at all, therefore all that they are required to do is to act chiefly as a police, in my opinion; and I think that the European part of the force ought to have a weapon superior to the native troops, in order to be able to keep them in check, and to keep them under.

3568. Do you mean to say that you would have the whole of the native army employed as a police force ? —No.

3569. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that there are any military services now performed by the native army which might be transferred to a police force ?—I should like to see an army and a police force totally distinct, but the way in which the army has been employed has been very much as a police force.

3570. Do not you think that there are some of the duties which have been performed by the native army which might be transferred to the police ?—Yes, undoubtedly.

3571. Do you include the police in your proportion of Europeans, or do you refer to the native troops irrespective of police ?—I include the police.

3572. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Your view with regard to arming the native troops has reference to the Bengal presidency, has it not ?—Yes, and to the others also. The old musket with spherical ball is a weapon inspiring no confidence; the native has little or none in it. A lighter weapon with smaller bore and conical bullet would, I think, be a great improvement.

3573. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You think that you would require the Europeans to keep the Bengal sepoys in check ?—Yes.

3574. Would it not be better to have no sepoys at all ?—On the principle that they have been on I would rather have none at all. I look upon the police and the native troops as the same with regard to being kept in check.

3575. (*Chairman.*) Have you formed any opinion as to the total amount of force which will be required in the Bengal presidency ?—I should think very much less than they have had. The Bengal men are picked out, and are very fine-looking, able men; but then they have been indulged in having four men to mount one sentry, whereas the Madras sepoy and the Bombay sepoy, who are much smaller men, never think of asking for four men to mount one sentry; it is always three men with the corporal. Therefore the Bengal regiments have been larger than they need have been, because they have required so many more men to furnish the sentries.

3576. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Do you mean to say that there are four men to every sentry in Bengal? —Yes; in Bombay and Madras it is only three men, like it is in the British army.

3577. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Do you mean that in consequence of that the strength of a Bengal regiment is larger than in the other presidencies ?—The establishment is the same, but they do less.

3578. The regiments never have been larger ?—I think that it is an abuse giving four men in Bengal; they have not the excuse of being weaker men; they are larger and stronger men.

3579. Do you believe that the Bengal regiments, in consequence of that circumstance, have been hitherto larger regiments ?—I suppose so. They have had more men than they need to have had; there has been a waste of numbers.

3580. (*Chairman.*) What number of European troops of all arms do you think it necessary to have in the Bengal presidency ?—I am not so well acquainted with the Bengal presidency as I am with the Bombay presidency, to which I belong. I have not the same means of forming an opinion, because I have never been in Bengal, except the upper part of it, with Lord Gough's force, and afterwards to Peshawer. I do not know much about the lower part of it.

3581. What number of European troops should you consider necessary for the Bombay presidency ? —I think a very slight increase upon what their establishment has been; it has varied a good deal; it is larger now, of course, than it has been.

3582. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) We want you to mention the number of men which you would recommend? —I should think that 12,000 men would be quite enough for the Bombay army.

3583. Europeans ?—Yes.

3584. Including artillery ?—No; I include cavalry and infantry.

3585. How many artillery would you have ?—I think that the Bombay and Madras native artillery might be kept up, if not to the full amount, to a considerable number.

3586. You would have native artillery ?—I think there is no great harm in them, to some extent; I would not have native horse artillery, but only foot artillery.

3587. (*Chairman.*) I understand that to apply to Bombay and Madras; would you have it so likewise in Bengal, or would you have all the artillery there Europeans ?—I can hardly say much about Bengal, but I should certainly not very much approve of native artillery there; I would not have them in Bengal; unless Christian half-castes, as they are called, who are in great numbers in Bengal, and cannot but increase, and for whom it may also be politic to find employment.

3588. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You gave your estimate of the proportion of European troops necessary in Bengal, with the proviso if the former system were maintained ?—Yes.

3589. Supposing that a new system were adopted and there were a well-disciplined army established, what proportion of Europeans to natives would you then think necessary in the Bengal presidency ?—I should think at least one-third instead of one-half.

3590. (*Chairman.*) What is the system which you complain of in the Bengal army ?—I think that the discipline is so lax that you cannot depend upon them; that it is not on the model of the British army at all; but they have a model of their own which I never saw anywhere else except amongst some of the native princes, who choose to keep up what they call native soldiers.

3591. What was that laxity of discipline of which you complain ?—In the first place, the sentries often relieved each other without a corporal, and when the men went to guard only the sentry had his clothes on and that only partly, and the others took them off.

3592. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Have you ever visited a Bengal guard ?—I have not. I never possessed the *right* to do so.

3593. Have you ever seen what you state yourself ? —Yes, I have.

3594. You have seen the guard without their clothes on ?—I have seen the commanding officer of a division having his sentry at his tent with the man only half clothed and lounging about, not walking about like a soldier at all; it was at Moultan, and everything that I saw was very slack; also on the left bank of the river Jhelum, the enemy being on the opposite bank within sight, a picket conducted itself as I have said.

3595. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the native army in the Bengal presidency should be on the regular or the irregular system, or both combined ?—

From what I have seen of the cavalry I would have irregulars; I would not have regular cavalry; I do not think that the natives are fitted for it. Irregular cavalry like General Jacob's troopers would be far superior, in my opinion.

3596. What would you have the infantry, regular or irregular?—I do not know what is meant by irregular infantry; I never saw any.

3597. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Like the local corps, with a few European officers?—I would approve of those; I think it better than having them as the present system is; they are called regular, but in reality they are not so, because the officers are moved away for other purposes. It is called a regular regiment, but it is not one. The companies are often commanded by ensigns of six months' standing, and sometimes officers are obliged to have two or three companies given to them because the other officers are absent; so that although it is called regular it is irregular, and therefore you had better have it irregular at once. However, the large number of officers borne on the rolls enables selections of officers to be made for irregular corps, commissariat duties, &c.

3598. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider the number of European officers with the native regiments sufficient under the present system?—They would be quite sufficient if they were always with their regiments, undoubtedly, but they are not.

3599. Then you consider that great inconvenience arises from their being detached from their regiments to perform other duties?—It spoils the regiment, undoubtedly, causing a hiatus on the grades which should support the commanding officer, betwixt whom and the juniors there remains frequently *no link.*

3600. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What have you been in the habit of commanding, a regular regiment of native infantry?—I have commanded a regular regiment of infantry, and I have commanded a brigade, and also a division.

3601. But generally a regiment of native infantry?—Yes.

3602. What has been the average number of European officers present?—It has varied very much. When I first went out in 1810, the regiment had about 26 officers; because they had no interest, or something or other, they were called Rough-and-readies, and they were always *for* duty. There were 26 there.

3603. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you mean present with the regiment?—Yes; and there were officers doing duty from a European regiment very often, in hopes of getting some service. After that fifteen was a very good allowance; I have often had them as low as eight or ten.

3604. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Did you see any falling off in the interior economy of your regiment from the fact of their being fewer officers present?—Yes, undoubtedly; because the young ones were some of them perhaps not of six months' standing, and were undrilled; but in that state they were obliged to have companies given to them, nobody else could take them.

3605. (*Viscount Melville.*) Had they passed sufficiently in the colloquial language?—They had done it in some degree. It was a general rule which I made that an officer should not have a company until he had passed; but still, after having passed the examination, he was not worth much for a considerable period.

3606. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) He had no discipline?—No; he was too young a good deal.

3607. (*Chairman.*) Are regimental officers taken from the regiments for staff appointments without consulting or applying to the commanding officer of the regiment?—Yes, certainly. I do not think that commanding officers of regiments ever had anything to say to the matter. There is a general rule that a regiment shall not be reduced under a certain number, but that is not often observed, I believe. There was a government order to that effect, but it was not always observed.

3608. In the Bombay army I believe that the selection of the native non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers is left to the commanding officer of the regiment?—Yes; I do not think that the commander-in-chief ever interfered with it at all.

3609. Do you approve of that system instead of the system of promotion by seniority?—Undoubtedly. I think that the seniority system is the worst which can possibly be; such promotions are non-effective, I think, altogether. I saw some of the Bengal native officers who certainly appeared to me to be non-effective, and their system is seniority.

3610. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then you are for selection?—Yes, but in that case I always regard to old service; I never took a young officer's selection merely because the same was a fine-looking man, or anything of that sort. It requires a great deal of discretion, and the difficulty with the commanding officer of a native regiment is to hinder those kind of promotions; if he is a weak sort of officer he very often does a good deal of injustice.

3611. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Supposing you have efficient officers at the head of companies, and an efficient commanding officer, no evil consequences will arise from the selection system?—I think that no harm at all arises from the selection principle; it makes the whole of the regiment smart and willing to be brought into notice. Under the seniority system they do not care a pin about the officers, because they know that they cannot do them good or harm.

3612. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) What is the duty which a native officer is called upon to perform in the Bombay presidency?—He is a subordinate, but he is very much consulted by the Company's officers in cases of applications for furlough and for character. It is impossible for a European officer, if he has not been a very long time in the regiment, to know the character of the men under him. If the promotion goes by seniority only, of course the company officer is removed from all trouble; he promotes the first man upon the roster. I ever looked to the native officers as responsible for the interior economy in the men's lines.

3613. You are of opinion that in the future organization the native officer should be maintained?—Yes, and I think that he should also have charge of a company. I think that there ought to be something for an energetic native officer to look up to, and that he should not be put under an ensign of six months' standing, who does not know his work, which he, the native officer, always is now.

3614. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you go to the extent of putting a native officer over a European officer, if the European officer happened to be young?—No; for that reason I should say that it would be much better if it was on the irregular system in some degree. I would give three or four companies to native officers, and the rest to European officers, and have a mixture.

3615. You say that you would rather have the irregular system introduced?—There would be a medium, that is, the irregular system; there are always two or three officers, at all events, in the irregular system.

3616. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You stated that you thought that great detriment had arisen to the service in the regular regiments from so many European officers being taken away?—If they call them regular regiments; but I would have a medium, I would not exact the whole discipline so strictly from the irregulars as I would from the regulars.

3617. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What do you mean by a medium?—As they are in the cavalry; they are not obliged to have all the strict observances which they have in European regiments; their stables and all those sort of things are different; for instance, horses frequently the property of the men.

3618. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the system of promotion by selection necessarily entails greater communication between the European and the

Major-Gen. D. Capon, C.B.

28th Aug. 1858.

native officers than the system of promotion by seniority ?—Undoubtedly it does.

3619. Therefore in that respect it is also preferable ?—I undoubtedly think so.

3620. (*Major-General Hancock.*) How many European commissioned officers do you think necessary with an irregular regiment of cavalry ?—I should think that there ought to be four at least.

3621. And how many with a regiment of native infantry under the system which you would think advisable when you say that you would have a medium ?—I would leave three or four companies out of the ten to be in charge of native officers, as a sort of reward for them, or something to look up to to keep up their energy.

3622. Supposing that arrangement carried out, how many European officers would you think necessary in addition for service with a native infantry regiment, supposing that four companies, or whatever proportion you fix upon, were commanded by natives ?—I should think that fifteen European officers would make it efficient, certainly.

3623. Why should so many as fifteen European officers be necessary with a native infantry regiment, and four or five suffice for an irregular regiment of cavalry ?—The proof has been in General Jacob's irregular horse, which I think has not above three European officers to a regiment. I have not seen the experiment of an irregular infantry regiment at all. I do not know what an irregular native regiment is.

3624. So far as the experiment has been tried in General Jacob's corps, is it not in favour of a fewer number of European officers ?—Yes, according to his system. I think there is no harm, but I think that four would not be too many to guard against casualties by loss in the field or by death or accident.

3625. In the Scinde horse has not a larger number of European officers been rendered unnecessary by the very superior qualifications and training of the native commissioned officers ?—Yes, I agree to that ; but then in action I doubt whether, if the command were to fall upon natives only by accidents in the field, the regiment would do as it would do if led by Europeans ; there must be one European officer, as I think, with it, and the liability of there being none at all from casualties ought to be guarded against.

3626. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You say that for a native infantry regiment you would have fifteen European officers ?—If a regular one.

3627. If you approve of the irregular system as established in General Jacob's regiments, why not extend that system to the infantry, and have irregular regiments of infantry, with a small number of European officers ?—I should not like to see the regular regiments done away with altogether ; and with only a few officers it would be impossible to have a mess, and I think that a regiment of infantry without a mess would not last very long. I think that it would degenerate.

3628. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Has that been found to be the case with General Jacob's regiment. Do you think that those officers are in any respect inferior in their morale, or in anything else, to officers in regular regiments where they are in larger number with messes ?—No, but they have so much to do, and they are always so busy in active service in comparison with what an infantry regiment in cantonments has to do, that they are not kept together, they are detached.

3629. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) If you detach troops surely there is the more reason to have Europeans with the detachments. Is it not a fact that a regiment being detached requires generally more officers ?—I do not think that you require a European officer with every detachment, but I say that an infantry regiment is confined in cantonments, and kept there three or four years doing nothing. If they only had three or four officers to a regiment they could have no mess, and would degenerate in consequence : moreover General Jacob's system being to "select *efficient officers*," whence could such be drafted from, were there no regular regiments with a superfluity of officers from which to select ? I say superfluity, not as regards the number usually present at regimental head-quarters, but as borne on the strength of the regiment in India.

3630. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not know that the officers of the Scinde horse were always at the head-quarters, and that the European officers were not detached, except upon a particular occasion ?—I have not seen much of General Jacob's interior quarters ; all that I have seen of his troops has been in the field, and there was only one officer ; and detachments, I think, are often sent by General Jacob without any European officer.

3631. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you like to see any native element introduced at once into the ranks in the shape of officers without passing through the inferior grade ? Would you like to see any of the native gentry introduced as officers ?—No, I do not think that that would answer at all. I should not like to see it. I have not a sufficiently good opinion of the moral character of the natives to think that any native is fit to be put into such a position without the education which he gets in the European service.

3632. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion ?—I think that caste ought not to be acknowledged, except in one case, that is, in the embarkation of troops, where a different sort of provision is laid in for natives of a particular caste, because their religion in high caste hinders them from cooking on board, which it would be a hardship not to acknowledge. Mussulmans and low-caste Hindoos may cook on board without any detriment ; a high-caste Hindoo cannot cook on board.

3633. (*Major-General Hancock.*) There is no practical difficulty in that respect ; the commissariat can always lay in the necessary provisions for them ?—That is all ; they do not wish to cook on board, therefore there is dry provision and fruit laid in store for them, in order that they may subsist.

3634. (*Chairman.*) You would not allow the plea of caste as an excuse for the non-performance of military duty ?—No, I would not, certainly.

3635. Have you ever known caste to be pleaded as an excuse for not performing military duty ?—I have not in the Bombay army.

3636. You think that under proper discipline and regulations it ought not to be recognized ?—It ought to be no bar to the performance of any duty, and I never heard of a Brahmin in the Bombay army making the slightest exception to stand next to the very lowest class man in the regiment. It is customary in a cantonment to apportion huts with some reference to caste in a company ; such being a great convenience to the men, I would not object to it.

3637. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Would he dig in the field, go on fatigue parties, and dig trenches when ordered ?—Yes ; I never knew any difference made.

3638. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Have you known any instances of its interfering with the performance of duty by the Bengal troops ?—No ; I have only heard reports.

3639. I refer to your personal knowledge ?—I have no personal knowledge of it.

3640. (*Chairman.*) Would you make any alteration in the terms under which the native army are enlisted at present ?—I do not know exactly what terms they are enlisted on. I believe that the old plan of enlisting them is done away, and that they are now enlisted for general service ; they are so enlisted on the Bombay side.

3641. At all events you would recommend that they should be enlisted for general service, to go wherever they were ordered ?—Undoubtedly. I would not think of allowing a soldier to say, "I will go here, and will not go there," it is out of the question.

3642. Are you able to form any opinion whether it would be any advantage to divide the Bengal army into two or more armies?—I think it would be an advantage to have one portion for the lower part of Bengal, and the other for the Punjaub and the upper provinces; it is an overgrown force, certainly, as it has been.

3643. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think that it would be advisable to increase the Bombay and Madras armies, so that whether three or four armies are maintained they should all be made nearly of the same strength. Are you of opinion that that would be better than having one very large army, and the others of smaller proportions?—I think that the division into armies, if not very small, is beneficial, undoubtedly.

3644. Do you think that there would be an advantage in equalizing them rather than keeping one army at 100,000 men, for instance, and the other at 30,000; I mean upon military grounds?—That must depend upon the territories under the charge of the respective Governments; they vary so much.

3645. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you extend the other presidencies to meet that difficulty?—If you increased your territorial extent of course you might enlarge your army also.

3646. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Would not the facilities for forming such a combination as we have lately had in Bengal be much diminished by equalizing the armies?—You could not equalize the territories; if otherwise, it might be beneficial.

3647. Assuming that it may be considered expedient nearly to equalize the territories, would it not be advisable also to equalize the armies?—Yes, I suppose you must do it then.

3648. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would it be an advantage to the armies to leave them as they are, or would it be an advantage to equalize the territories more or less, so as to assimilate the number of soldiers in the three separate presidencies?—That is more of a political question than anything else, I think. If they had been divided they would not have had the opportunity of combining so much, certainly.

3649. (*Chairman.*) Is that the benefit which you look to from dividing the armies?—Yes; I think that if you had half the Bengal army for the lower part, and the other half for the Punjaub and the upper provinces it would certainly be an advantage and I should think you would hardly require the same kind of troops for the lower part as for the other The police might almost do for the lower part if the upper part was well taken care of.

3650. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you of opinion that it is very detrimental to discipline that regiments should remain in quarters for a period of three years?—No, I think not; I think that they might be allowed to do that, but not more than that, certainly. I have known regiments kept five years, which certainly was not correct.

3651. Are you of opinion that the concentration of a certain force in different parts would be advantageous to discipline, say 5,000 men in a division in one place, and 1,000 in another, would that be advantageous to the army?—Yes, I think so; I think that there is less risk in a large body than in small ones.

3652. My question had not reference to any sort of risk, but had reference to the discipline and the establishment of a well-organized army?—I think that a large body is certainly superior; that if they could have cantonments of 5,000 men, instead of, as now, single regiments very often, it would be better; but in the absence of military roads, small cantonments cannot be avoided, because during the monsoon, marching over black cotton soil is nearly impracticable, wherefore troops are obliged to be kept somewhat *close at hand.*

3653. (*Chairman*). Do you think that the commanding officers of regiments have sufficient powers, or that they should have more than they now have to reward and punish?—I can only speak for the Bombay army. I had sufficient power; I was never interfered with by the commander-in-chief at all. I think that it was detrimental abolishing corporal punishment, while they upheld it for the Europeans; it was degrading to the Europeans, and there is no possibility of carrying out the solitary confinement system excepting in a cantonment; I do not approve of that.

3654. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are you aware of any instances of petitions having been sent direct to the superior authority without passing through the commanding officer of the regiment or the company to which a native officer or man belonged?—I have heard of it in Bengal; I never heard of it in Bombay at all; a man would be put into confinement immediately if it happened.

3655. You would be very much opposed to anything of the sort?—Of course.

3656. You think that it would strike at the root of all discipline?—Certainly.

3657. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that there would be any advantage in the admixture of European and native forces, either regimentally or by brigade? Do you think that it would be advantageous to have native troops mixed up in the same regiment with European troops?—There is something of that sort now existing in the case of the European artillery; they have a body of natives attached to them called lascars, to do the dirty work, as it were, of the guns, to clean them and look after that sort of thing. I hardly think that anything of that sort would do in the infantry; I should object to it.

3658. Would there be any advantage to the native troops, supposing that they were brought into greater communication with European troops, by placing, say three or four companies of natives to each regiment of Europeans?—I should think that that would not do at all. I think that they ought to be kept separate, undoubtedly.

3659. You are of opinion that they ought to be mixed by brigades, and not by regiments?—Certainly.

3660. (*Viscount Melville.*) Will you state the system pursued in Bombay in recommending a havildar to be promoted to jemadar?—The lists are sent up to the adjutant-general's office for the commander-in-chief's approbation. I think that the recommendation of the commanding officer is always attended to. I never had any instance of its being otherwise.

3661. Did you send up the names of all the havildars, or did you select a certain number and submit them to the commander-in-chief with your recommendation of the man whom you thought the fittest for the vacancy?—I only sent up the names of the men whom I recommended for promotion, and gave extracts from their registers of their services and their character.

3662. How many havildars' names were sent up to make a choice from in order to fill up the vacancy?—I never sent up havildars' names to make a choice from at all.

3663. Merely the man whom you recommended?—Yes; I recommended so and so, and the commander-in-chief confirmed it.

3664. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Did you find any ill effects as regarded those men who were passed over who were senior to the man promoted?—I never had any complaints made to me about them at all.

3665. Did it produce a bad feeling or an unhappy feeling to those men who were passed over?—Not at all, I think; of course no man liked to be passed over; the difficult job of the commanding officer was to see that no extravagant abuse or anything of that sort was done; for that reason it is beneficial to have officers of experience as the commanding officer and the second in command, and the adjutant and three or four captains, then anything of that sort would not occur; but if they were all boys, of course you might get extravagant recommendations, which, if the commanding officer of the regiment did not exercise consideration himself, would do harm.

Major-Gen. D. Caron, C.B.

18th Aug. 1858.

3666. Is it the system in the Bengal army that when a promotion takes place, and there is a regiment commanded by a captain, not by a field officer, the lieutenant-colonel and a major is removed to the other regiment, and that the removal would always be of the lieutenant-colonel, and not of the major?—No major is removed to a regiment commanded by a captain, but the lieutenant-colonel under whom the major is serving is removed, in order that he, the non-transferable major, may obtain command of his own regiment.

3667. Do you think that that is a good system?—I look upon it as a matter of necessity.

3668. Why?—In a seniority service like the East India Company's it must be so.

3669. Why should not the major, the junior officer, be removed in preference to the senior?—I think that it would be an improvement, and only justice to majors of European infantry regiments.

3670. Surely the command of a regiment ought to engender a feeling of pride in the officer conducting the command. If the officer conducting the command is liable to be constantly removed, it is not good?—It is bad, certainly. I have myself suffered from it. I have been sent to three or four regiments in a couple of years, because I was a lieutenant-colonel.

3671. But the major having obtained his promotion he would probably benefit by the fact of being removed?—Yes, I agree to that; I always thought so; and in the case of the European infantry, the major not being transferable is still obliged to remain serving under a lieutenant-colonel, losing thereby 400*l.* per annum, no European regiment being allowed permanently to be commanded save by a lieutenant-colonel.

3672. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you remember that several cases occurred in the Bombay army in which the major was transferred to command another regiment, and that an order came from the supreme government to put a stop to the system, saying that those officers belonged to their own regiments, and were not transferable?—Yes, I remember that.

3673. (*Viscount Melville.*) What was the general effect in the Bombay army of the mode of promotion to the rank of native officer, as to the style and efficiency of the native officers?—The native officers, I think, were very often superior to some of the European officers, and it often appeared to me very hard that when the native officers had made themselves more efficient than the European officers, some of the younger ones of whom were very often for a very long time unfit for anything, they should be placed so immediately under those unfit European officers.

3674. Did you ever test the qualifications of a native officer, a subahdar-major, for instance, or a subahdar, by calling upon him to manœuvre a battalion?—Undoubtedly, with every native officer of the regiment, and if he could not do it he was made to learn, or invalided, or something of that sort.

3675. Did they generally do it very well?—Yes, very well indeed, I think.

3676. At Moultan, where you saw the Bengal army, what was the opinion which you formed as regarded the native officers of the Bombay army contrasted with the native officers of the Bengal army?—I looked upon one as efficient, and upon the other as not efficient.

3677. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You attribute that in a great degree to the system which you think is adopted in the Bengal army?—Certainly.

3678. Do you know that that system does exist in the Bengal army?—I believe so.

3679. Will you read the last regulation made for the Bengal army. I think you will find that you are speaking more from hearsay than from anything else?—I have had no experience in the Bengal army; I only speak from what I have heard. I have certainly seen the native officers unfit from old age; I have had experience of the old age of the native officers, undoubtedly; they appear to be much older than they ought to be, if vigilant superintendence of the interior economy of a company is to be expected from them, as in the Bombay army.

The witness withdrew.

Colonel E. Wintle.

Colonel EDMUND WINTLE examined.

3680. (*Chairman.*) What rank do you hold in the Indian army?—I am a brevet colonel.

3681. How long have you been in the service?—Nearly thirty-nine years.

3682. How many years of that period have been passed in India?—Thirty-four.

3683. When did you leave India?—I left in February 1856.

3684. In what presidency have you served?—In the Bengal presidency.

3685. In what branch of the service?—In the infantry.

3686. Of course you had many opportunities of seeing the European and native troops acting together?—Not very much with European troops. At three or four of the large stations I have been with Europeans; but, generally speaking, I have been more with the natives than with the Europeans.

3687. Have you formed any opinion as to the proportion which the Europeans should bear to the native force in the Bengal presidency?—Do you mean strictly with reference to what is called the line?

3688. No; in all branches of the service?—I should say about one in three.

3689. Have you formed any opinion as to the amount of force which will be required in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled?—No, I cannot say that I have.

3690. Do you consider that the native force in the Bengal presidency should be on the regular or irregular system, or both combined?—I think that it would be almost impossible to do without some natives in the regular branch of the service, but of course they might be combined with irregulars.

3691. For instance, you might have irregular cavalry and regular infantry?—Regular infantry. I would rather not say anything about the cavalry; but with regard to the infantry, I think that there should be regular and irregular infantry, in the same way that it is now.

3692. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Why do you object to give us your opinion about the cavalry?—Because I do not think that I am competent to speak about the cavalry, whether they should be regular or irregular, having never been on service in the field with them.

3693. But you would have some irregular infantry?—Yes.

3694. (*Chairman.*) You have commanded a regular infantry regiment in the Bengal presidency?—Yes.

3695. How were the promotions made in that regiment from non-commissioned to commissioned officers?—By seniority.

3696. Strictly by seniority?—Strictly by seniority as the rule.

3697. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Without reference to character at all?—Generally speaking, I think that seniority has prevailed; if a man was very far superior to his neighbours he would be taken, but otherwise the seniority principle has been observed.

3698. (*Chairman.*) With whom does the power of selection rest, when you say that a man very superior to his neighbours would be taken?—The commanding officer has the nomination in the non-commissioned ranks, but I have known instances where the promotions have been sent up to the commander-in-chief against the seniority system with regard to commissioned officers, and the senior has been promoted by order of the commander-in-chief.

3699. In opposition to the recommendation of the commanding officer?—In opposition to the recommendation of the commanding officer.

3700. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Is this regulation still in force (*handing a book to the witness*)?—Yes; I think that that is the order which is now in existence.

3701. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the commanding officers of native regiments in the Bengal presidency have sufficient power to punish or reward?—No, certainly not; because there is always an appeal against them upon very trifling occasions. If a man is dissatisfied he has nothing to do but to go himself, or write a letter or petition direct to the commander-in-chief.

3702. (*Viscount Melville.*) Without going through the commanding officer?—Without going through the commanding officer. If a man has felt himself aggrieved he has sometimes sent up a petition himself to the commander-in-chief.

3703. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Has that been tolerated; has that man not been severely punished?—I cannot call to mind any punishment in such a case. Explanation has been called for and given, and there it ended.

3704. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do the regulations allow it?—No; the regulations do not allow that a man should make any reference to the commander-in-chief, the higher authority, except through the intermediate authorities.

3705. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And yet they do it?—Yes. I have had a man go up to Sir Charles Napier to make a complaint against me when I commanded a regiment. The man applied to me for his discharge in a pet. I let him have it, and announced it in regimental orders. On his pay being offered him he had thought better of it, and refused to take his pay and papers, and went to General Wheeler, who sent him back to me, and ordered me to try him by court-martial for leaving his regiment without leave, though I had struck him off the regiment. I remonstrated, but the order was repeated. I had nothing for it; and so the man was tried, and by the sentence of the court was dismissed the service. He went off to the commander-in-chief up at Simlah, and we got a letter from the commander-in-chief for an explanation of the subject, which I gave; but, in consequence of the man not having been of very good character, Sir Charles Napier confirmed my original order.

3706. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the discipline of a regiment would be much improved if the commanding officer had greater powers of punishment and reward?—Yes, I think so. We certainly felt as regimental officers that the men did not care about our authority.

3707. Would you have any native artillery in the Bengal army, or would you have them entirely European?—Judging simply by what has lately occurred in the army, I should say Europeans only; the native artillery have all turned against us, like every one else.

3708. Would you make any difference between the arms which you would give to the native troops and those which you would give to the Europeans?—I would now, certainly.

3709. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You would not give the natives the Minié rifle?—No, I would only give them the plain percussion musket; to those, I mean, in the line.

3710. (*Chairman.*) Upon what principle would you make the distinction?—Because I would not give the native the power of injuring the European as he has done; I would not give him an equal power as a soldier.

3711. At the risk of making him less efficient as a soldier you would give him an inferior arm in order to maintain the superiority of the European soldier?—I would keep the European above him in everything now.

3712. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I suppose you take into account that the native army are not likely to meet with troops of Western Europe?—Certainly.

3713. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you of opinion that the discipline of the Bengal army has deteriorated within these ten years?—Not within the last ten years; but I think that in consequence of the absence of the power which has been taken away from commanding officers the native troops have not had that respect for the authority of their commanding officers and for their officers in general which they used to have.

3714. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Since when has that great change taken place?—For nearly twenty years, I should say, it has been gradually coming on.

3715. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What powers have been taken away from commanding officers?—Formerly we had regulations in the service which enabled us to dismiss soldiers without any reference to the commander-in-chief. We cannot now dismiss a man unless by the proceedings of a court-martial, which are sent up to head-quarters. If we had a man of bad character formerly, the commanding officer could order his dismissal by a regimental order; but now unless he goes through the intervention of a court-martial, he must retain him in the regiment.

3716. (*Chairman.*) In what manner has that power been withdrawn?—By general order; by an alteration of the regulations made by the government.

3717. Applying only to the Bengal presidency?—I cannot tell as to that.

3718. (*Viscount Melville.*) Was it by an order of the governor-general or of the commander-in-chief?—We get all our orders through the commander-in-chief.

3719. Was this regulation, depriving commanding officers of that power, an order of the commander-in-chief alone?—Most of those orders must come from the government; they are issued under the authority of the governor-general.

3720. (*Chairman.*) Does the opinion which you have expressed with regard to the artillery being entirely confined to Europeans, extend to the sappers and miners?—I have not seen much of the sappers and miners of late years; but I think not, because there would be a great deal of the manual labour of sappers and miners which Europeans could not at certain times be expected to undertake.

3721. Then you would confine the natives to the manual labour, and not teach them any of the scientific portions of that branch of the service?—Just so.

3722. Do you think that the native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion?—Hitherto the native army, as regards Hindoos, in Bengal has been composed of Brahmins and Rajpoots, which are high castes. We have also had Gwallahs, that is, cowherds; those three castes have formed the principal part of the army. There are other inferior castes in a trifling degree, but generally speaking those are the three castes of the army. I think that those ought to be kept up still, and we might introduce some more, some of the lower castes. I do not see why a low-caste able-bodied man should not be as good a soldier as a high-caste man under similar physical ability.

3723. Would you preserve that distinction of nationalities or castes in the shape of regiments or companies, or would you distribute them promiscuously throughout the regiments?—I would make them as promiscuous as possible.

3724. Have you ever found any inconvenience from caste, or have you ever had caste pleaded as an excuse for the non-performance of a military duty?—There are certain things which we should never dream of telling the men to do with reference to their caste, because we know their prejudices. Their caste prevails in almost everything that we do with them.

3725. Then you do find that inconvenience arises from caste in the performance of military duty?—Not with regard to the mere soldiering part of the business, but we are obliged to consult their caste in

Colonel E. Wintle.

28th Aug. 1858.

all our treatment of them, especially with regard to their food; that certainly operates otherwise than beneficially for troops required on service, because every Hindoo cooks his own food individually,—they do not live in messes ; the consequence is that the regiment is encumbered with pots and pans for every single Hindoo in the regiment, and he must have them.

3726. (*Viscount Melville.*) On a march or on service have you found any inconvenience from this cooking?—It stands to reason that a smaller quantity of cooking vessels for a large body of men must be better than one set for each individual man; the greater the quantity of baggage the more carriage is required for their conveyance, and more fuel too is requisite at each daily halt.

3727. If you were on a march and it was required to cook, how many hours would it occupy ?—I think it generally takes about a couple of hours for a man to cook his food. The Hindoo generally eats only once in the day time, and once in the evening before he goes to sleep.

3728. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) But he only cooks once, I think ?—Generally once.

3729. (*Viscount Melville.*) Have you ever known the men, from being on service or from coming in late, unable to procure wood, and not able to cook, and consequently going without their meal for that day ? —Yes, but not often; but I do not think that a Hindoo cares much about that if it is merely a casual case ; he can cook a few chupattees in a few minutes.

3730. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that caste ought to interfere in any respect with the performance of military duties?—No, I do not think that it should.

3731. Do you think that you could recruit sufficiently to obviate caste being an excuse ?—I think that if we enlisted men with a distinct understanding that their caste should have no influence, it would not prevent men entering the service.

3732. (*Chairman.*) Have you ever had any opportunity of judging whether caste is more considered in the Bengal army than it is in the Bombay or Madras presidency ?—Only from what I have heard. I have had very little to do with the other presidencies, but I believe that the castes are not so much attended to there as with us.

3733. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How do you account for that ?—Because there is, I believe, a greater mixture of men in their regiments than we have. Still they have the brothers of our own men ; men who have gone from our side have enlisted in the Bombay and Madras presidencies.

3734. How do you account for those men's not objecting to do that which your men object to do ? —Simply, I believe, because it is the custom.

3735. Does not that prove that there is much more custom in caste than is generally admitted ? — We have listened to caste on our side, but on the other side they have not listened to it.

3736. Does not that prove that the excuse of caste is to a great extent an absurdity ?—Yes ; I think that the men would be just as willing to take our service, without any reference to caste, as the Madras and Bombay troops do.

3737. Then it is, in fact, a want of discipline ?—It seems to be a point of honour with our men that they shall stickle as much as they like for their caste.

3738. Do you not think that that is involved in the question of discipline ?—Certainly.

3739. You commanded an infantry regiment ?— Yes.

3740. Is it a fact that for a sentry you allow in the Bengal presidency four men, whereas in the Madras and Bombay presidencies there are only three ?—Yes, that is our practice.

3741. Can you give any reason why there should be that difference ?—I do not know why there is any difference, or any reason one way or the other, for or against.

3742. Are the guards weekly or daily ?—They are now generally daily, as many as can be ; those who go to a distance on Government treasures or offices, generally speaking, are weekly, but all regimental guards and station guards now are daily.

3743. Do you not think that the system of guards is one of great importance, and that nothing trenches so much on discipline as any irregularity which is allowed upon guard ?—Certainly.

3744. Do you not therefore think that the very fact of weekly guards is extremely objectionable ?— Yes ; it was for a long time the practice in our army, but it is now going out.

3745. Was it always the practice in your army ?— Formerly it was, excepting the mere regimental guards ; that is to say, the quarter guard, and the rear guard, and the magazine guard ; two or three small regimental guards ; but all the station guards used to be weekly formerly.

3746. Do you not think that the fact of merely making that change would produce a beneficial effect in the discipline ?—Certainly. A man is only twenty-four hours on duty, and he does that duty readily and properly, and there is an end of it.

3747. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Were you ever on duty at Calcutta ?—I only once went down with what is called the reserve guard to Calcutta.

3748. Are you aware whether the guards are weekly or daily in Fort William ?—It is some years ago now, and I cannot recollect.

3749. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that any alteration ought to be made in the terms of enlistment in the Bengal army ?—No other than that a soldier should be bound to go wherever he is ordered, whether by sea or by land, and to do whatever is required of him as a soldier.

3750. That he should be enlisted for general service ?—Yes.

3751. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Has not that been the case for some year or two past ?—For the last few years the enlistments have been for general service ; but then they have been in regiments among the men who have been merely enlisted for service in India. We have a few strictly general service regiments.

3752. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Have the officers commanding regiments in Bengal been of late years deprived of the powers vested in them by the Articles of War with regard to minor punishments for slight offences ?—We have nothing in the shape of punishments beyond what are laid down in the Articles of War, a few minor punishments, those we have not been deprived of.

3753. (*Viscount Melville.*) What are the punishments which a commanding officer usually inflicts ?— Ordering a man into imprisonment for a certain number of days in the quarter guard is almost all the punishment that we have.

3754. Do you give them drill ?—Yes.

3755. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Have the officers commanding regiments been deprived of the power of inflicting any of the punishments for slight offences, authorized by the 112th article of war, which I will now read to you (*reading the same*) ?—No ; but some of those we cannot carry out ; for instance, piling shot. In many stations we have no shot to pile.

3756. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have you had any circular to restrict your power ?—No.

3757. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that the system of promotion of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers would be better by selection or by seniority ?—By selection. I think that under the old system it was right that officers should stick to the principle of seniority ; it was the rule of the service, and the men understood that it was their right ; but still I think that the principle of the thing was wrong in itself. I think that seniority should not be considered at all when a man's fitness comes into question.

3758. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What powers have commanding officers with regard to granting leave of absence to their native soldiers in Bengal ; are they restricted ?—They have very little power at all. When I wanted to give men leave between musters I had to apply to the brigadier of the station for

it. Once, because I wanted to give a few men per company leave, the brigadier thought that I was taking too much upon me, that I was giving too much to men who wanted to go to places in order to carry out their religious prejudices. He had notions the other way, and thought that it was wrong to encourage their superstitions. I told him that the leave was a regulation of our service, and after a demur he allowed it; but I had no power to do it without his sanction. I could not detach a man from my station without the permission of the brigadier commanding it.

3759. Then, if you wished to grant leave in excess of thirty days you were obliged to apply to the brigadier?—Yes, and even for thirty days. The usual rule was, that where an officer required to give a man leave during the month between musters he should apply to the brigadier for permission to do so, because if he took so many men from his regiment, and another commanding officer took so many men from his, without the brigadier's permission, it was taking the men for the time from under the brigadier's command without his knowledge. I think it was so far right that he should know of it.

3760. Is there a regulation of the Bengal army requiring the commanding officer to grant leave according to the regimental roster?—There is as regards the annual furlough, and it is attended to as closely and fairly as possible; but this does not apply to other leaves of absence.

3761. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that you have a sufficient number of European officers present with the regular regiments of infantry, or not?—During the exercising season I think it is very desirable that we should have the full complement of officers, at least one for a company, but in the hot season I do not think it is absolutely necessary.

3762. You think that the fact of so many officers being detached for staff duties has not worked injuriously?—Not in time of peace, when little is to be done, but in time of service of course it is otherwise.

3763. But for keeping up the discipline of a regiment?—I think not, as so little is required in a native corps. We interfere very little with their private habits, and they have none of the faults of Europeans; they do not get drunk and get into disturbances; in fact, the only disputes which the natives have among themselves in regiments are as to something connected with women; that is, I may say, almost the only cause of disputes in a native regiment. But during the hot season I have never had the smallest compunction in letting as many of my officers go as pleased; the others did the duty; they did it willingly, and it was properly done. I only refer to my regimental officers.

3764. Supposing you had a certain number of regimental officers, and a large proportion of them were taken for permanent staff employment, do you think that that would injure the discipline of your regiment?—Certainly, I must have a certain number.

3765. What is the lowest number that you ever had?—I think in the hot weather I have had my adjutant and staff and one subaltern, but then I have allowed the others to go willingly, because the adjutant and staff and one subaltern would do all that was required during the hot season. We are not required to exercise our troops in the hot season. There is little to be done beyond supervision.

3766. (*Chairman.*) Do you find that the European officers are looking out for civil employment?—No, I do not know that. A man who may be particularly qualified for it, and who qualifies himself for it by a knowledge of the languages, might try to get it, but I do not think that there is any extraordinary demand for civil appointments in preference to military.

3767. (*Colonel Burlton.*) How is it as to the military staff?—Everybody who is anxious to do something, and not to be unemployed, tries to get on the staff.

3768. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is not the effect of that that those officers who do not get on the staff consider themselves rather lowered or hurt?—I do not think so; I have never perceived any feeling of mortification. It must be borne in mind that when an officer holding a company leaves the regiment permanently or beyond a month, the company allowance goes to his successor. This is a pecuniary advantage, and officers are sensible of it.

3769. (*Colonel Burlton.*) What is your opinion of the native commissioned officers of the Bengal army?—I have no great opinion of the native officers. I think that their establishment was a political act on the part of the Government; a sort of reward to old officers, to give them a good pay at the end of their service; but, generally speaking, I think that there are very few native officers who are worth their salt. When they get up to the rank of native officers they get addled, and are not fit for anything; a few men here and there you can get something out of; but, generally speaking, when they get up to that rank they look to their pay, which is an immense thing to them, if you consider what they have risen from, and they accumulate money; they do as little as they possibly can, and stick on to the regiments until by dint of great exertion we get rid of them to the invalids.

3770. (*Chairman.*) You are now speaking of native officers who have been promoted by the seniority system, and not by selection?—In the Bengal army there are no young officers promoted to the commissioned ranks, or hardly any.

3771. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not think that if they were promoted by selection, on the recommendation of the commanding officer, it would make a change in the efficiency of the officer, and in his feeling?—It would, I think, for a short time, but not for long.

3772. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then is it your opinion that you would rather be without them?—My opinion is against them, certainly.

3773. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Do you think that it would answer to introduce native gentlemen at once, without their going through the ranks?—But where are you to find them?

3774. You find them in the irregular horse?—Yes; but they take the irregular horse because they do not object to the discipline. I do not think that they would take the discipline of the line.

3775. Do you think that it would answer to dispense with native commissioned officers altogether, and to appoint two smart European serjeants to every company instead?—I should have no objection to getting rid of the native officers; but I am not quite sure about getting the Europeans, for this reason, we all know the habits of the European soldiers; with a native corps we might say that we would have two serjeants to a company, we should then have twenty or twenty-two Europeans; they would have little or nothing to do, and I think it is just as likely as not that they would turn bad men and take to drinking; even now I have had to dismiss several of our serjeant-majors and our quartermaster-serjeants; they have no society and no company amongst themselves of their own sort.

3776. If there were twenty or twenty-two in every regiment that objection would be obviated, they would have some society?—They would have a little.

3777. There are at present only two?—Yes.

3778. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would not it rather improve than deteriorate their position?—Still twenty-two is a very small number of Europeans. They would get tired of each other. If they cannot refrain from drinking when in their barracks, twenty-two would be no company for them in a native regiment, nor would there be sufficient employment for them.

The witness withdrew.

Adjourned.

Friday, 22nd October 1858.

PRESENT:

Major-General Peel.
Duke of Cambridge.
Marquis of Tweeddale.
Viscount Melville.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir Harry G.W. Smith.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir George A. Wetherall.
Major-Gen. Hancock.
Colonel Burlton.
Colonel Forsyth Tait.

Major-General PEEL in the Chair.

Major-Gen. Sir R. J. H. Vivian, K.C.B.

22nd Oct. 1858.

Major-Gen. Sir Robert J. Hussey Vivian, K.C.B., examined.

3779. (*Chairman.*) Will you have the kindness to state your present rank in the service, the length of time that you have been in India, and what opportunities you have had of forming an opinion upon the questions which have been submitted to you?—I am a major-general in the Indian army, on the Madras establishment. I went to India in 1819, and returned in 1854. During that period I was about four years altogether absent from India. I have therefore served about 30 years in India.

3780. During that period you have been adjutant-general of the troops, have you not?—Yes. I had previously served for a considerable time in that department, and also regimentally. I was adjutant of my regiment during the first Burmese war. I was adjutant general of the army from 1849 to 1854.

3781. Have you formed any opinion as to how far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only?—My attention has been attracted to that particular point by the paper which was forwarded to me, and I have given it every consideration. My opinion is very decidedly in favour of a large body of troops raised for service in India alone. I think that it is very essential that there should be a considerable body of troops of the line likewise. The two establishments induce a spirit of emulation which is good for the service generally. By the presence of Her Majesty's regiments of the line all those improvements which are progressively introduced in England are imparted to the local troops; and that, of course, is of the very greatest benefit to them. My impression is decidedly that the bulk of the additional troops now required for India should be local. I should say one-third should be of the line; the remainder local. I believe the maintenance of a local force to be indispensable on certain grounds, and desirable for many reasons. I think it, in the first place, indispensable in determining this subject, that our primary consideration should be the preservation of our Indian empire; and that this can only be secured by our possessing a force raised for India only. Her Majesty's troops of the line, as a matter of course, must at all times be subject to recall from India to meet emergencies in other parts of Her Majesty's dominions, and it will never do for the future to let the European force in India fall below a certain amount. What would be the consequence were we at the present time to be plunged into a European war, and the sudden recall of troops from India be the result? Such a weakening of the European force could not fail to be of very serious moment. My conviction, therefore, is, that the only proper means of providing for the security of India is by the maintenance of a large local force.

3782. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The reason which you assign specially for a local force is, that you think that there ought to be a certain number of Europeans in India, and that you secure the presence of those Europeans in India by having a local force. Is it your opinion that if the state of things were such that European troops were urgently required anywhere, the government of the day would not turn its attention to the possibility of making the Indian troops useful as well as any other troops of the line? Is it your opinion, on the other hand, that any government would ever venture to withdraw so many European troops from India, whether of the line or local, as would endanger the permanence of our rule in that empire?—I can only submit that in great emergencies at home I should presume that troops might be withdrawn from India as they have been before; as a matter of course it would be done with all the consideration which could be given to India, but there might be paramount reasons why they should be withdrawn for the moment to meet such emergencies as might arise.

3783. Is it your opinion that they would be less withdrawn from India if they were only for Indian service than if they were ordinary regiments of the line? Do you think that that fact would make a difference?—Yes, certainly.

3784. Why should it make a difference?—In the first place, if my suggestion were carried out, the troops would be raised for service in that part of the world alone, and it would be only in most extraordinary emergencies that you would venture to withdraw them; in fact, their withdrawal would be entirely dependent on the decision of the local authorities.

3785. Would any government, except under very extraordinary emergencies, ever venture to withdraw so many European troops as to endanger the state of affairs in India?—We have seen that during the war with Russia regiments were withdrawn, notwithstanding the strongly expressed objections of the Governor General of India. Circumstances may again arise which would render such withdrawal equally necessary, and the Imperial Government might not attach the importance it deserves to the withdrawal of regiments. It should be for the local Government to decide what could be spared.

3786. The regiments you refer to were withdrawn under immense emergencies?—Yes.

3787. And do you not think that under those emergencies, whether they had been local troops or any other description of troops, they would not equally have been withdrawn?—I think not, as I have already stated. I do not think the same risk so likely to arise from the withdrawal of Her Majesty's regiments, if you had the two separate forces in the proportion I propose, as you would then always have a fixed proportion for service in India.

3788. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are you not aware that by the charter, and now by a recent Act of Parliament, the European force is limited and must be limited?—Yes, I am aware that it is so.

3789. This force, I presume by your proposal, is to be larger?—Certainly.

3790. (*Chairman.*) Do I understand you rightly that you consider the advantage of a permanent force raised for India over regiments of the line, to depend entirely upon the liability of the latter being removed from India?—I think that a most important point, but not the only advantage of a local force.

3791. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that the climate of India is such that all fresh blood now and then instilled into the country is an advantage rather than a disadvantage?—I dare say that it would be; you mean in officers and men?

3792. Yes?—I consider that it would be an advantage to instil fresh blood into India; no doubt

that is one of the advantages of the purchase over the seniority system; but I do not think that it meets the disadvantages which to my mind present themselves by troops being suddenly withdrawn on any great emergency, as might be the case with troops of the line.

3793. Do you not think that some arrangement might be made to render that perfectly impossible; and, as a military man, is it not your opinion that one united, similarly disciplined, and organized army is far superior for all purposes of defence and discipline to two armies, one naturally jealous, as it must be, of the other?—For my own part, I conceive that such portion of the European troops as we have already as local troops in India, are equal to any troops in the world. I do not see that there is any difference in their discipline or efficiency in the slightest degree. I think that the one force is quite as good as the other.

3794. Do you think that there would be no jealousy?—I believe that there has always been a certain amount of it, and that it will always continue; you have it in different arms of the service.

3795. Should there be any jealousy? Is it not the great object of all military organization to prevent jealousy?—I do not believe it can be prevented.

3796. Would you not tend to increase jealousy by establishing a local force, and having a force of the line at the same time; whereas if you had but one force you would amalgamate the army in such a manner that jealousy would disappear?—I believe a certain amount of jealousy will always exist in the different arms of the same service. I have already alluded to the spirit of emulation which I think the two forces naturally create and excite.

3797. Cannot there be a spirit of emulation in one and the same army? Is not there a sufficient spirit of emulation in different regiments?—No doubt it exists likewise in different regiments, but I think it exists to a still greater extent when the services are distinct.

3798. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think, now that the whole of the European troops in India will be under Her Majesty, there will be the same ground for jealousies that there was under the previous system?—If the armies are kept up distinct, and if there is to be a purely local army, I doubt very much whether there may not still be certain grounds for jealousy.

3799. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Without reference at all to the question of the Indian army being local or not local, as a question of discipline and of military organization, is not an army united, that is to say, organised entirely on the same footing, a more manageable and more powerful body, than an army composed of two distinct descriptions of troops, to a great extent, as you yourself must admit and as we all must admit, jealous, or at all events to a certain extent jealous, of the other?—As a general principle, no doubt such an army is to be preferred; but no such disadvantage has arisen from the united action of the two armies in India as to counterbalance the advantages resulting from the maintenance of a local force.

3800. Do you not think that a regiment fresh from England is in a higher state of discipline than any regiment of any description which has been in the climate of India for a long period?—I really believe that Her Majesty's regiments in India, particularly after some years' duty there, and those which formerly belonged to the local service, are ordinarily in as fine condition as regiments in England; that is really my impression. I would beg to remark, that I have only given one reason for what I have advanced in favour of a local force, I have other reasons, of course.

3801. Will you be so kind as to let us have those reasons?—The second point to which I would principally refer, was brought to my notice through a paper which I have recently read of Mr. J. P. Grant, the Vice-President in Council in India. He very strongly presents to notice that one principal item of expenditure in India is our military establishments, and that before the mutiny we had no surplus nor any means of saving. He states, that as one of the principal items of expenditure in the military departments is the pay and pensions of European officers, and as we have a very large body of European officers in Bengal at the present moment at our disposal, in consequence of the mutiny of the native regiments of that army, our financial position will compel us to employ those officers in any future re-organization, and particularly in raising fresh European regiments; that those officers, as they are now in our pay and must eventually be pensioned, are the officers to put to any such fresh regiments. I think that is a very great point for consideration, because it touches largely on the financial question, and it is one which cannot fail to have consideration in any future re-organization of the army. I think, not only on the financial point is it deserving of consideration, but I believe that the conduct of the officers of the Bengal army during the late most trying events has been beyond all praise, and that it would be a most ungenerous return for their sacrifices and self-devotion to pass them over in any future organization which may take place. I think that they ought to be employed on those grounds alone. I of course attach very great weight to the financial considerations. I cannot fail to do so in my double capacity as a military man, and as occupying the position which I hold elsewhere. I feel that it is absolutely incumbent on us to watch vigilantly the financial bearings of any project for a future re-organization of the army. It is very important to remember that a local force officered as suggested must be so much expense spared as compared with officers of the line. Then, again, I would say that the reliefs of regiments of the line, presuming that regiments of the line are to form a great portion of the force in India, could not fail to be a very heavy burden on the Indian finances. I may state that the passage allowance of the European officers alone, of a regiment of the line to and from India, amounts to upwards of 11,000*l.* Now, assuming that your whole force is to consist of regiments of the line, I presume that hereafter you will not have in India less than from 60,000 to 70,000, men or probably more. Presuming the ordinary reliefs to take place every 10 or 12 years, you would, to effect the requisite reliefs, be required to have at least from 6,000 to 7,000 men continually upon the seas, with their officers and head-quarters of regiments. I think that that is a very important point. I would say that the cost of that, whatever it might be, must be again in excess of the cost of a local regiment, which is a point for very serious consideration.

3802. Supposing that all those officers to whom you allude were as a matter of course taken into the service and employed in the way that you propose, giving them all their rights and making such arrangements as you refer to in order to put them into the regular service, would you then object to this change?—Still I say that you could not better employ them than by putting them to new local European regiments.

3803. Supposing you do that, but appoint them to regiments of the line, what is the objection to that?—That would not at all alter the expense of the reliefs.

3804. That is another question—financially you say that the system to which you are opposed would be a great expense, because these officers would all have to be pensioned and others put into their places. Suppose that were not so, and that the existing officers were all accepted in regiments of the line upon certain terms to be fixed?—In that case, supposing the arrangement practicable, my argument on that particular point would drop.

3805. (*Chairman.*) What is the expense to the Company of one of their own European regiments compared with the expense of a regiment of the line?—The expense of one regiment is as nearly as possible equal to that of the other.

3806. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) As to the expense of sending out troops, you must send out draughts?—So

Major-Gen. Sir R. J. H. Vivian, K.C.B.

22nd Oct. 1858.

you would under any circumstances. What I mentioned just now was totally irrespective of draughts—draughts must be still sent out to the same amount to keep regiments complete. In the 6,000 or 7,000 men to which I adverted, I alluded entirely to regiments which would have to proceed to India to relieve regiments coming home. Independently of those, as a matter of course the draughts which are now necessary would still be required for both services just to the same extent as now.

3807. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) As a matter of expense, have you any idea or have you made any calculation as to the excess of the expense in regular reliefs or in keeping up the efficiency of the officers of the local European troops and the men?—I have not gone into a calculation; my own impression is that the expense of the reliefs is entirely extra when the reliefs are to be for the line; that is to say, presuming that the regiments of the line are to form the European force in India, I consider that the reliefs of those corps will be an entirely extra expense to the Indian finances.

3808. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you put all draughts in that category?—I think the draughts are the same either way.

3809. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You mean that if half the European force consists of local troops, those troops will never require any reliefs, and that to such extent there would be an economy to the state?—Yes, I think that there would be a downright saving to that extent.

3810. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What do you suppose roughly would be the saving?—The officers alone of a regiment cost in the transit to and from India 11,000*l.*; that is the only thing that I have calculated; the expense of the transport of troops varies very considerably: it may be from 10*l.* to 20*l.* or 30*l.* a head, it depends upon whether sailing vessels or screw steamers are used; probably many here have gone into that question more recently and fully than myself, for the transport question has been very much discussed lately. I have not gone into figures.

3811. (*Viscount Melville.*) It is stated that the expense of a field officer is 135*l.*, a captain 110*l.*, and a subaltern 95*l.* By the Cape route and steamers it is from 19*l.* to 45*l.* a man; in sailing vessels from 11*l.* to 26*l.*?—In ordinary times I believe that you get it done in sailing vessels at from 10*l.* to 12*l.* or 15*l.* a man. The figures quoted are much higher than those I have based my opinions on.

3812. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that, on principle, a local corps is as efficient as a regiment of the line?—Yes; I think that a European local corps is quite as efficient as a regiment of the line.

3813. Do you not recollect that the Duke of Wellington and others have always given an opinion that local corps were very objectionable forces, and that they were inferior for service compared with ordinary troops?—I, of course, should always be inclined to bow to any opinion of the Duke's, but, having my own experience to guide me, I cannot admit for a moment that the local troops in India are inefficient.

3814. Not inefficient but inferior?—I do not, myself, consider them at all inferior; I have served with them; I have commanded a European regiment in India; I have never had the honor of being in regimental command of one of Her Majesty's regiments, but I have seen the two together, and they have served together under my command. I think that their being together excites emulation, and that therefore their being associated on duty is to be desired. The local troops gain much from an observance of the interior economy of Her Majesty's regiments of the line. I have stated that the presence of the latter enable us to introduce into the local corps improvements gradually introduced into the army at home; but I cannot admit, even on the high authority which your Royal Highness has placed before me, that our European local troops are in any manner inferior; I believe that there are no better troops under the sun. No better proof of efficiency can be given by a regiment than its conduct in the field. The gallant behaviour of the Company's European regiments, during the recent struggle, is universally admitted. Such as they have now proved, they have ever been, whenever employed in war.

3815. I did not say that the Duke of Wellington had stated that the local corps in India were inefficient; I said that, on principle, a local corps was an inferior corps to an ordinary regiment of the line anywhere, in the West Indies or wherever it might be?—I certainly am not of that opinion as regards our troops in India.

3816. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You have seen perhaps in the Queen's service differences in corps as to discipline and efficiency?—Yes, certainly.

3817. (*Chairman.*) When you have seen them inferior, has it been after they have been some time in India?—I do not think it is possible, that all regiments should be kept up to the same state of discipline; some are certainly inferior to others. I have known regiments in Her Majesty's service fall into indiscipline, and local regiments too, but I attach no particular importance to this. I do not ascribe this state to their having been some time in India.

3818. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that a climate like that of India deteriorates the European constitution to such an extent that it deteriorates a great European body such as a regiment?—I have frequently heard the same observation, but my experience does not lead to the same conclusion. I have heard that regiments on returning from India are supposed to be deteriorated. I have had no opportunities of judging of this, but many causes may contribute to make a regiment look to disadvantage on return from Indian service. For instance, the general break-up before embarkation; the volunteering of the men; the removal of numerous officers to other corps; and the long voyage home, all tend unfavourably to the appearance of a regiment on landing.

3819. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that one of Her Majesty's regiments going to India keeps up the discipline there which it takes out with it after, say, ten years?—I have been stationed with regiments that have been longer out in India, and I have never seen better regiments in any part of the world. A case is within my own knowledge of a regiment quitting India in a far higher state of discipline and efficiency than it was in on its arrival. I saw the corps I refer to shortly after its arrival—a fine body of men and officers, but under a lax system, and inexperienced in Indian requirements. I saw the same regiment within a month of its embarkation for England, after a tour of service of 15 years, and it was in excellent order. This proves what I have before said, that all corps are not brought to the same state of efficiency. So much depends on the commanding officer, and on the supervision of the brigadier and the officer commanding the division. I may notice one point. The same officers seldom remain long in the regiment in which they arrive in India. All grades change. Whether this may account for any supposed change of discipline, I have not had sufficient experience to say.

3820. A European officer who was in the Company's service, or who retired was entitled, to a retiring allowance, was he not?—Yes. A European officer, after having served 22 years in India, is allowed to retire upon the pension of whatever rank he may have attained, or he is allowed to retire after 20 years' service upon the pay of a captain, or after 24 upon the pay of a major, after 28 on the pay of a lieutenant-colonel, and after 32 on the pay of a colonel.

3821. That is an expense chargeable upon the revenues of India?—Undoubtedly.

3822. They pay nothing for the officers of Her Majesty's service who come home; they do not pay their pensions?—No, I suppose not.

3823. Therefore there would be a saving to the Indian revenues if they were relieved from the payment of that retiring allowance to the officers. You

say that it would be much less expensive for the Indian revenue if there were a permanent force instead of having regiments of the line from this country. I wish to show that the officers attached to that permanent force would all be entitled to retiring allowances, therefore you must take that expense into consideration?—Undoubtedly, that is a consideration, but would that relieve the Indian finances entirely?

3824. (*Major-General Hancock.*) The meaning of the question is, that instead of the expense alluded to being defrayed from the Indian revenue, it would fall upon the English revenue?—Yes; and indisputably that in the course of time would so far relieve the Indian finances, provided no fresh demand was made for pensions of Her Majesty's officers and soldiers returning from service in India.

3825. There would be a transfer of the charge from the Indian to the English revenue?—Yes; I quite admit that I have not taken that point into consideration.

3826. Supposing the whole of the European force in India to be furnished from the regular army, would it not involve the extra expense of maintaining a sufficient additional force in England to supply the reliefs?—I should suppose so as a matter of course; you could not keep up a large army in India without increasing your army and establishments at home.

3827. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) Comparing the great expense of maintaining a much larger establishment at Warley with the expense of relieving regiments in India, provided they all belong to the line, would not the result be that the establishment of local corps would not much decrease the expense?—As a matter of course we should have to increase our establishments here very largely; to a certain extent this would add to the cost of the recruit. Such increase of establishment would be equally necessary for Her Majesty's service, and I presume that any extra expense incurred on account of India would be charged to India.

3828. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Putting all these things together, do you not think that the expense would be much the same?—I do not indeed.

3829. (*Viscount Melville.*) Can you state the difference in expense between a European recruit raised for the Company's service, and one for Her Majesty's?—I cannot say that I know the difference. I have a statement which will show what the bounty for a Company's recruit has been.

3830. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) The recruiting officer in the Company's service of the European branch of the army recruited for India receives a fee of 21*s.* for every recruit he raises, and a daily pay of 10*s.*; I believe, therefore, the mode of recruiting for the local army of India is vastly more expensive than that of recruiting for the Queen's army, and you may set that off per contra; you must equalize them. You do not mean to continue that system, I presume?—To tell the truth I have not seen what the expenses of Warley are at the present moment. I was not aware that the expense of a recruit for the former Company's army in India was more than that of one for Her Majesty's service; it is a point which is now first brought to my attention; but if we are to continue to have our own establishments, I do not see why, if there be no impediment to our own recruiting, a recruit for Her Majesty's Indian forces should cost more than a recruit for the line. I had believed that the whole of the East India recruiting establishments were under the authority of the Horse Guards, the same bounty being given, and the standard at all times regulated in communication with the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Army.

3831. (*Chairman.*) You pay now, I believe, for every man sent out to India a certain sum upon his embarking, which is sufficient to cover the expenses of recruiting him and keeping him for a certain time in this country; that is, for the line?—Yes.

3832. What is the comparison between that sum which you so pay, and the expense of your raising a recruit here for your own service and sending him out?—I could not answer that question without referring to official records.

3833. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) Were you, as adjutant-general of the Madras army, cognizant of any order issued by Lord Hardinge, when he was Governor-General, as to the necessity of a more frequent relief of the royal troops in India, in consequence of their deteriorating in health, and discipline, and efficiency?—Not when I was adjutant-general of the army, but I have heard that there was some report to that effect.

3834. (*Chairman.*) Have you any other reasons to give for the opinion which you have stated?—I should consider a local force desirable on this ground, that regiments on their first arrival in India are usually subject to greater mortality than seasoned corps. I would add, that in local corps, both officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, and particularly the medical officers, gain a certain amount of experience of the requirements of the climate. This is all favourable to the local corps. New draughts for a regiment of that kind, by being at once mixed with comrades who are accustomed to the climate, and who to a certain extent know what is good for the preservation of health, are far less subject to mortality than those arriving in a body.

3835. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) We have before us a comparative statement of disease, which does not bear that out at all?—I do not go by any tables upon this matter, I go merely upon a common-sense view of the question. Here I have a valuable paper from India, which I came upon only yesterday, in reference to the number of coups-de-soleil which befel one of Her Majesty's regiments, when a regiment of infantry belonging to the Bombay establishment was perfectly free from it.

3836. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Have you had any opportunity of forming an opinion as to whether what we call green regiments from England, arriving in India, suffer more or less than old regiments arriving from New South Wales and the Cape of Good Hope?—I do not know that my attention has been particularly attracted to that point, but I should think that any regiment which had been partially seasoned elsewhere, would suffer less on arrival in India than a fresh regiment.

3837. The fact is the contrary, that the green regiments do not suffer so much as the others; a regiment fresh from England suffers far less than old regiments from the Cape of Good Hope and New South Wales; those old regiments are the least efficient in India, compared with the young ones?—I am very much astonished to hear that statement.

3838. (*Chairman.*) Here is a "Return showing "the comparative amount of casualties amongst the "Queen's regiments of infantry on the Indian establishment and the European infantry in the service of "the East India Company, as deduced from the number of deaths, discharges in India, and men invalided "and sent to this country, during the ten years from "1843 to 1852," by which it appears that the casualties per cent. of the Queen's troops are 9·8, while those of the East India Company's European troops are 9·4, so that the difference between them is very slight, and this return would not bear out your argument?—I cannot quite agree with that; I do not know what may be the case in the long run, but indisputably regiments on first arriving in India are subject to greater mortality than they are afterwards.

3839. But this return takes the whole ten years?—It may be owing to fifty circumstances; a regiment may be badly located. I am quite impressed with the belief that regiments on first arriving have a larger amount of casualties than others, which may be attributed to their inexperience in every point of view and the inexperience of their medical officers. I do not wish to detract in the slightest degree from these officers, but a certain local experience is necessary. Will you allow me, with reference to what I have said, to read a part of a medical report:—"The attention of the superintending surgeon (Dr. "Arnott) was arrested to the somewhat remarkable

Major-Gen. Sir R. J. H. Vivian, K.C.B.

22nd Oct. 1858.

" fact that of the two European regiments engaged at " the affair before Koonch on the 7th May 1858, the " right wing of Her Majesty's 71st regiment, about " 425 strong, had 20 men attacked with sun stroke, of " whom seven died, whilst the portion of the 3rd " Bombay Europeans, about 330 strong, had not only " no casualty from but no man attacked by this disease, " although both corps were equally exposed to the " same causes of disease and were under circumstances " to all appearance precisely similar. The superin- " tending surgeon proposed that the committee should " inquire into the supply of drinking water to each " corps during the day, the allowance of food and " grog previous to going into action, their dress and " equipment, and the acclimatization of the men to " India. Dr. Arnott states, 'Should the inquiry " 'elucidate in the slightest degree what predisposes " 'most to this formidable malady, so that the causes " 'might be known and avoided, it would be conferring " 'a blessing of inestimable value on armies obliged " 'to take the field in the hot season in India with " 'the thermometer standing as it now does on an " 'average at upwards of 110° in our tents.' The " committee was composed of three medical officers, " the surgeon of Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons, the " surgeon of Her Majesty's 71st Highlanders, and the " assistant surgeon of the 3rd European regiment. " The prosecution of the inquiries by the committee " could not, however, be regularly conducted, owing to " urgent professional calls upon their time in the " immediate vicinity of the enemy; nevertheless they " submitted a minute and comprehensive report, of " which the following is a brief summary:—Although " no difference could be traced with respect to the " food, rations, or grog issued to both corps, and " although the men of each regiment partook of their " allowances for the day at the same time (neither " corps going into action under the influence of " either excessive repletion or the reverse), yet the " supply of drinking water before Koonch among " the 71st, tolerably abundant until about 11 a.m., was " by no means sufficient from that hour until 3 p.m., " whilst in the 3rd European regiment the supply " appears to have been scanty at first, but more plen- " tiful from 12 o'clock onward; between the hours " of 11 a.m. and 3 p.m. both corps were equally " exposed to the influence of the sun, in an open " plain where no shelter was obtainable. The general " dress of both corps was well suited for field service " in the hot months, that of the 71st admirably so, " being loose, comfortable, and allowing the free " unrestrained use of every limb; no stock or necker- " chief was worn by either corps before Koonch, " or if anything was put round the neck it was " a low soft stock or neckerchief. The head dress " of the 71st, consisting of the ordinary regimental " Highland bonnet and peak, with a cap cover of " thick cotton cloth of a grey colour, a roller stuffed " with cotton, and a broad flap hanging down behind, " was deemed superior to that of the 3rd Europeans, " which consisted of the ordinary Kilmarnock cap, " with a dark reddish orange-coloured turban folded " round, with a portion of it hanging down behind. " The men of the 71st regiment carried 60 rounds, " whilst those of the 3rd regiment only 40 rounds " of ammunition in their pouches. The committee " lay considerable stress on the antecedent circum- " stances of the two corps, as follows:—The 3rd " Europeans, of about an average service of three " years in India, took the field in July and October " 1857, and although employed on arduous duties, " including the siege of Jhansi, enjoyed as a corps " general good health. They were gradually trained " to field duties during the most favourable period " of the year, and were more or less enured to the " climate from previous residence in the country. " The 71st Highlanders arrived in Bombay at the " beginning of February 1858 by the overland route, " and the right wing was forwarded by bullock train " to Mhow, which station it left at the end of March " for Goonah and Jhansi, *i.e.* at the commencement of " the hot season, and under circumstances of great " disadvantage to a newly arrived corps. The " marches, from being double, were sometimes very " long, and the weather, particularly after leaving " Goonah, became very hot (on the 22nd April the " thermometer stood at 120°). The badness of the " roads, breakage of carts, &c., interfered with the " pitching of the camp before the sun was well up, " but this was obviated after camel carriage was " procured at Jhansi, a description of carriage the " 3rd Europeans had not been without." These are certainly all extraordinary circumstances; still it is a fresh corps arriving in India that suffers, and a regiment gradually acclimated that escapes.

3840. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) By a letter from Banda, from an officer on the staff with the 71st regiment, it appeared that they had marched 700 miles, that the thermometer was then at 135°, and that they had only three men on the sick list?—My object in bringing that paper here, which I came upon only last evening, was because I thought that to a certain extent it confirmed the views which I entertain, that an acclimated corps is less subject to disease than another; and it is pretty plain in that case, that the regiment which was acclimated did not suffer as the other, although it was at the time under precisely similar circumstances.

3841. (*Chairman.*) Have you any other reasons for the opinion you have expressed?—It occurs to me also that in local corps, by the admission of a certain class of men termed Indo-Britons, considerable relief eventually might be given to the recruiting at home. I rather think that I stand pretty nearly alone in the opinion which I maintain upon this point. There is something very much akin to the caste feeling which we so much object to in India, upon the subject of the employment of the half-caste; that is to say, the son of a European soldier by a native or a half-caste woman, but I think that the prejudice is extremely unfair. I do not think that that class of people have had at all a fair trial, and I believe that with the large accession of Europeans which is constantly taking place in India, we shall have by-and-by a very large number of that class. I think that their introduction into the ranks would not only assist in the recruiting of the army, which would be a great point gained, I should presume, but I think that it would be a means of raising that class very considerably, not only in their own but in the estimation of others. I firmly believe that if those men were fed, clothed, and paid as Europeans, they would turn out remarkably good men; and that their association with Europeans would make them all but European. I attach considerable importance to that point. Then, again, financially, I would only state that by as many recruits as you get in that way, you save the expense of sending them out from and recruiting in this country. I would introduce this class of men into the local corps in India; I would put them into the ranks with the Europeans.

3842. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What difficulty is there in putting them into the ranks of the line?—I do not mean to say that they may not be introduced into Her Majesty's regiments of the line, but whether it would be considered suitable or not I do not know. I know that there is a very strong feeling against that class; I have stated my own views upon that point; I think that eventually as the class increases, their employment will be a matter for serious consideration. Then I would likewise mention, in favour of the local force, that when our men receive their pensions they, in very great numbers, elect India for their place of residence, and there draw their stipends. Men are ordinarily invalided home from the line, whereas those belonging to local corps are transferred, when unfit for field duty, to what are termed veteran companies. Now this, in time of emergency, is a great advantage. It so happened that in Mysore, Sir Mark Cubbon, the able commissioner of that country, embodied a number of resident pensioners at Bangalore; he armed them and made them very

useful during a trying period there, and by such means he was enabled to dispense with a certain number of the troops of the line, which he could not otherwise have spared. I think that having this element is very beneficial, and that the greater the number of local troops which you have, the larger it necessarily must become.

3843. Could not you discharge the men of the line equally as well in India as at home?—The question is, will they remain; do they elect to stay there? At present they do not.

3844. Has anything ever been done for a soldier of the line in India, except just taking him out and bringing him back again?—I believe there is nothing more done for the soldier of the former Company's army.

3845. Except offering to him to remain if he likes?—You have some who do remain there from Her Majesty's service, but they are few in number; it is a matter quite optional, and I presume from its being optional, and so few remaining there belonging to the line, that the larger the number of local European troops which we have there, the larger the body that we shall have of veterans and pensioners in India.

3846. I understood you to say that these men were transferred to what you termed veteran companies?—Some of them.

3847. That has never been open to regiments of the line?—No; it is a different service.

3848. If you opened it to the line would you not get the same results?—I am doubtful whether you would. The men of the line do not mix so much with the natives; they have besides the advantage of being invalided home. There is one other point to which I would simply advert, as I think that it bears upon the question, although it is not of the same importance to my mind, namely, that a large portion of men are sent from our local European regiments to the public works department and to the staff. Now some supply of that kind is very necessary, and I conceive that a local corps is the natural source of such supply.

3849. Supposing that arrangements were made extending to regiments of the line those local regulations which have hitherto been confined to the regiments of the Company's service, would you still think that a regiment of the line is not better for service than a local regiment?—Yes; I adhere to the opinion which I have already given to your Royal Highness: I consider a local regiment quite equal to a regiment of the line.

3850. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Have you observed, during your long service in India, any particular difference in the general deportment and demeanour of a line regiment and a local regiment towards the natives—does the one fraternize more with the natives than the other, when the men know that they have a permanent home in India?—I consider that they do fraternize much more with them, and they intermarry very much more with the natives, but beyond that I have not noticed any difference in their demeanour.

3851. Do you think that that is a considerable advantage?—I think that it is a decided advantage.

3852. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) Do I rightly understand you to say that one of your reasons for increasing the local European force of Bengal is the great number of officers now doing nothing in Bengal, whom it would be necessary to appoint to such European regiments?—Yes; officers belonging to regiments having mutinied.

3853. Why not appoint them to the native regiments which must be raised?—Without understanding what is to be the system of organization, I am all abroad. I do not know what the system is to be. I know that you must have a large number of Europeans compared with what you have, and my observations tend to that point.

3854. You have not more officers in Bengal now, doing nothing, than would be sufficient to officer 100,000 men?—No, I think not, but it depends on what the organization is to be.

3855. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) If all those officers were employed, in whatever force you called it hereafter, supposing it was a line force, would you not get over that difficulty altogether about the officers and about the expense?—I have already stated, in reply to a similar question from your Royal Highness, that of course if they are to be employed in the way you mention, if troops of the line are to be sent out there, and these officers are to be attached to them, my argument falls to the ground on the point of expense, as regards these officers.

3856. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are you aware that for ten years, from 1843 to 1852, the local regiments in the Company's service have been invariably under the establishment, while those of the royal army have been generally rather above?—I think that that is an error. I am not aware of the fact.

3857. Will you look at that return (*handing the same to the witness*)?—I had my attention particularly attracted to the circumstance of the artillery in Bengal having been below its numbers. It was so stated in a paper received from the Governor-General of India which came before me in my official capacity in the East India House, and I was so much struck by it that I called for a return upon the subject. The result of that return is as follows:—The paper before me from the East India House says, "From "the return of military forces in India laid before "Parliament 16th April 1858, it appears that Her "Majesty's infantry which in 1853 numbered 23,049 "non-commissioned and rank and file, in 1857 were "reduced to 20,884. In the evidence given to the "Transport Committee it is stated, that early in 1857 "the number wanting to complete in Her Majesty's "infantry was 1,950. It scarcely ever happens that "Her Majesty's infantry regiments in India are com-"plete at head-quarters." That would be the same I presume in the local corps. "In the same return "as that above mentioned the European foot artillery "of the Company's service are specified as follows:"—Then come the actual strength and the establishment, but although there were, in 1852, 5,173, and in 1856 4,725, which was a decrease, and in 1857 4,390, yet these numbers are, in point of fact, in each year above the establishment. In the infantry regiments the strength was in 1852, 6,089, the establishment was 5,640. In 1853 the strength was 6,140. In 1853 the establishment was the same as in 1852, viz. 5,640; for those two years the strength is above the establishment. Then, in 1854, came an order for three new regiments, and of course in the process of filling up those three regiments there would be a falling off in the strength as compared with the establishment; I believe it is to be accounted for in that way. This is the return furnished to me by the India House upon that point. The European infantry regiments in 1852 had 449 supernumeraries; in 1853, 500. They were wanting to complete in 1854, 2,125; in 1855, 933; in 1856, 345; also in 1857, 357. "The re-"cruiting fell off during the Crimean war, but in-"creased again in 1856 and 1857, as will appear "from the annexed Return" (which with permission I will leave here) "of Recruits embarked for India "from 1851 to 1858."

The witness delivered in the same, which is as follows:—

Major-Gen. Sir R. J. H. Vivian, K.C.B.

2nd Oct. 1858.

RETURN of the number of RECRUITS embarked for India from the Year 1851 to 8th October 1858, inclusive.

Years.	Engineers.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	TOTAL.	REMARKS.
1851	26	606	—	232	864	31st Jan. 1851. Recruiting for infantry suspended. 20th June, Recruiting for artillery restricted to 20 per month from each district. 24th Dec. Restriction removed from enlistment of artillery.
1852	22	626	—	379	1,027	22d Mar. 1852. Recruiting limited to 8 artillery and 8 infantry from each district per month. 28th Sept. 1852. Recruiting limited to 10 artillery and 4 infantry from each district per month.
1853	27	724	—	1,522	2,273	13th Jan. 1853. Restriction removed from artillery recruiting, and infantry increased to 10 per month from district. 28th Jan. 1853. Restrictions from infantry removed. 8th Sept. 1853. Infantry standard reduced to 5 feet 5½ inches.
1854	36	516	—	1,504	2,056	1st Nov. 1854. Bounty raised to 6*l*. No restrictions.
1855	29	448	—	1,176	1,653	February 1855. Bounty raised to 7*l*. No restrictions.
1856	76	543	—	946	1,565	February 1855. Bounty raised to 8*l*. May 1856. Bounty reduced to 2*l*. and a free kit. 15th Aug. 1856. Infantry standard raised to 5ft. 6in. 20 per month from each district. 18th Sept. 1856. 10 artillery and 10 infantry per month from each district. 4th Oct. all recruiting suspended. 4th Dec. 1856. 10 artillery and 10 infantry per month from each district.
1857	89	1,294	814	1,519	3,716	13th Mar. 1857. Recruiting for artillery unlimited. 4th June 1857, Recruiting for infantry unlimited. 23rd July 1857. Standard for artillery reduced to 5ft. 7in. 15th Aug. Infantry standard reduced to 5ft. 5½in. 8th Oct. 1857. Infantry standard again reduced to 5ft. 4in. 22nd Oct. 1857. Cavalry recruiting ordered from 5ft. to 5ft. 4in. 18th Dec. Cavalry standard raised from 5ft. 2in. to 5ft. 4in. 18th Dec. 1857. Infantry standard raised to 5ft. 6in. 31st Dec. 1857. Recruiting for cavalry restricted to 60 men per month from each district.
To 8th Oct. 1858	89	712	2,515	1,833	5,149	February 1858. Bounty raised to 3*l*. and a free kit. 23d April 1858. Infantry standard reduced to 5ft. 3in. 29th April 1858. Cavalry recruiting restricted to 20 per month from each district. 11th June 1858. Artillery standard reduced to 5ft. 6in. 19th Aug. 1858. New recruiting district established at York. 27th Aug. 1858. Cavalry restricted to 5 per month for each district, and standard raised from 5ft. 3in. to 5ft. 4in. 26th July 1858. Artillery standard reduced to 5ft. 5in.
	394	5,469	3,329	9,111	18,303	

3858. (*Chairman.*) Previously to 1853 the Company had only the power of raising 12,000 Europeans to be kept in India, and 2,000 at home?—Prior to the year 1853 the maximum number of European troops to be kept up by the East India Company was restricted by law to 12,200 in India and 2,000 at the recruiting depôt at home.

3859. In the year 1853 the power was increased to 20,000 in India, and 4,000 at home?—Yes.

3860. How many of those have been raised since that period; how many have you been able to raise in addition to the 12,000 which you had power to raise in 1853?—Will you allow me to read this part of the document, because it touches exactly upon that point: "In that year," that is, the year 1853, "it was determined to add to the establishment three "regiments of infantry of the aggregate strength of "2,772, and as this addition was in excess to the "parliamentary standard, it became necessary to apply "for a revision of the law. The minister for India "then proposed that instead of raising the maximum "number merely to that required, to include the three "regiments, application should be made to Parliament "to raise the maximum to 20,000 in India, and 4,000 "at the depôt, thus allowing a margin for future addi-"tions when required," but the establishment was not raised to this extent until the additions which were sanctioned during the last and present year were made.

3861. Although you have had the power of raising your permanent local army from 12,000 to 20,000, I believe the actual increase has been only about 1,000?—The increase is mentioned here: "Since this time an "addition of four regiments of light cavalry and three "more regiments of infantry has been sanctioned, and "recruits are being raised to complete them. No less "than 8,865 recruits have been embarked for India in "the last year and nine months, terminating the 8th "instant." This is dated in the present month.

3862. What is the total strength of the European permanent army in India now?—I cannot accurately say. The returns are in arrear. The only numbers wanting to complete are these 357 in 1857, and we have been going on adding enormously since then.

3863. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) If you have embarked 8,000, and you had 12,000 there before, you must have 20,000?—Yes; we are, I suppose, very nearly up to the standard now; but a large allowance must be made for casualties.

3864. (*Chairman.*) The total increase, as stated in the return before me, is 1,210 men?—Here is the statement of 8,000 who have gone out.

3865. How many have you lost; what is the absolute strength of your European force at this moment?—I ought to have brought the last returns, but they are much in arrear, and I cannot therefore speak positively on either question. I should think that we must now be very close upon our complement in India, allowing, however, a large margin for casualties. Recruits for the Indian service, during the last year and nine months, have come in so rapidly, that it has been frequently found necessary to restrict recruiting, owing to want of space in our barracks; and we have been compelled to hurry out recruits to India from the same cause.

3866. You say that you would add greatly to the permanent local force in India; to what extent would you add to it? What do you think ought to be the fixed permanent force there?—I have said that about one-third ought to be regiments of the line and the remainder local corps. I do not know what force has been determined upon; it is a very wide question; it is a point, I believe, under consideration here and in India, but I presume that in future it is quite impossible to have in India, for a very considerable time to come, less than from 60,000 to 70,000 men at the very least; according to my view it would be a simple calculation, 20,000 troops of the line would be about the allotment.

3867. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would have fewer regiments of the line in future than you had before?—Yes, because of the extraordinary expense, as I believe, and the necessity for maintaining a European force not subject to removal, as I have already stated.

3868. So that the line, instead of being looked up to as heretofore by the numerically smaller force, namely, the local force, would have the local force much superior in numbers, and would therefore have rather to look up to the local force?—I cannot admit that there is any superiority or inferiority in either service. I consider both equally efficient.

3869. (*Chairman.*) How do you propose to raise this permanent force of 40,000 Europeans; where do you propose to recruit them?—I presume that we have already nearly 20,000 men.

3870. According to your own return you have quite the contrary, you have never been able to raise the 20,000 men that you have had power to get?—We have never until very recently had the power to increase our force to 20,000 men. This was a limit fixed by Parliament, which we might reach but could not exceed. It must always be remembered, notwithstanding the increase of force allowed by the Act, that not a single man could be added to our establishment, even to raise it to the 20,000, without the previous sanction of Her Majesty's Government. 8,000 recruits have been sent out within the last one year and nine months, since this sanction was obtained.

3871. This return is up to the 12th of April 1858, and it is your own return?—It is not possible that they should have given me a false return from the India House. I am quite willing to place my faith upon this document.

3872. Do you propose to enlist them in the same manner as you do now in this country?—Yes.

3873. Have you reason to believe that you could increase your army to that amount, enlisting them in this country?—If within the last two years we have been able to get 9,000 men, I do not see what is to prevent us.

3874. According to this return you have not added to your number 9,000 men?—This number has been sent out, but casualties must, of course, be allowed for. It must be remembered that such casualties and such times as we have recently passed through are not to be always recurring.

3875. Then you would enlist for that force in competition with the Queen's army in this country?—It is all one army. I attach great importance to the local army, both officers and men (the officers particularly), being accustomed to the habits of the people and knowing the language of the country, and in every respect I think it is desirable that there should be a local force. This is my firm conviction, and I am bound to give the opinions I conscientiously entertain.

3876. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Practically, how are you to recruit for two armies, one against the other?—I suppose your Royal Highness will give us every possible assistance.

3877. I am speaking of how, practically, it is to be done?—We shall be obliged to increase our establishments as a matter of course. I have not worked out the details of any plan. Recruiting for a large army here and a large army in India is a very difficult thing, but supposing the additional troops to be of the line they would have to be recruited here. Why should not our establishments be able to recruit in the same manner?

3878. But one establishment recruiting against another is a very different process from one establishment recruiting generally for all, and must be much more expensive?—If it should prove so, and our establishments be given up, we shall be glad to depend upon you for recruits.

3879. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) I do not think that the fact of the 8,000 recruits which you have mentioned argues at all the facility of recruiting for the East India Company's service, because a large majority of them were intended for the new cavalry, being men of five feet two, and five feet three?—That is true, and it undoubtedly assisted us, but we obtained what we wanted, light men for cavalry regiments.

Major-Gen. Sir R. J. H. Vivian, K.C.B.

22nd Oct. 1858.

3880. You would not consider men of five feet two and five feet three fit for the infantry service, would you?—I prefer them higher, but the standard was recently reduced to five feet three for the infantry, to meet a pressing emergency for fresh regiments. These once complete, the standard may be raised to such extent as may be deemed necessary; and you will obtain, I have no doubt, men amply sufficient to keep up the strength of corps. I have no objection to an infantry soldier of five feet four or five feet five. With respect to recruiting, I should be sorry to advocate anything which could be detrimental to either one force or the other, but I should hope that the local force of India, which has now become a royal force just as much as the line, would receive every attention from the authorities in this part of the world to keep it complete, and if so, I do not see what the difficulty should be.

3881. To my knowledge the recruiting for the East India Company's service increases the desertion from our army beyond conception. It was only yesterday that I had a communication from an officer of the Guards stating that some men had absented themselves and thrown their kits over the wall, and that they had traced them to the recruiting department of the East India Company at Warley, and begged permission to send an officer there. That is of almost every day occurrence. Therefore that is a great evil in recruiting for two separate services?—I have no doubt there may be that disadvantage. I should think, however, that it might be checked. But does not this circumstance go very much against the argument just now adduced, that we could not get recruits for that part of the world?

3882. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) They get the double bounty. Upon these returns there was a deficiency, at the breaking out of the war in the Bengal Presidency, of foot artillery of 783 men. How do you account for that?—I endeavoured to explain that in the first part of the paper which I have read—there was no deficiency because the number was in excess of the establishment, the number was certainly less than before—they formerly kept up a greater number of supernumeraries—but still there were supernumeraries to the very last.

3883. The foot artillery was 5,173 in 1852 and only 4,390 in 1857?—Exactly so; and at that time the establishment was 4,252. I stated that, notwithstanding the deficiency in number, which certainly did occur at the date referred to, in consequence of the difficulty of recruiting during the Crimean war, and the consequent reduction in the number of supernumeraries, yet still we had an excess of the establishment in 1857.

3884. Will you explain to me in what way that could happen? You say that you had a deficiency of men and an excess of the establishment?—No, not a deficiency of men, but a fewer number of supernumeraries compared with former years. In 1852, for example, there was a larger number of supernumeraries than in 1857; but, nevertheless, in 1857 we had an excess of the establishment.

3885. (*Chairman.*) What was the establishment in 1852?—4,226. We had a greater number of supernumeraries; it has been the practice to keep up supernumeraries.

3886. Are half-castes now allowed to enlist in the Indian service?—There is nothing positively against it, beyond the objection that officers in command of regiments have usually had to entertaining half-castes. It has not been the custom to enlist them.

3887. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) They are allowed in the bands?—Yes, they are allowed in the bands; they are allowed in the bands of the native regiments particularly.

3888. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Are you not aware that according to the charter of 1833 no man is excluded on account of his caste or colour?—I only speak of the fact. In my own regiment I know that there were not more than two or three Indo-Britons in the ranks.

3889. (*Chairman.*) You have pointed out that you think that that would be one means of relieving the difficulty of recruiting; to what extent would it be so?—I spoke of it as a prospective arrangement. I think that the great addition of Europeans now pouring into India will be the means of largely augmenting this class. I think that at the present moment there is a very proper feeling against enlisting these men, because generally they have not the requisite stamina; but I attribute that more to the manner in which as children they are left to their native mothers; they are made more natives of than otherwise; I wish to see the reverse done. It is not a thing which can take place as to-morrow; I do not at all mean that, but it is as a prospective arrangement entirely that I advocate it. Even presuming that my plan with regard to the local army were adopted, I do not think for one moment that the 20,000 additional men are to be raised in a year. There are, I presume, troops enough in India at the present moment, and I hope far more than enough, for anything that will be hereafter required. The addition to the local force would be introduced gradually.

3890. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then would you disband line regiments in order to form this local corps?—Certainly not. In lieu of sending out a regiment to relieve any regiment going home, I would raise a local corps in its place if required.

3891. The finances of England would never allow all the additional expenses, therefore you must disband the Queen's regiments of the line?—That is a point which I have not considered.

3892. (*Chairman.*) Would the pensioners of the Indian army to whom you have alluded be considered as part of the force?—No, they are quite independent of it.

3893. You stated that you thought that a very small portion of the Queen's forces were discharged in India?—That a very small portion took up their pensions in India, and remained there.

3894. It appears by a return that one-fifth of those who obtain their discharges are discharged in India?—Yes, but they do not remain. I have referred to a return, and I find that the number of pensioners from the line electing to reside in India is very small comparatively with the number of pensioners from the local corps, who continue to remain.

3895. Would they have been allowed to enter this corps of pensioners?—Certainly; and no doubt many of them are Chelsea out-pensioners. I am aware that there are several of this class in India; but I think that from the very circumstance brought to notice just now, of the men of local corps mixing so much more with natives, they more readily desire to continue to reside in India with their families.

3896. Then I understand the result of your evidence to be, that two-thirds of any European force to be kept in India should be enlisted for local duties in India?—Yes.

3897. That they should be there permanently?—Yes.

3898. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you include all arms in that recommendation?—Yes.

3899. (*Viscount Melville.*) You would have local artillery, and local cavalry, and local infantry?—Yes.

3900. (*Chairman.*) I understand you to say that both these armies were to be royal armies. In what respect is this permanent force there to be a royal army?—As it is at the present moment.

3901. Is it to be liable to be called upon, supposing Her Majesty wants troops to serve elsewhere?—Certainly not. It is expressly to guard against the weakening of the European force in India during a European war, by the withdrawal of regiments by Her Majesty's Government that I advocate the employment of a force not liable to recal for service elsewhere; at any rate, not without the consent of the local government. It is well known that during the Crimean war two or three regiments were brought from India in opposition to the deliberately recorded opinion of the Governor-General, "that the European "force at his disposal ought not to be weakened by the "withdrawal of a single soldier." The government of India subsequently expressed its opinion that even a

partial and temporary reduction of Her Majesty's infantry might lead to serious embarrassment. To my mind, the withdrawal of three or four regiments of infantry could scarcely afford to Her Majesty's Government in time of war such assistance as to counterbalance the serious risk incurred by weakening to that extent the comparatively small and scattered force in India; while the importance of retaining two or three regiments of the line in our widely-spread territories in the East, where the great moral effect of even one regiment in a district, can be readily comprehended.

3902. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Does not that cripple the resources of the empire for all purposes? Supposing you wanted those troops for Persia, you could not send them to Persia?—Then I would say Asia, subject to the controlling authority of the Governor-General of India.

3903. Why cripple the resources of an empire at all; why not let any great empire have all its resources available for any part of the empire?—I can only state the opinion which I have formed.

3904. (*Chairman.*) Would you enlist these men and officers upon exactly the same terms as they have been on hitherto?—Yes.

3905. In fact, the only change is to be, that it is to be called a royal army instead of being the army of the Company's service?—I do not see what further is necessary to be done; we are the servants of the Crown.

3906. Is Her Majesty to exercise the same authority over that portion of her army as she would over the other portion of her army?—Yes, through a certain instrumentality.

3907. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Through what instrumentality?—Through the instrumentality which is provided for, I presume, in the recent Act, by the Secretary of State for India, and the Council of India, who have the command of the finances of India.

3908. Then the Queen is to be represented by two armies, one responsible to the Secretary of State for War and the Commander-in-Chief, and the other to the Secretary of State for India and the Council in India; you cannot have unity of action with two heads?—I do not see any objection to the system.

3909. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are the officers as well as the men for this local force to be local?—Certainly.

3910. Not transferrable to the moveable force?—That will come in answer to another head of the questions submitted to me.

3911. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have you ever in history read of any country having two armies under one head?—Our position in India is unprecedented.

3912. Have you ever heard of a state which would thrive with a double system of army?—As I said before, I do not know any case parallel to the present one.

3913. (*Chairman.*) You consider the Act of Parliament definitive as to the terms upon which the army is to be transferred to the Crown?—That is my impression; a fresh Act could alter them. My view is, that it is intended that the army is to be governed through the instrumentality I have adverted to. I see no provision for anything else; I see a distinct provision made for all the charges of that army being vested in the President in Council, and I do not myself see any other authority adverted to than that, beyond the name of Her Majesty, who has to appoint in fact every officer to the army at the present moment.

3914. My impression was that that was only introduced in order temporarily to show the manner in which the army was to be managed until this Commission had reported. The very first question submitted to us is, "What are the terms upon which the army of "the East India Company is to be transferred to the "Crown?"—It will be for Parliament to determine whether an alteration of the Act may be required in consequence of the opinion you may arrive at here. I am only alluding to the Act as it stands, according to my individual interpretation of it.

3915. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) As a military man, perfectly irrespectively of your position in the Council of India, I wish to ask you how is the discipline of those two armies to be conducted; are they to be perfectly separate and distinct, or are they to be conducted on the same principles; and if they are not to be conducted on the same principles, how are the two armies to go on together?—I can see no difficulty with regard to the discipline in carrying out the rules hitherto in practice, or rules similar to them. The local force has its distinct articles of war; there are three several Commanders-in-Chief in India at the present moment.

3916. Is not that one of the greatest inconveniences of the service, that those three systems have been going on, and that one is a very superior to another?—I am not aware of any inconvenience which has arisen from it. I think there has been this decided advantage by the different systems. Had the three armies been under one head the same system would probably have been introduced at the different Presidencies, whereas the different systems have proved of the highest importance to us during recent events.

3917. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you of opinion that the local British force should report direct to the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief in India, without reference at all to the Commander-in-Chief in England; are they to be local troops and to report to the Commander-in-Chief in India; or are they to be organized and managed through the medium of the Commander-in-Chief in England?—My opinion is, that the local army must continue under the authority of the Governor-General of India.

3918. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Knowing so much as you do of the feelings of the natives with regard to armies, and the command of armies, and the power of managing armies, are you not of opinion that it would detract very much from the prestige of the Governor-General in Council if it were known that he had not the command of that army?—I think that would be the result were the supreme control of the army of India withdrawn from the Governor-General.

3919. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Had he ever the command of that army during the time of the late East India Company; was not it under the authority of the East India Company that he held the control of that army?—Certainly; he held his authority under his appointment by the Company.

3920. What difference is there in its being under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief?—I think it more than probable, were the authority of the Commander-in-Chief established over the local army, there would be constantly conflicting opinions between him and the Council, which, to say the least, would prove embarrassing. It would be introducing a separate authority not provided for by the Act, and be liable to cause the same delay in the transaction of business which was so much complained of under the system of double government.

3921. How do you mean, differences of opinion?—Certain measures might be proposed which the Council of India would not consider themselves justified in carrying out.

3922. Are you aware that the Commander-in-Chief has nothing to do with finance of any kind, the Secretary of State for War has that; the Commander-in-Chief cannot spend one farthing, no more could he do so in India?—I am quite aware of that, but the measures which you might consider indispensably necessary might, perhaps, involve very serious expenses, and those expenses might not be concurred in, and I think that there would be continual collision; that is my impression.

3923. How could there be collision more with the Commander-in-Chief in conjunction with the Secretary of State for India, than there is with the Commander-in-Chief in conjunction with the Secretary of State for War; with whom would there be a collision?—The introduction of another separate and distinct authority would, I think, lead to differences of views.

3924. (*Chairman.*) The Secretary of State for India would be in exactly the same position with

Major-Gen. Sir R. J. H. Vivian, K.C.B.

12nd Oct. 1858.

regard to the Indian army as the Secretary of State for War is in England?—Still I think there is the objection.

3925. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What more risk is there of a collision with the joint action of the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State for India than with the joint action of the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State for War?—I have already stated what I think; namely, that it could not be expected that such an authority could be introduced without causing the differences I have alluded to.

3926. With whom? — With the Commander-in-Chief and the Council of India or the Secretary of State for India.

3927. (*Colonel Burlton.*) I suppose you think that the Council of India, being mainly composed of gentlemen of great Indian experience, would be inclined to think that measures recommended by an authority with no Indian experience would be very different from what they would recommend?—There are a vast number of improvements and matters which may be recommended by the Commander-in-Chief, which if not carried out I think would lead to the collision to which I have adverted.

3928. (*Sir G. A. Wetherall.*) Are you of opinion that the discipline of the local European army as well as of the native army should not be vested in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief of the army, but that it should be continued hereafter as it now is, in the hands of the Governor-General?—I think that while there is a vast number of native forces kept, it is indispensable for that, as for other reasons I have already stated, that the Governor-General should have the supreme authority over the army in India.

3929. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are you not aware that there is nothing which is so great an evil as the system which now prevails of Company's officers being called to do duty in the Queen's service, knowing nothing whatever of the Queen's Regulations or of the Articles of War, and *vice versâ* of Queen's officers being called upon to superintend courts-martial on native troops, who are equally ignorant; can any system be worse?—I have never known one of Her Majesty's officers appointed to superintend a court-martial on native troops in India.

3930. To superintend it—a subaltern of eleven years' standing may superintend it?—That has not come within my knowledge.

3931. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that it would be a desirable and good arrangement, that half the army in India should look up to the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, and that half the army in India should look up to the authority of the Governor-General?—I have already stated what my opinion is on this point.

3932. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not think that one great advantage of a local European force would be found in the greater local knowledge and experience acquired by the officers, and in their consequent superior efficiency for service in India?—I think that local knowledge and experience is a matter of the highest importance.

3933. (*Viscount Melville.*) How is this force to be recruited? You are aware that now there is the militia as a volunteer force as well as Her Majesty's regular forces, and that the East India Company's recruiting force forms a third competing element. Do you think that this is an advantageous thing, or that it is possible under this system to raise the number of men which would be necessary?—In regard to that point, I have already stated that I am not sufficiently informed; I take for granted what I have heard here, and I presume that it is considered (and I can very well understand it) that to any competition in recruiting there might be an objection; but, considering that it is almost one and the same force, I cannot conceive, when you must have the same number of troops, under any circumstances, whether of the line or local, raised for the service, what difference it can make if certain parties are permitted to recruit for India, still treating it as part of the same army.

3934. These men are to be recruited, you say, for India alone, still belonging to the royal army, while the officers are also to be exclusively for India, and part of the royal army for India?—Yes.

3935. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Might not the objection be obviated by recruiting for Her Majesty's service to the full extent required for the European force in India, and afterwards allowing the men to volunteer for the local army?—The fourth head of inquiry submitted to me bears, I think, very much upon that point. I should think that there must be a very great objection at any time to depending entirely for keeping up your establishment upon volunteering alone, of whatever kind.

3936. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Supposing your local force not to be so large as you have contemplated, but to be, as it is now, what do you think of a system by which, instead of direct enlistment for those corps, you would allow the whole army of the line, but particularly those men who were in India, to volunteer for those corps, and keep them up in that way?—I think that that question comes under the fourth heading. I am quite prepared to answer it. I think that the objection is very much what I have stated; namely, that it would never do to depend upon volunteering alone. I think that volunteering is a very excellent plan for filling up with occasionally, but I do not think that it would do to depend entirely upon volunteering to keep up any establishment.

3937. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you of opinion that the two systems might be combined with advantage, permitting volunteering from the line to a certain extent, and recruiting to a certain extent?—Certainly, if it were not considered detrimental to the regiments at home; and I think, particularly in times of emergency, it would be most useful.

3938. (*Chairman.*) In connection with the first of the questions submitted to you, will you state what you consider to be the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the troops of the line and of securing the efficiency of the local force?—The efficiency of the local force is what we have been discussing very considerably. In regard to the first part of the question, namely, the best means of providing for periodical reliefs, I should think that if the great bulk of the army of India were to be composed of regiments of the line it might become a question whether or not a regular transport service should not be established for carrying out those reliefs. But I must admit, that having myself considered so thoroughly that a local force is really necessary, it is a point to which I have not given very great attention. In the way of reliefs something might be gained, I should have thought, except for what has fallen from Sir Harry Smith, from sending out reliefs from intermediate stations; in fact, I should have thought that anything which could at all inure the people to a tropical climate would be decidedly a step in the right direction. Medical gentlemen would, however, be better judges upon this point. I should think too that regiments fully formed, as in the Mediterranean and at the Cape and elsewhere, would possibly for the moment be more efficient than a regiment from home with a large influx of recruits, young lads.

3939. Do you think that there would be any advantage if a depôt for recruits for the Indian service were established at the Cape or at any intermediate place? You have to raise 15,000 recruits; do you think that it would be an advantage if those recruits were located at the Cape and elsewhere and draughted to the regiments in India?—I am very doubtful whether it would be more advantageous, there would be the same or a heavier expense. Young recruits too are more likely to fill up and to gain strength by being kept for a time in their native country.

3940. Would there be any advantage independent of the expense?—Beyond that it might be acclimatizing troops to a certain extent, which appears to be objected to. I think that a point upon which pro-

fessional medical men would be better able to give an opinion than myself. I hesitate to give a more distinct opinion upon the suggestion, although I am not favourable to it myself. It might at times be convenient to have men from the nearest point, but in any regular system of reliefs I do not think that much is to be gained by it.

3941. Do you think it possible to consolidate the European forces so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other, and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company? Supposing that the other view of the question from yours was taken, and that it was thought preferable for it all to be the Queen's army, do you think that it would be possible, under those circumstances, to amalgamate it?—I think that, with reference to the claims and interest of the officers now in the service, the thing is quite impracticable, in consequence of the totally different systems which exist in the two armies. I am not speaking of anything for the future, as new rules may be made for fresh officers who come into the service. But with reference to the just claims of those now in the service, I look upon the thing as impracticable. Officers of the Indian service have great advantage in the shape of retiring regulations according to length of service. I presume that it is known that in the Indian service the military funds and the funds for orphans and widows and sick officers are funds to which officers have been required, since the year 1823 or 1824, to contribute. I do not myself perceive how you could carry out an exchange. If an officer quits the service he forfeits all that he has hitherto paid: this would be his own voluntary act, and therefore there can be no objection to it; but I do not see how the officer entering in his room could take up his subscriptions or come upon the same advantages. If he is not to be admitted to similar advantages there will be a loss to the funds of so many donations and so many subscriptions, and in fact the fund would eventually lapse. If the force is to become the same as the line, and exchanges generally permitted, you must eventually lose the funds altogether; possibly, if there were to be periodical reliefs, and officers were to be sent backwards and forwards within a moderate period by the State, there might not be the same necessity for the funds; but my present view is, that as regards the interest of the officers now in the service, the exchanges cannot be carried out.

3942. Suppose an officer has exchanged into a Queen's regiment, why not permit him to continue his subscriptions and retain the advantage as before?—I should very much doubt his being able to do so on his English pay. In a regiment in India he could do it.

3943. The officer who exchanged with him would begin to subscribe to that fund, and you would get an additional subscription by that means, would you not?—There are very few who would be willing to pay up the arrears which would be required; much also would depend upon his age and condition.

3944. Would it not be possible to continue that right, which of course ought to be retained to the officer in the Indian service, by allowing him to continue, after his exchange, his subscription to that fund and to receive the benefit from it?—I see no objection to its being continued. The question is, could they afford to do so on quitting India? Officers on taking their pensions are permitted to continue their subscriptions.

3945. (*Major-General Hancock.*) It would be simply the loss occasioned by fresh officers who are posted to regiments, and who are not bound to subscribe to this fund?—Just so.

3946. (*Sir G. A. Wetherall.*) But the same argument applies on the other side. The mutual advantage of any service may be calculated by an actuary or by any person. If a gentleman in the Queen's army exchanging into the local army chooses to reimburse the officer who has subscribed to those funds, and they both agree, you may admit one to the benefit of those funds and take the other off the list, may you not?—You may be admitting a man of a very different age, and with a large family, which might seriously encumber the fund.

3947. That is a matter of calculation?—I think that it would be full of difficulties.

3948. (*Chairman.*) Retaining every benefit to the officer, there would, I take for granted, be an end to any further progress of the fund if it all became the Queen's army; the fund would belong to those who had subscribed to it, and there would be an end to any fresh subscriptions, and those who would continue the subscriptions would derive all the advantage?—I think it would be a very serious consideration to do anything which would deprive the officers of that fund.

3949. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that there would be any objection in future to an exchange being allowed between an officer of a local regiment and an officer of a regiment of the line?—I have mentioned the one difficulty about the fund.

3950. The question refers to all future appointments, and relates to men who have not yet subscribed to the fund. If the authority of the government stops any subscription to that fund, and all the young cadets coming into the local army come in exactly as they would into the Queen's army, without subscribing to anything, would you then see any difficulty or any objection to an exchange between the officers of the local army and the officers of the royal army?—There can be nothing unfair in such prospective arrangement; an objection to it which occurs to me at the present moment is, that you would be probably losing officers who had served with native troops, and receiving officers from regiments of the line who had had no experience in that way; I should think that that would be objectionable. If your force is to be eventually entirely one and the same, I do not see the same objection to it; provided it is intended that the army of India is eventually to become composed altogether of regiments of the line, I should certainly then think that the sooner that arrangement is made the better, but I have stated my objections to that arrangement.

3951. Put the other case, namely, an exchange from an officer of a regiment of European troops to an officer serving with native troops, there must always be a local native army, and that local native army must be officered, and I wish to ask you whether there would be any objection to exchanges between officers of the local native army and officers of whatever army may hereafter be required to be the European army of India?—I think, with regard to the native army, that the objection I have started is a large one. It would apply, though in a lesser degree, to exchanges from the European portion of the army of India to the native army, presuming the officers to have served only with European corps.

3952. Would the service suffer, in your opinion?—I think that the service would suffer in this way by exchanges: If this army were still to be continued a local army, and any measures were taken which would prevent the contributions to military funds, and allow those funds to drop, I think that it would be a most fatal error, and that you would be in the most serious difficulties with their widows and orphans eventually.

3953. (*Sir G. A. Wetherall.*) But is it not the case that half your army marry on account of those funds, to which they are compelled to subscribe, which they would not do if there were no funds?—I do not know that it would prevent a young man from marrying if he had nothing to look forward to; I think not, but the funds may to a certain extent encourage early marriages.

3954. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Can you see any advantage which would accrue to the public service from such exchanges?—No, I dare say that the gratifications of individuals might be promoted. I see no advantage to the public service.

Major-Gen. Sir R. J. H. Vivian, K.C.B.

22nd Oct. 1858.

3955. (*Chairman.*) Is there not this additional expense thrown upon the Indian revenues from a permanent army, namely, the guarantee which they give to secure these pensions?—There is no doubt an expense; the government contribute very largely to the funds.

3956. That would be one expense from which they would be relieved if the whole army was the Queen's army, and there was no further fund or subscription?—Those now in the service must still have all the advantages for which they have contributed.

3957. One of your great arguments in favour of a permanent local force in India is that it would be less expensive, therefore I have a right to ask what would be the diminution of expense, supposing the whole to be the Queen's army; you admit that the Indian revenues would be relieved from the guarantee which they give to secure these funds?—I do not know that there is any particular guarantee.

3958. (*Major-General Hancock.*) There is a guarantee of 8 per cent. interest?—Yes; I do not know of anything beyond that; it is a contribution to the fund. I should think that that contribution to the fund would possibly amount to very considerably less than the pensions to the officers' widows, and to their children, which you would be compelled, I presume, to introduce if you abolished that military fund altogether.

3959. It would not fall upon the revenues of India?—They would get pensions; you would never leave your officers without something to fall back upon, I presume; therefore there would be the cost either way; and if these pensions were granted for service in India, the charge must sooner or later fall upon the revenues of India.

3960. (*Chairman.*) I think you have answered the last question; namely, whether the local European force should be kept up by draughts and volunteers from the line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?—Yes.

3961. I take for granted that you would very much encourage Queen's regiments volunteering to the permanent force?—I think that it would be a very good plan, particularly on the first formation of regiments. With regard to the efficiency of local troops thus formed, I can perceive no difficulty that may not by proper management be overcome. The formation at once of a large number of European local regiments for India would, no doubt, be attended at first with certain difficulties. I would suggest that the nucleus of each newly-raised regiment should be formed by draughts of non-commissioned and a few old soldiers from the already formed corps. Each nucleus might be attached to a disciplined regiment, whether of Her Majesty's line or the local force, till officers and men had become thoroughly acquainted with their duties. The officers of the native infantry regiments would require some such training, for the systems of the interior economy of a European and a native regiment are totally different; and they would require some preparation before they could feel at home with Europeans. No large additions can be made other than gradually, and I feel persuaded that the authorities in India will be able to frame rules to meet any difficulties which may arise.

3962. Would you require every officer, before he was attached to a native force, to be attached, in the first instance, to a European corps?—That plan has been already carried out in India, but I cannot say that I am favourable to it. Many people are favourable to the system; my own idea is, that it will cause the young European officers to look down upon natives. There is not the least difficulty in regard to discipline, though I admit a young officer is more likely to be thoroughly initiated into his military duties in a European than in a native corps.

The witness withdrew.

Major-Gen. Sir E. Lugard, K.C.B.

Major-General Sir EDWARD LUGARD, K.C.B., examined.

3963. (*Chairman.*) Will you have the kindness to state to the Commission the length of time that you have been in India, and the opportunities which you have had of forming an opinion upon the questions which have been submitted to you?—I have been in the army since 1828. 26 years I served in India. Until 1845 I served as a regimental officer, and as brigade-major and assistant adjutant-general to mixed forces in the field. After that I was placed upon the general staff, and I continued in that position until I left India. I also had command of a division in the army.

3964. You have also acted, I think, as adjutant-general?—I was assistant adjutant-general in Bengal, from 1845 to 1854, nine years, and I was deputy adjutant-general in Bombay, from that period to October, 1857. I then went round to assume the office of adjutant-general in India, and remained in that appointment until I had given to me the command of a division in the field.

3965. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Did you not act as adjutant-general of the army in Lord Gough's first campaign?—Only as adjutant-general of Her Majesty's troops.

3966. (*Chairman.*) Have you formed any opinion as to how far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as parts of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only?—I am decidedly of opinion that the whole of the European troops in India should belong to the line, that they should belong to Her Majesty's service.

3967. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) On what do you found that opinion? What are your grounds for coming to that conclusion?—In the first place it would be very advantageous for imperial purposes that troops of the line should be employed in considerable numbers in India as the best nursery for soldiers; and in the second place it would be highly advantageous for discipline and general efficiency that all the European troops in India should be of one army, subject to the same rules and regulations, under one and the same master, and with one common interest.

3968. Do you find that the troops in India, both those which have been hitherto called regiments of the line and the local troops, deteriorate in discipline from the effect of the climate, not from any fault of anybody but from the natural debilitating effect of that climate? Is a seasoned regiment coming out fresh from England, in a higher state of discipline and efficiency than a regiment which has long been located in India, whether it be a local corps or a regiment of the line?—I am certainly of opinion that it would tend to efficiency and discipline that a relief should take place, but I have seen regiments who have been their whole period in India in as high a state of discipline as a regiment first coming from England. I would mention a regiment that has been recently under my command, viz., the 10th Foot, it would be impossible for a regiment coming from England to be in a better state of discipline or in a higher state of efficiency.

3969. Of course there must be a difference in regiments; but take ten regiments in England and ten regiments in India, do you not think that the climate of India would have a greater effect upon the discipline of ten regiments in India than it would upon that of ten regiments in Europe?—No doubt; there is no doubt a tendency to a looseness of discipline in India.

3970. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You state that there is a tendency to a looseness of discipline, but is not that tendency checked by extra exertion on the part of the officers?—It may be and it may not be, because I have seen regiments, as I mentioned before, in a very high state of discipline which had been many

years in India, and again there are regiments that have deteriorated terribly.

3971. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Does not it depend upon the difference in the efficiency of the respective commanding officers and also upon the particular locality in which the troops may be stationed?—No; I think, generally speaking, that a regiment if it is too long in India deteriorates in discipline.

3972. What do you call "too long in India?"—Beyond 15 years.

3973. Up to that time you think that a regiment may remain in India without any injury to its discipline?—Yes; I should say from 12 to 15 years.

3974. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that a regiment after it has been more than 12 or 15 years in India begins to suffer from the effects of the climate?—Certainly.

3975. (*Chairman.*) Speaking generally, it tends to the discipline of a regiment to be relieved instead of being permanently located in India?—Certainly.

3976. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not think 15 years a great deal too long a period to remain in India?—The regiment to which I belonged was there 22 years.

3977. I am aware of that, but do you not think that it is too long a period?—Perhaps it is. I said about 12 or 15.

3978. Do you not think that both officers and men become disheartened from being kept so long away?—You have not the same set of officers.

3979. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Do you remember the fact of the Buffs going home who had been 19 years in India, and only one man and one officer went home with them?—Yes.

3980. (*Major-General Hancock.*) In what way do you consider that remaining in India for a long period tends to the indiscipline of the corps?—I speak from general experience of what I have seen.

3981. You simply rest your opinion upon what you believe to be the fact, but you are not prepared to state the particular grounds on which your opinion is formed?—Upon the climate, and other causes.

3982. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The deteriorating effect of the climate?—Yes.

3983. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Upon the mind?—Upon the system altogether.

3984. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I suppose there would be a greater expense in changing troops so constantly than there would be if there was a local force?—It would be a very serious addition to the expense.

3985. Do you think that that would be counterbalanced by the efficiency?—I think that it would be counterbalanced not only by the efficiency, but by the general benefit to England; as an imperial question I think that it is most important.

3986. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What would be the advantages to England from having those frequent reliefs?—In the first place it would be necessary for England to increase her army to enable her to relieve those regiments.

3987. That would involve additional expense?—Of course it would be a matter of expense, but I am merely speaking of what I consider would tend to the efficiency of the army serving in India whatever it may be.

3988. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you extend your recommendation to the artillery and all branches of the European troops?—All European troops, most decidedly.

3989. You do not feel any hesitation in giving that opinion?—Not the slightest.

3990. Would there be any disadvantage in largely increasing the local force and leaving the force of the line at the same rate as it was formerly?—I am strongly against increasing the local force to any extent.

3991. Do you think that there is now any jealousy between the forces?—Yes, there is not one common interest.

3992. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that the local European force mix more with the natives than those of the line?—Not at all, in my experience.

3993. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not think that regiments of Her Majesty's regular army mix much better with the natives after they have been a certain time in India than they do on their first arrival?—You can never get strangers to mix with the natives at first, but that very soon wears off. You will always find a regiment of griffs estrange themselves in a certain way from the natives, but I think that it very soon wears off.

3994. Do not the officers also of Her Majesty's regiments when they first come to India look down upon the native army very much more than those of the local troops do?—I do not think that they do.

3995. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Upon the point of the officers learning the native language, has not the interpreter at head-quarters, generally speaking, been from one of Her Majesty's regiments and not from the Company's army?—For many years past it has been so.

3996. (*Colonel Forsyth Tait.*) The interpreter to Lord Gough, whose name was Prendergast, was an officer of the Company?—Yes, he was there for a short time, for I think a year or so, but Havelock was Lord Gough's interpreter.

3997. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) General Havelock was from the Queen's army?—Yes, and Sir William Gomm had Colonel Otter, and Lord Combermere had a Queen's officer, M'Cann. Indeed, I only remember two of the Company's officers.

3998. Do you think that the officers of the Queen's army, if they had the advantages open to them which have been hitherto open to the officers of the Company's army, would not be equally ready to learn the language of India as any of the Company's officers?—There is not the least doubt of it.

3999. Do you not think that the fact of their not having been hitherto in a position to get those advantages has acted very much against them, and has also perhaps prevented them from mixing so much with Indian life as they otherwise would have done?—I am convinced of it; I have had proof of it, and I could give it. There is one officer whom I will mention, Colonel Longden, of the 10th Foot; I know that he qualified himself; he was a first-rate Persian scholar, a first-rate colloquial scholar, and a man of the highest intellect, and he has never been able to get any appointment beyond the overseership of a canal or an appointment on the roads.

4000. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Generally speaking, after a regiment has been in India two or three years, are there not a great many of the Queen's officers who speak the native language?—Yes.

4001. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would there be any reason why officers in the Queen's regiments of the line, if they were required as overseers, or for any appointment of that description, would not be available and would not learn the language sufficiently for that purpose as well as those in the local regiments, if that career was open to them?—If you opened the career you would immediately find that men would study; indeed they have done so.

4002. Do you think that there would be more difficulty in obtaining such men if the whole of the army was on the line footing than if it was partially local and partly of the line?—Certainly not, I think that you would have a larger choice.

4003. (*Colonel Forsyth Tait.*) Then do you consider than an English officer, in an English regiment, where they entirely speak English, learns the native languages just as speedily and as well, and performs as efficiently all the duties of managing a great department as an officer who is in a native regiment where there is nothing but Hindostanee spoken?—What do you mean by "a great department?"

4004. The public works department, where all their accounts must be kept every day?—Certainly. If there was a large line army in India you would find that many officers would devote their lives to India;

Major-Gen. Sir E. Lugard, K.C.B.

22nd Oct. 1858.

for myself, I have been in the service about 30 years. I served 26 in India because a field was open to me, and I am sure that many other officers would do the same.

4005. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You are confident that officers of the army would do so?—Yes, they would exchange into regiments as they came out.

4006. (*Sir G. A. Wetherall.*) It must be within your knowledge that a great many soldiers of the Queen's regiments speak the language colloquially as well as the natives?—Yes; it has been so latterly.

4007. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In your experience, have the Company's local regiments been as efficient in point of numbers as the Queen's regiments?—I believe that the returns will show that they have always been below their strength; I think the India House return shows that the Queen's regiments have been above their strength, and the Company's below it.

4008. Are you aware whether there has been more difficulty in recruiting for the local service than there has been in recruiting for the Queen's service?—I am not aware.

4009. (*Chairman.*) Have you had any opportunity of judging between the comparative state of health of one of the local regiments and one of the regiments of the line?—I cannot speak with confidence upon that point, not having seen the returns of the Company's army; they go into the adjutant-general's office of the Company's army, and I never see them at all, I am only able to judge from our own returns.

4010. (*Sir G. A. Wetherall.*) You have served with European regiments of the Company's army?—Yes.

4011. Are their habits more dissipated, or do you see any difference in the habits of the soldiery, between the two services; as applied to discipline are they more lax?—I do not think that they are so strict as the Queen's corps certainly; I speak particularly of Bengal, where I have seen more of them.

4012. (*Major-General Hancock.*) In what respects are they not so strict?—In a hundred respects.

4013. Will you particularize them?—I allude generally to their system, their canteens for instance.

4014. Do you mean that they are more addicted to drunkenness?—I have never known a Queen's regiment come into the same cantonment with one belonging to the honourable Company that the commanding officer did not complain that his men were twice as drunk as they were before.

4015. Have you never known a Queen's regiment stationed by itself, as at Colaba, fall into a state of drunkenness quite as great as you ever saw elsewhere?—Yes.

4016. Then that was not in consequence of associating with the other corps?—What I mean to say is that the system of canteens is not so strict in the Company's service that I have seen, and the consequence is that our commanding officers complain that when their regiment comes into the same cantonment with a Company's regiment, the liquor is taken out from the canteen, and their men are able to get liquor which they could not procure before.

4017. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Do you not think that if two regiments came together, whether of one service or of the other, that thing would take place, that the one regiment would show a little hospitality to their friends, and that the others would return it?—No doubt; but I am speaking of a general rule.

4018. (*Major-General Hancock.*) How many European local corps have you seen?—All in Bengal, and at Bombay I saw two.

4019. What was the state of those regiments?—They were not in the highest state of discipline. It is very invidious putting these questions to me; I could give you my reasons, were we privately together, but I am now merely speaking generally.

4020. (*Viscount Melville.*) Speaking generally of discipline, have you had any opportunity of inspecting their books, particularly the defaulters' book, and the way that they keep it in those regiments?—No.

4021. The way that they keep their ledgers, the way that the men's small books are kept, and the discipline generally?—No, I never inspected a local European regiment.

4220. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not think that one great advantage of a local European force would be found in the greater local knowledge and experience acquired by the officers, and in their consequent superior efficiency for service in India?—I have answered a question to the same effect; I have said, that if a large army of the line was kept in India you would still have what you may call local officers; a large number of officers from every regiment would exchange or remain in India; an officer whose prospects were bright in India would never come home.

4023. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) That has been your own case in a very great measure, you have exchanged from one regiment to another for the sake of remaining in India?—Yes.

4024. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Still you think that there is an advantage in the European discipline of a regiment coming out, into which such an officer would be exchanged; it would be organized and conducted upon the highest principles of European discipline?—No doubt a regiment coming out brings an improved system from England, it brings new life as it were, there is not a doubt of it. It is not with reference to the Company's service, or to the Queen's service; I should like to see the whole Company's service, if it were possible, mixed up with the Queen's service; that is the view which I take of it.

4025. As a soldier, are you not of opinion that it is of immense advantage that a great army should have but one sentiment, and one feeling, and one object?—No doubt of it.

4026. And do you not think that the existence of a local army of any description and a line army must always cause and continue those feelings of jealousy, which are a disadvantage to any service?—It is the want of a common interest.

4027. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you of opinion that India could be governed without any black troops?—No, I think not, certainly; I do not think it could be.

4028. (*Viscount Melville.*) Have you given any consideration to what may be the effect, supposing all the European troops to be troops of the line, upon those officers who are obliged to be attached to native troops; do you think that the officers would look upon such service as inferior or would be dissatisfied with it?—I would make it a superior service.

4029. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that it would make any difference?—I would oblige it to make a difference so far. I would put native regiments upon that footing, that they should be prizes in the lottery. I would make the pay of the officers doing duty with a native corps higher than of the other, because he would have to qualify himself.

4030. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Surely merely increasing the pay would not place that officer upon an equal status with the officer of the European force?—I have found pay go a very great way in India, as to status, &c.

4031. Still I imagine you would be of opinion that under that arrangement the native army would be looked down upon as a very inferior army to the Royal European army?—I think not indeed.

4032. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would think it a very great disadvantage if it were so?—Certainly. I think that it ought to be raised.

4033. You think that every encouragement should be given to the most able officers to go into the native army?—Yes; and by that means I consider that you will have an efficient native army, and will preserve it; men will take an interest in their corps, instead of wishing to get away from it.

4034. (*Chairman.*) I understand that you consider it to be a great advantage to have one European

Queen's army under the same discipline and the same control, instead of having two armies under different control and different discipline?—Certainly.

4035. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Would you have any separate establishment for supplying officers for the native army?—It must be a matter for after consideration what is to become of the Indian service.

4036. How would you supply officers for the native army?—I would bring them from the European army; no officer should do duty with a native regiment who had not learned habits of discipline in the European army.

4037. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that any officer can learn habits of discipline as he ought to learn them unless he is combined with European officers in considerable bodies, and I might almost go the length of saying with European troops; do you think that an officer for Irrregular native troops could otherwise learn such discipline as would be required?—It would depend a great deal upon the commanding officer; as a principle I would oblige every officer to go through a course with a European regiment.

4038. Do you think that the fact of his doing so would make him look down upon the natives?—No, because I would lead him to look up to getting an appointment in the native army.

4039. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you of opinion that previously to the outbreak of the Indian mutiny the discipline of the Bengal army had deteriorated considerably?—I have never admired the discipline of the Bengal army at all, for many years past I think that it has been very lax.

4040. (*Sir G. A. Wetherall.*) Supposing the European part of the army of Bengal was made a purely local army, do not you think that by giving it a provincial character it would be lowered in its own esteem?—Not a doubt of it, it would become a colonial corps, and as a colonial corps it would be eventually looked down upon.

4041. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think, on principle, without reference to this Indian local force at all, that all local forces are inferior to the forces of the line. I am talking now of the West Indian or any colonial force. On principle, is not a local force rather an inferior force, whether European or native?—Yes, particularly when they are both under the Queen.

4042. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What difficulty is there in keeping them both upon an equality; if kept upon a perfect equality, why should that be the case?—I do not see how you can do it; you could have done it before well enough, but now that they are both under one head, under the Queen, I do not see how you can prevent the colonial corps deteriorating from the established army of the country.

4043. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Would they not be under the same Commander-in-Chief on the spot?—No, the local army is under the Governor-General.

4044. They would be under the same military government?—Yes, but the Governor-General has not the authority over the army of the line that he has over the local army.

4045. Do you think that his having authority over the local army deteriorates from the discipline of that army?—It serves two masters instead of one.

4046. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that having two masters is a great disadvantage to an army?—No doubt of it, I am sure that my friend General Hancock must have felt the inconvenience of having two masters more than once. He had four masters, he had the Governor of Bombay, the Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, the Governor-General of India, and the Commander-in-Chief in India.

4047. (*Major-General Hancock.*) And there was the government in England over all?—Yes.

4048. That must always be the case?—Yes.

4049. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The next question is "The best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter." That, of course, would be irrespective of your opinion as to a local force; upon your view of the question, how would you provide for the relief in India?—I do not exactly understand that question, whether it refers to the mode of transport.

4050. Do you think that it is an advantage for the regiments to go direct from England, or do you think it better that they should go from some intermediate colonial station?—I would vary it, I would send some regiments direct from England, and let other regiments take a tour.

4051. You do not think that that would much signify?—No, I think that that would be a matter for the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief. I have taken that question as referring to the means of transport; in that point of view, I would say, without hesitation, by a well organized effective line of large screw steamer communication round the Cape, with 80,000 or 100,000 Europeans in India, 800 to 1,000 men per month would be required to supply casualties; the Red Sea route must not be trusted to, as it might be closed any day against us, but I would strongly advocate the sending 300 or 350 soldiers per month by that route, so long as it is open, from the Mediterranean stations; these should go direct to Kurrachee and thence by rail and steam up the Indus to the depôts in the upper provinces, there to be partly acclimatized before moving down. The bulk of the draughts and all the relieving regiments should, however, go by the ocean route, which a hundred considerations determine to be our best and only reliable route to India, and which therefore ought to be made as perfect as possible by means of a subsidized steam transport service. I am of opinion that this is a matter of serious importance. It would be difficult to estimate the national losses which have resulted from the want of ready means of throwing troops into India, and who can say that another emergency may not arise, when if we still rely upon ordinary sailing vessels round the Cape, taking their 120 days, we shall deserve to lose India? Indeed, as a political question, I imagine it would be advisable to perfect the ocean route; for by showing foreign powers that we could do without the Red Sea route, they might be less inclined to interfere with our communications on that line. It would also bring the Cape and Mauritius into the system of regular reliefs. But the benefit to the soldier would be incalculable—he would be landed in India in little more than half the time that a sailing vessel would take; his accommodation and comforts during the voyage would be very superior; his time of arrival in India would be looked for with certainty, and due preparations would be made for it; and government would be able to reckon with positive certainty on the arrival of troops at any point it might by telegraph choose to indicate, the ordinary passage being fixed at seventy days, or in case of necessity reduced to sixty. That is the view which I took of the question.

4052. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that any advantage would be obtained by having a large supply of draughts at the Cape or anywhere else?—Sir George Grey has advocated it very strongly.

4053. What is your opinion?—I think that the Cape would be very valuable for return soldiers, and convalescent depôts, but I doubt whether it would be for soldiers going out direct to India. I do not think that they gain any advantage by a residence at the Cape.

4054. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are you aware that some of the regiments, which have lately gone from the Cape are some of the most unhealthy regiments that we have at the present moment in India?—One regiment, the 6th, came up under me, but I did not attribute their condition to their having been at the Cape; they were prostrated by fever in Calcutta before they left, and I think that if the 6th and the other regiments arriving from the Cape had been sent up immediately on their arrival instead of being kept at Calcutta until they all got prostrated by fever, they would have done much better.

4055. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Were the 73rd prostrated?—They went to Bombay. I did not see them. I was in Bengal.

Major-Gen. Sir E. Lugard, K.C.B.

22nd Oct. 1858.

4056. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that it would be possible to consolidate the European forces so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other, and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company?—In considering this subject I find fresh difficulties arise at every step, and I fear that whatever may be decided upon must be prospective only. There can be no doubt that an amalgamation of the two services would be of great benefit to the public interest, but I do not see how this is to be done so long as one set of officers enjoys advantages which the other does not possess; the Indian service is strictly a seniority service, and though exchanges, up to the rank of captain inclusive, might be accomplished with advantage, the difficulties that present themselves are very serious. Every Indian officer must be a member of the "Military Fund." If he were to exchange he would forfeit all his payments, and be no longer a member. The line officer will have to pay up arrears from the time he enters the service, if he is to be admitted a member. Then retiring pensions are granted to Indian officers according to length of Indian service; and this is, perhaps, the greatest boon the service possesses, as it compensates for slowness of promotion, and enables every officer to live in comparative ease and comfort after he has completed his term of service. Few captains or old subalterns of 18 or 20 years' service, would, I imagine, willingly forfeit this, by accepting an exchange into the line; and as the regulations would require a line officer to begin a fresh score of service in India to entitle him to the benefit of the retiring pension, there would be little inducement for him to exchange. As the question has reference to the claims of the Indian officers now in the service, I regret to say I cannot see any solution to the many difficulties which interfere.

4057. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Without any reference to pay, emolument, fund, or anything of that sort, do you think it advantageous for the Company's army and the English army that both officers should dovetail and exchange?—There is not the slightest doubt of it, but I have given the subject the deepest consideration, and at every turn there is some objection.

4058. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think that any benefit would accrue to the public service from it?—Certainly.

4059. In what respect?—Exactly as I stated with regard to the army generally, that there would be one common interest, there would be no little petty jealousies, there would be one service, and I think that that of itself would be sufficient to recommend it.

4060. (*Chairman.*) Supposing that there should be a local European force, should it be kept up by draughts and volunteers from the line, or should it be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?—I would encourage volunteering from the regiments about to quit India, as the best means of keeping up the local European force, in preference to recruiting separately for it in Great Britain; but if it be necessary to recruit, I consider that the men should be formed and drilled in England before they are sent to India.

4061. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That you think important?—Of the highest importance, that they should go out as formed soldiers.

4062. That is not the case now?—No, some shiploads of young men were sent out the other day to form dragoons, and in my opinion they never will be properly formed.

4063. (*Major-General Hancock.*) As you are of opinion that by long residence in India troops deteriorate in efficiency and discipline, do you not think that that makes against your recommendation, that regiments leaving India after 10 or 15 years' service should supply the troops which are to remain behind?—You forget one point, it is not always the old soldiers that volunteer, sometimes there are draughts of recruits. I have known recruits to volunteer who have not felt the ills of India, but who have tasted some of the sweets,—a whole batch of recruits have volunteered; although it may be an old regiment in India, of some 10 or 12 years' standing, still there are annual draughts of recruits coming out to it, and you get them to volunteer.

4064. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) And you do not allow inefficient men to do so?—You do not allow men after a certain number of years' service to volunteer. There is a regulation by which there is a limit to age for volunteering, and a limit to service, so that you must get the younger portion of the regiment.

The witness withdrew.

Adjourned to to-morrow, at 12 o'clock.

Saturday, 23rd October 1858.

PRESENT:

Major-General PEEL.
H.R.H. the Duke of CAMBRIDGE.
Marquis of TWEEDDALE.
Viscount MELVILLE.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir HARRY G. W. SMITH.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir GEORGE A. WETHERALL.
Major-Gen. HANCOCK.
Colonel BURLTON.
Colonel FORSYTH TAIT.

MAJOR-GENERAL PEEL IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel JAMES HOLLAND examined.

Colonel J. Holland.

23rd Oct 1858.

4065. (*Chairman.*) Will you be so good as to state to the Commission your present rank in the army, the length of time that you have served in India, and the situation which you filled there?—I am a colonel on the retired list of the Bombay establishment. I have served thirty-two years actually in India, between 1823 and 1857. The first five years of my service was with a native regiment, the remainder was chiefly on the staff of the quartermaster-general; for the last six years I was quartermaster-general of the army, and had held the same situation temporarily at two other periods intervening.

4066. You have had some questions submitted to you, I think?—I have had some questions sent to me.

4067. Have you formed any opinion how far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as parts of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only?—Thinking that it would save the time of the Commission I prepared answers to the questions, and with your permission I would prefer reading them. My answer to the first question is as follows: I think it desirable that a portion of the European force for India should be from the line,

and a portion raised for service in India only. It is very advantageous to the troops of the line to have the opportunity in time of peace in Europe of seeing some service, such as is always going on in some part of India, and it must be good for both to have a standard for comparison, and the means of imbibing new ideas. The creation of a spirit of emulation between the two is also desirable so long as it is clearly seen and felt that they are both placed on a footing of perfect equality in regard to honours and average promotion, and that no superiority be accorded to either save such as falls most naturally and justly to the most worthy.

For its own sake, however, and for the safety of India the local European army must be strong enough to be self-dependent. It is essential for its credit and character, and, as a consequence, for its efficiency, that it should be a powerful body as compared with the line. If to any great extent numerically inferior, it will be treated as subordinate, and will soon sink into a second-rate force, for the large number of officers brought out by regiments from home, comprising among the higher ranks many men of influence and aristocratic connexion, will, to use a common phrase, swamp the officers of the local army. Again, if the large addition of European troops which will, without doubt, be henceforward required in India, be wholly or mainly supplied from the line, the first European crisis will strip India to a dangerous extent of European soldiers, for the immediate safety of the nation may, on the breaking out of war, demand every soldier who can be procured from any quarter, at whatever eventual sacrifice; and when the small standing army of England is taken into consideration, an efficient army of 50,000 seasoned troops of the line summoned by electric telegraph, and hurrying home by steam, would be a temptation few statesmen would be able to resist, in such a contingency, were they at the disposal of the minister.

The troops of the line generally have an advantage over the local European forces in India, in their more complete establishment of officers with which to maintain discipline. Beyond this difference, which is easily remediable and should be remedied, I have failed, after many years of observation, to detect any superiority in the former; on the other hand the officers of the local force have the advantage of local information and experience, one often of incalculable importance.

Were a considerable addition of European troops made to the Indian establishment, the much larger body of officers available for detached employment, would increase the number present with all regiments by reducing the number of staff absentees from each, while on the other hand the importation into India of a large number of officers of the line would throw far too great a proportion of superior commands into the hands of officers ignorant of the customs and inexperienced in the ways of the country, and were such officers to feel themselves supported by an overwhelming body of their own service, they would naturally in very many cases set aside the advice and opinions of men of local experience, and, acting on their own judgment, formed under very different circumstances, would incur risks and prejudices to an extent it would be prudent to avoid. Even now the march of a regiment but newly arrived from England through the country is invariably a matter of anxiety, both as concerns the health of the men and collision with the people of the country, and it is necessary to send one or more local officers literally to take care of it. No European regiment can be considered morally and physically acclimatized until after some two or three years residence, a serious bar to their usefulness, and a strong argument against employing more than a moderate proportion of troops of the line. I may add that the moral acclimatizing to which I refer, involving an acquaintance with the habits and peculiarities of the people, invaluable in war, is frequently never attained by very many officers of the line, who, feeling themselves, as it were, mere birds of passage, take no interest in their place of temporary residence, and fix all their thoughts, views, and aspirations on home. Marked and distinguished instances to the contrary may no doubt be pointed out, but I speak of the general effect.

With these views I should recommend that a portion only of the European cavalry and infantry for India, certainly not more than half, after the present exceptional demand for them be passed, be troops of the line; and that European sappers, being quite out of place in India, save as instructors, be entirely furnished from the local army.

In regard to artillery, I am of opinion that the entire regular establishment should, as at present, be supplied by the local army. It is no argument to state, that notwithstanding the very insufficient establishment of officers the local artillery have long laboured under, they have nothing to learn from the English artillery, although the converse, could it have been justly asserted, might have been a strong reason for recommending that a body of the latter should take a tour of Indian service; but being the most powerful arm in war, it will be ever the first to be drawn upon in case of need in Europe; while it would, of all arms, be that which we could least afford at such a time to spare from India, for it seems to be certain that henceforward no native artillery will be allowed, save such small portion as may be found indispensable; and we should, therefore, not have the resource which to some extent would always be available in case of the sudden withdrawal of European cavalry and infantry to Europe, the replacing them for a time by native troops.

4068. What portion of the European troops do you propose should be formed for the line, and what portion should be permanent?—I have already given an answer to that question. I say about one-half of the cavalry and infantry.

4069. What number of Europeans do you suppose it would be necessary to keep up in India?—I have endeavoured to form a general idea of what the total force should be, but I think that that question can hardly be answered without reference to the amount of native force that is to be kept up. I have suggested a scheme for the re-organization of the native army, which I put in the hands of my friend General Hancock, and which I believe he has appended to a memorandum of his own. In that paper I have stated that 60,000 European troops of all arms, after the present emergency is over, would, I consider, be sufficient for the European garrison of India.

4070. Then you would propose that there should be a permanent body of 30,000 men recruited for service in India?—Not exactly so. I have said that the whole of the artillery should be, in my opinion, local; that would take about 12,000 men; the estimate which I formed of the number of European artillery required for India. That would leave 48,000 cavalry and infantry to be divided equally among the two services, that is to say, about 24,000 men would be required for the line, and about the same number for the cavalry and infantry for the local army.

4071. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In fact it would be a smaller army than before?—Somewhat about the same. It should unquestionably not be larger.

4072. The argument, as it appears to me, which is used in the paper you have read as your opinion, is, that in case of emergency there would be great risk if the Europeans were of the line, that the government of the country would withdraw those Europeans and leave India denuded of them?—Yes.

4073. Do you really think that any government would risk such a thing as the safety of a great empire like India, or if they did so, do you not think that they would equally do so whether the force were local or not, seeing that it is now all a royal force?—I hardly think that they would. I think that the mere fact of the main body being specially enlisted for the local service would tie them so completely to the country that it would not enter into the head of a minister to withdraw them; whereas, the troops of the line being part of the general forces composing

Colonel J. Holland.

23rd Oct. 1858.

the army of the country, and immediately under the military authorities at home, it would be much more likely that they would draw upon those troops than that they would draw upon the local army. I have strong support in my views on this subject in the opinion of Lord Dalhousie, who, in February 1853, urged an increase to the Company's European infantry specially on this ground; he stated on that occasion, "the addition of three more European regiments to "the Company's force will not avert the risk to which "we have adverted, but it will lessen that risk by the "full amount of the addition made, and it will ensure "the government of India having always 3,000 more "European troops at its command than it can now "count on with certainty." On the breaking out of the Crimean war in 1854, the ministry, with these remarks before them, and in disregard of an urgent remonstrance from Lord Dalhousie's government, who considered it their "duty to deprecate in the most "earnest manner the diminution, for how ever short "a period, of the British force at our disposal" directed the return to Europe of a portion of the Royal troops. Before leaving India, Lord Dalhousie, in 1856, recorded his opinion on this subject in these words: "At this time the only portion of the European "infantry whose services the Governor-General in "council can reckon on without fail, are the nine "battalions in the Honourable Company's service. "There is no fixed establishment of Royal infantry; "any portion of it might be at any moment re-called; "and although the government of India can feel no "reasonable apprehension that Her Majesty's govern- "ment would ever act on the published suggestion "of a distinguished officer, lately deceased, and would "suddenly withdraw the Royal infantry in India to "meet troubles and dangers which might have "arisen in Europe; yet serious dangers may readily "be seen in the uncertainty of the hold which the "Indian government has upon Royal troops, without "supposing any resort to so extreme a measure as "that to which I have just referred. For since the "establishment of European infantry in India is, in "its normal condition, kept down at a minimum, even "partial and temporary reduction of it by the orders "of Her Majesty's government must always cause "great and well founded anxiety to the Indian govern- "ment, and might lead to very serious embarrassment. "The supposition is by no means an imaginary one. "The government of India has already been placed "in the very position I have represented."

4074. As an imperial question, do you not think that an army altogether composed of one material and upon one principle and one organization, is a superior arm for the state to a double army?—Not in the circumstances of India. I consider that there it is absolutely essential for government that the army should be mainly at the disposal of the local authorities, and that the Governor-General should have at his disposal a large body of officers trained from their youth in India, and with no views beyond India; men who, like those at present in the local armies, concentrate all their hopes and wishes in India alone. I think that if the Governor-General had not such a body at his disposal it would cripple his hands to a lamentable extent.

4075. (*Chairman.*) How do you propose to raise this additional permanent force for India?—That point refers, I think, to the last question regarding enlisting. The whole of these questions appear to me so much interlaced one with the other, that if you will permit me to read the remainder of this paper you will find that I have endeavoured to give an answer to some of the questions which you and his Royal Highness have already asked. The second question is, "The best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion and of securing the efficiency of the latter." Were the number of the troops of the line restricted, as above suggested, about 23,000 or 24,000 men would, in my view, be the number required, and their periodical relief would be effected much as at present. Even now, however, it is found impracticable, with the actual strength of the British army, to carry out relief so frequently as is desirable.

4076. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Why desirable?—From the mere fact that if you wish to keep your British army for general service in England and the colonies, and to make it fully efficient for all these purposes, you should not localize it; you should not, as it were, bring it up for continual service in India. A regiment that has been (taking an extreme case) 25 years in India, has become, as a matter of fact, a local regiment; very good for service in India, but not so efficient for service elsewhere.

4077. Why not?—Because the officers have to a great extent become local officers. The officers may be more efficient for their peculiar duties in India, but I conceive not so efficient elsewhere; their ideas have become warped; while as regards the men, the longer they remain in India the more do they intermarry with native and half-caste women, so that they are unwilling to return to England.

4078. Do you think it an advantage for India that such should be the case?—Certainly, for the local service. I think that no one who has not been for many years in India and had experience of the extraordinary peculiarities of the country, the people, the climate, and the mode of service, can form a correct idea of the absolute necessity of having a large body of experienced men. For instance, if you will allow me, I will take a recent case, namely, Sir Henry Lawrence: he would always have been a man of ability and energy wherever he was; but had he been in the British army serving as a major or a colonel coming out to India merely for a usual tour, he would not have been the useful public servant he was on the late and on former occasions. He would not have had that extensive local knowledge which he possessed, which added infinitely to his general ability.

4079. Are you not aware that Sir Sydney Cotton and Sir Edward Lugard are very highly-qualified officers, and, I believe, have a very high reputation in India itself. They are Queen's officers; they have exchanged from regiment to regiment because they were able men, and had a career in India which they saw open to them. Why, therefore, would there be any difficulty in other officers doing likewise?—There are always exceptions to every rule, and I may mention a still more illustrious example, a friend of my own—Sir Henry Havelock—he was a marked instance; but Sir Henry Havelock himself, I am perfectly certain, would have said, that he was not equal to Sir Henry Lawrence for the peculiar duties of Sir Henry Lawrence.

4080. In any arrangement which was made, supposing the whole army was of the line, of course there would be every facility given to officers of the line doing that which officers of the Company's army have hitherto done, namely, taking civil appointments that they were capable of holding?—I think you overlook the circumstance that if they were not tied to the service, they would not become as a rule so well qualified for them. I have seen vast numbers of officers of the line in India, field officers who have been many years there; some of whom have been men of very excellent abilities, and some men of very fair average abilities; but many of these officers, after having been several years in India, leave the country with little more knowledge of it than if they had never left Hyde Park.

4081. Do you not think that that arises from the fact that hitherto, with the exception of certain military staff employments, they have been debarred from holding any high position, whether military or civil, in India?—Not altogether. You take an officer of the line, and say to him "Go to India, there "is a fine field open to you there;" but if there is also a field in Europe, he considers which is the most agreeable to him, and which offers the best prospect of distinction. If any war is going on in Europe, the probability is that he will fling up his appointment in India, however lucrative and honourable it may be, in order to join his comrades in

Europe. You must not give officers the chance of doing that, if you wish them to devote their energies to India.

4082. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You would not give them the option of coming away *ad libitum* ?—No.

4083. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that if there was a great war in Europe they would come away, and, have we not seen it ourselves, that every Indian officer who could get away from Indian service came home and tried to get employed in the army of the line, in the Crimea for instance ?—No doubt some did, and many will desire to do so on all occasions when there is war ; but you must not open the door too freely. In the Turkish contingent the main body of officers of the Company's service were those who were at home, on leave, and retired officers.

4084. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You think that the officers must adopt India as their country ?—Yes, that is my view.

4085. (*Colonel Forsyth Tait.*) That is the great hold which we have upon India ?—Yes.

4086. (*Chairman.*) Will you proceed to read your paper ?—Even now it is found impracticable, with the actual strength of the British army, to carry out reliefs so frequently as is desirable, and were large additions to be made to the force to be permanently furnished to India from home, their relief would be altogether impracticable without permanent and large additions to the army in England. In order to secure the most complete efficiency in the local European army, that army must, as above remarked, be strong in numbers and there must be more officers for duty. The mere increase of regiments would, as I have pointed out, of itself effect this object to some extent ; and, were a rule adopted such as was, I believe, proposed by General Hancock, when adjutant-general at Bombay, viz., to fix the minimum number of officers to be at all times present with regiments, instead of the maximum allowed to be withdrawn, sufficient would be done to meet this want ; but the quality of officers is of far more importance than their number, and to improve this no pains must be spared. With this view a fair proportion of staff and detached employment must be open to officers of the European local force as compared with those of the native army, and the highest commands and a liberal share of honours must be as freely bestowed on both as on their brethren of the line ; and the appointments in India, which their local experience renders them the most competent men to fill, must be mainly reserved for the local officers, both for the public good and as some compensation for their life servitude in a foreign and ungenial country.

The plans which I have proposed in the paper to which I before alluded for improving the character of the native army, should, so far as is practicable, be applied to those of the European force. Field officers should be selected men, and commanders of regiments especially so, with large powers and handsome pay, and all useless and incompetent men passed over in promotion, and compelled, when entitled to pension, to retire on it. In our service every officer is entitled to a pension according to length of service as well as according to rank. They begin at 20 years, and at the periods of 24, 28, and 32 years the pension increases. At present an officer may quit the service if he likes when he is entitled to a pension ; I desire that the Government may have the power of dispensing with his services when he is entitled to a pension.

4087. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you mean that a man may now claim his pension at a certain time ?—Yes.

4088. And do you mean that according to your plan when the time came, that the Government should have the power to say "You must take it" ?—Yes.

4089. They have not that power ?—No. The Court of Directors, I believe, had that power, but the local government has not got it, and in my opinion it should be possessed.

4090. (*Chairman.*) Am I correct in understanding you to say that you consider that useless and incompetent officers should be passed over until entitled to a pension ?—That they should be passed over in promotion, and that also when a pension came to them they should be told to take it and to leave the service.

4091. You would still retain them in the service until they were entitled to a pension ?—Yes ; so long as they were respectable, but incompetent.

4092. Do you think that a man would be of any use in the service who had been constantly passed over in consequence of incompetency ?—I mean this case, I will suppose that there is a senior captain in his regiment and that a vacancy occurs, he is not a fit man and has served only 16 or 18 years ; he may be a very respectable man, but many causes may make him a very incompetent officer ; I should say to him, "You do not get your promotion, but at the end of 20 years you will get your pension."

4093. What do you suppose will be his position in that regiment in the intermediate time ?—Not a very pleasant one, I admit.

4094. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Would you promote the second captain to be a major ?—Not necessarily, for I have an idea that all field officers should be selected from the line.

4095. That is opposed to the Act of Parliament, which says that there shall be no interference ?—But I consider that one Act of Parliament can annul another.

4096. (*Chairman.*) Will you proceed with your paper ?—The position of captains and subalterns would not, in some respects, be so eligible as that of similar grades in the native army, supposing the plan I have proposed for its re-organization to be adopted, but they would serve with troops more congenial to them, and in time of war would have the post of honour and the best opportunities of distinction. And to prevent any just cause for dissatisfaction or jealousy, cadets might be appointed in England to the European and native branches according to qualifications or choice, as they now are to the engineers, artillery, and infantry, or to the different Presidencies. They should, as at present, be equally eligible for all staff and detached employ, an arrangement I consider indispensible for the efficiency of an Indian government and of the individual officers.

The commanders-in-chief of the armies of the three presidencies should, I conceive, be independent of each other in every respect, and to a great extent uncontrolled from home as regards the troops of the line. There will always be one general code of army regulations to regulate the more important matters of pay and discipline, but within those regulations there are many minor points of difference suggested by climate and service, in which it may be well to admit of latitude and discretion. Above all, no commander-in-chief or divisional-general should be named to an Indian command who has not, in addition to general fitness, had many years actual local experience, and those appointments, should as a rule, in proportion to numbers, be shared equally among the two services.

The third question is, "Whether it be possible to "consolidate the European forces so as to allow of "exchange from one branch of the service to the "other, and what regulations would be necessary and "practicable to effect this object with perfect justice "to the claims of all officers now in the service of "the East India Company ?"—In the foregoing remarks there are various reasons advanced why the main European force of India should be a local service. I believe that the consolidation of the European forces and the power of exchange would be a double injury to India ; it would deprive it of the efficient service it now receives from vast numbers of men whose natural abilities are devoted from their youth to the service and country, which they look upon as their life inheritance ; while, were the armies consolidated, they would, as a general rule, feel no abiding interest in an uncongenial climate and people, but would turn their thoughts, wishes, and studies to the more agreeable prospect of home. I should fear further, that the power of exchange

Colonel J. Holland.

23rd Oct. 1858.

might be not unfrequently abused, and that men of influence would exchange into the Indian army for the special purpose of holding some influential command or lucrative appointment. Under any such system the officers of the native army would sink into an inferior caste, with no power to make their voice heard, and it cannot be too strongly urged that no army can have a high tone or be thoroughly efficient unless the officers learn to take a pride in it; nor can the Government of India be efficiently carried on unless the Governor-General has at all times a large body of thoroughly-trained officers at his entire disposal, and who look to him and him alone for honour and advancement. I think, therefore, an amalgamation of the two services most undesirable; and I am further of opinion, could the contrary be shown, that it could not be effected without seriously compromising the prospects and fair claims of the present officers of the Indian army.

Upon the last question, "Whether the local European force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line or should be as at present separately recruited for in Great Britain?" I am inclined to think that both methods will be found expedient, but I should prefer not entering at length on a subject I have not sufficiently considered.

4097. You propose that for the future there should be only 23,000 or 24,000 British troops of the line in India?—Yes; that is supposing that 60,000 be fixed as about the whole European force to be kept up.

4098. Are you aware of the present number of British troops in India and upon the Indian establishment?—I believe, there are between 80,000 and 100,000.

4099. There are 103,000?—My computation is entirely as regards India when the present affairs are settled.

4100. Then you propose that 80,000 of the troops now paid by the East India Company should be withdrawn from that country, and that their places should be supplied by new regiments to be raised for the country?—Not to the extent of 100,000. I propose that all the excess above 60,000, which I look upon as the permanent establishment hereafter to be kept up, should be as at present from the line. I look upon the present as a special establishment for the suppression of the mutiny; I am supposing the mutiny to be suppressed and India to be restored to a state of tranquillity. I think that 60,000 European troops in all, will then be sufficient for all three presidencies.

4101. Of which 23,000 or 24,000 are to be from the regiments and the others are to be permanent?—Yes.

4102. You are perfectly aware that we have been raising new regiments in order to supply the wants of India in the late important crisis?—Yes.

4103. Do you propose that those regiments should be brought home and disbanded in order to give the local government an opportunity of raising new regiments?—It would be by a gradual process of reduction; a large portion would be transferred by volunteering.

4104. And the officers are to be placed upon half-pay in order to make room for officers for the Indian army?—Yes, I presume that that would follow; and as they have been augmented on the clear understanding that they are liable to be placed on half-pay whenever no longer required, and as large numbers had in the meanwhile benefited greatly and permanently by increased promotion consequent on the augmentation, I see no hardship in placing the excess on the half-pay list, as it is always done in similar cases.

4105. What was the object in previous Acts of Parliament for limiting the number of Europeans to be raised by the East India Company?—That is more than I am able to state. I do not know what was or what could have been the object. I can only say that I think it is a great pity that it has been so limited. I never could see any good reason for it.

4106. Do you not think that one reason would be that if you were to raise a large army for permanent service in India you would interfere with the recruiting for the British army in this country?—I think not materially.

4107. What is the number of the permanent local European force in India at the present moment?—There are, I suppose, about 8,000 infantry and about 6,500 artillery; I should say in round numbers 15,000 men.

4108. You have had, since the year 1853, the power of raising 24,000?—Yes.

4109. How does it happen that you have not been able to raise that number during that period?—It was regarded too much as a matter of expense. They were greatly wanted; and had they been there, either the mutiny would not have broken out, or it would have been earlier suppressed. India was very much in want of European soldiers when the mutiny broke out. I believe that it was simply a matter of finance, but I am not able to speak with certainty on the subject.

4110. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Why did not the East India Company in those days have those European troops; I presume it was because they did not like to pay for them in addition to the royal troops?—I am not able to answer the question, as I am not positive upon all the facts; I know that the East India Company, on more than one occasion, would have been glad to have increased their European forces, but the Queen's Government preferred employing the troops of the line.

4111. Could not they have had the troops of the line?—That would have doubled the expense; they would have had to pay for the troops of the line and for the local army too; and, as I said before, the not recruiting to the full extent of their power was simply a question of finance; they wished to keep down the expenditure of India, which was very heavy.

4112. I thought that the cost of a Company's European regiment was just the same as of a regiment of the line. Is not the actual cost of the establishment the same?—It must be pretty nearly the same in India; but you cannot divest it of the question of the cost of relief. A regiment of the line actually costs more to India than a local regiment, because of the cost of the relief.

4113. (*Viscount Melville.*) What was the cost to the local force of the men invalided and sent home and the draughts sent out?—I am not prepared to answer those questions of finance because I am not thoroughly conversant with them. I merely state what I know upon general grounds.

4114. (*Chairman.*) I believe you stated that you considered that no regiment would be useful in India until after having been for two or three years accustomed to the climate?—The present service shows that the regiments which have been just landed are very useful, but with a qualification. A regiment newly landed and sent into the field, loses men from their not being sufficiently acclimatized.

4115. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have you any reason to believe that that has been the case in the recent operations?—I have not seen the returns; but I speak from long experience in the quartermaster-general's department, where I had to regulate the march of great numbers of European troops and newly-arrived troops for very many years; we always considered it necessary in Bombay to acclimatize our newly-arrived regiments by sending them to one of the healthy stations near the Presidency, keeping them there two or three years to acclimatize them—and that acclimatizing is more than as regards the health of the men, though there is a great deal in that—it is that officers and men may learn the precautions to be taken as to health and something of the native language, customs, and character. When a regiment newly arrives, if it has to be marched only fifty miles it must have a local officer with it. One of the arguments against employing an overwhelming force of the line is, that you will always have a certain

proportion of regiments who are unacclimatized, and therefore, to a certain extent, not available for service. If you had the larger proportion of the troops local they would all be acclimatized; whereas if you had the larger proportion of them line regiments there would at all times be a considerable number not acclimatized; and although in any emergency we never hesitated to send a regiment landed to-day into the field to-morrow, yet we always endeavoured to keep back a regiment two or three years.

4116. (*Chairman.*) You say that you consider that a permanent European force in India would be more useful than one landed from this country; is there any reason to believe that that has been the case hitherto?—I think that as regards the service of the men, with the exception of the mere fact of acclimatizing, they are very much the same. Whether the Indian artillery or the royal artillery are in India, they are equally good.

4117. You have never had an opportunity of seeing the royal artillery in India?—I never had an opportunity. I speak only from hearsay.

4118. Take the regiments of the line who were out there when you were there?—I saw no superiority of the one over the other in any respect, beyond this, that the royal regiments had most officers, and that the local officers had the advantage of local experience.

4119. Was the discipline better in local regiments than in regiments of the line?—No.

4120. Was it as good?—I think so, taking one with the other. I have seen regiments of the line in first-rate order, and some in very bad order; I have seen the same in the local infantry.

4121. How long had the regiments of the line that you saw in bad order been in India?—Various periods. I do not think that that has anything to do with the state of a regiment. I think that its state depends mainly upon the commanding officer.

4122. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Inasmuch as you say, very justly in my opinion, that it would be a great advantage to the army of the line to have a field open to them in India, why would you exclude the royal artillery from that field? Admitting your argument that there should be a local force, should not a portion of the entire force be artillery of the line?—The special reason which I gave against that was, that as in case of a war in Europe there would be a recal of many troops of the line from India, the artillery would be the first to be recalled, and they are the last that could be spared, because we have to some extent a resource in India as regards cavalry and infantry; we can afford to raise more natives in both branches to fill up a temporary deficiency, but it would not be prudent to employ additional native artillery.

4123. Putting that consideration on one side, and assuming that the government would not do such a thing, do you not think that it would be an advantage to have some of the royal artillery in India for the sake of the service?—For the sake of the royal service I have no doubt it would be useful.

4124. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you mean that the advantage to the public service of having a portion of the royal artillery in India would not be equal to the disadvantage of having both royal and local artillery in that country?—I think it would be an advantage to the royal artillery to have a portion of them in India; but I think it would be a disadvantage to the public service to have any considerable portion of them there.

4125. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Why?—One of the reasons which I have mentioned is the liability of their being withdrawn. Another reason is that in all probability if the royal artillery were sent to India, they being formed under a peculiar constitution, would be sent with their own staff, and that is rather a hampering arrangement. The quartermaster-general of the Queen's army in India, for instance, is a gentleman of handsome pay and very considerable leisure, and I think that if you sent out the royal artillery you would probably send out an adjutant-general and certain other staff officers, which would encumber the Government.

4126. Those are departmental matters which could be got over?—They are minor difficulties, certainly.

4127. Is there any other reason for your objections?—I am not aware of any other reason beyond what I have stated.

4128. You stated that the interference of the military authority at home was very undesirable. In what respect does that military authority interfere in anything except in the ordinary routine of discipline, which I apprehend you do not intend to take out of the hands of the military authority?—I think your Royal Highness has put rather a stronger term than I made use of. I said that I proposed that the interference of the home authorities, even with the troops of the line, should not be so great as it is at present.

4129. In what way is it so now?—I think that under the present arrangement orders are occasionally sent out from home, and arrangements are made from home with reference to the well-being of the soldier as he is in Europe, without sufficient consideration of local peculiarities.

4130. What orders?—Matters, for instance, connected with dress. As I have happened to mention dress, I will continue that point in illustration. The British soldiers are dressed according to certain regulations which emanate from the highest military authorities in England; no authority in India ventures to interfere with them. That may have been changed within a recent period; I speak of about two years ago when I was last in India. They were on the whole dressed very much the same as they are in Europe, and in many respects I think that alterations, had they been within the power of the local commanders to execute, would have been very beneficial for the health of the men.

4131. (*Chairman.*) Is not every regiment on its arrival in India furnished with light clothing?—I believe it is furnished with what is called light clothing in England.

4132. Does not that description of clothing depend entirely upon the Indian government, without any "interference" in this country at all?—I have always been under the impression that the uniform furnished to the British soldier in India is under regulation from the Horse Guards.

4133. (*Viscount Melville.*) I believe you were in the quartermaster-general's department. Can you produce any order either from the commander-in-chief in Bombay or from the commander-in-chief in India, that in any way regulated the white clothing which you may recollect the British soldier wore, and which he paid for out of his own pocket?—I do not understand the question; will you be kind enough to put it again?

4134. Can you produce any order from the commander-in-chief in India, or from the commander-in-chief of the presidency which emanated from the home authorities, in respect to the white clothing to be worn by the British soldier; and do you not know that the white clothing worn by the British soldier, was supplied under the control of the commanding officer, and paid for by the soldier himself, and not by the Company?—I do not think the question bears reference to the position which I have advanced. It is not with regard to the white trousers of the men, or what may be called their white clothing; I simply say that in my view the uniform of the British soldier in India, as regulated in England, according to what I have always been given to understand, is not suitable to the climate of India generally. I will mention, for instance, the Highlanders; I have seen the Highlanders in India, going on guard with their bare legs, exposed to the heat of the sun by day, and the chilly dews at night, and to the mosquitos and other insect plagues; that is a dress totally unsuited to India; but I believe no commander-in-chief in India ever had it in his power to alter it; it was ordered from home.

Colonel J. Holland.

23rd Oct. 1858.

4135. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are not the Company's European troops similarly clothed and equipped to the royal troops?—They are so.

4136. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Why are they so?—With the object of assimilation, that there may be no distinction between the two. If, as your Royal Highness has stated, it is in the power of the commander-in-chief in India to dress the soldier in any way he pleases, then whatever I may have said with regard to the interference of the home authorities in that respect is inapplicable; but I have always been under the impression, and it is a common one in India (I believe there are other Indian officers present who will bear me out), that the dress of the British soldier is regulated from home.

4137. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you remember a letter coming from the Horse Guards during the time that General Auchmuty was in temporary command of the Bombay army, severely censuring the commander-in-chief, Sir John Grey, for having issued an order authorizing mustachios to be worn by all branches of the Company's service, and directing him, if the order applied to Her Majesty's troops, immediately to cancel it?—Yes; I was going to mention that case myself as an illustration. I perfectly recollect General Auchmuty, showing me the letter which arrived in India just after Sir John Grey had left; General Auchmuty showed me the letter, and certainly could not help smiling himself at such an instance of the interference of the authorities at home. It was certainly a trifling case, but if the Horse Guards can interfere in a matter like that, I should think that I was borne out in my impression that they had also the power of interfering with the dress. I have also heard the late Lord Frederick Fitzclarence lament his inability to take the stocks off the necks of the Queen's soldiers under his command, as he had done off those of the Company's.

4138. (*Chairman.*) In what year was that?—I am not certain about the year, but it was just after Sir John Grey left India, only a few years ago.

4139. (*Viscount Melville.*) Can you produce any order either from the commander-in-chief in Bombay, or from the commander-in-chief in India, which emanated from the home authorities, regulating the white clothing to be worn by the British soldier?—I have it not in my power, I have no papers here. His Royal Highness has already stated that it is not a fact, that the dress of the soldier in India is regulated from home, that is quite sufficient to correct my impression.

4140. Do you think that it is possible to do away with the cloth clothing which the British soldier wears in India?—I think that it would be very injudicious to do away with cloth clothing undoubtedly. I beg to mention that I have been a great deal at head-quarters in the presidency of Bombay, and with many commanders-in-chief, and I have heard several of them complain of the dress, and lament their inability to alter it. They have made representations, I believe, upon the subject; the representations have most probably come through the Governor-General, and probably through the Court of Directors; how far they have gone I cannot say, but of this I am certain that I have often myself heard commanders-in-chief lamenting their inability to dress the soldier in a manner more consistent with the nature of the service to be performed.

4141. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) As a military man surely you will admit that every commander-in-chief is not to change the clothing of the army to suit his own fancy?—Certainly not.

4142. (*Viscount Melville.*) Since you say that cloth clothing in India cannot be dispensed with, in what respect would you alter that clothing, and what arrangements would you make when troops go on service for the carriage of both the cloth clothing and the light clothing?—I would alter, for instance, the dress of the Highlanders, to whose case I have alluded, for service in India; they are, I think, very injudiciously dressed; their full-dress caps are exceedingly heavy and burdensome, and their kilts are very inappropriate also.

4143. (*Chairman.*) You admit that the troops in India wear light clothing?—Yes; light clothing in hot weather to a certain extent, but not sufficient.

4144. There is no pattern of light clothing here, and we do not even know here what is the light clothing worn by the troops in India; therefore the nature of the light clothing given to the troops in India must depend upon the authorities there and not here?—All I can say is that there is a misunderstanding.

4145. (*Duke of Cambridge*). Would not that modify your ideas very much?—No doubt what your Royal Highness has said modifies my ideas considerably, because you have said that there is no interference at the Horse Guards with the clothing of the troops in India. I was always under the impression that there was a very considerable interference, that a rigid law was laid down which no commander-in-chief in India dared interfere with. General Hancock has also alluded to the stock, and which, I believe, Lord Frederick Fitzclarence tried to do away with; he took it from the local army, but not from the troops of the line, feeling that he had no authority to do so.

4146. (*Viscount Melville.*) Since you say that cloth clothing in India cannot be dispensed with, in what respect would you alter that clothing, and what arrangements would you make when troops go on service for the carriage of both the cloth clothing and the light clothing?—I think that with regard to the first part of the question, it is sufficient to give a general answer, that the cloth clothing should be made as easy and suitable to a climate like that of India as possible. With regard to the second part of the question, when troops go on service in the cold weather, they would naturally wear their warm clothing, and their light clothing would be in depôt, and would be forwarded to them afterwards; when they go on service in the hot weather, they would wear their light clothing, and their warm clothing would be placed in depôt and forwarded to them afterwards, should the carriage of the army be insufficient for both.

4147. Are you not aware that even in the cold season, as it is called, in the day time it is excessively hot, and at night when lying out it is absolutely necessary to have cloth clothing?—I am perfectly aware that that very frequently is so; and I think it highly advisable that European soldiers in the field should be provided with warm and with light clothing, and that additional carriage should be furnished, if necessary, by the government of India for the carriage of whatever additional clothing was requisite.

4148. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You have said that your impression had been that no commander-in-chief would venture to make any alteration in the clothing in India that did not emanate from home. As it is a fact that there is no pattern of summer clothing for India, and as it is also a fact that every regiment in India, both the Queen's regiments and the former Company's regiments, have had summer clothing, is not there in those two facts alone a deviation from what you have stated, namely, that the commanders-in-chief could not act upon their own responsibility; How was the summer clothing introduced, as it is not in the regulations?—I stated before that it was entirely a matter of impression on my part; General Hancock has confirmed me that I was right so far as the impression went. There are other Indian officers, I believe, present, who I dare say will bear me out in the same impression. Your Royal Highness has stated that the impression is based upon an error, and therefore I admit the correction; but I beg leave to refer to the illustration which has been mentioned as a proof that I was not altogether wrong in supposing that the Horse Guards did interfere in the details of the army in India, namely, the illustration of the cutting off of the mustachios, and the giving a severe reprimand (for the letter was a very rough one) for permitting

the officers of the Queen's army in India to wear that irregular appendage.

4149. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not know that in Scinde neither the Queen's nor Company's troops ever wear, from the 1st of March to the 1st of November, anything else but white jacket and trousers?—I am aware that light clothing is frequently worn by troops in India, but I also know that the regulation cloth clothing is often worn when it is injurious.

4150. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) What is the composition of the red jacket of the sepoy?—It is made of an inferior kind of cloth to that of the European soldier.

4151. But it is still cloth?—Yes.

4152. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) In consequence of an allusion having been made by Colonel Holland, to an interference with the dress having taken place at the Horse Guards, I am in duty bound, having seen it happen while I was in India, to state a case. The 15th hussars wore a foraging cap, which they had been allowed to wear in consequence of having overcome a regiment in the German service who wore a foraging cap, and that regiment since they had fought that action in Germany had always worn a light foraging cap without a peak. The surgeon reported, and the report came to the commander-in-chief, as well as to the military board, that it was a very inconvenient dress, that the men walked about and got ophthalmia in consequence of it. I said "Why cannot we order another cap?" It was said by my adjutant-general of the Queen's service, "We cannot do it without the order of the commander-in-chief at home." I could see no regulation to justify it. The circumstance was reported home to the Duke of Wellington, who was commander-in-chief at the time, and he ordered the cap to be discontinued.

4153. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) You know the enormous amount of carriage required in India?—Yes.

4154. The 43rd regiment moved the other day, having all their light clothing in possession. They were ordered to move one wing from Madras and the other from Bangalore, and they are now at Calpee; they marched 2,000 miles. You admit, as every officer who has served in India admits, that cloth clothing is indispensable in some part of every day?—Not to that full extent.

4155. The 43rd regiment have now been some years in India, and they had to choose the alternative which suit they should leave behind them, taking the opinion of the general officers and of everybody else of experience. They marched to Calpee without being able to carry their light clothing, taking their cloth clothing in preference. From my own knowledge we have illustrations and proofs that the two healthiest regiments who have served with Sir Hugh Rose are two regiments who have worn their cloth clothing throughout, namely, the 14th dragoons and the 86th; they wore their shakos and cloth clothes and they had no light clothing?—If I had to choose between warm clothing and light clothing I would certainly give the preference to the warm; but I see no difficulty, as a general rule, in giving them both.

4156. I have given you a practical difficulty?—In a case like that there is no help for it. With regard to the 86th, I happened to know that regiment; I have seen a great deal of it, and I think I can give one clue to its extraordinary healthiness. For some years, when I knew it, it was, I believe, one of the most sober regiment in India. It stood pre-eminent as a sober regiment.

4157. You have stated as a reason for having the European force local to a very large extent, the incalculable advantage which the officers of such local corps would have in commanding, whether in the field or at stations, over officers without experience?—Yes.

4158. Has any evil arisen to your knowledge from the inexperience of officers who have had less local experience than those officers belonging to native corps. Various officers have been sent out lately, for example, to India who have never before been in India; have they failed in anything from the want of local experience?—I merely stand upon the general ground which I think every one will admit, that local experience is of very considerable advantage to any man. Supposing you take two officers of equal natural abilities, and equal in every other respect, but the one having considerable local experience and the other not, which of the two would you select for duty in a particular country? I put it entirely upon that ground.

4159. For example, take Rose and Michel, and various others, who were never in India before?—I knew General Michel in India myself.

4160. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Take Rose?—I am far from saying that because a man has never served in India therefore he is not fit to command an army there; any such proposition would be absurd on the very face of it, when we have eminent men in command who were never in the country before. I merely say, that of the two the man with the local experience has a very great advantage over the other.

4161. (*Major-General Hancock.*) All other things being equal?—All other things being equal.

4162. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You said that it was a great object that the Governor-General should have a body of officers at his disposal. I presume that if the regiments were regiments of the line, those regiments would be quite as much at his disposal as any others in India?—I think I said, officers with local experience at his disposal.

4163. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You said at his entire disposal?—At his entire disposal.

4164. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What do you mean by "at his entire disposal?"—I do not consider that officers of the line would be at the entire disposal of the Governor-General.

4165. Why not?—I think they are always liable, in the first place, to recal by order, and in the second, to recal by their own choice. Supposing a war to occur in Europe, the Governor-General would very probably lose half of his best officers; they would take the first opportunity of availing themselves of any possible means of getting to Europe, in order to have a share in the war. In a local army they cannot do that; I think in that way you would deprive the government of many of its very best officers.

4166. (*Sir G. A. Wetherall.*) You said that no officer should be placed in command of a division of the army who had not served in India and had local experience?—I think as a general rule that is a very sound and proper one.

4167. That debars everybody from going?—No. If a number of officers of the line serve in India, they must serve in all grades; there must be subalterns, captains, and field officers; and if some 24,000 troops of the line are always serving in India, it will be very hard if you cannot pick out a certain number of qualified men for the divisional commands.

4168. You said that no officer should be placed in the command of a division who had not had local experience and served in India?—Certainly; I think so, as a general rule.

4169. You also said that the officers of the local European corps had a great advantage, because they were better acquainted with the customs of the natives. Do officers of European corps in the East India Company's service associate more with the natives and know more of them, in your opinion, than officers of Queen's regiments?—Yes; and I can give a reason.

4170. Some of them have been in native regiments?—Yes; and not only that. When officers rise to be lieutenant-colonels in the Indian army they are available for general service. It is all considered as one service, and although, no doubt, they look most after their own immediate corps; yet, by doing field duty and duty with native irregular corps, and in civil and miscellaneous appointments, they are constantly brought in contact with the natives; and, therefore, you will find that the officers of a local European

Colonel J. Hollan..

23rd Oct. 1858.

corps, on the whole, have a very much greater acquaintance with the natives, and with everything connected with India, than those of a regiment of the line.

4171. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Supposing you were to open to the officers of the line the same advantages that you have hitherto opened merely to the officers of the former Company's service, would not the same result follow ?—I think not, because they would not have what may be called the abiding interest which the officers of the local service have. An officer who goes to India at the age of 16 or 18 says, "Here is the "place where I am to pass my life. I look to the "governor and commander-in-chief above me as the "only authorities I know, and the service in India is "everything to me." If he has anything in him he devotes all his thoughts, views, and acquirements to the study of and acquaintance with India and everything connected with it. An officer of the line, a man equal to him in every other respect, goes to India under a different view. He says, "I am here only "for a short time; it is an exceedingly disagreeable "country with a bad climate, bad eating and drinking, "bad for health, everything almost that is disagree-"able; either my regiment will go home soon, or I "have friends at home who can manage to make an "exchange for me, or I have money and I will pur-"chase into another regiment." All these causes are operating constantly; that there are exceptions there is no doubt. Your Royal Highness has mentioned one or two very eminent exceptions, and one must always be prepared for them; but my argument is, that if you wish to get for the Indian service the greatest number of efficient men you must always make the main body a local force.

4172. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you mean European as well as native ?—Yes.

4173. In native regiments the European officers do not associate with the men or with the native officers particularly ?—They did when I was a regimental officer.

4174. They do not now, do they ?—I am not qualified to say from actual knowledge. I believe that they do not to the same extent as they did, but when I was a regimental officer we did to a great extent. We used to take out the men of our companies in hunting parties and shooting expeditions. The native officers were always welcomed, and received with respect when they went to call upon their European commanders. The officers would attend at some of the native ceremonies and festivals of the men, and give money to assist in them, and there was a great feeling of kindness and brotherhood between them.

4175. (*Chairman.*) Your view of the future organization of the Indian army is influenced a great deal by a regard to Indian interests, without any reference to what the effect would be upon the British army. You look at it as an Indian, and not as an imperial question ?—My opinions have been given entirely in regard to the public interests of the Indian service, and not in the slightest degree, so far as I am able to divest myself of it, with any care or thought for any private interest, but I have stated what I consider to be the best for the Indian service. I view it mainly in that light, undoubtedly.

4176. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Supposing that there would be no great difficulty in producing an amalgamation of the services, do you think that there would be any difficulty or any objection in maintaining the present European force in India recruited generally by volunteering from the line, leaving that portion local, but not adding to it ?—I should object to leaving the local European force of India at its present relative strength. I think that it tends to keep them down, and to lower them somewhat in their self-esteem, finding that they are only a very small body, and that they do not carry much weight.

4177. As a military man do you think it a good thing to have two coequal armies one against the other? —I think so; they would all be equally under the same commander-in-chief, and equally amenable to the same Articles of War; I see no objection to their being mixed together in certain proportions, provided they are on a footing of equality. I may say that I see no particular benefit, as respects India, from having troops of the line there. I think it is a very great advantage to the English army.

4178. (*Chairman.*) Latterly has it not been of advantage to India ?—Latterly it has, of course; but if you had had 100,000 local European soldiers they would have been just as good as 100,000 soldiers of the line.

4179. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) On military principles, do you not think that an army which can go anywhere and do anything is better than one which can only be employed in one place ?—Not for Indian service.

4180. But on military principles ?—That is a matter which I think does not come exactly within the scope of the questions; I am here to be examined upon the question of India.

4181. (*Viscount Melville.*) The local force which you propose to maintain in India is to be recruited in this country ?—Of course it must be.

4182. That necessarily is a competing force with Her Majesty's army, and the expense is exactly double for each recruit to what it is for one in Her Majesty's service, are you aware of that ?—I have seen a statement signed by the military secretary at the India House, dated in April last, that "the bounty and levy "money is the same in both services."

4183. And the expense ?—I consider that those are matters which might be very easily arranged. It is all henceforward Her Majesty's army, and if the army in India is to be an efficient one there should be no difference, beyond name, between the two portions; they should be simply the army of the East, and the army of the West, and there should be nothing like competition; recruits should be supplied equally for one as for the other, according to the wants of the public service. I cannot see why it should be looked upon as a foreign or antagonistic service in any respect.

4184. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is it not human nature, that if there is a great distinction in two services there cannot be unity of action, and will not it produce natural jealousies and honourable jealousies—not emulation, but honourable jealousies ?—I think that those jealousies exist at present to a very considerable extent in India, but I think that they would be greatly obviated by the system being altered. I think they exist, because the officers of the line have many advantages over those of the local army. With one rare exception, if I am not mistaken, there has never yet been a commander-in-chief selected from the local forces for any one of the presidencies, although forming the bulk of the army. There is also a much larger proportion of the divisional commands given to officers of the line, so that in time of war the main commands and the chief honours fall to the officers of the line. That has created a feeling of jealousy, and that, I think, should be obviated. When I left India there were eighteen divisions of the army, and a rule had been laid down, that thirteen of those were to be held by Company's officers for one tour, and twelve for another tour. If you had taken the number of officers of the two services you would have found that the officers of the Company's service bore the proportion of nearly six to one, while the troops were more than ten to one; whereas the divisions were given in the proportion of about two to one. The commands should be given in an equal proportion.

4185. Would you not get rid of the whole difficulty by having but one army ?—You would get rid of that difficulty no doubt; but then I think there are other difficulties.

4186. You said that the distribution of honours was not fairly proportioned;—Yes.

4187. In what respect ?—In consequence of that very fact which I have just pointed out, if the superior commands are given in what I consider they have been, an undue proportion to the officers of the line, especially on field service; the chief honours fall of

course upon the chief officers—they are the persons who come in for the highest rewards and the highest honours, and it is very proper they should do so; therefore the officers of the line get by that very means what I consider an undue proportion of the honours.

4188. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You have stated, and very justly so, that when a young cadet goes to India, his sole thoughts are upon India, and he looks up to the Indian authorities; what will be the feeling now that the whole army has become royal?—I do not think it will make the slightest difference provided you make the royal army of India a local army mainly; they will still be attached to India in the same way.

4189. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You mean that, provided both be placed upon a perfect equality in every respect, there will be no ill-feeling, but only a proper and good spirit of emulation between the two services?—Precisely so.

4190. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are those 60,000 Europeans to be commanded there totally irrespectively of the authority of the commander-in-chief in this country?—Those of the local army I should undoubtedly say should be so, and those of the line army should be so merely so far as regards matters of interior economy.

4191. Do you think that you will get Parliament to sanction that principle?—Upon that I am not able to give an opinion.

4192. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Admitting that any interference on the part of the commander-in-chief in England has occurred to the army in India, are you aware whether any injury has occurred to the army in India in consequence thereof?—If I am correct in supposing that the commanders-in-chief in India have been deprived of power, which very often they might have exercised but for the controlling power at the Horse Guards, and which I conceive with their local experience they could have exercised beneficially, then I think it is self evident that injury must have occurred.

4193. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you of opinion that the native army of India could be as efficiently officered by officers from Her Majesty's regular army as by officers enlisted for service in India and belonging to the local army?—Certainly not.

4194. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you think not, if they learnt the language?—Certainly not. I think I have answered that question already, and given the reason for it, that it is requisite that you should have officers who are devoted to the particular service to induce them to look to India as their home.

4195. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you not of opinion that if the whole European army for India were furnished from Her Majesty's regular army, the native army would be so looked down upon as to make it a service which no British officer would feel himself honoured in belonging to?—Certainly. I think that no man of spirit could wish to continue in such a service.

4196. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) For what reason?—It would be looked upon altogether (to use an Indian phrase) as a low caste service—as a subordinate service; it would be looked upon as something in the light of the Sierra Leone corps.

4197. Suppose very high rewards, distinctions, and honours, are specially given to officers in the native regiments, and that arrangements are made holding up the native regiments as an inducement for a spirit of emulation to acquire positions in them, instead of the reverse?—You may give high pay, you may make the service, to a certain extent, desirable in point of emolument; but if you officer it in the way that General Hancock supposes you never can have men who will take a real interest in it; it will be looked upon as an inferior service.

4198. Why?—The natives of India are in themselves an inferior stamp of men to the Europeans; the service is not so congenial to European soldiers; and if you cut it off altogether from the European local army, I conceive that there will be at once a line of distinction drawn between the two.

4199. Why should not that distinction have existed between officers in the European regiments of the former company and officers in the native regiments?—Because they were always interchangeable, and did interchange.

4200. Why should they not be interchangeable now?—What I stated was in reply to General Hancock's question, supposing the native army to be officered from the royal army, and not being an army of itself.

4201. Supposing that the European army of the line and the native army form one army, what difference will there be, they being on a perfect equality, or, on the contrary, rather raising the position of the officers of the native army, those officers being selected for merit, and talent and acquirement?—There would then be no local service; and then, for the reason which I have already repeated three or four times, the officers not being enlisted as it were specially for local service in India, would have their thoughts centred elsewhere; they would not give that attention to the service in India which they do at present.

4202. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Their only tie to the native army would in that case be the superior emoluments which would fall to them?—That would be all.

4203. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) With regard to the remark as to the distribution of honours to the Company's army, are you aware that there are now four officers of the Company's army aides-de-camp to the Queen?—I think it is very possible that there may be that number, but I do not think that it alters the fact, seeing that there are fully thirty officers selected from the line and militia for that honour. The special fact which I mentioned was this, that the commanders-in-chief in India are selected from the line; there has only been one exception.

4204. My question had reference to honorary distinctions?—Even with regard to honorary distinctions, I suppose, if you took a numerical estimate of the Queen's officers and the Company's officers, you would find that the latter had not a full proportion of honours. My statement referred especially to the fact, that the Queen's officers take the largest proportion of the highest commands, and with those the greatest opportunities for distinction.

4205. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) With all deference, I cannot quite agree to that?—I mean in proportion. If you will be good enough to take the number of Queen's officers serving in India and the number of Company's officers serving in India, and also the number of divisions at any time before the mutiny occurred, you will find that a much larger proportion of Queen's officers held divisional commands than of Company's.

4206. There are only five officers by regulation?—The number of divisions held by line officers is alternately five and six; that of local officers twelve and thirteen. In Bombay the line officers hold two and one alternately; and the local officers three and two.

4207. In alternate years two, and otherwise one?—That is merely number and not proportion; it is the proportion which the Queen's troops bear to the Company's troops that I apprehend should make the rule.

4208. Then the result would be that the Queen's troops would be merely auxiliary to the troops in India?—I would have it so, unquestionably.

4209. (*Viscount Melville.*) The proportion which the Queen's troops in Bombay bore to the Company's troops, was as 10,000 to 30,000; there was one divisional command for the Queen's officers, with an alternate second one, and the rest for the Bombay officers?—Your Lordship will pardon me, when I left Bombay, and for some time before, there were only five Queen's regiments, including the dragoons. There were three regiments of European infantry of the Company's

Colonel J. Holland.
23rd Oct. 1858.

service, five battalions of artillery, three battalions of engineers, three regiments of cavalry, and twenty-nine battalions of native infantry regulars, besides a large number of irregulars. There were five regiments in the Queen's service against more than forty of the Company's regiments, yet, at the very lowest, the Queen's officers had one-fourth of the divisional commands, and every alternate season one-half.

4210. Are you aware that some officers have recommended the abolition of the native officers; are you of opinion that it would be an advantage to retain them or to get rid of them?—Certainly to retain them.

The witness withdrew.

Major-General Sir THOMAS HARTE FRANKS, K.C.B., examined.

Major-Gen. Sir T. H. Franks, K.C.B.

4211. (*Chairman.*) You are now a major-general in the Queen's service?—I am.

4212. How long have you served in India?—15 years.

4213. During which time I believe you recently commanded a division in the field?—Yes.

4214. You have had some questions put into your hands. Have you formed any opinion as to how far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as parts of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only?—I am in favour of the whole being troops of the line.

4215. Upon what grounds do you form that opinion?—The advantages of having an army recruited, drilled, organized, and regularly relieved from England at stated periods, and all acting under the same system of command, are obvious; besides, to carry out a regular system of relief to a force so constituted it would be necessary to have a large reserve in England, which would be available for the defence of the United Kingdom, or for other purposes if required.

4216. With reference to India, looking to India alone, what is your opinion?—That a force so constituted would be more efficient.

4217. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In what respect will you have a more efficient army?—In respect to the points which I have already named.

4218. Do you consider it an advantage that regiments should come fresh from England or not?—I do.

4219. Why, because of the climate?—Because of the climate.

4220. Do you think that the discipline deteriorates in India?—Certainly, after a lengthened period of service in that country. I should say after 12 or 13 years.

4221. (*Chairman.*) You think 12 or 13 years in India quite long enough for an European?—Yes.

4222. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think that the local European force of artillery and infantry hitherto serving in India has been in any respect inferior, as regards efficiency for service in the field, to any of Her Majesty's regiments in the same branches?—I have served in the field with portions of the local European forces of artillery and infantry of the three presidencies, and nothing could surpass their gallantry, efficiency, and intelligence; but from what I have heard, and from my own experience, they were not equal in discipline to Her Majesty's regiments when in quarters.

4223. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That want of discipline to which you allude I presume you attribute to climate?—Partly the climate, and partly to other causes; for instance, they generally had too few officers attached to each corps.

4224. (*Major-General Hancock.*) With regard to discipline in quarters, upon what do you consider that the discipline of a regiment principally depends?—A great deal depends on the commanding officer.

4225. Principally?—Certainly, provided he is properly supported by his officers.

4226. Are you of opinion that if a regiment be commanded by an officer perfectly well qualified for the command; and if there be a sufficient number of officers under his command, the regiment ought to be perfectly well disciplined?—Generally speaking it ought to be.

4227. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that climate has nothing to do with the want of discipline?—Of course after a long service in India both officers and men in a certain degree lose their energies, but I have known exceptions.

4228. The climate is enervating?—Of course.

4229. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*)—Your regiment, the 10th, was in the finest order of any regiment in the British army when I left India; has it deteriorated in its discipline?—I never saw Her Majesty's 10th foot in finer or more efficient order than when it served in my division in the field within the last few months, although it never had the advantage of being cantoned in a hill climate, which by the bye I consider it ought to have had in turn with other corps. I could also mention instances of other regiments being in first-rate order, after having served even longer than the 10th in India, viz., the 16th lancers and the 40th foot, but I consider these were rare exceptions.

4230. (*Chairman.*) It has been stated that there is a great superiority on the part of officers permanently attached to corps in India, have you observed that superiority; do you consider the permanent European force superior to the British force sent out there?—I do not.

4231. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Although you state that your regiment is in that high order, in the period to which that refers how many officers and men have renovated that regiment from your depôt at home?—About 1,200.

4232.—(*Viscount Melville.*) Do you mean that they have been buried?—No, I mean casualties of all sorts, viz., men killed in action, died of wounds, and other causes, invalided and discharged.

4233. Dead?—No, casualties of various kinds.

4234. (*Sir Geo. A. Wetherall.*) How long has the regiment been in India?—16 years.

4235. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Still the question is, whether that local experience would not be acquired in about five or six years?—Certainly it would.

4236. You are of that opinion?—Yes; I am of opinion that local knowledge is of the greatest advantage to all ranks, but more particularly to the superior officers who are likely to be placed in commands; but it does not require an officer or soldier to serve his whole life in India to acquire this experience, five years ought to be amply sufficient.

4237. Therefore as regards maintaining a local force, upon that ground you do not see any great necessity for it?—Certainly not.

4238. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are you aware that the local troops, the artillery especially, have been always much under officered as compared with Her Majesty's regiments?—Yes; and I have considered this as one of the causes of their not being equal in discipline to Her Majesty's troops in quarters, but long residence in the country I consider the chief cause.

4239. Do you think that the officers on the staff of the army in India, furnished from the local troops, have been found in any respect inferior to the officers of Her Majesty's service on the staff of the army?—Certainly not.

4240. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have they been found superior?—I have already given an opinion on this subject before another Commission, that I considered officers of the Company's service generally made more efficient staff officers than those of Her Majesty's service, but I am glad to have an opportunity of here explaining what I considered to have been the cause. Until recently, the latter have had no encouragement to qualify themselves, as they were almost entirely debarred from staff employment of every sort, but

matters have greatly changed of late, and particularly during the last campaign, when the field was thrown open to all, and Her Majesty's service produced numbers of first-rate staff officers.

4241. Do you attribute that to the fact of there being fewer opportunities of employing officers of the line as staff officers?—Of course.

4242. Do you think that if that restriction were removed it would make any difference?—Of course; it has made a difference.

4243. I believe your experience has been confined to the Bengal presidency?—Yes.

4244. Is it within your experience that the officers of the Queen's army have been largely in excess in staff appointments to the officers in the Company's army?—On the contrary, until recently, there were very few staff appointments open to Her Majesty's service.

4245. We have it in evidence that the Company's officers have not been equally favoured with the Queen's officers in the command of divisions; is that your opinion?—Until lately there were only two divisional and three brigade commands allotted to officers of Her Majesty's service in the Bengal presidency.

4246. Was the number allowed to the Queen's in undue proportion?—I do not think so.

4247. (*Major-General Hancock.*) How do you calculate the proportion; do you take the proportion to the number of officers?—I am not prepared at this moment to calculate the proportion, but I am under the impression that there was no favoritism towards the officers of the Queen's service in regard to commands.

4248. (*Viscount Melville.*) Will you have the goodness to state what Queen's officers were on the staff, for I have never heard of them?—I am speaking of the divisional commands.

4249. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How many divisional commands were there in Bengal?—I believe eight formerly, two of which were held by Queen's officers.

4250. What approximately was the force of the army of Bengal before the war?—I cannot exactly recollect at this moment.

4251. Was it about 200,000 men, natives and Europeans?—I should think so.

4252. And there were two divisional commands out of that number?—Only two held by Queen's officers in the Bengal presidency.

4253. From your regimental experience, is it your opinion that you would find plenty of officers in the regiments of the line who would be very willing to prepare themselves for any high employments in India if they had an opening?—Undoubtedly.

4254. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Looking at the very different circumstances under which the officers of Her Majesty's and of the Company's armies were serving in India, the former possessing the power of exchanging into regiments at home, and having staff and other appointments open to them in England, in the Mediterranean, in Canada, and elsewhere, from which advantages the latter were altogether excluded, do you think that the officers of the two services in India had equal claims to the staff and other appointments there?—I do not think so.

4255. Do you think that under those very different circumstances it would be just that the officers of both services should have an equal proportion of the appointments in India to which the Company's officers were altogether restricted?—No.

4256. My question refers to the state of things which has existed hitherto, and not to that which may be supposed to exist prospectively. Do you think that, under the very different circumstances which have existed hitherto, it would have been just to open to Her Majesty's officers an equal share of all the appointments civil and military in India?—I am not prepared at present to give a decided opinion on that subject.

4257. Are you unable to form an opinion?—I am quite satisfied that the arrangements made at the time were intended to be very just ones, but not the best to bring forth the talents of the officers of Her Majesty's service.

4258. (*Chairman.*) You are merely giving an opinion as to the effect of the arrangement, and not as to the system?—Yes.

4259. How were the troops in India supplied with light clothing during your experience?—Latterly the men themselves generally purchased in India a kind of white cotton stuff, which was made up by the regimental tailors at the lowest price.

4260. Who regulated the nature and description of the light clothing?—It was regulated by a general order.

4261. From whom?—From the Commander-in-chief.

4262. From the Commander-in-chief, where?—In India.

4263. The description of light clothing worn by the troops in India was regulated by the authorities out there?—Yes.

4264. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) It did not emanate from the Horse Guards?—No; I do not think there was ever the slightest interference by the Horse Guards with the authorities in India, as to the description of light clothing to be worn by Her Majesty's troops there.

4265. (*Viscount Melville.*) Was not the order about white clothing the regular order, that a man was to have so many white jackets, so many pairs of white trowsers, so many white shirts, and so many check shirts, all of which he had to pay for himself out of his own pay?—Yes.

4266. The government giving no assistance whatever?—None.

4267. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) There has never been the slightest interference from the authorities here?—Never.

4268. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What authority has regulated the uniform worn by Her Majesty's troops in India—the red coat, schako, Highland bonnet, and all the rest of it?—The authority of Her Majesty's warrant, but that clothing was only intended to be worn during the cold season in India, when it was as much required for the health and comfort of the soldier as in England.

4269. (*Chairman.*) That species of clothing is as necessary in India as here?—Yes, during the cold season.

4270. As you state that you think that there ought to be only the Queen's army in India, perhaps you have considered the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the Queen's army?—If the question refers to the most reliable route for conveying troops to India, I am in favour of their being sent round the Cape of Good Hope, as political circumstances might at any time interfere with their transit overland.

4271. (*Colonel Forsyth Tait.*) It would be a question of expense also?—Yes; but in case of emergency we should also be prepared, if possible, to send them by Egypt.

4272. But as a general relief you should choose the most certain and the cheapest route?—Yes.

4273. (*Chairman.*) What is the longest period that you think a regiment ought to be kept in India without being relieved?—Twelve or thirteen years, provided they could be cantoned for three years in the hills during that period.

4274. Do you consider it possible to consolidate the European forces so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other, and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company?—I am not prepared to give an opinion as to how it should be effected; but I conceive the advantages would be great if it could be so arranged, as I think you can never have an efficient army under the present system.

r-Gen. T. H. K.C.B. ct. 1858.

4275. You think, then, that it is very objectionable to have two separate armies with different discipline?—Yes.

4276. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that it produces feelings of great jealousy?—Yes; I think you will never have such an army as you should have, until you have the whole of your European force, troops of the line and your native troops, the same as your colonial regiments; such as, for instance, the Ceylon rifles. How it can be done, I have not thought of sufficiently; but my opinion is very strong upon that point.

4277. Is it your opinion that the officers in the native regiments would be looked down upon on account of being in native regiments?—Certainly not, under proper arrangements.

4278. Do you think that the line officers would come forward and go into native regiments?—I think they would.

4279. You think that there would be no difficulty?—Not the slightest.

4280. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that they would rather look up to service in the native regiments than down upon it?—It would be respected according to the advantages derived from serving in such corps. In our service we do not look down upon the officers in colonial regiments.

4281. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) They are all allowed to exchange?—Yes.

4282. That would be complete equality, except the advantages arising from being in the native corps?—Yes.

4283. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are the only advantages to which you allude pecuniary?—Pecuniary advantages would be a great inducement.

4284. Would you make pecuniary advantages the chief incentive to an officer going into the native army?—As I said before, it would be a great inducement to enter any branch of the service.

4285. Are you of opinion that officers taken from European regiments and put into native corps would draw with the native ranks equally as well as those trained to it from their youth?—Provided they have a proper knowledge of the language, and from a few years' residence in the country have a general knowledge of the native character.

4286. (*Colonel Forsyth Tait.*) Do you think that an officer could command a native regiment without speaking the language?—Certainly not.

4287. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would not allow a man to go into a native regiment who had not passed a certain examination in languages?—Of course not.

4288. As a superior officer you managed natives without speaking the language?—I spoke the language very imperfectly, but I never had the slightest difficulty in managing native troops under my command.

4289. (*Colonel Burlton.*) You have stated that you think that there is no objection to a system of exchange among the officers?—I think it would be most desirable if it could be effected.

4290. Does that apply to the present officers, or hereafter?—I think it must apply to hereafter; as if you interfered with previous arrangements it would be considered an injustice; but I am strongly of opinion that the interests of the state should always be considered paramount to the interests of any body of individuals.

4291. Are you aware that in the Act just passed, abolishing the government of the East India Company, there is a clause which says that no alteration whatsoever shall take place which in any way affects the faith which has been pledged to the officers in the Indian army: that their prospects, their advantages, their pensions, and everything else, are secured to them upon the faith of the British government? Would you break through that?—I should be very averse to recommend anything of the kind.

4292. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Admitting that you are bound to consider the claims of these officers, and that by arrangement you can do it, is not the question a simple one?—Yes, of course it is.

4293. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Can it be good for the state to break faith?—I consider that I have already given an opinion on that subject.

4294. As you know that the Company's service is a seniority service, and that all the privileges of that service have been pledged to those in it on the faith of the British government, you must be aware that the British government cannot break faith; is there any mode in which the exchange can be effected without breaking faith?—I am not prepared at present to suggest any plan to effect that purpose.

4295. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you not think that the withdrawal of any considerable part of the army in India, in case of an European war breaking out, would occasion very great inconvenience, to say the least of it, to the government of India in the number of officers holding staff and other employment, who would return to their regiments?—I do not think it would.

4296. The government of India must part with the services of those officers, whether they thought it beneficial or not?—The Commander-in-Chief would have to arrange that; and I think there would be no difficulty in doing so.

4297. (*Chairman.*) You are against a local force; but supposing that there is a local European force, do you consider that it should be kept up by draughts and volunteers from the line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?—I strongly recommend that the strength be kept up by recruits from England in preference to volunteers from regiments returning home, as I consider the system of volunteering, which has hitherto been adopted to fill up vacancies in regiments of the line in India, has been most injurious to the discipline of corps remaining in that country, as well as to those returning to England.

4298. Do you not think that there is a great disadvantage in having two separate armies recruiting one against the other?—I most sincerely hope that that disadvantage, as well as many others, will be obviated by having one united army in India, and without which I am of opinion we shall never succeed in having a properly effective one.

4299. Do you not think that there is a great disadvantage in recruiting for two separate armies, one competing against the other?—Most certainly.

4300. Was the permission to volunteer confined to regiments in Her Majesty's service, or were the men allowed to volunteer into the Company's service?—To Her Majesty's service only.

4301. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Supposing you only allowed them to volunteer into the local service in India, and not into regiments of the line, do you see any objection to that?—I am strongly opposed to filling up vacancies in any regiments in India by volunteering.

The witness withdrew.

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Charles Renny, Esq., C.B., examined.

4302. (*Chairman.*) Will you have the goodness to state to the Commission the position which you have held in the Indian army, the length of time that you have been in India, and the opportunities which you have had of forming an opinion upon the questions which have been submitted to you?—The last position which I held was as surgeon-general and a member of the medical board in Bengal.

4303. How many years were you in Bengal?—I was there 44½ years.

4304. You have been furnished with some questions which the Commission wish to inquire upon?—I have a printed paper which includes four questions.

4305. Have you had any opportunity of forming an opinion how far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as parts of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only? —The Commission, I suppose, will wish me to confine myself to medical views of the question.

4306. Yes.—As I am of opinion that the most efficient services would be obtained from European troops formed on the plan of a local army I think that the troops should be raised for service in India only.

4307. Upon what ground do you form that opinion. I understand you to confine yourself entirely to medical views?—Yes. The health and the efficiency of the Company's European troops have been as good as of those of the line, under considerable disadvantages I may state.

4308. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What disadvantages? —One disadvantage is that they have had to receive into their body volunteers from the line, men of a more advanced age than recruits, men probably acclimated but adding to the average of age in European regiments.

4309. I thought that the rule in India was, that no men from Her Majesty's regiments were allowed to volunteer into the Company's European troops?—I have frequently had to examine Queen's volunteers; up to a very late period of my service I have had to examine them.

4310. (*Viscount Melville.*) But to go into the Queen's regiments, not into the Company's regiments? —Some into the Company's; that is a military point on which I may be mistaken as to the present understanding of the rule; but a reference to the India House will show that volunteering into the Company's regiments from corps of the line on being relieved was always permitted, that it was suspended for a short period, was again authorized, and continues so to the present time. The Company's troops are at any rate not a well selected body of men originally; they are not a very select body of men, I believe.

4311. (*Chairman.*) Are they not recruited here exactly in the same way as the Queen's troops?—But it is generally supposed that they are not such good recruits. I would leave that question aside; putting that aside, a great disadvantage to the European troops there is that the non-commissioned staff of all the numerous establishments, military and civil, of the State, are withdrawn from them—their steady men.

4312. (*Colonel Forsyth Tait.*) The best men are withdrawn from the Company's European troops for general staff appointments throughout the country? —Yes.

4313. And therefore you consider that the men are not so efficient as they otherwise would be?—That is a disadvantage. I am away at present from all papers and documents that I have formerly had access to, and I cannot speak so fully as I might otherwise have done, and therefore I cannot state all the reasons why I think the European troops labour under a disadvantage; but I think they have laboured under a disadvantage.

4314. (*Chairman.*) You think that the troops of what was the Company's service have laboured under a disadvantage compared with the troops of the line? —Yes, and yet have maintained their health and efficiency.

4315. Will you have the goodness to state what you consider is the effect of the climate of India upon a European on his first coming out? How long do you consider that a European would remain in India without the climate at all interfering with his efficiency or power of service?—They reckon that a European soldier should be efficient at least for 15 years.

4316. Do you consider 15 years about the limit of the efficiency of a European soldier?—Yes.

4317. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) How soon do they become acclimatized?—No exact period, I think, can be assigned.

C. Renny, Esq., C.B.

23rd Oct. 1858.

4318. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Generally speaking?—Some suffer earlier and some later.

4319. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Has the colour of their complexion or of their hair anything to do with those who become earliest acclimatized?—It has, so far as the European constitution is not able to bear the climate so well as the native.

4320. (*Chairman.*) Will you have the kindness to proceed, and give any evidence which you wish referring to any of the questions?—I should merely limit myself to these four questions. I have said that I think that the troops ought to be raised for service in India only. I have therefore, with regard to the second question, to consider only the efficiency of the troops raised for India, not with reference to the troops of the line.

4321. The efficiency of all European troops in India, whether belonging to the permanent force or the Queen's regiments going out there?—I consider it of great importance for the efficiency of the European troops that they should be located in favourable stations, as elevated as possible, and well and carefully selected.

4322. At what season of the year do you think it most advisable for the reliefs to arrive in India?— In the month of October or November, and I think that they should be sent *viâ* the Cape in steamers, or in the best vessels that could be obtained.

4323. You prefer that to the overland route?—I would adopt the overland route only on an emergency.

4324. Do you think that the effect of the passage tends at all to prepare the men for Indian service?— I think that the loss of men by the overland passage would be much greater than by the Cape.

4325. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have you any grounds for giving that opinion. Are you aware whether there has been any mortality in consequence of the troops proceeding by the overland route?—I am perfectly aware that there has been great mortality from troops arriving in the rainy season in India.

4326. I mean so far as the passage goes. I understood you to say that you thought the passage by the Cape to be very preferable?—I have some knowledge of the overland passage, having twice passed it; still I think the Cape passage to be preferable.

4327. Take the result of the experience which we have had in the last two years?—I have not the means of knowing. I only speak from former experience and observation.

4328. You only speak from the experience of having made the passage, but not from the result of the passage?—Just so. I do not speak from recent trials, having little or no information regarding them.

4329. (*Chairman.*) What is your experience with respect to the clothing of the troops in India, with regard to its effect upon their health?—The clothing has been much too thick and too warm for the climate.

4330. Is not warm clothing required there at different periods of the year?—Two kinds of clothing are required; the lightest for the hot season, and the thick clothing for the cold season.

4331. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have not the troops got the lightest clothing for the hot season, and the thick clothing for the cold season?—They have got them, I believe; but it is generally said that they are not permitted to wear such light clothing as they ought to wear.

4332. Is that your experience in India?—My experience goes to convince me that they have worn too much clothing in the hot weather.

4333. To what do you attribute that; I understood you before to say that they had light clothing?—They have light clothing.

4334. Why, then, have they worn the other?—It has been understood to be partly owing to the regulations.

C. Renny, Esq., C.B.

23rd Oct. 1858.

4335. (*Chairman.*) Are you speaking now of the European portion of the Company's service?—Generally of the service.

4336. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) To what regulations do you refer?—Regimental regulations; I should be entering into military points if I discussed that question. It has been very much according to the pleasure of commanding officers.

4337. (*Chairman.*) Would you, as medical officer, have an opportunity of giving any opinion about the dress of the men?—It was open to the medical officer to give an opinion; but I imagine that it would not have been attended to.

4338. (*Viscount Melville.*) Can you state whether the troops wore the warm clothing in the hot season?—It is the impression generally that such is the custom.

4339. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Can you give any instance of it?—My belief is that they might have worn much lighter clothing.

4340. When?—In the hottest weather.

4341. (*Viscount Melville.*) Will you name the months?—Say from April to September.

4342. Did they not always wear white clothing then?—I have seen troops in warm clothing, in red clothing.

4343. In the rains?—Even in the hot weather.

4344. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Is not there a day fixed for the European troops to put on their warm clothing?—Generally from the equinox, I think.

4345. And generally for putting on the light clothing?—Yes, from the vernal equinox.

4346. (*Major-General Hancock.*) That is merely a general regulation?—It is a general regulation, but it is not generally adhered to, I believe.

4347. (*Chairman.*) Will you have the kindness to proceed with any statement which you have to make?—In regard to the third question, which relates to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company, the first part of that question it is not my province to speak of, it is more a military question; I would wish to point out to the Commission only what affects the medical service. The Indian medical service is strictly a military branch, but it has also a great portion of it employed on civil duties; any amalgamation of the officers would require this to be provided for, and that there should be a separate branch for the civil departments; and it appears to me that that would be a question for the Indian government to settle. Rules applicable to military officers would not do for the entire service, and the Indian government would have to prepare fresh rules for the civil department which would be necessary. The form of a permanent local body of professional men, experienced in the diseases of the climate and the means of preventing them, not interchangeable, is more required for the medical than for the purely military department.

4348. Have you any other remarks to make upon the fourth question. Do you consider that the local European force should be kept up by draughts and volunteers from the line or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?—I remarked before that volunteering is to a certain extent at present allowed in the Company's European troops.

4349. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That is a mistake?—I think that it would be impossible to keep up the force of any European army there merely by volunteers; that it will always be necessary to recruit from Great Britain.

4350. I think you said that you considered that the stamp of recruits for the Company's service was inferior?—That is a general belief in India; it may be a mistake.

4351. Is that your own experience?—I should say that they were rather inferior.

4352. In what respect?—Perhaps a little in height. I believe, however, that there is a regular standard for that; but in general conformation they are inferior,

4353. (*Colonel Forsyth Tait.*) Do you think that the European recruits are inferior who are enlisted for the Company's army. Have you had an opportunity of judging of them?—I have had considerable opportunities.

4354. I was only talking the other day with Dr. Dempster, who has been a great many years in the Company's European artillery, and he told me that he thought they were the finest recruits that he had ever seen in his life, that he did not think there was any army in the world which could get finer men?—That may be so as far as the artillery is concerned; but for the European troops generally, it is held that they are inferior.

4355. (*Viscount Melville.*) With regard to the sanitary state of the troops in India, do you consider that the barracks in India were properly constructed, and were adapted for sanitary purposes?—The new barracks have been made much better than the old ones; certainly improvements were necessary in the old ones, but the most recent barracks have been constructed in a very improved manner.

4356. Were they on a level with the ground or raised from it, and were they under-drained?—They were generally somewhat raised; the most recent ones have been made what they call upper-room barracks.

4357. Can you name any station?—In Fort William the newest ones are made upper-roomed, which they were not before.

4358. You are aware that on a regiment first arriving at Calcutta it is usual to send it up to Chinsurah?—Yes.

4359. Can you explain the reason why a regiment on first going out suffers so much from cholera?—It is known to be so, but no sufficient grounds have been found to account for it, more than the susceptibility of the newcomer to local causes of acute disease.

4360. Do you consider that the ration of arrack which is given to the European soldiers, and the strength at which it is made, is a good thing for their health?—I consider that arrack is most detrimental to the health. I should say that the use of any spirituous liquors or the distribution of any spirituous liquors to the soldier is very detrimental.

4361. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) What would you substitute in the place of spirit?—I am not prepared to offer a substitute; beer is a favourite substitute with them, but it cannot be entirely a substitute for it.

4362. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you consider that beer has any injurious effect upon the constitution of a European soldier in India?—I have not observed that it has any injurious effect.

4363. Do you consider that it has a beneficial effect?—It has a beneficial effect.

4364. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Do you consider that the hospitals are built upon a proper principle in India?—They have been gradually improving the construction of hospitals in India, and the latter ones have been built in a very superior style, and with more cubical space to numbers.

4365. Do you think that that applies to the whole of India; can you speak to that?—I speak of Bengal, and it may not apply to the whole of Bengal, but it is very general, especially in the North-west.

4366. But you cannot speak to the other presidencies?—I cannot.

4367. (*Viscount Melville.*) Have you had any means of knowing the difference of mortality among the European troops stationed in the hills and among those in the plains?—There is not sufficient experience yet of whole regiments stationed for lengthened periods in the hills; I cannot speak to that in the Neilgherries, not having been there. As far as my observation goes, it has only been upon convalescent and sick detachments sent to the hill sanataria from Landour eastward to Cherra Poongee. There is in Bengal no experience of a whole regiment having been sent up to the hills.

4368. Of what period are you speaking; the present hill stations are at Kussowlie and Dugshai and

Subathoo; there are three stations?—I wish to make a correction; there are no hill stations for complete regiments in Bengal Proper, where the mortality is greatest.

4369. (*Sir Geo. A. Wetherall.*) Do you not consider that it is the abuse of spirits more than their moderate use which is injurious?—Of course, it is the abuse.

4370. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Supposing that a regiment was of 800 men, and you wanted to keep it up an effective regiment, how many men would you require in the depôt to keep it up to the efficiency of 800?—These are military points, on which I cannot exactly answer at this moment, being without the documents which I have hitherto had at my command.

4371. I should say the contrary; I should say that it was a doctor's business to answer that question, and not the business of a military man; it is a question of health?—I can speak to the mortality, but I cannot speak to the general complement of a regiment.

4372. If a regiment was 1000 strong, cannot you say how many on an average there ought to be in hospital or sick?—I cannot speak from recollection, not having the documents before me; my regimental experience is so old, that I cannot speak distinctly upon that point. I have seen it put at six and a fraction per cent. per annum upon strength for ordinary mortality and invaliding. It may be stated that the calculations from the proper returns for long periods have not been published in England. The materials are ample; and, in my opinion, they should be examined and collected by competent persons, and the results laid open for general information.

C. Renny, Esq. C.B.

23rd Oct. 1858

4373. (*Viscount Melville.*) Did you ever find the ratio of mortality diminished or increased in proportion to whether the regiment had been a long or a short time in India? What do you take to be the per-centage in Bengal?—The per-centage on an average is about five per annum on strength.

4374. I have always heard it put at ten?—That is the highest; I speak of the average. Here is a document from which I speak, which states that it has been five per cent. during ten years for the Bengal presidency; in the Bombay presidency it is about the same, and at Madras it is three per cent. per annum on strength.

4375. Do you or do you not think that the mortality increases as the European is longer in the country?—That would require many points of consideration, because you have to take into view that the regiment is recruited during that period.

4376. (*Sir Geo. A. Wetherall.*) But the recruiting depends upon the casualties?—Some regiments have the casualties increased by the residence, but in other regiments I have known it otherwise.

4377. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you think that in general the barracks for European troops in India are sufficiently high in the rooms, and that there is sufficient ventilation, and that they are well adapted to the climate?—Generally I should say that they are very well adapted; they have been more improved of late years; but I believe that they are generally well adapted.

The witness withdrew.

Adjourned to Monday next, at twelve o'clock.

Monday, 25th October 1858.

PRESENT:

Major-General PEEL.	Lieut.-Gen. Sir HARRY G. W. SMITH.
H.R.H. the Duke of CAMBRIDGE.	Lieut.-Gen. Sir GEORGE A. WETHERALL.
Lord STANLEY.	Major-Gen. HANCOCK.
Marquis of TWEEDDALE.	Colonel BURLTON.
Viscount MELVILLE.	Colonel FORSYTH TAIT.

MAJOR-GENERAL PEEL IN THE CHAIR.

JAMES RANALD MARTIN, Esq., F.R.S., examined.

J. R. Martin Esq., F.R.S.

25th Oct. 185

4378. (*Chairman.*) You belong, I believe, to the medical staff of the Bengal army?—I was 22 years in Bengal.

4379. From the year 1820 to the year 1842?—Yes, about those years.

4380. And you are the author of works on diseases from the climates of India?—I am the author of the work on the table on the influence of tropical climates upon European constitutions, and of various reports upon the sanitary condition of the army of India, European and native, during the whole course of my service, and since my return home also.

4381. You have been furnished with some questions, I believe, by the secretary of the Commission?—I have been furnished with two series of questions; one of them relating to the sanitary condition of the European army in India.

4382. Will you have the kindness to state to the Commission anything which you wish to bring before them upon this subject?—I have brought written and detailed replies on both the series of questions. My replies upon the sanitary branch of the subject contain some tables illustrative of the influence of tropical climates on European constitutions, the influence of age, and length of residence in India, and various other points, such as the influence of locality, to which I request to direct particular attention.

4383. Will you have the kindness to read the paper which you have prepared?—This letter is addressed to Colonel Wood, the secretary of the Commission:—"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant, requiring me to furnish to the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the organization of the Indian army, information on the effect of tropical climates on the European constitution, on the best means of securing the efficiency of European troops serving in India, and on the fixing the period at which they should be relieved.

"I. As to the effect of tropical climates on the European constitution."

"1. This may be very satisfactorily determined for all the great military stations throughout India by an enumeration of the ratio per thousand admitted annually into the hospitals suffering under tropical diseases, together with the ratio of deaths. These ratios will vary somewhat, according to the nature of the soil and water constituting the local climate, the structural arrangements of barracks and hospitals, the interior discipline and economy of regiments, the character and conduct of commanding officers. The sickness and mortality thus estimated will be found to have been very great at all stations, and even in times of peace, when compared with what occurs in temperate climates, if the range of observation as to numbers of men and of years be sufficiently extended.

J. R. Martin, Esq., F.R.S.
5th Oct. 1858.

"2. For example, it appears that out of an aggregate force of 25,431 British soldiers stationed during ten, eight, and ten years respectively, between the years 1823 and 1836 at, Calcutta, Chinsurah, and Berhampore, all in Bengal proper, there occurred of sickness as follows:—

Fevers, remittent, intermittent, and continued	13,596
Dysentery and diarrhœa	8,499
Hepatitis	1,354
Cholera	1,117
Total cases from acute tropical diseases	24,566

"3. There was a total of admissions into hospital on account of all diseases of 45,170 cases, and a total of deaths from all causes of 1,588 soldiers.

"At the depôt of Chinsurah, 28 miles from Calcutta, the annual ratio of admissions into hospital during 12 years, ranged from 755 to 4,325 per thousand. To determine the truth respecting the influence of climate two elements are necessary, a wide range of observation in years and large masses of men. Observations referring only to a few years and to a small body of men may be all in excess one way or the other, and they may thus mislead.

"4. The official results in respect to the mortality at each age among the military officers and the civil servants of the Bengal presidency afford a convincing proof that in the East Indies no advantage in the way of acclimation has hitherto been derived from length of residence. As those individuals are never employed out of India, and generally arrive there about the age of 18 or 20, their respective ages and ranks may be assumed as a criterion for estimating their length of residence in the country. On that principle then we find that, taking equal numbers of each rank, the annual mortality among the ensigns, for the most part youths but recently arrived, amounts only to - - - 23 per thousand.

Ditto lieutenants of about 3 years more of residence - - - 27 „ „

Ditto captains of 12 or 13 more years of residence - - - 34 „ „

Amongst the civil servants of Bengal the rates of mortality are as follows:—

First year of his residence	19·5 per thousand.
Second	23·5 „ „
Third	20·0 „ „
Fourth	22·0 „ „*

"This law, which is of universal application to the better classes of Europeans in India, will be found to operate *a fortiori* on the condition of the British soldier there.

"5. The acute diseases of India may be ranked as remittent (jungle) fever, dysentery, inflammation and abscess of the liver, and epidemic cholera. They are terms which have at all times expressed the more or less speedy destruction of the European forces located over the various provinces of Hindostan, even in times of profound peace.

"6. The whole range of service in the plains of India is to the British soldier one unbroken course of physical degradation. Every function of his body has been unnaturally excited or disturbed from the first to the last day of his residence, ending too often in a serious organic disease and degradation of the very blood. It is important here to observe that this last-mentioned degradation of the circulating fluid is surely brought about by mere residence in a hot or malarious district, even without the occurrence of any of the formidable diseases enumerated; a few years of residence in the hot and pestilential plains of India being of itself sufficient to spoil the blood and tissues of the European.

"7. The returns which you mention, as showing more deaths in regiments on their first arrival in India, speak to a state of things requiring careful explanation, and such explanation may perhaps be found in the following circumstances."

I mention them at hazard, not being acquainted with the actual facts; these are general reasons.

"The landing of European troops at an improper season, as the hot weather and rains; their too early or unseasonable exposure on active service, the being stationed in open cantonments, giving ready access to the bad liquors of the bazaars, the use of which tells most upon the newly arrived; exposure to epidemics, neglect of inspection parades, and the consequent non-detection of the silent earlier invasions of disease, differences in the character and conduct of commanding officers, and the absence in Her Majesty's regiments of certain traditional local experiences possessed by the old soldiers of the Company's European battalions, and which, to a certain extent, shielded the younger men on their first arrival from the consequences of their ignorance and recklessness.

"8. Where the enforcement of sanitary duties is discretionary, the character of the officer in command becomes a concern of the highest importance, and I apprehend that the greater losses in certain newly-arrived regiments as compared to those of older standing in India are not necessary to the climate, and that they may be entirely prevented."

The second question stated in Colonel Wood's letter is, "On the best means of securing the efficiency of European troops serving in India."

"1. On this subject I beg leave to refer to my addresses to the Chairman of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, of dates the 12th August and 1st December 1857. In the first of these statements the urgency of having the European troops removed to the mountain ranges everywhere to be found throughout India is represented; in the second the course of investigation for determining the best mountain climates, and the elevations most suitable to European residence is set forth in detail.

"2. It is impossible to overrate the importance of this measure, whether we regard the health and efficiency of the British army in India, its power to garrison and maintain that empire, or the capability of England by voluntary enlistment to fill up the muster rolls. The study and careful consideration of this subject for more than 20 years has brought to my mind the settled conviction that all this may easily be done; and further that the eventual saving in men and money will be enormous.

"3. The astounding sacrifices in men and money consequent on the locating the British troops in the plains of India, in ill selected stations, and worse barracks and hospitals, have been referred to in my official addresses already mentioned. The statements of the medical officers on these heads, extending over many years, and referring to almost every British cantonment in India, are such as almost to stagger belief; yet do they appear to be essentially well founded. They suggest the necessity of an inquiry into the conditions affecting health in the various climates, stations, camps, cantonments, barracks, and hospitals throughout India, and into the best means of applying sanitary experiences in improving their condition.

"4. I would here beg leave to express my strong conviction, founded on experience, that no amount of attention to structural arrangement, no perfection of barrack and hospital accommodation, can ever secure health to the British soldier serving in the hot and malarious plains of India, and that while such positions as it may be absolutely necessary to occupy on the level grounds, whether open or fortified, should be most carefully selected, the structural arrangements being made as perfect as sanitary science can dictate; yet, even from such well selected and well constructed stations, the European soldier on duty should be frequently removed into the mountains, so as to refresh and invigorate him.

"5. The formidable diseases of India which afflict and eventually destroy the European serving there

* Influence of Tropical Climates, and Colonel Sir Alexander Tulloch's reports.

are, as already stated, fever, dysentery, hepatitis, and epidemic cholera. Their fatal character is well known, and need not here be dwelt upon. They are essentially diseases of the plains." That is the important question, they are every one of them diseases of the plains.

"6. But it is not with deaths exclusively that we have to deal, for the man who has suffered severely or who has had relapses of remittent fever, dysentery, or hepatitis is generally injured for service in tropical climates and he ought at once to be sent home. It is here as with the sufferers from the Walcheren fever, the soldier could never afterwards be counted on for effective service in the warm and malarious climates of Portugal and Spain. A severe attack of cholera is also very damaging to the constitution, and many men are never well thereafter. When we read of 70 or 80 deaths per 1,000 annually, we see immediately a high rate of mortality of soldiers. But who shall detail the numbers of broken constitutions meanwhile amongst the survivors? This is a kind of information which no statistics can furnish to us.

"7. All cases of severe relapsing tropical disease, and all cases of chronic organic disease the results of previous acute attacks ought to be sent to England; for it has generally been found that the benefits derivable from a removal to the hill ranges have been but temporary, the invalids relapsing into their diseases on their return to the plains. How far a protracted or permanent residence in the mountain climates of India may tend to the maturing and confirming of health once seriously injured in the plains, our experiences do not as yet demonstrate. Meanwhile it is most satisfactory and important to know that in the hill ranges throughout India we may find the ready means for the more or less complete prevention of those endemic diseases which have in all times and under all circumstances of service, proved the bane of the British soldier."

The third point is, "On fixing the period at which British soldiers should be relieved."

"1. One of the great results to be derived from the removal of the European troops from the plains to the mountains of the East will be, the diminished occasion for general reliefs to Europe, a measure otherwise frequently necessary, and the consequent saving of enormous costs, not to speak of the obvious military and political inconveniences attendant on such frequent interchanges in the positions of large bodies of men.

"2. Formerly, and in respect of the great body of the Europeans serving in India, there could hardly be said to have been any reliefs. Of the old soldiers who originally mustered around the colours, few or none came home excepting the maimed and the incurable sufferers from tropical diseases. When a British regiment was eventually and after 15 or 20 years' service ordered home from India, the few who remained of the original corps, and those of more recent enlistment, were encouraged to volunteer into battalions stationed in the country; so that in fact, very few soldiers of Her Majesty's regiments returned from India. For the European battalions of artillery and infantry of the Company's army, there was no system of reliefs contemplated, the soldiers having enlisted for life to serve in India.

"3. Referring to the great benefits to be anticipated from a residence in the mountains throughout India, I am of opinion, that the questions of the nature, extent, and the times proper for the periodical reliefs, may be postponed or left to be determined, so far as health is concerned, by the event; that is, by the state of health and constitution of the soldiers, after a ten years' service in the East. But there can be no question as to the necessity for sending home annually the class of invalids mentioned in paragraph 7 of Article II. of this address. The treatment of the sufferers on their arrival in England should be of a special and most careful nature."

To that letter I added the following postscript:

J. R. Martin, Esq., F.R.S.

25th Oct. 1858.

"While touching upon the subject of the sanitary condition of Her Majesty's and the Honourable the East India Company's regiments in India, I would beg leave to say that a special and searching inquiry of a statistical nature is, in my opinion, necessary to the elucidation of the subject. To the regret of all scientific men connected with the army, the statistical reports of the sickness, mortality, and invaliding prepared by Sir Alexander Tulloch and Dr. Balfour have not comprised the sanitary history of the European army in India, I would therefore beg leave to urge such an examination of that subject as may be made of immediate avail. The surprising discrepancies that we hear of in estimates of the influence of general climate, of particular stations and other localities, of the influence of length of residence in India, and of age, all point to the necessity of a special inquiry into the whole question of the sanitary condition, past and present, of the European forces in India, including of course that of the officers of the two services. This is a subject of peculiar interest, owing to the vast difference stated by Mr. Neison to exist in the mortality of officers in each army."

(*The witness delivered in the following documents.*)

SUGGESTIONS for PROMOTING the HEALTH and EFFICIENCY of the BRITISH TROOPS serving in the EAST INDIES.—By *James Ranald Martin, Esq., F.R.S.*

To the Chairman of the Honourable the Court of Directors, East India House.

1. IT is stated by Colonel Sir Alexander Tulloch as the result of investigations in the War Office, made by desire of Mr. Sidney Herbert, that amongst British officers and soldiers of the Queen's and Company's armies serving in the East Indies, there occurred, from 1815 to 1855 inclusive, a total mortality, exclusive of casualties, of about 100,000 men, "the greater portion of whose lives might have been saved had better localities been selected for military occupation in that country."

2. Dr. Burke, late inspector-general of hospitals in Bengal, has stated that in the station of Secunderabad alone, during thirty years of its occupancy by British soldiers, the cost to the state on account of loss of life amounted to 150,000*l.*, estimating each soldier as worth 100*l.* But estimating the loss of life mentioned by Sir A. Tulloch at the same valuation of 100*l.* each man, we arrive at a loss in money of 10,000,000*l.* sterling.

3. Then there has been enormous waste of the public funds on account of barracks and hospitals, placed in stations so unhealthy that they were subsequently abandoned. The buildings for the European troops at Berhampore, Bengal, abandoned since 1835 on account of its unhealthiness, are stated by the finance authorities of Calcutta to have cost since 1757 nearly 17,000,000*l.* sterling.* Tennant declares that, up to his time, the sums expended by the East India Company for the accommodation of their European troops, "if laid out at the compound interest of the country, would, at a determinate period not very remote, have equalled the national debt."

4. Looking to these enormous sums, often absolutely worse than wasted, of what account in the comparison has been the cost of the medical establishments of India? how truly saving of the public revenues must be a well-ordered and well-directed and a well-contented medical corps! In truth, the importance of an efficient medical establishment is so great that we cannot put a money value on it.

5. As regards the preservation of European health in India, and indeed in all tropical climates, the due selection of locality is the first consideration; and next in importance stands the structural arrangements in barracks and hospitals.

* Influence of Tropical Climates, p. 424.

J. R. Martin, Esq., F.R.S.

25th Oct. 1858.

6. As to barracks, provided the site be of sufficient elevation, well cleared, drained, and levelled, with a good water supply, the material need not, I think, be of a costly character—well constructed huts for the accommodation of ten or twelve men forming a good protection against the inclemencies of weather. Such simple and cheap structures will, I believe, prove more conducive to the health of the European soldier in the mountain ranges of India than the most costly barrack, and the same may be said of hospital huts for the reception of the same number of men—viz., ten or twelve. In stations on the arid, hot plains of India, the same structures would answer well; but if large brick-built barracks and hospitals be preferred, they should be very spacious, double-roofed, and raised on arches.

7. The considerations involved in the subject of the last paragraph are of the utmost importance, whether viewed in a sanitary or financial light; and the subject has hitherto been altogether neglected in locating troops in most of our foreign possessions; although our experiences in all our European campaigns have demonstrated that the soldiers who were hutted fared well, while such as were massed in barracks and general hospitals perished at enormous rates.

8. This experience has been uniformly accordant, whether the climate was hot or cold, whether our men were serving in Holland or in the Crimea.

9. The Irish sufferers from typhus, during the famine, who were massed in workhouses and hospitals, perished in enormous numbers, whereas those who were thrown along the roads and under the hedges recovered in goodly proportions;—of so much more avail is pure air towards the restoration of health than a fine building. The thorough ventilation through the openings and crevices of huts supplies the sick with what they don't obtain in our ill-constructed barracks and hospitals—namely, pure air.

10. They were not palaces that were constructed by order of Sir Charles Metcalfe on the mountains of Jamaica, but a substantial form of hut, which, on a pure and elevated soil, was all that was required. Buildings such as those just referred to, constructed of the most ordinary materials, have been found to assure health, while Indian experiences prove that costliness of material and splendour of structure, apart from a good locality, will not prevent disease.

11. The importance of determining the true physical characters, and the exact medical topography of all the mountain ranges throughout India—especially of those situated in provinces in which it is desirable that British troops may reside—has now become imperative. European soldiers cannot maintain health or vigour in the plains, and the selection of suitable mountain stations has become more than ever a state necessity.

12. The experiences of the Himalayah positions, of those of the Neilgherry mountains, and of those of Ceylon, as sanitary stations, prove that by residence on their respective elevations the European is removed greatly above the range of the malarious fevers of India. But while this great and valuable fact is admitted, it is undoubtedly true that he is, in too many instances, carried into the range of another class of diseases—namely, that of bowel complaints. This circumstance has been found in various of our mountain positions to constitute a serious drawback from the otherwise great benefits derived from a residence in them.

13. Another disadvantage of the hill stations hitherto occupied by us in the East Indies was noticed by me when serving in Bengal—namely, that while the hill climates are permanently serviceable against the malarious fevers of the country, their influences in conducing to the cure of these and other diseases is limited in extent; the soldier being troubled with relapses of his disorders on descending into the plains, unless kept in the hills for a long time. The mountain ranges, therefore, which have hitherto been occupied by Europeans stand forth as possessing climates *preservative against fevers*, and as such we must improve them, and use them wherever required.

14. When, on the other hand, we find the British soldier lingering under chronic or structural diseases contracted on the plains, a removal to the seaboard, or to an insular sanitarium, or, still better, to England, will be found the only effective means of restoration; and this last resource of medicine should never be denied to him, for the climate of the mountains, invaluable in prevention, will not cure disease.

15. Referring to what has been stated in paragraph 12, how are we to escape from the admitted evils hitherto experienced in the very high positions occupied by us? Where and how are we to obtain that amount of elevation which, while it removes the European from out of the range of malarious fevers, may not place him in that of an exhausting and dangerous diarrhœa? This is the great desideratum—one hitherto unascertained because unsought for; yet no examinations which may fall short of ascertaining this desired medium elevation can be deemed satisfactory of our sanitary wants.

16. In the climates of yellow fever, an elevation of two thousand five hundred feet is found sufficient to remove the European from the locality of pestilence, without placing him in that of bowel disorders; and in the mountain stations of Jamaica the mortality amongst British soldiers is found to exceed but little, if at all, that of the same class of men in the United Kingdom.

17. Let us then have a series of careful and scientific examinations, by competent persons, of the lower and medium ranges of hills throughout India, in order that the great sanitary problem may be solved in a conclusive manner—namely, the providing a place of resort for our European troops which shall be alike free from malarious fevers and from disorders of the bowels. That such procurable localities are to be found in the East, as they have been in the West, is my firm belief, and let them be perseveringly sought for.

18. Let the solitary hills—those islands on the plains—be sought for, and carefully examined; they give sanitary excellences peculiar to themselves.

Lastly. Let there be appointed for the sanitary duties of the army, at each of the Indian presidencies, a medical officer of health—an officer of scientific attainments and of rank, who shall be attached to the quartermasters-general's department; we shall thus add to the department of military topography that of medical topography. The medical officer of health should preserve in his office, for the use of the scientific persons concerned, plans and models of the best barracks and hospitals which may be from time to time approved by the military powers of Europe, in order that the most recent improvements may be rendered available wherever buildings of the nature indicated may be found necessary.

The duties of the medical officer of health should be, in peace, to examine and report on all sites and on the condition of camps, temporary military stations and cantonments, on convalescent stations and sanitaria, on mountain ranges suitable for troops, and on solitary mountains and their capabilities, on the plans and structure of barracks and hospitals, and on everything relating to the health and comfort of the soldier.

In war, he should be attached to the quartermaster-general in the field, and be always in advance with this officer, so as to master the medical topography of the scene of action; and, where military reasons of imperative necessity do not overrule sanitary considerations, the advice and opinion of the medical officer of health should be received on the sites of camps, whether temporary or permanent, and on all matters having reference to the sanitary condition of the camp.

In a recent report to Her Majesty by a Royal Commission, of which I was a member, and which was ordered to inquire into the organization, government, and direction of the medical department of the British

army, the appointment of a medical officer of health, as long previously recommended by me for the service of the Indian army, was strongly urged upon Her Majesty's attention, with a view to the great benefits to be expected from the services of such an officer.

J. R. MARTIN.

Grosvenor-street, London,
August 12, 1857.

SIR, Grosvenor-street, Dec. 1, 1857.

Having recently submitted to the consideration of the Chairman of the Hon. the Court of Directors certain suggestions for the selection of localities for the European troops in the East Indies, and feeling assured that the mountain climates to be found throughout our possessions in the East must be largely used for the purpose stated, I beg leave to submit further suggestions which may prove of use to such officers as the Governor-General of India may appoint to examine and report on the important subject in question.

I do not mean that these are all the questions which may be examined; but I trust they will be found to comprehend the most useful subjects to be investigated and ascertained previously to fixing on permanent stations in the mountain climates of the East.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. MARTIN.

To Sir James Cosmo Melvill, K.C.B.,
Secretary, East India House.

Suggestions for the Investigation of Mountain Climates in the East Indies.

1st. The medical history of mountain climates, noting the physical character and state of health of the inhabitants at different elevations.
2nd. Climates of elevated valleys as compared to those of plains.
3rd. Climates at different degrees of mountain elevation.
4th. Differences produced by the different aspects—N., S., E., W.
5th. Differences produced by disposition of surrounding hills.
6th. Climates of solitary mountains.
7th. Meteorology of mountain climates:—
- *a.* Temperature at different elevations.
- *b.* Range of diurnal variations at different elevations.
- *c.* Range of annual variations at different elevations.
- *d.* Atmospheric pressure at different elevations.
- *e.* Humidity at different elevations.
- *f.* Rain and snow at different elevations.
- *g.* State of the sky at different elevations. Electricity.
- *h.* Relative dryness of the air of mountains as compared to plains.
- *i.* Rate of evaporation at different heights.
- *j.* Frequency and intensity of aërial currents at different heights.
- *k.* Power of the solar rays at different heights.
- *l.* Relative moisture of the soil at high and low elevations.
- *m.* Relative amount of dew at high and low elevations.
- *n.* Relative frequency of atmospheric renewal at high and low elevations.

8th. Physiological influences of mountain climates of the medium elevations of from 2000 to 4000 feet:—
- *a.* On the nervous centres.
- *b.* On respiration.
- *c.* On circulation.
- *d.* On secretion.
- *e.* On digestion.
- *f.* On locomotion.
- *g.* Summary of the influence of diminished pressure.
- *h.* Summary of the influence of diminished oxygen.

9th. Physiological influences of mountain climates of elevation from 4000 to 8000 feet:—
- *a.* On the nervous centres.
- *b.* On respiration.
- *c.* On circulation.
- *d.* On secretion.
- *e.* On digestion.
- *f.* On locomotion.
- *g.* Summary of the influences of diminished pressure.
- *h.* Summary of the influences of diminished oxygen.

10th. Pathological influences of mountain climates at medium elevations of from 2000 to 4000 feet:—
- *a.* Diseases of the nervous centres.
- *b.* Diseases of the thoracic viscera.
- *c.* Diseases of the abdominal viscera.
- *d.* Rheumatism, fevers, and their types.
- *e.* Ophthalmia.
- *f.* Other diseases.

11th. Pathological influences of mountain climates of elevations of from 4000 to 8000 feet:—
- *a.* Diseases of the nervous centres.
- *b.* Diseases of the thoracic cavity.
- *c.* Diseases of the abdominal viscera.
- *d.* Rheumatism, fevers, and their types.
- *e.* Ophthalmia.
- *f.* Other diseases.

12th. The habitations best suited to mountain climates.
13th. The best modes of water supply on elevated ranges.
14th. The kinds of diet suited to various altitudes.
15th. The kinds of clothing suited to elevated regions.
16th. Capabilities of elevated ranges for the cultivation of vegetables and fruits.
17th. Facilities for cultivating trees, and the influence of arboriculture on mountain climates.
18th. Facilities for exercising grounds.

(Signed) J. R. MARTIN.

SIR, East India House, Dec. 24, 1857.

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 1st inst., with its enclosed paper of suggestions for the investigation of mountain climates in the East Indies.

In reply, I have received the commands of the Court of Directors to convey to you their best thanks for this document, and to state that a copy of it will be forwarded for the observation and notice of the government in India.

I am, &c.
J. R. Martin, Esq. (Signed) JAMES M. MELVILL.

J. R. Martin, Esq., F.R.S.

25th Oct. 1858.

4384. I understand that you consider that the ratio of mortality increases in proportion to the length of residence in India?—Steadily and certainly.

4385. And that lengthened residence leads to physical degradation?—Almost without an exception, the exceptions being so rare as hardly to come into the account.

4386. Would not this prove the advantage of a regular system of relief?—Assuredly, if troops are to be relieved and to be maintained in vigour with any reference to European service after their return, the reliefs should be very frequent. The other view would be the following out the suggestion which I made to the Court of Directors, to have the main portion of the European garrison of India permanently located in the hills, and that no European corps should, under any circumstances, serve in the plains longer than one year, after which they should go to the hills for invigoration and refreshment.

4387. I understood you to say that removal to the hill ranges afforded only a temporary relief?—In cases of disease hardly so much as that, very often. The real benefit of the mountain ranges, as it appears to me, must always be the prevention of disease, the preservation of the European soldier in health and vigour. For the cure of disease they have been found very imperfect indeed. I found in Calcutta that an officer, whom I sent to the hills for the cure of the mildest form of disease which we have in India, which is intermittent fever, was very well while he remained there, but that even from so mild a disease he did not permanently recover. He relapsed when he came into the plains. That is the uniform result regarding the soldier also of course.

J. R. Martin, Esq., F.R.S.

25th Oct. 1858.

4388. (*Duke of Cambridge.*)—Then, in fact, you mean that the climate of the hills operates as a prevention of disease, but not as a cure of disease?—Quite so.

4389. (*Chairman.*) I understood you to say that under any circumstances there was a certain class of invalids who ought to be sent home annually?—Those who have once contracted severe tropical disease, any one of the four diseases which I have mentioned. Experience shows that such men cannot be counted upon for effective service in the plains of India without some radical change, some better change than the mountain ranges afford; that change I conceive ought to be to Europe. Then the cases of organic disease, the result of previous acute tropical disease, should be sent home also for the recovery of their health.

4390. You think that men so sent home might recover so as to be able to do effective service in another climate?—Quite so, as occurs every day in my practice here in the return of an officer. He comes in often on crutches, unable to stand, and in 18 months or two years he looks in point of health like a farmer, and is fit to go back.

4391. (*Major-General Hancock.*) He would be fit to return to serve in a tropical climate as before after about two years?—Assuredly.

4392. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You impute the cause of sickness to a neglect of inspection parades?—That is one out of several causes which I have enumerated.

4393. Does that affect inspection parades for an unfortunate disease?—I am speaking of young soldiers who arrive in India as detachments, very often with inexperienced and young officers. It has sometimes happened that the recruits for the Company's army have had only one subaltern. I have seen them left in Calcutta with only very inexperienced non-commissioned officers. The sanitary results were terrible. In those days the Company used to send out the troops so as to arrive in the month of May. They arrived in Fort William in the month of May. There were no inspection parades because there were no officers to order them.

4394. The reason why I ask as to inspection parades is, that we have a parade in the army for the inspection of an unfortunate disease, and certain hospitals in India, which you are well aware of, called lock hospitals, were done away with by the Government to the great injury of our service, and to the increase of the sick on that account beyond measure?—Just so.

4395. Do you allude to that?—No; I allude to the inspection parades for the detection of tropical disease.

4396. Ordinary inspection parades?—Yes; particularly among young soldiers who do not know anything about their condition. The parades are most influential to the saving of their health.

4397. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are you not aware that in many cases, and, in fact, in very frequent cases, the cause of soldiers not acknowledging that they are unwell is the very high hospital stoppages to which they are subject?—I have no doubt that does influence the old soldiers. I do not know that it influences the inconsiderate and reckless recruit so much; the old soldier will think of it doubtless, and those stoppages are very heavy.

4398. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Hitherto the great mass of the European force in India has been located in the plains, has it not, and location on the hills has formed the exception?—Until recently the entire European force has been on the plains throughout all India; it is only within very recent times that stations have been selected in the mountains, and even there I conceive that a great error has been committed. It has been found that in the West Indies the raising of the soldier 2,500 feet above the level of the plains, in Jamaica for instance, has raised him out of the range of yellow fever, and of course out of the range of remittent fever, and dysentery also. In the East Indies, overlooking that fact, we have carried the troops to very great elevations, 7,000 and 8,000 feet, and upwards, and assuredly it has so far succeeded as that we have raised the soldier out of the fever range, but unhappily we have carried him into the range of another series of diseases which was not contemplated, namely, bowel complaints, and they are very intractable. I see officers every day who go up to the mountain ranges simply for the cure of that mild disease which I mentioned, the intermittent fever; there they contract a very intractable form of disease in the shape of chronic diarrhœa, which is very difficult and troublesome of cure in this country. In my letter to the Court of the Directors, of which I have submitted a copy of the Commissioners, I suggested that a commission should be appointed in India to determine those elevations which, while they are high enough to carry the soldier out of the fever range, shall not be so high as to carry him into the range of bowel complaint; that suggestion was sent to the Governor-General, and I believe is in course of being acted upon.

4399. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you not aware that it is the received medical opinion that 5,000 feet must be attained before fever is defeated, that is laid down in all medical books which I have read?—There is no fact which has ever come to my knowledge which goes to show that; on the contrary, in the West Indies 2,500 feet have been found sufficient to raise the soldier, as I have mentioned, out of all fever range.

4400. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Of course your opinion, although a very valuable one, is a mere medical one. I suppose you will admit from your residence in India that it would be very difficult so to adjust the occupation of the country by Europeans as always to give them that due proportion of hill stations which you think so very desirable and necessary?—I am not a soldier by profession; and the proportion which is to occupy selected points upon the plains must of course be determined by the political and military authorities; but what I would beg to suggest is, that the soldier who shall perform duty on the plains, no matter where it be, shall have the benefit of an annual return to the mountain ranges to refresh and invigorate him, and that a fresh man shall come down to take his place, that is, when railroads and roads shall admit of such an arrangement in the East Indies.

4401. (*Major-General Hancock.*) But you are of opinion that by locating the mass of the European force on the mountains at the most desirable elevation, the endemic diseases of India would be in a great measure prevented?—Almost entirely. I would here beg leave to mention to the Commission a remarkable circumstance regarding the climate of India, and the opinions entertained by great philosophers respecting it in Europe; it has reference to the total absence in any part of Asia, and very especially in our British possessions in the East, of any temperate zone, of any temperate climate whatsoever. Montesquieu says, "The astonishing rapidity of "political revolutions in Asia arises out of one fact "which is really dependent on its physical geography; "in that part of the world weak nations are opposed "to strong; people warlike, brave and active, border "on those who are effeminate, idle, and timid; the "one must necessarily be conquerors, the others con-"quered. Here we have the principal reason of the "liberty of Europe, and the slavery of Asia." Malte-Brun, the great geographer, commenting on this observation, says, "It is necessary to combine this just remark "with another truth proved by physical geography, "namely, that Asia has no temperate zone, no inter-"mediate region between very cold and very hot "climates. The slaves inhabit the hot, and the con-"querors the elevated and cold regions." The suggestion derived from that remarkable expression is of a sanitary nature; we should strive to place our troops in the region of the conquerors of India, and I believe there is not a province within our dominions that does not contain elevations, many of them so low that we have not condescended to look at them, but which would be of extreme value. I refer particularly to

great table lands, such as occur in Central India, which might by military authorities, perhaps, be found extremely advantageous for great bodies of cavalry, European cavalry particularly; they contain a fine soil, forage, and water, such as Googoondah, a table land on the Aravelli range, about 150 miles west of Neemuch. Then there is another, Goonah, which has been lately occupied by irregular cavalry, and found a healthy fine table land. I mention this upon little information of my own, but upon hearsay; but I am satisfied from what I have seen throughout India in my various services there, and in Burmah, in which I served in the first Burmese war, that there is no country throughout our possessions which does not contain the soil, water, and elevation which we require.

4402. (*Colonel Burlton.*) The places which you have just mentioned are not in our territory?—No, I believe Mount Abo is not in our actual possession, but we purchased it, or we secured it from some of the native chiefs.

4403. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Surely there are no tracts of country of the elevation which you speak of from Calcutta to Lahore excepting the Rajmahal hills?—Along the valley of the Ganges generally there are not; but where it becomes necessary to garrison European troops there are mountain ranges of considerable elevation near Bhagulpore and Rajmahal. They are said to be unhealthy, but the facts ought to be well ascertained.

4404. (*Colonel Burlton.*) The elevation of Hazareebaugh is considerable?—Yes, sufficient to be to some degree salubrious. It is a table land.

4405. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are you aware that some military officers have recommended that the European force should be permanently settled in the hills, and only brought down to the plains for service. Do you think that if that could be done it would be advisable?—I have mentioned in my note to the second question put by Colonel Wood that I conceive the European army should be brought down to the plains every cold season to be exercised for the purposes of the march and the fire, which are not only necessary to military excellence, which does not belong to my profession, but for the perfection of health. Those are the two grand essentials; the one to perfect the action of the lower extremities, and the other of the upper extremities.

4406. Then you would bring them down from the hills from November to March?—Yes, returning to the mountain ranges every month of March.

4407. (*Lord Stanley.*) Assuming that European troops were placed habitually in residence upon the hills, and that an occasion arose which required them to be marched down into the plains in the middle of the hot weather, would they not suffer more from the sudden change of the climate than if they had been removed from a station in the plains?—On such occasions no doubt they would suffer in some degree; but in my experience the sufferings of European troops from sudden exposures during the excessive heats of India are more connected with a state of repletion of the system, too high feeding, and especially the spirit ration, than with any other circumstance. I have myself been on a march of forty miles with the Governor-General's body guard in Burmah on the 12th of May, and a remarkable circumstance occurred there to show how Europeans may stand the sun if they are temperate and abstemious, even where the natives are knocked down by it. In that march some twelve or fourteen native officers and troopers fell off their saddles, and not one of us Europeans did so. We were young and temperate, and I believe that was the reason; and if there be such a thing as acclimation we had it. We had been some years in the country; it was forced temperance to a certain degree.

4408. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Does not the necessity during the hot months in the plain of not moving at all, and of remaining in-doors, but still feeding highly, as you say the troops do, make them more subject to disease than if they were moving about in a hot climate?—Very much.

4409. Has it not rather come out recently that some of the troops on service in all this heat have suffered less actually in disease than the troops in quarters?—It is quite so. Exercise itself is a great preservative against such injuries, and when exercise is associated with abstemiousness, it goes almost to an immunity. I believe that British soldiers in a proper sanitary condition will make extraordinary exertions under the hottest sun of India, as they did in the army of Sir David Baird when crossing from Cosseir to Cairo in the first campaigns in Egypt.

4410. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you or not of opinion that the result of the reaction after excessive exertion in hot weather is one of extraordinary sickness, and which we may expect to hear of now at the end of October?—That has happened in the most disastrous measure on some occasions. There was an instance of one of Her Majesty's regiments, the 69th regiment, which made a march in the Madras presidency of 150 miles in a very few days. The men went through it apparently without injury, but the subsequent result was excessive sickness and mortality. Something of the same kind happened after a long march by Her Majesty's 62d regiment.

4411. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would not that result very likely be caused in a great measure by the natural irregularity of troops getting into quarters after a long and fatiguing march?—I have no doubt that if that very case were carefully investigated it would be found that the sanitary condition of that force before it marched was unfavourable; they were not hardened by exercise or by temperance; and they were most probably intemperate on getting into quarters.

4412. (*Chairman.*) I think you said that the proportion of deaths was in the ensigns, 23 per 1,000; in the lieutenants higher, and in the captains still higher; what was the general average percentage of sickness in the whole troops during the years to which you refer?—The sickness is stated in that paper to have been immense.

4413. It does not state the exact percentage, does it?—I think it will be found there.

4414. Have you had any opportunity of seeing the returns of the percentage of sickness which has taken place during the late campaign?—I have not.

4415. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Does not a greater mortality prevail among young officers and soldiers than among those who have been eight, ten, or twelve years in India?—Yes, always; the mortality is greater among the young, the improvident, and, if I may so call it, the unseasoned. I am afraid to say anything which should lead to the conclusion that there is such a thing as acclimation; but that kind of accommodation of the habit and constitution occurs in every country in the world, not in India alone. The army of Napoleon broke ground from Boulogne in 1805; he marched 400 French leagues to the battle of Austerlitz; they were all old soldiers, they were exercised; no room was left for idleness, and there were hardly any sick on the roads. When he went again, in 1809, to the battle of Wagram, the roads were lined with youths, who perished.

4416. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In every army before the army goes upon field service there must be a great many weedy men; these do not appear till they go to hard work, they must then be got rid of; and when they are got rid of the sickness is gone. More or less that will happen to any army in any climate?—It will; but from amongst old soldiers there will be but little weeding.

4417. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) From your experience in India what is usually the ultimatum of service of a British soldier, how long will he serve in India?—I do not know that that average has ever been struck, but of course it will depend upon the nature of the service in which he has been employed, the stations in which he has been resident, and his sanitary condition.

J. R. Martin, Esq., F.R.S.

25th Oct. 1858.

4418. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Has it not been found to be the fact, that in all exposed and fatiguing services, the middle aged officers and soldiers have always far outworked the younger?—That is the case in all countries; it only goes to show this, that the moral qualities of the old soldier are not the only qualities for which he is superexcellent, but that he is superior in his physical qualities also.

4419. A resident of a few years in India you consider has no advantage over a young soldier on his first arrival in India?—Under the most carefully regulated sanitary measure I think that a few years residence in India might be called favourable in reference to your question, but anything like a protracted service or residence in the plains must always be pernicious to European health.

4420. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I suppose we may put it in this way, that although a certain amount of experience is gained by men from residence, which would be an advantage to them, yet physically you think that there is no advantage?—Local experiences have their various uses, besides affording some protection against disease.

4421. Physically it is not an advantage, but there is the experience obtained by seeing what the climate demands?—What I meant by saying that there were in the old battalions of the East India Company traditionary habits was this, that the experiences of the old soldiers proved a kind of protection to the young recruits.

4422. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) But there is no such thing as acclimation?—No, I believe not.

4423. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Physically you do not think that acclimation exists?—I think it does not.

4424. (*Viscount Melville.*) With reference to sanitary measures, do you think that the barracks in India erected for the Europeans are of a proper construction as regards elevation, ventilation and site, and that they are such buildings as European soldiers ought to occupy?—I have never seen a good barrack in. India in any station in which I have been, or in which I have served, and I do not know that there is any good barrack in India, except that which was erected by Sir Charles Napier in Scinde. I am told that that is very fine. A very fine barrack has often been erected in India in stations which from their insalubrity are uninhabitable by British soldiers, which is the case with the station at Berhampore, in which Lord Clive built a noble barrack for that age, and which is rather a fine barrack now. But to show how important it is to attend to locality as well as structural arrangements, I am told that one of the latest structures was a fine barrack at Cawnpore. The survey was made by persons who did not consider the question; it was made in the cold weather when the soil was dry; they never took the levels, and they never looked even at that point; they took a bird's-eye view of the ground, and when the rains came the hospital was found to be built in a saucer, from which draining was next to impossible. But generally the barracks and the hospitals throughout India are alike bad.

4425. Are you aware, with reference to the barrack which you have just mentioned, built by Sir Charles Napier, at Hyderabad, that it was built upon limestone rock, on which in the hot season, at 12 o'clock at night, you cannot bear your hand, and that the expression which the natives made use of was, "The Englishmen make their houses where we make our graveyards"?—That is another example of what I have stated. I did not know of this error in the site.

4426. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Are you not aware that in many of the cantonments out of a number of buildings one or two send a great many men to hospital, and other buildings none at all, and that the cause has never yet been traced?—In all cases of that kind I should think the cause not so difficult to be divined by persons experienced in sanitary science. In respect to buildings, both as to locality and structural arrangement, I cannot myself perceive any very great difficulty in finding it out.

4427. You are aware that in the case of regiments going in boats up the Ganges which anchor every night, one boat will have several cases of cholera, some boats a considerable number of cholera, and many of them none at all, and that the surgeon attending them can give no reason why that should be the case?—That, I believe, applies to all epidemics, to plagues, yellow fever, and cholera.

4428. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Is it not found that cholera attacks especially men who have been weakened by intemperance or other causes?—Cholera has been found invariably to visit the worst class, the depraved and the dissipated among the soldiers in India, and it has been found to be most severe upon those who have marched the longest. In the great outbreak in Scinde it could be determined in ratio,—according to the number of miles that the regiment had marched so was the severity of the cholera, the regiment which had marched the longest suffered the worst. I may instance Her Majesty's 86th and others, but the scale could be determined.

4429. Surely that is not always the case, sometimes it is merely endemic. On the return march of the Bombay division from Affghanistan, every regiment in succession got the cholera at a particular station, and lost it at another?—That sort of caprice applies, as I have said, to all epidemic diseases, it is in a measure inscrutable.

4430. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) I dare say you are aware that in many of the soldiers' barracks one corner of the room will yield sick men invariably, and in another corner of the room there are no sick men at all. Do you think that circular barrack rooms would not be better than square rooms, where there is no circulation of air in the square corners?—I don't think that the exact figure of the room can signify; the amount of freedom of ventilation and elevation from the soil are the two important ingredients. It has been found in almost all countries that soldiers inhabiting the lower ranges have suffered more than in the upper ranges.

4431. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Are you acquainted with the Madras presidency with regard to the barracks?—I have only been in the very presidency of Madras. I have never passed through any part of it, except in going from Masulipatam to Hyderabad to see Sir Charles Metcalfe. I was sent by the government of Bengal to see him; that is all that I ever saw of Madras from being a week at the presidency itself.

4432. Are you aware that a very great change took place in consequence of the formation of the barracks at Cannanore in the Madras presidency?—I am not acquainted with the sanitary history of Cannanore, but I am very well acquainted with the sanitary history of the very worst cantonment in the Madras presidency, which is that of Secunderabad, in which the losses of upwards of thirty years are something enormous.

4433. The reason why I asked you the question was simply this, that I understood you to say that there was a barrack which you thought was a perfect barrack for the preservation of the health of the soldier. Was that at Berhampore?—No; the one erected by Sir Charles Napier in Scinde I have understood to be a perfect barrack, but the site of it, I am sorry to hear, has neutralized the excellence of the structure.

4434. The barrack of which I speak was a very low barrack, where a great sickness prevailed—a barrack with no ceiling, but a very high roof was then built, and since then it has been one of the healthiest places which there are?—I should account for that change by the greater freedom of ventilation and the elevation of the roof giving necessarily a comparatively large amount of coolness.

4435. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Do you recommend that all barracks should be built with a current of air underneath them, that after the foundation is laid there should be a regular current of air underneath, and three or four feet elevation?—All barracks I think erected in tropical climates, especially with

reference to the rainy seasons of tropical climates, should be raised upon arches; they should be of two stories high, and the roof should be double; then they would be as perfect as structural arrangement could make them.

4436. (*Viscount Melville.*) I believe that there is not a single barrack occupied by European troops in India which is not built on the ground, and no attention whatever is paid to drainage?—That is the general rule.

4437. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You have stated, I think, that one great cause of mortality among European troops is the too early employment of regiments on active service after their first arrival from England?—That had sole reference to the sickness of corps just arrived in the country.

4438. As you are of opinion that there is no such thing as acclimation, to what do you attribute the greater mortality in such regiments?—Youth, a more impressible state of the system, a greater irregularity of habit of life, a greater disregard to sanitary arrangements, and a total unacquaintance with the habits of the country.

4439. As the regiments arriving from England are not formed of mere recruits, but of old and middle aged as well as young soldiers, in the usual proportions, and as they are usually commanded by officers of experience, why should that state of things exist which you have described?—There may be old soldiers coming to India, but I believe that the average age of a British regiment of 1,000 men may be taken at 26 years; it results, therefore, that the great majority are youths, and I saw very recently an estimate of the age of the troops now serving in India, and the age was very young indeed, very little above 20 or 21.

4440. Are you able to state what is about the average age of one of the Honourable Company's European regiments?—I should think that taking service on the plain with its consequences into account, and the annual admission of recruits, it would be much the same age as one of Her Majesty's regiments, that is, 26 years being the average age of 1,000 men.

4441. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that the fact of a long sea voyage would on first landing have an effect upon a regiment and upon anybody.—That has always been found to favour so much of acclimation as may exist—very much so.

4442. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Taking regiments generally, are you of opinion that there is no difference between one of Her Majesty's and one of the Honourable Company's regiments with regard to age and the length of service?—Serving in the same country, I should apprehend that there is no difference.

4443. (*Chairman.*) According to the per-centage given in the table which you have laid before the Commission, it would appear, taking the civil service, that in the first year of residence the deaths are only 19 with a decimal per thousand. In the second year they increase to 23 and a decimal; they then fall down in the third year to 20; and in the fourth year they come up again to 22?—Yes; that is from a return of Sir Alexander Tulloch's. I have never heard it accounted for, but he says that in the documents submitted to him that is the actual fact.

4444. (*Major-General Hancock.*) In your opinion has the adoption of a suitable clothing for the European troops in India any effect upon their general health?—I regard that as one of the most important of the sanitary improvements which may be effected for the benefit of soldiers.

4445. Are you of opinion that the present uniform, for instance, Highland bonnets, kilts, schakos, and double-breasted coats, forms a suitable clothing for European soldiers?—Only for service in the cold season. It is not suitable to the hot weather and the plains. It may answer very well for campaigning in the cold season, when European cloth is found to be a great comfort to the men in Upper India.

4446. What do you think would be the most suitable head dress for European troops when employed in the field on the plains?—The proper head-dress for a soldier with regard to health should be such as is planned by Dr. Jeffreys; it would secure two requisites: the one is, that it should be made of material of slow conducting power, so as to be very slow in transmitting the rays of the sun. There is no such thing as a non-conductor, it is a misnomer; but some articles are of a more slow conducting power than others. It should be made of that material, whatever it be; and then it should have ventilating means so as to admit of a free current around the man's head. With those two requisites the head-dress may be made of whatever the authorities may think proper.

4447. You have made no allusion, I think, to weight; do you attach any importance to that?—I do not attach so much importance to weight as may appear; the soldier himself does not care much about a little more weight, provided his head be kept cool.

4448. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Colour would be of some importance I presume: a non-absorbing colour would be preferable to one which absorbs?—It should be white of course.

4449. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not think that in any head-dress which you have, it is advisable that it should be elevated from the head, and not low down like the foraging cap?—Certainly; ventilation cannot be secured without a sufficient space.

4450. (*Chairman.*) I suppose you are aware that the light clothing worn by the troops in India is furnished and regulated by the authorities there?—Yes.

4451. (*Colonel Forsyth Tait.*) After first arrival in India, how soon do you think that Europeans may be considered as most efficient for service in India?—Considering the extreme youth of the great majority, they should not be called upon to make the utmost exertion before two or three years; that is to say, a soldier should be 23 years of age before he is called upon for his utmost exertion; and that applies to all countries.

4452. Up to what number of years do you consider that a European soldier, with proper care and occasional location during the hot weather in the hills, ought to be expected to do good service to the state in India?—Upon such a question we have as yet no data. I have stated with reference to the removal of the European troops to the mountain ranges, that in respect to reliefs that question may be deferred pending our better experience; I should apply the same observation to that question. My individual impression is, that properly guarded against the influences of climate, and protected as far as can be against the influences of his own recklessness, and ignorance, and ill treatment of himself, the soldier may serve many years in India, and render good and effective service.

4453. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Will you have the goodness to state your opinion as to the effect of the existing system of issuing spirit rations upon the health of the European troops in India?—I regard the spirit ration as an injury to the young soldier. I think that it would be a benefit in India if he were to have beer instead of the spirit ration, and that the spirit ration should await his more advanced age and experience. I do not attach any harm to a dram given to the soldier after his dinner.

4454. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But in the morning?—In the morning it is deleterious.

4455. (*Chairman.*) I suppose the ration is the same to all troops in India, whether the former Company's troops or the Queen's?—The same.

4456. (*Major-General Hancock.*) What limit would you place upon the allowance of spirit rations to European troops?—As far as regards health, I should say that the one dram per day is quite as much as is good for them.

4457. They now get two?—Yes. I think one better.

4458. What allowance of porter would you recommend?—The soldier should have an equivalent.

J. R. Martin, Esq., F.R.S.

5th Oct. 1858.

4459. What do you consider an equivalent?—A pint or more. I do not know what the equivalent in beer to the rum ration should be; he should have that equivalent.

4460. Will you state the quantity which you consider would not be injurious to health?—A quart of ale a day, I think, could not injure a healthy soldier, particularly if on work.

4461. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Have you ever seen at any cantonment the establishment of a convalescent hospital for the admission of a soldier who is dismissed by the medical gentleman as cured; he is sent back to his regiment, he is exposed to the sun, he takes the ordinary ration, he comes back to the hospital and dies. I have seen it practised in the West Indies with the greatest possible benefit, that alongside of the hospital there has been a convalescent hospital, and the man has been treated with nurses and cooks until he has perfectly recovered and joined his regiment?—Speaking of the general European hospital in Calcutta, of which I was first assistant, and I was afterwards surgeon of that large institution for the treatment of European soldiers, we often had occasion to lament the absence of a convalescent hospital. The soldier, when discharged the hospital, was convalescent; he demanded his discharge being convalescent, and we could not refuse him. The first use which he made of his liberty on going into his detachment, was, perhaps, to get drunk, and relapses occurred continually. That has been found a great evil in all our foreign possessions, and the establishment of convalescent hospitals would be a great desideratum. But again, if by removing the troops to the mountain ranges we diminished sickness we should diminish the occasion for those large expenditures.

4462. (*Chairman.*) Will you be so good as to proceed to the second series of questions submitted to you?—In the second paper sent me by Colonel Wood the first question was, "How far the European por-
" tion of the army in India should be composed of
" troops of the line, taking India as part of the
" regular tour of service; and how far of troops
" raised for service in India only?"

1. With the advantages of a mountain climate in India, troops of the line may in future be enabled to garrison our Eastern possessions in tolerable health and vigour; but as even then a given number of regiments must always be employed in the plains, with the certainty of injury to health, and consequent diminution of the physical force, I do not consider it desirable that the army of India should be composed exclusively of troops of the line, taking that country as a part of the regular tour of service.

2. British soldiers who are debilitated by service in India, or who have contracted the severer diseases of that country, are found to suffer from the cold of Europe on their return, and the mortality amongst them during the first three years after their return is in excess to that of regiments on home service; indeed, the men returned from the East dislike both the climate and the duties of home service; when invalided they give a preference to settling in the Australian colonies, on account of the warmth. All the circumstances here stated will prove of diminished force when once the greater part of the Indian army shall be located in the hill ranges, but years must pass it is feared before that desideratum can be accomplished.

3. I am of opinion that soldiers should be raised as heretofore within the United Kingdom for service in India only. Entering on the duty with free will, well treated by the State, and tutored into the better traditional habits of the country by the old soldiers of the Indian regiments, and under direction of their officers, the position of the men would at once become one of comfort and contentment; and when partially worn out they may be employed in garrison and police duties, with enhanced pay, or be encouraged to settle with their families on the mountain table-lands of the country, should colonization be determined upon in the East Indies.

4. I apprehend that the army of India should be composed principally of British troops raised for service in the East only, having a certain proportion of model battalions of the line at each presidency, all to be light infantry. These model battalions interspersed throughout the great military stations of the East, would form examples of the best interior economy and military discipline of Europe, and form the patterns upon which all field movements and musketry exercises should be framed. The Indian army proper would thus be kept at all times in the highest state of discipline and efficiency; the great bulk of the Indian force, which I will presume to be eventually cantoned in the mountain ranges all over the East, should descend into the under lying plains every cold season, so as to be practised and perfected in the march and the fire; returning to the hills by the beginning of the month of March following.

5. The British army and the army of India ought, I think, as now constituted, to be kept separate and distinct; each army has its constitutional character, its habitudes, its traditions, its prestige, all tending to promote that honourable rivalry, that salutary competition for fame, which has hitherto proved so beneficial to the State. I look upon competition to be as necessary to the perfection of the military machine as it is to the advancement and perfection of the mechanical arts in civil life, and that all possible encouragement should be given to so great a moral power. On every ground therefore which has presented itself to my mind, I think that the two armies, the royal and that of India, should be maintained as separate and distinct bodies. There might indeed be reason to apprehend that one and the same army if scattered over the immense superficies of Hindostan, might in time relax in its discipline, and become listless if competition were withdrawn from it.

6. The presence of such a number of regiments of the line in India as military authority might deem fitting, would keep up a high order of competition, such as is here contemplated, amongst the infantry branch of the service. It may be found unnecessary to establish there a like competition in respect to the mounted branch and the scientific corps of the Indian army.

The second proposition is, "In connection with this
" question the best means of providing for the periodi-
" cal relief of the former portion, and of securing
" the efficiency of the latter."

1. I recently had the honour to submit for the consideration of the Royal Commission certain replies to questions sent to me by the Secretary to the Commission, and bearing on the suggested head number 2, I have here only to add my opinion that if stationed in the mountains during the hot and rainy seasons, the pattern regiments of the line need not be relieved frequently on the score of health; but it may become a question for military authority to determine how often they should enjoy relief on purely military grounds.

2. Referring to the paper already submitted by me, I would beg leave to suggest that the determination of the proper periods for reliefs be deferred until experience shall have proved the actual influence of a residence in the mountains of India on the European constitution. Where it is not a purely military question, the reliefs of troops must be determined on considerations of health only; and as regards the hill ranges of the East, we do not as yet possess the local and special experience necessary to guide us aright, and no amount of theoretical reasoning could on such a question be accepted as just.

3. On the question of securing the health and efficiency of the troops raised for the service of India only, I would again refer to my previous communication wherein the subject is briefly sketched forth. It is a question which resolves itself into securing to the soldier the best climates to be found within the boundaries of our eastern empire.

The third question is, "Whether it be possible to "consolidate the European forces so as to allow of "exchange from one branch of the service to the "other, and what regulations would be necessary and "practicable to effect this object with perfect justice "to the claims of all officers now in the service of the "East India Company."

1. I have not been able on reflection to arrive at any scheme of exchange from one branch of the service to the other, which should either prove of justice to the public interests or to the claims of officers now in the service of the East India Company. Exchanges might indeed be brought about so as to inflict great injury on regiments and departments.

2. The two armies are so essentially different in their mode of nomination of officers, in the manner of promotion, and in their habits, that interchanges could only be very rare, even if sanctioned by authority. The Indian officer is seldom possessed of wealth or property, a circumstance almost amounting to a prohibition of any reasonable expectation of rise in the British army.

3. It is of course open at all times to the governing authorities of the State to employ in Europe officers of the Indian army for commands, for staff duties, and for scientific purposes, such as was, I believe, contemplated by the Duke of Wellington so far back as 1812, in such manner as have been recently employed in England Colonels Irwin, Forbes, and Green, of the Bengal Engineers, and as Sir Robert Vivian, and many other Indian officers were employed in the late war with Russia.

4. But in exchanging from the one service to the other, each officer would lose at once his distinctiveness, as well as his identity, and with it, it is feared, much of his *esprit de corps*, while his character and merits would merge into the general mass of the army into which he would necessarily enter as a stranger.

5. The Duke of Wellington, writing in 1812, says, "that the three armies ought to continue separate "and distinct," meaning I presume the Royal army and the European and native forces of the East India Company. Again he adds, "I do think it would be "a very beneficial arrangement to allow officers in "the service of the Company to exchange into the "service of the king, and for the Company's service, "as well as for the public, that His Majesty might "be enabled to avail himself of the services in Eu-"rope of officers who had served the East India "Company in India." The author of the life of Sir John Malcolm says, "The Duke of Wellington had "at one time a very strong opinion that the officers "of the Company's army ought to be available for "service in Europe, and he would fain have had "Munro and Malcolm with him in the Peninsula."

The fourth question is, "Whether the local Euro-"pean force should be kept up by drafts and volun-"teers from the line, or should be, as at present, "separately recruited for in Great Britain."

1. Referring to what has been already stated, I am of opinion that the local European force should, as at present, be separately recruited for in Great Britain.

2. I think that men so recruited, and stationed in India, will take more naturally to the habits and customs of the country than other soldiers, and that by being recruited for the local force, and by serving only in India, they will readily acquire a salutary *esprit de corps* connected with the particular service and country.

4463. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Though not a soldier by profession, of course you have had a good deal of experience in military matters, having served in the medical portion of the army. Is it not your opinion that as a principle one and a united army is a more manageable and more powerful body than a double army, not in allusion to India alone, but to any country?—In regard to that question, I think that competition is more important than unity. Even in the British army the competition of national regiments, or even county regiments, has been found most effective in keeping up the high tone of that army, and I have a strong impression that the competition which would arise from the presence of pattern regiments, if I may so call them, in a service where all are pattern, but I mean choice regiments of light infantry, would keep up that competition which I have seen in India to be so salutary in maintaining the high spirit of our Indian officers. In the campaign there is, in fact, but one action, with two armies in powerful competition.

4464. Admitting as I do to the fullest extent the principle of competition, do you not think that in all armies the competition of corps or regiments, as you yourself describe, is the thing to be looked to and to be desired, but that the unity of feeling of an army should exist, with that competition existing in it regimentally?—Surely, and I believe that that unity of feeling may be well exemplified in what is said to have been the competitive feeling between Her Majesty's 78th and the Madras Fusiliers under General Havelock.

4465. Could you not obtain that feeling quite as much and more usefully for the State, regimentally, than by having it in two separate armies, producing perhaps feelings of jealousy as well as competition. Is not the one a feeling of real competition, and the other an individual feeling of one army as against the other?—If any feeling of jealousy, or any other than the feeling which I have ventured to contemplate, should arise, then at once I should say that it should be one army. The benefit which I contemplated from the competition was the benefit of the highest feeling which could actuate a soldier.

4466. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Provided that both armies be placed upon a perfect equality with regard to honours and emoluments, and in every other respect, why should any other feeling exist than that of generous emulation between the two?—I can only speak from the period during which I served myself, and my first service was with two of Her Majesty's regiments, and afterwards with many of Her Majesty's regiments in the Burmese war, where there was a large force of the Indian army also. I never saw or heard anything but what was of the most salutary kind, namely, a good feeling of emulation.

4467. Whatever other feeling may have existed between the two services, is it not attributable to the supposed or real unfair advantages enjoyed by one as compared with the other?—Personally I have never seen any difference of feeling, or anything approaching to it; on the contrary, hearty co-operation and good feeling is all that I have ever seen.

4468. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not agree, to a great extent, with the opinion expressed by the Duke of Wellington, of the immense advantage which there must be, *vice versâ*, both for Europe and for India, from the interchange of eminent officers when their services are required?—Certainly.

4469. Would you not produce that result if you were enabled to interchange and deal with the army as the State required, and not as any particular portion of that State required?—It would work best, I conceive, among the higher class of officers, both for command and for the staff, that the experiences of both countries might be interchanged. Regimentally I question whether it would be worth much.

4470. (*Major General Hancock.*) Had not the opinion of the Duke of Wellington, which you have quoted, exclusive reference to the employment of the officers of the East India Company's army in Europe?—That was all that the Duke of Wellington contemplated at the moment; but his Grace must have well known that India was full, at the very moment when he was writing, of officers in Her Majesty's army in every situation; there was no occasion to refer to that point.

4471. (*Viscount Melville.*) With reference to what you have stated as to keeping up a double army, are you not aware that under the present system it is necessary to have double arrangements for the supervision of the Company's European force and of the

J. R. Martin. Esq., F.R.S.

25th Oct. 1858.

Queen's, and that an additional expense is thereby entailed ?—I am not aware that there is anything in the supervision and control of the European force of the East India Company at all separate and distinct from Her Majesty's regiments.

4472. There is a distinct supervision for the Queen's army ?—I see that both are supervised and controlled in common by one commander-in-chief at each presidency, and by generals of division.

4473. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) There is a double staff, is there not ?—Yes.

4474. Surely that is not an advantage, is it ?—On the plea of competition it may be an advantage. If I am right in my view of the advantages of competition, even that kind of competition may be beneficial ; staff competition is beneficial as well as regimental.

4775. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Is there any disadvantage beyond that of the expense ?—I am not aware of any but the expense.

4476. (*Chairman.*) I understand you to say that you consider that for the future the Europeans to be employed in India should be enlisted partly for permanent service there, and partly for regiments to be relieved from regiments at home ?—Yes.

4477. What proportion would you have of the permanent character, and what to be relieved ?—I should venture to say more than a moiety for permanent service.

4478. How do you reconcile that with the answer which you have given before ; that you consider that the rate of mortality increases in proportion to the length of residence there ; that the length of residence leads to physical degradation; that you consider a system of regular reliefs absolutely necessary, and that there is a certain class of invalids which should be sent home annually ?—My answer to the previous questions contemplated a residence in the healthy mountain climates of India. I am well aware that if Europeans are to be retained on the pestilential plains, then very frequent reliefs indeed will be required if they are ever expected to be efficient soldiers in Europe. That I look upon as a separate and distinct question. All my previous reasoning has had in contemplation the ultimate removal of the great body of the European troops to the mountain ranges, and that no British soldiers should, under any circumstances, serve in the plains longer than twelve months.

4479. I understood you to say that the mortality was greater in a regiment returning from India to Europe than in those regiments which had not been there ?—So I am informed by Sir Alexander Tulloch.

4480. Did not you say that the men returning from India were generally old and worn-out before they came home ?—No. It is a remarkable thing that I believe even soldiers who have only served five, six, and seven years in India are still averse from European service ; that they find the climate of Europe very cold and very uncongenial to them, and that they dislike service in Europe ; with the old soldier it would be *a fortiori* greatly more so.

4481. I understood you to say that the regiments which came home generally consisted of old and worn-out soldiers ?—No, they have a few old, but not worn-out men, and the great majority of them are middle-aged soldiers, and it is necessarily so. The encouragement to soldiers volunteering into regiments remaining in India will be available most to the old soldiers who have domesticated in India, who have married there and got into the habits of the country. I believe that most of Her Majesty's regiments which return are composed of men of a very few years service in India.

4482. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are you aware that only effective men have been allowed to volunteer according to the system hitherto adopted ?—Yes.

4483. Does not it therefore follow that all the broken-down men in regiments come home, and therefore make a regiment so very inefficient on its return ?—I am aware that that is the case ; but the very broken-down men of course have been invalided.

4484. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you know what limitation, if any, is placed upon the age of men allowed to volunteer ?—I am not aware of the limitation as to age.

4485. (*Sir Geo. A. Wetherall.*) Have you ever seen a statement, or are you aware of the relative sickness between European regiments in the Company's service and those in the Queen's ?—I have very recently seen some statement.

4486. Can you state it ?—The conclusions to be drawn from it are not very obvious, for the range of observation in years is brief, and the numbers of men are not great ; those are two great defects, but so far as I have seen, the difference is little or nothing.

4487. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You have advocated that the European troops should be located as much as possible in the mountains, and you have also advocated that one-half of the European force should be enlisted exclusively for Indian service. You are aware that the Himalayah range, which is the only range that we have in Bengal to locate troops upon, is far distant from Calcutta, and if half that army was to be a local army and constantly in the country, where would you locate it ; it could not be located in the hills because the hills are too far distant ?—The hill ranges have not been sufficiently examined so as to determine at all what can be done and what cannot be done. Kumaon is unexamined; the province of Kumaon contains, I am told, some magnificent positions, but it is unascertained, in the strictly medical sense.

4488. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Taking into your consideration the fact that the present service of the Indian army is a seniority service, and that all the officers are most deeply interested in many ways, not only pecuniarily, but in their best feelings of sympathy, do you think it would be at all possible to introduce any system of exchange between the two armies, namely, the British and the Indian, at the present moment, with the present incumbrance, without infringing upon the just rights and claims of the officers of the Indian army ?—As to their just rights and claims, I should be disposed, in the case of any exchange, to leave that to be determined by the individual himself. I have stated in my replies that I have not myself been able to arrive at any calculation which should lead to such a result.

4489. We will suppose the case of an old lieutenant in the Indian service ; he may have been twenty-five years in the service, and he is, perhaps, senior lieutenant of his regiment; if the system of exchange were permitted, might it not happen that one or two of the old captains of his regiment, who must necessarily be old men if he is so old a subaltern, might exchange, and is it not almost certain that any exchange of a captain of that regiment would be introducing a young man above the lieutenant's head, which would be a most serious hardship ?—I look upon it that any plan of exchanges which should leave out the relative condition of age between officers, might prove very prejudicial.

4490. (*Chairman.*) Is it true that all the captains are old men ?—Not all.

4491. I understood you to say that you considered that there was an advantage in regiments coming out, because they served as pattern regiments ?—Picked regiments of light infantry are what I contemplate, such as those trained by Sir John Moore.

4492. Why are they pattern regiments ; is their discipline better than that of the others ?—They would be patterns to the regiments of India.

4493. Because their discipline would be superior ?—Because they are fresh and vigorous from Europe.

4494. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then you think that there is a difference in the discipline of a regiment from Europe and of a regiment stationed in India ?—Regiments long stationed in India, particularly regiments in the Company's army, had not the smart appearance that regiments of Her Majesty's army, particularly those recently arrived, had. It may have been that certain small matters were for the convenience and perhaps for the good of the men relaxed from by their officers for the sake of their health, but I do not think that any relaxation has ever been made

which tended to detract from the efficiency in the field of the Indian regiments.

4495. (*Chairman.*) Did not that loss of smartness apply also to Her Majesty's regiments which had been out there equally long?—Hardly so much; I have myself served with the 17th and the 59th of Her Majesty's regiments. It so happens that the colonel is almost always a smart, clever man, and many of them are young men, on coming out from England, though the regiment may have been many years in India. I believe that there was always some degree of superior smartness in going through evolutions,

4496. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you not apprehend some difficulty in the larger body of Europeans looking up to the smaller body as an example. Would it not be rather the other way, that the smaller body would quickly accept the deficiencies, more or less, whatever they might be, of the larger body?—No.

4497. Do you not think that it is rather the tendency of bodies that the smaller generally adopts the principles of the greater?—I think that the general impression throughout the Indian army was to defer to those more vigorous conditions which appertained to regiments recently arrived from Europe.

4498. Was not that probably caused by the fact that the regiments coming from Europe were very much at that time in the ascendant, that is to say, that there were 24,000 men from Europe as against 12,000 stationed permanently in India?—I think that referring to the necessary influence of a tropical climate on European constitutions, there will be always in the regiments permanently stationed in India an amount of what, in a military sense, I suppose, may be called relaxation, and that the example of the regiments coming from home, however few they may be, will always be held up as a pattern for example.

4499. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Have you turned your attention at all to the recruiting of the army for India?—During my service in India I was both garrison surgeon of Fort William, and surgeon of the European general hospital in Calcutta. In both situations I had an opportunity of seeing what were called the batches of recruits, arriving generally in the month of May, the most improper month that could be for their arrival. In Fort William I had the opportunity of seeing them in their barracks, in the general hospital I saw them as patients.

4500. I rather allude to the physical character of the recruits on their arrival in India; at what age would you enlist them?—Their physical characteristics varied with the season; they were sometimes fine fellows, and at other seasons they were not so good. I presume that those differences arose from differences in the agricultural and manufacturing prosperity of the county from which the recruit came.

4501. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I suppose you are aware that of late years no recruits have arrived in India in the month of May?—Quite.

4502. You are aware that of late years the regular drafts for India have never embarked till June or July?—I am aware of that, at the time I have mentioned the East India Company used to send them out at the time of year I have mentioned.

4503. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) If half of the European force in India are to be local and recruited from the same source as the troops of the line, do you not think that the recruiting for the supply of both armies, the army of Great Britain and the local army in India, will clash considerably?—I do not see how it should, except by competition on the part of the recruiting officers, to see who should strive to get the best men.

4504. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You did not see any difference in the men?—I have not seen any; the only remark that I recollect ever to have been made by the medical officer was this, we often had occasion to remark upon the fine appearance of the drafts for the artillery.

4505. (*Chairman.*) What is the time of year which you think most advisable for the drafts to arrive in India?—I think the proper time to arrive in India is the very commencement of the cold season, the first or second week in November.

4506. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You are aware I suppose that invalided men of the Company's service, who come to Europe and are discharged, occasionally return to India, that they re-enlist, being allowed their former service, and return to India to serve there?—Yes.

4507. (*Viscount Melville.*) I suppose you have had no opportunity of knowing the antecedents of recruits before they have come to you?—No, excepting this, that in the regiment of Bengal artillery, with which I came in contact when I went to India first, there was a great number of broken down gentlemen amongst them.

4508. Did it ever happen to you to discover men who had been dismissed from the Queen's service, afterwards enlisting in the Company's, and going out to India?—No, I never served with any of the Company's European regiments. I only had an opportunity of seeing them in the manner that I have stated as garrison surgeon of Fort William, and as surgeon of the European general hospital.

4509. (*Sir Geo. A. Wetherall.*) Are you not aware that soldiers invalided from the East India Company's service and sent to England are never sent back to India?—They return on regaining their health.

4510. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Have you ever been president of a board or on a board to examine invalids coming down from the country to Calcutta, and has it occurred upon the examination of some man who had passed the medical board on the frontier to say, "Oh! no, you are fit for service," and to send the man back up the country?—I have served as the garrison surgeon of Fort William repeatedly upon such committees, and committees for the transfer of of volunteers from one regiment to another, but what you mention has never occurred within my recollection. The invalids were, on the contrary, so battered by length of service and disease that in 19 cases out 20 there could be no question about them whatsoever.

4511. (*Major-General Hancock.*) You have stated, I think, that the sickness and mortality in an European regiment depend in some measure upon the character and ability of the officer commanding. In what respect does the officer commanding interfere with the medical practice or the medical arrangements of a regiment?—Not in any way whatsoever, but he can, and he ought to interfere in a far more important direction; that is, in the sanitary regulation of his men, in their supply of food, barrack and hospital accommodation, the selection of the station, and the improvement of it, and in every way that he can. It is in those matters that I think the functions of a commanding officer and of all his officers are very important.

4512. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is it not your opinion that the discipline of a regiment itself adds very much to the sanitary condition of the regiment, that is to say, that a regiment in good discipline will probably be in better health than a regiment in bad discipline?—Yes, assuredly; the interior economy and discipline of a regiment is a most powerful element in the health of a regiment.

4513. (*Major-General Hancock.*) In fact your opinion is that the sickness and mortality depend in a great measure upon the officer at the head of the regiment being in every way well qualified for his command?—Assuredly, he is the father of the regiment.

4514. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Therefore, the higher the state of discipline of a corps, unless there is some exceptional reason for the contrary, the higher the

J. R. Martin, Esq., F.R.S.

9th Oct. 1858.

health of the troops, every little matter connected with the regiment having been thoroughly and well considered ?—Yes, assuredly ; all other matters being equal.

4515. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Are you of opinion that a local army such as you recommend, knowing that its officers and men are to reside in India, and to make it a sort of abiding place for their lives, would be likely to become more intimately associated with the natives, more acquainted with their customs and manners, and more agreeable to them, than regiments constantly relieved backwards and forwards from England ?—Yes, permanence of residence would assuredly have that influence.

4516. And do you think that that would be advantageous ?—I do.

The witness withdrew.

Colonel Sir A. M. Tulloch, K.C.B.

Colonel Sir ALEX. MURRAY TULLOCH, K.C.B., examined.

4517. (*Chairman.*) You are a colonel in the army ?—I am.

4518. You are at present attached to the War Department ?—Yes.

4519. Will you have the kindness to tell the Commissioners what length of time you served in India ?—I served in India for about four years, from 1826 to 1830.

4520. (*Major-General Hancock.*) In which presidency ?—Principally in Burmah.

4521. (*Chairman.*) You are attached to the statistical department at the War Office ?—I have been in the habit of discussing all statistical questions which have arisen there.

4522. Your attention has been drawn to some questions which have been submitted to you by the secretary of this Commission, and you are, I believe, prepared to give some information upon them ?—Yes, I shall be happy to read a Memorandum upon the subject.

" MEMORANDUM in reply to Heads of Inquiry sug-
" gested by Commission for Re-organization of
" the Indian Army.

" As regards the first head of the proposed inquiry, " I should be disposed to ask what object can be ob- " tained by the employment of troops raised for ser- " vice in India alone, which cannot be gained as well " by the employment of troops of the line ? It rests " apparently with those who advocate the former " description of force to point out its supposed advan- " tages,—I am aware of none

" There is no duty that European troops raised " for service in India alone can perform which could " not be done as well or better by troops of the line, " because as a body they are likely to be less debili- " tated by long residence in India, and consequently " more efficient. If the proposition of having Euro- " pean troops raised for service in India alone be " founded on the idea that many of those who enlist " may, from family connexions and other causes, wish " to remain continuously there, that object can be " accomplished just as well by allowing them to " volunteer from a regiment of the line going home, " to another coming to India, till the usual period of " 21 years service has been completed, when the sol- " dier could have the option of being pensioned there " if he wished to remain permanently.

" Such volunteering should, however, be entirely " irrespective of bounty, for as the practice of fre- " quent reliefs is founded on the supposition that, " morally and physically, it is for the advantage of " the soldier that he should not remain too long in " India, it would exhibit a great perversion of rea- " soning to be contending for that principle on the " one hand, and on the other inducing the old " soldier to remain by holding out any pecuniary " consideration.

" The facility for volunteering, if it suit his views, " gives all the advantages to the soldier which he " could obtain in a local European force without its " disadvantages ; one of which obviously is, that as " no soldier can, till he has tried it, tell whether India " will agree with his constitution, or if he will like " the country, it is better by entering a regiment of " the line to be saved from the necessity of binding " himself to perpetual service, where he never can " be a willing and efficient soldier.

" The whole tenor of military legislation for the last " 20 years has been most decidedly opposed to pro- " longed tropical service, both on moral and physical " grounds, and the change has been attended with the " happiest results. In the year 1837 a great alteration " was brought about in the duration of service in the " West Indies, through some suggestions made by me " while conducting an inquiry for Parliament into the " enormous loss sustained by our troops in the West " Indies and Jamaica, which led to the period of their " service being reduced to three or four years instead " of extending to 11 or 12 as formerly. This measure " was at first strongly opposed, owing to the appre- " hension of a greater loss among the men in conse- " quence of want of acclimatization ; but it having " been established, by a long course of investigation, " that as a general rule, the mortality increased quite " as rapidly with the advance of age in a tropical " climate as in any other, the change was at length " made, and the loss among the European troops " under what is termed the 'rotation system' of reliefs " has fallen in consequence within the last twenty " years from 81 to 62 per 1,000 annually in the West " Indies, and from 128 to 60 per 1,000 in Jamaica.

" That the increase of mortality with the advance " of age is just as manifest in the East as in the " West, may be seen by reference to Return A. " annexed, which contains a statement of the mor- " tality at different ages among troops, for a period " of seven years, and in every climate ; the regi- " ments in India run thus :—In the Bombay presi- " dency, soldiers between 18 and 25 die at the rate of " 18 per 1,000 annually ; between 25 and 33 at the " rate of 34 per 1,000 annually; at the age of 33 to " 40 at the rate of 46 per 1,000 annually; and at the " age of from 40 to 50 at the rate of 71 per 1,000 " annually."

4523. Those are taken from actual returns ?—" In " Madras, soldiers between 18 and 25 die at the rate " of 26 per 1,000 annually ; between 25 and 33 at the " rate of 59 per 1,000 annually ; between 33 and 40 " at the rate of 70 per 1,000 annually ; and between " 40 and 50 at the rate of 86 per 1,000 annually."

4524. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) They are much higher than in Bombay ?—Yes. " In Bengal men die at the " rate of 23 per 1,000 annually between 18 and 25 ; " 50 per 1,000 between 25 and 33 ; 50 per 1,000 " between 33 and 40 ; and 83 per 1,000 between 40 " and 50."

4525. That makes Bombay much the healthiest ?—It was so at that time. The results will always vary whenever you take them over a different period, but the general features will be the same.

The witness delivered in the following paper, illustrative of the influence of age in the following climates.

"A.—RETURN showing the RATIO of MORTALITY per "THOUSAND, of the Strength at the under-men- "tioned PERIODS of LIFE among the Non-com- "missioned Officers and Privates of White Troops "serving at the following Stations, from 1st Jan- "uary 1830 to 31st March 1837.

Stations.		Under 18.*	18 to 25.	25 to 33.	33 to 40.	40 to 50.	Average of all Ages.
Household Cavalry	United Kingdom.	8·4	14·7	11·4	16·3	22·8	14·5
Cavalry of Line		4·4	13·9	14·	17·3	26·7	15·3
Foot Gds.		6·1	22·3	22·5	17·7	27·5	21·6
Gibraltar	Mediterranean.	10·	18·7	23·6	29·5	34·4	22·3
Malta		16·	13·	23·3	34·	56·7	22·3
Ionian Islands		6·6	12·2	20·1	24·4	24·2	19·3
Mediterranean Stations generally		10·	15·5	22·2	28·1	33·	21·
Bermudas	North America.	—†	16·	42·	42·	76·	28·9
Nova Scotia, &c.		9·	14·	22·5	30·8	41·5	20·3
Canada		—†	19·7	27·8	37·8	35·	25·7
Windward and Leeward command		4·	50·	74·	97·	123·	67·
Jamaica		57·	70·	107·	131·	128·	91·0
Cape of Good Hope		14·	9·	20·6	29·7	32·	17·6
Mauritius		11·	20·8	37·5	52·7	86·6	34·6
Ceylon		23·3	24·	55·	86·4	126·6	49·
Bombay		—†	18·2	34·6	46·8	71·1	33·1
Madras		—†	26·	59·3	70·7	86·5	52·2
Bengal		—†	23·8	50·3	50·6	83·3	44·5

* No correct deductions can be drawn from the ratios under 18, as the numbers are so few and the results consequently irregular.
† Not given.

"RETURN showing similar RESULTS for the Ten Years "from 1st April 1837 to 31st March 1847, at the "under-mentioned PERIODS of LIFE, and at the "following STATIONS.

Stations.		Under 20.	20 to 25.	25 to 30.	30 to 35.	35 to 40.	40 and upwards.	Average of all Ages.
Household Cavalry	United Kingdom.	7·5	11·7	10·3	13·3	8·4	13·4	11·1
Cavalry of Line		8·1	11·8	14·3	14·6	15·3	18·3	13·5
Foot Gds.		11·1	21·6	21·1	19·5	22·4	26·2	20·4
Infantry of Line		13·1	17·8	19·8	19·8	21·	23·4	17·8
Mediterranean Stations		0·	16·3	15·1	16·4	25·4	34·4	16·4
Canada and Nova Scotia		14·8	13·1	17·7	19·2	20·3	35·6	17·
Jamaica		37·	60·	50·	73·	83·	97·	59·

(*Sir Alexander Tulloch.*) The same result applies to officers as well as men, civil as well as military, as will be seen from the following calculations.

"Out of 1,184 deaths among officers in the Bengal "presidency, the proportion occurring annually in each "rank and at each age has been as under:—

—	Colonels, average Age 61.	Lieut.-Cols., average Age 51.	Majors, average Age 40.	Captains, average Age 36.	Lieutenants, average Age 18 to 33.	Cornets and Ensigns, average Age 18 to 33.	General Average at all Ages.
Died annually per 1,000 of each rank	59·4	48·4	41·0	34·5	27 5	23·4	31·2

"This extends also to the civil servants, the mor- "tality among whom for a period of forty-six years "from 1790 to 1836 exhibits a modification of the "same results, viz.:—

—	Above 50 Years of Age and 30 of Service.	Age 45 to 50, Service 25 to 30.	Age 40 to 45, Service 20 to —.	Age 35 to 40, Service 15 to 20.	Age 30 to 35, Service, 10 to 15.	Age 25 to 30, Service 5 to 10.	Age 20 to 25, Service 1 to 5.
Died annually per 1,000 of each rank	48·6	37·4	35·4	23·4	16·6	20·8	19·9

"Thus there can be no question that the longer "any one stays in India the more likely is his health "to be deteriorated."

Colonel Sir A. M. Tulloch, K.C.B.

25th Oct. 1858.

4526. In whatever class of life, whether military or civil?—Yes.

4527. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Is war included at all in this estimate?—It is not. In fact, I have endeavoured as much as possible to keep war out of view.

"It follows, as a natural consequence of these re- "sults, that if regiments of the line serving in India "are relieved at proper intervals, say every ten years, "their loss while serving there must generally be less "than that of any European corps permanently resi- "dent, because they will, as a body, be younger men "—hence a strong reason for the employment of the "former force in preference to the latter.

"Those who contend for a local European army in "preference to troops of the line, probably do so on "the supposition that it would materially reduce the "expense of reliefs, forgetting the important change "which has been brought about by the Limited Enlist- "ment Act now coming into operation in the Indian "army.

"If the men thus enlisted wish to come home they "must be discharged at the end of ten years, being "the same period I propose for the relief of regiments "of the line. If they do not wish to come home they "would be just as likely to continue in the service by "the facility of volunteering into a newly arrived regi- "ment of the line, to complete their second period of "service, as if they had originally enlisted into a "local European force. Besides, it appears very ques- "tionable whether, during the excitement of a war "in Europe, young men would be disposed to enlist to "the required extent in any local corps for remote "service, and still more questionable whether it would "be good policy on the part of the Government at "such a time to encourage their doing so; but if the "whole European force in India were composed of "corps of the line, second battalions could be raised "without reference to their ultimate destination; some "of these might then be sent to India to replace the "first battalions, which could be brought to the theatre "of war, with all the experience acquired by their "previous service, while the newly raised men would "do just as well in India, where the "white face" is "all that is wanted.

"By this arrangement, in the event of war, India "would add to our military strength, whereas any "local European army would tend seriously to re- "duce it, by keeping back so large a proportion "of our trained soldiers, whose services could not "be made available elsewhere without a new engage- "ment.

"It forms another weighty consideration, militating "against the employment of any such force distinct "from our troops of the line, that soldiers not return- "ing home periodically, and serving under different "conditions from the rest of the army, must always, "to a certain extent, have local interests, and be sub- "ject to local influence. Some question of pay, allow- "ances, or coveted advantages, granted to one branch "of the service but denied to another, may with such "a force some day create another mutiny. On such "questions both officers and men of the Indian army "have before now been nearly, if not altogether, in "that state; but were any such feeling ever to arise "among regiments of the line, the very first suspicion "of its existence would lead to immediate removal to "some other foreign station—a remedy which would "be impracticable with any localized force. This "danger becomes, of course, the greater the larger the "army, as it must necessarily give confidence to the "disaffected to know that they may make their own "terms, from the utter impossibility of sending any "adequate force against them.

"Whatever the force employed may be, it would, "however, I apprehend, be impossible to keep up the

Colonel Sir A. M. Tulloch, K.C.B.

25th Oct. 1858.

" large European establishment likely to be required " in India otherwise than by a much greater economy " of life than has hitherto been practised; say, that " 80,000 men were to be the minimum (which is less " by upwards of 20,000 than what we have at present), " the mortality among these, based on the long average " of our experience for 39 years, would amount, " according to the following table, to about 70 per " 1,000 annually."

" TABLE showing the MORTALITY in each of the " Presidencies for a Period of 39 Years, as ex- " tracted from the War Office Returns.

YEAR.	Bengal.		Madras.		Bombay.	
	Strength.	Deaths.	Strength.	Deaths.	Strength.	Deaths.
1817	7,284	622	9,092	548	2,607	143
1818	6,203	384	9,306	903	3,645	352
1819	6,219	483	7,656	637	3,417	270
1820	6,156	439	7,043	411	3,076	404
1821	5,732	399	6,989	396	2,907	262
1822	5,899	365	6,949	491	3,164	318
1823	6,584	496	6,838	386	3,082	224
1824	6,894	937	7,388	1,068	2,562	147
1825	6,669	1,086	6,919	1,187	3,178	357
1826	7,877	1,312	6,405	1,081	2,936	344
1827	8,035	583	7,061	656	3,063	171
1828	8,284	633	7,602	434	3,222	209
1829	8,555	618	7,680	290	3,978	117
1830	8,325	406	7,408	219	3,914	160
1831	8,347	431	6,976	268	3,845	94
1832	8,031	346	6,773	418	3,723	79
1833	7,569	403	6,241	571	3,583	129
1834	7,340	394	6,086	444	3,426	134
1835	7,655	272	5,881	215	3,415	102
1836	7,541	369	6,646	254	3,465	139
1837	6,878	355	6,078	362	3,226	148
1838	5,401	327	5,493	269	3,319	141
1839	7,645	499	5,792	405	3,422	380
1840	8,581	1,268	6,255	265	4,402	296
1841	9,438	1,020	5,411	223	5,418	601
1842	12,593	1,608	6,101	292	6,106	668
1843	11,003	1,028	7,699	427	6,066	468
1844	11,280	984	7,350	276	6,323	824
1845	11,108	2,213	7,535	351	4,710	337
1846	11,007	1,103	5,772	264	7,197	681
1847	12,349	781	6,040	227	5,556	139
1848	11,502	1,190	5,321	125	6,208	179
1849	14,703	1,306	5,014	159	6,619	310
1850	17,307	911	4,838	110	5,872	165
1851	17,070	849	4,162	88	5,774	194
1852	16,659	1,196	4,548	304	5,688	194
1853	16,190	950	4,598	215	5,306	102
1854	17,087	782	4,357	143	4,104	90
1855	14,980	532	3,209	80	4,423	80
1856	—	—	—	—	—	—
Totals	377,980	29,970	249,012	15,462	165,947	10,152

SUMMARY of the above. Per 1,000.

Bengal	- Strength	377,980	- Deaths	29,970	- Ratio	79·2
Madras	„	249,012	- „	15,462	- „	62·9
Bombay	- „	165,947	- „	10,152	- „	61·1
Total	„	792,939	- „	55,584	- „	70·0

" These losses include some 200 or 300 men killed " or dead of their wounds during the Mahratta, Pin- " daree, and other campaigns prior to 1824; also " 3,750 who perished in the first, and about 1,000 " in the second Burmese war, chiefly from sickness; " also nearly a whole regiment lost at Cabul; like- " wise the casualties during the campaigns of Scinde, " of the Sutledge, and the Punjaub, about 2,000 in " all; and nearly 1,200 who died in the first Chinese " war, all from sickness with very few exceptions. " The loss arising from the climate of stations now " usually occupied on the continent of India may " therefore be reduced by about 8,000 or 9,000 men, " or to an average of 60 per thousand annually, though " the total loss from all causes has been at least 70 " per thousand.

" In addition to the latter rate, which must of " course form our estimate of the number to be re- " placed, the proportion invalided annually may be " taken at about 25 per thousand more, and of time- " expired men not renewing their engagement nearly " the same proportion (the last of course is alto- " gether conjectural, as the effect of limited enlist- " ment is only coming into operation). These " totals would make, in all, a decrement of 120 per " thousand, or 9,600 annually; whereas the average " number of recruits raised by all the recruiting " districts throughout the United Kingdom from 1845 " to 1849 inclusive, which may be fairly assumed as " an average for a period of peace, amounted to " rather less than 12,000 annually; so that, unless " means can be adopted to reduce the mortality and " invaliding, the force in India alone would absorb " nearly all the recruits raised under ordinary cir- " cumstances for the whole army, of which the re- " quirements are not now likely to be less than " 20,000 men a year,—probably more.

" It must not be assumed that in consequence of " the successful exertions made in recruiting during " the Russian war and since the outbreak of the " mutiny in India, we can rely on the like numbers " for the ordinary recruiting of peace. To say " nothing of the military spirit which is excited by " such events, our former practice of limiting the " standard age during peace to the period between " 18 and 25, and the standard height to five feet " five or six inches, necessarily left in our popu- " lation a vast mass who could not previously be " received into the army, however willing they " might be, but who readily availed themselves of " the opportunity when the age was extended to 35, " and the height reduced to five feet three or four " inches. But after that surplus stock on which we " have been drawing during the late pressure is " exhausted, the same difficulty will arise regarding " recruiting as before; and, owing to the facilities " afforded for desertion since the introduction of " railways, additional bounty cannot be relied on for " a remedy, because as you add to that, so also do " you increase the desertions, and lose large sums " without getting men in return.

" The extensive recruiting since 1854 has also been " largely aided by the militia being kept up and " volunteering in great numbers. The recruiting on " the outbreak of the mutiny in India was also greatly " assisted by the large numbers who had been dis- " charged a few months before, at the reductions con- " sequent on the termination of the Crimean war, " neither of which sources could be relied on under " ordinary circumstances.

" I am thus particular on this head for the purpose " of impressing the conviction that the selection of " healthier stations for our troops than they have " hitherto occupied is no longer a matter of choice but " one of necessity, as we cannot hope to keep up " the large European army required to hold India " without the strictest attention to this important " measure.

" It has been ascertained by experience that in all " tropical climates, whether in the East or West, locali- " ties may be found where the mortality to which " European troops are exposed does not very much " exceed that which takes place in their native country. " Returns extending over a great number of years " show that at Bangalore, or in the Neilgherry hills " in the Madras presidency, and at Poonah, or the " Mahableshwar hills in the Bombay presidency, Euro- " pean troops may be located without sustaining a " greater loss than about 3 per cent. annually, a con- " siderable portion of which arises from disease con- " tracted at other stations more unfavourable to " health. There can be little doubt that in the upper " provinces of the Bengal presidency, at elevations of " from 3,000 to 4,000 feet, situations of equal salu- " brity might be found adapted for large bodies of " troops, but, judging from the results given in the " following abstracts and summary, which extend over " a period of many years, the selection of stations " there does not appear to have as yet been fortunate, " probably because strategetic may have hitherto over- " come sanitary considerations.

"ABSTRACT showing the Sickness and Mortality of the "Troops of the Line at the under-mentioned Sta- "tions of the Indian Presidencies, as nearly as can "be ascertained from the Returns forwarded to the "Medical Board from 1817 to 1836 inclusive.

Stations.	Period of Observation.	Strength.	Admissions into Hospital.	Deaths.	Ratio per 1,000 of Admissions.	Ratio per 1,000 of Deaths.
		BENGAL.				
	Yrs.					
Fort William	17	12,855	23,967	885	1,863	68·82
Chinsurah	7	4,155	6,930	224	1,667	53·91
Dinapore	9	6,845	14,251	484	2,081	70·70
Ghazeepore	14	10,936	16,888	449	1,554	41·05
Cawnpore	19	25,701	46,471	1,495	1,808	58·16
Agra	4	2,701	3,671	49	1,359	18·14
Berhampore	14	13,342	26,494	853	1,985	63·93
Meerut	19	27,328	35,949	862	1,315	31·54
Kurnaul	6	5,314	5,252	137	988	25·78
Hazareebaugh	2	1,368	2,308	78	1,687	57·01
Boglipore	4	2,564	4,338	224	1,691	87·36
		MADRAS.				
Fort St. George	18	13,606	26,009	671	1,911	41·96
Cannanore	18	12,809	18,402	420	1,436	32·80
Trichinopoly	19	15,317	27,394	681	1,788	44·46
Secunderabad	18	13,939	35,555	854	2,555	61·26
Bangalore	21	21,870	34,538	672	1,579	30·73
Quilon	6	4,846	6,576	146	1,357	30·1
Wallajahbad	5	2,398	4,480	242	1,868	100·9
Bellary	10	7,504	14,911	355	1,987	47·3
Arnee	5	3,136	4,518	140	1,440	44·3
		BOMBAY.				
Colabah and Bombay.	16	11,907	22,195	763	1,864	64·08
Poonah	16	19,974	36,140	495	1,819	24·78
Belgaum	10	6,332	10,814	175	1,707	27·63
Deesa	4	2,682	2,879	144	1,073	53·69
Kirkee	10	6,207	9,447	102	1,521	26·09
Kairah	8	4,059	10,108	500	2,490	123·18

"ABSTRACT showing the Sickness and Mortality of "the Troops of the Line at the under-mentioned "Stations of the Indian Presidencies, as nearly as "can be ascertained from the Annual Sanitary "Reports forwarded to the War Office from 1838 "to 1856 inclusive."

Stations.	Period of Observation.	Strength.	Admissions into Hospital.	Deaths.	Ratio per 1,000 of Admissions.	Ratio per 1,000 of Deaths.
		BENGAL.				
	Yrs.					
Fort William	7	4,683	7,735	272	1,652	58·08
Chinsurah	2	859	2,235	60	2,601	69·96
Dinapore	13	10,915	20,158	903	1,847	82·73
Ghazeepore	5	3,002	5,638	276	1,878	91·94
Cawnpore	10	8,985	20,473	799	2,278	88·90
Agra	8	5,847	13,833	355	2,365	60·71
Meerut	14	14,512	24,522	639	1,690	44·03
Kurnaul	5	3,434	8,051	268	2,344	78·04
Hazareebaugh	2	1,054	1,710	36	1,622	34·15
Allahabad	2	938	2,325	108	2,479	115·14
Loodianah	2	1,251	2,826	159	2,259	127·10
Umballa	10	13,773	20,627	850	1,497	61·71
Kussowlie	7	5,040	6,160	247	1,223	49·01
Ferozepore	5	4,445	7,817	245	1,759	55·12
Jullundur	5	4,273	7,380	160	1,727	37·44
Lahore	7	5,232	14,901	473	2,848	90·40
Rawul Pindee	4	3,359	6,276	146	1,868	43·46
Peshawur	5	8,182	26,384	588	3,225	71·86
Wuzeerabad	4	6,889	11,438	408	1,660	59·22
Dugshai	3	2,618	3,726	69	1,423	26·36
Subathoo	3	935	1,524	29	1,630	31·02

Abstract showing Sickness, &c.—*continued.*

Stations.	Period of Observation.	Strength.	Admission into Hospital.	Deaths.	Ratio per 1,000 of Admissions.	Ratio per 1,000 of Deaths.
		MADRAS.				
Fort St. George	16	11,858	20,804	343	1,754	28·93
Cannanore	17	15,416	24,832	488	1,611	31·65
Trichinopoly	11	7,628	14,599	237	1,913	31·07
Secunderabad	8	7,133	12,243	405	1,716	56·78
Bangalore	17	17,133	24,016	418	1,402	24·39
Kamptee	7	6,014	12,440	287	2,068	47·72
Tennasserim Provinces.	9	9,165	16,218	302	1,770	33·00
Bellary	7	5,290	10,259	257	1,939	48·6
		BOMBAY.				
Colabah and Bombay.	7	3,606	7,806	219	2,165	60·73
Poonah	13	13,663	28,541	451	2,089	33·01
Belgaum	10	7,244	11,909	299	1,644	41·27
Deesa	7	7,473	12,262	250	1,641	33·45
Kirkee	14	9,131	17,218	234	1,886	25·63
Kurrachee	12	12,410	23,662	585	1,907	47·14
Ahmednugger	3	1,154	2,765	66	2,396	57·19
Hyderabad	4	1,744	4,352	74	2,495	42·43
Aden	8	3,083	4,934	138	1,239	34·64

SUMMARY of the two preceding Periods.

Stations.	Period of Observation.	Strength.	Admissions.	Deaths.	Ratio of Admissions per 1,000.	Ratio of Deaths per 1,000.
		BENGAL.				
FORT WILLIAM:—	Yrs.					
First Period	17	12,855	23,967	885	1,863	68·82
Second Period	7	4,683	7,735	272	1,652	58·08
Total	24	17,538	31,702	1,157	1,807	65·92
CHINSURAH:—						
First Period	7	4,155	6,930	224	1,667	53·91
Second Period	2	859	2,235	60	2,601	69·96
Total	9	5,014	9,165	284	1,827	56·64
DINAPORE:—						
First Period	9	6,845	14,251	484	2,081	70·70
Second Period	13	10,915	20,158	903	1,847	82·73
Total	22	17,760	34,409	1,387	1,937	78·09
GHAZEEPORE:—						
First Period	14	10,936	16,888	449	1,554	41·05
Second Period	5	3,002	5,638	276	1,878	91·94
Total	19	13,938	22,526	725	1,616	52·01
CAWNPORE:—						
First Period	19	25,701	46,471	1,495	1,808	58·16
Second Period	10	8,985	20,473	799	2,278	88·90
Total	29	34,686	66,944	2,294	1,930	66·13
AGRA:—						
First Period	4	2,701	3,671	49	1,359	18·14
Second Period	8	5,847	13,833	355	2,365	60·71
Total	12	8,548	17,504	404	2,048	47·26
MEERUT:—						
First Period	19	27,328	35,949	862	1,315	31·54
Second Period	14	14,512	24,522	639	1,690	44·03
Total	33	41,840	60,471	1,501	1,445	35·87
KURNAUL:—						
First Period	6	5,314	5,252	137	988	25·78
Second Period	5	3,434	8,051	268	2,344	78·04
Total	11	8,748	13,303	405	1,521	46·30
HAZAREEBAUGH:—						
First Period	2	1,368	2,308	78	1,687	57·01
Second Period	2	1,054	1,710	36	1,622	34·15
Total	4	2,422	4,018	114	1,659	47·07

Colonel Sir A. M. Tulloch, K.C.B.

25th Oct. 1858.

Summary—*cont.*

Stations.	Period of Observation.	Strength.	Admissions.	Deaths.	Ratio of Admissions per 1,000.	Ratio of Deaths per 1,000.
MADRAS.						
FORT ST. GEORGE:—	Yrs.					
First Period .	18	13,606	26,009	671	1,911	41·96
Second Period .	16	11,858	20,804	343	1,754	28·93
Total . .	34	25,464	46,813	1,014	1,838	39·82
CANNANORE:—						
First Period .	18	12,809	18,402	420	1,436	32·80
Second Period .	17	15,416	24,832	488	1,611	31·65
Total . .	35	28,225	43,234	908	1,531	32·17
TRICHINOPOLY:—						
First Period .	19	15,317	27,394	681	1,788	44·46
Second Period .	11	7,628	14,599	237	1,913	31·07
Total . .	30	22,945	41,993	918	1,829	40·00
SECUNDERABAD:—						
First Period .	18	13,939	35,555	854	2,555	61·26
Second Period .	8	7,133	12,243	405	1,716	56·78
Total . .	26	21,072	47,798	1,259	2,268	59·74
BANGALORE:—						
First Period .	21	21,870	34,538	672	1,579	30·73
Second Period .	17	17,133	24,016	418	1,402	24·39
Total . .	38	39,003	58,554	1,090	1,501	27·94
BELLARY:—						
First Period .	10	7,504	14,911	355	1,987	47·3
Second Period .	7	5,290	10,259	257	1,939	48·6
Total . .	17	12,794	25,170	612	1,959	47·8
BOMBAY.						
COLABAH and BOMBAY:—						
First Period .	16	11,907	22,195	763	1,864	64·08
Second Period .	7	3,606	7,806	219	2,165	60·73
Total . .	23	15,513	30,001	982	1,933	63·30
POONAH:—						
First Period .	16	19,974	36,140	495	1,819	24·78
Second Period .	13	13,663	28,541	451	2,089	33·01
Total . .	29	33,637	64,681	946	1,923	28·12
BELGAUM:—						
First Period .	10	6,332	10,814	175	1,707	27·63
Second Period .	10	7,244	11,909	299	1,644	41·27
Total . .	20	13,576	22,723	474	1,674	34·91
DEESA:—						
First Period .	4	2,682	2,879	144	1,073	53·69
Second Period .	7	7,473	12,262	250	1,641	33·45
Total . .	11	10,155	15,141	394	1,491	38·80
KIRKEE:—						
First Period .	10	6,207	9,447	162	1,521	26·09
Second Period .	14	9,131	17,218	234	1,886	25·63
Total . .	24	15,338	26,665	396	1,738	25·82

" These results do not exhibit the loss at all the " Indian stations during the 39 years included in the " first Table, but at those only where regiments have " been stationed for the whole or the greater part of " a year ; they are also exclusive of the loss on long " marches, which is often very heavy ; but it has been " considered more advisable thus to found the results " on incomplete data, than to incur the risk of adopting what might prove to be incorrect.

4528. (*Chairman.*) On what are those averages founded ; is it upon all Europeans ?—It is upon Her Majesty's European forces only. The Europeans of the East India Company's army are not included in the sanitary returns which come home to us.

4529. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) All this information is obtained from official documents ?—Yes.

" Not merely this difficulty of recruiting, but the cost " of replacing those who die or become invalided, affords " also a financial reason of the utmost moment for finding some healthier stations for the largely increased " force of Europeans to be kept in India in future, as " well as some cheaper mode of effecting the necessary " reliefs. On this subject the following rough calculations may not be inappropriate, as connected with " the latter part of the second head of the inquiry.

" Assuming that one-tenth of the troops must be relieved every year, and less it cannot be, consistently " with the maintenance of efficiency, there would have " to be provided the following passages annually :

8,000 men of relieving regiments.
8,000 „ relieved regiments.
5,600 recruits to replace deaths.
4,000 invalids and time-expired men coming home.
4,000 recruits going out to replace them.

29,600 annual passages.

" There are at present two ways of providing these " passages, the one by the Cape, the other through " Egypt. I shall in the first instance calculate what is " apparently the cheapest of these, viz., by the Cape, " and suppose that the cost, including provisions, is " even as low as 12*l.* per man, the total expense thus " involved would be 355,200*l.* annually.

" To this has to be added the cost of passages for " the officers of the regiments coming home and " going out, say,—

	£
40 for each of the eight regiments, or 320 out and home annually, being 640 in all, at an average cost of 90*l.* -	57,600
And for officers invalided or coming home on duty or to join other battalions, say two per regiment annually from 70 regiments, would be 140 officers each way, or in all 280, at 90*l.* each - - - - - -	25,200
Total for officers - - -	£82,800

" But as the average passage of sailing vessels " (unless they be of a very superior description, which " would add to the expense,) may be taken at about " 4 months ; these men, though paid, would be during " all this time available neither for the army in the " East nor the army at home; indeed they might, so " far as regards any military purpose, be just as well " in a state of non-existence.

" The loss sustained in consequence by adopting " this mode of transit is equivalent to a third part of " the whole number on the passage, or 9,866 men for " one year ; the pay of whom, including officers, " would, according to the army estimates, be about " 282,410*l.* to be added to the annual expense of " passage by this route—indeed it must be considerably more, taking into account that a large part of " the force would be cavalry and artillery, with increased pay, and that there are women and children " to be taken out and brought home also.

" But as the passage by the Red Sea might be made " in a month, the probable loss from this source would, " in the event of that route being adopted, be reduced " to one-fourth of the above amount, or 70,602*l.* In " that case, however, there would have to be added " the increased expense of transit. It is doubtful " whether, even when subject to the average charge " for that service, that increase would be equivalent " to the loss of the pay for so many months without " any duty being rendered in return, but in the " event of a regular system of reliefs through Egypt " being adopted, the expense might, it is submitted, " be so far reduced by the following arrangement as " to make that route unquestionably the cheapest.

" Let six ships of the line, of a class no longer " available for warlike purposes, but capable of conveying about 700 soldiers in addition to a complement of 150 sailors each, be fitted up as screw " steamers under a commander or lieutenant, and " three placed as troop-ships on the route between

" Southampton and Alexandria, and a like number on " that between Suez and India.

" This number of vessels would ensure the troops " reaching India or coming home in about one month, " and it can be shown that their employment for this " purpose, including the cost of fitting out, is not " likely to involve even half the expenditure which " would ultimately be incurred by sending the reliefs " round the Cape.

" By a properly arranged system of this kind, the " employment of the vessels both out and home would " be secured, and an establishment of troop ships kept " up, which, on the breaking out of a war, might be " of the greatest possible utility.

" The accompanying estimate (*see* Appendix, No. 8, " p. 16,) of the cost of converting an 80-gun ship on this " principle, shows that it can be done for 53,000*l.* each " vessel. For six such vessels it would be 318,000*l.*, " the interest on which, say at 10 per cent. annually, " would have to be added to the sailing expenses. " These are stated in the estimate at 16,331*l.* per " annum, exclusive of coals, for which add 3,670*l.*, " reckoning half speed throughout, and an average cost " of 30*s.* a ton, and the total would be in round num- " bers 20,000*l.* each vessel, or 120,000*l.* a year. This, " with 31,800*l.* for interest on the alteration and " equipment of the vessels, would raise the whole " expense to about 151,800*l.* per annum ; whereas, " going round by the Cape, the cost would be 438,000*l.*, " besides a loss of 212,000*l.* or thereabouts by the " men being on board the vessel three months " longer, and doing nothing, while their pay was " running on.

" It might be possible to combine this arrangement " with a system of reliefs for the Mediterranean sta- " tions, so that the men might have the experience of " a year at least in a warm climate before proceeding " to India. This would add in no respect to the ex- " pense, and might be useful as what is termed ' a " ' seasoning,' by accustoming the troops to the pre- " cautions necessary for health in a warm climate.

" In making this suggestion for a continuous cur- " rent of reliefs by the Red Sea, I am aware that all " seasons are not alike in respect of health for troops " arriving in India; but as they can soon be sent " from the presidencies by rail beyond the most un- " healthy localities, that need create no obstacle. I " am also aware that the passage through Egypt and " the Red Sea must at certain seasons be attended " with exposure for a few days to a high temperature, " but as no particular loss of life has arisen hitherto " from this cause, I think the passage not likely to be " attended with any serious risk, even at the hottest " season. It is difficult to say what degree of heat " Europeans cannot stand with impunity, provided " they have free ventilation, and are not long exposed.

" I am thus particular in urging the employment of " regular troop ships as part of the system of reliefs " for India, because I feel confident that the rotation " of reliefs for the Mediterranean, West Indies, and " America, would never have been effected or kept up " sufficiently long to give the measure a fair trial, but " for the circumstance of troop ships having at first " been especially devoted to that object. The desire " or the supposed necessity for saving an immediate " outlay for freight would, I am confident, have caused " a temporary postponement of the relief at some " period; and the same reason would probably have " operated from year to year till the whole arrange- " ment was ultimately broken up, and the troops left " to perish in the West Indies as before; but the " vessels being prepared, no difficulties of this kind " occurred, and the rotation was kept up regularly " with the best effect on the men, both morally and " physically, and at less expense, ultimately, than " would have been incurred for freight ships.

" As regards the third head of the inquiry, I am of " opinion that it might be practicable to consolidate " the European force, whether of the line or perma- " nent corps, so as to admit of exchanges from one " branch of the service to the other; but it appears " to me that the officers of the Bengal presidency " stand in a different position from the others as to " their *liability* to any such change. There, the " original native army exists only on paper ; the men " are gone, and it may be considered inexpedient to " employ many of that class in future, thus leaving " the mass of officers disposable. If these officers " will not go voluntarily into line regiments if " wanted, then I apprehend they, as in all cases of " reduction, *from whatever cause*, can only claim their " half or full pay retirement according to their periods " of service. Few legislators are likely to entertain " an opinion that the government must re-form regi- " ments which they do not want, merely in order to " keep these officers in possession of their Indian " allowances. The great check on mutiny or mis- " conduct in every corps is that the officers know " they will suffer in their professional prospects by " any laxity of discipline which may give rise to " such an event; remove that wholesome apprehen- " sion, and, except as regards his own personal safety, " it might become a matter of indifference to an " officer whether his men mutinied or not.

Colonel Sir A. M. Tulloch, K.C.B.

25th Oct. 1858.

" I think, therefore, that all grades of officers in " the Bengal army under the rank of field officer, " who are not required for the native force by the " new arrangements, should be liable to be transferred, " according to their standing, into the new European " corps or regiments of the line to be formed, and if " they decline the position allotted to them, or make " any difficulties, that they should then have the " option of retirement on half or full pay, according " to their service.

" With regard to the Bombay and Madras armies, " however, in which there has been no mutiny of any " extent, the officers under the rank of major should " only be transferred at their own request to the " European force or the regiments of the line to be " raised for India, as nothing has occurred in these " armies to invalidate the contract or understanding " under which the officers were originally engaged, " and consequently there is no necessity for remodel- " ling their force except what has arisen from the " occurrences in the other presidency, for which they " should not suffer.

" This distinction will suit the case of the different " presidencies. In Bengal, for instance, where the " changes and reductions must necessarily be nu- " merous, it would, perhaps, be difficult otherwise to " obtain a sufficient number of officers for the intended " European force, while in Madras and Bombay the " number of officers not required in the native army " will probably be so few, that the necessary reduc- " tions may be practicable without any compulsory " removals.

" A number of the officers, more especially in the " junior ranks, will, I apprehend, think it no hard- " ship to serve in the regiments of the line proposed " to be formed, but rather the reverse, and when " once the change has been authorized I see nothing " to prevent officers of the line and of the native " army, under the rank of major, exchanging, pro- " vided they enter junior of their respective grades, " and that the former possess the requisite qualifica- " tions with respect to languages.

" The value of the contributions to the military " and retiring fund by each of the officers going into " the line could be calculated by an actuary, accord- " ing to the respective ages and ranks of the parties, " and whether they were married or single ; so much " thereof as corresponded to the advantages which " the military retiring fund and widows fund gave to " the Indian officer in excess of what he would receive " under Her Majesty's regulations for himself in case " of returning home, or for his wife and family in the " event of death, should then be repaid to any who " left the native army. These officers would after- " wards be disposable wherever their services were " required, as in any line regiment, and all the benefit " of the funds should then be confined to the officers " of the native corps permanently resident in India,

Colonel Sir A. M. Tulloch, K.C.B.

25th Oct. 1858.

" whose rate of India pay would admit of keeping up " their subscriptions.

" Into the cases of the field officers I scarcely think " it necessary to enter; many of them would probably " be disposed to retire under the change of system; " and every encouragement should be given to facilitate their doing so. The numerous appointments " existing on the staff, and in the commissariat, political, and revenue departments, would, I apprehend, " find ample employment for all disposed to remain, " and who were not wanted for the command of " native or irregular corps, without moving them " into regiments of the line.

" I can see great advantages to both armies by " the facility of interchanging officers. The health, " inclination, or prospects of many in the Indian army " may induce them to prefer the very moderate pay " in the British line regiments, with the chance of " spending a portion of their service at home, or in " healthy colonies. And as retired full pay has now " been established for line regiments, as well as those " of India, no difficulty need arise on that account, " provided it were arranged, as ought in justice to be " the case, when so many are in India, that in calculating the thirty years required for full-pay retirement, two years' service there should be allowed to " reckon for three. The extra boon now granted, of " an increased rank with corresponding retirement " according to the period served in India, might " then very fairly be reserved exclusively for the " officers with native corps.

" In order to prevent the injury which might arise " to the prospects of officers of the Indian army who " are without the means of purchase, it would be necessary, should any transfer be made otherwise than " voluntarily to the regiments of the line raised for " India, that all that force should be, like the artillery and marines, non-purchasing corps, but if the " change be voluntary in every case, I see no reason " even for that distinction, as each officer would, or " ought, in making the application for removal, to " consider his prospects and how far he had the " means of advancing himself by purchase when opportunities offered, as well as whether he had the " means of supporting himself out of India on the " limited amount of his pay.

" The change on the whole I conceive by no means " impracticable at such a moment as the present, and " one well calculated to make the officers of both " services better satisfied with their position. It " may, perhaps, also induce the Indian officers to " serve more willingly under the new system when " they find they have such an option within their " reach, provided circumstances will admit of their " availing themselves of it. In the event of any " such change, however, the corps formed must be " regiments, not battalions of the line.

" In regard to the mode of keeping up the local " European force, which forms the fourth question, " should these arrangements be carried through, that " would of course be done, both by volunteering in " India and separate recruiting in the United Kingdom, as is the case now with regiments of the line " in India.

4530. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) In your calculations of transport have you taken the expense of feeding the troops into both calculations?—I have not taken the expense of feeding the troops into the calculation for the Red Sea voyage.

4531. 12*l.* includes feeding?—Yes, the soldier you are aware pays 6*d.*, there is 6*d.* stopped from his pay which goes to the account of the feeding; the difference, therefore, upon a month's passage cannot be very much.

4532. The 12*l.* in going round the Cape includes the feeding?—Yes, but it is a very low estimate; I think it is the lowest estimate which has ever been taken.

4533. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Do you give the passage money as 12*l.*?—Yes.

4534. It is always 13*l.* 10*s.*?—Even that is very low; and the reason why I did not take into account either the feeding of the men or officers by the Red Sea route is, that the cost would be very small indeed, the men being only a month at sea, and 6*d.* a day stopped from their pay. According to a calculation which I made some years ago of the cost of the soldier's ration on shipboard, I find that it is only 8½*d.* to the Admiralty, so that the difference is but 2½*d.*, which is not worth going into. I have made no calculation for the officer's expenses by the Red Sea route, because he would walk on board his vessel and find every accommodation provided for him there. I see no reason why he should not have a mess on board.

4535. (*Viscount Melville.*) The regulated passage money will not bring a subaltern home?—He would only have to walk on board a troop ship; everything would be provided for him. If an officer got the advantage of having a good cabin coming home in one of these ships, a very small addition given by the Government would cover the expense of messing. I believe at present he gets 4*s.* a day, and contributes 3*s.* 6*d.* This would be no great additional charge to the public, and it appeared to me that as we were dealing with a question of several hundreds of thousands of pounds, the calculation would be sufficiently near as I had taken it; but I will hereafter submit further particulars on the subject.

4536. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You have given your opinion very decidedly that you are in favour of regiments of the line, is it your opinion that in the organization and treatment of great armies it is of immense importance that there should be one general system and not a double system, causing jealousies and other undesirable results?—Most unquestionably; I think it would be one of the greatest recommendations of the change, and throughout the whole of this paper I have been actuated by the consideration, that having the whole under one head would add to the strength of the nation instead of diminishing it.

4537. It is of course your opinion that emulation is a very desirable thing in the army as in every other profession?—Most unquestionably.

4538. Do not you think that the emulation of corps and regiments in an army is the thing to keep up the whole managability and efficiency of an army?—It is certainly most important.

4539. And do you not think that that emulation is very different from the emulation of two distinct armies standing in the same country, one quite separate from the other?—Yes, and there is another advantage. You have an immense army out in India; if that is to be kept a separate army, when officers come home there is nothing for them to do; whereas in the other case, they could join their regiments here and go out to India again when their health was recovered.

4540. They are available in both countries?—Yes, whenever they are wanted. I think that is most important; you have not less than 500 officers always in this country belonging to the Indian army whom you could attach to any regiment or send to their own regiments as might be required.

4541. Emulation of corps in one army is a very different thing from the emulation of two armies?—Most unquestionably.

4542. I apprehend you would think that the one would be likely to lead to difficulties of treatment, and even jealousies, and the other not?—Yes, and of all the jealousies I think the question of pay is the most serious one; one army being paid at a different rate from the other.

4543. (*Viscount Melville.*) That does not now exist?—No, you have the same rate of pay.

4544. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Provided that the two armies be put on a perfect equality as regards honours and emoluments, and in every other respect, why should any other than a generous feeling of emulation exist between them?—Just for the reason that what ought to be does not always exist.

4545. I ask you why the contrary should necessarily exist?—I do not say it is necessary, but we do not always find those effects produced which ought to be produced.

4546. Do you see any reason why a feeling other than a generous spirit of emulation would necessarily exist?—I would not say "necessarily," but many circumstances might call a different feeling into operation; as, for instance, if it were found that one army was more favoured in getting good stations or lucrative appointments than the other.

4547. Why should you assume the possibility of such a thing?—Simply, because some people suppose it to be so; that is the only reason why I say so.

4548. Why should that apply more to one army than to the other?—The same thing might apply to both. I have heard the question discussed in India over and over again,—See how fortunate such a regiment is, it is always at a healthy station. This may have been mere chance, but people will say so, and I think it is a great matter to avoid it.

4549. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In a double army there must be a difference of feeling between the two bodies?—Yes, and I am anxious to see the same laws and rules extended to both, and the whole made available in every possible way as one army.

4550. Do you not think that if two bodies of troops are in a country, the one the smaller, and the other the greater, the smaller body is much more likely to adopt the rules and the system of the greater, than the greater those of the smaller?—That is a very natural consequence.

4551. Therefore is it not likely that the fact, as stated in evidence, of the European Company's troops having hitherto always looked up as a model to some extent to the troops of the line, has in a great measure been caused by the fact of the troops of the line preponderating in numbers?—Yes, and also by their coming out more frequently. For instance, a regiment arrives fresh from England, bringing with it all its new ideas, a new mode of drill, and new habits on the part of the officers; I think that a very great advantage.

4552. Supposing that you reversed the order of things, and that there was a local army, and that the local army was the preponderating army, is it likely that that local preponderating army of Europeans would look up to the inferior army of Europeans of the line?—No; in fact I contemplate that if you are going to have a large European army, you must have it entirely a local army, and withdraw all regiments of the line. I do not think that the two combined would then be good.

4553. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Do you think that no advantage accrues to Her Majesty's regular army from a certain portion of it having opportunities of service in India during peace in Europe?—Yes.

4554. (*Colonel Forsyth Tait.*) Hitherto it has answered well, having a large portion of the Queen's troops in India serving in that country, and what is the particular reason why the same system should not go on. In what way will it deteriorate Her Majesty's service by the same system being continued that has hitherto gone on?—I understood it not to be the same system which was proposed. The question put to me was on the assumption of there being a large local European army; if it was the same system, and the same proportion of line and Indian European force respectively as now, I have no objections.

4555. Partly European?—I understood that you were going to have, and I have assumed that you must have 80,000 Europeans, and that it was proposed by some to have this chiefly a local army, and all my observations have been founded upon that assumption. I do not see that any harm has arisen from the arrangement hitherto adopted of having a portion of Her Majesty's army in India; it has had its good effects.

4556. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Upon what grounds then do you rest your opinion, that if there is to be any local European army it should be entirely a local army?—I have stated many reasons. One is the risk that if any circumstances arose to create a mutiny, or to raise any question connected with local interests, or anything of that sort, it would be a very serious matter to have a large European army there which you could not remove.

Colonel Sir A. M. Tulloch, K.C.B.

25th Oct. 1858.

4557. Surely that goes against what you have recommended, namely, that if there is to be any local European army, it should be entirely a local army; surely upon the other supposition, if any mutiny takes place in the local army, there would be the regular army to put it down?—That, of course, supposes the regular army to be the largest, and the possibility of this not being the case, will serve to illustrate the risk to which I have referred in the immediately preceding answers. It is obvious that so long as the local European army consisted of a few battalions merely, as hitherto, while there were twenty or thirty battalions of the line, any mutiny in the former could readily be put down; but let the conditions be reversed, and the local European army be raised to 50,000 or 60,000 men, we should be certain, in the event of any mutiny among them, to lose our regiments of the line altogether, as they could never be withdrawn in the face of so overwhelming a force.

4558. Have you not stated that if there is to be any local European army, it should be altogether a local army?—Yes, and I have just given my reasons for it.

4559. Still, if there is to be any local European army, you recommend that it should be entirely a local army?—I think that would be the safest, if you must have a preponderating force of that description; but I would prefer 60,000 or 70,000 of the line, and a few battalions of the other, if you must have them.

4560. (*Viscount Melville.*) With reference to what you have stated, I presume you are unquestionably of opinion that the whole European force, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, should be decidedly European—that it should be part of the Bengal army?—Yes; every one of them, I think, with the exception of such native troops as may be necessary.

4561. Regarding the differences in the circumstances of the three presidencies, and the present European force existing in Bengal, and that in Madras and Bombay, how do you propose to absorb the present local regiments and the officers belonging to them?—With regard to the European regiments already formed, I should number them just as regiments of the line. Supposing that you required to add 20 or 30 more regiments, those should be numbered in succession as regiments of the line also; the officers who wished to be removed (and I think you will find a sufficient number who wish it, to fill the whole of those vacancies,) should be removed according to their respective standing. Of course that would require to be adjusted; but you can have no more difficulty in doing so, than in the cavalry arrangements. I understand that some regiments of cavalry have lately been raised in India, and they have absorbed a number of officers; and I think the same principle should be followed in the absorption of the present officers into these new regiments of the line.

4562. (*Colonel Burlton.*) One of the objections which you have started to the employment of a local European force in India, is the probability of their being mutinous?—Such an event is possible.

4563. Is there not a possibility that if they were all royal they might be mutinous also?—They might be mutinous; but it would be merely in one or two regiments, and it would be checked in time, because you could move those men immediately. The first order would be,—Remove such and such regiment to the Mauritius or Ceylon.

4564. Why should a local European regiment be more likely to be mutinous than a royal regiment?—I am not assuming such a thing.

4565. I suppose you have heard of an instance of one of the Company's regiments being mutinous in India?—We are told in history of the officers being so on different occasions; and I recollect once sitting at

Colonel Sir A. M. Tulloch, K.C.B.

15th Oct. 1858.

table with an officer who had long been a prisoner for joining in the mutiny of the Madras army, and leading his men into action against His Majesty's 25th Light Dragoons.

4566. That is as regards a native regiment. I am speaking of a European regiment. I presume it is within your knowledge that a European regiment has mutinied?—I do not recollect any case of the kind. I refer at present to the officers.

4567. Would it not be in the case of mutiny an advantage to bring one force against the other?—No; I think the great advantage which you have by having them all regiments of the line is, that the moment you see a regiment getting into a bad state or exhibiting the smallest tendency to mutiny, you could immediately send that regiment away. You cannot do that with a local force.

4568. (*Viscount Melville.*) Putting mutiny and other considerations out of the question, do you not think that there is something more involved than mere numbers in allowing 80,000 men or 60,000 men of the European force to be stationed in India, altogether out of the control of the commander-in-chief in this country?—I have started with this principle, that I hold it absolutely necessary we should have one army, and I think it rests with the parties who say that there should be two armies to show the reasons for it.

4569. You are aware that the principle is contended for of a part being a local force, and a part the Queen's. Supposing that the whole European force be a local army, do you not consider that it involves a serious question independent of numbers?—I think it might do so; I think it might involve a serious question respecting discipline.

4570. Those troops being totally withdrawn from the control of the commander-in-chief?—Yes. I do not know whether a separate commander-in-chief is proposed as the head in India, therefore I am anxious for the parties who advocate a local army to state their reasons. I cannot combat them without knowing the advantage which it is supposed there would be in having a partly European army and partly troops of the line. The only advantage which I have heard quoted is that they might fight one against the other.

4571. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) On military principles I suppose, as a military man, you would give a very decided opinion that a united army is a great advantage to a country of any description?—Most unquestionably; and I might add, from what I have known of the East India Company's officers, that I believe most, the junior ones at any rate, would prefer being under one head.

4572. (*Chairman.*) Can you, on some future occasion, give a calculation of what would be the difference of expense to the Indian revenue between a regiment raised for permanent service in India, including the expense of retiring allowances to the officers and a regiment relieved at the end of ten years?—Yes. There is, however, an element which requires to be taken into consideration upon which we can get no data at present, namely, how many of those men will avail themselves of the privilege of coming home after ten years' service. In consequence of that great change, which I expect has not been adverted to, the expense of reliefs will be very nearly the same in the one case as in the other, because a man can now say, "I do not wish to remain in India; if you say I am to remain, I shall claim my discharge and go home."

4573. Then there would be an additional expense and the reliefs would be about the same?—Yes; if a soldier is not sent home in a regiment he is entitled to claim his discharge after serving ten years.

4574. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) One is a set off against the other?—Yes.

4575. (*Viscount Melville.*) Does the Ten Years Act apply to the East India Company?—Yes.

4576. (*Colonel Burlton.*) I think you estimated the expense of passages to and fro round the Cape, in order to keep up a regular series of reliefs of the army of the line, at 450,000*l.*?—I think it would not be much less.

4577. Would not that expenditure be very considerably reduced if one half of that Indian force was local—sent out there not to return?—If they wanted to come back they would come back—that is to say, they would claim their discharges after ten years; and if they wanted to stay they could transfer themselves into regiments of the line and continue to serve until their twenty-one years were out, just as well as with any local European force.

4578. Your estimate is based upon a regular relief?—Yes; but it would come to the same thing. If at the end of ten years a man says "I will come home," you must bring him home.

4579. (*Chairman.*) If you do not relieve him at the end of ten years he will come at your expense?—Yes.

4580. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Are you not of opinion that when men recruit here and are enlisted for service in an Indian local corps, they go out with the full understanding of spending the remainder of their lives in India?—I do not think they always do; that does not always follow. They enlist now for ten years; they do not go out intending to remain there any more than the others.

4581. The soldiers in the East India Company's army never dream of coming home?—On the contrary, I have, in my capacity of military superintendent of pensioners, to pay in this country about 2,800 of them. Comparatively very few, of course, come home, because the mortality is so high that few live to return. I only reckon upon 2½ per cent. coming home annually.

4582. (*Viscount Melville.*) You state that you see no difficulty in the officers exchanging one with the other. Who do you propose is to repay the sum which an officer has been paying to the Indian fund. Is the Indian government to pay it to the officer, or the officer who exchanges. If a Company's officer has been paying for ten years to the retiring fund and to the widows' fund, and he wishes to exchange with an officer of Her Majesty's service, is the officer of Her Majesty's service to repay him the sum which he has contributed to those funds, or is the government to pay it?—Not the officer who is going in, for he cannot assume the other officer's place, therefore he cannot pay; he may be of a different age, and may have a greater number of children, and other circumstances may make a difference; but the party to pay it, I think, should be the Indian government, who are relieved from the obligation which otherwise they would be under. I believe they are bound to guarantee those pensions. Before giving a precise answer to the question it would be necessary, however, to look into the exact constitution of the fund.

The witness withdrew.

Adjourned to Tuesday, November 9, at 12 o'clock.

Tuesday, 23rd November 1858.

PRESENT :

Major-General PEEL.	Lieut.-Gen. Sir GEORGE A. WETHERALL.
H.R.H. the Duke of CAMBRIDGE.	Major-Gen. MONTGOMERIE.
Marquis of TWEEDDALE.	Major-Gen. HANCOCK.
Viscount MELVILLE.	Colonel BURLTON.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir HARRY G. W. SMITH.	Colonel FORSYTH TAIT.

MAJOR-GENERAL PEEL IN THE CHAIR.

General Sir WILLOUGHBY COTTON, G.C.B. examined.

Gen. Sir W. Cotton, G.C.B.

23rd Nov. 1858.

4583. (*Chairman.*) You are a general in the army?—I am.

4584. Will you have the kindness to state to the Commission what length of time you have served in India, and the different commands and situations in which you were there?—I went to India with the rank of full-colonel in the year 1821, and on my arrival there was appointed to the command of the troops and station at Poonah. On the 47th regiment to which I belonged, being ordered to Ava, I was desired by the Commander-in-chief and Governor-general to proceed immediately to Calcutta, and when I got there I was appointed brigadier-general with a commission on the staff, and ordered to go immediately to Rangoon, and report myself to Brigadier-general Campbell, who commanded the troops in Ava. On my arrival at Rangoon I was appointed by Sir Archibald Campbell to command the Madras troops, vice Major-general Fraser, who was ill and obliged to quit that place, and I held that command until the peace, and afterwards until the embarkation of the whole of the Madras troops to return to their presidency. On my return to Calcutta after the Ava war, I was appointed by Lord Combermere, who was Commander-in-chief in India, to act as quartermaster-general to the Queen's army, in the room of Sir Stamford Whittingham who had just got his promotion of major-general. I held that appointment for one year. But on the death of Colonel Macdonald, the adjutant-general of the Queen's army serving in India I was transferred from the quartermaster-general's department to that of the adjutant-general, and held the acting appointment of adjutant-general until I got my promotion and came home. In the year 1837 I was again ordered to India as major-general on the Bengal staff. I was appointed to the command of the provinces in Lower Bengal, and on the formation of the army of the Indus I was appointed to the command of the first division of that army, and ordered to proceed to Ferozepore. On my arrival at Ferozepore, Sir Henry Fane, who was to have taken charge of the whole of the Bengal troops and to have proceeded with those of Bombay to Affghanistan, declined the command of the army, and I was ordered to take the command of the Bengal troops proceeding down the Indus, and to put myself under the orders of Lieut.-general Sir John Keane, at Shekapore, with directions to serve under him in the whole of the operations which he might think proper to order in that country. I did so, and on Sir John Keane leaving the army, with the troops of the Bombay army which he took with him. I retained the command of the Bengal troops in that country, until I was relieved by Major-general Elphinstone, having been obliged to quit that force from ill health. I then proceeded immediately to England, and remained there until 1847, when I was appointed Commander-in-chief of the Bombay army, and I held that appointment until the year 1851, when I returned to England.

4585. You were in India the first time, from 1821 till when?—I went to India in 1821, and I remained there until, I think, three years after the Ava war, until 1829 or 1830.

4586. Then you went again in 1837?—In the year 1837 I was appointed to India as major-general on the Bengal staff, and then I was ordered up to command the first division of the army of the Indus.

4587. And then you came home?—Yes.

4588. In what year did you come home?—In 1841, the year before the catastrophe.

4589. Then you were four years there on the last occasion, four years there the time before that, and eight years the first time, making altogether 16 years in India?—Yes.

4590. You have been furnished with some questions by the Commissioners?—Yes.

4591. Will you have the goodness to state what opinion you have formed as to how far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only?—I conceive that as India is now under Her Majesty's Government, there ought to be but one European army, and that that should be called the royal army, to be recruited wholly in England, but that all regiments ordered home should be encouraged to give volunteers to the regiments remaining in India. I conceive that the period of service in India for a Queen's regiment should not exceed, at the maximum, 14 years.

4592. As I understood you, you would have but one army, and not any portion of that army recruited for local service in India alone?—Our general Queen's army. I am quite aware of the numerous difficulties which will arise with regard to making a fair and just arrangement between the officers of the Company's army, now with the European regiments, and those in the Queen's service. I am aware that great difficulty will arise; but still I do not think that it is insurmountable; that must be argued with the joint opinions of the most experienced officers that you have appertaining to the Company's and to the Queen's service, in order to form what would be a just thing to those officers who are now there.

4593. Still you must be aware that it would be perfectly impossible not to keep faith with those officers who have lately been in the Company's service, and who have entered that service subject to certain regulations with regard to pay and allowances, and regarding which, of course, faith must be kept with those officers,—that of course you anticipate doing?—Exactly so. I would blend them with our army until the whole thing is made one system.

4594. That is what you propose?—Yes.

4595. You think that there would be some difficulty, but not an insurmountable difficulty?—I think that there would be a difficulty, but not insurmountable.

4596. (*Col. Burlton.*) How can you get rid of the difficulty arising from the fact that the one is a seniority service, and that every officer entering it has the pledge of the Government that it shall be so? How can you reconcile that difficulty with the system of exchanges in the other service where purchase is allowed?—You have another very serious thing, namely, your military fund.

4597. Do you see any way of getting over the difficulty of the one being a seniority service and the other a purchase service?—The only thing is, when you mix them together to permit exchanges till the

Gen. Sir W. Cotton, G.C.B.

3rd Nov. 1858.

two are perfectly amalgamated ; ten or twelve years would do for that purpose.

4598. How can you do it without injustice to those who have entered the service on the faith of its being a seniority service, without the chance of supercession by purchase ?—By exchanges.

4599. Can you regulate or graduate those exchanges so that they shall not be unjust to the officers of the seniority service ?—That requires great consideration, and it is a question to which I cannot give an off-hand answer.

4600. We will suppose that we have an old lieutenant, say, of 20 years' standing ; he is, perhaps, senior lieutenant in his regiment ; if he has been 20 years in arriving at that point in his regiment, the captains of his corps must necessarily be old men. If, then, one of those old men to whom he has been looking forward as a bad life, and who would certainly give him a step very soon, should exchange with a young man from the horse guards here who purchases in as junior captain, would not that be an act of injustice to the senior lieutenant, whose promotion would be so much the more protracted thereby ? How can you get over that difficulty ?—I have not considered the question.

4601. You do not see perhaps any way in which that difficulty could be got over ?—I have not considered the question.

4602. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) If the entire European force in India be composed in future of troops furnished from Her Majesty's army in England, would there not be much greater risk of their being withdrawn to a dangerous extent in the event of an European war than if composed of troops enlisted for service in India only, and therefore under the entire control of the Government of India ?—No, I do not think so; it does not strike me in that point of view.

4603. You are not aware perhaps that they were withdrawn during the war in the Crimea, notwithstanding the protest of the Governor-General of India? —I was not aware of it.

4604. Do you not think that the authority of the Governments of India and of the several presidencies would be lowered, and their power abridged to a very injurious extent, if thus made dependent upon the pleasure of the several Indian commanders-in-chief, and of the Commander-in-chief in England, for obtaining and retaining the services of every officer without exception, whether on regimental, staff, or other detached employment ?—No, I do not think so.

4605. You would have the whole European force in India composed of troops of the line from England ? —The whole.

4606. Would you have the European troops in each presidency formed into a separate command, or place the whole under one head in India ?—I conceive that the whole of the European troops in India should be called the royal army ; there should be but one army, and that army should be under the Commander-in-chief in England. Of course it is understood that if circumstances should arise in India, which would call for the employment of any regiment, the Commander-in-chief in India or the Governor-General should have the power of moving them.

4607. My question has reference to the commands in India. As there are three separate presidencies, would you have your one army divided into three, and each placed under a separate commander-in-chief, as the East India Company's European army has been hitherto divided and placed, or would you have only one commander-in-chief for all India, and place the whole European army under his command ?—I would have the whole army under one commander-in-chief, namely, Commander-in-chief in England ; but as I have said just now, if circumstances should arise in Madras or Bombay to render the employment of the troops in India requisite at any particular point, the Commander-in-chief and the Governor of Bombay or Madras, independently of Bengal, should have the power of moving the troops to that point.

4608. Am I to understand that you would still retain the separate commanders-in-chief at Madras and Bombay ?—Certainly ; but I should conceive that that would not interfere at all with the efficiency of the Queen's troops which were out there.

4609. As I understand you the whole of the troops would be Queen's troops ?—Yes, the whole of the Europeans. It should of course be understood that either in Bengal or Madras or Bombay, if it was required to move those troops in consequence of any insurrection, they would be ordered as they would be at this instant from Bombay to Hyderabad, or in any direction which the other presidencies required.

4610. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That is to say that you would have the arrangement just as it stands now as far as command goes ; each presidency should have a separate commander-in-chief, but the Commander-in-chief in India should have supreme power over all in emergencies ?—Clearly ; I would have it go on as it is now, and the promotions and vacancies and all that sort of thing filled up and returned home, of course for approval, as at this moment, or as it was before the transfer of the territory.

4611. (*Viscount Melville.*) Has it not hitherto been the case that the Commander-in-chief in India has commanded all the Queen's troops ?—Yes.

4612. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) It has not been the case, has it, that the Commander-in-chief in India has commanded all the Company's troops ?—No, that has been under the Governor-General.

4613. Hitherto the European as well as native troops of the East India Company in each presidency have been formed into separate commands under presidential commanders-in-chief, but according to your plan the commanders-in-chief at Madras and Bombay would cease to have the powers of a commander-in-chief over any portion of the European troops in those presidencies ; they should only have subordinate commands under the Commander-in-chief in India ; they would not have the same power over troops of the line from England which they have had hitherto over the Company's European troops under their respective commands ?—I beg your pardon ; I have clearly stated twice that the commanders-in-chief in Bombay and Madras should have the power, in case necessity required it, in case (using a military term which you will understand) there was an insurrection, of moving any troops in their presidencies as they have at this moment.

4614. I understand you as regards the movement of troops, but with respect to the general powers to be vested in them as commanders-in-chief, what powers would you give them over the European troops under their respective command, supposing the whole to be furnished from the regular army in England ?—That is a question which I am not prepared to answer.

4615. Hitherto the commanders-in-chief at Madras and Bombay have held independent commands, as regards the Company's European troops ; they have not been in any respect under the Commander-in-chief in India, except when he might be personally present within those presidencies. Would you have that system continued in the event of the whole European force in India being composed in future of troops of the line from England, or would you have them cease to be commanders-in-chief, and make them merely local commanders of divisions, under the Commander-in-chief in India ?—I never contemplated the question in the point of view in which you put it.

4616. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The difference is this, that up to this moment the Company's troops, even including the Company's European troops, have been under the authority and command of the different presidential commanders-in-chief ; and the Commander-in-chief in Bengal, though exercising supreme authority over the two other presidencies as regards the Queen's troops, has had no power whatever over the troops of the Company's army. What General Hancock, I understand, wishes to know is whether you would increase the power of the Commander-in-

chief of Bengal to that extent, or whether you would leave it as it was before, or how you would arrange it?—I have said that the presidential Commander-in-chief ought to have the power, if necessity required it, of moving the Queen's troops on any emergency; in his own presidency he should have the power of moving the troops whenever he thought proper.

4617. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) My question had reference to ordinary matters of military discipline and the command of an army generally, and not at all to the movement of troops?—I am not able to answer the question.

4618. Have the European artillery and infantry of the East India Company's army been found in any respect inferior, as regards efficiency for service in the field, to the artillery and infantry of the royal army?—No, I have never found them so; but I am perfectly well aware that there are four different systems at this moment in practice with regard to the artillery in India. There is the Bengal artillery; there is the Bombay artillery; there is the Madras artillery; and there is the royal artillery; and their materiel differs. But in the field I do not think it is possible that there should be a more efficient force than the Indian artillery.

4619. Have the officers on the staff of the army in India, and belonging to the East India Company's forces, been found in any respect inferior, as regards efficiency for service in the field, to the officers on the staff of Her Majesty's army, whether in Europe or in India?—Certainly not; I do not think it is possible to have better staff officers than the Indian army had.

4620. Have the European officers and soldiers of the East India Company's army ever failed to uphold, equally with those of the royal army, the honour of their Queen and country whenever employed in the field?—In every action in which I have been connected with the Honourable Company's troops, I never found either Europeans or natives behave in any way but in the most gallant manner.

4621. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you think that any advantage arises to the public service from the Europeans in India being a distinct force under the Company as they have hitherto been, instead of being under the Crown?—I have before stated that as India is annexed now to the Queen's raj, I conceive that there ought to be but one army, and that army called the royal army.

4622. (*Marquess of Tweeddale.*) Do you think it is necessary that the discipline of the royal army, now that the three bodies are made into one, should be the same?—The European discipline, of course, will be the same, because they will be under one head, and called the Queen's army.

4623. Would you not have the natives under the same discipline?—The power of punishment of the native is very different, as you know, from ours.

4624. I am not talking of punishment, but of discipline?—Discipline is connected with punishment.

4625. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is there not a difference between the native armies of the three presidencies in that respect?—No.

4626. Is there the same code for all three?—I do not believe that there is the same code.

4627. Do you think that the code should be or should not be the same?—I should think, of course, that you had better have one code if you can amalgamate the thing, but that is a question of detail with regard to the native army, as to which officers who have served in Madras and Bombay, and Bengal, would be able to say how far it could be arranged.

4628. (*Marquess of Tweeddale.*)—If all the armies are to be under the Queen and all made one, would you not have the discipline of the army placed under the direction of the Commander-in-chief in England?—The crimes which will be committed will be committed in Asia, and not in England; consequently the courts-martial must take place in that country, and not here; but you should so regulate your Mutiny Act as to meet the discipline of the European army, which is there.

4629. Then, in forming your Mutiny Act, you would place the whole under one head, and that of course would be the Commander-in-chief in England?—The Commander-in-chief in England cannot regulate the discipline of the troops serving in Asia; your Mutiny Act must lay down a certain code, and you would try offenders by court-martial according to that code. But with all commissioned officers who are cashiered, it always has been the case that the sentence has been sent home to the Commander-in-chief. The commanders-in-chief in India have the power, I believe, of confirming, but the mode of proceeding in filling up, was always that there was a schedule sent home every month or two months by the military secretary of the Commander-in-chief in India for the approval by the Commander-in-chief in England, of the names which were sent. I know that when Lord Combermere was Commander-in-chief of Bengal, Colonel Finch, who was his military secretary, always sent home the promotions which were proposed by Lord Combermere for approval and confirmation here.

4630. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The question that Lord Tweeddale asked, is whether the European armies in India should be under the same Mutiny Act as the armies at home, and if they are under the same Mutiny Act, whether they should be under the general control of the Commander-in-chief?—The Mutiny Act must be regulated and looked into, I conceive, by the Judge Advocate General of India, who knows what the crimes of India are better than we do here.

4631. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) There are certain exceptions in the Mutiny Act at this moment, excepting the East Indies, and excepting Ceylon, and so on?—Yes.

4632. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) To what extent do you think it would be expedient to place the power of supervision and control over the European army in India in the Horse Guards?—I should conceive that the Commander-in-chief, of course, would have the supreme control—the word itself conveys that meaning.

4633. Do you mean in all minute matters of discipline?—He would have the command of the army.

4634. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) As he has now?—As he has now.

4635. (*Col. Burlton.*) Under what authority would you place the large native army which must necessarily be kept up?—That is a point which I have not considered.

4636. You would not have it placed under the Horse Guards, I suppose?—I have not considered the question.

4637. Cannot you form an opinion upon it?—I do not think it is a point which can be answered off-hand at all; I think that it requires the most mature deliberation of the best officers which you have in the Company's and the Queen's army.

4638. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Upon what do you consider that the discipline of a regiment principally depends?—Upon the commanding officer and the adjutants and the field officers, and the degree of attention which is paid by the officers to it.

4639. But principally on the commanding officer?—He is seconded by the field officers, and by the adjutants; he cannot do it all with his own bat.

4640. If the officer at the head of a regiment is fully qualified for the command, has the full complement of officers under him, and is invested with sufficient power to maintain his own authority over all ranks, do you not think that a regiment might and ought to be kept in a state of as perfect discipline in India as in England, or anywhere else?—Yes; and the regiments are so kept, I think.

4641. Is it not the fact, that, under the existing system of succession by seniority to the command of regiments, many incompetent officers succeed to these commands, both in the Queen's and Company's armies; and have you not found it to be so in

Gen. Sir W. Cotton, G.C.B.

23rd Nov. 1858.

your own experience during your service in India, as well as elsewhere ?—That question is rather an invidious one to answer.

4642. It is general, merely as regards the general system, have you not found that to be the fact ?—I have found officers in the Honourable Company's service who have been a long while holding civil situations, and who have been ordered to join and take command of their regiments, and not having been in the habit of manœuvring those men for years, I have found that they wanted practice as anybody would do in the world, and I have certainly seen in our service many men that I should much rather not see in command of a regiment.

4643. Would not the discipline of regiments in your opinion be better secured were officers appointed to these commands by selection for superior qualifications ?—I think that the present system works remarkably well, and I would make no alteration in it ; I have served since the year 1798, I have been nearly 58 years in the service ; I have seen a great many regiments that have been commanded by men whom I would much rather not see commanding them, and of course that must take place.

4644. Do you remember when you were commander-in-chief at Bombay, communicating to the Government through the adjutant-general, in reply to a reference from the Government of India, your opinion that the seniority system of appointment to brigade and divisional commands was injurious to the interests of the public service, and strongly recommending the substitution of the system of selection for superior qualifications ?—Without reference to the memoranda of what took place when I was there, I cannot answer the question off-hand, but I dare say you are right in what you state, that it was so.

4645. (*Marquess of Tweeddale.*) I understood you to say that you wished to see the discipline of the European army in India alike ; there are three commanders-in-chief, and there are three codes of regulation ; how can you assure the Secretary of State that the army will be in that state of discipline until there is one to whom the others shall report, and until he shall see that the others carry on the discipline according to the regulation ?—If you have the Mutiny Act clearly drawn out for all troops in India, it will apply to the whole of the Queen's troops serving in the three presidencies.

4646. You suppose that the generals will carry it out in the same way ?—Exactly.

4647. Then there is no occasion to have a commander-in-chief to superintend them ?—You must have a commander-in-chief, but the commander-in-chief I should think would work better under one Mutiny Act than under three.

4648. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) There never has been but one Mutiny Act ?—Never, that I have heard of.

4649. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that in quarters the discipline of the local European troops is equal to that of the ordinary troops of the line ?—Yes, I have always found them behave remarkably well in quarters.

4650. You see no difference between them ?—No. I answer the question generally ; I never had any difference reported to me, and I think that they have behaved equally well.

4651. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Have not the East India Company's European regiments, artillery and infantry, been kept hitherto under great disadvantage as compared with Her Majesty's artillery and infantry regiments, in the much smaller number of officers allowed to the former to assist in maintaining their efficiency and discipline ?—No, I do not think there has been any disadvantage. I think that very often the Company's regiments have had much too few officers with them, because they have been allowed to be drawn upon by the civil service to so great a degree that they have crippled the efficiency of the Company's army by it, and so much so that there is a regulation of the Court of Directors that only certain officers should be taken from each corps, and the adjutant-general of the Bombay army must be perfectly well aware that when I was Commander-in-chief of that army, I never in one single instance where the complement of officers was given which the regulations specified, allowed the Governor to draw upon me without remonstrance, and I requested and begged that he would not urge it, telling him that if he did I would not be answerable for the discipline of the regiment.

4652. (*Chairman.*) Then there is a power of withdrawing officers irrespective of the power of the Commander-in-chief ?—I must explain myself. The Court of Directors specified the number of officers that should be deducted from each corps, or rather that should be allowed to take civil employment. From my memory at this moment, I cannot state it exactly, although I think I can very nearly, but whenever I found that the Governor of Bombay through his military secretary, Colonel Melvill, asked me to give an officer from a regiment, that regiment having found the quota required, and whenever in my own opinion it would deteriorate the discipline of that corps, if any more were given, I always pointed out that the quota had been given, and never allowed that officer to go without a remonstrance on my part, and stating to the Government through the military secretary that I would not be answerable for the discipline of the regiment if they took him.

4653. Notwithstanding that remonstrance the governor has the power of withdrawing the officers ?—I must say that I do not recollect (I may be wrong as it is so long a period ago) after that strong remonstrance, Lord Falkland ever pushing the thing.

4654. General Hancock asked you whether you were not aware that the Governor-General had remonstrated upon the withdrawal of European troops from India during the time of the Crimean war, and you stated, I think, that you were not aware of any such remonstrance ?—Yes.

4655. (*Col. Burlton.*) I think you stated that you were not aware that troops had been withdrawn from India for that purpose ?—I was not.

4656. (*Chairman.*) If there was such a protest on the part of the Governor-General, would not it be upon record ?—I was not in India at the time; I never heard of any troops being withdrawn.

4657. (*Viscount Melville.*) The 10th Hussars ?—Yes, from the Bombay presidency. I knew that they were moved, but I never knew that there was any remonstrance.

4658. (*Chairman.*) You never heard of the Governor-General having protested ; and, if he did protest, that protest would be upon record, I suppose ?—Certainly. I never heard that he had protested.

4659. In connection with the first question, what do you consider to be the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter ?—I do not conceive that there will be any great difficulty in relieving the British regiments in India, after the system is arranged which, with every deference, I should propose. I think that the thing is perfectly feasible.

4660. What is the system which you would recommend ?—I should recommend that, in the first instance, it should be perfectly understood that the given route should be round the Cape, because, although the route by Alexandria, Egypt, and the Red Sea may be the shortest, yet it must be obvious to everybody that circumstances might arise to interrupt that route. If you make your arrangements for a periodical relief round the Cape, you have now in the Queen's service two or three of the finest steamers ; but, if you choose, you have the finest fleet lying in Hamoaze and Portsmouth harbour of seventy-fours which will never go to sea, each of which, if they were cut down, would make a steam-vessel to hold 1,000 men, and consequently you would make yourself in a year, although the expense would be heavy, totally independent of what they call the various steam companies, and you would have ten or twelve of the finest steamers in the world, which might be employed in various ways. I am

talking of the reliefs. The periods, of course, would be specified and laid down, and the route, as I say, should be round the Cape only, for the ports of Kurrachee, Bombay, and our ports there. I would do away with the route by the Red Sea—that is my idea of the thing. Of course the expense would be very heavy at first of transforming these seven or eight sail-of-the-line into screw steamers; but that would pay itself as a state question in five or six years, and make you totally independent of the various steam companies. If you do not choose to take the men-of-war, build seven steamers of the same calibre and tonnage as the Himalaya and Pera; but have it in your own power; do not be dependent upon a steam company.

4661. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I imagine that you would suppose that irrespectively even of the Indian reliefs, the advantage of such steamers to England as an empire would be very great, and that therefore they would never be useless?—Never useless, but of the greatest moment; and permit me to add that the sending of troops round the Cape, and taking them to these various ports, would be conducive not only to their health, but to their discipline, and in every way; having 1,000 men on board a ship, a whole regiment, in my opinion there are a great many objections to the Egypt route; I have gone it myself three or four times backwards and forwards; if troops go from here to Alexandria they are obliged to be disembarked and put upon the canal to get upon the Nile; they then go along the line and get to Cairo; from Cairo the railroad is not opened, at this moment they have to march over the desert to go to Suez, then they have to re-embark at Suez, and go down the Red Sea, and the steamers cannot take more than 200 or 300 men each.

4662. Could not you have large steamers on the other side, the very steamers to which you have alluded, and if the railroad were finished, would not it simplify matters very much?—I do not think that you could have them in the Red Sea; I think the navigation of the Red Sea is so exceedingly dangerous and difficult that it would not be safe to work those large seventy-fours if they were cut down to screws; I should recommend the route round the Cape decidedly, and not through the Red Sea, for I conceive it to be a very dangerous sea to navigate with very large vessels.

4663. (*Col. Burlton.*) And besides that, it is only three months in the year that you could send troops with safety, in consequence of the extreme heat?—Yes.

Gen. Sir W Cotton, G.C.B.
23rd Nov. 1858

4664. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider it possible to consolidate the European forces so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other, and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object with perfect justice to the claims of all officers lately in the service of the East India Company?—I am perfectly well aware that it would require the greatest possible consideration so as to arrange any system which would give perfect justice (which they ought to have) to the officers who constitute the European force of the Company's army. It is a question whether, by allowing exchanges, it could be effected. But obstacles meet you there directly, because the rate of pension in the Honourable Company's service is much greater than the rate of pension in our service. Then they have funds in each presidency, I believe, called the military fund and the orphan fund, which we have not. Therefore it is a Gordian knot; it is the most difficult thing to answer in the world.

4665. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Irrespectively of that, on principle, do you think that it would be desirable; supposing that you could get over those difficulties to which you are alluding, would it, in a military point of view, be desirable that exchanges should take place?—Yes, I should think very desirable.

4666. Would it be an advantage to both services, both local and of the line?—Yes, I should think so. I should think that it would be an advantage to the whole army.

4667. (*Col. Burlton.*) But perhaps those officers may be allowed to be the best judges of what is to their own advantage?—Certainly.

4668. If I state that it is the almost unanimous opinion of every one in the Bengal army that I have ever spoken to on the subject that they would not like to exchange, what would you say?—It depends totally upon themselves whether they choose it or not.

4669. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) If you open to officers in India the prospects of advancement in England, will it not detract from their usefulness in India, and indispose them to continue in India?—At this very moment our own officers in India in the Queen's army have the power of exchange.

The witness withdrew.

Sir GEORGE CLERK, K.C.B., further examined.

Sir G. Clerk, K.C.B.

4670. (*Chairman.*) You have been furnished, I think, with four additional questions to those upon which you were so kind as to give us evidence before; will you have the goodness to state your opinion upon them? Have you formed an opinion how far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only?—We have a very extensive empire in India, and therefore we must have the people with us, and therefore have a considerable native army; that army, should be a local army. If the Act which was lately passed would admit of it, I should think there would be great advantages in making the European portion of the army a general army, and not local. I am not aware of any advantages there would be in making the European portion local, confined solely to India. In fact, I think, that the State would then lose a most important advantage, which it derives from the possession of India, and one of the few advantages, namely, as a field of exercise for our European army.

4671. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That is, to say, that you look at the question in an imperial point of view, and as such you think that it is of great advantage to the empire that there should be one army, and that it should be a united army, and what we should call an army of the line?—Yes, one European army, all having the advantage of employment in India.

4672. I suppose your opinion is founded upon this, that you look at it as an imperial question, and you see no disadvantages which will arise to India from it?—None whatever. I imagine that there would be many great advantages to India from it; and India is now brought so near that I see no reason for perpetuating the defects of the other course.

4673. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Do you recommend that the native armies of the three presidencies should be separate armies, each exclusively belonging to its own presidency?—Yes.

4674. (*Col. Burlton.*) You suppose that the whole of the European army in India is to be furnished from the line in England?—Yes.

4675. Would you have the whole of that army under the command of the English Commander-in-chief?—Yes, under the Crown.

4676. Under what authority would you place the native army?—Under the authority of the Government of India, as now.

4677. Do you think that there would be no inconvenience in having the army half under one command and half under another?—Not so great an inconvenience as having an army with its European portion under divided authority.

Sir G. Clerk, K.C.B.

23rd Nov. 1858.

4678. You stated, that if the Act permitted, you would recommend this European portion of the army being made general ?—Yes.

4679. Do you consider the difficulties opposed to that measure by the Act of Parliament to be insuperable ?—As I read it, there are points on which I have great doubt; the Act guarantees to officers belonging to the army of India their promotion as now. The pay, I suppose, could be adjusted; but whether the promotion, as affected by the alteration, could be legally adjusted I am not aware. The 56th clause is intended to secure it. Then the subsequent clause vests authority in Her Majesty to make alterations hereafter. But the army, as it is at present, has by the Act all its privileges guaranteed.

4680. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But I apprehend from that, that prospectively the Crown, at the recommendation of the Government, could make any alterations it chose ?—Yes.

4681. Even under the present Act of Parliament ?—Yes; the Act apparently, in the next clause, provides so for the future.

4682. Therefore it would only affect the army as it stands at present ?—Those who now are in it.

4683. It would affect the European regiments in the late Company's service ?—It might.

4684. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) In the event of the entire European force in India being furnished from the regular army in England, would you retain the separate commands at Madras and Bombay under separate commanders-in-chief, or would you place the whole force under one commander-in-chief only, namely, the Commander-in-chief in India ?—Under separate commanders-in-chief, as now.

4685. With what authority would you invest the commanders-in-chief at Madras and Bombay; would you give them any authority independent of the Commander-in-chief in India. Would you give them the same authority over the troops of the line within those presidencies which they have exercised hitherto over the Company's European troops ?—Yes.

4686. Then they would exercise their commands altogether independently of the Commander-in-chief in India ?—No.

4687. It has been so hitherto, has it not ? No reports have been made to the Commander-in-chief in India by the commanders-in-chief at Madras and Bombay relative to the Company's European troops ?—But that I am supposing henceforth should be limited to the native troops. If there was one royal army, that independent control should extend to the native army only.

4688. Then, in fact, there would be no such thing at Madras and Bombay as a Commander-in-chief of the regular troops within those presidencies ?—Not necessarily independent of the Commander-in-chief in India.

4689. Would it not be impossible that there should be ?—No, I think not. I am supposing, if the European portion of the royal army becomes one, that the authority of a local Commander-in-chief would extend to the native army, and that his authority over the royal troops there would be whatever the highest military authorities here should delegate to him.

4690. Still the commanders-in-chief at Madras and Bombay would not exercise the same authority over the troops of the line which they have hitherto exercised over the Company's European troops ?—They might not exercise the same authority as they now exercise over the Company's Europeans. That would depend entirely upon the authorities here. They might invest them with an equal degree of authority as they formerly exercised over the Company's European troops, or more or less; that is, more or less independent of the Commander-in-chief in India. Facilities of communication between them now exist which did not formerly.

4691. Is not a certain degree of independent authority necessarily implied in the very term "Commander-in-chief" ?—A certain degree; still he is subordinate to the Commander-in-chief in India, and that Commander-in-chief is again subordinate to the headquarters of the army here.

4692. (*Sir. H. G. W. Smith.*) Can you tax your memory with the proportion of the Company's European force, and of royal troops in the presidency of Bombay or any presidency; can you state how many local European regiments there were and how many Queen's regiments ?—They varied occasionally in the several presidencies; the Company's line European troops were three regiments at each presidency.

4693. But can you state the proportion as to numbers ?—I cannot say with any precision, not having seen any late returns.

4694. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) You have stated that there would be a great advantage in having one European army, in what would the peculiar advantage consist ?—Whatever European forces you have, are then available for all the purposes of your country.

4695. Are they not equally available supposing they are local to India; supposing it is an Indian-European army, the same as the native army of India?—Certainly not, if you cannot readily employ them out of India.

4696. You can employ them out of India; they have been employed in Persia, and they have been employed elsewhere, whenever they have been required ?—And the position becomes a very embarrassing one in various ways.

4697. (*Chairman.*) Are they not enlisted only to serve in India ?—No, not in India only.

4698. (*Col. Burlton.*) It has been stated here by one or two witnesses that the great objection to having all the forces from the royal line is that the Government might withdraw the troops from India ?—Yes, that is assuming that the authorities here are very supine, and very indifferent as to the possession of India. If the necessity arose for employing troops in Europe which had been seasoned and acclimatized in India, which, I believe, is excellent soldiering for troops, if properly cared for, their place there would, of course, be promptly supplied by the means which the efficiency of an united system would create.

4699. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is it not your opinion that if any Government saw the necessity, for the welfare of the empire, of withdrawing troops, they would endeavour, at all events, to get over the difficulty even of local troops, and would withdraw them should such an emergency arise ?—No doubt they would.

4700. And is it not your opinion, on the other hand, that no Government would presume to divest India of troops to such an extent as to endanger it, if that Government thought, as we do, that the possession of India was of great value to the empire ?—I feel perfectly satisfied that they never would jeopardize the security of India under any circumstances of the kind. And one consequence arising from having an increased royal European army to that extent would be that you would have many more troops available. Besides that, you would mature your system of periodical relief and transport in such a way, that you could with great facility then do what you cannot do now, excepting by the most haphazard and scrambling sort of means; you would be in the course of periodically relieving troops from India, and troops which I believe, for service in Europe generally, would be found highly useful, in consequence of their having been nine or ten years in India; that applies to both officers and soldiers.

4701. Is it not your opinion therefore that a great deal of the extra expense incurred might be obviated by judicious and wise measures, for the transport of troops ?—There is not a doubt about it in my mind; a part of that arrangement should be, I think, acclimatizing troops for India half-way at the Cape of Good Hope. My service in South Africa has confirmed me in the opinion that we are losing a great opportunity of benefiting our soldiers in every way,

by not stationing them at the Cape on their way to India, and in this case I think that we should be losing a great opportunity of qualifying our soldiers for general service if we neglect the Cape route and station.

4702. (*Marquess of Tweeddale.*) Would you allow the Governor-General to have any voice in the withdrawing of troops from India by the Government at home?—Certainly, I take it for granted that he would always be consulted.

4703. But not to have a veto?—I should be inclined to let it rest very much with the Governor-General, You would scarcely withdraw a portion of the army from Ireland without asking the opinion of the viceroy of Ireland.

4704. Do you think that Ireland and India can be compared in that respect?—I think they are both possessions which you would be careful to retain.

4705. (*Col. Burlton.*) Upon the supposition that the whole European army of India is composed of troops of the line sent from England, would you have them entirely under the Horse Guards, and entirely free from all control of the Council of India?—No; the Governor-General of course would have a voice.

4706. Would you have the references of the Governor-General coming home regarding the military command of the European troops referred to the Horse Guards alone, or to the Secretary of State and Council for India, as they used to be referred to the Board of Control and the Court of Directors?—I take it for granted that in references on army matters to the head-quarters of the army in England on important points affecting India, the general commanding Her Majesty's forces in England would always consult with the Secretary of State for India. In some matters it would rest with that Secretary of State to consult his Council or not as he pleased.

4707. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) In dispensing honours for services in the field would you have the recommendations forwarded by the Commander-in-chief in India through the Horse Guards or through the Governor-General of India to the Secretary of State for India?—I think they should come of course from the Commander-in-chief of the army in India, and sanctioned by the Governor-General in India, to the Secretary of State for India in the first instance.

4708. (*Col. Burlton.*) The Secretary of State for India and his Council are the responsible parties, I believe, for the charge and the management of the finances of India?—Yes.

4709. Do you not think that there might be some difficulties if the European army of India were entirely under the authority of the Horse Guards here, that expenses might be called for which the Council for India might refuse to allow?—Seeing that you have provided for concord between the head-quarters of the army in England and your Governor-General in India, through the Secretary of State for India, as to any organic changes or reinforcements for India, I do not apprehend any difficulty of the kind.

4710. (*Chairman.*) Are you not aware that the Commander-in-chief has no power to order anything which will cause expense, without a reference to the Secretary of State?—He never thinks of doing so.

4711. Therefore, the Secretary of State would always have a complete control over anything which involved expense?—Entirely.

4712. (*Col. Burlton.*) If the Commander-in-chief here cannot order expenses, supposing he applies for the sanction of a measure involving a large expense, and the Secretary of State for India and his Council may refuse it, may not that produce unpleasant collision?—It occurs every day without any unpleasant collision.

4713. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) In the event of the whole European force in India being furnished from the regular army, from what source do you contemplate supplying the large body of officers required for the native army, and for the numerous staff and detached employments in India?—I conceive that the native army in India would still be provided as it is now.

4714. By officers specially appointed from England?—Yes.

4715. How would you provide for the numerous staff and detached appointments, civil and military?—That is a difficulty which no one has yet solved. I have always thought it would end best in the officers, who are employed in some military and all civil staff, being placed on a staff corps.

4716. Do you then mean that they would be supplied from the regiments of the line in India in the same way as they have been supplied from the Company's regiments?—Equally, if qualified. Of course no officer should be appointed to the staff in India who is not qualified for the office, whatever it may be.

4717. You do not apprehend that the withdrawal of so many officers would materially detract from the efficiency of the line regiments in India?—No, I think not.

4718. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I apprehend you mean that if you were to withdraw officers from the Queen's regiments, and to put them into a staff corps, you would supply their places in those regiments?—Yes, of course.

4719. You would have a staff corps for those purposes especially?—Yes, which would permit of promotion going on in the regiments, so that the employment of some on staff would not reduce the number of officers required to be with a regiment.

4720. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you mean that all officers holding staff and detached appointments would be supernumerary to the regiments in India?—That after a certain period, if they elected not to return to their regiments, they should be on a permanent staff corps, and promotion would go on in the regiments.

4721. (*Col. Burlton.*) If every European regiment out in India is a line regiment, how can you manage that; how can you take their officers and transfer them to a staff corps in India, striking them off the strength of the regiment?—If promotion goes on in the regiment their places are filled up.

4722. You are giving the Governor-General of India, or the Government of India, power to withdraw officers from Her Majesty's line regiments, and to put them on the permanent staff corps of India, do you think that that would answer?—I suppose so, it has been done already.

4723. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) The Governor-General can take from the whole army indiscriminately, and of course he has a great selection, but when it comes to a small number of native regiments and a local service, will not it be very different?—I am supposing that also, from the European regiments, some must be taken; I do not contemplate that such a system would deprive the regiments of the line of many officers, and if it temporarily deprived them of some, they would be men qualified for those staff appointments, and their rank in the regiments would soon be filled by others.

4724. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And the corps which you contemplate would be a local corps in which you could exchange with officers of the line at any time. I apprehend therefore it would not debar a man, supposing he was put into that corps, from coming back into the army at some future period if the good of the public service or his own inclinations required it?—It would only debar his coming back to his own regiment, to the prejudice of those who remained in it.

4725. (*Viscount Melville.*) Why should it debar a man from coming back to his own regiment if he was what is called "seconded," that is to say, if his name was kept in italics in the list, he rising to his promotion when it came to his turn?—Because if he continued to rise in that regiment, such a system carried out to the extent contemplated, would prove a hardship on the officers who remain.

4726. (*Col. Burlton.*) Take the case of officers. Suppose one set of officers goes out there with the full understanding and knowledge that they are going to India for their lives, as the officers did under the Company's service, and suppose that another regiment goes out with a set of officers who know that they are to

Sir G. Clerk, K.C.B.

23rd Nov. 1858.

be relieved in a few years, and that it is only a temporary service, do you not think that the former are more inclined to mix and associate with the natives, and make themselves better acquainted with their customs and their prejudices than the latter?—Instead of the officers now going out to the army of India to serve for their lives, the whole tendency of your measures with regard to officers, with regard to magistrates, with regard to public works officers, has been to bring them home to England as often as you can (the term is, "every few years"), in order, as it is called, to Europeanise them, to improve them, and to invigorate them. It appears to me therefore that a system which is intended to fix your men in India is wholly opposed to that, and if it is good for Mr. A. of the civil service, or Captain B. of the army, to come to Europe every few years, it must be equally good for Sergeant O. and Corporal H., and for privates too. The last and most popular measure now proposed is Colonel Jacob's, which is to give to every officer what he calls a sabbatical year—that is to say, after seven years a year's leave at home, on full pay, or, if he abstains from his year after seven years, then after twelve years, two years in England on full pay. That is the last proposition of the kind which I have met with, and I believe it is one which some of the authorities think rather highly of, and it certainly goes a great length to bring officers home more frequently.

4727. (*Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) Do you contemplate the engineers and artillery being local, or forming also part of the royal artillery and engineers?—If the Act of Parliament permits it, the scientific corps would be none the worse for being amalgamated, so far as I can judge.

4728. (*Chairman.*) Would it not be easier to amalgamate the artillery in which there is no purchase, than the line?—I should think so on that account. The engineers and artillery are neither of them purchasing corps, and in that respect they ear on a footing with the others. Then, again, the artillery and engineers, I think, as organized in the royal army are in the higher ranks on rather a superior footing; that is to say, the higher ranks are more extensive. It is therefore so far preferable.

4729. (*Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) As regards the education of the young officers, there would be but one seminary, you conceive?—It might be advisable to have more than one. Addiscombe is now going to be assimilated, as you are aware, to the standard of the Woolwich education.

4730. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) An engineer officer in India, unless he understood the native languages of India, it strikes me would be utterly useless in the department in which he is chiefly employed, which is the executive and barrack department. How could an English engineer officer, who could not speak one word of the language, (and hardly one of them can speak it so as to make himself properly understood,) take charge of a large department, and control the expenditure of lacs and lacs of rupees every month?—They have had no inducement hitherto to qualify themselves to speak the language.

4731. It takes a man years of his life before he learns the language to be able to speak it properly?—Officers qualify themselves in less time when desirous of undertaking the duties of such appointments.

4732. (*Marquess of Tweeddale.*) I understand that a protest has been made by the Governor-general against troops being removed from India without his sanction. Would you have it inserted in the Act of Parliament that a certain number of the European troops should be considered not moveable from India without the sanction of the Governor-general?—I would not specify the amount of those which were to remain, but I would make it dependent upon the approval of the Governor-general of India how many troops you were to withdraw.

4733. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you not do it by minute instead of by Act of Parliament; could not there be a minute laid down by the Secretary of State?—I would merely provide that the Secretary of State for India and the head quarters of the army in England should consult and agree upon the subject.

4734. (*Chairman.*) The Secretary of State being a member of the cabinet must surely be the best judge?—I should say so.

4735. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Supposing that a portion of the European troops in India were enlisted for service in India only, could the Home Government withdraw those troops without their consent for service in Europe or the Colonies?—Certainly not; but I am not aware that any troops have been so enlisted.

4736. Without reference to what has been the case, supposing an army were enlisted to serve in India only, would not that army be secure from being removed from India by the Home Government to serve elsewhere?—Certainly.

4737. (*Chairman.*) Would it not be a very great inconvenience that a large proportion of the British army should be placed in that position, that it could not be made use of wherever it might be wanted?—Certainly.

4738. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Would it be a disadvantage to the State to have a body of European troops, sufficient to maintain a secure hold of India, made irremovable from the country, by being a local force; would it not greatly strengthen the hands of the Governor-general to have such a force at his entire disposal, and beyond the power of the Home Government to withdraw?—I should not feel it so, if responsible for the government of India, provided I could rely upon having a sufficiency of European troops in periodical relief, with their transport service properly organized. That would be quite sufficient for the purpose, and I should recognise no advantage in their being enlisted exclusively for India.

4739. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you consider that this question should be entirely decided upon Indian grounds, and do you think that we should be justified in not looking to the interests of the empire as well as of India; and in looking to the interests of the empire do we not at the same time look to the interests of India?—Of course you do, and I think that you are losing an advantage which the army might possess by excluding any portion of the Europeans that you can afford to raise from the general field of service, especially men who have acquired experience in India, officers and soldiers.

4740. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you not think that all the higher offices of the state in India, would be more efficiently filled from a body of officers trained from their youth in India, and with no views beyond it, than from one sent to India only for a ten years' tour, free to leave it at any time by exchanging, having no abiding interest in the country, and whose hopes and aspirations would naturally turn rather to the prospects of professional honour and advancement open to them in Europe?—I may have thought that, and I might think so now, if it were possible, but you have cut at the root of the whole of that; there is no such thing, I believe, now as that feeling of having no views beyond India, or that officers are to turn their attention solely to India, and are to serve there continuously.

4741. Still you think that it would be an advantage to the government of India, regarding it rather as an Indian than as an imperial question, to have a body of officers at its disposal, with no views beyond India, such as would be secured to it by having a large local army?—Regarding it as an Indian question, I think it would be an advantage to India, to the people of India, and to the welfare of India,—but you must go further than that; you must annihilate your furlough system, your privilege leave system, and many other measures which you have lately introduced, as it is supposed, for the benefit of the public officers there; men must work continuously, and never think of coming home for many years, in order to obtain those advantages you allude to as

resulting from the services of men who have no views beyond India.

4742. Will you explain what objection there can be to officers who may be enlisted as the Company's officers have been for the local service in India, being allowed occasional furloughs to Europe?—I would not interfere with their furlough. As they had it formerly, there were certain disadvantages attending a furlough. Many men waived their opportunities of coming home on furlough; staff officers thought twice before they sacrificed a staff appointment to come home. Now, when a man has a staff appointment, he very soon begins to calculate when he can get his leave to come with his India staff appointment to England. It may be a great advantage to him, and an admirable measure as affects the individual. Treating it as an Indian question, I go quite with you that the continuous service of the officer is of advantage to India; but that continuous service you can no longer command.

4743. Why not?—Unless you were greatly to modify those regulations.

4744. And why should regulations which interfere with the efficiency of officers in the Indian service not be altered?—Because I do not think that your officers now would submit to it. The whole tenor of late measures towards the military and civil services in India, and every other class of European servants of our Government there, has been such that I do not think you could safely rescind those privileges.

4745. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) If the European part of the army were made entirely local, the officers of course would be for service in India only?—Yes.

4746. Would not their going out there for their life engender a wish to accumulate wealth, with the very laudable desire of returning afterwards to their native country; and would not that desire perhaps predominate and militate against the discipline so necessary to European troops?—That is a wish which never can be realized in India now, namely, the accumulation of wealth by public servants; but I think that the objection really is, and it is a serious one, that the state loses the advantage of the employment of experienced Indian officers in the military field of Europe, and unless you have them serving at home in junior grades, you will never seek to employ them here in senior grades, and I do think that the state loses much when put to it in a European war, by not being able to call out those officers to commands who have been seasoned and experienced in the field of India, having served from the age of 15 to 30, 40, or 50. They learn early to look after their men's transport and commissariat; they are never at a loss in such matters; they distinguish between dry ground and swampy ground, and that kind of thing, and you would not find an Indian officer putting down hismen where their health would be risked if it could be helped. Those are advantages which are so far lost to the state, in my humble opinion, if you have exclusive local armies.

4747. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that it would be of immense advantage to the army of the line that they should have those opportunities in India which otherwise would not be afforded?—Yes.

4748. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) If instead of being composed entirely of troops of the line, or entirely of local troops, the European force in India were composed partly of one and partly of the other, would not the army of the line have sufficient opportunities for acquiring that experience in the field of India which is considered desirable; and the Government of India retain also the great advantage derived from a local army, of having a body of officers at its entire disposal who would have no views beyond India?—As long as rebellion and insurrection endure there, of course our European army must be so numerous that it would amply provide for both, but looking forward, and supposing that the authorities are on the alert there, and bring the people round to help them and to serve them, to restore order, of course there will be a considerable reduction of the European army. I do not think that you would find them in such numbers then as to be available for an efficient and well regulated attainment of both purposes.

4749. (*Chairman.*) What is the amount of the native force now employed in India including the police?—The native Bengal army are about 30,000 more than they were before the rebellion, and the others are about what they were, with the addition of something to the strength of regiments, and a few local corps.

4750. (*Col. Burlton.*) Do you include police battalions in that estimate?—A new police, called military police, which, if so called, will resemble the regular sepoy regiment.

4751. (*Chairman.*) Do you know the total number of native troops employed now in India?—I do not know precisely. My estimate is 300,000; that is a rough estimate founded on general information, as all the returns from India which I have seen are incomplete.

4752. That amount, I suppose, would require at least 100,000 European troops?—During rebellion.

4753. During the time that that native force was employed?—No, I think not always, provided your native army and civil administration are what they ought to be.

4754. (*Col. Burlton.*) Do you not think that the native troops require watching over?—It depends entirely upon the discretion of those who enlist them and those who govern the country. Lord Canning writes during an insurrection, and in the heart of an insurrection, and he, being in it, is a better judge of it than I can be. I am looking forward to a time when there may be no rebellion, and then I think, if the authorities exercise an ordinary degree of prudence in the selection of the materiel and other matters, there will not require to be any such proportion of Europeans as that. We should of course in so very extensive a dominion have a considerable force of Europeans, and be guarded as to certain posts entrusted to natives. But if we go on as now, for instance, raising an army of Sikhs, there is in that greater danger than before.

4755. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In giving your opinion as to there being but one army, no doubt you have taken into account that it is very disadvantageous that there should be two armies, from the fact that jealousies must arise between two distinct bodies, which would all disappear if there were but one army?—It would allay a great deal of it, I think. One great advantage, in my opinion, of having a regular rotation of relief for the European troops is that of confining them more to the plains of India it will do away with the idea of putting troops upon the mountains of India, which I look upon as a false measure, excepting for invalid detachments, or now and then a shattered regiment to remain there for health, and not counted on to come down for active service on the plains in hot weather. Looking at it from a rebel's point of view, if the Nena or any other arch rebel were asked by one who was in his confidence, "To what measure shall I persuade the British Government?" he would say, "Persuade "them, if you can, to put all their European troops "upon the mountains, and to leave the plains of "India open to us." Formerly European troops were placed at certain commanding points upon the plains of India. Barracks ought, of course, to be of the very best that can be; and I believe that, generally speaking, the men will be more healthy than they are in the West Indies, or in many other colonies.

4756. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Troops returning from the hills into the plains have suffered a great deal more than if they had not gone up into the hills?—When brought down in regiments, during the rains or the hot weather, no doubt they have. Whenever your measures excite rebellion, it will not display itself until the season when every European functionary gets to the mountains, if he can, but no native, high or low, if he can help it. It was lately seriously proposed to construct barracks for 40,000 Europeans

Sir G. Clerk, K.C.B.

23rd Nov. 1858.

in the mountains; if that is sanctioned, there should be added to the force remaining on the plains, 20,000 more than would be required, if the 40,000 were not out of the way aloft in the mountains. There is nothing so enervating and so liable to produce illness and inactivity, either to the individual or in regiments. But if you were to relieve regiments periodically from England, or from other parts of Europe, or other British possessions, they would all move in regular rotation through India. A great deal has to be done in India, in improving the health of the troops. They were formerly sent the wrong way into India—into the swamps of Bengal. They should be disembarked, and move on from the westward, and work their way up gradually, until as time expired regiments embarking from Bengal.

4757. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you say that the present strength of the Bengal native army is 300,000 men?—No; the whole native army of India—that is a rough estimate.

4758. Does that include police?—Yes, the new military police.

4759. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) With regard to the supposed necessary existence of jealousies between a line and a local army in India, do you see any reason, if both be placed upon a perfect equality in every respect, why any other than a feeling of generous emulation should exist between them?—It might be unreasonable, but I apprehend it would exist. One reason is, that the field of Europe would not be open to Indian officers; they would feel that; superior officers—officers who had been in positions of command.

4760. Do you consider that the two armies have hitherto been placed upon a perfect equality? Do you think that they have been treated with equal favor by the authorities in England?—Not in that respect, certainly, because they would not be known. For instance, take the case of General Roberts, now in the field. I do not suppose that anybody had before heard of him in Europe; but still there was a locally known active and experienced soldier, who would have been very useful in campaigns in Europe It was impossible he should be known in Europe, short of his having been engaged in a war in India, disastrous enough to excite some attention to it in England.

4761. Still, if the army of the line have the field of Europe, and the local army of India the field of India, although it might be of advantage to the state to have the two armies available for both fields, the officers of the local army would have no ground of complaint in being restricted to appointments in the actual field of their employments?—I do not consider it as a ground of complaint, but I look at the service to the state generally.

4762. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is not the field of India a much more constant field than the field of Europe; at any rate, has it not been so of later years?—Yes, for many years, almost the only field.

4763. Therefore it would tell the other way?—The European regiments serving exclusively in India were admirable, the Bengal Fusiliers, the Madras regiments and the Bombay regiments; but still we cannot say that they were better than any other troops. You would not in preference make use of a local European regiment. If you had a local European regiment and the 93rd or the 88th in your brigade, and had to call out one regiment, you would not in preference, I think, take the local European regiment, though you might just as soon take one as the other. Therefore, if a royal regiment is as good for India, why not make them all royals in India. I do not see any objection.

4764. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Do you advocate the maintenance of the 80,000 Punjaubees whom we have in our pay now?—No; I am the last person who should advocate our raising a Sikh army. I have seen a Sikh army in rebellion, not only killing their European officers, but killing their own native officers. I know well what they are. One of the most difficult problems the Government in India will have to solve will be, how to reduce that enormous and extended provincial force within reasonable compass.

4765. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) You have given it as your opinion that the native army should be officered in future by cadets to be appointed specially to that branch of the service. Do you not think that the status of the native army would be thereby lowered, and that it would be generally regarded as an inferior service?—I would not allow it to be lowered.

4766. If you enlisted officers exclusively for the native army, do you think that they would feel the same pride in belonging to it, as officers would feel in belonging to the European army?—I would let them exchange.

4767. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that the power of exchanging, as is done with colonial regiments, would take away the possibility of any such feeling?—They cannot feel it after that is once permitted. I believe that exchanges would be few, but still it would tend to neutralise that feeling.

4768. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Why should you not officer the native army from regiments of the line?—As far as I am concerned I should do so, but I have no patronage to sacrifice; those who have would probably object.

4769. Are you of opinion that the native army would be as efficiently officered by transfers from regiments of the line, as it has been hitherto by officers trained from their youth with native regiments, and having no views beyond India?—I am of opinion that it might be as well officered, supposing that those officers were passed through a military college. Some of the cadets now go through a military college training, and in my opinion all ought to be so prepared.

4770. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You mean the Addiscombe cadets only?—Yes; we have had excellent officers who have not been there, but still, as a rule, I think that they should all be passed into the army through a military college.

4771. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you not think that it would detract from the usefulness of officers belonging to native regiments were they to possess the power of leaving them at any time by exchanging into European corps, and that continual changes in native regiments would be the consequence?—I do not think exchanges would be frequent; but still the very existence of the power of exchanging would put an end to a great deal of the feeling of inferiority in the service, without really injuring any.

4772. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The very fact of being able to exchange places them upon a perfect equality?—Yes. I should not apprehend that the discipline of the regiment would suffer. The intercourse between the officers of that regiment and the natives of the country would not suffer, because no officer in a royal regiment would be allowed to exchange unless qualified for a position in a native regiment; he must have served for instance a certain number of years in India in a royal regiment; he should also be required to pass an examination in the languages of the country. Those two things being given, if a man brings his money and exchanges, what is the harm?

4773. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Are you of opinion that it is of no advantage to a native regiment to have the same officers continue to serve in it, for a long course of years, to have the officers and men thoroughly acquainted with one another, and to have an officer in the command who has served with them in the junior grades?—Yes; if that officer is serving with a good will; and if he is serving with a good will he will not be willing to exchange, you will not lose him, but there are some men who might wish to leave the country. I should not apprehend any mischief from it, if such a one could be gratified, and his place taken by one desirous of serving in India.

4774. (*Chairman.*) The second question is, in connexion with the former one, the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former por-

tion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter?—My idea with regard to the relief of troops in India, even now, but still more so then, would be to make use of the Cape as a depôt. I suppose hereafter there must be a periodical supply of troops for India. I do not estimate it so high as some people do, but whatever it is, the greater portion might be supplied I should think from thence.

4775. Do you mean that the depôts of the regiments in India should be located at the Cape?—That regiments should be sent in rotation from the West Indies, or from Gibraltar, or elsewhere, to the Cape, and there acclimatized for three or four years.

4776. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You mean by regiments?—Yes; I would also have a depôt for invalids from India at the Cape. It would have the double advantage of acclimatizing soldiers for India, and it would answer the purpose of securing the Cape colony, and for that purpose, of course, the colonists would be willing to pay something.

4777. (*Chairman.*) At all events, they would never be chargeable to the Indian revenue till they arrived in India?—Just so; South Africa is hot, and soldiers there are much exposed to the bright sun. Still it is very healthy. Therefore service there is a good preparation for service in India.

4778. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) From your experience of the climate, do you think that the men would not suffer more from going from the Cape to India, than from going from Europe?—Not so much; I consider that a regiment which has been three or four years in British Caffraria is in the best possible condition for service anywhere.

4779. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you contemplate maintaining a larger European force in India than may be deemed necessary for the secure hold of the country with the view of having troops there available for service in Europe in the event of a European war?—No; only as many as are necessary for the security of India.

4780. (*Chairman.*) Would not the Secretary of State take very good care that there were not more troops chargeable to the Indian revenue than necessary?—Certainly.

4781. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you advocate the Cape route, or would you advocate a route partially by the Cape and partially through Egypt?—I would have nothing to do with Egypt, except during an emergency like this, when it is necessary to push more expeditiously through the Red Sea on to India, and when you are permitted to use it; because if things are as they should be, I think the transport round the Cape to the West side of India, which is the proper side on which to land troops, would be expeditious, and regular, and secure.

4782. Do you not think that that service might be very greatly improved and benefited hereafter if it were conducted by the Government in the shape of large steamers, or if old men-of-war were prepared for troops; would not that be preferable to going into the market and taking contracts from various steam packet companies, and would not that measure, though it might in the first instance be a greater expense, yet in the long run be much the cheapest?—I would first inquire what propositions are before the Government, or might come before the Government on the part of private companies, and compare them with the means which the Government may have of providing a transport service; but I have not a doubt that something ought to be done, and nothing whatever has yet been done towards it, not even to the establishment of a coal station.

4783. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) If the amount of European force in India be limited to the strength required for its secure hold, in what way will any troops there become available for service in Europe, unless you relieve them?—I am assuming that you relieve them in the ordinary course of relief, without reference to emergent wants in India. That would rest with the head-quarters of the army here; they would relieve them as they relieve regiments now in the colonies.

4784. Do you contemplate diminishing the established force in India for the purpose of making troops available for service in Europe?—Whenever troops are wanted for a special purpose in Europe, I would bring some from India, and supply their place in India with other troops.

4785. With what troops?—Newly raised English troops, if necessary.

4786. European troops?—Yes.

4787. From whence?—From any part.

4788. Then, in fact, there would be no actual increase to the troops available in the event of a war breaking out in Europe?—Not unless you had added to your number, as has been done; and I assume besides that a regiment from the field of India, if not kept too long there, will be more efficient in any field in Europe than a regiment which is lying in barracks in England.

4789. Then you contemplate simply the exchange of a regiment in England, which you consider would be less efficient, for one in India, which in your opinion would be more efficient for service in the field?—Yes, generally speaking.

4790. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You must have a larger number of reliefs in hand, in order to give the ordinary rotation system to the regiments in India?—Of course, as the increasing strength of the army will now admit of, if rebellion is suppressed.

4791. Therefore that fact would oblige you to have more regiments at home than you otherwise would have?—More regiments on account of Indian service.

4792. (*Viscount Melville.*) I presume that in contemplating a large increase in European troops in India, in proportion to the increase so must the establishment of the army generally be increased, in order to afford a sufficient number for the periodical reliefs?—Just in proportion to that increase required in India, which I do not estimate so largely as some do.

4793. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that it would be impossible to consolidate the European forces so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other, and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object with perfect justice to the claims of all officers lately in the service of the East India Company?—I do not think that you could combine the two armies in a satisfactory manner unless you permitted exchange to take place.

4794. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would permit it then?—I would.

4795. (*Viscount Melville.*) How would you regulate the rate of retirement and the allowances to which an officer is entitled from the various funds to which the Company's officers have been in the habit of subscribing?—Exchange of course is a voluntary measure on the part of both officers; an officer exchanging into the local army of India would take the advantages of that army if he considered them so, and the retiring pension.

4796. Then the officer of the Indian army who exchanged would exchange at a great loss?—That would be his look out. It can only occur when he desires to exchange, and knows into what he exchanges.

4797. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Might it not also involve great loss to other officers in the corps; for instance, a young captain comes into a regiment in which there are many old lieutenants, in the place of a very old man?—The latter would probably come in to serve and to obtain rank.

4798. (*Col. Burlton.*) Does he not inflict an injury upon every officer below him in that regiment, if they are all older than himself?—His means of purchasing might indirectly benefit promotion generally.

4799. He cannot purchase a higher rank than he held in his other regiment?—No; but, for instance, coming in as a captain, he might bring means which would facilitate the purchasing out of old officers in higher ranks less tardily than that process now takes effect.

4800. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the local European force should be kept up by drafts and vo-

Sir G. Clerk, K.C.B.

23rd Nov. 1858.

lunteers from the line, or should be as at present separately recruited for in Great Britain?—I think that for the present they had better be recruited as now; that is a change which had better be gradually introduced. Ultimately, supposing there is only one European army, I suppose they would be recruited as the royal army is now, by drafts and by volunteers from regiments early relieved in India. The existing establishments are very effective, and it would probably create embarrassment if they were now interfered with.

4801. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Supposing there should be a local as well as a line army in India, what arrangement would you make?—I should leave it just as it is now.

4802. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Supposing your views were not carried out, but that a portion of the army were local and a portion of it of the line, would you have the local portion recruited directly from England, or would you let it be by volunteers from the regiments of the line?—By both means, by recruiting and by volunteers from relieved regiments.

4803. (*Viscount Melville.*) You say that you would recruit the local army in the same way as you do now. Would you do so at the present expense? Are you aware what the present expense of a recruit for the local army in India is?—I am not aware precisely of the difference of expense. But on the India recruiting establishment, the officer is, I believe, paid a guinea a man, the sergeant five shillings. Supposing the armies kept separate, it might be convenient still to recruit separately.

4804. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you see any reason why there should be a difference in the expense of recruiting for the line and for the local army?—No.

4805. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I suppose you are aware that there is a difference?—Yes.

The witness withdrew.

Colonel G. Campbell.

Colonel GEORGE CAMPBELL examined.

4806. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I believe you command the 52nd regiment?—Yes.

4807. How long have you been in India?—I was in India from the 1st of October 1853 to the 6th of August of this year, about 4½ years.

4808. During that period I believe you have seen a good deal of service?—Yes.

4809. And you have been latterly on field service at Delhi?—Yes.

4810. You were also, I believe, for a short time in the command of a brigade at Lucknow?—Yes.

4811. So that you have been much mixed up with the European troops, both of the royal army and of the local army?—Certainly.

4812. In your opinion how far should the European portion of the army in India be composed of troops of the line, taking India as parts of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only?—I am of opinion that the local force, if it is found necessary to have one, on the score of expense, should not exceed one-fourth of the number of troops in the country.

4813. Would you rather have a local force or not?—I would rather see the whole European force a royal one, undoubtedly.

4814. Will you state your reasons for giving that answer?—In the first place I think it is the only way to secure a proper system of discipline in the local force.

4815. Is that the only reason which you would mention?—That is the principal reason.

4816. Do you consider that there is a difference of discipline between the local force and the other?—Undoubtedly.

4817. In what respect do you think that there is a difference of discipline?—That it is not so severe.

4818. In what way?—I do not think that the officers know their duty so well; I do not think it is possible that they can.

4819. Why do you think so?—Because they have hitherto been drawn from the sepoy army, and the system in a sepoy regiment is so totally different from what it is in European regiments, that they have not the means of learning how to deal with European troops.

4820. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) With respect to that reason, the officers of European corps are originally posted to them as ensigns, and continue in them throughout their service, until promoted to lieutenant-colonels?—I was not aware of that.

4821. That being so, the reason which you have given is without foundation?—Of course it is if that is the case; but I do not think that they could ever have had any means of learning a proper state of discipline of a regiment before they arrived in the country.

4822. Do you form your opinion from one particular regiment which you saw?—No, I do not indeed.

4823. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think it is of great importance that they should go out as formed officers?—Yes.

4824. Which they would be if they belonged to regiments of the line, and had served in other parts of the world?—Yes.

4825. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you see any reason why a young officer should not be as well trained with a regiment in India as with a regiment in England?—Yes; in the first place, in England, there are several very strict garrisons, and there is no such thing in India that I know of.

4826. (*Col. Burlton.*) Is there no such thing in England as an ensign newly going out with a Queen's regiment and learning his first step in India?—Yes, but that does not matter because the officers generally are well up to their work, and are able to teach this youngster how to do his.

4827. Why should not the experienced officers of a local European regiment be able to teach a young cadet as well?—I do not know why it is, but I only judge from the facts, from what I have seen.

4828. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Are you aware that in opposition to that opinion, the regiments of the local army have been constantly reported by the brigadiers, generals, and commanders-in-chief in Her Majesty's service, as being in the best order and state of discipline, and equal in efficiency to the regiments of the line?—I do not know what general officers may have reported.

4829. Are you aware that until recently no Company's officer has ever held the command in chief of the army of either presidency, so that the responsibility of whatever may have been defective in their system of discipline pertains therefore solely to the officers of Her Majesty's service, who have held those commands?—Those are questions which I cannot answer.

4830. Is it not the case that neither of the armies of India has ever been commanded by any but an officer of Her Majesty's service?—I believe that to have been the case until latterly.

4831. How do you account for the European regiments of the local service not being in the same state of good discipline with those of the line?—It is impossible that they can always be under the eye of the commander of the forces. The commander of the forces may not see a particular regiment for years.

4832. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that the climate itself would deteriorate discipline unless it was strictly kept up?—I do not think that it would deteriorate it at all if it was properly looked after.

4833. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you think that if a regiment is commanded by an officer fully qualified for the command, any reason exists why it should not be in as perfect a state of discipline in India as anywhere else ?—I know no reason why it should not, certainly.

4534. (*Viscount Melville.*) But do not you think, and have you not seen it, that the reason why these regiments are not in the same order is that the officers do not do their duty in the same way, that they are not trained in the same way, that the interior economy is very inferior, and that they go upon the Indian system and not the European ?—I perfectly agree with all that your lordship has asked me, except that I do not know their interior economy. I have never had an opportunity of looking into it, but if I may judge from outward appearances, I should say so, decidedly.

4835. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Did you arrive in India subsequently or previously to the outbreak of the native troops ?—Previously ; I arrived in India in 1853.

4836. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Did you ever see the European troops of the late Company's army before the mutiny broke out ; were you mixed up with them at all ?—Not very long before.

4837. You are decidedly of opinon that there should be no larger proportion than one-fourth, if it is a double army ?—Yes.

4838. But you would prefer its being but one army ?—Yes.

4839. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Have you ever seen regiments in the Queen's service in a low state of discipline in India ?—Not regiments ; I have seen one regiment.

4840. Has that regiment remained in the same state, or has it improved ?—When I saw it in that state it was a very short time ago, and it had fallen off ; it was a very good regiment, and it fell off.

4841. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) To what cause do you attribute its being in that state ?—To the superior officers not being well fitted for their work.

4842. What superior officers ?—Field officers.

4843. Was that regiment commanded by an efficient commanding officer ?—He was supposed to be so.

4844. (*Col. Burlton.*) Did you ever see any other local European regiment in a bad state of discipline except the one to which you have alluded ?—Yes, I have seen two others.

4845. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In connection with the first question, what do you consider to be the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter ?—I can see no other way of relieving troops in India, except from England.

4846. Do you think that a certain service at the Cape first would be an advantage ?—I think that the reliefs would be too numerous for the force which you have at the Cape.

4847. Otherwise do you think it would acclimatize the men ?—No, I do not think that it would do any good at all.

4848. You think that the regiments going out from England are as good ?—I am quite sure of it ; I think that perhaps it would be advantageous to form a depôt at the Cape for invalids of a certain class instead of their coming home.

4849. Have you ever considered which route is the best, the Egypt route or the Cape route ?—No, I cannot say that I have, but I should think that in ordinary times the Cape route would be the best.

4850. How often do you think that the regiments of the line in India should be relieved ; how long a tour of service do you think it would be desirable to give them ?—Twelve years, I should think, at the outside.

4851. You think that after that they would rather be disposed to deteriorate ?—It is not that exactly, but I think that the spirit of the corps altogether would be refreshed by relief.

4852. Do you think that the climate has anything to do with it ?—No, I do not think so.

4853. What then has ?—It is like all other service in the colonies. Regiments look forward to going home after a certain period abroad.

4854. And you think that the fact of being retained longer than a certain period acts rather disadvantageously upon a corps ?—Yes, I think so.

4855. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you think that it is partly attributable to the large number of officers who usually exchange when a regiment is ordered to India, and the number who afterwards leave it and return to England ?—I cannot speak upon that, because in my own regiment I had only one exchange.

4856. Is it not very much the practice in the royal army for officers, when their regiments are sent to India, to exchange and return to England ?—Yes.

4857. (*Viscount Melville.*) Did you find that, as the regiment remained longer in India, applications from the men for discharge increased, or that there was any desire on the part of the men to get to Australia or elsewhere ?—No, I cannot say that ; I think that the men disliked India very much more the first two or three years than they did afterwards.

4858. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But you think that afterwards they get to like it ?—I think that those who do dislike it so very much manage to get away, a great many of them.

4859. And the rest are more disposed to exchange into regiments which remain there ?—Yes, they get more reconciled.

4860. Would you object to their so exchanging into regiments ?—No.

4861. You think that there would be no advantage in preventing exchange ?—Not at all.

4862. Do you think that it would be possible to consolidate the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other, and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers lately in the service of the East India Company ?—That is a question which it is rather difficult to answer, I think ; I do not know of any claim, in fact, that an Indian officer would have.

4863. The whole system of promotion is different in the two services, and you are aware that there are funds and pensions ?—I am aware of that ; and again there is the purchase money.

4864. (*Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) And the right of retiring after a certain period of service on full pay ?—Yes.

4865. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Taking all those things into account, do you think such a plan desirable ?—I do not think it would be a desirable thing for the local force, if there was one, to be permitted to exchange. I think it would be the worst thing possible for it.

4866. Why ?—Because I think that the exchanges from the Queen's service would be principally made by men in embarrassed circumstances, and who were obliged to remain in the country on that account ; and I do not think that those are desirable individuals to have in a regiment.

4867. Would it not amalgamate the feelings of the two services very much more if they were known to be exactly on a footing of equality one with the other, and were allowed to exchange, than if that was not permitted ?—It might have that effect.

4868. Do you think that the local force would not be rather looked down upon if exchanges were not permitted ?—I do not see that at all, they are not looked down upon now, I should not look down upon any.

4869. As it is all now a royal army, supposing portions were local, would there not be a tendency to look down upon officers who were never allowed to serve out of India ?—The other plan would be better if it could be managed, certainly.

4870. Take the West Indian regiments, would they not be looked down if an officer could not exchange

Colonel G. Campbell.

23rd Nov. 1858.

from a West Indian regiment to a regiment of the line? —I think very likely.

4871. Would not that same result take place in India?—I suppose they would all come under the same head, under the Horse Guards.

4872. In your opinion, should the local European force be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, or should it be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?—I think that at first it would be quite impossible to recruit it in any other way except from Great Britain.

4873. But afterwards?—If you increased that local force and wanted to recruit it up to its establishment, I do not think you could do it except from Great Britain.

4874. Supposing you had the present force local and the rest of the line, would you recruit the local force by volunteers?—I would certainly, as far as men did volunteer.

The witness withdrew.

Adjourned to to-morrow at 11 o'clock.

Wednesday, 24th November 1858.

PRESENT:

Major-General PEEL.	Lieut.-Gen. Sir GEORGE A. WETHERALL.
H.R.H. the Duke of CAMBRIDGE.	Major-Gen. MONTGOMERIE.
Marquis of TWEEDDALE.	Major-Gen. HANCOCK.
Viscount MELVILLE.	Colonel BURLTON.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir HARRY G. W. SMITH.	Colonel FORSYTH TAIT.

MAJOR-GENERAL PEEL IN THE CHAIR.

Major-Gen. T. S. Pratt, C.B.

24th Nov. 1858.

Major-General THOMAS SIMSON PRATT, C.B., examined.

4875. (*Chairman.*) Will you be so good as to state to the Commission your rank in the army, the length of time which you have served in India, at what dates, and the different positions which you have held in India?—My present rank is that of major-general. I went to India in 1828 as a captain in the 26th regiment, I remained with that corps until I became a lieutenant-colonel, commanding officer of the regiment. I then returned to England.

4876. In what year?—In 1843, at the end of the Chinese war. Having been six weeks in England, the Duke of Wellington sent me back to India as deputy-adjutant-general of Her Majesty's troops at Madras.

4877. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How many years were you in India?—I went there in 1828 and returned in 1856.

4878. (*Chairman.*) You returned for a short time in 1843?—Yes, for six weeks, and I was at one time 2½ years on sick leave at home previously to 1843, so that I consider that I was 25 years in India.

4879. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You were adjutant-general, I think?—I was deputy-adjutant-general of Her Majesty's forces at Madras, from January 1844 to January 1856.

4880. (*Marquess of Tweeddale.*) In what presidencies have you served?—I have served in the Bengal presidency for nine years, and in the Madras presidency for the remainder of the time.

4881. And in China?—Three years in China. I have served with native troops and forces of all kinds.

4882. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Have you ever served with Bombay troops?—Never.

4883. (*Chairman.*) You have been furnished with some questions upon which the Commission requested your opinion?—I have had four questions sent to me, and I have put down the answers to them, which, if the Commissioners will allow me, I will read, and I will answer any question after reading them.

The first question is, How far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as parts of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only? In my opinion the European portion of the army in India should be, if not altogether, at least the greater part composed of troops of the line, taking India as parts of the regular tour of service, and relieved as far as practicable every ten years.

The second question is in connexion with this question, the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter. The answer to that which I have written down is this,—There will be required for the military occupation of India a European force of between 55,000 and 60,000 men, the greater portion, if not all, requiring to be regularly relieved from England, say every ten years, with large annual drafts of recruits to keep up the numbers deficient from deaths, invaliding, and soldiers seeking their discharge, so that large bodies of European soldiery will be constantly *en route* between India and England, either in the shape of regiments or drafts of recruits. The expense will be very great, but I think might be much diminished. I never could understand why Government should let themselves be so much dependant on the merchant shipping for the transport of their troops and military stores. I would suggest that the royal navy should equip a sufficient number of troop-ships regularly fitted up for the express purpose of transporting troops and military stores of all kinds; these to be kept constantly employed, a portion of them in the Mediterranean and Red Sea for the overland route, and when the heat in the Red Sea, or the emergencies of the service, did not require troops to be sent by Egypt, then another portion of the troop-ships would convey their freight of troops and stores round the Cape. I think, under this arrangement, the charge for the conveyance of troops would be very greatly diminished, whilst the comfort of the soldiery would be much increased, and without doubt their discipline and efficiency better preserved. The victualling of the troops under naval arrangement would be very trifling, as I know by practical experience that merchant vessels contract for the victualling of soldiers both out and home for a voyage of 120 days, *viâ* the Cape, at about 6*l.* a head. As far as the very important subject of the health of the soldier is concerned, it would seem most desirable that when the exigencies of the service did not render it necessary to land troops at Calcutta, the troops for Bengal and the Upper Provinces being the greater portion of the European force in India, should proceed from England by the overland route, and landing at Currachee, proceed at once up the Indus to the Punjaub, Peshawur, and the north-west provinces, taking their first tour of service there, and getting acclimatized, proceed gradually down to the more unhealthy stations in the lower provinces, and finally embark for England at Calcutta.

The next question is, Whether it would be possible to consolidate the European forces so as to allow of

exchange from one branch of the service to the other, and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers lately in the service of the East India Company?—With respect to the consolidation of the European force and exchange from one branch of the service to the other, I have to offer the following remarks:—No person who has served a quarter of a century in India, as I have done, can have failed to remark that the division of the troops in India into three distinct armies for local service in India, with a fourth body of Her Majesty's troops, has a most injurious effect. The officers of the army of each presidency are jealous and unjust to each other; all three have somewhat similar feelings to Her Majesty's troops, and, in my opinion, good feeling and harmony will never be perfect until the armies serving in India shall cease to be separate bodies, but shall feel themselves a decided integral portion of Her Majesty's army, with the European portion of it liable to serve in all parts of the world, and I think much should be sacrificed to obtain this end. I do not think the system of local European forces should be perpetuated; I would not increase it now, but make all future European troops for service in India, (officered by whom they may,) be regular troops of the line, relievable from England, as before proposed. The only obstacles that I can see to the exchange from one branch of the service to the other are two:—First, the funds, to which the officers of the Indian army have subscribed very largely; secondly, that there is a purchase system in one branch, whilst in the local service promotion is purely by seniority. This latter obstacle would not exist in the exchange between the scientific branch of either service, and is applicable only to the small local European force now in India. The first obstacle is difficult to deal with, and premising that with regard to it all vested rights should be rigidly preserved at whatever cost, it may be useful to enter somewhat into the general history of these funds, without pretending to critical accuracy. As far as I can learn, there was originally in each presidency a fund for widows and children kept up by subscriptions of the officers of the Indian army, but to which adhesion was optional. The Court of Directors had frequent applications for assistance from the relicts of non-subscribers, and in 1826 the Court induced the subscribers to the voluntary fund, to merge their assets into a general military fund for each presidency, the Court holding out as the inducement on their part a large rate of interest for all deposits (8 per cent.), a very favourable rate of exchange for remittances to England, and a very small annual donation, about 250*l.*, at the same time making subscription and donation to the funds compulsory on all their new nominations; and this was agreed to on the proposed conditions. The funds of the respective presidencies are now supposed to stand thus; the Madras and Bombay funds are perfectly solvent, with large capitals, and able to meet all claims. I am not so sure about Bombay, because I have never served there. The Bengal fund from some management is not at present very solvent, but has (as stated by the subscribers) just claims upon the Indian Government for nearly 500,000*l.*, the receipt of which would make them perfectly solvent, and able to meet all claims. These funds have been raised to a very great extent by the subscriptions and donations of the officers themselves, and the advantages of interest, remittance, and donation from the Government, although very great, are not equal to what Her Majesty's Government grant in the shape of pensions to officers in Her Majesty's service, without any pecuniary sacrifice on their part whatever. If these statements are correct as far as it can be judged, it would appear that had the officers of the Indian army received such pensions as are granted by Her Majesty without a pecuniary charge, and had they placed the subscriptions and donations they now give to their military funds to any insurance office, they would be fully in as good circumstances as under the present arrangements.

Major-Gen. T. S. Pratt, C.B.

24th Nov. 1858

There is another fund called Lord Clive's fund, for the benefit of those not having a certain amount of means, which is legally and exclusively the property of the old Indian armies. The Court of Directors had a perfect right to make what conditions they pleased with those gentlemen accepting appointments in their service, but it will now be for consideration whether these funds are to be perpetuated, or whether (perfect faith being kept with present subscribers) the new appointments shall hereafter be compelled to give donations and subscriptions as heretofore, or be placed with regard to pensions as Her Majesty's officers are in all parts of the world, leaving it of course in their power to make such other arrangements for the benefit of their families as each individual may think fit. The exchange between the officers of the line and the present European local force would of course be only permissible, each officer would consult his personal interest. The officer of the Indian service would consider whether he would keep up his subscriptions and donations to the military fund, and retain the benefit of it. The officer of the line would receive the Indian increased rate of pay, have no claim upon the fund, and rest satisfied with the pension allowed by Her Majesty. I feel assured that many an officer of the European local force, whose health had failed, or from other personal reasons, would feel it a great boon to be permitted to exchange to a more genial climate, and would give up much to effect it; whilst on the other hand, the greater emoluments in the Indian service would induce many an officer of the line to exchange. I cannot see that the obstacle caused by the fund is insurmountable, and I would permit exchange in all ranks between the scientific branches of both services, the line and the European local force. With respect to the officers with native regiments, it is evident that exchange between them and the line would only be admissible in the very junior ranks. With respect to the difference between a purchase and a seniority service, I cannot see much difficulty in the way of exchange; each officer would abide by the regulations of the service into which he had exchanged, and would have made his previous calculations. And with regard to the question of purchase generally, I have the most perfect persuasion that its days are numbered, and that it will ere long cease to exist in the army, and seeing the amazing number of officers who, during the late war in the Crimea and the present war in India, have obtained commissions without purchase, there possibly never was a more favourable time for effecting the alteration, should it be decided on.

The fourth question is, Whether the local European force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain? The answer to this is this,—I should hope that ere long there would be no local European force existing, but as regards either that force or the relievable force being kept up by drafts or volunteers from the line, I have a most decided opinion, which is, that the force in India should be kept up by recruits from England, regularly drilled at the depôts to the use of arms, &c., before they embark. I saw a great deal of the system of volunteering when in India; the Government there was desirous of saving the expense of the passage home of soldiers by inducing them to volunteer to regiments remaining in India, when their own corps was returning home, and I presume they also wished to retain trained and acclimatized soldiers. For this purpose they gave a bounty of 3*l.* to every soldier not beyond a certain age (40, I think), and who was of good character. The soldiers are shrewd calculators of their own interests. With the exception of a few men, who had married native women, and were thus somewhat tied to the country, those who volunteered were men who had but a short period to serve before, under the various provisions of the royal warrants, they could claim their discharge, and they did so, and their passage had also then to be provided, so that the saving was altogether fallacious. In many instances,

Major-Gen. T. S. Pratt, C.B.

24th Nov. 1858.

when the regiment to which they had volunteered was in another presidency, the difficulties of transit being great in India, they had scarcely joined their new regiments before they could claim to leave them. In spite of all precautions, men of not very good character did volunteer; they brought with them the vices of the old regiment to engraft upon that which they joined, or if not up to the extent of vices, the different habits and customs of their old regiments. Soldiers desirous of leaving the regiments in which they have long served, are not generally the best soldiers. Good soldiers are generally proud of their old corps, and are desirous to abide by it, and it is a feeling that ought to be fostered. Speaking practically as an officer commanding a regiment, I would never wish to see it joined by bodies of volunteers from other corps; but isolated cases of exchange are always admissible.

4884. Those answers I take for granted contemplate and are applicable only to the restoration of perfect tranquillity in India?—To a great extent necessarily, for the future of India.

4885. When you fix the number of 55,000 or 60,000 men, that is in contemplation of the restoration of tranquillity?—I contemplated that number very much after reading a set of remarks drawn up by a most intelligent officer, Lieut.-General Shaw Kennedy, in which he put down seriatim the manner in which he proposed to locate bodies of troops in India for the future military occupation of it, and keeping it in order, and his calculation was that 55,000 European troops would be ample for the three presidencies.

4886. His calculation, I suppose, was founded upon the assumption that there was tranquillity in India at the time when these 55,000 men were to be placed there?—His calculation was, that with the force located as he proposed, in separate divisions of 8,100 men, each capable of joining each other when occasion required, they would be enabled to put down any insurrection whatever, and to keep the country in order.

4887. Are you aware of the number of European troops at the present moment in India?—I fancy that at this present moment there are about 80,000.

4888. There are 93,000 of Her Majesty's army, besides the European force of the late company?—The country is in a state of disorder to a great extent.

4889. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) I presume that General Kennedy's statement was with regard to the state of things after the mutiny was put down?—His statement was for the future military occupation of India. I do not mean to say that you do not require a very large body of troops in the country when in a state of insurrection, but for the future military occupation of India, that was his calculation, and it appeared very fairly drawn up.

4890. (*Chairman.*) Your opinion is formed more upon General Kennedy's views than on your own experience?—My opinion is formed upon General Kennedy's proposition, with my own experience added to it. I am glad to have the opinion of an experienced officer.

4891. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Your opinion is, that after tranquillity shall be restored in India, about 55,000 European troops will suffice for maintaining the country?—Yes, if General Kennedy's other propositions are carried out.

4892. Does that estimate include troops of all arms?—European troops of all arms, engineers, artillery, cavalry, and infantry.

4893. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you hold India with 55,000 European troops of all arms?—That was General Shaw Kennedy's proposition, with other arrangements.

4894. General Shaw Kennedy was never in India, was he?—Never.

4895. (*Chairman.*) We would much rather have your own opinion, founded on service in India, than that of a general, however distinguished, who was never in India at all?—He proposed to have forts at different stations.

4896. Did he give any estimate as to the proportion which was required of European troops to native troops?—He wanted to have a somewhat limited proportion of native troops, and a considerable proportion of armed police.

4897. Did he give any proportion of the Europeans to be employed to both the police and native troops employed?—I think the proportion of armed police was about 50,000. It is a great pity that I have not brought the memorandum.

4898. Are you aware of the number of native troops and police at this instant employed in India?—I am aware that it is fearfully large.

4899. Do you not consider, from your own knowledge and experience in India, that it will always require a certain number of European troops in proportion to the number of native troops employed?—I should say that you must now depend very much, if not altogether, upon your European troops.

4900. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And yet, though you depend entirely upon European troops, you are of opinion that 55,000 Europeans would hold the whole of India?—With those forts and defensible positions which General Kennedy proposed.

4901. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) What forts did he propose?—He proposed for the Bengal side, between Calcutta and Peshawur, ten forts, with defensible barracks in their vicinity, five of these forts being already built, a corps of 8,000 troops of all arms at each; a small portion of the troops holding the fort, the rest in the barracks. The ten forts and positions were Calcutta, Dinapore, Benares, Allahabad, Agra, Lucknow, Meerut, Loodianah, Lahore, Peshawur, with a double tête de pont at Attock.

4902. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How can a man propose to occupy a country which he has never seen; has such a thing ever been heard of?—He asked for information from every officer who had served in India; he made inquiry and took their opinions.

4903. (*Viscount Melville.*) In what proportions do you propose to distribute these 60,000 men in the different presidencies?—The vast proportion would be in Bengal and the upper provinces.

4904. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How many?—I should say 35,000 in Bengal, and the others between the two presidencies.

4905. Then that would be about the same number as was in Bengal before the mutiny, because, with the Queen's troops and the Europeans of the Company, I suppose there were very nearly 35,000 in Bengal?—In the Madras presidency, when I left it, they had so denuded the army of troops that there were only three regiments altogether of the Queen's troops, and one of them was in Burmah.

4906. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) That was rather an error than a piece of judgment?—It was a great error. I feel that it is not just to Lieut-General Shaw Kennedy to have his plan for the future military occupation of India judged by the meagre replies I have made when unprepared to give evidence upon it; his plan must be judged as a whole, and I am authorized to state that it will be forwarded to the Royal Commissioners, if they see fit to call for it. I consider the plan founded on sound stratagetical principles, and one of its great merits is, that by the proposed combinations India may be maintained in order from all internal attacks, and be able to hold out until reinforced from England against all attacks from without by a moderate European force and native army. Certainly most desirable if practicable, for England cannot afford the drain of a huge European force for India, and there are few who do not feel that at any hour she may find herself engaged in a conflict in Europe which will require all her strength to meet; and farther, as regards finance, a moderate European and native army would be most advantageous to the Government of England, as rendering the revenues of India more equal to the expenditure. I use the term Government of England advisedly, for

Major-Gen. T. S. Pratt, C.B.

24th Nov. 1858.

from the moment the British Government took the actual government of India into its own hands, and wielded their power over its resources, which might be for good or evil, there was not a holder of Indian loans who did not feel that the English Government had become virtually responsible for the Indian debt, in spite of any repudiation.

4907. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) In the event of the European force in India being henceforth composed exclusively of troops of the line, would you keep those in each presidency under the command of a separate Commander-in-chief, as the local European troops have hitherto been kept, and if so would you leave the Commanders-in-chief at Madras and Bombay to the same extent, or to what extent, free to exercise their authority independently of the Commander-in-chief in India?—As I have before stated, I have the greatest objection to the division of armies for the different presidencies. I should like to see one distinct and positive army under one Commander-in-chief, with deputies of whatever name you please to call them in the other presidencies, and with one set of pay and audit regulations.

4908. With what powers would you invest the Commanders-in-chief at Madras and Bombay?—They would have the same power as they have now. The Commanders-in-chief have the powers of courts-martial to the extent of all but cashiering and death. The Commanders-in-chief in the respective presidencies for the local force have absolute power, but not for the Queen's troops. They have to refer to the general commanding in India.

4909. Then you would limit the powers of the Commanders-in-chief at Madras and Bombay to those which they have hitherto exercised over the Queen's troops?—I think so.

4910. Are you not mistaken with respect to the powers vested in the Commanders-in-chief at Madras and Bombay, in stating that they have not authority to confirm sentences of death?—Not for the Queen's troops.

4911. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Will you be good enough to explain a case which took place at Madras upon that subject, with regard to a man of the 4th Queen's regiment?—It is a considerable number of years since that transaction took place, but my recollection of it is this:—A soldier of the 4th deliberately, in the middle of the night, loaded his musket, and went up to the bedside of a sergeant who had annoyed him in some way or other, and shot him. Death did not ensue, but death was intended to ensue. The man was tried, and sentenced to be hanged. Lord Tweeddale, who was both Governor and Commander-in-chief sent to me to ask this question,—"Does the discipline of the Queen's troops in Madras "require an example of death, seeing that death has "not ensued?" At that time the discipline of the Queen's troops in Madras was perfect, and my answer was:—"The man is a deliberate murderer, he deserves 'death; but if you put the question whether the "service requires an example, I have the power of "saying that there is no example required." Upon this the matter was sent up to Lord Gough. I think it was because it was an independent territory. It was in the Nagpore presidency, and not immediately under the Madras Government. Lord Tweeddale wished the sentence to be commuted to transportation for life. Lord Gough, to whom it was referred, took a different view of it, and wished the sentence of death to be carried out. It then became necessary for Lord Tweeddale in a very extraordinary manner to decide, as Governor, his signature being required as Governor, whether he would act as Governor in a different position from that to which he had occupied as Commander-in-chief, and considerable difficulty arose upon the matter. I do not know what communications took place between the Government and Lord Gough, but the result was that death was not inflicted, and the man was transported for life. It is fully twelve years ago, and I just repeat what I know: but it was necessary to refer the matter to the Commander-in-chief in India.

(*Chairman to the Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Is that a correct statement?

(*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) It is not according to my recollection. I was commander-in-chief at the time, and the question was this—there was a soldier of the 4th regiment who loaded his musket and shot a person. He was sentenced to death for that crime. The question in my mind arose, as commander-in-chief alone (for it could be treated in no other way), whether it was necessary for me to send that sentence to be confirmed up to Lord Gough, as the commander-in-chief in India. I always understood, and I believe it is the case, that the commander-in-chief of either Bombay or Madras, in all cases where there is a question of life and death of a soldier of Her Majesty's line regiments, must send up the sentence to the commander-in-chief for his confirmation. Lord Gough took a different view from me, and sent it back again to me, and I refused to sign it. He said that I ought to have carried it out. I took as far as I could the advice of those who could give it, at Madras, namely, the judge advocate general and the advocate general, and I was told that I was right, and that Lord Gough was wrong according to law.

(*Duke of Cambridge.*) In consequence you did not carry the sentence out.

(*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) The man was not shot. Lord Gough would not sign it, and I would not sign it.

(*Major-Gen. Pratt.*) As far as the Queen's troops are concerned, the commanders-in-chief at Bombay and Madras are not commanders-in-chief, they are lieutenant-generals commanding, and always sign every document, both those relating to courts-martial and others, not as commanders-in-chief, but as lieutenant-generals commanding.

4912. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) And that is the arrangement which you would maintain in future, namely, not to allow commanders-in-chief over any part of the European army, but simply lieutenant-generals commanding?—Yes; and for the whole of the troops. I want but one army in India in order to do away with the jealousies otherwise subsisting.

4913. Would you unite the native armies of the three presidencies also under one command?—The general recommendation was that there should be but one army in India.

4914. One native army as well as one European army?—One native army serving in the respective presidencies, but under one command and regulation.

4915. Do you think, considering the great extent of India, that it would be possible for the commander-in-chief in Bengal to exercise an efficient personal supervision and control over the whole European and native force?—I consider that he would delegate his power to the commanders-in-chief and the general officers in the respective presidencies. I suppose that the commander-in-chief in England has to exercise a general supervision over the troops to a great extent where he has no personal power of visitation.

4916. Do you think that during his five years' tenure of command the commander-in-chief in India would see one-tenth part of the European or native corps there?—It depends entirely on his power of locomotion. I should say in that case it must depend very much upon the individual. One man would make a point of seeing a great portion; another man would not.

4917. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I suppose you would make the generals at Madras and Bombay responsible for their presidencies, but would still place the army under one head, viz., the commander-in-chief in India?—Yes, and any person who has had the working of an office where they are under different heads, with the different pay and audit regulations, will know that a great portion of an officer's time in office in India is occupied in appeals to Government regarding the retrenchments in consequence of the difference.

Major-Gen. T. S. Pratt, C.B.

24th Nov. 1858.

4918. (*Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) You have stated that you consider the fact of the armies being separate in India a great evil ?—I do.

4919. Do you not think that late events have shown that the circumstance of the armies being in three presidencies has been the safety of India ?—I am quite aware that that is an opinion which has been expressed, and expressed long ago, that in dividing the army into three, if one portion became rebellious or mutinous, the others might not do so. I do not think that the fact of some of the troops not being mutinous was caused by their being divided into three armies. I think it was caused by the different composition of the troops in the respective armies, and not by their mere division into three armies. That might be retained though there were but one army.

4920. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you think that no advantage accrues to the State from having a considerable diversity of system, in the several native armies of India ?—I do not quite understand the question. If you mean by diversity of system being under different local pay and allowances, I cannot see any advantage.

4921. Would not one consequence of their being all united under one commander-in-chief be that one system would pervade the armies of the three presidencies ?—One general system would pervade the armies of the three presidencies as matter of necessity ; but questions of caste or questions of food would be altogether local.

4922. Have there not been very great differences of system with respect to discipline in the Bengal native army and in the Madras and Bombay armies ? —I am not sufficiently conversant with what has been the fact beyond hearsay to speak upon that. I do not like to speak of things that I do not know personally. I do not see why there should be such differences. I think that good officers would make the one set of troops just as good as the other if they had one system.

4923. Is it not very probable that had the armies of the three presidencies been under the Commander-in-chief in India, the system of organization and discipline which had been adopted in the Bengal army would have been introduced into the other two armies ?—That is to say, that the bad system which has produced rebellion would have extended. I cannot say that.

4924. (*Col. Burlton.*) The natural inference I suppose would be, that the army under the immediate personal supervision of the Commander-in-chief of all India, would be more likely to be in a high state of discipline than those armies away from his personal supervision ?—If he has good lieutenants I do not see why it should be so, and I do not think it was so. I think the Madras army was in an admirable state of discipline. I can speak more, of course, to the troops that I knew. I think that the discipline and interior economy of Her Majesty's troops in Madras was nearly perfect. I should like to give an instance of it. In one case there were seven regiments at Madras within a short period ; three of them came from actual service at the Cape, one was going to Burmah, and three were going to England. They were encamped on the beach at Madras. There was no power of keeping them within walls of any description, and the chief of police at Madras, Mr. Elliot, came to me, and told me that he could not have believed it possible that discipline could have been carried to so excellent an extent, for that he as police magistrate had not had a single individual during the time that they were there brought before him.

4925. (*Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) That relates to the European troops of Her Majesty's army. As I understood the question, it was addressed to the army in general, including the native army ?—I am telling you what happened, and what I know.

4926. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do not you think that it would have been far better that instead of having had, as has hitherto prevailed, three different systems in the different presidencies, there should have been one rule and one system throughout the whole of India ?—I have already stated that.

4927. I do not mean as regards the Europeans, but the native force ?—I think that the division into three armies has led to a most injurious result. I do not mean to say that there may not be local matters to which you ought to attend, such as you would when you send troops to Canada—you would supply them with fur cloaks, and would make a different arrangement, but the general system should be one—the general pay and allowances should be one.

4928. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Upon what do you consider that the discipline of a regiment principally depends ?—A good commanding officer.

4929. If the officer at the head of a regiment is well qualified for his command, if he has the full complement of officers under him, and is invested with sufficient power to maintain his own authority over all ranks, do you not think that it might and ought to be kept in a state of as perfect discipline in India as in England or any other country ?—I have not the most distant doubt that with a good commanding officer and good officers, it ought to be and is kept, as far as Her Majesty's troops are concerned, in as good order in India as in any part of the world. I should like to see the same number of troops coming from active service put upon the beach anywhere here, and to see whether they would behave as well as they did in India.

4930. Do not the interests of the public service imperatively require that none but fully qualified officers should ever be placed in the command either of a regiment, brigade, division, or army ?—It is a perfect truism.

4931. Is it not the fact that under the existing system of succession by seniority to the command of regiments many incompetent officers succeed to these commands both in the Queen's and Company's armies, and have you not known it to be so in your own experience during your service in India and elsewhere ?—With regard to Her Majesty's troops, with which I am more conversant, the half yearly confidential reports state distinctly whether the officer in command of a regiment is qualified for his command or not. If the general officer does his duty he will report an officer either whether he is from age or from other infirmity disqualified ; it is done every day. If that recommendation is not attended to, it is the authorities to whom the report is made who are in fault.

4932. My question has simply reference to the matter of fact, and not to the failure or otherwise of general or other officers to report inefficient officers. Is it not the case that many incompetent officers do succeed under the existing system to the command of regiments ?—It is not the case that many inefficient officers succeed and remain in command of regiments. There may be isolated cases. I have known one case where an officer required to be reported two or three times, but who ultimately was removed.

4933. Have you not occasionally found it to be the case also with respect to the brigade and divisional commands in India ?—I know no case in which an officer utterly incompetent has been retained either in divisional or in brigade command. I know cases where indifferent officers have been retained, but none to such an extent as to require imperatively to be removed.

4934. From what source do you contemplate that officers shall be supplied in future for the native army, and for the numerous detached appointments in India ?—I do not know why they should be taken from a different source than that from which they are now, namely, the young gentlemen of England.

4935. Do you mean that you would supply the officers by appointing cadets in England specially to the native army, or would you furnish officers from the regiments of the line serving in India ?—I think they are persons who could only be allowed to exchange in

Major-Gen. T. S. Pratt, C.B.

24th Nov. 1858

the very junior ranks. It would be better to have appointments made direct for the purpose of serving in the native infantry regiments, and for the officers to abide with them; it would never do to have an exchange higher than the subaltern ranks, for you cannot expect that a man would go and command a sepoy regiment from a European corps who knew nothing of the language and the customs. A lieutenant-colonel who had only commanded Europeans would be totally astray when he went to command a sepoy corps; even commanding detachments as high as captains, I think, would be objectionable.

4936. (*Col. Burlton.*) Does it not occur to you that the variety of the system now prevailing, namely, the seniority system in one service, and promotion by purchase in the other, renders it utterly impossible to admit of exchanges between those two services without the liability or almost certainty of great injustice to one of them, where there may be an old man exchanging with a young one from a line regiment?—I have already stated that the question of exchange is simply permissive; if the two officers choose so to make their calculations as that one of them chooses to go into the seniority service, and the other to come into the purchase service, I can see no possible objection.

4937. Suppose that Mr. A. is a lieutenant of 20 years standing, and senior lieutenant of his regiment, the five captains above him are necessarily men of old standing also, they all having advanced by seniority as he has done; if one of those old captains, who Mr. A. expects is about to die or to retire home to spend his latter days here, should exchange with a young captain from a line regiment, is not it a hardship to every one below him? does not Mr. A. and all the lieutenants below him suffer by having a young and good life put above their heads instead of an old one?—It would necessarily retard promotion, but it is a matter of every day's occurrence in the Queen's service.

4938. In the Queen's service every officer enters it upon the perfect understanding that that is the case, while in the Company's service every officer enters it upon a perfect understanding the contrary way?—He has so entered it; but I think that that will soon die away. You are now about organizing an army for the future. I see perfectly that it has the effect of retarding that officer's promotion; at the same time I beg to say that I think that an officer at the top of his list would be the very last person who would attempt to exchange.

4939. It is not only the one at the top of the list who suffers, but every ensign and lieutenant below this senior lieutenant, every officer in the regiment must suffer by having young lives put in instead of old ones?—Yes.

4940. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is not your experience of exchange in the Queen's army that of retarding promotion when it is permitted?—I have seen instances occasionally where it has retarded promotion. I recollect an instance in which I suffered; one always feels a matter when it is personal. I perfectly recollect myself being very much annoyed at an exchange which took place in the 26th Cameronians, when an officer, who was an old man, and had been seven years in the regiment without ever having joined it, which was a very extraordinary thing, instead of selling out, which we had arranged that he should do, exchanged all at once with a young officer, a lieutenant-colonel. I then felt that we were all pulled back.

4941. (*Col. Burlton.*) Then it is your opinion, I suppose, that exchanges cannot be carried out between the two armies as long as the present incumbrance of the Bengal army remains?—I think that the great mass of exchanges might be effected without injury.

4942. With the junior grades?—Yes; I may also say that you see every day that a man whose life is apparently better than that of another dies first.

4943. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) If the native army be officered, as you recommend, by the appointment of cadets specially to that branch of the service, will it not be regarded generally as an inferior service to that of the European army?—The officers who take the appointments in that army well know what they have to expect,—that they will remain in India. I presume that officers who remain in India and abide by it are more likely to be employed in situations of emolument and situations leading to honours than those who come away, and I think that they would have an advantage in that way. I do not see why they should consider themselves inferior.

4944. Still do you consider that the native army so constituted would be looked upon with the same respect and regard by the country generally and by the officers of the European branch of the service as the European army?—I do not see why there should be any difference; I do not find it so in our local service; I do not find that an officer in the Ceylon rifle corps is looked upon as at all inferior to an officer in a regiment of the line.

4945. Do you contemplate the native army maintaining the same high status which has hitherto been accorded to it in relation to the European troops, being armed with the same description of weapons, and having the same high military training?—I think no person could have foreseen that 72 regiments of natives and a variety of irregulars would have gone into a state of mutiny; otherwise, if that could have been foreseen, I do not believe that such a weapon as the Enfield rifle would ever have been put into the hands of the natives at all. The power that the European has over the natives is his physical strength, and his being able to come in contact with the native. If you put into the hands of the natives a weapon which keeps you at 1,200 yards distance, the native is possibly the more efficient of the two; he is as good a shot, if not better, his nerves are cool. I think it was a great mistake arming the natives with the Enfield rifle, but nobody could have foreseen that what has taken place would have occurred.

4946. Then do you recommend that for the future the native army should be armed with an inferior weapon and inferior ammunition, and should have a lower degree of training than the European troops of the same arm?—No, I would have the native army in so small a proportion, and so located with the European troops, that you might arm them well, because you would always have a superiority over them.

4947. How do you recommend that the native infantry should be armed?—With the best piece that you can get for them.

4948. (*Col. Tait.*) With the Enfield rifle?—With the Enfield rifle. If you put, as I propose, the troops with a large comparative proportion of Europeans to a small proportion of natives, and these natives enlisted from a trustworthy source, you may arm them in the best possible manner that you please.

4949. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You say that there should be as small a proportion of natives as possible to the Europeans?—Yes.

4950. You said that you thought the Europeans ought to be from 55,000 to 60,000?—Yes.

4951. You are aware, probably, that at this moment there are in India no less than 300,000 native troops, what number of native troops do you propose for the permanent army of India?—Whatever may be the case at the present moment, the army of India was nothing like 300,000 native troops; every man in a difficult position has been raising native troops till they have got up to an extent which was never contemplated before. The native troops in the Madras presidency were 52 regiments; the native troops in the Bombay presidency, I think, were 26; I mean of the regular line.

4952. (*Viscount Melville.*) Twenty-nine?—In Bengal they were 74. Supposing that each of those regiments comprised 800 men, you can calculate what the total number was; it was nothing like the number mentioned.

4953. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Still you say that there is to be a very superior number of Europeans to natives, and you give us the Europeans at 55,000

Major-Gen. T. S. Pratt, C.B.

4th Nov. 1858.

to 60,000—what number of natives would you give us for those 60,000 Europeans ?—I may have spoken confusedly, but I said that there was to be a comparatively small number of regularly organized native troops, and that the other portion was to be organized police, not armed as the regular native troops are, but with swords and shields or whatever is the usual method.

4954. I want to know whether it is your opinion that, say, at the extreme, 120,000 troops, native and European, are sufficient for India. If you doubled your number of 60,000 Europeans as you say that the Europeans are to predominate, you would only have 60,000 natives ; do you mean to say that 120,000 troops are sufficient for the whole of India ?—Of regularly armed troops, I should say that 120,000 natives to 60,000 Europeans would be ample, thus making two-thirds of the whole number of natives.

4955. I understood you to say that you would have the Europeans predominate ?—Not in numbers. I hold that 2,000 Europeans predominate over 6,000 natives.

4956. (*Col. Burlton.*) You take into calculation also, I imagine, a very large proportion of organized police ?—Yes, and the regularly organized disciplined native army reduced.

4957. (*Chairman.*) Would you arm your police in the same way as you would the native force ?—Certainly not.

4958. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And you would take no account of them as regards the number of Europeans to be employed in India ?—They would be employed in aid.

4959. I am talking now of the proportion of Europeans to natives ?—You would reduce your regularly organized native troops very considerably, in consequence of having these organized police.

4960. What would you state as the proportion of Europeans to native troops and police ?—I have said 60,000, in round numbers.

4961. (*Viscount Melville.*) Would you have one European to three natives or four natives ?—To three natives, I should say.

4962. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Including police ?—No, not including police. I would have one European to three drilled and organized soldiers, and then the police would depend entirely upon the exigencies of the service, and the particular place at which th y were.

4963. If you have your police regularly drilled, organized, disciplined, and armed, how is it that you will not take them into account at all ?—I do not arm the police, except with shields and tulwars ; it is quite a different thing.

4964. You said that they were to be organized ?—Regularly organized ; a portion cavalry and a portion infantry.

4965. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Would you give the soldiers of the native army equally good weapons and as high a degree of military training as you would give the European soldiers of corresponding arms in the service ?—I would place them in regular organized divisions of the army ; there could then be no harm in giving a small number of natives, that is to say, small, not in numbers, but in physical strength, just as good an arm as you would give to the European soldiers, whether the Enfield rifle or a superior weapon to the Enfield rifle.

4966. You would give them as good arms in their several branches as you would give to the Europeans ?—Yes.

4967. (*Chairman.*) Your proposed establishment is 55,000 Europeans ?—I have merely mentioned that incidentally, as having read the matter. The statement that I saw for the military occupation in India was from 55,000 to 60,000.

4968. That would give you 165,000 native troops, being three to one, and the police force besides ?—Yes ; and police up to the extent of the exigency that might exist.

4969. You imagine that there should be but one army, namely, the Queen's army, in India altogether ?—I think that it would tend most particularly to the harmony and good effect of the service if there were but one army. No person who has not served in India can understand it. It is not easy to give isolated instances of this feeling, but there is no person who has served in India but must feel very greatly that the separation is most injurious. The common conversation of those in the different services to each other is something most extraordinary.

4970. Even if it should be necessary, now that the Indian army has been transferred to the Queen, that a portion of that army should be enlisted for local service in India, still you would have the discipline and the system the same for that portion so recruited for India as for the remainder ?—Necessarily the highest possible discipline. There is no use in having soldiers if you do not give them the highest discipline.

4971. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And you would have them under one authority ?—Yes.

4972. (*Chairman.*) Supposing a portion of this European army to be recruited in future for service in India alone, you say that there would be some difficulty in the system of exchanging with those officers who at present exist in what has been the local army in India. In order to remedy that difficulty for the future, would you make all those officers for the future entering that local force enter it with the perfect understanding that they were to be upon the same footing as the moveable force ?—I have already stated in my answer that I think the system of a local force should not be perpetuated. I am quite sure that if an offer was made to the soldiery, for instance, of the local service in India, whether they would change their state of enlistment from a perpetuation of service in India to a removable force, you would find that the great mass of them would agree to it at once. Their enlistment being, I think, only for 10 years, you can easily understand that a very short time would elapse before their numbers would be exhausted. If you enlisted all the new men under the provision of not being for a local service, but for service in all parts of the world, the others would die out very rapidly with the invaliding, and discharging, and deaths.

4973. Then your idea is that though it may be necessary to keep faith with those officers lately in the service of the East India Company, yet that hereafter a different system may be adopted ?—It would be utterly shameful to break faith with them, in my opinion.

4974. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) It is your opinion that the bond of unity which an army feels under one great control is of immense advantage ?—Yes.

4975. And that cutting it up into different portions must encourage and continue jealousies and heart-burnings ?—Yes, it does in every direction. You find an officer of one army, instead of being proud of an action in the other, trying how to decry it, because it has been done by a portion of another army. That feeling never should be perpetuated.

4976. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Provided the two armies be placed upon a perfect equality in all respects, do you think that those jealousies can exist to the extent to which they have hitherto existed between the Queen's and the Company's armies, which have been so differently circumstanced in many respects ?—I think that if you have any division at all, those jealousies will exist.

4977. (*Col. Burlton.*) You appear to have paid a great deal of attention to our funds in India ?—Merely within these last two or three days.

4978. Can you see any way by which the interests and rights of the officers of the Indian army, in connection with its funds, can be adjusted, if exchanges are permitted ?—It would be utterly impossible for a young officer of our service, for instance, to exchange into yours, and to take the place in the fund of a very old officer; you would not receive him.

4979. There is the difficulty?—Yes.

4980. Do you see any way out of that difficulty?—The way out of it is simply not to perpetuate the fund.

4981. If the Government would take upon themselves all the present liabilities of those funds, and all their capital, both the military fund in Bengal, and the orphan fund, which is separate in Bengal. Do you think that that would adjust the question?—In Madras, I understand the capital is 700,000*l.*, that is quite equal to meeting all its liabilities without any assistance. I do not know what it is in Bombay, because I have never served there. I am quite aware that the Bengal fund is insolvent.

4982. The Bengal fund at the present moment is in possession of a capital of upwards of half a million of money?—Does that include the claim which you make?

4983. No, that is Company's paper. The Government owe that money, we have their promissory notes for it. In addition that, we have a claim upon them of about 300,000*l.* If the Government would agree to take all our liabilities, that is to say, the liabilities of all present widows or prospective widows, all present incumbrances, and all liabilities in every possible way, and to take over our capital and our claims upon them, do you think that that would settle the thing?—That would settle the thing, and I think without any very great expense, as far as the funds are concerned, provided you get your 500,000*l.* for Bengal, I mean that you have a claim on the Bengal Government for nearly 500,000*l.* for things which they have withheld from you, to which you think that you are entitled.

4984. It is not quite 300,000*l.*?—It was given to me at the sum I name. If you get that you will be perfectly solvent to meet all your claims.

4985. (*Chairman.*) I understand that for the future you would put an end to making it compulsory on all officers entering the army to subscribe to the military fund?—Yes, distinctly so; I think that all should go on the perfect understanding that they would be entitled to Her Majesty's pension, whatever it may be, and not be compelled to subscribe to anything. They have always the power of subscribing to any insurance office if they please.

4986. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) With respect to the comparative expense of a line and a local army in India, assuming the casualties amongst the line and local troops in India to be equal in proportion to numbers, and the rates of bounty and levy money to the recruit to be the same in both services, the expense to the Government of the drafts sent to India to supply casualties would be the same, would it not, whether for the line or the local army?—I cannot conceive why there should be any difference.

4987. Does it not follow that if relieved periodically as you have recommended, the Government would incur, on the completion by each line regiment of its 10 years' tour the additional expense of the passage of a relieving regiment to India, and of the relieved regiment to England, minus only the men permitted to volunteer from the latter into the regiments in India, and that the whole of this expense would be saved by having local instead of line regiments?—I do not think that there would be much expense saved; there might be a trifling expense saved. All men for local service being enlisted for 10 years' service, would come home as individuals at the end of their 10 years' service if they so pleased.

4988. Has that any reference whatever to reliefs of regiments? It is just the same in the Queen's regiments: they enlist also for 10 years, do they not?—Then what advantage is there in a local European force, if the individuals of that force are to come back at the end of 10 years as individuals instead of a body?

4989. Both come back in 10 years?—Yes. Upon the question of expense, I cannot conceive where the expense is to be different. Your men go out there as 10 years' service men; they have the power of taking their discharge at the end of the 10 years' service there, or of being banished for life by taking 10 years more; they come back piecemeal; of the others, some come back piecemeal and some in a body. I know of no difference of expense.

4990. Is not it the fact that the Government of India incur the expense of the passage of a complete regiment from England to India for every regiment relieved, and the expense of a complete regiment from India to England minus only the men who volunteer?—The expense of a regiment going to India and the expense of a regiment coming back has necessarily to be defrayed.

4991. That expense is not incurred at all with respect to local regiments?—It is incurred in the shape of individuals, and not in a body.

4992. Is not the expense on account of individual soldiers, incurred also in respect to line troops, irrespective of that occasioned by the reliefs of entire regiments?—Yes, and there is no additional expense; the soldiers who choose to come back, come back, and their passage is equally paid.

4993. (*Chairman.*) The officers of a local regiment stationed in India, and enlisted for service in India only, become entitled to a retiring pension, do they not?—The officers have a large retiring pension, whether they belong to the European local force or belong to the native force.

4994. If it is a regiment of the line from England relieved at the end of ten years, the Government of India are saved that expense?—Altogether, it is a new system for the future.

4995. Therefore you would put that off against the expense of relief?—Yes.

4996. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) As line regiments on embarking for India are composed of men whose periods of service vary from one to eighteen years, and those embarked for the local army are all recruits, does it not follow that by having line regiments the Government would incur a considerable additional expense during their ten years' tour in having to send home and to supply the places of numerous time-expired soldiers after very short periods of service in India, and that this additional expense would also be saved by having local instead of line regiments?—As far as I understand the question, it is that line regiments going out would have men in all periods of service from one up to ten years' service, and that the local European corps having gone out for ten years to remain there, would be in a different position.

4997. I ask you whether an extra expense would not be incurred by the Government of India in respect to line regiments, from having to replace time-expired men after short periods of service in India?—The drafts of recruits would go out, I suppose, every year or twice a year; they would go out to serve their ten years, and after their period of service they would be, of course, entitled to come home again the same as the others. I do not know where the great difference would be in that respect.

4998. A line regiment we will suppose embarks this year for India; is it not the case that it has some men whose contracted period of service will expire after two years, others after three, four, five, and so on; and that the Government of India will have to pay the passage home of those men, and the passage to India of men to supply their places; whereas this expense is incurred with respect to local regiments only for men who have completed the full periods of 10 or 21 years service in India?—Every regiment has a depôt of two companies, and I do not know how it can be possibly supposed that people who are near their discharge would not be kept at the depôt instead of being sent out to India.

4999. (*Chairman.*) Have you anything to suggest which would obviate any hardships which you consider have hitherto existed in the mode of regulating the promotion between the two armies, the regular army and the local army?—I can add but little to the statement made in my letters of the 1st September and 6th of November, but I may state the numbers of

Major-Gen. T. S. Pratt, C.B.

4th Nov. 1858.

the colonels of the East India service who have superseded their seniors in the royal army. In the Gazette of the 6th of February, 1855, ninety-five colonels of the East India Company's service were made major-generals, their rank of colonel commencing in 1847, and ending in February, 1854, thus superseding all the colonels of the royal army for seven years and two months, and giving the rank of major-general to some colonels of only ten months standing, whilst the Queen's officers were of ten years. The supersession did not stop there, for whilst in the royal army one step of major-general was given to the senior colonels after three death vacancies amongst the generals, and after six vacancies when an officer obtained rank for service in the field, the promotion in the Company's service (they having few supernumeraries) has been continued and regular, and in addition to the ninety-five colonels promoted in the brevet of November, 1854, not less than fifty more junior colonels have obtained the rank of major-general, and the colonels of 1851 who were promoted on the 26th of October last, stand superseded by not less than 127 junior colonels, individually I have been superseded by eighty-six. There were several more, but deaths have occurred amongst them within the four years. By this enormous supersession the vested rights of all colonels of the royal army who held that rank from January, 1847, to the 20th of June, 1854, under the warrants then in force, have been infringed. The commission granted to such of them as were serving in India in order to keep their rightful position (here is mine given by order of Her Majesty) has been made waste paper. The desire expressed by the royal commissioners in making the alterations carried out in the warrant of the 6th of October, 1854, to the effect that it was not their intention to recommend any interference with vested rights has been set aside, and the condition upon which Lord Hill granted the rank of colonel to the officers of the East India Company's service, reserving the right of keeping their position in the rank of colonel and of major-general to the officers of the royal army, has been distinctly violated. In conclusion I beg to state that I know that the supersession complained of had not been foreseen by the home authorities, for General Anson, Commander-in-chief at Madras, when the supersession appeared, told me that he wrote to Lord Panmure, then Secretary or War and to Lord Hardinge, urging that the Queen's colonels who had been superseded should be given rank so as to keep the position they had previously held; and the reply of Lord Panmure was that he was afraid many deserving officers had suffered by the application of the royal warrant of the 6th of October, 1854, and that he would call Lord Hardinge's attention to the subject, and I have reason to know that Lord Hardinge was thwarted by ministers in his efforts to repair the injury done, I presume on the score of expense. Reparation can now be made without expense to the State, and in common justice it ought to be made. I say reparation can be made, but even if back rank is given, the injury will not then be altogether repaired; the loss of four years to old officers, such as I am, is irreparable, and the heart sickness endured during them by this grievous supersession no after act can fully recompense.

5000. I understand you to complain of the operation of the warrant of 1854?—Yes, as having taken away from me that which I was entitled to have under all existing warrants, and by which this commission given to me by order of Her Majesty has just been made a piece of waste paper.

5001. That is merely for local rank in India, I suppose?—Yes, and since then rank has been given to the Indian officers who held the same commissions in all parts of the world.

5002. Did you make any application to the commissioners appointed to take into consideration the effects of the warrant of 1854, to be heard upon that subject?—I did not, because I never understood that I was to make application; if I had been the least aware of it, or if any circular had been sent, I should at once have stated it.

5003. I believe it was stated by me in my place in Parliament that every one would have an opportunity of representing his case?—I could show, but I do not wish to show, that I perfectly understood that you would take care that the case was brought into notice.

5004. If it is in a private letter of mine you are perfectly at liberty to show it?—I was not aware, or I would certainly have brought the matter forward before.

5005. (*Viscount Melville.*) Were you in India when the results of that warrant took effect?—I was.

5006. Was it not the case that Queen's officers actually in command when that brevet took effect were superseded, and that company's officers were put into the commands which Queen's officers had formerly held?—I do not know of any case of actual displacement, but I know that it had a most injurious effect.

5007. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Are you not aware that the several Governments in India have always been required by the home authorities to take care that the commands allotted to the officers of the Queen's and Company's services respectively should not be interfered with to the disadvantage of either?—I am quite aware of that, and the proportion was given in a regulated scale; one Queen's officer got a brigade in proportion to four Company's officers; the proportion of divisions was different.

5008. Whatever may have been the proportion, it was fixed by the authorities in England, and every care was taken by them to preserve to the officers of both services the proportion of the commands respectively allotted to them?—I only know that it was interfered with by the local government.

5009. (*Chairman.*) A proportionate number of general officers were given to what was then the East India Company's service?—Yes, under the operation of the new warrant; what I complain of is, that the position which I held under the former warrant has been violated.

5010. Do you consider that by making the whole one army you will get rid of the objection which you have now mentioned?—I consider that you would not do justice to the Queen's troops by sending them to serve under junior officers. We had majors serving under my actual command who have been made major-generals four years ago, and if I was going out again, or another officer, we should find ourselves under people eight years our junior.

5011. Then I understand you to say, that you consider that making it one army would be a great advantage, that it would do away with several inconveniences and hardships which have arisen from the former system?—Yes, and jealousies in every possible way.

5012. You have given an instance of it in your own case?—Yes, it is exceedingly hard, and no person can tell the heartburning which there was at finding persons whom Queen's officers were commanding, made major-generals the next morning over their heads.

5013. Is there any other point which you wish to bring before the Commission?—No, I have no more to say upon the matter.

The witness withdrew.

Brevet-Major B. D. W. Ramsay.

Brevet-Major Balcarres Dalrymple Wardlaw Ramsay examined.

5014. (*Chairman.*) Will you be so good as to state to the Commission the rank which you hold in the army, the length of time you have served in India, and the different positions you have held there?—With respect to my rank in the army, I am brevet-major of the 75th regiment; I have served in India

on three different occasions: firstly, in the years 1845 and 1846. In 1845 I was aide-de-camp to Sir George Arthur, governor of Bombay. In 1846 I proceeded to the head-quarters camp at Lahore, served on the staff of Lord Hardinge; at the end of 1846 I returned to England invalided. On the second occasion I served in India as a captain in the 75th regiment from August 1849 to the commencement of 1851, when I proceeded home on leave of absence. On the third occasion, from the year 1854 to 1858, I served as brigade-major of Her Majesty's forces at Calcutta, and returned home on sick certificate last June.

5015. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Did not you serve in some other situation during that time. Were not you acting adjutant-general? — Yes, upon two different occasions I had charge of the adjutant-general's office, and of the quartermaster-general's office, first, when General Anson arrived in the country, for about six weeks, and secondly, before Sir Patrick Grant arrived, and while Sir Colin Campbell was there, for a short period.

5016. (*Chairman.*) Have you formed an opinion how far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as parts of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only?—I have. The European portion of the army in India should, in my opinion, be composed entirely of troops of the line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service. To have a local force serving in India along with troops of the line, appears to me an objectionable plan. The existing evils would, I consider, be perpetuated; the uncomfortable feeling, if I may so term it, which often existed between officers of Her Majesty's and the Honorable Company's forces when thrown together on duty, though personally, perhaps, great friends, would, I conceive, still exist, and probably in a heightened form between the officers of the troops of the line and those of a local force. I will take the liberty of here remarking, that having, during my service in India, associated much with officers of the Company's service, and numbering in its ranks many intimate and valued friends; in any remarks which I am constrained to make, I speak entirely free from any bias, or, perhaps I should say, prejudice, in favor of the service to which I have the honor to belong. Under the government of the Honourable East India Company's service, although there were often mutual jealousies, perhaps unconsciously, existing between the two services, still they were so distinctly separate in their whole constitution and bearing that unpleasant results only occasionally occurred; but this I apprehend would not be the case with a local European force brought into daily or hourly contact with troops of the line. With a local European force in India, and troops of the line, it would probably be found necessary to have, as now, a separate staff establishment. That this is most objectionable I think will be admitted by most officers of both services. The local Government would naturally, as now give their countenance more especially to the staff establishments connected with their own local force, and it would be impossible to prevent misunderstandings occurring between officers serving to a certain extent under different commands. I am supposing that the local European force proposed to be raised would be solely under the orders of the local Government, whereas the troops of the line would in all matters of discipline be under the control of the commander-in-chief at home, subject of course, as now, to local orders. Her Majesty's staff officers were certainly under the old system not placed in a proper position. I use the words "old system" advisedly, for since the rebellion, and the consequent vast accession of British troops the staff officers of Her Majesty's service have become of unexpected, and perhaps, in some instances, of unwelcome importance; but prior to this they had very far from exclusive charge of their own troops. In some cases they had absolutely nothing to do but to draw very handsome salaries, paid by a liberal government. I would instance the quartermaster-general of Her Majesty's forces. This officer had not the power to arrange the movement of a single regiment, or even to order the embarkation of a single soldier. All he could do was to present his compliments to the quartermaster-general of the army, and request that he would cause the matter to be effected. There existed, I conceive, a desire amongst the departmental officers of the staff of the army in India to retain in their own hands, as much as possible, power with reference to troops of Her Majesty's service. With reference to this point, the late commander-in-chief, General Anson, when, on his first arrival in Bengal, I had temporary charge of the adjutant-general and quartermaster-general's departments, expressed his intention, if possible, of arranging so that the quartermaster-general of Her Majesty's forces should perform exclusively the duties connected with his own service, but he was unable to carry his intention into effect. I can, if required, produce proofs that this state of things has acted prejudicially to the interests of Her Majesty's service.

5017. (*Major-General Hancock.*) The quartermaster-general of the Queen's troops in India had full opportunities of communicating his views regarding the movement of any of Her Majesty's troops to the commander-in-chief in India, had he not, equally with the quartermaster-general of the army?—Yes.

5018. Then in what respect did the Queen's troops suffer from the quartermaster-general of the army, who received his orders from the commander-in-chief in India, arranging for the general reliefs of the two services? — The quartermaster-general of Her Majesty's forces was unable to carry into effect himself the orders which he received. He was obliged to communicate with the quartermaster-general of the army, and to request him to carry them into effect.

5019. He had the power of submitting to the commander-in-chief his own views with respect to the advisability of all the arrangements proposed, and the commander-in-chief, after being made acquainted with those views, communicated his orders through the quartermaster-general of the army?—Yes.

5020. And it was only in carrying the orders of the commander-in-chief into effect that the quartermaster-general of the Queen's troops was not employed equally with the quartermaster-general of the army in the matter of the reliefs?—Yes.

5021. (*Col. Burlton.*) You think that there has been considerable jealousy between the two services in India?—Yes. There is an uncomfortable feeling even with friends. I can perhaps speak better than most officers on that point. My friends are officers of the Company's service.

5022. Do you not consider that from the fact of the whole army now being under one head, our gracious Sovereign, that feeling of jealousy can no longer exist, whether it be called a local army or a line army in India?—I do not think so. I think that it will be rather heightened, and that the evils will be perpetuated.

5023. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In what respect do you think that that feeling will be increased by Her Majesty's army being partially local and partially the line or moveable?—I think that the officers in a local force would not feel themselves *bonâ fide* officers of Her Majesty's service, and in all respects and particulars placed in the same position.

5024. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Why should they not be placed in the same position?—I think that some point of disagreement would occur, and they would not feel themselves in the position of being *bonâ fide* officers of Her Majesty's service.

5025. Surely they would be in a more favourable position than when the royal army was kept distinct from the local army, when, although serving together, the two armies were under different masters, the one under the immediate authority of the Crown, and the other under that of the East India Company?—I consider that in a certain respect they would serve two masters with a local force in India. If they were in regiments numbered from 100 upwards, they

Brevet-Major B. D. W. Ramsay.

4th Nov. 1852.

would consider themselves *bonâ fide* in Her Majesty's service, and I think would consider themselves in a better position.

5026. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you mean to say that from the fact of those officers being in a local force you think that the rest of the army would not think so highly of them?—I consider so.

5027. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Suppose the discipline of the local army was placed under Her Majesty's commander-in-chief at home, in the same way as with the regiments of the line, would not that remove the jealousy of which you have spoken?—Yes, I think that it would; but I have been supposing that they receive their orders from the local government.

5028. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You have been taking for granted that if they were localized they would not be under the commander-in-chief at all?—Yes.

5029. Supposing the army was under the commander-in-chief, and still partially local and partially moveable, do you think that that would make any difference?—Yes, I think that it would make a difference.

5030. (*Chairman.*) Do you not think that if there was a power of exchange from the local force to the general army it would also do away with any feeling of inferiority?—I think it would, in a certain measure.

5031. You think that the power of exchange, combined with their being under the commander-in-chief, would tend to do away with that feeling?—Very greatly.

5032. You think that in all armies there is a great advantage in having a uniformity of feeling?—Decidedly.

5033. And that anything which would counteract that would be, in a military point of view, objectionable?—I think so.

5034. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Are you not of opinion that it will add considerably to the feeling of inferiority on the part of a local European force, when they are constantly in the habit of seeing Her Majesty's regiments go to that country covered with medals of European fights, and all that sort of thing, and an officer says, "You fellows were never out of India, "look at us."—I think it might do so. I have a strong feeling on the point. I think the whole system is objectionable. From the feeling amongst junior officers of the Indian army, I think most of them would be inclined to be incorporated entirely, *bonâ fide*, in Her Majesty's service. I am far from taking upon myself to state that such a plan would be congenial to the feelings of the older officers of the Indian service; many of them have gained high distinctions and are much attached to the service in which they were raised to such high rank and distinction; but I think that the desire of all the junior officers would be to serve in Her Majesty's army. I have associated so much with them that I may say I know that to be their feeling.

5035. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Have you seen any inferiority in the local regiments to the Queen's, or in the Queen's to the local regiments?—Yes, most decidedly so; an inferiority in the Company's European corps.

5036. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In what respect?—As far as discipline is concerned. There is no doubt about it. Any officer who has commanded mixed bodies of the two troops will state that the discipline of the Company's European corps is, from what cause we can hardly say, far inferior. That comes under my own observation.

5037. In what respect under your own observation?—As regards the invalids coming home, of whom I had the charge at Fort William. The invalids of our service and of the Company's Europeans came generally together. The officers had always complaints to make of the extreme want of discipline of the Company's Europeans on their way down. Their want of discipline rose to such a height in Fort William that I was obliged to request General Anson, on his first arrival there, to remove our invalids who were there to Chinsurah, about 30 miles off. The Company's European soldiers who came there had thrown off every species of discipline, and it was impossible to guide or restrain them in any way. They were generally in Fort William under no officers of their own. The officers left them there, and they were under the town major, whose town sergeants endeavoured, as much as possible, to keep them in order, but it was impossible, and the embarking was a scene of riot and drunkenness.

5038. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) They were just brought down to Fort William and left?—Yes, and they were often without uniform.

5039. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) To what do you attribute the want of discipline?—I should say that it arises mostly from the paucity of officers amongst them.

5040. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) As you have seen a good deal of the two, what are comparatively the number of officers doing duty with a Queen's regiment and a number with a regiment of the local force?—There is hardly a comparison at all; the Company's Europeans have very few officers indeed.

5041. That of itself would account for a great want of discipline?—Yes; I apprehend that it principally arises from the paucity of the officers. A great proportion of the senior officers are absent on staff employment. An officer for years employed in a civil capacity rising by seniority in his regiment, suddenly finds himself called upon to command a thousand European soldiers. How can he be expected to keep his regiment in a proper state of discipline? The behaviour of the Company's European soldiers when proceeding home to England invalided was invariably, year after year, so bad that I was obliged to represent the matter most forcibly to General Anson, and to request that the invalids and recruits of Her Majesty's service might be sent to Chinsurah, so as not to suffer from the deteriorating influence of the Company's invalids. Any officer who has commanded a mixed body of Her Majesty's and the Honourable Company's invalids, of whom there are several now at home, will speak as to the relative discipline of the two. The result of the absence on staff employment of so many officers is that the work falls heavily on those who remain, consequently the service becomes distasteful to them. I have frequently heard officers congratulate themselves on not serving in the Europeans. On the other hand cadets, on first arrival, are almost invariably ambitious of being posted to a European corps, and during the progress of the rebellion, when there were no native regiments to post the cadets to, I can bear testimony to the pride and satisfaction with which they joined the regiments of Her Majesty's service to which they were temporarily attached. I argue from this, and generally from the feeling which I know to exist amongst the junior portion of the Indian army, that the most popular measure would be to raise so many more regiments in Her Majesty's service, numbering upwards from the 100th regiment for general service, incorporating in them the officers of the Company's service. Those officers would then feel themselves *bonâ fide* officers of Her Majesty's service in all respects, and in all particulars placed in the same position; then hearty good will and unanimity would prevail, whereas with a local force there would always be some point of disagreement, some comparisons instituted, some jealousy of peculiar privileges, in short, as I before remarked, the old evils would be perpetuated.

5042. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) The grounds, I understand, for your stating that you have seen the Europeans of the local army in that state which you describe, proceed from your having been in that particular position of receiving them when they came down to be invalided to go home?—Yes.

5043. Have you ever made any observation when you have seen them in the field, when they have been in cantonments, and so on, have you then observed a difference between the two?—I have not myself made any observation upon that, but I have frequently

heard statements from officers who have commanded mixed bodies of the troops.

5044. (*Chairman.*) Your experience is entirely confined to invalids, who have come down and have been left without an officer?—Yes, without an officer, except being under the townmajor.

5045. (*Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) As I understand those were men no longer in the service?—To a certain extent no longer in the service.

5046. (*Chairman.*) Were they discharged men?—They were to be discharged when they got to the India house, but not until they got there.

5047. (*Col. Burlton.*) Have you served in cantonments with any of these regiments?—No.

5048. Then you have not seen any of these regiments embodied?—At the hill stations I have seen them quartered, but I was merely on leave at the time.

5049. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Were you not with Lord Hardinge on the Sutlej?—Yes, but I only arrived on the 10th of March, after the campaign was ended.

5050. (*Chairman.*) In connection with the first question, have you formed any opinion as to the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter?—No; I do not feel myself competent to give any opinion upon that. The point upon which I felt most and wished to give my evidence most, was the position in which staff officers were placed, and the want of unanimity, which I consider has acted prejudicially in several instances to the service.

5051. Do you think that that would be obviated by making the whole one army, there being no distinction between the two?—I think so.

5052. Have you formed any opinion whether it is possible to consolidate the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other, and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect the object with perfect justice to the claims of all officers lately in the service of the East India Company?—In a financial point of view I have not formed any opinion upon that subject. I do not feel myself qualified to do so.

5053. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) As far as the principle of the thing goes, what is your opinion?—I think it would be very desirable to allow exchanges throughout. I adhere to my original opinion which I have stated, that I consider it best to have the whole Her Majesty's service: but if there is to be a local force, I consider that the best plan next to that would be to admit of exchanges.

5054. And that they should be under one code?—Entirely.

5055. And under the commander-in-chief at home as respects discipline?—Yes.

5056. Subject to local orders of course?—Yes; subject to local orders as now.

5057. Of course a great proportion of the army must be a native army. Would you allow of exchanges between European officers of native regiments and officers of regiments of Europeans?—Yes, I think so, I would hold it out as an inducement to the officers of native regiments to learn the language, and I would give them extra pay.

5058. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) From what source do you propose to officer the native army?—I would officer it from the whole body of officers, from the entire of Her Majesty's regiments. I would accept those wishing to remain in the country, there being an inducement to them to learn the language, but with a local force I would admit of exchange.

5059. Would you give the soldiers of the native army an equally good arm, and the same high military training as you would give to European soldiers of the corresponding branch of the service?—I think experience has shown that a knowledge of artillery has proved very detrimental to the interests of the country.

5060. I allude to the arms of the individual soldier, infantry and cavalry?—Yes, I certainly would.

5061. You would make no difference?—I would make no difference.

5062. Would you give him the same high degree of military training?—Decidedly so.

5063. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Do you think that there would be any difficulty in exchanges taking place between the officers of Her Majesty's regiments of the line and the officers of the native service?—No, I do not think there would. I think there would be a sufficient number of officers on either hand who would be anxious to exchange.

5064. Are you prepared with any financial view as to how they could do it?—No.

5065. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that it would act detrimentally to either service if it were done?—I think not. Anything which would tend to bring the services entirely together, so that there should be no point of disagreement in any possible way is the great end which I should look to.

5066. Your experience, which has been considerable in that respect, tends to the conclusion that there has been a good deal of feeling, which I would not characterize as bad feeling, but feeling of distinction and jealousy?—Yes; I could instance it in my own career, and no man more so, because my personal friends were some of the very officers that I speak about. In the Queen's service the regiments live entirely by themselves; they have their own circle, and an officer in the position of a staff officer of Her Majesty's service finds his friends amongst the officers of the Company's service, at least, that is my impression, and yet I say that there is that feeling which I have mentioned, and I can instance it from my own career. I am prepared to bring forward an instance of it.

5067. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Had the number of staff appointments that the Company's officers had in comparison to those which the officers of the troops of the line, had anything to do with the jealousy?—Yes, I think it had to a certain extent, because they found that the appointments were not thrown open to them; and since the appointments have been thrown open, which, until very lately, were only on "the "roads," *i.e.*, minor engineer service, very many officers have studied and got them.

5068. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) If the appointments were thrown open, do you think that the officers of the army in general would study the languages and prepare themselves for the appointments?—Decidedly.

5069. And you think that the service of India would not be unpopular amongst a certain class of officers?—Very far from it. I know that since the very limited number of appointments has been thrown open to the officers of Her Majesty's service, it has acted as a bond of union between the two services. I have particularly observed this within the last few years.

5070. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Of course, if all the appointments in India be thrown open to both services, you would also throw open to both all the appointments in England and the colonies?—Decidedly.

5071. You would not consider it just to give the officers of the line army a full share of the appointments in India, and to exclude those of the local army from appointments in England and the colonies?—Certainly not. I wish to remove every boundary.

5072. Do you think that officers who have been accustomed to serve with European troops before going to India, would take as kindly to the native soldiers, would conciliate to some extent their confidence, and would take the same pride in serving with them in the field, as they would with Europeans?—I think they would. I think, perhaps, more so, because being older and more experienced, they would be more likely to be careful and cautious in their dealings with the native soldiers, unless they have very strong prejudices.

5073. Do you not think that officers who go out to India in their youth, and serve from the first with native soldiers, would be more efficient in native regiments than officers who join them latter in life, and

Brevet-Major B. D. W. Ramsay.

4th Nov. 1858.

after having served with European corps?—I should say so, speaking of 25 or 30 years ago, but not as respects those who have lately come into the service; from my experience there has been a careless feeling among them, as far as the native soldiers are concerned.

5074. Regarded as an Indian question, do you not think that the various appointments in India, the higher offices of the state especially, would be more efficiently filled by officers who, from belonging to a local army, would have an abiding interest in the country, than by officers who, from having prospects of advancement open to them in England and elsewhere, would naturally turn their hopes and aspirations more towards Europe?—To a certain extent it might be so, but at the same time I think that it is very useful to bring European feelings and ideas into the country. I think that a man who has stayed a long time there, is almost certain unconsciously to imbibe very strong local prejudices, which I think often prove very embarrassing.

5075. Are you not of opinion that an occasional furlough to Europe would have the effect of removing such prejudices?—The old officers often go home, and then come back still more prejudiced.

5076. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Are you not aware that the greatest harmony and unanimity existed between Her Majesty's regiments of the line and the native troops before the revolt?—Decidedly, the greatest. I have seen it since the mutiny, with the new regiments which have arrived. There has been the same feeling as if they knew nothing about it. They have walked about and talked to each other in Fort William constantly, with the utmost unanimity, saying one to the other:—"Jack, what have you "heard? Let us have the news:" and so on.

5077. (*Col. Burlton.*) Have you ever heard the mutiny of the Bengal sepoys in some measure attributed to the fact, that the young officers of the present day, or of the last ten or twelve years, have not entered so intimately into association with their sepoys as was done in former days?—Most decidedly.

5078. I understood you to say just now that you considered that intimacy a disadvantage?—No, I cannot remember that I stated so.

5079. I thought you said that it was better to have fresh officers from India to command the sepoys?—I was talking of officers of some standing, holding appointments in the country.

5080. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) With reference to the want of discipline which you have stated that you have observed in the Europeau troops of the Company's service arriving in Calcutta, invalided to England, from the state of drunkenness in which they used frequently to be while in Fort William, preparatory to sailing for Europe, can you state under whose care those men were supposed to be placed on their arrival in Fort William, and how it happened that such men were seemingly left without any control?—They were placed under the care of the town-major in Fort William.

5081. Would not almost any European soldiers under such circumstances have become nearly as much demoralized as you have described such men to have been, whether of Her Majesty's or the Company's service, and do not you think that the blame exists, not in the men, but in the authorities, who appear to have permitted those men to be put into such a situation when about to embark for Europe after becoming entitled to their pensions?—Her Majesty's troops were placed in precisely the same position. The officers, unless specially ordered by the general, did not remain with them.

5082. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Was there no difference of system in respect to keeping efficient non-commissioned officers with them?—In each service the non-commissioned officers who accompanied the men were only those invalided or about to be discharged.

5083. Had the Company's European invalids the same advantage as regards having efficient non-commissioned officers over them as the Queen's invalids had?—There were double the number of non-commissioned officers of the staff of the Company's service in Fort William appointed to look after the invalids; there was only one non-commissioned officer attached to the brigade office of Her Majesty's service.

5084. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that there would be any difficulty in finding employment for the European officers of the late Company's service advantageously in India?—I think not, because when large numbers of them were in Calcutta without being posted to regiments, they found employment for every one. Sir Colin Campbell said, that if he had double the number he could find employment for them. They were employed in every possible capacity; officers were in all the stations on the roads, and in the Commissariat, affording assistance in every way. I remember hearing Sir Colin make that remark.

5085. (*Col. Burlton.*) That was only under a temporary emergency, it was an exceptional case?—Perhaps so.

5086. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But every officer was employed?—Yes.

5087. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) With reference to your statement that the discipline of the East India Company's European corps is far inferior to that of regiments of the line, I think you said that you made that statement from your own knowledge and experience only as regards the invalided soldiers of the Company's service whilst at Calcutta previously to their embarkation for England?—Just so.

5088. You have not served either in garrison or in field with the Company's European regiments?—No.

5089. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Do you feel yourself authorised to give an opinion as to the discipline of a corps because you saw the invalids of that corps behave ill under neglected circumstances?—I should hardly call them neglected circumstances; they were placed in the same position as Her Majesty's troops were, and Her Majesty's troops behaved well.

5090. They had officers with them?—No, the officers leave them when they came into the fort, and they are placed under the brigade-major there; all allowances cease for officers on entering Fort William.

5091. Do you feel yourself authorised to give an opinion as to the discipline of the head-quarters of a regiment, because the invalids behaved ill?—I think it is a very good criterion.

5092. (*Viscount Melville.*) When did you come home?—About the commencement of last June.

5093. Did you serve in India during the revolt?—The whole time. I had charge of the adjutant-general's office, and the quartermaster-general's office for three months.

5094. Had you any means of forming an opinion of the native feeling in India towards the British rule in the present state of the country?—I observed a marked change in the manner and demeanour of the natives (those with whom I was brought in contact) from the time that I had been previously in India.

5095. From what source do you suppose that it would be possible to enlist men to reorganize the native army, on whom you could depend?—The only safe plan that I could imagine would be raising and employing men such as the Sikhs in the lower parts of Madras and Bengal, and away from their homes. As I suppose that India cannot be governed without native levies, and those men raised in various parts of the country, I would employ them away from any local influence.

5096. Do you think that the Sikhs and the Punjaub levies are men that you can depend upon for their loyalty and fidelity?—I think, as long as they are paid well, and kept away from local influence, we can depend upon them, but not more than any other mercenaries, and certainly we can depend upon them as long as there is a Hindoo or a Mussulman against whom they can be brought.

5097. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) What was the particular class of natives in which you found the great change take place of which you have spoken?—

It was amongst those in Calcutta, amongst servants more especially, and decidedly in the bearing or demeanour of the sepoys.

5098. You had not made observation in the interior ?—No.

5099. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) What was the conduct of Her Majesty's regiments upon their arrival in Calcutta, generally speaking, as to discipline and behaviour. I speak of recent reinforcements ?—It was very exemplary, except as far as drunkenness was concerned, there was the usual amount of drunkenness.

5100. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Was their discipline bad or good ?—Very good indeed.

5101. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Was there any difference between them and the Madras European regiments which came ? — The Madras European regiments went up the country immediately, and I saw nothing of them.

5102. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Was their conduct bad as regards drunkenness ?—There was the usual amount. In only one regiment do I remember its occurring to a great extent. There was a want of unanimity in the staff at Calcutta.

Brevet-Major B. D. W. Ramsay.

24th Nov. 1858.

5103. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In what respect ?—I mean that I, in the position in which I was placed as brigade-major, the sole officer on Her Majesty's staff, was not at first in a position to carry out the requirements and secure the comfort of the regiments which arrived ; and I consider that the drunkenness in the particular regiment I allude to, arose in a great measure from the absence of proper arrangements for its reception, and from the consequent discomfort the men suffered.

5104. (*Viscount Melville.*) Was there no officer of the quartermaster-general's department to superintend the disembarkation ? — There were officers of the quartermaster-general's department.

The witness withdrew.

Adjourned to to-morrow at 11 o'clock.

Thursday, 25th November 1858.

PRESENT :

Major-General Peel.	Lieut-Gen. Sir Harry G. W. Smith.
H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge.	Major-Gen. Montgomerie.
Lord Stanley.	Major-Gen. Hancock.
Marquis of Tweeddale.	Colonel Burlton.
Viscount Melville.	Colonel Forsyth Tait.

Major-General PEEL in the Chair.

Colonel Henry Marion Durand, C.B., examined.

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

25th Nov. 1858

5105. (*Chairman.*) You are a colonel in the Bengal engineers ?—Yes.

5106. Will you state to the Commission the length of your service in India ?—I landed in India in May 1830. My service in the army counts a year and a half longer than that.

5107. You have served in India 28 years ?—Yes.

5108. What appointments have you filled in India ? —I have filled a great variety of appointments, but I commenced with being employed in the barrack department in the department of public works. I was then several years in the canal department, and from the canal department I was sent upon service into Affghanistan. I returned on furlough to England after the campaign in Affghanistan, and went out with Lord Ellenborough to India, and was with him as private secretary in India ; upon his going away I was sent as commissioner to the Moulmain coast, and was two and a half years commissioner on the Moulmain coast ; after that I returned to England, and returned afterwards to India in time for the last campaign in the Punjaub ; I served in that, and was afterwards sent as political agent to Gwalior, and after that as political agent to Bhopal, also as resident at Nagpore for a short time. I then again returned to England, and afterwards went back to India, and was employed for some time in the engineer department as the superintending engineer in Bengal, and then was deputed to officiate as agent for the Governor-general in Central India, and was there during the time of the insurrection. I subsequently went round to Calcutta, and was sent for by Lord Canning, in connexion with the reorganization of the army, and have latterly been employed, in that capacity, in collecting information with reference to it.

5109. (*Col. Burlton.*) You have had two furloughs to England during the 28 years ?—Yes. I have had in fact three, because when I first came home, as I went back with Lord Ellenborough after being four months in England, I had only one year, and I returned to England for the remaining two years of furlough ; and I a third time came upon private affairs.

5110. (*Chairman.*) You are now specially deputed by the Governor-general of India and the Secretary of State for India to lay before the Commission the opinions collected upon the questions issued by Lord Canning's instructions and Lord Canning's own views on some of the principal heads under the consideration of the Commission ?—Yes; the views of the Governor-general have already been put into the hands of the Secretary of State, and he, I believe, has laid them before the Commission. I was directed to deliver to the Secretary of State the general views of the Governor-general, which appear in the memorandum that he put into my charge to deliver to Lord Stanley.

5111. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you wish anything that you state to be considered as your own opinion, or to be considered as the opinions of the Governor-general ?—I have been so much in actual confidential communication with the Governor-general, that my own opinions coincide very much with the memorandum which has been already laid before the Secretary of State. Where my own opinions at all differ I can distinguish, but I do not think that they differ in any material degree.

5112. (*Chairman.*) Will you make a general statement of what your opinions and views are upon the subjects which have been submitted to the Commission ?—They in fact coincide very much with those of the Governor-General, in all the points which enter into that memorandum of Lord Canning's, which was put before the Secretary of State. I have been in constant communication and intercourse with Lord Canning, and there really is little difference between our opinions.

The witness read a memorandum explanatory of Lord Canning's views ; the same being as follows :—

"Memorandum by Viscount Canning.

"The appointment of a Royal Commission in England to consider the question of the reorganization of the Indian

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

5th Nov. 1858.

army, induces me to send to England immediately the officer who for some time past has been specially employed in obtaining and collating the opinions of the governors and commanders-in-chief of Madras and Bombay, of the commanders-in-chief in India, and of officers of rank and recent experience in the civil and military services of the East India Company.

"2. In doing so, I consider it advisable to enable Lieutenant-Colonel Durand to lay before Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, not only the opinions which have been given in India in answer to the questions circulated under my instructions, but also my own views on some of the principal heads of inquiry which will be submitted to the Royal Commissioners. For this last purpose this memorandum is placed in Lieutenant-Colonel Durand's hands.

"3. In expressing these views, however, I must, for the present, abstain from entering into details. Time will not admit of this. Moreover, I have not yet been placed in possession of the opinions of some of those to whom the questions were referred; and the views and suggestions of others of high authority have been received too recently to allow of my giving to them the consideration which they deserve.

"4. I should have been glad that my own general opinions as now expressed should have been accompanied by those of my honourable colleagues in the council; but it has not yet been possible to submit to the consideration of the president in council at Calcutta the papers which have been laid before me, and which, though still incomplete, are very voluminous. This will, however, be done as quickly as circumstances will admit, and I trust that before long I shall be enabled both to place it in the power of the members of council to express their opinion on the several points involved in the reorganization of the army in India, and to transmit to Her Majesty's Secretary of State my own views in regard to them in fuller detail."

[I should state that at Allahabad there was very great difficulty in the mere amanuensis part of the business, the mere copying, and we really could not get the number of duplicates which were requisite in order to send them. Lord Canning was exceedingly anxious that the Secretary of State here should know what was doing, and that copies should be sent to him, and there was necessarily a copy to be kept there, and if it had not been for the politeness of Brigadier Wood of the Royal Horse Artillery who lent me two or three clerks, and so forth, we should not have been able to do even what was done, and as it was Lord Canning could not send his memorandum down to the Council.]

"5. I understand that the Commission will be instructed to inquire into the following points:—

"(1.) The terms on which the army of the East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown.

"(2.) The permanent force necessary to be maintained in the Indian provinces respectively, after the restoration of tranquillity.

"(3.) The proportion which Europeans should bear to native troops, in infantry, cavalry, and artillery, respectively.

"(4.) How far the European portion of the army should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as parts of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only.

"(5.) In connexion with this question, the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter.

"(6.) Whether it be possible to consolidate the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other; and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company.

"(7.) Whether there should be any admixture of European and native forces, either regimentally or by brigade?

"(8.) Whether the local European force should be kept up by draughts and volunteers from the line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?

"(9.) Whether it would be possible to raise any regiments in the colonies, either for temporary or permanent service in India?

"(10.) Whether the native troops should be regular or irregular, or both, and if so, in what proportions?

"(11.) Whether any native artillery corps should be sanctioned?

"(12.) Whether cadets sent out for service with native troops should, in the first instance, be attached to European regiments, to secure uniformity of drill and discipline?

"6. It appears to me that these points of inquiry are divisible into two branches, those which should be decided by Her Majesty's Government directly and absolutely, and those which the Government of India should be empowered to decide on, in accordance, of course, with any general instructions which may be issued by Her Majesty's Government, and subject to its approval, but with liberty to the Government of India to act upon its own decision, where early action may be necessary.

"7. On the first point of the inquiry to be instituted by the Commission,—'The terms on which the army of the 'East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown,' I consider it unnecessary that I should offer any opinion. It refers, as I understand it, to terms which must be adjusted between Her Majesty's Government and the East India Company, and is one on which Her Majesty's Government can alone decide.

"8. For the same reason I do not propose to offer any opinion on the fifth and eighth points; the fifth, relating to 'the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the 'portion of the European army which is to be composed of 'troops of the line, and of securing the efficiency of that 'portion which is to consist of troops raised for the service in 'India only;' the eighth, relating to the 'keeping up the 'local European force, whether by draughts and volunteers 'from the line, or by separate recruiting in Great Britain, 'as at present.'

"9. The remaining points appear either to require an expression of my views, or to embrace subjects which might be most conveniently committed to the discretion of the Government of India.

"10. And first, in regard to the second point,—'The 'permanent force necessary to be maintained in the Indian 'provinces respectively after the restoration of tranquillity.'

"11. At the time of the outbreak at Meerut, the Bengal army numbered about 119,000 native troops of all arms; that of Madras 50,000, and that of Bombay 31,000. The aggregate of the Madras and Bombay armies was therefore less than that of the Bengal army by 38,000 men.

"12. We are now emerging from the state of anarchy consequent on the revolt of the Bengal army, mainly through the strength and exertions of our British forces, but partly by the aid of the Punjaub troops.

"13. Exclusive of the disarmed corps, the Bengal army now amounts to about 80,000 men, and if the militarily organized police be included, it amounts to about 130,000 men; that is, some 11,000 men more than at the time of the outbreak at Meerut; of these 130,000 men, about 75,000 are Punjabees; and of these Punjabees probably 23,000 are Sikhs. The difference, therefore, between our position in 1858 and our position in 1857 is, that there is now a larger native force, and that the bulk of it, instead of being drawn from Oude, is drawn from the Punjab.

"14. When the police of Madras is complete, there will be in all India about 300,000 native troops, regular, irregular, and police militarily organized.

"15. In this state of things, the demands for European troops put forward by the various Governments, as at present necessary, are not excessive. The whole number does not much exceed the number which will be in the country when the draughts and reinforcements of the season arrive, viz., about 100,000 men.

"16. I consider that the force of European infantry ultimately requisite for the permanent occupation of the Bengal presidency, may be estimated at forty-five regiments. I do not think it possible that the ground which the Bengal army will have to hold, can be sufficiently covered by less than that number. I should wish to see this force composed of thirty local regiments, and fifteen regiments of the line; the local regiments would be strong enough, if of the strength of 800 rank and file.

"17. There are now in the Bengal army three European regiments of the Company's service, and three are in course of formation, being officered by European officers of six native infantry battalions. Therefore, for the other 24 regiments of local European infantry to be raised for service in Bengal, there remain available 68 cadres of battalion officers. If two of these cadres are taken for each European regiment, 48 cadres will be absorbed, and a surplus of 20 cadres will be left, after the European infantry shall have been provided for.

"I propose that upon these 20 cadres there should be formed 20 regiments of regular native infantry; and further, that the 30 regiments of local European infantry should furnish the officers required to officer on the irregular system 30 regiments of irregular native infantry.

"18. In time of peace, it will, I believe, be found sufficient if these regiments are limited to a strength of about 700 each. This would give 50 native battalions for purely military service, and it would leave the 30 local European regiments, and the 20 regular native regiments, well able to supply officers for the command of the military police battalions, which have already been largely raised, and which, when once fully organized, will relieve the native troops of many of the non-military duties hitherto imposed upon them.

"The same regiments will also be able to supply officers for general staff purposes.

"19. In regard to native cavalry for Bengal, none but irregular corps are to be desired, and this arm of the service must be kept up on its present scale. It will be necessary that with each of the European regiments of local cavalry a corps of irregulars shall at all times be quartered, to relieve the European regiments of some of those duties which press heavily upon a small European corps.

"20. In regard to European cavalry for Bengal, I have already represented to the Home Government, in a despatch of the 8th July last, that it is very desirable that the cavalry regiments of the local army should be ten of 440 sabres each, rather than five of 818 sabres each, as originally ordered by the Honourable Court of Directors. Should this proposal be complied with, it will still be necessary that not less than three regiments of cavalry from the English army should be retained in Bengal for the present.

"21. In regard to artillery, I have given my opinion fully in a minute of the 9th of August last. I wish to see 78 batteries allotted to the local army.

"22. Passing to Madras, and including with that presidency the province of Pegu and the Straits, I believe that 12 regiments of European infantry will suffice for its service.

"23. Of European cavalry, I am of opinion that Madras requires for the present three regiments from the English army; but I recommend that eventually the eight native regiments of light cavalry be converted into three regiments of European cavalry, raised for the local army of Madras, of about the same strength as has been already recommended for Bengal, and that from the officers of the light cavalry remaining undisposed of, five regiments of irregular cavalry be officered. I say eventually, because, before this or any other change which will raise discontent, and which is not immediately urgent, is attempted in the native armies of Madras or of Bombay, the new Bengal army ought to be well in hand. This caution applies to all changes which will entail the disbandment of any large number of native troops in those presidencies. It will be better to incur for a year or two the expense of maintaining an extra European force drawn from the English army than to run the risk of the results which dissatisfaction and excitement may produce if we disturb the soldiery of Madras or Bombay before the great army of Bengal is reconstructed on safe principles. It would be a great error to suppose that we have now throughout India a tabula-rasa, upon which we can build up any new military establishment which may be deemed proper, and to forget that, in prudence as well as in justice, the native armies of Madras and Bombay, which are still standing at their full numbers, and have shown themselves on the whole loyal, must be treated cautiously and considerately in the introduction of changes.

"24. I have given my opinion respecting the artillery of Madras and Bombay in separate minutes, and I would not recommend that the changes to be made in this arm should be deferred.

"25. In the matter of the European force to be allotted to Bombay, I am not in possession of the views of Lord Elphinstone; I therefore abstain from giving any positive opinion upon it. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, Sir H. Somerset, estimates the required number of regiments at fifteen of infantry, and three of cavalry; the former at the full complement of 1,077 rank and file each, and the latter at 748 sabres each. I believe this requirement to be unnecessarily large, even though Rajpootana should be held by the Bombay army.

"26. In regard to the 3rd point of inquiry, viz., 'the 'proportion which European should bear to native troops 'in infantry, cavalry, and artillery respectively,' I am of opinion that, as a general rule, the proportion should not be less than that of two to five, reckoning the military police as troops. It does not seem necessary to lay down any particular rule as to the proportion to be observed between Europeans and natives in each particular arm of the service, especially as, in the case of the artillery, the arm of paramount importance, it has been determined that in Bengal no appreciable strength of native artillery should be maintained.

"27. The 4th point has already been noticed, so far as regards the army of Bengal.

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

25th Nov. 1858.

"28. The 6th point is this, 'whether it be possible to con- 'solidate the European forces so as to allow of exchange 'from one branch of the service to the other, and what 'regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect 'this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers 'now in the service of the East India Company.'

"29. The difficulties of amalgamation, arising out of the two distinct systems of promotion, by purchase and by seniority, obtaining respectively in Her Majesty's army and in that of the East India Company, are very great. I can suggest no satisfactory solution of them. But it appears to me to be most important that, in the event of an amalgamation of the local army with the line being found to be too difficult for adjustment or too expensive, or, for other reasons, not advisable, some arrangement should still be provided, by which the local European army should be made to feel that it is composed of the same stuff, and is in all respects in an equally honorable position with the line. I think it very desirable that officers should be enabled to pass from the one into the other, though here also difficulties are not slight; that there should be a clear understanding that the senior officers whose service and ability may render them fit for such marks of Her Majesty's confidence shall be permitted to serve Her Majesty out of India as well as in this country, and that divisional and brigade commands should be distributed between the two armies in a fair proportion. On the other hand, the officers of the line should have a larger share of staff employment than they have hitherto had.

"30. On the subject of staff and civil employment I would here say a few words.

"31. I think that in order to remedy the chief evil resulting from the Indian system of staff and civil employment, it will be found necessary to adopt the plan of *seconding*, as followed in Her Majesty's service. It would probably suffice to adopt it in regard to officers taken from their regiments for civil employ alone, and not in the case of those taken for the staff departments connected with the army. I doubt whether a staff list would work so well as *seconding*. The latter is equally encouraging to the regimental officer. It preserves to Government the advantages of the present system, and is more in accordance with the organization of the Indian service.

"32. I do not share all the objections which have been very generally made to the withdrawal of officers from regiments for staff employ. I think that the disadvantages of the system are counterbalanced by great advantages which it would be unwise to sacrifice; and that the former admit of much mitigation, without departure from the system.

"33. Considering the frequency and suddenness of calls for active operations in India, it is convenient to be able to strengthen a regiment with officers at short notice. At the same time it is desirable that officers whose presence with their corps is not required in time of peace, should be saved from the many evils attending an idle garrison life. Both these objects will be most cheaply and better accomplished by retaining with proper checks the system of civil employment for military officers.

"34. Civil employment, and the prospect of it, give to officers a much greater interest in and knowledge of the country than they would otherwise acquire.

"It places an officer in situations of responsibility and trial, of which he would otherwise have no experience; it sharpens his intelligence and makes him readier, handier, and more self-reliant, and therefore eventually a better soldier, than he would otherwise be. Some of the ablest and most distinguished men of the Indian service are those who have had the benefit of this system. Of those of the present day it suffices to name Outram, Nicholson, and Edwardes; other names of more or less note might be added. Looking to the Queen's army, the mention of Sir Hugh Rose and Sir W. Mansfield is enough to show that military ability is in no way impaired by a course of civil service.

"35. And it is further to be recollected, that if the system of placing military officers in civil situations be discontinued, the inevitable consequence will be that the civil service must be largely increased, and considerable additional expenditure be occasioned thereby.

"36. The 7th question, 'whether there should be any 'admixture of European forces, whether regimentally or by 'brigade,' may with advantage be left for experiment and decision in India. Admixture in brigades seems scarcely avoidable—in regiments it does not appear to me desirable; and in proposing, as I have already done, that a body of irregular cavalry should invariably be associated with each European cavalry regiment, I do not contemplate that the connexion should be permanent, but that the body of irregulars should be changed from time to time as may be most convenient.

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

25th Nov. 1858.

"37. In the evidence will be found a suggestion from Colonel Keith Young, for attaching to each European regiment a company of native infantry, selected from the cook boy class. Such a body would no doubt be useful in relieving the European soldiers of some duties which are wearing to the men, not beneficial to their discipline or health, and equally well performed by a native. The experiment is worth trial; but I think it would be found that nearly the same convenience could be obtained by a less close association, and that it is not an advantage to either party that the European and the native soldier should be forced into habitual juxtaposition.

"38. In regard to the 9th head of inquiry, viz., 'whether 'it would be possible to raise any regiments in the colonies 'either for temporary or permanent service in India,' the possibility of raising these troops can be satisfactorily considered by Her Majesty's Government alone; but I earnestly hope that, even if the facility should prove greater than it has yet been found to be, no systematic introduction into India of African, West Indian, or foreign Asiatic troops, may take place.

"39. Fifteen months ago a West Indian or an African brigade would have been of great service, morally as well as physically. Our native regiments were turning against us daily. The natives in general were incredulous of our ability to supply their places, and to hold our own, with Englishmen. Any manifest proof that we had resources hitherto unknown to them, from which we could draw soldiers as impenetrable by the climate as themselves, and equal to them in bodily strength and discipline, would have operated very usefully. But the case is altered now. It has now become at least as necessary to inspire confidence and goodwill, as fear. Few measures could be more destructive of the first-named feelings than the suspicion that that which they consider the most honourable employment which we can offer them is, under a new order of things, to be put in other hands.

"I quite concur in the objections which are urged by most of the witnesses to the adoption of this measure.

"40. The tenth point has already been answered, so far as I am able to do so at present.

"41. The eleventh is to this effect, 'whether any native 'artillery corps should be sanctioned.' I understand this to have been ruled generally in the negative. As regards Bengal, it will be easy to make the change, and I am of opinion that it will not be wise to make any exceptions to it unless in one or two outlying districts, such as the Trans-Indus frontier, Assam, and Arracan.

"42. In Madras and Bombay the transition from native to European artillery must be made gradually; but I would begin to make it with as little delay as possible. The Scinde frontier, like that of the Punjab, would furnish an exception; but of the soundness of the policy which shall make the native army feel that nearly every piece of ordnance in the British territory is in our keeping, I have no doubt whatever. No change that we can make will be a surer source of security.

"43. The twelfth point of inquiry is, 'whether cadets sent out for service with native troops should in the first 'instance be attached to European regiments, to secure 'uniformity of drill and discipline.'

"44. It has been already ordered, that cadets for the native infantry are to be attached for the first six months to European corps. The rule is an excellent one, though I doubt whether the term is long enough. But I am strongly of opinion that some measure more effective than this is necessary to make our young officers what they ought to be.

"45. Cadets have hitherto joined their corps as half-educated youths; and it is more surprising that many have turned out well than that many early acquire indolent habits, which unfit them for an active career, and for posts of responsibility. It would be a great improvement if a higher scale of education were exacted from candidates or nominees, and if it were further required that, before a young officer came out to India, he should qualify himself by being attached for a time to a Queen's regiment in England, in all the professional knowledge expected from an efficient subaltern.

"46. I have now touched briefly upon the points of inquiry which I understand to have been submitted to the royal commission; but many collateral questions spring out of these: the castes and races from which the native army shall be mainly recruited; the proportion to be observed between them; the extent to which the recruiting for each regiment should be confined to a particular district, so as to give a local character to the corps; the grouping of different castes and races in the same regiment, or in the same company; the retention of native commissioned officers; the enlargement of the powers of commanding officers; the changes desirable in the system of courts martial; the continuance or modification of the pension system.

"47. Upon all these heads much valuable information will be found in the evidence which Lieutenant-Colonel Durand carries to England, although it is in many respects incomplete; and I am of opinion that upon nearly all of them a large discretion and the power of final action should be placed in the hands of the Government of India, subject to any guiding principles which Her Majesty's Government may think fit to prescribe.

"48. Meanwhile the raising of troops mainly Hindostanee must continue, if only to provide a counterpoise to the present preponderance of the Punjabee and Sikh soldiers, upon whom during the disquietude of Hindostan we have been compelled to draw so largely, and whose number cannot be reduced until others are ready to take their place.

"This is being done in such a manner as to avoid as much as possible any prejudgment on important points in the general reorganization.

"CANNING."

5113. I understand you generally to concur with Lord Canning in the opinions expressed in that paper?—Yes.

5114. Therefore it is your own opinion that is now asked. I see that the first answer which is given to any of the questions which have been submitted, is to the second question, and that it is proposed that in the Bengal presidency there should be 45 European battalions?—Yes.

5115. Can you state the number of battalions proposed in the other two presidencies?—Lord Canning in this memorandum mentions that Sir Henry Somerset asks for 15. In the 22nd paragraph, Lord Canning states "Passing to Madras, and including with that "presidency the province of Pegu, and the Straits, I "believe that 12 regiments of European infantry will "suffice for its service."

5116. That would make 72 European regiments altogether for service in India, 45, 15, and 12?—But then Lord Canning remarks that he thinks the 15 required for Bombay more than would be necessary.

5117. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have you any idea what he thinks would be necessary for Bombay?—Yes; I think he said 12, exclusive of Rajpootana.

5118. (*Chairman.*) How many European regiments do you think will be eventually required for service in India?—That is a very difficult question to answer, because it depends so much upon the settlement which is made, upon how the present revolt is got over, and in what state the country is left. I think that for Bengal, after putting down this revolt, there may be from 50 to 45 regiments requisite; I think that ultimately 45 will be sufficient for Bengal, and that 12 will be requisite for Madras, and about the same number for Bombay; but it is a question which cannot be answered with absolute decision, because it depends so much upon the way in which this revolt is stamped out everywhere.

5119. I see that the only answer which has been given to the fourth point has been mixed up with the answers given to this point, and that it is there recommended by Lord Canning that of the force of European regiments, whatever it may be, two-thirds should be local, and one-third of the line?—Yes.

5120. Upon what principle is it that this great change is proposed to be made in the increase of local regiments in comparison with those of Her Majesty's service?—It appears to me that there is a necessity for employing them. In the first place, we have a large number of officers, who are a great expense to the Government, and who have at present no corps whatever. You are, in fact, spending about 1,000,000*l.* upon cadres of battalions which have no regiments at all; therefore there is, in the first place, the difficulty how to dispose of these officers, and how to get rid of this useless expenditure. And at the present time the military expenditure in India is so enormous, that already, according to a sketch estimate which I have here from the military auditor, it is some 4,000,000*l.* over what it was before. The charges for 1856-7 the military auditor gave me as 7 crores, 2 lacs, 96,921 rupees, you may say 7,000,000*l.* The sketch estimate for 1858-9 is 11 crores, 23 lacs, 48,975 rupees; that is to say, a differ-

ence of upwards of 4,000,000*l.* These sketch estimates are usually under the mark, therefore I think that in all probability the military expenditure will be much greater, and the financial question is really a very essential part of the consideration at present. That is one point which makes it important that employment should be found for the officers of the Bengal army; and I do not think that they could be disposed of in any other way without exciting very great discontent among the officers themselves, and also great apprehension in the other two armies, and perhaps a good deal of discontent too. Therefore, upon the principle of economy, and also upon the principle of not having a discontented body of officers, which is really a very important thing, considering the present state of India, and the present state of the other two armies which have remained loyal, it is advisable to officer the local corps of Europeans in that way. But there is a further point, which is that a local army is really essential. It appears to me, if I may be allowed to state my own opinion, that it involves the question whether we shall keep or lose India, because you require in India a body of officers who shall not be liable to be estranged from the country, whose regiments in India they look upon, in fact, for the greater part of their lives as their homes; they become acquainted with the country, and they become acquainted with the people, and you can obtain in no other way a set of gentlemen who are thoroughly fit for the work which they have to perform in that country, work of a very varied character. You draw large numbers of them for all kinds of employments, and they are always available for military service.

5121. You have stated that one of the reasons for your opinion is, that there are at present a large number of officers who have no employment; I believe that the native army now is 30,000 in excess of what it was previously to the mutiny?—Yes.

5122. How is it officered?—It is officered by these officers.

5123. Therefore at present they are in employment?—A great number of them are in temporary employment at present, drawn to officer police corps, and employed in various ways; in any and every way, but it is not regular employment.

5124. Are you aware of the number of regiments belonging to Her Majesty's service that are now in India?—I have not the return here.

5125. It is 75; therefore if this proportion was to be maintained there would be only 24 regiments of Her Majesty's general service kept in India, and 51 must be returned to this country. What would become of the 51 Queen's regiments who have been raised for this purpose for service in India if they were to be returned according to your plan?—In the first place I do not think that you can withdraw 51 regiments rapidly; I think that it will be a very slow operation. The raising of these local corps will take time; and again the first army which is to be dealt with and reconstructed is that of Bengal, in which, out of 45, it is proposed that there shall be 30 local regiments. Therefore, Bombay and Madras would have to remain unaltered for the present. Whatever proportion of European troops is requisite there over and above those where they already have local troops, would have to remain for the present, the first thing being to get up the Bengal army to its proper strength, to the strength proposed by the Governor-general. Therefore, I look upon it that it would be a slow process raising a local army, and that there would be no difficulty of the kind which you are at present suggesting with the royal army.

5126. Why not? Eventually, by your plan, there are to be 51 regiments returned upon this country, the officers of which must be reduced, and therefore it would be a great additional burthen thrown upon the revenue of this country?—It appears to me, that in the time which it would require to raise the local army with the calls which would most likely be made for service in this country or elsewhere, there would not be that question. It is one reason, and a very main reason, with myself why I advocate a local army in India, that I look upon it as absolutely necessary that India should be free from the danger of a sudden recal of a large body of European troops from India. It is, therefore, that I say that I look upon it as a question whether we are to keep or whether we are to lose India, because the moment a pressure comes upon this country, in consequence of a European war, which may happen at any time, there would be a number of troops withdrawn from India, and possibly withdrawn in too great a quantity. We had an instance of that not long ago in the case of Lord Dalhousie. During his administration there was a Governor-general, a man of great authority, whose opinions had the greatest possible weight; then came the Crimean war, which was a war at some distance from England: there was no immediate danger, if one may so speak, to England itself, and yet that Governor-general, with all his power and influence and name, was forced at last to say that if more troops were withdrawn from India, he could not answer for India.

5127. (*Viscount Melville.*) But in that case there were only two cavalry regiments withdrawn, and Lord Dalhousie had been urging upon the Home Government to withdraw those regiments before they were withdrawn?—Yes; but they wanted to withdraw more infantry than he could spare, because he himself has said so.

5128. (*Chairman.*) Must not the withdrawal of regiments from India depend upon the Secretary of State for India and the Government at home? Is it not on the responsibility of the Government?—It is upon the responsibility of the Government, no doubt, but my argument is that the home pressure will not be withstood.

5129. The Secretary of State for India being a member of the Government, surely would take that matter into consideration?—I only judge by results when the pressure comes. India viewed from home is a secondary matter altogether, and the troops are removed.

5130. (*Lord Stanley.*) The question of removing or keeping the troops would be decided by the Government here?—Yes.

5131. In the event of a European war, public opinion, which influences every Government here, would be concentrated upon the European difficulty, and the risk to India, if it were not very imminent, would probably be overlooked altogether?—Quite so.

5132. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that in the event of a great pressure, the Government of the day, if the pressure was put upon them, would attempt to get these troops, whether they were local troops or not, and would make arrangements to do so?—I think they would; but I think it would take time, because when you recruit men for a local service, and when you have officers whose condition of service is a local service, it takes some time to get over the mere technical difficulties which all that creates, and it takes some time for a Government to consider the matter, and to arrange before they strip the Indian empire, in fact, of those troops.

5133. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Is there not something beyond that? Were the local troops enlisted for service in India only, would not the circumstance of their not being liable to serve elsewhere put it beyond the power of the Home Government to make them available to meet a European emergency, and thereby secure to India the permanent retention of that portion of its European force?—I look upon it that of course Parliament would have the power to do anything; therefore, however, the men had been enlisted, the Government could by Act of Parliament or by other means ultimately arrange to draw whatever body of troops was wanted, but it takes time. The statesmen of England and the

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

25th Nov. 1858.

commanders of England must then think before they act.

5134. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would not the statesmen and commanders of England think before they denuded such an empire as India, valuable as it is to this country, of troops as you think they might do?—No doubt they would think, but at the same time I merely judge by results, and although they would think to a certain extent I do not think that they would realise to themselves the danger of stripping troops to the extent to which they would be inclined to do it.

5135. (*Chairman.*) You consider that it would be a great advantage to India to have a body of European troops raised in this country which the Government here would not have the power of withdrawing from India in case of a war in Europe?—Not suddenly.

5136. Do you not think on the other hand that it would be a great disadvantage to the empire to have a large body of men raised in this country who could not be employed in a European war if necessity arose for it?—No.

5137. You can only raise a certain number of men in this country by voluntary enlistment. If a large proportion of that number is to be tied up for local service in India, and not to be removed under any circumstances, will not it create great danger to the empire in general?—But can you withdraw those men? The question as it is at present put to me appears to involve this, that it takes for granted that you can withdraw the men from India. Now I argue that you cannot withdraw the men from India; that for the future, after what has happened, you must hold India upon a different footing from that on which you have hitherto held it; you must have a larger European force, and wherever you have troops in India, those troops must be well balanced forces. You can no longer have what we used to have; for instance, I recollect that in 1844, in Rajpootana and the whole of Central India, there were some 30,000 native troops, and there were two European batteries of artillery or something of that sort, that was all. On looking at papers, perhaps many other instances might be given, but you will be no longer able to do that in India; wherever you have troops they must be well balanced forces, and you will require a large permanent garrison of European troops, you will never be able to do without it; it may change, it may be a little more, and a little less. When your railway communications are all complete, it may perhaps be brought down a little lower even than the 45 regiments. But taking the question as it is put to me, it appears to me to involve that which will be in future impracticable, namely, holding India with very few European troops.

5138. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The question as it appears to me is a double question, there is a question as regards the interests of India, and the question as regards the interests of the empire, should not the interests of the empire, which include the interests of India, be considered as the primary ones and is it not the case that you should not regard the Indian advantages or necessities only?—I am quite of opinion that the object of paramount importance is necessarily England itself; but I am inclined to maintain that you peril that paramount importance by endangering India, that if you leave it open to a sudden stripping of India of troops, and if you lose India, you peril the position and the importance of this country more in that way than in any other.

5139. Do you think that any government would risk such a position?—That I can only judge of by results so far as I have seen; I have now served in India from 1830 up to the present time. It has appeared to me that on the one or two occasions when there has been any pressure, but chiefly the last one, the danger of India being suddenly stripped of troops has been very great.

5140. Excepting the Crimean war, which is an exceptional case, do you not think that on former occasions if there has been a reduction of troops in India, it has been on Indian financial grounds, and not because there has been any pressure upon the Government to withdraw troops?—It may have been on both accounts; the financial consideration may have entered as much as others.

5141. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are you not aware that years ago the Court of Directors forced upon the British Government a reduction of the number of troops on financial grounds?—Yes.

5142. (*Chairman.*) You assume that the European force to be maintained in India, whether local or movable, is to be raised in this country?—Yes.

5143. Would it not be a great disadvantage to this country if there was not the power of removing a large proportion of that European force in case of great danger in Europe?—I look upon it that there would be the power of removing it after going through certain measures, which would necessarily force upon the Government a consideration of the matter.

5144. But you assume that which I believe to be perfectly incorrect, namely, that if a man was enlisted under certain conditions, Parliament would have the power to waive those conditions; you would then have a mutiny in your army at once?—I suppose it would have the power of allowing men to volunteer from that army; I do not mean to say that it would have the power to cancel the obligations entered into, but it certainly would have the power to say that that local army might volunteer.

5145. (*Lord Stanley.*) That is to say, that you consider that a force raised for local service in India, and having its head quarters in India, would be available for service in Europe, or that a great part of it would be so available in case of extreme emergency?—Yes.

5146. But you think at the same time that there would be a check, and that that check would be a necessary and useful check upon its employment in Europe to the danger of India, without any mature consideration?—Yes.

5147. (*Chairman.*) Therefore although the necessity might be immediate, that force could not be made use of without time being taken, in order to carry the measure into operation?—I consider that the distance from India from this country quite puts that position out of the question, because anything immediate you cannot meet by sending to India for troops. I mean to say, for instance, taking an extreme case, that if there were landed upon any part of your coast 40,000 or 50,000 French troops, you could not send to India for troops.

5148. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Supposing that the local Indian army is to be raised by recruits from this country, which recruits would not be available for service in this country, and that, on the other hand, you have a large number of regiments of the line in India, which must be relieved, and consequently you will require a larger proportion of line regiments at home to afford those reliefs, will not that very fact alone, if it is a line army, in contradistinction to a local army, give more military power to this country at home?—It might give more military power to this country at home with respect to European powers, but I do not think that it would give such stability to our Indian empire, and that I look upon as a very important consideration for this country. For instance, what natives usually advance against our Indian administration is, that almost everything is shifting, that very little is stable; the one thing which they see that is stable is these three Indian armies. If they find one of the few elements of stability which there are in our administration of India removed, it will have a great political bearing upon them; they would see first of all that the artillery is perpetually shifting and changing. If all the troops are to be line troops and not local troops, there must be perpetual reliefs. In fact Lord Elphinstone in his paper, which of course will come before the Commission, advocates that no troops should be more than ten years in the country. Putting aside the enormous expenditure which that involves of reliefs, the people in India itself will see that there is a perpetual changing of troops and

officers, and that element of stability which they saw and which they understood will be gone. They will argue, they have not enough men to have the old arrangement of having local corps of artillery and infantry, and that these are liable to be withdrawn at any time.

5149. (*Viscount Melville.*) Has not the very reverse been the fact lately, from the people of India seeing the large number of troops which you can pour into the country upon an emergency?—They know quite well that it has been an extreme exertion, they know just as well as any one sitting at this table that the country was taxed to the utmost to do it. Every one of the chiefs (I have been in a great many of their courts) take in the English papers; they have men who translate them, so that those who cannot read your English papers have them translated to them. There is not one chief, nor one man of any intelligence amongst the natives of India, who are likely to be motive powers, and to be in any way dangerous, who does not know, as well as any one here that it was an extreme exertion, and that this country was dangerously stripped of troops in order to meet our Indian emergency.

5150. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That is an emergency, if that emergency is over, which it will be, and you have the permanent means of keeping up that force which you proposed, by troops of the line, what difference can it possibly make?—I think it makes a great difference upon those points which I have mentioned, one of which is that you will necessarily not have the officers accustomed to the country, and knowing the country; you will necessarily have the natives of India regarding them as a transient body, as another element of instability in the mode of administering the country, and you will open India to the danger of being suddenly stripped of troops whenever there is a pressure.

5151. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that the discipline of the troops permanently located in India is equal to the discipline of those who are relieved occasionally?—Some persons argue that there is a difference in the discipline; for instance, Sir William Mansfield in his paper expresses that opinion; several opinions are given, in which it is said that an advantage arises from the emulation created by the comparisons between the discipline of the line regiments and that of the local regiments; but I cannot say myself (having been on service with them) that I ever observed that difference between a local European regiment and a line regiment; and I cannot say myself that I ever observed anything that I could wish altered; for instance as regards the artillery, I have happened to see Bengal artillery and Bombay artillery, I have been on service with them both, I have never seen anything that I could wish changed in them. I have seen Bengal local European infantry; I cannot say that I have ever seen a difference at all.

5152. Do you consider the discipline of the Bengal army generally to have been equal to that of the armies of the other two presidencies previously to the mutiny?—That is a question which is perhaps rather a difficult one to answer, because there was a good deal of difference in their modes of discipline, and difference arising from the difference of material with which they had to deal. I have had the troops of all three presidencies under me, and I have seen the discipline of all three of them, and I really do not think that there was much to choose between one and the other in matter of discipline.

5153. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) As it may be assumed that the amount of permanent European force to be maintained in India will be fixed at the minimum necessary for the secure hold of the country, how could any part of that force be withdrawn to meet an emergency in Europe without endangering the loss of India?—That is exactly why I wish to throw a check to that action taking place, that is the very object in view, namely, to prevent anything of that sort.

5154. Do you think that the Government could rightly maintain European troops in India with the view of training them there, and bringing them home when required to meet a European emergency. Do you think it would be just towards India to throw upon its revenue the expense of maintaining a larger European force than may be deemed necessary for the secure hold of the country, for the purpose of having an available force there to meet a European emergency?—Certainly not, it could not afford it.

5155. Then, if the whole European force were enlisted for service in India only, no part of it would be available to meet a European emergency, would it, except by volunteering?—Except by volunteering; but, as the question was put to me, I understood that it was meant to refer to cases of such extreme emergency, that the absolute life of this country, if I may so call it, the vitality of England as a state, was brought in fact *in extremis*.

5156. Still the Government could not break faith with the soldiers who had enlisted for service in India only, and it could only make those troops available by inviting volunteers. Of course, there can be no doubt that the whole force in India would volunteer in a case of that sort; but at the same time it would be necessary to obtain it by volunteering?—Of course.

5157. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you think it advisable that the Government of this country should be hampered to the extent which it will be if 60,000 men are to be enlisted for service only in India, making a competing force against Her Majesty's?—I do not admit that it will be hampered, nor do I regard it as a competing force. It appears to me that where some are inclined to take the line of advocating a complete amalgamation, either the term "competing" or "jealousy" is used; it is to get rid of jealousy.

5158. I refer to competing for recruiting in this country?—Sometimes where persons advocate amalgamation the jealousy between the two services is objected to, and at other times when they advocate the employment of a portion of the troops from the line and a portion as a local army, the advantage of the emulation is advanced, so that really I do not look upon it as competing. It is all now under the Crown; it is no longer a company's service; it is, to all intents and purposes, a royal army. I do not look upon it as competing in any way.

5159. But still it is as regards enlisting at this moment a competing force, and the men enlisted for India are withdrawn from any other service?—But it is necessary, you cannot avoid it.

5160. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) If you can obtain the same results by having but one army, is it not an advantage to have one united body rather than having an army separated into two distinct bodies with different interests and views, which must be the case if one is local and the other is not?—With great deference, I should say that they ought not to have different views or different interests.

5161. How would you prevent that?—They are both in reality serving the Crown and serving the same Government; they are under the officers of the Crown. I do not see that there should be any difference of interest.

5162. Have you not found that where men are enlisted on a different principle and are employed entirely in a varied service, there is not that feeling of jealousy which otherwise exists, and which it is not desirable to maintain in a great army?—I am quite aware that there are a great many advantages to be adduced in favour of the other system, but at the same time it appears to me that the disadvantages greatly counterbalance them. I can quite understand that in the case of a country like France, which has got Algeria close to it, it can manage in the way that it manages, though even there they are forced to have local corps, but the present case is quite different; there is no analogy between a country like France with Algeria close to it, and a country like England with India at a distance of a quarter of the circumference of the globe from it.

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

5th Nov. 1858.

5163. (*Viscount Melville.*) Under whose control is this local army to be placed?—Under the direct control of the Government of India and the Secretary of State.

5164. Distinct from the Commander-in-chief at home?—No; I suppose that the Secretary of State and the Government of India, but certainly the Secretary of State in everything connected with the armies of India, always act with the advice of the Commander-in-chief in this country.

5165. With whom is the discipline of that army and its organization to rest?—The discipline of the line troops would necessarily rest with the Commander-in-chief in India under the Government of India as he now is, and the discipline of the armies of India is all under the local Commanders-in-chief, they being necessarily under the Government of India.

5166. You are aware that the Queen's regiments, though locally of course under the command of the Commander-in-chief in India, are actually under the Commander-in-chief at home?—They are.

5167. The local army will not be so?—No, nor do I think it should be, because I look upon it as a thing of very great importance that the Governor-general of India and the Secretary of State for India should have very great powers for India; that you cannot manage that country otherwise.

5168. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) It appears to me that you advocate a system under which the Government of India should be almost independent of the Government of England, and by which India should be under its own sovereignty, as it were, rather than as it is now made by the Government, part and parcel of Great Britain?—No, with deference; nor do I think that you are putting the case as the Act of Parliament puts it. I was only looking at it the other day. The marginal note of the 56th section is "Indian military "and naval forces to remain under existing con- "ditions of service;" and it says, "The military and "naval forces of the East India Company shall be "deemed to be the Indian military and naval forces "of Her Majesty, and shall be under the same obli- "gations to serve Her Majesty as they would have "been under to serve the said Company, and shall "be liable to serve within the same territorial limits "only, for the same terms only, and be entitled to "the like pay, pensions, allowances, and privileges." I need not read it through. It appears to me that it makes no real difference. The question which you have now put, in fact, involves an assumption which does not exist, because I propose no change in that respect. The armies of India, according to this Act, are directed to continue in their actual position.

5169. (*Viscount Melville.*) But you quadruple the European local army of India from what it is at present?—I increase the number very considerably.

5170. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) You increase the number, but you do not alter its actual position nor the relative powers of the Commanders-in-chief?—It does not appear to me to alter at all the position of the Secretary of State or of the Commanders-in-chief in India, whether the principal Commanders-in-chief, or the local Commanders-in-chief, things would be managed exactly as they are and have been.

5171. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not see that it does alter the position so far as that the local army is most materially increased from what it is at present, thereby obliging England to recruit for the service in India alone a much larger force than it does now?—You increase the force, but you do not do what I understood Sir Harry Smith to assume by his question, you do not alter the principle upon which the government of India has been conducted, and is conducted at the present moment under this Act.

5172. Is it advisable that the local force should be increased in this manner to the detriment of the permanent force of Great Britain?—With deference, I do not think that it would be to the detriment of the force of Great Britain.

5173. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Is it not the fact that hitherto, when employed in the field, the two armies have always acted most cordially together, and that no injury has ever resulted to the public service from there being two armies?—That is an historical question of such magnitude that I really cannot answer it, for it would require a much more attentive consideration than I have given to the great variety of instances in which all the different armies of India have been employed, and if I were to reply to the question I should be giving a very sweeping answer to a sweeping question.

5174. Speaking generally, has any injury resulted to the public service when the troops have been employed together from there being two armies, one under Her Majesty, and the other under the East India Company?—I am not aware of any.

5175. (*Chairman.*) You are assuming that that Act of Parliament was the final decision of Parliament with regard to the conditions upon which the army should be transferred?—This Act purports to be an Act upon which, as I understand it, things are now proceeding.

5176. (*Lord Stanley.*) It is at least an expression of the mind of Parliament until or unless it be altered by any future Act?—Yes; I observe that the note to the next section is "provision for persons hereafter "entering Her Majesty's Indian forces;" and the section itself states, "Provided that it shall be lawful for "Her Majesty from time to time, by order in Council, "to alter or regulate the terms and conditions of ser- "vice under which persons hereafter entering Her Ma- "jesty's Indian forces shall be commissioned, enlisted, "or entered to serve, and the forms of attestation "and of the oath or declaration to be used and taken "or made respectively on attesting persons to serve "in Her Majesty's Indian forces, shall be such as "Her Majesty, with regard to the European forces, "and the Governor-general of India in Council with "regard to the native forces, shall from time to time "direct." That appears to me to have reference to the future, whatever alterations are made, and I take it that with reference to the present this Act is in force, and that it covers the ground which I was supposing it to cover.

5177. Of course the duration of every Act of Parliament is uncertain, depending upon the future will of Parliament?—Yes.

5178. But as you understand it that Act does for the time being limit and define the status of the local Indian army?—I understand it so.

5179. (*Chairman.*) This Commission has been appointed, and the very first question submitted to this Commission is, "The terms on which the army of "the East India Company is to be transferred to "the Crown?" What do you understand to be the object of that question, if the Act of Parliament is to be final?—I do not understand that question.

5180. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Irrespectively of the Indian question, as a soldier, can you quote any instance in history, going back to any distance, where you have read of two armies serving one country under two different heads?—I do not suppose that if one searches through history there is a parallel instance with our Indian empire, and therefore it is entirely an exceptional instance, that a small state like England (and after all viewed with reference to great continental military nations this is a small military state) at one side of the globe, should hold an enormous empire at the other side of the globe. Those conditions are not paralleled anywhere that I am aware of, nor the rise and the establishment and the maintenance of that empire. It appears to me an entirely exceptional case, and that the whole system has been exceptional, and that it would have been very different if we had lain close to her shores, for instance, as Algeria lies close to the shores of France. Therefore I cannot adduce any instance of the kind.

5181. You have said, I think, that you regard it as very desirable that there should be a uniformity of feeling, that there should be one sentiment pervading both forces, and that feeling should be kept up?—Yes.

5182. Do you not admit that the fact of having two distinct armies with two distinct heads will prevent such a unanimity of feeling. How can there be a unanimity of feeling with two forces differently constituted under two distinct heads?—They are both serving the same Government; they are both serving Her Majesty. I am using the word "Government" in its general sense.

5183. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Provided both be placed upon a perfect equality in every respect, why should any other than a generous feeling of emulation animate the two services?—I do not myself see that it involves a difference of interest or any of those disadvantages which would arise from two wholly distinct armies; they are serving under the same executive entirely.

5184. (*Col. Burlton.*) Going back to the question of the probable withdrawal of troops from India by the Ministry, do you think it possible, or at all events probable, that any immediate or pressing emergency could arise in Europe calling for reinforcements from India to an amount exceeding that of the aggregate of those line regiments which it is proposed in Lord Canning's minute should be continually kept up by the three presidencies. In other words, if the Government here were determined to withdraw European troops from India, they would have the option of withdrawing a certain number of line regiments; do you not think that, that would be equal to any sudden demand made upon a sudden emergency in Europe without interfering with the local troops?—In ordinary emergencies I should certainly think it would.

5185. Supposing the emergency was so great as to require more troops, do you think that it would be possible to withdraw a greater number of troops, speaking with reference to the transport of troops, in so short a period as to enable the Government to bring more than that number at once to meet any pressing emergency, such as an invasion of this country?—Not well.

5186. (*Chairman.*) Would not your argument go to the extent that it would be desirable to have the whole European force a local force in India; why do you propose that there should be any force of the line?—For this reason, I look upon India as one of the best fields that England has for the formation of its officers. I look upon it that there is no finer field, and that therefore it is very desirable that Her Majesty's army should have a considerable proportion of officers accustomed to commands in India; it prepares them for service in Europe; they have the advantage of seeing large armies moved, and therefore of seeing large operations there; and I think that it would be very impolitic that that field should be lost to the British army. Instead of diminishing it I would keep it at what Lord Canning proposes.

5187. But you propose to reduce it?—No; I look upon the number of troops now in India as an exceptional case altogether.

5188. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Upon the proportions given of 30 to 15, you reduce the line troops and raise the local troops?—I do not think that it diminishes the number of troops before the outbreak, for instance, take the time of Lord Dalhousie, it leaves them as they were before. The question put to me was, whether the argument did not amount to its being better to have the whole of the European troops local in India, and I have replied to that in the way which I have mentioned, namely, that I think it is extremely important to this country and to the British army that a proportion of Her Majesty's officers should have the advantage of serving in India; they there have large commands, and see large bodies of troops put in motion, and it is a very good field.

5189. (*Chairman.*) Would they be in an equal position if they only formed the proportion of one-third of the European army in India, instead of being as before at least one-half of it, if not the majority?—I think that if you take the proportion of the officers you will find that what Lord Canning proposes in that memorandum reduces the number; for instance, the number of colonels of the local forces would be considerably reduced, and therefore a fair proportion of commands would fall more in favour of the royal army than was the case anterior to the insurrection.

5190. (*Viscount Melville.*) How are the colonels to be reduced if you increase the regiments?—Because in doubling up two cadres of battalions for officering one regiment, you necessarily get rid of one colonel in every case.

5191. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that the native and European troops are very different, and though, perhaps, the native troops would not have such an influence as regards the regiments of the line, would not a very large proportion of local European troops have a preponderating influence?—The proportion of commands had reference to the officers of all arms and all services; it was not limited to the officers attached to European troops; otherwise, the three Indian armies would have had a very small proportion of commands, as there were very few European regiments; and what is now proposed by Lord Canning does not increase the officers, but it diminishes them.

5192. There is a wide difference, as you will admit, between the native portion of the army, and the European portion of the army as a body of troops?—Yes.

5193. I grant that you diminish the number of officers in the aggregate, but you increase the number of European regiments?—Yes.

5194. Therefore the European element as an element is much increased in the local force?—Yes.

5195. It is nearly doubled in the local force as regards the line to what it was before?—Yes.

5196. Do you not think that that fact would have an injurious effect upon the feeling and position of the regiments of the line as regards the local European regiments?—No, I do not think so at all, and in fact the apprehension as one may see from Lord Canning's memorandum on his part, is, that the local troops would run a risk of being rather looked down upon by the line, and he wishes to remedy that by some arrangement which should admit of exchanges, where officers of one service or the other wish to exchange into the other.

5197. (*Chairman.*) How can that system of exchange be effected unless you make all officers entering the local force, enter for the future upon the same terms with regard to pensions as in Her Majesty's army?—I think that that question of exchange is to be regarded from two points of view, one from which Lord Canning regards it, which you may call the politic view, and the other a purely personal point of view. Now I suppose that no one objects to the view which Lord Canning has of the desirableness if there is a local army that there should be the power of exchange. Upon the second point of view, namely, the purely personal one, I really regard it as more a personal thing than anything else; and if two officers want to exchange, and can satisfy their own executives that the exchange is proper with reference to the individuals, it must be a question between them, they taking up what may be called the money obligations.

5198. If there is a different system of pension and retirement, surely it creates great difficulty?—There would be very great difficulty if it was attempted to rule the whole thing *ab initio* from beginning to end, so that all the different grades should have the power of exchange by clearly defined rules, one man to pay this and another man to pay that, and so forth; but it appears to me to be a purely personal matter; and that if two officers wanted to exchange, it would rest with them whether they chose to take up the obligations.

5199. You could not put a young life who wished to exchange in the same position with regard to the pension list as the old life with whom he exchanged?—No; that is why I think it a purely personal question, the different people who are involved must satisfy the different funds that the exchange is fair and equal.

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

5th Nov. 1858.

5200. Supposing there to be a local army for the future, would it not greatly facilitate the means of exchanging, if those officers who entered, for the future, that local army were placed upon the same footing with regard to retiring allowance, and were not called upon to subscribe to these funds?—I do not think that it could be carried into effect without dislocating the present system of the three armies; for instance, the funds to which you are alluding depend upon the subscriptions not only of the seniors, but of the younger officers also; so that if those who entered the service were to be exempt from all these sort of things, the fund must necessarily go, or the Government must meet the expenditure.

5201. Would it not go to those now entitled to it?—The fund must break, because these funds are supported not alone by the subscriptions of the seniors, but by the subscriptions of every grade from the time that the officers enter the service.

5202. (*Col. Burlton.*) It is a compulsory subscription?—It is a compulsory subscription.

5203. (*Chairman.*) I propose gradually to abolish the funds?—You cannot abolish them gradually by exempting those who enter, unless the Government takes upon itself the expense; because in the case of a young man coming into the army, payment becomes compulsory from the moment he enters the service.

5204. What was the number of native company's artillery in the Bengal army at the time when the mutiny broke out. According to the return laid before Parliament by the East India Company, the number of officers attached to the native portion of the Bengal artillery was 76?—I have a note of my own, which is as follows:—Before the revolt of 1857, the Bengal artillery consisted of 13 batteries of horse artillery, 21 light field batteries (horsed), 1 light field battery (bullocks), 1 mountain train battery, making a total of 36 batteries. For the service of these batteries and the general duties of the artillery branch, there were, the first brigade of horse artillery, 3 European and 2 native troops; the second brigade of horse artillery, 3 European and 1 native troops; the third brigade of horse artillery, 3 European and 1 native troops; making a total of three brigades of horse artillery, of 9 European and 4 native troops. There were six battalions of foot artillery of 24 European companies, 3 battalions of foot artillery of 8 native companies; total, 9 battalions of foot artillery of 32 companies, making a grand total of 55 troops and companies of artillery. Besides the European artillerymen and golundaz, there were details of gun lascars to each company, and drivers to each battery of foot artillery, so that the European and native artillery stood as follows:—

Horse Artillery.

1,034 European, 548 golundaz and lascars.

Foot Artillery.

2,034 Europeans,	864	gun lascars.
„	1,518	drivers.
„	1,902	golundaz.
Total 3,068 Europeans	4,832	natives.

The grand total of all was 7,900 Europeans and natives. In addition to the foregoing was the artillery of contingents, as follows:—

Oude	4	Companies	Mutinied.
Gwalior	5	„	
Malwa	1	„	
Bhopal	1	„	
Kotah	½	„	
Joudpore	½	„	
Punjab	5	„	Stood.
Nagpore	2	„	
Hyderabad	4	„	
Total	23	Companies.	

The regular and irregular artillery numbered therefore altogether 78 companies and troops of European and native artillery.

5205. How would that correspond with this return made by the India House on the 12th April of last year, which states that the number of European officers employed with the native artillery in Bengal was 76 previously to the breaking out of the mutiny?—I do not know how that is; they must have left out a good many of the contingents, I should think.

5206. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Probably it means the regular artillery?—It may do so.

5207. (*Chairman.*) 76 European officers were employed with the Bengal native artillery previously to the mutiny, of whom there are 25 now. Those are the only officers who would be thrown out of employment by the mutiny?—That is under the mark. I cannot help thinking that there must be an error of some sort there; it would require looking into. Of course I cannot speak with any certainty upon it; all the contingents I suspect are left out.

5208. (*Lord Stanley.*) The contingents are 23 out of 78?—And there was also the artillery reserve, for instance, to each of the Oude batteries, and there was the artillery reserve to each of the Gwalior batteries. I am not prepared to enter into the statement now referred to, because I do not know it.

5209. (*Chairman.*) The mutiny could only affect those European officers attached to the native regular or irregular artillery in Bengal?—It affected all the officers who were attached to native artillery. I am not prepared to say what number. The returns ought to be correct. I have not any exact return of them here.

5210. Supposing that a great number of artillery officers were thrown out of employment in consequence of the mutiny, would it not be extraordinary that additional artillery officers should go on being appointed to that very Bengal artillery when so many were out of employment?—No; because the object was to bring up the artillery to the point which Lord Canning thinks necessary.

5211. You say that a great proportion of these officers attached to the Bengal artillery were thrown out of employment by the mutiny?—I did not mention the artillery especially.

5212. I find that the return tallies exactly with what you stated?—There is a minute of Lord Canning's upon the artillery; there you have it exactly.

5213. Then I may assume that the only proportion of those officers thrown out of employment would be those attached to the native artillery who revolted?—Yes, of the artillery.

5214. Do you think that there would be any difficulty in finding employment in Bengal for those artillery officers?—There is a great deal of employment in India. I do not know exactly in what way you propose to employ them.

5215. Have not a great number of them been absorbed by placing the local European artillery upon the same footing as the royal artillery?—Not exactly upon the same footing, because they have not colonels-commandants, otherwise they are assimilated, but are not exactly on the same footing.

5216. How many of those officers would it absorb? I think Lord Canning states, that out of the 76 who were employed, 25 are left; that would leave 51?—Yes.

5217. How many of those 51 will have been absorbed by the increase to the European portion of the artillery?—There has been no absorption; there has been a promotion of a certain number of second lieutenants; they are all first lieutenants, and a certain number of first lieutenants have been made captains. I am not aware that there has been any addition to the actual number of officers.

5218. You had only three officers, and we have five?—If you take the assimilation which has been carried out by the general order in India; the assimilation is not an increase.

5219. You increase the number of officers to each company?—You merely alter the grades of the officers.

5220. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then you have not increased the number?—No; there is a recommen-

dation of the Governor-general which proposes a large increase.

5221. What has been the establishment of officers per company before this change in the armies of India?—It varied with the battalions.

5222. (*Chairman to Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) You are perfectly well acquainted with the formation of the Bengal artillery, I presume?—Generally. I do not belong to the Bengal artillery.

5223. Do you think that there would be any difficulty in finding beneficial employment for the number of artillery officers supposed to be thrown out by the mutiny?—I should say, certainly not. They could have been employed even in the other European companies, or in duties connected with the artillery service in arsenals and elsewhere.

5224. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Were not you very much under officered in the artillery?—Very much so.

5225. And the cry was always for more?—Yes.

5226. And that was in all the presidencies?—Yes, you may say in all. I know that it was in all.

5227. The establishment of officers per company was smaller than for the royal artillery, it was a lower establishment of officers?—Yes.

(*Lieut.-Col. Durand.*) The first battalion of foot artillery had one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, one major, five captains, ten first lieutenants, and four second lieutenants. There were only four companies to a battalion. Then the native battalions were on a different footing. The native battalion had six companies, and it had the same number of officers, one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, one major, and five captains.

(*Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) At Madras for 12 companies they had only an establishment the same as a European battalion of four companies.

5228. (*Chairman.*) Then your opinion is that they might very beneficially have employed any of the officers of artillery?

(*Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) Speaking from my knowledge of the service, I should say, certainly they might have been employed.

5229. (*Major-Gen. Hancock to Lieut.-Col. Durand.*) With respect to the supposed hardship to those officers of the line army who might be placed upon the half-pay list, in the event of the local army being increased to the extent recommended by Lord Canning, considering that the augmentation of line regiments to meet the Indian emergency was made, as in all similar cases, with a distinct understanding on the part of the officers, that they would be liable to be placed upon half-pay when their services might be no longer required, and that the officers of the local army have not had the advantage of any augmentation whatever since the mutiny, where would be the injustice to the officers of the line army who might be placed upon half-pay, in carrying out a reduction of that army, according to the established regulations of the service?—I am not acquainted with the rules of Her Majesty's service.

5230. (*Chairman.*) Would there not be this injustice to the revenues of this country that you would place upon the half-pay list a very great number of officers?—I before met that question, I think, by saying that the raising a local army would take time, and therefore that number which is stated would not be thrown back at once upon the country, very far from it; it would be done gradually, and therefore I do not myself see that it would be necessarily unjustly done in any way. It would not do to charge the Indian Government with more troops and officers than were requisite, or to throw a greater expenditure upon the Indian Government than was requisite.

5231. What appears objectionable is this, that you propose that new regiments should be raised for India, and that the old regiments which had been raised in this country for service in India should be disbanded; surely it would be a great disadvantage to be obliged to raise new regiments, and in order to make room for them to disembody the regiments which have been raised for that purpose?—I am not aware exactly what number has been raised. It does not appear to me that the disembodiment will be so rapid as to throw upon the country the number, whatever that may be, at once. You must raise the local army very gradually. You cannot form 30 corps rapidly. If it was necessary to disband some of these regiments, admitting that there might be disadvantages such as you advance, still I think that the advantages from a local army quite overbalance the temporary disadvantages in the other respect.

5232. That is looking at it in an Indian point of view?—Yes.

5233. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But in an imperial point of view, what would be the effect?—It appears to me that it is an imperial point of view holding India, and holding it safely.

5234. (*Lord Stanley.*) The one you regard as, at the utmost, a temporary inconvenience, and the other is a very serious permanent evil?—The other I look upon as really a question whether you are to keep or to lose India.

5235. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In what respect do you think that we should risk the loss of India by such an arrangement?—Because, as I have mentioned, I look upon it as almost amounting to a certainty that whenever there was a great pressure upon this country, there would be a sudden and a very large withdrawal of troops from India, and if there was no check upon such withdrawal from the fact of a local army existing, it would be very likely to cause the loss of India.

5236. Is that the only reason?—There are other reasons which I mentioned, such as that you require to have a body of officers accustomed to the country, and not perpetually in course of being relieved and removed from the country, that you cannot administer the country satisfactorily with the perpetual reliefs of the officers, because a large proportion of your officers are employed in a great variety of ways; there are a number employed in the commissariat, a number employed in the ordnance commissariat, and a number employed in the different departments of the state, some of them are in political and some of them in civil employment, and so forth; and if the whole army is to be in a perpetual course of relief, and you are to be perpetually changing these men, you naturally lose an element of stability, which is, I think, essential to the administration of the country.

5237. (*Viscount Melville.*) Did not the Government, notwithstanding the pressure for troops in this country during the whole of the Peninsular war, maintain the European force in India up to its full strength, and why should it not do so now?—Then the circumstances of India were in a very different state, and I do not think that the cases are parallel.

5238. In what way?—It depends so much upon the particular period. During the heat of the Peninsular war, what was considered the crisis at that time had been got over. The Duke had, in fact, fought and won his battles, and Lake, too, before we got in to the Peninsular war.

5239. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) In the event of the local European army being increased to the extent recommended by Lord Canning, do you not think that a great part of the line regiments raised to meet the Indian emergency might be absorbed in all probability by permitting the men to volunteer into the local army, to form the new local regiments?—If volunteering were allowed, I have no doubt that a great portion of them would be.

5240. And with respect to the officers, assuming that I am correct in supposing that it is in accordance with the established system in Her Majesty's service that they should go upon half-pay, when their services are no longer required, and considering the great and permanent advantages in promotion which those officers have received by the augmentation, do you see that there would be any hardship in their being placed upon half-pay, in accordance with the regulations of the service?—As you have put it, as it

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

25th Nov. 1858.

would be gradually done, I do not see that there would be any injustice in it.

5241. (*Chairman.*) Would it not be an equal hardship to them to be placed out of employment, as it is upon the Indian officers who are thrown out of employment, for whom it is proposed that these regiments should be raised in order to find employment for them?—No, I do not think that; I do not think that you could do it. These officers are entitled by their engagements and by the Act of Parliament.

5242. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) And by the established system?—And by the established system; and I do not think that the two cases are parallel.

5243. (*Chairman.*) You do not think that it is an equal hardship to the officers of Her Majesty's service to be unemployed, as it is to the officers in the local service?—It is not exactly the same hardship, because the one officer enters knowing that that is the condition of his service, the other enters upon a service which is really banishment, and he enters under certain conditions of service which are assured to him, and are just assured to him, it appears to me, by this Act of Parliament; therefore, I do not see that you can draw a parallel. In the one case, the conditions of the man's service are defined, he enters knowing that those are the conditions of his service, and it is legal and customary to put him upon half-pay when required. In the other case he enters under certain conditions; those conditions are assured to him, they are just here again assured to him in the Act, if I understand the case, and really the two cases do not appear to me to be parallel.

5244. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you not think that the officers of each service have a just claim upon the Government for the fulfilment of the conditions upon which they entered it, and that those conditions being fulfilled, there is no undue hardship incurred by the officers of either service, and no advantage gained?—Exactly.

5245. (*Viscount Melville.*) It appear to me by the measure which you are advocating that regiments must be made for officers, instead of officers being made for the service?—Not at all; you will see the opinion recorded of Sir John Lawrence and other officers; all those officers have served their country very well, I am merely speaking with reference to India. I think that nothing too much can be said of the services of Her Majesty's officers upon this occasion; I am now merely speaking of the Company's officers. I look upon it that those officers really deserve great consideration at the hands of the Government, for they maintained a struggle and maintained it well, at a time when in fact everything was against them. Many lost their families and all that was dear to them, but fought desperately, and did their duty.

5246. But the Government ought to compensate them for their losses, and not to make regiments for officers?—But I look upon it that it is to the advantage of the Government to employ those officers, they are accustomed to the country, they know it, they have experience of the people, and are valuable to the Government in a great many ways, in which new officers are not and cannot be.

5247. (*Chairman.*) They are employed now as I understand you?—They are employed to a certain extent, merely temporarily.

5248–9. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Has it not always been felt to be of great importance to have a body of regiments of the line to counterbalance any local prejudices and feelings which Europeans would imbibe if resident in India in very large bodies. Has not that been the feeling of the Duke of Wellington and many other eminent men expressed on various sions?—I think that that is secured by the proportion which is recommended by Lord Canning. I think that the danger generally apprehended is that a local force would be rather looked down upon, and therefore in so far as its strength, has the effect of giving it weight, I do not think that that is a disadvantage, and when you keep the proportion which is recommended by Lord Canning of one-third from the line, you have a very strong counterpoise in the event of your anticipating that that feeling will be at all carried too far.

5250. But not half so strong as it was before when the tendency was the other way, and the Queen's European regiments of the line very considerably out numbered the European troops of the Company's service?—I say it with great deference, for I see entirely the way in which the question is put; but the question appears to me to assume that there would be almost an opposition of interest. Now, I regard the services according to this Act as royal services; the Indian armies as royal armies; and I do not see why there should be that feeling of several interests; they are both serving the same Government; they are all Englishmen, all English officers. I do not understand why there should be that feeling.

5251. Because they have separate interests; the one local, and the other general?—The one being local, and its system of promotion entirely distinct and different, and therefore not in any way mixed up with the purchase promotion.

5252. Is not that the very fact which engenders difference of feeling and jealousy of feeling, and perhaps even upon no grounds whatever, but merely the fact of their being distinct services?—At the present time in Her Majesty's army there are engineers, and there are artillery, and under the Admiralty there are marine corps in which the promotion is entirely by seniority, and I believe there are colonial corps. They may or may not be by seniority, I suppose not, they are by purchase. However, the coexistence of those two systems of promotion, that by seniority and that by purchase, does not appear to work in the royal army any particular opposition between the two, and I do not see why that which coexists in the royal army without any inconvenience should not coexist with the royal Indian armies, which would be exactly similarly circumstanced. They would have their own system of seniority promotion just the same as the marine corps, or the royal artillery, or the royal engineers.

5253. Only with this difference that they would not look to the same head as all the other corps look to one and the same head, and no distinction is made between them; but in the way proposed these two corps would look to quite different heads?—I think that practically they all look to the same head, inasmuch as all honours and all distinctions flow from Her Majesty. Therefore I take it that they all look to the same head, and that they all serve the same executive government. At the same time, with respect to India, I do not think that you can strip the government of India and the local governments of their position without great detriment and danger to our rule in India. There is also another thing which I have omitted mentioning, which I intended to mention before, which is that I think that it is of immense importance to India to keep the presidential armies separate, and that this amalgamation would inevitably lead to fuse those three armies together, which ought to be avoided as much as possible. It is rather a delicate point, but in future we cannot be too careful in keeping the three armies separate, and in fact it would be better if we divided the native portion of the Bengal army into two armies; but merely looking with reference to the three presidencies, I look upon it as exceedingly important not to take any measures which shall fuse those three armies.

5254. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you refer to the European armies?—The whole. I do not think that you can amalgamate the local European forces of the three armies with the line without practically fusing all those three armies into one.

5255. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What has that to do with the native army; why should that not be kept quite distinct, being quite a different element?—Those three armies are accustomed to see their local troops, and to act with their local battalions and so forth.

5256. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Is it not very necessary in order to preserve the high status of the native army that it should be combined, as it has hitherto been, with a considerable European force?—I think it is very necessary to maintain well balanced forces.

5257. (*Chairman.*) The officers of the local force and those of the great native army have all the same interest have they not? I am talking of the European officers in the Indian service.—The European officers have the same interest. The European officers of Madras, for instance, have the same interest; the European officers of Bombay have the same interest, and the European officers of Bengal have the same interest.

5258. Have there been occasions on which they have shown a disposition to defend their own interests rather than do their duty to the Government?—There is an instance a long time back in which they have.

5259. Instances have occurred?—Instances have occurred.

5260. And they were balanced by the Queen's army?—Yes.

5261. Would not there be great danger, if you had a great preponderance of the local force, of that occurring again? Would it not be necessary for safety to keep up a Queen's army there for the very purpose of balancing that interest?—Not if you treated them all alike. I do not think there would be the slightest danger.

5262. You admit that their interests are separate, and you wish to keep them separate?—I wish to keep the armies distinct.

5263. Is it not necessary for the safety of both, that there should be a power, the one to counterbalance the other?—I think that you do so by having the proportion which is proposed. If you mean that the 30 regiments are stronger than the 15 regiments, that is of course.

5264. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Does not that form a very strong argument for having both line and local troops in India?—Certainly; it appears to me that that is foreseen and provided for in this memorandum of Lord Canning's. I did not touch upon the point, because it is a delicate point; I was nearly approaching it, and then I did not touch upon it. Of course, wherever you have at a great distance from the mother country large bodies of troops there is always danger, and must be danger.

5265. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You said that you would not strip the Governor-general or the Governors of any authority. In what way would they be stripped of any authority?—I think that the local armies ceasing to look up to them it would very much diminish their power, influence, and authority.

5266. In what way would they cease to look up to them?—For instance, if I understand the advocacy of amalgamation, it would introduce into the local service exactly the same system as exists in the royal army, namely, that the greater proportion of them would come under the purchase promotion system. It would come into that system which would be in no respect under the local governments at all; it would be no longer what it is now, namely, that the whole of the promotion and everything else passes necessarily through the local government, that is to say, that the officers have their promotion from the Governor-general if they are in Bengal, or from the Governors of Madras and Bombay.

5267. Upon certain regulations laid down?—Upon certain regulations laid down, but those regulations would not be departed from in the present instance.

5268. Supposing that certain regulations are laid down, whether it is for the royal army or for the local army, those regulations are acted upon. Whatever regulations are laid down may be laid down, of course, with the entire concurrence of the Secretary of State here, and his views may be embodied with those of the Governor-general or in any mode you like, but surely there would always be regulations, and they would not be departed from?—It appears to me practically to remove the control of the army, and the authority which the Governor-general, for instance, and the local governors have over the army.

5269. Was not that authority formerly vested in them under the Court of Directors?—It was formerly vested in them under the Court of Directors; it was always exercised in connection with the advice of Her Majesty's Commander-in-chief and the local Commanders-in-chief, but still it was under the government of India.

5270. The government of India could not remove an officer, nor do any act without the concurrence and sanction of the Court of Directors?—They could do it temporarily, but still it does not appear to me that that power should in any degree be diminished.

5271. In what way would it be diminished?—I think that if the local armies ceased to be under the local governments, it will practically be diminished, and necessarily be diminished.

5272. In what way would it cease at all, more in one way than the other?—I could bring forward an instance which happened lately, although it is perhaps of no great moment. Our own officers, those under the government of India, were precluded from leaving the country whilst service was going on; acccording to the Governor-general's orders, no officer could even retire from the service pending those operations. It was not the same thing with respect to the line.

5273. Why not?—There were officers who were exchanging and going home.

5274. By whose authority was that?—I really do not know. That has merely occurred to me as an instance. There are 50 others if I went into them.

5275. (*Lord Stanley.*) You consider that a local army established for service in India alone, and looking to the Governor-general and to the local Commander-in-chief as its immediate superiors, is far more closely connected with India than any portion of the general service army which is sent there to be renewed after a certain time?—Certainly, the general service army being subject to continual reliefs.

5276. The one class of officers are comparatively strangers in the country, and the others come there to pass their lives?—The latter are comparatively permanent. If you will allow me, I will read the opinion of Lord Elphinstone, which bears upon this point. He takes a different view upon the question of amalgamation from myself, but he says, "If there "is one thing which must be laid down as a prin- "ciple not to be departed from in our military "arrangements in India, it is the entire subordi- "nation of the army, both European and native, to the "Government of India. The troops of the Queen's "regular army while serving in India must be wholly "subject to the authority of the Queen's government "in India. Regimental promotion indeed may be "left entirely to the Horse Guards, but the patronage "of every staff appointment in India, should be "as, with very few exceptions, it now is, entirely in "the hands of the supreme and local Governments, "and of the supreme and local Commanders-in- "chief."

5277. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Are you not of opinion that previously to the revolt and to the alteration of the constitution of the government of India, the British army was auxiliary to the Indian army. Whereas now the thing is materially changed; India has become a royal possession with a royal government, and the local army must be the auxiliary, and the Queen's army the principal. Hence the armies of the three presidencies may be continued precisely as they are, and form the auxiliary of Her Majesty's army in the respective presidencies?—I never regarded the European armies as the auxiliaries. Our whole empire in India has necessarily been won by European troops, and therefore I for one always regarded the European troops as the main thing, and the native troops as the auxiliary; I therefore, start from rather a different point of view from that which you put in the question. I look upon it that the

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

25th Nov. 1858.

native troops now, as heretofore, are merely the auxiliaries of the European troops. I suppose there is no English officer who would not very much sooner command in action a regiment of his own countrymen, than he would one, or two, or three regiments who were not his own countrymen.

5278. The British army were 26,000 men in all India, the native army were 280,000, I believe; hence, the British army were the auxiliary?—But it must be recollected that now you have an army of about 100,000 European troops in round numbers, and you have 300,000 armed natives; therefore, you have not altered the proportions as much as you appear to suppose. But I have never looked upon the native part of our forces in India as anything else but secondary, necessarily, to that element which forms the strength of our power in India, namely, the European troops.

5279. Still you can hardly regard it in that light, because the native army was the army of the country, and it possessed all the advantages which an army can possess; it had every staff situation. Her Majesty's regiments came there for certain periods of service, and they were kept exclusively as auxiliaries to the great army of India?—I can only answer of course for the Governors with whom I had the honour of serving. There was every desire, for instance, on the part of Lord Ellenborough that all commands should be fairly distributed. There was a class of minor appointments, of staff appointments, which were for some time confined to the local armies, but Lord Hardinge first altered that; and it has been very considerably altered since; and now it is very much altered altogether; and, in fact, does not exist.

5280. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Supposing that the Governor-general and the Governors retain all the power which they have hitherto held, and that the power exercised independently of them is merely for the general military control of the army without any reference to local circumstances whatever, which would be entirely provided for in India, do you not think that if those details could be worked out it would be of great advantage to the army to be altogether under one military head as regards general organization and discipline?—If you can strike off all consideration of the political questions which I think so seriously affect the case, there cannot be a doubt that putting it in the light in which it is at present put, namely, one army under one control, which is what is stated by the question, will be advantageous; but the political bearings of the subjects appear to me in this case to be so great, that you cannot put them aside.

5281. Admitting, for the sake of argument, that there should be a local army as well as an army of the line, even in that case, with all the provisoes which I have already stated as regards the power remaining in India, would it not be a great advantage even for that local army and for the army of the line to be, as regards discipline and general organization, under the supervision and control of one Commander-in-chief?—I think that it necessarily is that; it always has been that, and must continue to be that. So far as I am aware, every Governor-general in all that he does with reference to the Indian armies constantly either consults and acts upon the advice of the Commander-in-chief in India, who is in communication with the Commander-in-chief in this country, or he acts in communication with the Secretary of State, who is in communication with the authorities here. I was with Lord Ellenborough, and he was in constant communication with the Duke of Wellington about different things, and it appeared to me that, practically, the whole bearing of the discipline of the armies was brought through the Government of India, and through the Board of Control before the Government here, who consulted the Commander-in-chief.

5282. Supposing that such is not the case; supposing that there is no official, but only a private intercourse between the Commander-in-chief at home and the authorities out there, would not you call that a disadvantage?—I should think that in a matter of such great importance there ought to be more than a private communication, and that there would be.

5283. You think that it would be an advantage?—That there should be communication. I am not aware how business is conducted, but I suppose that the Cabinet in matters affecting the armies in India would certainly consult the Commander-in-chief.

5284. Would you not have any official communication between the Commander-in-chief in England and the Commander-in-chief in India, irrespective of any great Cabinet question; ordinary official communication?—Not for direct action upon the armies of India. If the question involves that the Commander-in-chief in this country could write to the Commander-in-chief in Bengal, or the local Commanders-in-chief of Bombay and Madras, so as to have a direct action upon the local armies there without reference to the local governments, then I say that there should not be, because I think it throws out of gear the Governor-general and the local governors.

5285. Do you mean as regards the movements of troops?—I mean with regard to every thing, because the organization, the regulations, and everything connected with these services are so complex, and often involve such dangerous questions, that really none but the local governments are necessarily competent to deal with them. I use the word "competent" merely in a lawyers way of using it. It is only the local governments who have all these regulations and things at their fingers ends, and are really competent to deal with these cases. Your Royal Highness will allow me to give you an instance of how far that goes. The other day, when I was coming to England upon this duty, I was anxious to bring home the various regulations of the different services, which are usually in one or two volumes, or whatever the number may be; I found that in Calcutta I could not get those of Madras; when I landed at Madras, I applied to get those of the Madras army; they were sent to me with a note from the officer who sent them, saying, that this was the only printed set which they had got, that it was old, and that a great many of the regulations were obsolete, and that therefore I might be misled if I trusted to this edition. I instance this to show how very difficult it would have been for any one, even in Calcutta, had he taken up this book to give any instructions, or to do anything with reference to Madras without referring to Madras; how very easily he might have gone wrong.

5286. Do you think that that is an advantage?—I think that it is unavoidable where you have three armies and where you must maintain a distinction, for I look upon it as of most primary importance to our hold of India that these three armies should be distinct and separate.

5287. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Both European and native?—Both European and native.

5288. (*Chairman.*) What is the advantage of having three distinct systems?—The differences between the European branches are very small; there is no very great difference, I apprehend, but I have not gone into it; there are differences. There are differences, for instance, in the Bengal artillery and the Bombay artillery, and the Madras artillery. There are very likely minor differences in the local European artillery, but I am not perfectly aware of that; I am aware of differences in the organization of the artillery and things of that sort, but there are very great differences in the general regulations; for instance, there are differences with reference to pay, with reference to allowances for this, that, and the other; all these things in the course of a century, or whatever may have been the duration of our rule there, have arisen gradually, and the whole of this military legislation for these three armies has gradually arisen, being suitable to the necessities of those three armies within their several beats; and according as circumstances have arisen, these regulations have been altered. It is almost impossible for one of the three governments exactly to be able to write to another to give them instructions upon anything which involves these sort

of rules and regulations which have risen gradually. I dare say the Marquess of Tweeddale, who was Governor of Madras, would understand what I mean.

5289. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But is that an advantage as far as Europeans are concerned; I admit that it is an advantage as far as regards the natives? —I think it is no disadvantage with respect to the Europeans; I look upon it that the amalgamation of the European branches would lead almost necessarily to the fusion of the three armies of native troops, and I think that there can be nothing more dangerous to our hold of India than anything which tends to break down the demarcations between those three armies. I would maintain those three armies as distinct as I possibly could.

5290. (*Viscount Melville.*) Can anything be more inconvenient (for I have experienced it) than having these differences existing in the presidencies where the troops of two presidencies have to act together?—These are minor inconveniencies; but I was in service in Affghanistan with Sir John Keane, who had two armies, he had the Bombay and the Bengal troops together, and we were acting up in that country for a long time. I was aware of no great inconvenience at all, nor in Lord Gough's army in the last Punjaub campaign.

5291. What is the reason that one system cannot be established for the whole army of India?—Since you have put the question, I really regret very much the tendency to assimilate and to centralize, which has gone on already, and I look upon it that we have just stopped in time from carrying it further, and that if it is carried further, it will only endanger us still more.

5292. The centralization which has taken place is not to be attributed to system, but the centralization is from the Government taking away the powers of commanding officers and doing that as a Government which ought to be left to generals of divisions and commanding officers. That is the centralization which has taken place, and which has done the mischief, but there would be no danger from having the same system throughout the three presidencies?—I quite agree with you in part of the question; and you will find if you go through the papers which I shall hand over to the Secretary of State that there is a very strong and universal opinion as to the necessity of increasing the powers of commanding officers of native regiments especially; that is a point on which there is great unanimity.

5293. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Surely it has not been the Government but the Commander-in-chief who has adopted this centralizing system, and taken away the powers of commanding officers, because the local governments have never interfered in any way with respect to the discipline of regiments?—According to the general opinions which have been laid before the Government of India it has been mainly the Commanders-in-chief.

5294. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) You cited an instance in which the separate armies agreed most particularly well together, and in which you served yourself?—Yes.

5295. Are you not aware that there was considerable jealousy, if I may so call it, between the commanders of those separate armies; one belonged to Bombay, and he said that he would command, and the other belonged to Bengal, and he said that he had no right to be commanded by a Bombay officer. I was not present myself, but I have heard accounts of such dissensions?—I do not recollect any more jealousies than what you mention; I think that in all armies which I have ever met with there are always minor jealousies; I have known as great jealousies in other armies.

5296. (*Duke of Cambridge:*) I do not think I have yet had an answer as to the result of direct official intercourse between the Commanders-in-chief in India and here, provided that that intercourse is so guarded and so arranged by rules and regulations that you cannot in any way interfere with local arrangements or detract from the power or authority of the Governor-general or the governors of the presidencies?—May I ask whether the question is restricted to communications here with the Secretary of State or whether it refers to direct communication with India?

5297. I meant direct communication with India?—I think that it should all be through the Secretary of State and through the Governor-general and Governors in India. It is a difficult thing perhaps, to convey my meaning, but the importance of maintaining the power and position of the Governors and the local Commanders-in-chief, but of the Governors in India especially, I think is paramount; I think it of the greatest possible importance, and that nothing should be done to diminish that power if it can be avoided.

5298. In what way would the actual intercourse between the two Commanders-in-chief take away from the powers of the Governors or the Governor-general?—I am supposing that there is direct action from the highest military authorities at home through the local Commanders-in-chief in India upon the armies of India. That would necessarily lead to those armies looking up directly to the authorities at home and rather putting aside, if I may use the expression, the power of all immediately over them; that is the danger.

(*Lord Stanley.*) I assume that by direct intercourse between the Commander-in-chief here and the local Commander-in-chief, what is meant is, that instructions shall be given by the one to the other.

5299. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Merely as regards the existing regulations?—There would come into play these regulations of the different services. The regulations and the practice of these different armies and services have grown up with the growth of those armies, and are not well understood even by those who are in India, that is to say, a Governor-general will always refer to a governor at Madras. He will not act directly himself for the simple reason that he is afraid to act; he knows how dangerous it is. Therefore, what with the extreme advisability of maintaining the separation of those armies (I would keep them distinct and separate, for the great political advantage of it we saw in 1857), and what with the danger of direct action, I should certainly strongly advocate everything being done through the Secretary of State and the governments.

5300. (*Chairman.*) Although the Indian army is nominally transferred to the Queen, you would wish it still to remain the army of the Governor-general?—But I look upon the Secretary of State, and I look upon the Governor-general, and I look upon the Governors of the presidencies, and I look upon the Commanders-in-chief, as all of them Her Majesty's officers; I do not see a distinction or a difference.

5301. (*Lord Stanley.*) You consider that all executive authority in this country necessarily emanates from the Crown?—Yes; and what is more I look upon this that every officer in the Company's army at the present time, and even during the Company's rule, knew perfectly well that all honours and distinctions emanated from the Crown, and looked to that source for all. Therefore I do not see the distinction.

5302. (*Chairman.*) Are you not aware that it is the prerogative of the Crown to communicate with the army through the Commander-in-chief, independently of the executive government?—I am quite aware of that.

5303. The Crown would have no such power in India?—That was for Parliament to have taken into consideration when they passed this Act. I think the Act wise with reference to the political position of India, and looking to the present difficulties of India I think this Act perfectly right and wise. I suppose that the Cabinet conveys the orders of the Government in connection with anything so important as the discipline of the armies of India. I suppose that it would consult the military authorities which were in connection with the executive.

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

25th Nov. 1858.

5304. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then you would not object to have a direct connexion at home; you would think it desirable?—At home I suppose that it exists, but I am speaking in entire darkness. I do not, of course, know the working of the Cabinet.

5304. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) There is another point which I think should be considered in fixing the proportion between the local European force and the line force; it is this, that the local force represents an entire army, whereas the line force is part of a large army in England, and, of course, participates in the dignity which belongs to that army. Do you not think that that is a reason why the local force might be increased to the extent recommended by Lord Canning, without in any way deteriorating the position of the line force?—I do not think that it can deteriorate the position of the line force. I look upon Her Majesty's line as the finest body of troops, perhaps, that exists anywhere, therefore I do not see how it is to deteriorate it in any way.

5305. (*Lord Stanley.*) I understand the question to mean this; we do not allow that an opposition of interests will exist between the local army and the army for general service, but assuming that any such opposition of interests could be supposed to exist, and any consequent jealousy to arise, would not the importance of that portion of the general service army which is quartered in India be preserved, not by the comparatively small number of troops in India, but by the general importance and numerical strength of that army which is scattered over the whole empire?—Certainly; and the general apprehension seems to be that the local army would be the one which would be deteriorated. For instance, Lord Elphinstone in his opinion says, "it is impossible that any local troops "can be really equal to the British line." He thinks that "they must always be conscious of a species of "inferiority," because "they do not fight the battles "of England on the battle fields of Europe." That is his opinion, and it goes on further, so that the general impression is rather the other way, namely, that the danger would be that the local army would be looked down upon.

5306. The summary of your view then upon this point is this, that there is no danger whatever of even a small numerical force of the general service army in India being looked down upon by reason of its smallness, whereas there is very great danger that a small local army in the presence of a preponderant general service army might be looked down upon, and regarded as an inferior service?—Most certainly.

5307. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that that has been the case hitherto? Do you think that the army of the East India Company has been looked down upon by the regiments of the line? Have you had any reason to suppose so?—Personally I have never seen any misunderstandings or disagreements between the two services. I have seen them go on upon service and off service with a very good understanding between them. How far here in England the one service may be looked down upon, and the other considered the superior, is of course a sort of social question, which I do not suppose your question intends me to deal with; I limit it simply to India. So far as regards the services getting on well together, I have not seen any difference.

5308. Then practically you have not seen that which has just been suggested, namely, that the smaller numerical force has been looked down upon, that has not been the practical result?—That has not been the practical result, but it was a very large army existing at that time. The local European part of the army of Bengal formed a very small portion; one was not separated from the other. The army was looked upon as a whole, and the service was looked upon as a whole. I mean that the local European and the local native was one great army, the Company's Bengal army; and any great army has a weight of its own, therefore, that weight was acknowledged and felt, and all the practice of the service and the rules of the service had reference to the officers having a fair proportion of commands, and so forth. They got on very well together; I never saw any disagreement.

5309. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Has it not been the case, that since the year 1788, when King's commissions were first granted to the Company's officers, they have not held the same high status which the Queen's officers have held, in many respects. I will particularise some of them, to enable you to understand what I mean; for instance, the Order of the Bath was extended to the Company's officers actually only in 1826. Brevets for service were first granted in 1828. The rank of general was first given to the Company's service in 1837. The nomination to be Queen's aide-de-camp was first introduced in 1842. Rank in Europe of the Company's officers was first acknowledged in 1855. The first Commander-in-chief ever appointed from the Company's officers in India was appointed in 1856?—Yes.

5310. Do not those instances show that hitherto the officers of the two armies have not been placed upon exactly an equal footing?—They have not been placed upon exactly an equal footing, according to the instances which you have brought forward, that is very clear; but my reply had more reference to this: I understood the question to be with regard to what I had myself seen as to the two services out in India, and the way in which they got on with each other, and not with reference to the treatment of the service by the home authorities at all.

5311. (*Viscount Melville.*) If there is any chance of these jealousies existing between the two portions of the European force, is not that a reason for having one European force, instead of two?—I do not see why these distinctions and differences should exist, or why these jealousies should exist, and I look upon it that the political advantages so overbalance the minor disadvantage, that I do not think that they are to be put into the balance.

5312. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that it is a political advantage to the empire to tie up a large proportion of Her Majesty's troops in India alone, and to withdraw them from the direct action of their own Commander-in-chief?—I think that you cannot hold that country without a large body of European troops in it, and that a considerable proportion of the number of European troops which must be kept in that country ought to be as permanent as you can well make them, with reference to the variety of advantages connected with that permanence of employment there. Therefore, although it involves the necessity of their being under the direct control of the Government of India, and the Secretary of State for India, I think that it is preferable to a system which involves rapid changes, and also which involves direct action upon armies, the regulations and the system of which cannot be so well understood here as they are out there, and cannot be tampered with without great danger; it is the danger of the thing which presses upon my mind.

5313. It appears to me that all regulations cannot be laid down here, but they must be laid down in connection with the authorities out there. If the regulations are laid down, and the only thing is to work those regulations out strictly, I cannot see what danger there can be in that respect. No regulations can be made or altered without the authorities on the spot being a party to it?—I think that practically the direct action from England would be full of danger.

5314. (*Col. Burlton.*) Do you not think it likely that, if there was that direct action from the authorities at home, putting aside as it were the Governor-general and the governors of the presidencies, it would have a great effect upon the natives in diminishing the high prestige of the Governor-general and the presidential governors?—I have all along agreed that there must be no diminution of the power and position of the Governor-general, and necessarily when the natives saw that his control over the armies was not what it was before, as soon as that became known the idea of his power

would be diminished; there cannot be a doubt about it.

5315. (*Viscount Melville.*) In what way will the natives see the power of the Governor-general diminished in that respect, seeing that hitherto a large proportion of the European force has been of Queen's troops, and not of Company's troops, over which he would have the supreme control?—It never has been so yet; you would take away the artillery and all the European troops, and that would be at once seen, the Bengal army would be diminished to nothing at all. There is not any native prince who does not read and hear what is going on. It would spread amongst them that the control of the army was taken away.

5316. The local control would not be out of the power of the Governor-general at all?—They do not draw such nice distinctions; they do not understand nice distinctions, and nothing could be more prejudicial in my opinion to the power of the Governor-general than a thing of that kind. Nothing could be more prejudicial to the influence of the Governor-general in India than that his power and control over the local army should be at all diminished, and put upon a different footing from what it has been hitherto.

5317. (*Lord Stanley.*) The result of what you have been saying on this head is that you are in favor of giving a consultative power, as indeed is now possessed by him, to the Commander-in-chief in this country, that influence to be exercised over the Indian army through the Secretary of State and the local Government of India, but that you are not in favour of giving him any direct authority or control over the local Commander-in-chief?—Yes.

5318. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You stated as a reason for thinking it desirable that a portion of the regiments of the line should be in India, that it was a great field for the officers of Her Majesty's service, and would be a great advantage. I fully agree with that view; but I see in the minute of the Governor-general that he objects to having any royal artillery in India. Surely the same rule that holds good as regards the army of the line holds good as regards the artillery; why should they be excluded from that field?—I think that there is a difference. The royal artillery going out to India must be equipped entirely in India. Its system is peculiar; and I am not aware that it is necessary as a point of emulation or example, or anything of that sort, that it should go out there.

5319. Do you hold that opinion with respect to so important a branch of the service as that?—If it is merely wished that they should have the value of the experience in India, I fully admit that it is of value to a royal artillery officer to have the experience which he will acquire in India, and if you could give it to him without great extra cost to the Government of India, then I should see no sort of objection to a portion being of the royal artillery; but the fact is that the employment of the royal artillery does occasion a great extra expense.

5320. Why?—You have a separate staff.

5321. All those are matters of regulation that could be reduced?—When they come out of course they have to be equipped, and everything has to be found in India.

5322. There would not be any extra expense in equipping them any more than other troops.—For instance, they do not bring out their horses with them; you have to find them horses, you have to find them followers, you have to find them interpreters for each battery, in fact there are a great many points.

5323. You have to find followers for the regiments of the line, you have to find horses for the cavalry. The materiel of the battery coming home would be made over to the one which goes out; what would be the extra expense?—The extra expense is what I have mentioned, you necessarily have a separate staff, there are also the reliefs, which are expensive.

5324. (*Viscount Melville.*) You must have followers for the European artillery now?—There is not that necessity nor that advantage in the royal artillery going there which there is as regards the line.

5325. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Why is there not that advantage?—I suppose that the artillery of this country is as good as the artillery in India.

5326. But all artillery taking the field has always the advantage of service, which it has not in garrison?—I admit the advantage to the royal artillery officer of his practice in India, but I think that the Government in India would pay very dearly for it.

5327. It cannot cost more?—I think, if looked into, it would be seen that it did cost more.

5328. Suppose that it did not, what would be your opinion then?—In so far as regards the advantage to the royal artillery in having some officers who have had experience in India, it is an advantage, but simply upon that point, I do not think that it is any advantage to our artillery in any way.

5329. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) There would always be the extra expense falling upon the revenue of India of the reliefs backwards and forwards?—Yes; I think, if you look into it, you will find that the expense incurred is heavy.

5330. (*Col. Burlton.*) If all the European troops in India were of the line, would it not greatly curtail the field of selection open to governors in selecting for appointments competent officers acquainted with the customs and habits of the people of the country?—With the first reliefs I think it would almost necessarily entail a very large increase to the civil service of India, because men who are relieved every eight or ten years, require some time before they become acquainted with the country; and you could not employ them in the same way as you can employ officers who are more permanently stationed in the country; therefore I look upon it that it is one of the disadvantages of that system that it would lead almost necessarily to a very large increase in the civil service, because a great many officers in a time of peace are occupied in civil employments.

5331. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Supposing the officers of the regiments of the line were to hold these appointments, if they were competent to fill them, do you not think that they would all exchange and remain in India, where their regiments were removed to another station, and that it would be to their interest and advantage to do so?—I am not sufficiently acquainted with the system of exchange in the royal army to be able to answer that question thoroughly; I really do not know how far the rules admit of officers exchanging; for instance, if war broke out in Europe and regiments were withdrawn, I suppose all the officers belonging to those regiments would have to accompany their regiments.

5332. (*Col. Burlton.*) At all events, under any circumstances, if the army was all of the line, some of the best officers in the political line or filling staff appointments, or anything else, would be liable constantly to be recalled by an order from home, and to be taken out of the hands of the Government, without a moment's notice?—I suppose so.

5333. (*Lord Stanley.*) Have you any means of ascertaining what the difference of cost is for an equal number of general service artillery serving in India, and of local artillery?—No, I have not; the sketch estimate would not give it. I have not the means of exactly stating.

5334. The experiment has never been tried, I believe, since the outbreak of the insurrection?—No.

5335. (*Viscount Melville.*) Is it proposed to maintain the horse artillery in Bengal upon the same footing as they are now, supposing they are continued?—I do not think that that subject has been touched upon.

5336. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) It is admitted by all that the Bengal artillery, and generally the artillery in India, are remarkable good; nothing could be better, I admit; but upon the same principle that you think it is an advantage to have certain regiments of the line to go to India as an example to the local corps to keep up their general efficiency, however good they

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

25th Nov. 1858.

may be, do you not think that there is the same advantage, or perhaps to a greater extent, as regards the scientific corps, in a portion of the European force coming fresh from Europe?—I do not think that it is so necessary with them; so far as regards scientific acquirements, and their status as a scientific body, I look upon the Indian artillery as unequalled anywhere. I do not think that there is any body of artillery that I have seen which is better than the artillery of the three services in India. Of course my own experience in the field has been limited to seeing the artillery of the three armies. I have not had the advantage of seeing the royal artillery, or the artillery of any European power in the field, but merely judging from what one reads, there is no artillery in the world, I think, which has shown itself in any way superior for service to that of the three armies in India. I would instance it in this way, every officer who has turned his attention at all to his profession, is aware that in a very short campaign amongst European powers, one reads of the carriages of the artillery suffering, and being ruinously shaken from their having to go over a bad country, with bad roads. I can speak for the Bengal artillery, which went through Affghanistan, for I happened out of curiosity to inspect the whole of the carriages of the park and batteries that were with us at different points. I had been reading at the time about the artillery of European powers and their failures, and I inspected the artillery carriages at Candahar, again when they got up to Ghuzni, again at Cabul, and again when they descended the passes (those of them which did descend), and came back to Delhi. I could not have conceived it possible that any artillery in the world could have made that circuit, and gone over that line of country, really having suffered nothing at all. The carriages appeared just as good as when they left the arsenals.

5337. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) The carriages were built in India?—They were. I instance that as one of the things which show the excellence of the Indian artillery. I hope I am speaking most impartially, for I am not an artillery officer myself. It was from mere curiosity that I watched the effect of that campaign upon the carriages of our artillery; and I certainly cannot conceive anything which is such a test, and I cannot conceive any artillery coming out of such a trial better than they did.

5338. (*Viscount Melville.*) What wood were the carriages built of?—The various parts of the carriages I think were built of different woods, but the main part was of Saul.

5339. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In what manner are the local European troops more under the control of the Governor-general than the troops of the line?—In the first place, as to all the officers their promotion, and everything of that sort, passes through the local governments; any promotion which is made is made by the local government.

5340. Subject to regulation?—Yes. A late order has gone out to India which imposes upon the Government the necessity of the selection of officers for the command of regiments. Now, of course, that involves entirely looking up to the Governor-general, to the Commander-in-chief, of course under the Governor-general; but I mean to the Government there.

5341. Do you think that the experience which the European officers have had of command in native regiments would justify the supposition that they would be all of them very well qualified to command regiments of Europeans?—The experience which officers acquire in the command of native regiments, is of course different from that which is acquired in the command of European regiments, but it is one which requires a great deal of tact and management, therefore I think that a man who is a good commanding officer of a native regiment, will most likely make a good commanding officer of a European regiment, but I think that a man who is a bad commanding officer of a native regiment will most likely make an indifferent and bad commanding officer of an European regiment.

5342. Taking the generality of officers who have served with native troops, do you think that they are very well qualified to take the charge of and to command European troops?—I think that there is nothing to prevent their being very good officers with European troops, and that if there is a difference of treatment and management required, which there no doubt is, they will acquire it very rapidly if they have not got it. In the artillery, we shift a man from the Europeans to natives.

5343. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Among the field officers available for appointment to regimental commands, there is always a certain proportion of officers who have been trained from their youth in European corps, and are available for the command of such corps, is there not?—Yes.

5344. They are all in one line?—Yes; but his Royal Highness's question rather referred, it appeared to me, to the application of two battalion cadres, and therefore I answered it with reference to that. I think that, although those officers may have been accustomed to native troops and dealing with natives, there is nothing in that habit which should preclude them doing very well with European troops; it might take a little time.

5345. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You are aware that new regiments require particularly good officers, and if the local force is to be increased there would be virtually new regiments formed. Do you think that in spite of all that, the officers of these cadres would be fully qualified to make good officers for those regiments?—I think that many of them are very good officers, and that you would get a proportion of very excellent officers. The difficulty which I should apprehend would be more in the case of the non-commissioned officers. It appears to me always that the difficulty in forming new corps is in getting good non-commissioned officers.

5346. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) In the event of additional regiments being raised for local service, of course non-commissioned officers might be received from the regiments of the line; they would be, according to my proposition, absorbed by volunteering into the new corps?—But you require them in the beginning.

5347. You would have them in the beginning?—I think that Her Majesty's regiments, if applied to, might afford a proportion of non-commissioned officers. You cannot begin absorbing at present. From your question, you appear to contemplate immediate absorption or reduction; now, I do not think that is possible.

5348. Supposing the Government of India were to raise half a dozen local regiments, upon the understanding that some of the regiments of the line in India should be simultaneously reduced in strength, I imagine it might be arranged by the authorities for a certain number of volunteers from the line to be received into the local army to form the nucleus of the new regiments; would there be any difficulty in effecting that arrangement?—I suppose it would depend upon the Commander-in-chief in India, whether he thought that corps could spare non-commissioned officers for the new corps to be formed.

5349. Of course it would be upon the understanding that each corps should only furnish a certain number?—I suppose it could be done.

5350. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Is the service generally speaking of officers with the European force in India a popular service?—At present most popular.

5351. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Was it popular before the mutiny?—It depended upon officers. I have known officers who infinitely preferred serving with Europeans, and I have known others who preferred serving with natives. I saw it more amongst artillery officers, because they had more latitude and choice, inasmuch as part of the artillery being native and part being European, there was to a certain extent more opportunity of choice, and there you would see one man prefer serving with the Europeans, and one man prefer serving with the natives in peace.

5352. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) In an army comprising so large a proportion of native troops, is it not a great advantage to the State to have officers who have been trained to serve both with European and native troops, and are qualified to command either a European or native corps?—I look upon it that, of course, whenever you can train either officers or men to more things than one, it is an advantage. Therefore, putting it upon the general question, I should say it is an advantage to train them to both.

5353. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You are, I think, anxious to see exchanges permitted?—Lord Canning is very anxious to see it.

5354. Is it your opinion also that it would be desirable?—I think that if it could be so arranged as that it could take place, it would be an advantage. At the same time I think that exchanges would very seldom take place.

5355. Do you think that it would assimilate the feelings and general habits of the officers of the army if they knew that they would be permitted to exchange?—I think that it would give a satisfactory feeling to both. If there were officers in the local army, who by coming into property or anything else, wished to change and to come into those regiments which were more likely to serve in Europe, I think that it would be a satisfaction to them to be able to do that; and it might be a satisfaction to officers in the line who thought that they could get on in India, who had shown that they were good linguists, or had got their foot in the stirrup in some way or other with the people in India. I think that they would like it, and I think that it is very desirable, if it can be done.

5356. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you think that any advantage would accrue to the public service from such exchanges?—I think that from the point of view from which Lord Canning puts it, there would be an advantage to the public service, inasmuch as it would be one mode of putting them on a sort of equality.

5357. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Amalgamating them?—Amalgamating them.

5358. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Would not one evil result to the local army too probably be that officers in embarrassed circumstances would not unfrequently exchange into it on their regiments being recalled to England?—But I look upon it that it would be the duty of the Commander-in-chief on the side of the British Government, and the duty of the governments of India upon the side of India, to see that the exchanges were fair and reasonable and equitable. For instance, it would not do that a person who was in any way noted as inefficient should be able to change into Her Majesty's line; and so it would not do that an officer from the line to whom there was any objection should be able to change into the other service; therefore it would necessarily be with the sanction and approval both of the Commander-in-chief and also of the Government of India.

5359. (*Lord Stanley.*) You would trust the respective heads of the two armies to protect the forces which they represented against bad bargains?—Exactly; and I would trust to the personal interest of the two individuals to arrange with reference to the exchange, as to what either of them should pay.

5360. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) As a preliminary to introducing the system of exchanges between the officers of the line and local armies, it would be necessary, I imagine, to assimilate their systems of promotion; you could not carry out the system of exchanges between a service in which promotion by purchase and a service in which promotion by seniority are the established systems?—I do not see that. I look upon it as a purely personal question between the two individuals subject to the approval or the disapproval of the two Commanders-in-chief, who are to look after the interests entrusted to them.

5361. Would not the exchange of a young captain from the Queen's service into a regiment of the local service in which there was a much older officer, say 20 years his senior, very much injure the prospects of all the officers below him?—I guard the system of exchange by saying that the Commanders-in-chief and the Governments must see that the thing is fair and equitable, and not open to these sorts of objections.

5362. (*Lord Stanley.*) In reference to that part of the subjects, assuming that no local European army existed, or a very small one, and consequently that the defence of India were mainly carried on by the general service army, do you not think that that would greatly affect the class of men who would enter the army here, that is to say, will not there be many men who will enter the general service army under the existing conditions of service, men of independent fortune and social position, who would be very reluctant to enter it if they knew that very probably one-half or even more of their service must necessarily be passed in India?—I think that it would go far to alter the character of Her Majesty's general army. I do not know whether I may be right or not in the view which I take, but I think that it would have the effect of diminishing the number of men of means and rank entering the army. I think that the chance and the very great chance of long service in India and frequent service in India would have a tendency to diminish the number of men of rank and wealth entering the army, but I may be quite wrong in my view.

5363. (*Col. Burlton.*) Have you ever turned your attention to the circumstances connected with our funds with regard to exchanging, and how it could be managed?—It could only be managed, I think, in the way I mention, by its being made a purely personal question between the two officers who wish to exchange. For instance, if there are any funds or money obligations on the part of an officer of the line which he has to meet, he must arrange and see that he can transfer those obligations to the other man, and in the same way a man from the local army who is subject to the obligations connected with all these funds must ascertain that there is no objection on the part of the managers of those funds to the exchange being made, because it necessarily involves that class of actuary questions connected with life insurance, relating to age and family, and whether a man is married or single, and all those sorts of things; but those I consider personal questions which the man who wishes to make the exchange must himself arrange.

5364. It appears to me, that you do not take into your consideration that these arrangements, although they are personal to the two parties, yet in every possible way must involve the interests of other officers in the fund; one life may be a better life than the other, and the manager of the fund may object and say, I will not have that man. The wife of one man may be younger than the wife of the other. What are you to do in cases of that kind?—If they do not satisfy those objections, the officers wishing to make the exchange cannot make it.

5365. (*Lord Stanley.*) You would therefore limit the power of exchange to the case where the value of the two lives was equal or nearly equal, and where the security for the parties being able to pay the relative obligations must be held to be equally good?—Yes; wherever the exchange was equitable to the public service with reference to the individuals viewed as public servants, and wherever it was equitable to the money obligations on both sides.

5366. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Would you have exchanges made without the consent of the officers below the officers exchanging?—I think that there would be a pretty good security where a man had to satisfy the different interests which were at stake; for instance, a man wishing to exchange from the local service must satisfy the funds and his own Government, and the other man must satisfy his. I think that there is a very good security there. The managers of these funds would watch with jealousy exchanges which they thought in any way unfair to the funds.

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

25th Nov. 1858.

5367. Still you would have the exchange made without the consent of the officers below the officer exchanging ?—Yes, with the approval of the superior authorities.

5368. Do you think that this would be just on the part of the Government towards those officers who have entered the service under the pledge afforded by the regulations in force at the time, that their regimental promotion should continue to be made in entire accordance with the system therein laid down ?—I think it would not be unfair, if the exchange were equitable.

5369. Who is to be the judge of that ?—The two Commanders-in-chief for the several parties, or the Government of India and the Commander-in-chief.

5370. (*Col. Burlton.*) How can the Governor-general or the Commander-in-chief ascertain the value of lives ? I see a man coming, and I know that he is a very good hard life, and I see an old man with a diseased liver going out of my regiment; no Commander-in-chief can settle that question ?—But I should think that the managers of the funds would settle it.

The witness withdrew.

Adjourned to to-morrow, at 11 o'clock.

Friday, 26th November 1858.

PRESENT :

Major-General PEEL.	Lieut.-Gen. Sir HARRY G. W. SMITH.
H. R. H. the Duke of CAMBRIDGE.	Major-Gen. MONTGOMERIE.
Lord STANLEY.	Major-Gen. HANCOCK.
Marquis of TWEEDDALE.	Colonel BURLTON.
Viscount MELVILLE.	Colonel FORSYTH TAIT.

MAJOR-GENERAL PEEL IN THE CHAIR.

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

Colonel HENRY MARION DURAND, C. B., further examined.

5371. (*Col. Burlton*). With respect to exchanges, how would you dispose of the difficulty with regard to the orphan fund ; supposing, for instance, you have a number of children, and exchange with an officer who has none, how would you carry out that exchange ?—My idea is, that it is a personal thing between the officers; that they have to satisfy these funds, that it is a fair equivalent in every sense of the word ; I mean, that the people who are wishing to effect the exchange are fair equivalents, everything considered ; it falls upon the private individuals to satisfy the different interests concerned that they are fair equivalents.

5372. In the case of the orphan fund, the Government insist upon every officer being a subscriber to it as they do at present with the other fund. Supposing that by exchanges these funds lose a large number of subscribers, would it not be detrimental to the fund ?—In the first place I consider that it would be the object of the Government and the Commanders-in-chief to see that they were fair equivalents as regards the public service, and I assume that the different interests concerned, before whom these private individuals must make good their arrangements, would see that the thing was fair and just ; therefore I do not anticipate that there would be a loss.

5373. You are then speaking of the interest of the individuals only, I am speaking of the interest of the fund itself. If the fund loses its subscribers, if many subscribers to the orphan or widows' fund leave the service, and are replaced in the service by officers in the line who are not subscribers either to one or the other, those funds will become insolvent, even more so than they are at present ?—But I premise that they have to satisfy the different parties concerned as to their taking up the different obligations.

5374. You could not call upon an officer from the line, a captain or a major in Her Majesty's service, on coming into our service to join those funds at an advanced period of life ?—I start with the proviso that they are fair equivalents.

5375. Your equivalents are only between the two individuals, but the question involves a much greater matter than that, namely, the stability of these funds ?—The proviso is that they establish before the different interests concerned, that they are fair equivalents in every way, because, after all, it is only a question of money.

5376. In another point of view, if these two officers exchanged, would you have an officer who comes in and makes that exchange pay up the value of his life interest in the fund which he is about to enter ?—I think that he must do whatever is found necessary, in order that he may be a just equivalent for the man whom he replaces. I know of no better description of it.

5377. That is not the question. It involves the interests of the complete body ?—I am speaking with reference to the interests of that complete body. They say we do not approve of the exchange, unless such and such things are done or paid, or whatever it may be. If the private individuals agree to that, I do not see that there is any difference.

5378. If that were the case, and if a captain in the army, for instance, coming into our service had to make good the subscription of the person with whom he exchanged, both to the orphan fund and to the military fund, it would put an end to all possibility of exchange ; it would take some 5,000*l.* or 6,000*l.* in addition to what he would pay for the exchange, and I apprehend that it would be impossible to do it ?—I think that it would be very seldom done. I do not say that it would be impossible ;—you are taking an extreme case, you are supposing an officer of long service exchanging; now I think that it would not be usually among the officers of long standing, it would be usually on the part of lieutenants or captains, seldom among the field officers ; it might happen with them occasionally, but very rarely I think, and I do not think that it would frequently be done even among the captains and lieutenants.

5379. With regard to the military fund, in a case of that kind you would have the process to go through of getting an actuary to value the life of the man, to value the life of the wife, and to estimate the difference of value between the husband's age and the wife's age ; it would be a process of very great complication and difficulty ?—That I admit fully.

5380. But you think that it would be possible to do it ?—I do not see that it is impossible, I regard it from that point of view as a personal thing.

5381. Do you think that that difficulty regarding the fund, the military fund in particular, could be got over on this principle, that we make over to the Government of India the whole of the debt which they owe us, for which we hold Company's paper to the extent of about half a million of money, besides a claim which we have (and a just and equitable claim as I conceive) to the extent of about 300,000*l.*,

making altogether a claim against them of about 800,000*l.* If we were to cancel all claims upon the State to that amount, and the State were then to take to itself the whole of our liabilities and responsibilities, both present and prospective, do you not think that that would be a better mode of adjusting the matter, securing to all present and future widows the pensions to which they are entitled, and all other things ?—On the first view of the thing, I think that it would facilitate the matter very much ; this is the first time that I have heard it suggested, therefore I have not considered the proposal ; but upon the first blush I think that it would facilitate the object very much.

5382. You are aware that the military fund is, in point of fact, speaking as an actuary would speak, altogether insolvent ?—So I have heard.

5383. That is, that its prospective liabilities, taking the value of each annuity, prospective and present, are about 200,000*l.* beyond the value of its assets ?—I have heard that, but not with reference to Madras or Bombay. I was informed at the same time that the Government had taken upon themselves the payment of all widows consequent upon the late insurrection; that they had taken all such payments, and that therefore that had restored the solvency of the fund.

5384. (*Viscount Melville.*) As you have been in India during the whole of the time of this revolt, and are aware of the native feeling at present existing, will you have the goodness to offer your opinion as to what you consider that the native feeling at present is, and whether you regard this outbreak really as a sepoy revolt, or as a general national rising ?—I look upon the feeling as varying very much in different parts of the country, and therefore I cannot reply generally to the question. I should have to take different parts of India, and to give an estimate, so far as I could, of the state of feeling in those parts in India. I think that where the main military operations are now being carried on, the sympathy of the people is rather with the insurgents and the mutineers than with the Government, and my reason for thinking that is, that every officer who has been in command, with whom I have had an opportunity of speaking, always makes one remark, which is, that they have had extreme difficulty in getting information. Now, so far as I have seen upon service, wherever I have been upon service in India, and to the west of the Indus, where the feeling of the people was with you, there was comparatively less difficulty or no difficulty in getting information of the movements of the enemy. Where the feeling of the people was hostile to you, there was always difficulty, and often very great difficulty, in obtaining information with respect to the movements, or the position, or the force, or anything else concerning the enemy ; and so far as I have had an opportunity of speaking with those actually in command on the present field of action in the north of India, there has always been the same remark, that they found considerable difficulty in obtaining information. I am speaking generally ; there were instances where they got information.

5385. Taking that to be the case, I see that in Lord Canning's minute, he states that "the raising of troops "mainly Hindostanee must continue." Seeing that these are the very men who have revolted, how do you propose to raise men in whom you can have confidence ?—The word "Hindostanee" covers a very large extent of country, and the mutineering sepoys were chiefly taken from two parts of the country, mainly from Oude, and some from the districts of one portion of Bahar. We left untouched, I may so say, a very large portion of the population, a great many strata, if you may so call them, of castes and people were left nearly wholly untouched ; so that the recruiting may in a great measure avoid, if the Government so direct, those tracts of country where there is the greatest animosity shown or supposed to exist ; they may avoid the dangerous parts of the country, and they may enlist in other parts of the country where there has been no exhibition of feeling to that amount, and where there is a reasonable prospect of getting men who would be as faithful as you can expect Easterns to be.

5386. Is it not the case that a feeling now exists on the part of the Punjaub Government, that the Sikhs and the Punjaubese are not to be particularly relied upon, and are a source of uneasiness at this moment ?—I look upon the preponderance of the Punjaubee element as a very great danger, (you may observe in Lord Canning's memorandum that it is looked upon in that view,) and that is to be dealt with as soon as possible ; it cannot be dealt with too soon, that is one reason why Lord Canning presses much for the settlement in England of these questions, and that the views of the Government should be sent to him with as great expedition as possible ; he carries it to that degree that in a letter which I received from him lately, and of which, with the permission of the Commission, I will mention one portion, (it is a private instruction to myself,) he says, speaking of amalgamation which has been advocated by some of the officers and authorities, whose replies have been received by the Government of India, "Even if it be granted that amalgamation is possible "and desirable, the working of it out will be "tedious, and the first steps in reconstruction ought "not to be hampered by the consideration of it. If the "Commissioners do not dismiss it at once you cannot "urge too strongly that it should be the last point to "be taken up, and that the formation of a European "army, local to begin with, should not be delayed for "it. The real difficulties of amalgamating will not be "increased by creating a new army first." The subject upon which your last question touches is one which presses upon the Government, and to the importance of which that Government is very fully alive, and is extremely anxious, so soon as it is possible to begin reducing the preponderance of the Punjaubee element, which is really a danger, because as mentioned in the memorandum of Lord Canning there are about 75,000 Punjaubee troops, about 50,000 of these are irregulars as they are called, but still they are troops, and the others are spread through the police. Therefore on anything taking place in the Punjaub, under the supposition that such a thing occurred, a chord would be struck, not only in the Punjaub, but throughout every police battalion in which there were any Sikhs, and consequently it is of extreme importance that the local army of Bengal should be placed as soon as possible upon a footing which will permit the Government at once to proceed to reduce the preponderance of the Punjaubee element, which is not all Sikh. I beg to guard the Commission upon this point, about one-third of it is Sikh, and the other part is Mussulman, and from the Punjaub.

5387. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How does Lord Canning propose to meet that difficulty ?—By forming some of the battalions which he proposes to form, and also if the Bengal artillery is brought up to the mark, which is recommended by Lord Canning;—the mere fact of our preponderance in that arm would go far to keep down and quiet everything.

5388. Supposing that to-morrow the Government ordered eight or nine additional companies of royal artillery to go out, what would be the difference ; they would be much quicker in the field than any new artillery raised ; the new artillery companies raised could not be in the field under a year or 18 months ?—I think the royal artillery would cost more.

5389. Why ?—Because the system is different.

5390. In what respect is the system different ?—If you take the constitution of a battery, the number of gunners is much larger.

5391. What is the number of guns in an Indian battery ?—Six.

5392. That is the same as ours ?—But they have a larger number of gunners. The difference of system mainly arises, I take it, in this way. In England everything of the grooming sort necessarily falls upon the men attached to the battery, who all form part of the battery ; in India that is not so. If your Royal Highness were to take the minute of Lord Canning,

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

16th Nov. 1858.

and the strength which he proposes for the companies of artillery and the reserve companies, and were then to compare that with the strength of gunners attached to a royal battery of artillery, you would see that there is a large difference, the fact being that in India, where you are forced to have grass cutters and scices, part of the work, namely, the work of looking after the horses, and that sort of thing, falls upon them. Therefore, you are enabled to have your artillery at a much cheaper rate than according to the royal artillery system, because it requires, according to that system, more Europeans.

5393. That is a matter of detail. Suppose you arranged that the batteries of royal artillery did not go out stronger than the batteries of artillery in India, and that immediately on arrival these scices and people were attached to them, what difference of expense could there be?—Perhaps there might be no difference of expense upon that point, if they were put exactly upon the same organization that our batteries are; but then you have the disadvantage of men who are wholly unaccustomed to the country, who cannot speak to these scices, who cannot give them an order or do anything with them.

5394. How are the newly raised companies to be managed?—In the newly raised companies the men are mixed, you form new batteries, partly of old men and partly of new men, and therefore you have a mixture.

5395. You have not the means of doing that when a battery is in the field. How can you put recruits into a battery in the field?—It is constantly done. They are first of all trained. There is a reserve company or two. There is a battery, not in the field, where they are kept for some time, and they are sent to the other batteries; there is no difficulty in that way. Tombs's battery, I suspect, has very few men remaining in it who were in it a few years ago.

5396. What facility have you of forming the men out there rapidly?—You always have a proportion of old men remaining who understand the country, and have got into the ways of the people, and the ways of the service, and the new men join them and learn very rapidly.

5397. (*Major-Gen. Haneock.*) Is it not the case in Bengal as in Bombay, that the men of the European regiments of infantry are trained to and practised with the guns?—I cannot speak with certainty upon that point, for I really do not know.

5398. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) As a soldier, do you mean to say that if you had a battery formed of soldiers fully trained, you do not conceive that a battery so formed is a much more efficient battery than one formed of 30 old men and 50, 60, or 100 boys, recruits, fresh from England, and untrained?—If it was a question of bringing these batteries in front of a European enemy at home, I should say that necessarily the battery which was formed wholly of trained men was the better of the two; but where it is a question of taking them to a country like India, and where there are the mixed considerations of your having to deal with those men, and the other men, namely, grass cutters and scices, and all that sort of thing, it requires some knowledge of the country and the climate for them to keep their health properly; and there really is a very great difference, then, for the old men indoctrinate the young men, and the young men, in fact, become experienced men far more rapidly than they otherwise would be.

5399. In what respect is the royal artillery, which went out to India, inferior in the field to the Bengal artillery?—I am not aware that I ever hinted that it was inferior.

5400. I do not mean inferior on general principles, but inferior through local circumstances, caused by what you state?—I would instance the things which I have just been mentioning, that a battery of men arriving wholly ignorant of the country, and having to be fitted out directly they land, are under very great disadvantages as compared with the battery which has been in the country for some time, which is all equipped, which knows its people, and has the habits of the people at its fingers' ends. The one necessarily comes under a very great disadvantage in comparison with the other. I do not mean that there is any inferiority in the men. I look upon the royal artillery as being just as fine troops as any others.

5401. Has it been found in practice that they have been inferior, not from any inferiority of arm or service, but from the circumstance of arriving in India, and having been suddenly sent into the field?—I think it has. I think it has been found that a great deal has had to be done in order to provide them with servants, to find them scices, and find them grass cutters, and all those sorts of things.

5402. Was not that the result of a very great increase of artillery generally, which would have taken place whether it was royal artillery or Bengal artillery, or any other; was not it merely the result of adding so many troops and batteries to the force which was already existing there?—It comes in a very much more difficult shape when you land whole companies of artillery, and have to equip them wholly *de novo*. It is a very different thing when you send a detachment of recruits to a battery which is already existing, and which, wherever it is, has facilities of getting the people and things which are requisite. A commissariat officer would be able at once to explain the great difference which there is, because in the one case it is spread over a considerable surface, and in the other case you plump down a certain number of batteries and men; you have to fit those up and to provide them with everything.

5403. Granting, as I do at once, that that is a perfectly military and correct view of the case, supposing that you have to add companies to that force, is it not the same thing whether that force is royal, or Bengal, or Madras, or Bombay, or any other force; and must not the new formation always, for a time, somewhat retard the efficiency of the battery?—But the new formation is in the one case gradual; you send out the men, and they are diffused amongst the old batteries to bring up the old batteries to the proper strength. Drafts from the old batteries are taken to join on to the new men to form new batteries, so that the whole thing is, comparatively speaking, a gradual formation; it is not as if you plumped down so many hundred new artillery men.

5404. But for the time you make all the batteries in the field inefficient; you must take from them?—You take a certain number, but I do not think you make them inefficient; you make all these men from the moment you get them.

5405. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) As a matter of course, you would keep the batteries in the field efficient by supplying them with men from batteries at garrison stations, but without rendering the latter inefficient further than in having a few untrained men in the place of the trained ones?—My meaning is simply this, that you diffuse the new recruits amongst the old men, and that they are formed very rapidly, and acquire the habits much more rapidly than perfectly new men.

5406. It would be done according to the system now uniformly adopted in India, under which batteries ordered on field service are always weeded of their inefficient men, and completed with efficient men from batteries at garrison stations which are not expected to be employed in the field; is it not so?—Yes.

5407. (*Col. Burlton.*) Do you know how the royal artillery were sent up to the upper provinces when they landed; were they sent by steam, by rail, or did they march?—Some were sent by steam; it depended somewhat upon the time at which they landed; I think D'Aguilar's batteries, for instance, went up the river, and I think some were sent by land, for I think I remember their arriving by waggon train.

5408. Do you know whether any officers of the native Bengal army happened to be sent in charge of them, or with them upon those occasions?—I am not clear as to any particular occasion, but I know that

with troops and batteries they have to give interpreters, because they are new to the country, and they require an officer to interpret.

5409. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That is the case with a regiment of the line or any other regiment?—Yes.

5410. Do you not think that, financially speaking, without reference to the other points to which you have alluded, it would be quite as easy to put the detail of a company of royal artillery on the exact footing of a company of Bengal artillery, as any other portion of the troops that may be sent out?—If you alter their organization and assimilate it to that of the Bengal artillery, necessarily it can be done.

5411. (*Chairman.*) Can you state the number of officers who have been added to the Bengal artillery since the breaking out of the mutiny? How many officers have obtained commissions in the Bengal artillery since that event?—I am not able to answer that question, for I have not any data.

5412. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) There has been no augmentation of the Indian artillery, has there?—There has been no augmentation, there has been an assimilation, but it was no augmentation. When the question was put to me yesterday with reference to the employment of some 36 or 46 officers, I was thinking that the question rather referred to an increase; there has been no increase, but merely an assimilation; an increase is required and recommended. There is a minute by Lord Canning, in which he strongly urges that there should be an increase.

5413. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) There has been an increase of officers already by the very assimilation to which you allude, has there not?—I think your Royal Highness will find that there has been no absolute increase of officers; that the actual number of officers remained exactly the same. There was an assimilation of grades, but it went no further than an assimilation of grades; there was a difference made necessarily, but the establishment was not officially increased. There is a requisition for its increase.

5414. In the royal artillery it stands thus: a first captain, a second captain, and three subalterns. As I understand it, the establishment of the Bengal artillery was one captain, and, as far as the European part of the artillery went, there were three lieutenants, but not so for the native batteries; they had much fewer. There are now two captains and two subalterns, according to the establishment of a Bengal European battery?—Up to the time when I left India there had been no definite order, saying that the strength of a battery should be so and so, therefore I cannot answer the question positively.

5415. (*Chairman.*) My question applied to the original system, the ordinary cadets?—I cannot answer the question, because I do not know the exact number sent out, any army list will show it.

5416. I understood you that the great difference in the Bengal presidency is the number of artillery officers who are left unemployed?—I never said that; instead of their being unemployed we want more officers of artillery. If you understood me to say that, I never intended to say it at all, however I may have expressed myself.

5417. There is no want of employment for the artillery officers in the Bengal presidency at the present moment?—No, we want more.

5418. (*Lord Stanley.*) Is their present employment permanent or temporary?—The present employment of some of the artillery officers is temporary, with a great many of them who are with the troops and batteries it is permanent; then those with the ordnance commissariat are on staff employment, those with contingents or employed politically are of course employed temporarily.

5419. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But that will always be the case, there is nothing special in that; you always take officers from the artillery as from the rest of the service for staff employment, and also for civil staff employment?—They have a share; they have been generally taken in rather fewer numbers than the others from there being a deficiency of artillery officers, from our not having so many artillery officers as we ought to have.

5420. How is that now; is there a larger proportion than there otherwise would be, I mean on staff and civil employments?—No; what with the casualties and what with the requirements of the service during the last year, we are short-handed in officers; we want more artillery officers.

5421. (*Viscount Melville.*) I think you said in answer to one of the questions, that the reason for having a local artillery instead of the royal artillery was a question of economy, inasmuch as there were fewer men, and that the syces took charge of the horses?—I did not say that they took charge of them, they do a great deal of work.

5422. You are aware that that is merely a Bengal system, that it does not exist at Bombay, nor I believe at Madras, where the men clean and take charge of their own horses?—The difference is, that they are much stronger both at Madras and at Bombay, where the horse artillery are nearer the royal establishment. In Bengal the gunners see to the grooming of the horses, the syces do not take care of the horses. If you walk down to one of our batteries you will see the officer on duty, and you will see the men seeing to the grooming of the horses themselves, and superintending the thing.

5423. I have seen the syce doing that instead of the man?—That is not what I say; my own experience is, that there is always an officer of the battery on the day duty, or whatever it is termed, that he attends stable duty regularly, it is part of his duty; very often the captain of the battery is down himself to look after it, but always the officer of the day; he attends the stable duty regularly, and the men overlook the grooming of their own horses.

5424. You say that the Bombay and the Madras system approaches more to that of the royal artillery. Do not you consider that the Madras and the Bombay horse artillery are consequently much more efficient than the Bengal?—As to number of men they are stronger, and therefore as to number of men they are more efficient; but yet it is a question of finance, and where you have a large body of artillery to maintain, I would not advocate changing the system, because it is more economical. We can do the work at a cheaper rate, and we are pressed by our finances.

5425. In the Bengal presidency you have 13 troops of horse artillery on the system on which they are organized. I should like to know your opinion, whether if those 13 troops had been made into 6 or 7, they would not have been a great deal more efficient than with their present organization?—I should say, that in some respects necessarily, whenever you double the strength of a battery with Europeans, you make it more efficient in this way, that under the supposition that you come in for two or three sharp actions, and that you lose a proportion of men in each action; necessarily the battery which has most men, under the supposition that two batteries are equally exposed in action, will stand most actions, and will come out with more guns; but, taking the requirements of the country, the usual requirements of the military service, and the usual amount of casualty upon service, I do not think that it would be to the advantage of the Government to make that change.

5426. Are you not aware that the horse artillery in Bengal cannot move without a troop of dragoons to attend them?—But I consider that no horse artillery should ever be unsupported by cavalry.

5427. They should be supported to a certain extent. The royal artillery and the Bombay artillery have detachments, but they are more efficient?—I consider that no battery of horse artillery, even with a royal complement of men, should, excepting under very peculiar circumstances, be left without the support of cavalry.

5428. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) They cannot be considered as a really efficient body without they have some cavalry with them; I mean, even stationed with

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

26th Nov. 1858.

them, wherever they may be?—I think they may be regarded as perfectly efficient without it, putting it in the way in which your Royal Highness is putting it, but at the same time I consider that, wherever you have got artillery henceforward in India, in fact, wherever you have got troops at all, those troops must be a well balanced force. Your artillery must feel that it has European horse and foot to support it, and I think that it is not advisable ever to have any forces in India in future where they are not well balanced.

5429. (*Viscount Melville.*) In the organization of the Bengal horse artillery, you are aware that the men who work the guns drive the horses; consequently, when they have to dismount, their horses are left without drivers, and the system is to leave the leading driver and the wheel driver with no centre driver at all; you must bring the waggon into action, because without doing so you have not the men to work the gun?—It is a minor difference; their system is always found to work perfectly well, inasmuch as no difficulty has arisen from it at all.

5430. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) The point appears to me to be this: I had some experience with the horse artillery of India, and nothing can possibly be more efficient; but I think you were about Lord Ellenborough when representations were made of the want of detachments, as it is called, to the artillery gun. It is not in action that the gun is not worked well for a moment, but where there is a considerable loss of artillerymen the gun becomes deficient because it does not enter the field with a sufficient number of gunners?—The complement of men is a very moderate one with a Bengal battery, and the way in which you are putting it appears to me to be very much the same as the way in which I replied to the question that was put to me just now, namely, that if two batteries were going into action, the one with double the number of men of the other, and if they each underwent a certain loss in the first action, and afterwards a certain loss in another action, and so on, there being, perhaps, three or four actions, in coming out of the contest the battery which had originally the greatest number of men would necessarily come out the most efficient, because as you lose men you are forced to knock off one or two guns and send them into park. Therefore, merely putting it upon the question of actual service in the field under the supposition that you are to go through four or five sharp engagements, and that you have not the time or means to repair your casualties, then necessarily the battery which has gone in with the largest number of men will come out of the contest able, perhaps, to work five guns, when the other is working four or may be three. But to revert to what I said before, I do not think that it would be advantageous to the Government, taking the general run of the service and the requirements of that service, to put the whole of their artillery upon that footing in Bengal.

5431. I think you would have taken a different view of the case upon the outbreak of the revolt, when all the native artillery had gone against us; you would have been very glad to have had all the battalions as efficient as possible, would you not?—Every man would then have wished instead of native gunners to have European gunners, but I do not think that that touches the point.

5432. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that it is an advantage in the field to bring the waggons into action?—I suppose there is always a certain portion of the battery waggons brought into the field.

5433. Not to the front?—And there is always a reserve of waggons which are kept under cover.

5434. The difference is that the gunners sit on the waggons; therefore, the waggons must actually go into action under fire, or the drivers cannot bring up their guns?—The waggons are never kept so near to the guns as that they are under fire at the same time. The artillery is an arm to which I do not belong, but I know that as an officer I should be extremely sorry if I were commanding a battery of horse artillery, and were going into action to be sharply engaged, to have my waggons not pretty close up. I should prefer keeping the battery together.

5435. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) The point is whether there are a sufficient number of men to the batteries of horse artillery in Bengal, or whether there are not. I think you were about Lord Ellenborough at a period when a representation was made that the Bengal artillery would be more efficient if they had detachments like the royal artillery. Were you about Lord Ellenborough then or not?—I do not recollect the reference, it may have been made, but I do not recollect it. It is a subject which has been very much discussed, and it is merely a financial one, because when it comes to be debated whether a battery is more efficient for continued service, and when exposed to repeated casualties with a couple of hundred men, or with one hundred and twenty, there cannot be much doubt about the matter.

5436. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) As far as the interests of Government are concerned, do you not think that the more efficient you can make your army the better for the Government. That the Government is better served, and that a battery even of six guns thoroughly efficient, is more valuable than two batteries of 12 guns which becomes very shortly inefficient?—That depends very much upon the casualties which they are likely to go through upon the service.

5437. (*Chairman.*) I understand you to say that in a military point of view, you consider an increased establishment advantageous, but not in a financial point of view?—Exactly so.

5438. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) With respect to the comparative establishments of officers in the royal and Indian regiments of artillery, is not it the case that in the latter the establishment was fixed with a view to provide officers for the ordnance, as well as other regimental requirements, and also to leave a sufficient margin for securing to that corps its fair proportionate share of the various army staff and other detached appointments, in common with the officers of the other branches of the service?—I suppose so; whether it was originally contemplated or not I really cannot tell, but I suppose that that is the object kept in view, that it should meet the general requirements of the service in India, which comprise what you state.

5439. Are you aware that the Court of Directors many years ago fixed the complement of officers for a battery at a captain and three subalterns, but have never maintained the establishment of their artillery regiments at a strength sufficient to provide the batteries with that number; that on the contrary in the Bombay presidency, with which alone I am acquainted, there have always been many batteries with only two or three officers; some occasionally with only one, and some under the command of subalterns?—I believe that that has been pretty general all over India.

5440. Are you aware that about the year 1850, the Commander-in-chief at Bombay in reply to a reference from the Government of India, represented the urgent want of officers in the Bombay artillery, and stated that he could not be responsible for the discipline of the corps, unless his urgent representations were attended to; that he asked for an increase, to the extent of one battalion of officers, as being required to make up the complement, which the Court of Directors had laid down as requisite to secure efficiency, but that notwithstanding repeated subsequent representations, no augmentation has been made since, with the exception of the addition of a captain to each battalion, in view to equalise the chances of promotion with the other branches of the service?—I am not officially aware of the fact; I have heard that it was the case. I have also heard several things with respect to Madras. I have heard more with respect to Madras than with respect to Bombay.

5441. (*Chairman.*) Then you are officially aware of a great want of artillery officers in India?—I think I may safely say, as I said before, that our artillery generally is under officered; it wants more officers.

5442. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that there is an advantage in there being a different system of artillery for the three presidencies, a different system of equipment and organization?—I think there would be an advantage by the whole of the artillery, so far as the material went, being organized similarly.

5443. That is not the case at present; they are all three different to some extent?—It is not the case at present.

5444. (*Viscount Melville.*) Will you state the length of time which you think it would take to re-organize the native Bengal army to the strength which you propose, and the districts in which you think men might be raised in whom you could place confidence?—I can neither say the time, nor can I enter into the detail of the districts; I think that it should be left to the local government.

5445. Do you know in what way the Madras and Bombay armies have kept up their recruiting during this outbreak, or from what districts they have drawn their men?—I only know it from the replies which they have given to the questions sent from the Governor-general, one of which questions is asking where their men are drawn from; and when the papers are put before the Commission, you will find full replies upon that point from the various officers who were referred to, both for Bombay, for Madras, and for Bengal.

5446. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In contemplating a reduction of the Sikh or Punjaubee element in the army, did I rightly understand you that you would wish for a time to have a still further increase of Europeans than there are in India at this moment; did your answer imply that?—I forget the question exactly to which your Royal Highness refers.

5447. Lord Melville put a question as to the danger of the Punjaubee and Sikh element in the army, and you said that the Governor-general felt that so forcibly that he could not too strongly urge the propriety of at once coming to some resolution as to the European portion of the armies of India, and you said that that was a principal reason why he pressed for a decision; does that imply that he required a further European force in India, in order to meet that difficulty which Lord Melville started?—The stronger we are in India the more easily that object will be effected. The forming of these local European corps is necessarily a work of some little time, and as men come out for these corps they for the time being strengthen the hands of the Government; although, when these corps were formed, it might be possible to recal some of the general service regiments from India, yet for a time there would be an additional force of the men who were actually forming or formed as new regiments in the country, as well as those regiments which might be relieved in course of time, in consequence of the new regiments and the new local corps being formed. I mean that whenever you are making reliefs, there is temporarily an additional strength, but I do not think that Lord Canning's memorandum had reference to that. I think that his desire is that no time should be lost in the formation of the local army, with a view to the general fact that until that local army is formed the Government is exposed in India to the chance of troops being recalled from emergency at home, and that it is essential and very requisite from many points of view, that there should be no time lost in bringing up the artillery to the mark, and in forming the local European corps.

5448. As regards efficiency of arm, do you not think that the regiments (whether they are to be continued there or not) which exist in Her Majesty's service in India, being old corps, are more efficient regiments than any which you can send out?—For the time being old corps are more efficient than new corps.

5449. Then, surely, the Governor-general has more European power in the regiments which he has now than if some of them came home and were to be replaced by raw levies, which certainly for some period could not be considered as efficient troops?—I think that some of the regiments have suffered so much that either they must be quite renewed, or they must be sent home; and that, therefore, even upon the point upon which your Royal Highness puts it, the forming of new regiments would be a very great advantage.

5450. As an experienced officer, which you are, how long do you think that a regiment will take before it really is fit to take the field. I refer to an entirely new regiment such as is now contemplated?—That, I think, varies so much, and depends so much upon how it is formed, and where it is formed, that I feel that I should be giving a very wild answer.

5451. Do you think that an entirely new regiment or battalion is fit to take the field under a year or a year and a half?—I should say that a regiment of European infantry would require about a year to be brought up to a desirable state of efficiency to bring it up to anything like good order.

5452. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) It would be composed not exclusively of recruits of course, but of drafts taken from other regiments, and probably of volunteers from regiments of the line?—Yes; but it depends so much upon where you form it, and how you form it, that I really cannot answer the question with anything like correctness. But there is another object in pressing for the formation of a local army; Lord Canning attaches considerable political importance to the fact of the inhabitants seeing Europeans. For instance, I forget the exact strength of the cavalry which was sent out, but for the formation of our European cavalry there was a certain body of men sent out, and Lord Canning considers that the mere effect of seeing a number of European recruits sent out and seeing that there is a large supply coming out, is good upon the country and upon the people.

5453. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) If that is the case would it not be very valuable if eight or ten regiments of Her Majesty's service were withdrawn this year, and eight or ten other regiments sent out to replace them; would not the effect of their coming as a trained body, actually new regiments, both officers and men, and ready on the day of landing to take the field, be far greater than with a new body of recruits sent out to be formed there?—I suppose that no one would for a moment say that eight or ten fresh full-formed regiments coming out in that way were not more efficient, and would not have a greater effect than a body of raw recruits landing; I do not suppose that any one would argue against that, but the political object of having the local army kept up with its Europeans, both for the artillery and for the European infantry, is the point upon which I was.

5454. That is a purely political question, but I think you must admit that the pressure for troops would be met in the way I have put it more efficiently by sending out a fresh body of Queen's troops and withdrawing regiments which were much cut up, than by sending out recruits to be formed there?—Certainly, so far as the military efficiency in the field goes.

5455. And the moral effect?—There again you must take into consideration that it involves the question not only of the number of men, but also of the stability of the system. For instance, if you see 1,200 or 1,400 men sent out to bring up the local artillery to the mark, and if the natives see that that is never allowed to go down, that is a stable element which they see is not allowed to shift or change. With the 1,400 or 1,500 men which you might land as regular artillery, the moral effect in one sense would be rather less than it would be in the other, because the people would say, these are new troops sent out for a pinch, and they may be recalled again just as

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B. 6th Nov. 1858.

quickly as they have been sent out. In a military point of view, in the way your Royal Highness puts it as matters of efficiency for the field, I do not for a moment mean to say that 8,000 or 10,000 men, old formed soldiers, would not be much more efficient than if there were 8,000 or 10,000 men who were recruits.

5456. I do not see how you should put it that the moral effect of 1,200 recruits should be greater than the moral effect of two or three regiments of 1,000 men fully effective in every respect ?—The instance which I put was with respect to the artillery. The way that the natives, looking at the thing, would see it, would be that the batteries of artillery which had been diminished, and which had lost in casualties, and in one way or another, a certain number of men, were not allowed to go down at all, but that, on the contrary, 1,200 or 1,400 men were sent out to form new batteries, and so forth, those new batteries being formed partly with the old troops.

5457. Admitting that it is of importance merely as regards the natives, that they should see that what has existed is kept efficient and complete, what has that to do with raising new companies and new batteries for the local force, supposing you could send complete batteries of royal artillery fit to take the field at once ?—Because a new class of considerations comes into play, namely, the necessity which there is for having in India a body of officers and a body of troops which shall belong to the country, become acquainted with the habits of the people and of the country, and also become acclimated. I look upon it that there is really less loss of life amongst the old regiments. I would instance it: there were serving with myself in Western Malwa this time last year four troops, or two squadrons of Her Majesty's 14th dragoons, under Colonel Gall; these were old troops, acclimated troops in India, and they had just returned from Persia; they were under a most admirable officer. Those men were worked and did the work as if they were natives; that is to say, they were exposed and worked incessantly just as hard as the Nizam's cavalry, who were alongside of them. But I am perfectly convinced that if you had attempted that with any new regiment, you would have foundered, and destroyed the regiment in the course of the first fortnight.

5458. Do you not think that that is the case with every regiment which takes the field. From the very fact of that regiment having been to Persia, has it not been weeded of all the men unfit for the service, and brought up to the highest pitch of efficiency, and therefore would it not be more fit for service in any climate and any country ?—It is therefore that I argue in favour of a local army; those men were acclimated and fitted for the work, and all the officers accustomed to the country, but that is not the case with new troops.

5459. If, statistically, it is found that it is not so, but, on the contrary, that the local regiments are less healthy than the ordinary regiments of the line, what would you say to that ?—That would depend very much on where they were located, and how they were used.

5460. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) If, on the other hand, the statistical tables show that the actual mortality in the Queen's regiments has been greater during a long period of years than in the Company's, does not that lead to an opposite conclusion ?—I should answer that question subject to the same proviso, namely, that a great deal depends upon where the corps are put. If you put a European corps in an unhealthy climate and keep it there, and then compare that corps with a corps which is in the hills, or anywhere else, in a very healthy place, the comparison is not fair.

5461. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I refer to the aggregate, because I suppose that no particular localities are told off to the local regiments or for the line regiments. I suppose that they all take their tour of duty, wherever it may be. I am talking of the whole troops, local and Queen's, throughout India ?—It would depend very much, of course, upon the time which that aggregate covered.

5462. Say, ten years ?—Some corps I have known kept a pretty good time at an unhealthy station, and then, instead of being removed to a very good one, perhaps removed not to a very good one. If you get two or three cases of that sort it affects your averages very much.

5463. (*Viscount Melville.*) Does not it happen in India just as it does in every other country, that on the breaking out of a campaign, for instance, this very outbreak, no matter how long the regiments have been in the country, do you not have, on a regiment first taking the field, a great many casualties until it has been out some time, and the men have become accustomed to the duty ?—My own experience is rather that your loss is at the end, when you come in. There is a loss during the campaign, of course. The more acclimated harder troops go through it better than the other; and there is a difference during the campaign in the actual endurance of acclimated men and of men who are new to the climate. But the thing which shows the stamina of the corps is at the close of the campaign after you come in, after the excitement and everything is over, and you come again into quarters.

5464. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That would not be the case as regards the 14th dragoons which you quoted, because they were actually at work all the time ?—I quoted them as an instance of an acclimated regiment. No body of men could have done higher and better service than that small body of Her Majesty's 14th dragoons.

5465. Did you see anything of the 71st, or had you left Central India before they came up ?—I handed over the charge before the 71st joined. I saw nothing of them at all.

5466. I think I asked a question yesterday as to the formation of these new regiments, and whether you thought that the officers who had been in the habit of serving exclusively with native troops who would now have to be employed with Europeans, were qualified to form new regiments, to which, I think, your answer was yes, but especially as there had been an order sent out recently to select commanding officers. Am I correct in that ?—The two matters were not put in that connection, they were put separately. With respect to the first question as to the efficiency of the officers to be employed with European troops, my reply was that you would find I thought a proportion of good officers and a proportion of indifferent officers, but that I thought, taking the question generally, you would find very good officers and officers perfectly fit to raise and form the regiments. With reference to the second question, I brought it forward in connection with the authority of the Governor-general; it was as to touching in any way or diminishing in any way the authority and influence of the Governor-general, that I brought forward that instance that the orders of the Secretary of State to the Government of India are that the Government is to select officers for the command of regiments.

5467. That is a new principle ?—That is a new principle.

5468. When was that introduced ?—The order reached Allahabad before I left Allahabad. I speak with deference to the presence of the Secretary of State; he can correct me if I am wrong; but that was the order.

5469. Was that an order which emanated from the Home Government or from the Governor-general ?—It came from the Home Government to the Governor-general in India.

5470. Does not that strike at the root of the system of seniority which has existed in India ?—No, it affects it necessarily, but it does not strike at the root of it. Upon this subject I may be allowed perhaps to add a few words;—when the papers which I have brought home come before the Commission it will be seen that very great stress is laid by a large number

of those who give their replies upon the necessity of increasing the powers of commanding officers. There is a great unanimity on that point, and the Commission have already the memorandum of Lord Canning before them, in which he touches upon the necessity of young officers, before they join, having higher qualifications. Now, where you are to put great powers into the hands of commanding officers, it certainly is a matter of very great moment that the officers who join the army should be officers of higher attainments than mere youths of 16 usually are. Where those officers are to rise, as a proportion of them will rise to the command of regiments, and are to be entrusted with these very great powers which it is proposed to entrust to them, it is in every way important both to the Government and to the army, the fate of which, in fact, is to be entrusted to these men, that the officers who join the army in India should in the first instance be brought up to as high a mark in qualification as you can secure, because, as regards the working of that principle which I have just mentioned, that the Government are to select officers for command, and also the practice that they are to remove them if they are unfit to command it, very greatly affects the Government, that they should have as many officers as possible who are fit to command, and that there should be as little necessity as possible for removing men unfit to command; that they should have as few men as possible lumbering the lists, and whom they cannot employ. Therefore, if I may be permitted, I would press upon the Commission the very great importance of that point upon which Lord Canning has touched.

5471. If that is the case in the local army, do you not think that it should be so in the royal army too, and do you think that you can make any difference between the two?—As the question is asked me, of course I will reply to it with great deference, for I do not know the system well of the royal army, further than what I have seen in India, but I think it would be no disadvantage at all to the royal army if the officers, when first entering that army, were of higher qualifications; I never could understand why the military profession was not to require much higher qualifications at starting than it does.

5472. All that has been very much increased of late years?—I was going to make that remark. All I know of what is doing in the royal army is what I see by the papers, and I have seen, I believe, under your own orders and instructions, that there are a great many rules and regulations which have lately been issued upon that very point; therefore, it entirely tallies with what I have been saying, that so far as I have seen, I do not think that the royal army would at all suffer by higher qualifications being required from officers.

5473. If you make a great change such as that of selection for the command of regiments in the local army of India, how can you do that without making some great change in the same direction in the royal moveable army of the line?—I think that it is essential that you must do it in India, it is necessary and must be done. With reference to the general service of Her Majesty, I suppose that practically the Horse Guards have the power of selection, that is to say, that from the knowledge of the men and from the purchase system, and in a variety of ways, and from the great power of the Horse Guards, I have always supposed that practically they have had the power of selection, and that upon a general officer, for instance, reporting upon the inefficiency of a colonel or a lieutenant-colonel, there would be no hesitation at the Horse Guards in removing him; that has been my idea.

5474. That is as to the power of removal, but that is a different power from the power of selection. Of course an inefficient officer may be removed, but that is a different thing from the power of selection, which is putting a junior officer over the heads of senior officers, which I understood you to mean?—The power of selection is enjoined; of course the working of the selection would depend upon the Government of India; I suppose that they would avoid, where it was possible, putting very young men over the heads of older men, but that they have orders to select for the commands of regiments I know, and the action of that principle I think necessary for India; it must, however, be exercised with wisdom and discretion of course.

5475. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Has the principle been extended also to the commands of brigades and divisions in India?—It always has existed; I can only say that, so far as my experience goes, the appointment for brigade commands and divisional commands was always a matter of selection.

5476. (*Viscount Melville.*) Is it intended that the commanding officers of European regiments are to have these extraordinary powers as well as the commanding officers of native regiments?—No, not that I am aware of.

5477. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) If this power of selection is given, will it not very considerably affect the position of the senior officers of the moveable army?—Whether it would affect, and to what extent it might affect, the officers of the general service army, I really have not traced out; it depends entirely upon the mode in which the discretion which is vested in the Government of India is exercised.

5478. (*Chairman.*) I understood you to say yesterday that no great change was made in the organization of the Indian army without consulting the military authorities at home?—I said that I was ignorant of the working of Cabinets, but that I supposed that a Cabinet which was sending out orders affecting the formation of the three great armies of India would in all probability make a point of consulting Her Majesty's Commander-in-chief; I think that that was the way in which I put it.

5479. Has it ever occurred that under the old system in India, officers have been transferred from native corps to the command of European corps?—I believe that it has occurred repeatedly that officers have been transferred from the command of native corps to the command of European corps, and *vice versâ*, that officers from European corps have been put in command of native corps.

5480. Do you think that an officer who had been accustomed only to a native corps would be competent to command Europeans?—Quite so. I recollect an instance of a Madras officer to whom had been intrusted the formation of a new corps; one of the regiments added to the Madras establishment, a European regiment. That officer was employed in raising and forming that regiment, and for some time I believe commanded that regiment. When I met him he was in command of a native regiment, and shortly afterwards he was in command of a brigade, so that I speak with certainty as to the fact; and although I cannot give instances, I know that it has been done in all three armies.

5481. Upon what conditions have the late additions to the native army been made, upon what conditions have the men been recruited?—That is a point which I think you will find very fully put before the Commissioners in the papers which I have now brought. The mass of the Punjaubee levies are almost absolutely under the command of the commanding officers of corps; there is no oath; they are not under the articles of war. In fact we have now an army which is really not under the articles of war, that is to say, it is not governed by the articles of war in any way, but it is governed by the discretion left under general rules given by the Punjaub administration, that is to say, by the chief commissioner of the Punjaub to the officers in command of those corps.

5482. Are they enlisted for any particular length of service, or may you dismiss them all to-morrow morning if you please?—I think that it is entirely at the discretion of the commanding officers to dismiss them; they can dismiss them for misconduct, and it is entirely at the discretion of the board of administration of the Punjaub to increase or to diminish the corps.

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

16th Nov. 1858.

5483. You have made no conditions with these men to retain them for any given time?—Not that I am aware of; but I do not speak with absolute certainty.

5484. When you say that they are entirely under the direction of the commanding officer, that commanding officer is a European, I suppose?—Always.

5485. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Has he arbitrary power, even to the extent of life and death?—No.

5486. Everything short of that?—Not exactly everything short of it, there are some things short of that, but there is very little reference. In the replies of Sir John Lawrence, Brigadier-general Chamberlain, and Colonel Edwardes, there is very clearly and fully given the state in which that force exists and is ruled. In the evidence given by Colonel Coke and one or two others it is also touched upon.

5487. Of course in these exceptional cases every one was justified in doing the best he could under the circumstances; but as a rule do you think that it is a good thing that an army should be so constituted?—As a rule with respect to easterns and to mercenaries, raised as we raised them in India, I think the necessity of putting into the hands of commanding officers of regiments almost absolute power is very great. I concur with the generality of opinions which are advanced by the officers whose evidence has been written in reply to the questions put to them in India, that it is very requisite that the commanding officer of a native regiment should have very great power.

5488. Still should not they be under certain regulations laid down by the supreme government?—I think that there are a few regulations which it would be advisable to lay down, and some such as are laid down in the replies by the Punjaub committee, by Sir John Lawrence.

5489. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are not these levies which you have got to be regarded more in the view in which you would regard a police corps, and do not the officers act magisterially rather than militarily?—It cannot be said that they exactly act magisterially, though in some, for instance, the police corps at present being raised in the north-west provinces, the commanding officers have magisterial powers.

5490. I refer to these Sikh and Punjaub levies; are not the commanding officers magistrates, and if they order a man to be flogged, do not they do it?—No, I am not aware that they are made magistrates. With some of the police they are magistrates. There are two bodies in the Punjaub, the police and the regular corps.

5491. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Will you be good enough to say from what source you contemplate that the Commander-in-chief in India should be selected?—I have never given the subject any consideration, but I suppose that he should be selected from any and every force. I do not see that there should be any limitation put to the discretion of the Crown in choosing its Commander-in-chief wherever it pleased.

5492. But you contemplate now instead of the local force being the minor force, its being one-third more than the auxiliary force, which is the Queen's; therefore, I suppose there is a chance of the Commander-in-chief in India being selected from the local force?—I do not quite accede to the mode of putting the question, because I look upon the army of England as being so large and so important, that one cannot look upon it exactly in the sense in which you put it as an auxiliary one, and therefore if I may be allowed the expression, correcting so far as I am concerned that point, I do not contemplate any particular necessity for drawing the Commander-in-chief from the local army which happens to be serving there.

5493. But it is possible?—I should think it is possible, because I would put no limitation to the selection of the Crown. Wherever it chose to appoint a Commander-in-chief, and thought a man fit, I suppose it might be done.

5494. At present the discipline which is followed in India is the discipline of the army under the Commander-in-chief in England. Supposing that any one of these three officers were to do what I understand you to say might happen, namely, that in the event of an officer of one of Her Majesty's line regiments being incompetent, the officer commanding the army in India should recommend that that officer should be removed, does not that take the discipline of the Queen's regiments of the line out of the hands of the Commander-in-chief, and place it in the hands of a person over whom he has no control?—In the way in which it is put, it does not appear to me to take it out of his control, because with respect to Her Majesty's general service regiments, and to all questions affecting the discipline of those regiments, I suppose the same system would be pursued as is pursued now, which is that reference is made to the Commander-in-chief. I do not see that it necessitates any difference or alters the position at all. If an officer were found fault with, and it were thought advisable to remove him, and he belonged to one of the general service corps, I suppose that the reference would be made by the Commander-in-chief, whoever he was, exactly in the same manner in which the reference would be made now.

5495. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But how would you manage the intercourse of the Commander-in-chief in India, supposing him to be selected from the local force, with the Commander-in-chief in England, as regards the Queen's troops, the Commander-in-chief in England having no power over the officer who is the Commander-in-chief in India, if he is a local officer?—The commission which constituted him Commander-in-chief would necessarily, I take it, (the very brevet of his commission) put him in connection with the Commander-in-chief in this country.

5496. But he would not be under the authority of the Commander-in-chief?—But the brevet of Her Majesty would put him in connection and under the authority of the Commander-in-chief in so far as regarded that portion of Her troops which was employed in India. I do not see that there is any difficulty in that at all.

5497. I do not see how he could be under that authority. There is a great military functionary, the Commander-in-chief in India, the highest military functionary in the land, even in some respects with higher powers than the Commander-in-chief in England, for he has the power of confirming courts-martial, which the Commander-in-chief in England has not; that officer is not under the authority of the Commander-in-chief in England, and yet he is to command the troops of the moveable army in India?—He bears Her Majesty's commission, and it is perfectly in the power of Her Majesty in giving him his brevet of command with reference to that point, to put him in connection with the Commander-in-chief in this country. It does not appear to me to be a practical difficulty. I speak with deference to those who know better.

5498. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) I understood you yesterday to give your opinion that the Commander-in-chief at the Horse Guards ought not to have the power of giving instructions to the Commander-in-chief in India, with reference to the troops serving in India?—The question put, I think, had reference to the local army to which my reply was given.

5499. Supposing that in future the European force in India be composed entirely of troops of the line, would you in that case have the Commander-in-chief at the Horse Guards empowered to give instructions to the Commander-in-chief in India with respect to matters pertaining to the troops of the line in India, or would you have instructions relative to those troops sent through the Secretary of State for India, and the Governor-general?—I concur entirely with the view which Lord Elphinstone has given. I have before quoted the words of Lord Elphinstone, and I think that they afford the best reply which I can give to your question; he says, "If "there is one thing which must be laid down as "a principle not to be departed from in our mili- "tary arrangements in India, it is the entire sub-

" ordination of the army, both European and native, " to the government of India. The troops of the " Queen's regular army while serving in India must " be wholly subject to the authority of the Queen's " government in India; regimental promotion indeed " may be left entirely to the Horse Guards, but the " patronage of every staff appointment in India should " be vested, as with very few exceptions it now is, " entirely in the hands of the supreme and local " governments, and of the supreme and local Com- " manders-in-chief." I think that that is so well worded and so well put that I cannot answer your question in a better way.

5500. Do you understand from that opinion of Lord Elphinstone that he considers the Commander-in-chief in England should have no further power of interference, than in the matter of regimental promotion, which is the only thing that he particularises to be left to the Horse Guards?—I understand it according to the bearing of the words which prescribe the limitation that you mention.

5501. (*Viscount Melville.*) Have you formed any opinion as to the propriety, or otherwise, of retaining the native commissioned officers?—It is a subject which I have thought about, and I wrote a memorandum upon it, which, if the Commissioners had the time, I would read, but I am afraid they have not the time. But the question which you put is one which has met with a good deal of consideration. It must be remembered that we have not only the Bombay and the Madras armies with native officers, but also that we have got a very large force of irregular troops, both infantry and cavalry, which are necessarily officered with native officers, and that therefore that question, with reference to regular native troops, becomes hampered by the consideration of the effect of withholding native officers from the regular native troops upon the rest, that is to say, it might excite a little feeling of apprehension either in Bombay or Madras, if it was found that in regular native troops in Bengal there was a discontinuance of having native officers. It is a subject upon which you will find a variety of opinions given in the papers which I am going to send in. I think that the general feeling is, that you cannot discontinue having native officers. In the first place, where you have got irregular corps with few European officers, they are an absolute necessity, you cannot do without them; and moreover, where you are having them in irregular corps, you necessarily must select by merit, and merit alone; because they are really of importance in the discipline and the working of the irregular corps. It becomes another question where it is a regular corps with a full complement of European officers. There the absolute selection by merit, and putting aside all considerations of seniority, is more a matter of doubt; and for this reason, that you may select by merit up to the point of the commission grade, and then after that, as you go on promoting men in the commission grades of native officers, if you throw out seniority altogether, and promote alone by merit, you cause a good deal of discontent. And there is the political bearing of the subject, which was shown very much in this last insurrection, which is that really we should have found that we had much more difficulty in dealing with our mutineer army, if it had not been that that army, with its old habits of discipline, stuck to its old native officers, a proportion of whom had been appointed by seniority, for it had never been the absolute rule in the Bengal army; but the general rule had been, that where you could do it fairly and properly, and a man was fit, and so forth, he should be promoted by seniority. The working of that during the insurrection was, that with their old habits of discipline clinging to them, they did not put aside their old officers; they stuck to their old officers; they did not raise young men, and men with energy and talent. That had a very great effect upon the contest between us and the mutineers. Had those men not stuck to their old officers, many of whom were elderly men, and some of them very old men; but had they put aside all their old men, and picked out smart young men to lead them, or had we originally provided them with smart young men, pushed up to be subahdars when they were quite young men, we might have found the contest quite a different thing.

5502. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) How do you mean that we might have found the contest quite a different thing?—Simply by the mutineer sepoys, who held to their discipline for a long time, being much better commanded.

5503. Then do you argue that it would be wiser for the Government to have inefficient native officers with the view of guarding against such a danger?—No; that is going to another extreme altogether.

5504. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would have the two combined?—I would have the two combined; they were combined in the Bengal army. It is a mistake to suppose that in the Bengal army promotion was entirely by seniority; it was not entirely by seniority; there was a certain discretion exercised. Sometimes a man was promoted, as was thought fit, even after he got into the commissioned grades, whether it was for distinguished service, or whether it was for this, that, or the other. Sometimes a man was promoted (I am speaking of the regulars) out of his seniority turn. I know that the promotion was not at all absolute.

5505. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Is it not the fact that by the regulations of the Bengal army, published in 1855 with the sanction of the Government of India, seniority is made the general rule of promotion, and supersession allowed only in cases in which the senior on the list is found unfit for the promotion?—That rule was no doubt issued as you state. There was also another regulation, which was that the promotion was to be partly by merit; but the practice was what I state.

5506. We have it in evidence from several Bengal officers that the average age at which men in the Bengal army obtain promotion to naick is about 40 years, and the average age at which they obtain promotion to the commissioned grades is about three score. Do you consider that under a system which fills the commissioned and non-commissioned grades with men of such advanced ages it is possible to have an efficient or trustworthy native army?—I have not looked into the point as to the ages at which men got their promotions. Of course I do not know to whose evidence you allude; but I should have a little doubt of the correctness of that evidence. So far as my own recollection of a great many men whom I have met, and had to deal with and to do with in a thousand ways, native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, I should very much doubt what you have adduced as having been put in evidence.

5507. I think I have made a mistake in saying the average age, I should have said the age at which they generally obtained the promotion specified?—I should very much doubt the correctness of that. I have seen a great deal of it in one way or another.

5508. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In Lord Canning's memorandum I see it is stated that the rank and file of a cavalry regiment should be 440 instead of 700, as had been originally intended. What is the advantage of so very small an establishment? In taking the field, do you think that that is an advantage to a force?—The advantage of the proposition made by Lord Canning appears to me to be this:—Henceforward in India, as I have before said, wherever you have got forces they must be well balanced forces. The field is so great in India, there are so many points to be occupied, and those points are often at such great distances that it is much more convenient to the Government to have two corps of the strength which Lord Canning proposes, than to have one corps of large strength, one wing of which would be at one place and one wing at another place far away from it, because it has been found by experience in India (and I am speaking to a military authority far more com-

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

26th Nov. 1858.

petent to judge than myself upon that point,) that the discipline of a regiment suffers where one wing is separated from head quarters and kept away from it, and that is one of the main reasons.

5509. Otherwise for service you will admit that a very weak corps like that would very soon dwindle to nothing?—A weak corps like that for service is of course not so advantageous as a larger corps when you are coming to a shock of cavalry.

5510. I mean in the casualties and the wear and tear of service without the mere action; it would dwindle down to very small numbers?—It would dwindle down to something small; but still the proposition is a thing of very great importance. The enormous area of that empire is scarcely ever kept clearly in view, and really it often appears to me that the simple fact of the sort of way in which maps of India are usually made, in which India is made to look about the size of Yorkshire, or something of that kind, gives a wrong impression as to the immense extent of that empire. That is an important proposition of Lord Canning's.

5511. (*Col. Burlton.*) Do you think that in a financial point of view it would be advantageous. Two small regiments would cost very much more than one large one?—Not much.

5512. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) You stated yesterday, I think, that in your opinion it would be advisable to divide the Bengal native army into two; upon what ground do you rest that opinion?—Upon the ground which I hold, and which a good many others hold, that in future it would be very desirable (I dwelt upon it incidentally in other parts of my evidence) and necessary to keep the presidential armies separate; so likewise with that great army, which belongs to the Bengal presidency. That presidency may be divided into two or three great areas, in which the people are very distinct, and in which there is a very considerable degree of that sort of jealousy and animosity which always exists between conterminous people. It is advisable for us to take advantage of that sort of feeling. The feeling of the Punjaubese, and the heart with which they served us, was partly owing to this sort of national or *quasi* national feeling on the part of the Punjaubese against the Hindostanee people; they had no compunction in plundering their cities, and working against them. It was just the same, and would have been much more the same, with the Hindostanese when we went into the Punjaub if it had not been for preliminary tampering between the Punjaub army and the Hindostanee. A part of the Punjaub army under Runjeet Sing was formed of Hindostanese, because he knew the Sikhs perfectly well, and he took good care to have a portion of his force Hindostanee, in order to qualify the preponderance of the Sikh element there. We must take advantage of that; practically, I would divide that great army into two.

5513. Would you place the two under separate commanders?—No.

5514. What is the advantage of keeping them under one command?—There is a financial advantage about it; there is also a practical advantage, that that great presidency and that great frontier must be looked upon as a whole, and that the working of the machinery will be easier and better if it is under one head. At the same time, financially, it would entail much greater expense to have separate heads.

5515. Do you not think that all those advantages might be gained and some others also by equalizing the armies of the three Presidencies, and transferring portions of the present Bengal Presidency to the Madras and Bombay armies?—No, decidedly not; because I think that it is of paramount importance to India to keep those Presidencies separate. If I had my own way, I would not move the Bombay troops further north than Mhow, and I would not move the Madras troops further north than Jubulpore.

5516. For what reason?—For the reasons which I have already stated, that I think it extremely necessary to keep the Presidential armies separate and distinct, and the great advantage of that has been shewn during 1857.

5517. In the question which I put to you, there was no suggestion for amalgamating the three armies, on the contrary, it was put upon the assumption that they would be kept separate, as they have hitherto been and are now?—Yes, but you bring them into contact with the nationalities, from which I wish to keep them distinct.

5518. Is it not the case that the Madras and Bombay armies generally are composed of men enlisted in the southern provinces of India, who have no sympathies in common with the Punjaubees and Hindustanees in the northern provinces, and would it not, for that very reason, greatly strengthen the hands of the Government of India to have considerable bodies of Madras and Bombay troops located on the frontier and in those districts where danger is at present apprehended from the large number of Punjaubees and Hindustanees in the Bengal regiments?—No; and for this reason, in the first place, I think that you are incorrect in stating that the Bombay and Madras armies are recruited chiefly from the southward. To my knowledge a very large proportion (and in the evidence of Lord Elphinstone and also of others it is given) of the Bombay army was drawn from our northern provinces, and that was a dangerous element in the Bombay army during the late insurrection. Therefore upon that point I think it inadvisable to bring them up, because I wish to keep clear of the northern nationality, and so far from its strengthening the hands of the Government, I think that you run a great chance, if you bring up those southern armies and mix them with northern nationalities (if one may use the term), of endangering the state of feeling in those armies which I wish to keep perfectly distinct.

5519. You have made no reference in your answer to the Madras army?—I would do the same with the Madras army for the same reason. In the first place, there are peculiar difficulties about moving that army to any distance; they always rise the moment you move them north of the Nerbuddah. I have necessarily had to pay great attention to many things connected with the Madras army; I have had some Madras troops in connection with myself, and I certainly think that for a great variety of reasons, which would perhaps take the Commission too much time if I went into them, it is very important to keep these two Presidencies distinct.

5520. Have we not had two divisions, one of the Madras, and the other of the Bombay army, doing good service against the mutineers in the northern provinces?—I think that the Bombay army have done admirably, and I think that the Madras army, so far as I know, have done very good service where they were put, but that does not alter the question; it is an exceptional case, and it is for these exceptional instances that I wish to keep them distinct and separate. They have acted well, partly in consequence of having been kept distinct and separate, but if you were in the habit of moving these troops up into these districts, and they got accustomed to and into communication with these people, you would run imminent risk of causing the very thing which you wish to avoid.

5521. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Is it not upon these occasions when the regiments go up there that they get some of the men who are so objectionable in the Bengal army, namely the high caste Mussulmans and Brahmins?—I have heard of one or two regiments even of the Madras army, who have recruited when they were stationed north much too largely in those districts. I think that our object should be to keep these armies as distinct and separate as we possibly can.

5522. Have you not known it inconvenient to the government of India that a Madras regiment should be sent beyond Calpee?—Yes: that was the reason why I put the Narbuddah as the northern limit, and I only carry it to that point because militarily and

strategically speaking, I think it no disadvantage that what may be called the key points of the plateau of Malwa should be held, the one by the Madras army, and the other by the Bombay army: but I would not push them further north than that.

5523. Are there not interior arrangements between the government and the sepoys which make it objectionable that they should be sent so far away from the Presidency, namely, as to the reliefs, the sending of recruits to make up the deficiencies, and as to the invalids. Then again, you know that most of the sepoys in the Madras army are married; if they move you must give them batta?—I fully admit every one of those reasons which you have adduced.

5524. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Are not those simple difficulties which it would be quite possible for the government prospectively to remove entirely?—I do not call them simple difficulties. If you had as much to do with it as I have had, and saw what great difficulties it entailed both upon the local government, and also upon the government of India, I think you would not call them simple difficulties, but very complex difficulties, out of which it is very desirable that the government of India, both the governor-general and the local government should keep as clear as possible.

5525. Still if prospectively enlistments be made under new rules, so framed as to obviate the objections alluded to, would the Government have any difficulty in obtaining men for the Madras army?—But I think that involves a departure from what I would lay down as the broad principle of policy, for the reasons which I have already stated, namely keeping wholly distinct those three presidencies.

5526. From your answer to one of my questions, it would appear you are not aware that in the Bombay Presidency the regulations required the recruiting of the native army to be confined within the limits of the presidency and the neighbouring states tributary to or in alliance with it, and that the present large proportion of Hindustanees in its ranks has been the consequence of that rule having been practically set aside for 20 or 30 years previously to 1848, when measures were adopted for gradually reducing them to a minimum?—I only spoke from the knowledge of the fact, and without reference to any particular regulations. I know the fact in a variety of ways. I know the fact from the evidencies of officers, from the evidencies of authorities such as Lord Elphinstone and Sir Henry Somerset, and from my own acquaintance with the troops. What you state as to the regulation may be perfectly true.

5527. Supposing the Madras and Bombay armies to be recruited henceforth almost entirely within the limits of their respective presidencies, would your objections still exist to the territory occupied by them being extended to the Punjaub and borders of Hindustan?—Yes.

5528. On what ground?—On the grounds which I have already stated very fully.

5529. (*Col. Burlton.*) You apprehend that they might coalesce and become more intimately associated with the Hindustanees of the Bengal army?—Yes; and you would lose the very thing which you want, namely, that when exceptional instances arise you can call out those troops with comparative certainty that they will act.

5530. (*Viscount Melville.*) Is it not a question at present pending whether the Bombay army is to occupy Rajpootana or not?—I believe the question is pending, but practically I believe they are holding it.

5531. If they hold it permanently will not it require an increase to the Bombay army?—I am not sure that it is at all decided whether they are to hold it or not.

5532. Supposing they do hold it, will not it require an increase to the Bombay army?—I do not think that the Bombay army should be increased more than is recommended. In fact, I think that the view taken by Sir Henry Somerset, with respect to the Bombay native army, is a very good one as to the strength requisite, and he does not propose any great increase of that army.

5533. But he proposes a very large increase of the Europeans?—He has proposed a larger increase of Europeans than Lord Elphinstone has proposed, and than Lord Canning has proposed.

5534. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) I think neither Lord Elphinstone nor Sir Henry Somerset raised any objections to extending the limits of the Bombay Presidency?—You will see the whole of the papers.

5535. You stated, in answer to a question with respect to the principle of selection, that you believed it always to have been the rule in appointing officers to the command of brigades and divisions in the Bengal presidency?—As far as my own knowledge went only.

5536. I think you will perceive by the orders laid down by the Court of Directors in that respect, that it has not been the rule, but the exception. Their order is dated 23rd June 1835, "We have no hesitation in "expressing our opinion that officers have no strict "right to succeed to the appointments of brigadier "or brigadier-general on the ground of mere senio- "rity, these being staff appointments, involving both "confidence and responsibility, but we must express "our firm reliance on the discretion and good feel- "ings of our several governments that the claims of "officers to these or any other appointments arising "out of length of service, will never be set aside "except on public grounds."—I was speaking from the practice which I had myself seen when I was in connection as private secretary with Lord Ellenborough, at a time of very great danger in India, when a great variety of military operations were going on, and when references were made by the Commander-in chief in usual course to the Governor-general, and it became a question as to who should have command. With every disposition to give the utmost attention to the claims of senior officers, Lord Ellenborough made it a rule that the claims of the public service were paramount to every thing else, and that the thing which must be done upon these occasions was to secure the services of a competent officer, the officer who he thought was the fittest for the command. Therefore, the practice of selection was carried into effect for commands.

5537. I understand you to mean, at all events, that now the Government of India fully admits the principle of appointing to the command of regiments, brigades, and divisions upon the system of selection for efficiency?—Yes, certainly. In making that answer I do not mean to say that there is no consideration given to the claims of officers.

5538. (*Lord Stanley.*) I understand that the practical state of things is this, that the rule is one of selection, but with a strong preference to the claims of the senior officer, if not unfit?—Yes, with every consideration to the claims of the officers, if not unfit.

5539. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you know from whence Sir John Lawrence and the officers composing the Punjaub Committee, obtained the following story, which I find inserted in their report: "We have "heard of a small guard of the Bombay army on "detached duty making their own jemadar, a man of "low caste, carry on his head the bundle of their "clothes, &c., to which the jemadar, away from his "European friends, submitted as a matter of course;" for although confessedly given only upon hearsay, it is certain that Sir John Lawrence believed it to be true, or he would not have allowed it a place in his official report?—I am quite unable to say how they got the story at all.

5540. Is the Government of India in possession of a single authenticated case in which a native commissioned or non-commissioned officer of low caste, either in the Madras or Bombay army failed duly to maintain his authority when on duty, or was induced by caste influence to perform any menial office for his caste superior?—I really do not know what the Government of India may be in possession of upon

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

26th Nov. 1858.

a point of that sort. It is so very large and general a question that I really do not know what they are in possession of.

5541. Do you know upon what ground the Government of India continues to ignore the fact established by the experience of so many years in the Madras and Bombay armies that men of all castes, from the highest to the lowest, have been brought by discipline to make the pride of good soldiership rather than the pride of high caste their ruling principle, and is still maintaining caste distinction in the Bengal army by now raising regiments composed exclusively of sweepers?—I am not aware that they ignore anything of the sort.

5542. Do you not know that they are raising regiments of sweepers?—I do not know that they are sweepers. There are several regiments of mixed castes and low castes.

5543. I observe this in the report of the Punjaub Committee. "For these reasons our advice would be "that we introduce the new system gradually, by "having separate regiments for the low castes." There is then an asterisk, and there is this note, "In the "newly raised Punjaub regiments there are two "entirely composed of Muzzubees, *i.e.* sweepers, "of the Sikh religion. They are pioneers, and are "doing well?"—What is the question to which you wish me to reply?

5544. Do you know upon what ground the Government of India continues to ignore the fact established by the experience of so many years in the Madras and Bombay armies that men of all castes, from the highest to the lowest, have been brought by discipline to make the pride of good soldiership rather than the pride of high caste their ruling principle, and is still maintaining caste distinction in the Bengal army by now raising regiments composed exclusively of sweepers?—It appears to me that the question assumes that the Government of India ignore facts which I am not aware that they ignore one way or the other; and also I am not aware that the Government have come to any decision as to the constitution of the Bengal army; it appears to me that that is under discussion, and that nothing definite has been settled at all.

5545. You do not think, then, that the fact of two regiments of sweepers having been raised in the Punjaub indicates such an intention?—I cannot answer the question.

The witness withdrew.

Major-General Sir A. Wilson, Bart., K.C.B.

Major-General Sir ARCHDALE WILSON, Bart, K.C.B., examined.

5546. (*Chairman.*) Will you be so good as to state to the Commission what rank you hold in the army?—Full colonel in the Company's army, and major-general in the Queen's army.

5547. Will you state what the length of your service in India has been, and what positions you have held there?—I have been thirty-nine years in India.

5548. What are the commands which you have held there?—I have been in the Bengal artillery the whole of my time. I have held the command of battalions, and I have held the command of my regiment; for the last two years it was joined with the command of the station at Meerut as a brigadier. I also commanded the artillery with Brigadier Wheeler's field force in 1849, and the force before Delhi in 1857.

5549. You have been furnished with some questions from the Commissioners; will you have the goodness to favour them with the opinion which you have formed upon any of those points. The first question is, how far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as parts of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only? Have you formed any opinion upon that point?—I think that the whole of the European portion should be composed of troops of the line.

5550. Will you be so good as to state to the Commission the grounds upon which you form that opinion?—I think that unless the whole of the European portion was a colonial force, which I think is hardly possible, there would be great jealousies between the two services, so long as the royal army and the local army were serving together; that is one chief reason for my opinion. Another is, that from the system of purchase in the Queen's army, there would be constant supercession of the colonial corps.

5551. Do you think that there would also be an advantage in having but one system of discipline?—Decidedly; there should be one discipline under one head. In the scientific branches the materiel and equipment, would be all assimilated, which I think would be of great importance in a country like India, where the royal army come with one equipment and the colonial army with another; I think it very necessary that they should be assimilated, and it would be a great thing for the scientific branches of the service to have the power of coming home occasionally to study and learn the different new improvements which are constantly taking place in their profession in England.

5552. You think that a system of relief for the scientific branches of the army in India would be of great advantage, by giving an opportunity to the officers of those branches in the service, on coming home, of seeing the various improvements?—Yes, those improvements being so very constant in the present days.

5553. Do you find that that is the case upon regiments arriving in India fresh from Europe, that they bring with them new improvements which have taken place?—A great number, and particularly the royal artillery, brought a great number of improvements, which we had not in India.

5554. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then you think that the fact of the royal artillery having been sent there has been rather an advantage than otherwise?—There is no doubt that it has been a very great advantage to both services; they had a good deal to learn, and we had as much to learn.

5555. (*Chairman.*) What is the difference in the organization of the Bengal artillery and of the royal artillery?—In the Bengal artillery, the horse artillery particularly, every horse is mounted; they have no outriders as the royal artillery have. It is a much cheaper system than the royal, but it is done very well; I think everybody will allow that the Bengal artillery have done their duty wherever they have been called out, but I do not say that the system is so good as that of the royal artillery. In the Madras and Bombay artillery I believe they have introduced the royal system of detachments.

5556. Was the system in the presidencies similar previously to the arrival of the royal artillery, or was there any difference?—We have always had a system without detachments in Bengal.

5557. Was the system the same in the three presidencies?—No, it has been different: Bombay and Madras have had the detached system; Bengal alone has had the other.

5558. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Although the Bengal artillery, as I fully admit, has done admirably, so far as the corps is concerned, still you think that the system upon which it is organized is not the best?—I have no doubt that it would be more perfect on the other system.

5559. (*Chairman.*) Do you know how that system of putting every man upon a horse originated in Bengal?—The first troop of Bengal artillery was raised, I believe, to go to Egypt during the French war; and whether it was from want of men or not I do not know. Colonel Pennington raised it.

5560. They went, I believe, without horses?—No; they took their horses: merely one troop went; one troop was first raised.

5561. Was every man there mounted?—Yes. I cannot say whether they did or not take their horses. I believe they did. They could not have got horses in Egypt.

5562. That has always been the system in the Bengal presidency?—Yes; it was found to answer well and cheaply, and it was kept to.

5563. What are the number of officers attached to each troop or battery?—A captain and three subalterns ought to be the number, but it has been a captain and two subalterns. We have never had sufficient officers to furnish the full number, so many have been taken away for staff appointments and political and civil employments.

5564. You think that that has been a disadvantage?—A great disadvantage, no doubt of it.

5565. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Have the officers of the Bengal artillery had a full share according to their strength in the general staff appointments of the army?—I should say so, particularly in the surveying department.

5566. You do not include Ordnance appointments, of course?—No; those I look upon as regimental appointments.

5567. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that the establishment of officers is not sufficient?—It is not sufficient, and never has been sufficient. We had at one time eighteen European companies and only four officers to them, the reserve companies. Many of the companies for years never saw an officer; there were two or three companies under one officer at Peshawur constantly, and the same at Lahore. All the officers were taken away to complete the troops and batteries, and to make them as complete as possible. A captain has hardly ever been seen with a reserve company since I have been in the service; generally a young lieutenant was posted, and he was removed as soon as he was wanted for anything else. I have known four and five officers sent to one company during the year, each never remaining more than two months; the men never knew their officer, and the officer never knew his men.

5568. (*Chairman.*) What was the cause of their being removed?—Because we had not officers enough; we never had even a proper number of officers with the troops and batteries.

5569. Were the officers generally looking out for civil employment?—I am sorry to say that a good many were.

5570. Are non-commissioned officers ever taken from the troops for civil employment?—They are taken very much for all the police and other purposes, and a great number for the ordnance.

5571. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Does the commander-in-chief in Bengal usually allow men to be taken from the horse artillery for police purposes?—Yes; both from the horse and foot: all the bazaar serjeants, all the commissariat serjeants and barrack serjeants, and those sort of people.

5572. If confined within moderate limits, of course it is beneficial to the public service that such appointments should be open to them?—I do not know of any benefit to be derived from it.

5573. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) They must be had?—They must be had, of course, but they ought to supply their place. They take all our best men.

5574. But they fill up the vacancies?—I am sorry to say that our vacancies never were filled up. Our troops and companies have been always short of men.

5575. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Putting the financial question on one side, admitting that financially the arrangement is cheaper, do you think that the Bengal artillery would be improved by having the system of detachments introduced?—Most decidedly.

5576. (*Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) Are you not aware that that was recommended so far back as Sir Henry Fane's time; that a committee of artillery officers from the three presidencies assembled at Calcutta to consult upon those very points, and that it was there recommended by that committee that they should follow the detachment system?—Yes.

5577. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that it would be an advantage if all the artillery of the different presidencies were put on the same footing so far as concerned the materiel and organization?—They should all be assimilated. The Indian artillery has been ordered years ago to be assimilated with the royal artillery as nearly as Indian warfare would permit, but I am sorry to say that it has never been carried out.

5578. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) Merely on account of the expense?—No; it has been because the officers of the three presidencies could not agree; one liked this plan, and the other that plan. They would not agree upon what it should be.

5579. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) They each had their peculiarities, and they valued them?—Yes; one preferred shafts, another preferred poles, another preferred metal wheels, and another wooden naves to the wheels.

5580. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that the effect of having three separate armies is to prevent agreement?—It prevents that assimilation which I think is very necessary, particularly in an arm like the artillery.

5581. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) Surely it depended upon the Commander-in-chief and the Government? If they heard what the officers of each presidency had to say for their own particular service, it was for them to decide what was the best?—The Supreme Government, I know, ordered it; but the governments of the other presidencies did not carry it out.

5582. (*Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) I believe it was the other way: that the Supreme Government did order it in the first instance, and that it was afterwards set aside by the Supreme Government. The minor governments cannot set aside what the Supreme Government orders?—They cannot; but they did not carry it out.

5583. It was ordered to be carried out, and a line of the pen of the Supreme Government set it aside?—I never heard that.

5584. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In the event of the army being partially local and partially of the line, would you still wish to see a portion of the royal artillery in India?—You must increase the local artillery very largely unless you do have royal artillery.

5585. Do you think it is an advantage to have some of the royal artillery?—I think that it is an advantage to both services.

5586. (*Chairman.*) In connexion with the question which has been put to you, have you formed any opinion as to the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter?—If the whole of the European troops are royal, you can easily manage the relief by taking a portion every year, say one-twelfth.

5587. I am assuming that a portion of them should be local, and a portion of the line?—The local, of course, would never be relieved.

5588. Would you send the troops round by the Cape, or in the other way?—I would send them round by the Cape.

5589. How long do you consider that a European will serve with advantage in India?—I think that he ought not to serve more than twelve years.

5590. Therefore, to keep up the efficiency of the latter portion, it would be necessary to afford such relief to them?—Yes; taking a twelfth every year, it would give a relief once in twelve years to the whole.

5591. Supposing there to be partly a local and partly a moveable army, do you think that it would be possible to consolidate the European forces so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other; and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company?—The officers now in the service are entitled, I should say, to their pension on

Major-General Sir A. Wilson, Bart., K.C.B.

26th Nov. 1858.

retirement, with the understanding of which they entered the Company's service. If that is the case, I do not think that any officer would wish to exchange; if he did so, he should be bound to give up what he is entitled to from his status as an Indian officer.

5592. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that there would be any difficulty in that?—No, I do not think that there would be.

5593. (*Chairman.*) How would you propose to effect it?—The pensions of officers in the Indian service are guaranteed to them as well as their promotion by seniority. This could be provided for by retaining the regiments and battalions as they now are until the present generation are absorbed. Those who entered hereafter should obtain their commission by purchase, and be amenable to all the rules now in force in Her Majesty's service. Exchanges would seldom be wished for by those now in the Indian service. Should they wish to exchange, it should only be in the same way as I understand is now done in the Royal artillery (I do not know whether I am correct in that or not), namely, that the step should go by seniority in the regiment from which the officer exchanged. I would keep these corps on the same footing until the present generation is absorbed. I think that if a man chooses to exchange (very few would exchange), he should forfeit his advantages from his status in the Indian army.

5594. (*Colonel Burlton.*) Would you have him forfeit all that he has contributed to the military fund and the orphan fund?—He gets these benefits from having entered a service which is local; if he chooses to enter another service, I think he should forfeit them all.

5595. (*Lord Stanley.*) Would not that practically be to impose a prohibitory tax upon exchanges?—No doubt; I do not think that any would wish to exchange.

5596. (*Chairman.*) But you anticipate that those entering the service should enter upon the same terms as those entering the Queen's service?—Yes.

5597. (*Lord Stanley.*) That is to say, you would introduce the system of purchase which exists in the general service army into the Indian army?—It would gradually come in; all those now coming in should come in by purchase.

5598. (*Chairman.*) Would it necessarily follow that the system of purchase should be introduced; many officers in our service have come in without purchase?—I do not mean to say that it is absolutely necessary.

5599. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Could not you alter the system without introducing the system of purchase?—If you give the first commission, you cannot well ask people to purchase; I am talking of the army in general.

5600. (*Chairman.*) It does not necessarily follow that a man in the Queen's service should purchase; many officers pass through the Queen's service without ever purchasing or intending to purchase; it is not necessary?—It is not necessary, but I would put it on the same footing as the present royal army.

5601. You would not call upon an officer to subscribe to the funds?—Decidedly not.

5602. (*Lord Stanley.*) As I understand it, your proposal for exchanging is this,—that officers from the general service army exchanging into the local army should obtain all the benefit of funds to which they have never contributed, and, on the other hand, that officers exchanging from the local army into the general service army should forfeit all benefit accruing from funds to which they have contributed?—Yes; as respects the latter portion, there can be no exchange of the former kind. A man may exchange from the local into the general service, but you cannot exchange from the general service into the local without interfering with the seniority system.

5603. Then it is no exchange?—It is on the same footing as it is in the royal artillery. An infantry officer cannot exchange into the royal artillery, but a royal artillery officer can exchange into the infantry.

5604. (*Chairman.*) If the officer came in junior of the rank into which he exchanged, there could be no objection?—No.

5605. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Supposing his age to be thirty, and that he comes into a regiment in the place of an officer of forty, with a number of officers in the rank below him, older in the service, would it not injuriously affect those officers, and lessen their chance of promotion by a death casualty?—I say that it should not interfere with the promotion by seniority.

5606. (*Col. Burlton.*) How is it possible to work it without that?—The only way is for a man to come in the junior of the rank.

5607. Suppose I am the senior lieutenant, he comes in instead of an old grey-headed captain who is going to die, and I thus have a young captain above me: does not that affect me and every man below me in the regiment?—My principle is, that it should be just on the same footing as the royal artillery now is, that you can exchange out of it, but not into it, until the present generation have had their promotion to the top of the tree.

5608. Then you would allow the local army officers to remove out, but you would not take in anybody in their place?—Yes.

5609. You would not bring into the local regiments any officer from the general service regiments?—You could not do so, I think, without interfering with the pensions and funds, and the advantages which the officers now derive.

5610. (*Viscount Melville.*) When you say that you would have all the European force troops of the line, do you contemplate in that amalgamating the artillery with the royal artillery?—Yes: and amalgamating the infantry and European cavalry also with the royal army.

5611. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) And also the engineers?—Yes.

5612. (*Col. Burlton.*) Supposing this is done, how do you dispose of the officers of the Bengal army, or of the other armies?—I propose to keep the battalions as they are now, in fact.

5613. The native battalions?—No; the native battalions I suppose to be done up.

5614. Not those of Madras and Bombay?—I should be sorry to see another native artilleryman in the service.

5615. I am not referring to the native artillerymen, but to the officers of the line; you say that you would propose the whole European force of India to be composed of troops of the line; in what way would you then dispose of the officers now remaining in Bengal without any regiments at all, and of the officers in the Madras and Bombay armies now attached to native regiments? Would you leave them as they are?—I do not know how you would dispose of them; they must get their seniority according as the regiments now stand.

5616. What would you do with the Bengal officers who have no regiments at all?—I do not know what is intended to be done; they are employed in different ways.

5617. That is temporary; what would you do with them permanently?—The regiment might be kept up in name, and you might employ those officers as you like.

5618. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Which are most important, the interests of the officers or the interests of the public and of the empire?—No doubt, the interests of the public.

5619. You would not raise regiments in order to employ the officers, would you, if you thought that the system was not good?—No. I think that the public have a right to employ those officers in any way they like.

5620. Provided their interests are always guarded?—Provided their vested interests are guarded, decidedly.

5621. (*Lord Stanley.*) Do you contemplate, under the name of "vested interests," that a large number

of officers, whether employment should be found for them or not, should go on receiving their pay?—I should think that employment might be easily found for them; you must have some native army in India, there is no doubt of it.

5622. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You do not contemplate any difficulty in employing the superabundance of officers at present without regiments?—I do not.

5623. (*Chairman.*) The great point has been the deficiency of officers hitherto?—We have had a tremendous deficiency.

5624. (*Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) Then you must make some provision for promotion?—For promotion you must keep the regiments nominally.

5625. (*Col. Burlton.*) What number of Europeans do you think that it will be necessary to maintain in India hereafter, take Bengal?—I think that if you disarm the whole population, which should be done at once, or as soon as possible, you will not require more than 25,000 Europeans.

5626. What number of native troops would you have?—Exclusive of police battalions, I would not have more native troops than I would have Europeans.

5627. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) 25,000 natives and 25,000 Europeans?—Yes.

5628. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) For the whole of Bengal?—Yes.

5629. (*Viscount Melville.*) Including the Punjaub?—Yes; but then I would have police battalions besides.

5630. (*Col. Burlton.*) Do you think that we have had that number of Europeans hitherto in Bengal, before the mutiny?—There have been 20,000. If you disarm the country, and have regular police battalions, properly organized, I do not think pou will require more. I think that with the assistance of police battalions, 25,000 Europeans and 25,000 natives would be sufficient. You may have as many police battalions as you like.

5631. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Would you arm the police battalions and the regiments of the line in the same way?—No; I wouid not allow any native to have the Enfield rifle or the Minié rifle.

5632. How would you arm the police?—With the common percussion musket.

5633. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The whole force of Bengal, including the Punjaub, taking the European and native regiments and the police, would only be 75,000 men?—50,000, exclusive of police.

5634. Do you think that that is enough?—Yes; if you disarm the country perfectly.

5635. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) I suppose the police now in the Bengal presidency is upwards of 75,000 men, if it is not 100,000?—I am not talking of the civil police, the ordinary police of towns and villages.

5636. The police are civil and military combined?—Yes; but you have police for towns and police for villages, which are quite distinct from military police; they are only armed with sticks, bludgeons.

5637. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) You seem to lay great stress upon the natives being disarmed?—I do; very great stress. I think that if you had disarmed the whole population, as has been done in the Punjaub, you would not have required half the men that you have. I would have no native attached to the artillery.

5638. (*Viscount Melville.*) In the amalgamation which you propose of the cavalry, infantry, and artillery, now called the Company's force, with the Queen's army, how do you propose that it should be done?—By numbering the present battalions in India as Queen's regiments.

5639. What would you do with the officers?—I think I have answered that question. I would keep them with their present regiments and battalions until the present generation died out

5640. What would you do with the artillery officers: would you put them with their rank in the royal artillery, according to the date of their commissions, and to rise in the royal artillery as the other officers do, retaining their Indian allowances while serving?—I do not see why they should not be kept in the same brigades as they now are.

5641. They would be liable to serve anywhere?—Yes.

5642. Wherever they go they must retain their Indian pay, and of course be entitled to their retirement whenever they quit the service?—The present generation.

5643. (*Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) Would they not retain their pay?—Not Indian pay.

5644. (*Viscount Melville.*) Supposing they were withdrawn from India along with some detachment coming home, and they came to England, or were serving at Corfu or any where, would you have them then retain their Indian pay?—No, they would have the pay of the country in which they were serving.

5645. Do you not consider that would be a hardship upon those officers?—I do not know why it should be. The additional pay is given under the head of batta, and gratuity for peculiar service in India, where you are obliged to keep up so many more servants, and you have so much more expense than you have in this country. The pay proper is the same. I believe the pay of an Indian officer is actually less.

5646. Supposing an officer to rise to a command—commands are much better in India than anywhere else—a lieutenant-colonel in India would receive a much higher command than he could do if he was in the royal artillery?—I do not know the system of the royal artillery sufficiently to answer that question. I do not know what the emoluments are for the commander of a regiment or of a battalion.

5647. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Could not an arrangement be made by which the officers now in India should remain in India until their service expired, and could not that be done irrespectively of any other amalgamation of the force?—That you might do; you might keep them for Indian service.

5648. Unless they voluntarily preferred to take their share of the other duties; would there be any difficulty in that?—I do not think there would be any difficulty; I think the officers would be glad to come home for a tour of duty.

5649. You think that it would not be an unpopular movement as regards the officers if they were amalgamated in that way?—I think that generally the wish of the Bengal artillery is that they should be amalgamated with the royal artillery; but how it should be carried out regarding pay is a question which I have not thought of.

5650. You put forward the principle?—I think the principle is good, decidedly, both for the public and for themselves, that they should be amalgamated.

5651. (*Chairman.*) You saw the royal artillery and the Indian artillery serving together?—Yes; they were both under my command.

5652. Did they serve together with perfect cordiality?—With very great cordiality; and each was materially benefited by working with the other, there is no doubt of it.

5653. (*Lord Stanley.*) Then you have not found that the carrying on of that service by two different armies leads to any jealousy between the two?—They met there under peculiar circumstances, at a time of very great difficulty, and both of them were only anxious which should do their duty best. But in peace time I should doubt very much whether very great jealousies would not arise.

5654. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have you seen any instances of jealousy at all; not specially as regards the artillery, but generally as regards the two services?—There is, no doubt, a great feeling of jealousy between the Company's troops and the Queen's, and it has existed ever since I have been in the service. We have had no royal artillery till lately.

5655. (*Chairman.*) Does that jealousy exist in any degree between the armies of the different presidencies?—I think it does.

Major-General Sir A. Wilson, Bart., K.C.B.

26th Nov. 1858.

5656. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Provided all be placed upon a perfect equality in every respect, why should any feeling beyond a generous emulation exist either between the armies of the three presidencies, or between the army of the line and the local army? —From one service being called the royal army and the other a colonial army.

5657. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) Is it called a colonial army, or is it called the royal army?—I do not know.

5658. (*Chairman.*) Any distinction would give rise to that feeling?—I think any distinction would do so.

5659. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That would not be confined to India; it would extend to any double army in the world, would it not? That there would be a jealousy of feeling between two distinct bodies?—I should say that it always would do so wherever the armies were.

5660. It is human nature?—It is.

5661. A feeling of jealous emulation, as far as good feeling exists, would always exist in all armies with reference to different regiments and different companies of troops, but being one army there would not be the jealousy which is engendered by two distinct bodies. Is that your opinion?—Decidedly. If the two armies are to be kept distinct, although they are perfectly assimilated to one another, there will still be that slight jealousy which you talk of inherent to human nature, but otherwise they will get on very well together, no doubt.

5662. (*Lord Stanley.*) But, assuming that there is no invidious distinction, either in point of name, both being now called the Royal Army, or in point of eligibility for promotion to the highest commands, or in any other respect; do you think that there need necessarily be more jealousy between the two than such as is calculated to produce a healthy competition?—I believe that the West Indian colonial army is very much looked down upon by the royal army.

5663. You are speaking of colonial regiments?—Yes.

5664. That is to say, the force which you speak of as being looked down upon is a force extremely limited in number, and confined to service within a very restricted area, is it not?—It is confined to the West Indies. I am supposing that the troops in India are confined to the three presidencies.

5665. Is there not a considerable difference between the opportunities of service afforded and the extent of area to be protected in India, and in the West Indies? —With regard to area, that is of course so, and there is a larger army so far, but I do not think that that would make any difference.

5666. Was it not of the very essence of your reply, that that which created a feeling of inferiority in a colonial army was, that it belonged a very small force as opposed to a large one?—No, merely because it is confined to one peculiar portion of the globe, while the other is employed every where; I think it more likely to be the case. The colonial army never feels that it is under the same protection that the royal army is, and that it is cared for so much.

5667. When you speak of a colonial army, what experience have we of a colonial army upon anything like the scale of the army of India?—The Indian army has been a colonial army, as it has been under the East India Company instead of under the Crown.

5668. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I suppose you are aware that in the West Indian regiments there is the power of exchange, and that the officers of those regiments are exactly on the same footing as those of any other regiments in Her Majesty's service?—I know that they can exchange.

5669. So that the officers are not confined to the West Indies?—No.

5670. Their service can be transferred to other portions of the globe?—Yes.

5671. That in itself would rather raise the character of those corps than otherwise, would it not?—I expect that they have to pay for it if they exchange.

5672. Have you found any bar in the fact of troops and batteries having recently landed, and being, to a certain extent, new on taking the field; did you find any want of efficiency in the royal artillery which landed in India, and which seemed newer than the other?—No, there was no want of efficiency. There was a want of practice in the field; that was the only thing. They picked up everything as fast as they possibly could.

5673. They soon picked it up?—Immediately.

5674. And you did not find that after a short period the arm suffered from that fact?—No; I should say that it did not suffer at all.

5675. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) What do you allude to when you say that they picked up?—I mean that there were many things quite strange to them in the Indian service. Their equipments were different from what they had been accustomed to. They had native workmen instead of Europeans attached to them, and several other things, and they had not been in the habit of using their artillery in the way that we do in India.

5676. But so far as their efficiency went they were perfect?—Their efficiency was as perfect as one would wish to see it.

5677. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) Did they suffer any inconvenience from a want of knowledge of the natives?—They had, generally speaking, an officer of our service attached to them as an interpreter to assist them, and they sought information from us in every way, which was readily given.

5678. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That would soon be picked up?—That would soon be picked up, no doubt.

5679. If you wanted a large increase of artillery to-morrow in India, would you object to see eight or ten companies or troops of royal artillery come out; would you be afraid of their efficiency?—I never wish to see better troops or batteries anywhere than those which came out.

5680. (*Viscount Melville.*) You are aware that the royal artillery drive with shafts, and that they do so in Bombay, but that in Bengal and Madras it is with the pole?—Yes.

5681. With regard to the Arab and the horse which you get in the East, which do you think the best system?—We do not use Arabs; we use what are called stud horses. I believe in Bombay they have Arabs.

5682. Your horses are not much larger, are they? —Yes, they are much larger. They are 15-2, 15-3, and frequently more, and 16 hands the pole horses.

5683. Supposing you had the Arabs, what do you think should be the mode of equipment?—I think the Arabs are too small for pole horses, or shaft horses either; they do very well for leaders.

5684. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How do you train your artillery recruits which come out?—We have a school of instruction at the head quarters, where all the recruits first go. They come to us from the plough; they get no training in this country. They go through their infantry drill first of all; they then learn the gun drill, and they go through the laboratory course.

5685. Do you think that it would be an advantage if they were trained in England before going out?— No; I think they would lose a great deal on the voyage.

5686. (*Chairman.*) Do they enlist for particular services?—Yes; they enlist for particular presidencies.

5687. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How long do you consider an ordinary recruit to take before he is fit for service?—He ought to be fit in a twelvemonth after his arrival there. I do not think you can do it in less.

5688. Supposing a very large increase were made to the local force as the force stands at present, would not there be a very great difficulty in raising 20 or 30 companies at once to make them efficient for the field?—I think you would hardly be able to get

men to enlist in sufficient quantity to make the whole perfect.

5689. Would not the effect be to make inefficient what you have at present efficient in the field?—You must transfer some old soldiers to each company as non-commissioned officers and to teach them their duty, and you would be weakening the present troops and companies by taking men for that purpose, and it would be a full twelvemonth before the fresh company were fit for any duties in the field.

5690. I believe it is the system in the Bengal artillery to employ a good number of syces and men of that description?—We have a syce to each horse.

5691. That system has not been introduced, I believe, into the royal artillery?—Yes; they have each got their syce. They have syces and grass-cutters.

5692. Has a battery of the royal artillery the same number of natives of that description attached to it as a battery of the Bengal artillery has?—Just the same.

5693. Therefore, there is no difficulty in assimilating one service to the other in that respect?—In India you must have them; you cannot get grass as you can in this country, and you cannot expose your Europeans to take their horses to water under a hot sun as you do in this country.

5694. Consequently the expense of one service in contradistinction to the other is a mere matter of detail, depending upon the numbers of officers and men whom you settle to attach to each battery or troop?—Yes.

5695. There is no difference of expense in one from the other?—There ought not to be. India would be more expensive than England for this reason, that you have to attach these natives to your horses.

5696. But it is a mere question of detail?—It is a mere question of detail.

5697. (*Viscount Melville.*) How did you manage with the native syces and servants during the late revolt?—Generally speaking, they stuck remarkably well to us; some few deserted, but others took their duty.

5698. They did not participate in the disaffection, or show any bad feeling?—No, not generally.

5699. I heard some report that they had deserted?—In some regiments I heard so, too. I heard that they had deserted from some of the cavalry regiments of the royal service.

5700. How did your followers behave at Delhi?—Very well.

5701. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that it is any inconvenience to the service of India generally that the materiel of the three presidencies is different?—It has been the cause of a very great deal of trouble: whenever one has taken the place of another the whole equipment has had to be changed. The magazines of one presidency are useless for the other, on account of the want of assimilation in a great measure. *Major-General Sir A. Wilson, Bart., K.C.B.* 26th Nov. 1858.

5702. So that the one presidency in cases of emergency can hardly draw upon the magazines of the other?—A Madras battery coming to Bengal cannot get the wheels which they use for their guns, and there are several other little bits of equipment which we cannot furnish them with, but which they are accustomed to have. Every gun in each presidency ought to have exactly the same materiel in every way, so that one could take the place of another.

5703. In fact it is the life and soul of an army?—Yes; when the Madras troops took our place in Burmah, our magazines were quite useless.

5704. (*Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) In what respect, what part of the magazine, do you mean the wheels?—Not only the wheels, but several other things; different portions of equipment, such as implements, half-wroughts, &c.

5705. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Many minor details?—Yes.

5706. Harness?—Yes.

5707. But not the ammunition?—No, because the calibre is the same.

5708. You mean the stores?—Yes.

5709. Is it not a fact that according to the Bengal system, the waggons must go into action with the battery?—Yes.

5710. Do you think that a good system?—You can always keep them behind a little, while under fire. I think that is a good system. I prefer it to having your waggons away from the guns.

5711. Do you prefer the detachment system or not?—I prefer the detachment system. I think it more perfect than the other.

5712. Do you think that there is any difference as to the rapidity of motion?—No; I think it is about the same. I have seen a royal troop and a Bengal troop go into action together, and I saw very little difference. You get quicker into action by the detachment system, no doubt.

5713. In that respect it is militarily an advantage?—Yes.

5714. Is there any other statement which you would wish to make?—No.

The witness withdrew.

Adjourned to Monday next, at 11 o'clock.

Monday, 29th November 1858.

PRESENT:

Major-General Peel.
H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge.
Lord Stanley.
Viscount Melville.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir Harry G. W. Smith.
Major-Gen. Montgomerie.
Major-Gen. Hancock.
Colonel Burlton.
Colonel Forsyth Tait.

Major-General Peel in the Chair.

Major-Gen. Sir Frederick Abbott, C.B., examined. *Major-General Sir F. Abbott, C.B.* 29th Nov. 1858

5715. (*Chairman*). You are a major-general in the Indian service?—Yes.

5716. You belong to the Bengal engineers?—I do.

5717. Will you have the goodness to state how long you have served in India?—From 1822. I returned in 1847.

5718. You were the whole of that time in the engineers?—Yes.

5719. You have been furnished by the Commission with some questions?—Yes.

5720. Will you have the goodness to state to the Commission any opinion which you may have formed upon those various questions. The first question is, how far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as parts of the regular tour of service

Major-General Sir F. Abbott, C.B.

29th Nov. 1858.

and how far of troops raised for service in India only?—I think that it would be better for the service in India generally that the whole of the European corps there should be a special service, and that it should be enlisted for local service in India.

5721. Do you think that no portion of it should be a moveable force sent out from this country?—I think that for some reasons a portion might be sent out occasionally, but not so much for the purposes of India as for taking advantage of the different battle fields of India for learning duties which are required of soldiers.

5722. Will you state the reasons which induce you to believe that it would be better for India to have the whole a local force?—Because I think it should be quite independent of the fluctuations of European contingencies; in my opinion there should be a minimum amount of force established in India, which could not be altered by any requisition from Europe, otherwise India might be denuded at some particular moment when it would give great advantage to the disaffected to unite against us.

5723. Have you formed any opinion as to what that minimum amount of force should be?—That is a very difficult question, and everybody would have a different view upon the subject. I have taken peculiar views upon it myself, and I think the minimum force required is very much smaller than that usually considered necessary. I have had the honour of laying before the minister for India a statement of my views regarding the amount of force requisite, and I think that by the introduction of engines for locomotion, for moving the troops about rapidly with the introduction of very light cavalry, and so on, we might reduce the total amount of force to somewhere between 40,000 and 50,000 Europeans.

5724. Must not the amount of European force depend upon the amount of the native force which is raised in India? Do you not consider that it is necessary to keep a given proportion between the European force and the native force?—Certainly; you must not overtax the Europeans by having too many natives attached to the force; but as I think that one European to two natives would be a very fair proportion, between 40,000 and 50,000 Europeans might be enough.

5725. Where would you propose that they should be recruited?—There is only one recruiting ground that I am aware of, namely, Great Britain.

5726. I believe there is nothing to prevent our recruiting foreigners for service in India?—I have not considered the question much of enlisting foreigners. I have no great affection for them myself.

5727. Do you anticipate that 40,000 or 50,000 men should be recruited from this country for local service in India, and not be removable from India?—Yes, that is my opinion.

5728. Do you not think that it would be a great disadvantage to this country to have so large a proportion of the force which you can raise by voluntary enlistment tied up and not allowed to be removed in case of emergency?—I was speaking merely as to India; I would have the minimum amount as a force specially attached to India.

5729. You consider the question as entirely an Indian one?—Certainly, on that part of the subject; I think it is very difficult exactly to assimilate the two, but taking the minimum force to be established in India, then it would be very useful indeed to have a certain number of Her Majesty's regiments paraded; the very appearance of them would show that we still had a connection with the mother country, and that we could have assistance whenever we wanted it.

5730. Would it not also have the effect of bringing out any improvements in discipline?—Certainly; bringing out the latest improvements, and I think the communication of ideas between military men is very useful. Those coming out would learn the art of war in India, to a certain extent, and they would communicate to us the improvements lately made in Europe.

5731. Would you have one a moveable army, and the other confined entirely to service in India?—As the regiments on proceeding to India are always paid by the Indian government and by the Indian funds, they should be made over, I imagine, to the Commander-in-chief in India, whoever he might be.

5732. Would you place that portion of the moveable army sent to India under a different discipline and command from the portion of the moveable army remaining in this country?—For the time being they are lent as it were; they are not paid by the country.

5733. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Lent to whom?—To the local government in India.

5734. It is now all under the Crown?—It is.

5735. Therefore, how can any portion of the troops be lent?—I am not aware of what arrangements will be made regarding the commands in India, but if an officer is posted there with powers plenipotentiary as regards military affairs, I should say that those regiments which are lent to India should be placed immediately under his command, they being severed for a time from the mother country.

5736. Does not the fact of their being but lent to India, imply that India is altogether a separate country from the mother country?—I do not know how it will be arranged.

5737. (*Lord Stanley.*) You regard the government of India as a department of the public service of the empire with a separate system and with a separate revenue, and therefore you speak of the troops being lent by one department to the other?—Certainly.

5738. (*Chairman.*) Do you consider that the troops sent to the different colonies and supported by a part of the moveable force are lent to the colonies?—A vast difference is caused by the position of India with regard to the mother country; I do not know of a parallel case with India, where there is a large force 30,000 or 40,000 men.

5739. Upon what ground do you think that the restriction as to the amount of force in India has been founded in previous local Acts of Parliament?—I have not the slightest idea.

5740. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Are you of opinion that the portion of troops to be sent from this country should form part of what you have called the minimum European force in India, or an additional force?—An additional force.

5741. Then, as regards that additional force, you view it as an imperial question, and consider that it would be sent for the benefit of Great Britain?—Chiefly for the benefit of Great Britain, and partly of India.

5742. Do you think that the expense of that extra force should fall upon the Indian or the English revenue?—If the men are entirely made over to the officer commanding in India, then, I think, that the Indian revenues should bear the expense. I think it would an advantage to India to parade a force of that sort occasionally.

5743. Perhaps then you think that the expense should be borne partly by India and partly by England, inasmuch as both would derive advantage from it?—Yes.

5744. In so far as the additional force might enable the Government of India to reduce the native force, to that extent you would probably think it just that the expense should fall upon the Indian revenue?—Certainly.

5745. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In what respect have the European troops of Her Majesty's army of the line been found not to answer in India. In what respect have they not been efficient in India, which I presume is the reason why you wish for a local army?—That is not what I stated. I did not put it upon that view at all. I am aware of no deficiency or inefficiency in Her Majesty's officers in India.

5746. Then seeing that we have acquired the possession of India through Her Majesty's troops of the line, why should we suddenly make this great change?—It has not been entirely through Her Majesty's

troops of the line in India; it has been chiefly done by the aid of the sepoys.

5747. As far as Europeans are concerned, it was done by the troops of the line?—I stated in the first instance that my proposal was for the special purpose of avoiding a fluctuation of the force in India.

5748. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Has not the Company's army furnished the most important arm of all, namely, the whole of the artillery and the engineers?—Entirely.

5749. Does not the circumstance of the whole of the engineers and artillery having been furnished by the local army in your opinion weigh to make the services rendered by it at least equal to those rendered by the troops of the line in the conquest and maintenance of India?—That is a great historical question, to which I feel myself incompetent to reply. I could hardly presume to adjudicate upon the exact part which one or the other has taken in the conquest of India.

5750. (*Lord Stanley.*) If I understand your view, it is this, that the existence of a local force and the defence of India mainly by such a force is a guarantee against India being used as a convenience to the mother country for receiving and paying for troops which we do not want at home, though they may not be required in India; and on the other hand, against India being stripped of troops which may be wanted in India, because they are required at home?—My view was not exactly what your lordship states in the first part of your question. I had no anticipation that the mother country would make use of India in an improper way, but it was what your lordship states in the second instance; it was merely for the safety of India. Her Majesty's forces in India, we know, in times of peace are always reduced to their minimum amount, and below a proper efficiency. If a war breaks out, as in Persia or China, India is indented upon for the best of her troops, as was the case in the last Persian war, and she is denuded; it is to guard against this being done that I make the proposition that a certain number of troops shall be attached to the soil.

5751. (*Chairman.*) Have not all the requisitions for the Queen's troops come from the Indian Government? Has it not been impossible to send out troops to India without a requisition being made for them by the East India Company?—That is a point with which I am not at all conversant, but I think it does not affect the prospective question.

5752. No troops could be sent to India without a requisition from the Secretary of State for India now, or previously from the East India Company?—I believe not, but I speak with no authority.

5753. The officers of the local force which you propose to raise for service in India only, and the European officers attached to the native force, would, of course, all have the same interest, would they not? Yes.

5754. Have occasions never arisen on which the presence of the Queen's army to check that feeling, would have been very beneficial? Have occasions never arisen on which the local forces have shown a disposition to defend their own interests rather than to do their duty to the Government of India?—Yes; there is one historical case of mutiny.

5755. Would it not be a very great advantage to have a certain portion of the troops in different interests, and depending upon this country alone?—After the late occurrences in India, I should think it very unlikely that there would be any disposition to mutiny, inasmuch as the Europeans see that it is only by supporting the Government that they can keep their place in the country.

5756. You admit that such cases have arisen?—There was one case, I believe; I do not know that it was stopped by any overpowering force of Her Majesty's troops.

5757. (*Lord Stanley.*) You do not consider that the possibility of mutiny or discontent among the Europeans of a local force, either officers or men, is a contingency which deserves to be taken into account?—Certainly not; I think that after the trial which the army had of the half batta question, there is no fear that they will ever set themselves against the Government in any improper way.

Major-General Sir F. Abbott, C.B.

29th Nov. 1858.

5758. And especially in a country like India, where they are a small garrison amongst an immense population, many of whom are hostile?—I should think it almost impossible.

5759. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) In your opinion the force of from 40,000 to 50,000 men which you consider would form a sufficient minimum force for India in future should not be liable to be employed in Persia or Burmah, or any other part of Asia?—They should certainly not be removed beyond what we call the present Indian territories.

5760. (*Chairman.*) You propose that they should be enlisted upon those terms?—Yes.

5761. And therefore it would not be in the power of the Government to remove them?—Just so.

5762. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think it a desirable thing that the hands of the imperial government should be crippled to that extent, that 50,000 Europeans should be actually shut up for the Indian service only?—If India is worth keeping it must be so.

5763. Do you think that that would be an advantage to the mother country?—I think it would in this respect; I think that the authorities of the War Department would be able to get their estimates passed for a greater amount of force than is now allowed.

5764. (*Viscount Melville.*) What amount of force do you expect to keep up in order to secure 50,000 men permanently in India, and how do you expect to recruit them?—I do not know why any particular force should be kept up, except in the recruiting depôts.

5765. To have an efficient army of 50,000 men you will want 100,000 at least?—That is a matter of detail, I consider.

5766. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How would you manage that?—Speaking generally, I can only say, that I would have recruiting depôts established on a sufficient scale to enlist the men.

5767. (*Chairman.*) Where would you have the recruiting depôts established?—In Ireland, Scotland, and England.

5768. In this country?—There is no other recruiting field.

5769. Do you not think that it would be a great advantage to this country to have those large depôts of men consisting of at least 20,000 men in depôt here, under the direct discipline and control of the Commander-in-chief in England?—They might be entirely under the control of the Commander-in-chief as well as the troops in England. I should think that every man is under the control of the Commander-in-chief as long as he remains on the British shores.

5770. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you not think it would be advisable that the Government of India should have a body of European troops at its disposal for employment in Burmah or China, and in repelling aggression upon the Indian frontier?—Burmah is part of the Indian territory, China is not; I look upon China and Persia as quite a European question.

5771. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Do you not view India as part and parcel of the British empire?—It is a colony.

5772. Then why should it have an independent army?—Because as I have stated before, if it has not an independent army it is sure some day to be denuded of troops, and then the natives will rise as they did on the last occasion, and we shall lose probably the whole of the territory.

5773. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What reason have you for saying that it is sure to be denuded of troops?—Because it always has been.

5774. When has it been?—When the Persian war broke out the troops were taken from India.

Major-General Sir F. Abbott, C.B.

29th Nov. 1858.

5775. Was that a European or an Indian question?—A European question entirely.

5776. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Are you not fully aware that when India has ever been in any danger whatever, troops have been rushed from Great Britain to India with the greatest possible rapidity?—Yes, and with great danger to Great Britain; the country has been denuded to supply India, and the troops have not generally arrived in time; but I would avoid the necessity of having that great rush of troops across the peninsula.

5777. But at the same time you would avoid the possibility of England making use of troops which were located in India?—That is my great purpose.

5778. You would have 50 or 60 regiments tied up in India, and belonging exclusively to that country, which you call a colony of Great Britain?—They could not be removed with safety to the empire.

5779. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Supposing the empire is threatened to such a degree that it is shaken to its foundation, do you think it a wise arrangement to tie up 50,000 men in India whom you might otherwise make available; which of the two methods would be the most dangerous?—I do not see any necessity whatever for the mother country being in such danger; she ought never to fall into such danger as that; she has her own men, she has millions to recruit from, and why should she be in danger? Can you suppose it possible that the ministers of England should ever allow the safety of England to depend upon troops serving 10,000 miles off? it seems to me to be impossible.

5780. Can you on the other hand suppose that the ministers of England could ever endanger the possession of so vast and important an empire as India by removing troops, which could only be done upon their responsibility?—We have so many instances in history and in human nature that what is far away is always less thought of than what is near at hand, that I think the ministers would take care of Britain with much more energy than they would take care of her colony in India.

5781. Will you give me an instance in which India has been denuded, on the responsibility of Government, unnecessarily of troops?—I say that it might be.

5782. I want to know whether it has been?—It has been in the case of the Persian war.

5783. Can you give me any other instance?—We have sent troops to China before now.

5784. Has not that been done by the directions of the Government of India?—That I am not able to speak of.

5785. Do you mean to say, that even with the concurrence of the Government of India you would not allow troops to go out of India?—The Government of India must, of course, be left entirely to their own arrangements; if they sanction it there is no help for it. There is no power on earth which can bind them but their own discretion.

5786. Would you prevent their using their discretion?—I would if I could.

5787. (*Viscount Melville.*) If you call India a colony, which is considered a term of reproach, it always having been looked upon as our Indian empire, why should you suppose that the Government of Great Britain would endanger the safety of India any more than they do that of the other colonies. Australia is as distant, is that neglected? Are the West Indies neglected?—They are not placed in the same circumstances at all.

5788. They must be defended, whether it is by ships or by troops. It is the duty of the Government to have the necessary force?—In each of those cases there is a very small portion of European troops established, and they can be easily spared; but if you send troops to India, you can hardly spare 50,000.

5789. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you mean that you cannot spare them; in what respect?—I think that the Government of England would count upon having so many troops, say 50,000, available in case of need, and, therefore, they would, generally speaking, reduce the estimates for available men elsewhere.

5790. (*Chairman.*) Do you think there is no limit to the power of recruiting men in this country by voluntary enlistment. We have had a pretty good example during the last two years, when a certain number of men have been voted which we have never been able to raise?—I think if you increase the bounty you will find plenty of men.

5791. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are you aware that that is about the very worst thing which you can do, and that it is only a premium to desertion?—I was not aware of it.

5792. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Still is it not the case that of whatsoever troops the European force in India may be composed, the same number of men will be required, whether enlisted for general service, or for service in India only?—Certainly.

5793. (*Chairman.*) But you propose that at least one-third should be withdrawn from the power of this country, to make use of them in case of emergency?—But I imagine that there will always be plenty left. Under any circumstances, you cannot with safety withdraw them from India, so that it comes to the same thing in the end.

5794. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But in one case you cripple the hands of the Imperial Government, and in the other you leave the Government free to act upon its own responsibility, for which that Government is responsible to Parliament and the country; and I ask whether you do not think that, guarded as that power of withdrawal is, you may safely leave in the hands of the Government the responsibility of losing India through the withdrawal of troops?—I would not trust the safety of India to Parliament under those circumstances.

5795. (*Col. Burlton.*) Supposing any very pressing emergency arose, such as the invasion of England, what length of time do you suppose would elapse before troops could be sent for from India and brought here to assist in that emergency?—I think that question would be answered by stating the time that we took to send out troops to India. I think it was some six or seven months.

5796. If the emergency was so pressing as I have imagined, would it be of any use to send for those troops?—Not the slightest.

5797. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) If the whole European force in India were composed of troops of the line, would not the difficulty of recruiting for the army of the line be increased in proportion to the number of additional troops which it would be necessary to maintain in England to furnish reliefs to the force in India?—Certainly.

5798. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Why should that be so?—On account of the reliefs of the regiments. You must have a much larger number of Europeans if you relieve the troops in India, because there will be always one set in transit.

5799. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Supposing the whole European force in India to consist of 80,000 men, and that about one-tenth of that number of troops would be required for annual reliefs, on the assumption that the Indian term of service would be limited to ten years, would not the consequence of that arrangement be that about 8,000 men would be constantly on the seas, and therefore not available for service in either country?—Certainly.

5800. (*Chairman.*) How long do you consider that a European can serve with advantage in India without affecting his health?—I am not, I think, competent to give a very fair opinion upon that point. I have never been much with European troops, having been a departmental officer, but I think all these things are recorded in tabular statements which could be easily referred to, and much more effectively than if I were to give a mere opinion.

5801. Does not that affect the question altogether. If you are obliged at the end of 12 or 14 years, to remove the European soldiers, it amounts to reliefs?—But they go out by driblets; it is not sending out

large masses at a time. If the troops of the line served in India, they would require their reliefs every 10 years. You would be taking out at once 1,000 men, and sending home 800, and so on. By my proposition those that went out would remain.

5802. I think it is admitted that the arrival of English troops and regiments is a necessity?—Unquestionably; but not such an influx as that. And besides that, I think it detrimental to India to have so many troops arriving; for so many officers and troops arriving with European prejudices, is a great shock to the natives.

5803. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that the native feeling has suffered in consequence?—Yes.

5804. In what respect?—Because those going out are not aware of the native prejudices, and do not consult or respect them.

5805. Can you give any instance of that?—No.

5806. (*Lord Stanley.*) Is it not a notorious fact that men and officers arriving fresh in the country are often unable to take care of themselves in regard of health, and are more likely to come into collisions with the people than officers and men who have resided there for some years?—No doubt.

5807. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Cannot you make such regulations by superior authority as to prevent any mischief arising from that fact?—I think it is almost impossible.

5808. Why?—You can hardly break in 1,000 men at once to a totally new system of proceeding. The men will think that they are in Europe for a long time after they are in India.

5809. Has it been found so practically; can you give any instance of it?—I cannot.

5810. (*Col. Burlton.*) Have you never heard of instances of newly arrived regiments in Calcutta getting into collision with the natives on account of interfering with their peculiar prejudices?—I have heard a great many stories, but I merely wish to speak of what I know personally.

5811. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Does not that apply to the discipline of the regiment, and would not such a thing be a disgrace to that corps?—I think that all irregularities if carried to excess show some laxity of discipline in the regiment.

5812. (*Col. Burlton.*) But there is no irregularity or laxity of discipline in the fact of a European soldier, in walking to his cantonment, putting his foot within the circle where a man is going to cook his dinner?—No; every European soldier going out from England whether he be in the Company's service, or whether he be in Her Majesty's service, is new to the country, and he may often, and must often, shock the feelings of the natives, they being so full of prejudices. All this, of course, becomes a much more serious consideration when there is 1,000 or 1,200 men coming at once into the country. That is what I meant to state. I do not mean to say that the discipline of Her Majesty's regiments is in the least degree relaxed. I should be very sorry to say a word against them. I have known them, and have served with them, and have the highest respect for them, and the greatest affection for many of them.

5813. (*Lord Stanley.*) You are merely speaking of the sort of offence which any person, whether a soldier or not, coming fresh from Europe, and being unacquainted with the natives, would be liable to give perhaps 20 times in a week without being aware that he did it?—Certainly.

5814. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Regarding the matter as one of comparative expense, in the event of the whole European force in India being a local one, would not the Indian revenues be saved the entire expense which, if the force be composed of troops of the line, would necessarily be incurred for the periodical reliefs of regiments?—Half the relief would be saved; the return regiments, I suppose, would be saved.

5815. In the event of its being a local army only, there would be no return regiments?—No; of course the same number must go out to India.

5816. If the rule be that every line regiment shall be relieved after ten years' service in India, will not the Indian revenue incur for each relief the expense of conveying a relieving regiment from England to India, and the relieved regiment from India to England, in excess of the expense that would be incurred in maintaining a local regiment?—Yes, excepting that when a relieved regiment goes home, it throws off many as volunteers into the service of India.

5817. (*Chairman.*) In the case of local regiments serving in India, the officers upon retirement are entitled to great retiring allowances, are they not?—There is a scale of allowances. I do not know that I should call it very great. It is greater than in Her Majesty's service.

5818. The Indian Government would be relieved of that in the case of the regiment being a moveable one?—I suppose it would.

5819. That of course is a set-off against the expense of the relief?—I should think so.

5820. How do you propose to raise the native portion of the Indian army?—I should take much more the fashion of the Madras army at present, which is to consider men of low caste as efficient in the army.

5821. I refer to the terms of the service, what length of time would you enlist them for?—I have not paid a very great deal of attention to that particular point. It is of no use enlisting a native for any length of time, for as soon as he is tired of the service he bolts, and you cannot catch him again, so that it is of no use making the term of service long.

5822. I believe there are now 300,000 native troops and police?—Yes.

5823. Would there not be very great danger in discharging any large portion of them?—When they are disbanded I think they are harmless, especially when they retire from the service unarmed.

5824. Have you not taught them all the habits of a soldier?—Yes.

5825. Is there not the danger of having a discontented population which has been trained to military habits?—I do not think it is the case generally. We have not found it so in the late mutiny. It has been chiefly amongst the native troops that the mutiny has taken place, but those are men with arms in their hands. We have not found that the men who had retired and gone to cultivate the soil in the villages have turned against us.

5826. Is not there always danger of their going off with their arms?—I cannot speak positively, but I believe it is very seldom the case that they carry their arms. When they bolt they strip themselves, and go as natives of the country, and not as soldiers, and they do not carry their arms with them.

5827. May not the same danger of mutiny arise upon any future occasion?—Yes, if you have so large a force of natives as to overpower the European force, which I would not do. I do not think we want such a very large force of natives as we have.

5828. We have at this instant 300,000 natives?—We have too many. That is under peculiar circumstances; that is not the normal state of our native army. We have enlisted 80,000 Sikhs to put down a certain insurrection; when that is put down I imagine that we shall disband them and reduce them to a proper number.

5829. Is there no danger in discharging a great number of men whom you have trained to the habits of soldiers?—Under ordinary circumstances there would be no such disbanding of troops.

5830. What proportion of Europeans to natives would you keep up?—Two natives to one European, independently of the police. My idea is, that we should not have the police armed with fire-arms.

5831. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) Are not the police exactly the same as the native soldiers?—Yes.

5832. Armed in the same way?—Yes.

5833. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Therefore they are just as dangerous as the native soldiers?—I would not have them so; I would draw their teeth.

Major-General Sir F. Abbott, C.B.

19th Nov. 1858.

5834. (*Viscount Melville.*) How would you arm the police?—With swords and spears.

5835. (*Col. Burlton.*) With no fire-arms at all?—No.

5836. Not a musket?—No.

5837. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) For the treasuries you must have men armed with muskets?—My views are that we should have the treasuries at large stations.

5838. (*Chairman.*) How many officers would you attach to each of the local regiments?—I think about the strength of one of our native regiments; but I would have the European regiments of only 500 men each.

5839. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What is your reason for having so small a number of men?—I think they are very handy. I think as the native mind always counts by regiments, they have very nearly the moral effect of larger regiments; at the same time they will be more easily disposed of and brigaded about the country.

5840. Is it not much more expensive to have small regiments than large ones?—Not much more.

5841. Is not there the whole difference of the officers and the staff?—There is a little greater expense.

5842. Suppose a small regiment went into the field, how soon would it be wasted to nothing?—But then you have more of them.

5843. Are you not aware that the strongest regiments dwindle down to nothing in a very short time?—I think most of the regiments during the late war were very little more than 500 or 600 men.

5844. If with an establishment of 1,000 it is so, what will a regiment be with an establishment of 500 men?—They ought to be kept up if you have proper recruiting depôts.

5845. Supposing that all the regiments in India were of an establishment of 500 men, and that they took the field and went on service, the natural result would be that a very large per-centage would be knocked off duty?—Yes.

5846. How would you fill them up?—You could not fill them up more than you do the present regiments.

5847. A regiment at present is double that establishment. How do you propose to keep a weak regiment efficient in the field, when you have such great difficulty in keeping a strong regiment efficient in the field?—It is quite impossible to recruit while you are in the field.

5848. How is it to be done?—I only multiply the number of the regiments instead of strengthening each regiment individually, for general purposes.

5849. The result would be that after not a very lengthened period you would have a great many regiments quite skeletons, would it not?—It might be so.

5850. (*Viscount Melville.*) Suppose one of these small regiments of yours to be stationed at Poonah, or anywhere you like, in time of peace, and field duty is ordered, your establishment being 500 men, how many men do you suppose, on an ordinary field day, you would muster for parade out of the 500 men? Do you know what the casualties are before you ever get the men into the ranks?—I am not prepared to speak upon that point.

5851. What is the reason which you give for proposing a regiment with an establishmeut of 500?—Because I think they are more handy; they have the moral effect of stronger regiments certainly; the native mind always calculates by regiments. They say, "there are so many regiments there," they do not say, "there are so many thousand men;" wherever they are they say, "there are so many regiments."

5852. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) Probably you said 500 without considering the thing; there might be 600?—500 or 600; I mean that I should make smaller regiments.

5853. (*Viscount Melville.*) Before you had been in a campaign six weeks you would have to put two or three of these small regiments together to make one regiment and a provisional battalion?—In Indian warfare it is very advantageous to mix up a smaller number of Europeans with a larger body of natives; the Europeans act as the point of the wedge, therefore if you have a dozen regiments of 500 men, in my opinion, it is better than having six regiments of 1,000 men, because you can mix them up; you can brigade them more easily with the natives, and they are the cutting points which you use with them.

5854. What is the difficulty in brigading 1,000 men any more than 500?—We have instances in India where it is requisite to have a wing, and we now detach a wing; but I think that a perfect regiment of small force is better than the wing of a stronger regiment; it is more complete in itself.

5855. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Are you not of opinion that such a system would have been a very injudicious one in the late revolt, if small regiments had been detached with large bodies of insurgents?—I do not propose to detach them in actual warfare; my idea is quite the contrary, namely, to mass them. I gave in a little memorandum to the minister of the way in which I would do it generally. I would have no small detachments anywhere about India. Each of these head quarters, in my opinion, should constitute the collectorate of the country roundabout, and it should always be well garrisoned and well attended to.

5856. What I advert to is not the country, because the country has not revolutionized itself, but it is the army which has revolutionized itself; therefore European troops detached in small bodies would be prospectively in danger?—If you keep them in the same proportion to the natives you are safe.

5857. (*Viscount Melville.*) As we know that a regiment with an establishment of 1,000 men dwindles down in no time to perhaps 600 or 700, how do you propose to keep up these regiments of 500 efficient, so as to have the regiments always of that strength?—I think that a means might be devised, and ought to be devised, for keeping the regiments in cantonments up to their proper strength, and then you would have only the usual casualties on going into the field; but at present, generally speaking, (I do not know how it arises,) the regiments are very deficient; they do not get the proper number of recruits out to India.

5858. (*Chairman.*) You have stated your opinion that youwould have the whole a local force, I therefore confine myself to the latter part of the second question, how would you propose to secure the efficiency of that force?—If it would answer the purpose, I would rather be asked in detail; it seems to me that the efficiency of the whole European force in India is a very broad question.

5859. If you propose the whole to be a local force enlisted for service in India only, is it not very important for you to give us some idea of the mode in which you propose to keep it up?—I have already stated that I would have them formed into regiments of 500 men, officered by about the same number of officers as are now attached to native regiments in India.

5860. What is the number?—About twenty-seven officers; namely, three field officers, seven captains, and I think there are seventeen subalterns to a native infantry regiment.

5861. Would you allow those officers to be withdrawn for civil service?—Yes, you must.

5862. Why must you?—Because you have no means of filling up the civil service otherwise, and they are the most efficient men you can get. India could not get on if you stopped the recruiting of the civil appointments from the army.

5863. Would it not be possible to establish a civil service which should furnish all the requirements of the country?—I think not; there is not the experience. You send men from England who are perfectly untried; they may be very clever and pass a good examination, but be quite unfit for India; whereas when recruiting is allowed from the army, you get a better class of men for the civil service. I would

keep a sufficient number of officers to allow of a certain proportion being always drafted away.

5864. Then according to your account you would always withdraw the best officers ?—Not the best regimental officers, but those best fitted for civil duties.

5865. Do you not think the effect of that is to make men always look out for those civil appointments ?—Yes, if not properly guarded, but I think it might be so regulated as that officers performing civil duties in India should be struck off their regiments; they might take their rank, but not be allowed to join after a certain number of years of civil service, and then the others would be very glad to stay.

5866. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Which would you prefer, a staff corps, or the system of *seconding* ?—The system of *seconding*.

5867. (*Chairman.*) Would you apply the same proposition to the non-commissioned officers of the regiment ? Would you allow them to withdraw for civil service?—You must, for all the departments of public works you must do so, I think, for many years to come.

5868. You anticipate of course that the class of recruits which you would gain for these local regiments would be about the same on the average as those now enlisting in Her Majesty's service ?—Yes.

5869. As we find great difficulty in getting a sufficient number of good non-commissioned officers, do you not think that the same difficulty would apply there ?—Then you must put the screw upon them. If you cannot spare them from the regiment, you must try and find them somewhere else.

5870. Do you think that a regiment enlisted for local service alone, from which the best officers and non-commissioned officers are withdrawn, can be upon the same footing as a regiment in the Queen's service ?—Not if you withdraw all the best officers and non-commissioned officers; it is impossible.

5871. (*Lord Stanley.*) Does not the knowledge that they have civil occupation as well as military occupation open to them act as a very powerful incentive to men of ability to enter the local service ?—I imagine that it does; but I do not speak from any personal knowledge.

5872. Though a regiment may suffer to some extent by having good officers withdrawn from it, does it not gain in the increased stimulus to exertion which is thereby given to other officers ?—No doubt. I think there would be very little study of the languages if the civil appointments were not open to the officers of the army.

5873. Men are induced to study and to exert themselves, and become acquainted with the native habits and characters, and otherwise to educate themselves, in the hope of obtaining something besides regimental occupation ?—Certainly; it has been a very great stimulus to our army.

5874. (*Chairman.*) Then it must tell in the first instance upon the recruit who is first enlisted ?—I do not think that a recruit thinks much about it. He generally gets rather tipsy, and takes the shilling.

5875. Do you think the fact of appointments being open to officers in the local army would give rise to your having a higher class of men originally entering the local army than the Queen's army ?—No, I think not. I think his lordship referred to the stimulus afforded after entering the service.

5876. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You do not think it would be an inducement to men to go into the local army rather than the army of the line ?—No, I think young men get where they can. If they have interest at the Horse Guards they get into the Queen's army; if they have interest at the India House, they get into the Company's army.

5877. (*Lord Stanley.*) If by any regulation passed to that effect it were made known to every officer entering from henceforth the local army of India, that he was incapable of holding any employment except strictly military employment, would not that act as a great discouragement to young men of ability in the first instance to enter the army, and would it not also tend very much to lower the character of those actually serving in it by taking away from them all stimulus and all encouragement to educate themselves ?—As to a portion of the question I think it is perfectly certain that it would take away the stimulus to those in the service. With regard to those about to enter the service, I think it is difficult to answer the question exactly. Were all promotion of that sort withdrawn from the army in India, and all appointments thrown open, as they are very much now to competition, people would rather prefer entering the Queen's service than they would going to India, I think.

5878. If it were not for the prospect of civil employment ?—I think so.

5879. (*Chairman.*) But that prospect of civil employment does not appear to have acted upon the lower classes, namely, the recruits ?—I should say not.

5880. Doctor Renny was asked whether they were not recruited exactly in the same way as the Queen's troops, and his answer was, "It is generally supposed that they are not such good recruits ?"—I am not a regimental officer, and I can hardly speak to that point.

5881. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) If I understood you correctly, you did not give it as your opinion that opening the civil appointments to the officers of the army would have the effect of withdrawing the best officers from regiments ?—No.

5882. But simply that of withdrawing officers who might be the best suited by their particular qualifications for that branch of the service ?—I meant to state that.

5883. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In practice is it not found that they generally are the best officers—the most intelligent officers ?—Not the best regimental officers, I think; from my knowledge of the service, I should say not.

5884. Do you think that a less clever man is as good a regimental officer ?—No, I would not say that. I think that there is a military disposition in one man, and that there is a civil disposition in another. One man likes surveying, another man likes studying the native languages, and entering into the political department; another man likes handling his regiment. I think that every man should have his choice in a great measure.

5885. (*Viscount Melville.*) Has not the extent to which officers have been withdrawn from their regiments hitherto detracted most seriously from the efficiency of those regiments ?—That has been, I think, because they have been rather under-officered; the number of officers has not been sufficient to supply this great demand.

5886. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You propose that the door for entering the civil service should be opened quite as wide as it has been heretofore, but that after a certain period of absence the places in the regiment of those holding civil appointments should be filled up ?—Certainly.

5887. Do you think that that would be a great advantage ?—Yes.

5888. (*Lord Stanley.*) You would compel a man after a certain time to make his option between civil and military employment ?—Yes.

5889. You would not allow him to go on calling himself an officer in the army, and to be capable of returning to military duty, though practically he had lost all military experience from a want of familiarity with the life of the army ?—I would allow him to carry on his rank in the army to a certain point; but would not allow him to return to command or to military duty after a certain number of years' civil service.

5890. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) During which period he would be *seconded* ?—Yes.

5891. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Are there not instances of very eminent men having served in civil employment, who have proved themselves first-rate officers in very high command on returning to military duty ?—Yes.

Major-General Sir F. Abbott, C.B.

29th Nov. 1858.

5892. I refer to such men as Sir Henry Lawrence, Sir James Outram, and others of that type?—I think there must be exceptions to every rule; but what I mean is that I think that we might allow the officers of the army to fill up vacancies in the civil service, and at the same time maintain the full establishments of the native army. By my proposition, when a man is *seconded*, his place is immediately filled up.

5893. Still you understand that under the system of *seconding*, officers of the line are not put upon the shelf and excluded from army employment. They continue on the returns of the army; their promotion goes on in their regiment, and they continue eligible for high commands?—I do not think that that would be objectionable if a man was fit for it.

5894. (*Chairman.*) Will you proceed with the statement of your views?—I have stated that regiments might be formed smaller than they generally have been, and these regiments to be officered by the same number of officers as are attached to the native regiments; those officers to have the privilege of serving in the civil service on a sort of *seconding* regulation, their places being filled up.

5895. And the recruiting and enlistment for the service to take place here?—Yes.

5896. Would you recruit exactly upon the same terms as for the Queen's army, otherwise would there not be the objection of having one service bidding against the other for the troops? Would it not be a great disadvantage in the recruiting market to have two contending parties, one against the other? Would it not give rise to the necessity of always raising the bounty, first on the one side and then on the other?—I do not know that a little rivalry might not do good. We have already a large recruiting depôt. I do not think that it at all affects the recruiting for Her Majesty's service.

5897. Do you know how the Indian troops are recruited now?—I am not acquainted with the full details.

5898. You do not recruit at all, we recruit for you; any person offering himself to the recruiting sergeant may say, "I am for the portion of that army now in "India," and he may enlist for it, but you have no recruiting establishment separate from the other?—If that works well I do not see why it should not be continued.

5899. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that for a great empire it is an advantage to have one united army instead of a double army?—I think it is too far separated to be united.

5900. Do you not think that there is more hold upon the mother country if the distant army is part and parcel of the army of the mother country than if it is isolated for local service only?—What we want chiefly there is that the men should feel themselves attached to India.

5901. Do you not think that the fact of a double army would rather lead to jealousies and heartburnings between the two services than the reverse, however much they might be placed upon an equality?—Where there are two services there always will be heartburnings to a certain extent, but I have never seen any inconvenience. I have often been serving with Queen's troops in India, and I have never seen anything like heartburnings to any disagreeable extent.

5902. Do you think that there is no jealousy at all between the two services. Do you think that they feel exactly as if they were one?—No, they cannot.

5903. Is not that felt constantly?—I do not think that it is inconveniently felt; I have never observed it.

5904. Do you not think that if it exists at all it is a great misfortune. What is the advantage of it?—There is no advantage in having a bad feeling, of course, but I have never seen any inconvenience from it.

5905. As a military matter, is it not a great advantage to have everything so united as to make the force, whatever it may be, carry out concord and unity of feeling and action?—That is an argument which I would use for having the whole force special in India.

5906. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Is it not the fact that hitherto there has not been that perfect equality between the officers of Her Majesty's service and those of the East India Company's service which is necessary to remove all ground for heartburning?—I believe the only difference has been in the matter of appointments to the staff, and that has been in a great measure rectified of late years.

5907. Have the officers in the Company's service been upon a perfect eqality with those in the royal service during the 70 years that they have held Queen's commissions, have they not in many respects been in an inferior position?—Might I submit that there is no great object in answering that question if you will excuse me from answering it.

5908. Is it not the fact that the rank of officers of the Company's service was not acknowledged in Europe until 1855?—Yes.

5909. Is it not also the fact that the Company's officers were excluded from the commands in chief in India until the year 1856?—Practically so.

5910. Were not nominations to be Queen's aides-de-camp first extended to the Company's officers in 1842?—I cannot speak to dates, but I believe so.

5911. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is it not a fact that the whole of the civil service of India was shut against the officers of the army of the line till within a very recent period?—I think it was, with very few exceptions.

5912. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) Why, was not it because they did not know the language?—I have no knowledge of that.

5913. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The civil service being thrown open as it now is to the officers of the line, do you not think that that fact would induce officers, and has induced officers, and is doing so daily, to acquire the language and to become acquainted with the habits of the people more and more?—No doubt to a certain extent.

5914. Would not that of itself induce the officers to learn the language?—Certainly.

5915. (*Viscount Melville.*) Was not the interpreter to the late commander-in-chief in India, and to the three or four preceding commanders-in-chief, a Queen's officer?—Havelock was, I know.

5916. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Although the staff and civil appointments in India were confined to the Company's officers, had not the Queen's officers, as a set-off, the advantage of being able to exchange into regiments in Europe, and of having staff and other appointments open to them in England, the Mediterranean, Canada, and the other colonies?—Necessarily.

5917. From which the officers of the Company's service were altogether excluded?—Certainly.

5918. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Which are the best appointments, those in India, or those in Canada, or the Mediterranean, or the colonies?—I should prefer those in India, excepting when health fails.

5919. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that it would be possible to consolidate the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other; and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers lately in the service of the East India Company?—I think that that is utterly impossible; there are so many circumstances against it.

The witness withdrew.

JOHN M'LENNAN, Esq., M.D., examined.

J. M'Lennan, Esq., M.D.

29th Nov. 1858.

5920. (*Chairman.*) You belong to the Bombay medical service?—Yes.

5921. Will you have the kindness to state to the Commission how long you have served in India?—I have served 34 years in the Company's service, and nearly 32 of those in India.

5922. Will you state at what periods?—From 1822 to 1855.

5923. You have been furnished with some questions on the part of the Commission?—I have.

5924. We shall be very much obliged to you if you will give us any information relating to them. The first question is, how far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as parts of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only?—In a medical point of view the trained and efficient men of these two descriptions of troops appear to me to be equally good. A far greater number of soldiers of the line come to India trained than of the local European force, and the men of the line are certainly more carefully recruited than those of the local force. No soldier of the latter quits India so long as he is able to serve there, while a soldier of the line may quit, and often has quitted, India having 10 or more years of good service in him, if he does not choose or is not permitted to volunteer to remain in India when his own regiment has been ordered home. A consideration of these differences, peculiar to the two descriptions of troops, may, with other matters, assist in fixing the ratio asked for. I do not quite know, as a medical man, whether I may say more on that which seems to me to be a military question.

5925. How long do you consider that a European will serve in India as a soldier without detriment to his health?—A healthy, temperate man, I think, may serve well and efficiently 16 to 18 years.

5926. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What should you give as the average run of service in India?—I should think probably 10 to 13 years, striking off those who were unfitted, and so forth.

5927. (*Chairman.*) Then you think that it would be necessary to have them relieved every 10 or 13 years?—I do not think that that follows; I think into that consideration many other matters enter. With a regiment relieved every 10 or 13 years, of course it is only the men who went out with that regiment who remain in it 10 or 13 years, but the majority would be found, I think, to be under 5 or 6 years; those men would return having much service in them; it all becomes a matter of economy, which of course I have nothing to do with.

5928. Will you have the goodness to proceed?—To the second question, I would give the following reply: Economy (in the saving of the expense of transport home), and efficiency (in retaining in India soldiers trained to Indian service), would both be consulted by the fullest possible opportunity being always given to the men of a royal regiment ordered home to transfer their services to regiments remaining in India. This ought particularly to be the case with men under 7 to 10 years service, who about that time are probably most efficient for field duties. When regiments of the line are sent out, and particularly for immediate field service, it would be well that neither very young lads (soldiers) nor very old men should be sent. The period of arrival in India should be in the beginning of the cold weather, so as to permit their destination to be reached at a favourable season. Avoidance of exposure to the sun and to temptations on landing, and due regulation of marches, &c., are well attended to in India. More in my opinion depends on a proper selection of men than on any particular roster of service in other colonies before going to India. The efficiency of the local European force would be increased by attention to several circumstances. I do not think its recruits have generally been passed into the service with the same care as in royal regiments. Men have not unfrequently been sent to India who ought never to have been taken as soldiers, imbeciles, deaf, of deficient stamina, with diseased hearts, lungs, &c. I have understood the cause to be that recruits are finally passed into the service at recruiting districts, and that difficulties have been made about their rejection after they have joined the depôt at Warley. Yet, whatever the causes may have been, they must be capable of removal and ought to be removed, the fact of the inefficiency being as I have stated, at least as regards Bombay; and it is likely, I presume, to have been felt at the other presidencies likewise. I ought to state that the recruits alluded to have for the most part belonged to the infantry. The local artillery appears to me to have been well recruited; it is of the infantry that I make this remark. No man of the local force should be embarked for India who was not in perfect health and strength. The number of recruits affected with venereal (in many cases, doubtless, of recent origin, but some even reported to have been transferred from hospital,) has at times been considerable; and if the ship, in which such men were embarked, met with stormy, wet weather on leaving Europe, the result has been that the constitutions of several have been permanently injured, and they have thus been lost to the service. Such a matter, even, as men previously to leaving England being furnished with quilted cap covers to protect the head and neck, would render them more independent of awnings during the passage, and prevent many an attack of illness brought on by exposure. There is one matter of the greatest importance to the European soldier in India, both of the line and of the local force, of which most are, I believe, cognizant, yet on which nothing efficacious has, so far as I know, lately been done. I allude to the check of venereal disease by police regulations in cantonments and cities. No one who has seen the large number of fine men, generally the youngest, who are yearly ruined in constitution from this cause, would hesitate to apply the remedy, which is simple, and consists, principally, in the compulsory cure of the public women who are the causes of the evil. The Bombay Medical Board, some years ago, when pressing recommendations on this subject on the notice of Government, adduced the conduct of all nations in the matter of plague, as an instance of the mode of preventing the spread of one disease, on the advisability of which all agreed, although it was essentially selfish, and abstractedly considered from some points of view, actually cruel. In plague, when a case occurs in a town or district, the sick and well are together confined, and the latter, under penalty of death, are not permitted to escape from the pestilence, in order that their fellow men outside may not be infected. For the prevention of venereal, no such selfish or cruel measure is necessary; harshness to any one even is not required; all that is needed is the cure of diseased public women of cantonments and cities, and the police regulation that they should not live within their precincts, or within a circuit of five miles, unless they were free from disease, and agreed that when they were sick, they should be made well. All wandering tribes, Gipsies, Kolalnees, Nuths, &c., whose women are often of the above character, should (the women I mean) be punished, if they were found nearer than 5 to 10 miles, unless they subjected themselves to the above law. To carry the regulation out, there must be the supervision of the police, and the examination of the women; but, generally, there would be no necessity to institute any hospitals, since at all old stations there are civil hospitals in which these females could be, and are now, cured, whenever they choose to apply for admission. At new cantonments it would be necessary to have a lock hospital.

J. M'Lennan, Esq., M.D.

19th Nov. 1858.

5929. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Is the lock hospital re-established?—I think not; I am not aware of it. The importance of the prevention of venereal is not to be judged from an inspection of returns of deaths, but from an examination of the causes of invaliding contained in unfit rolls; when it will, I think, be found, that of those discharged as unfit, far more owe the causes of their discharge to venereal, and its sequelae, rheumatism and broken down constitutions, than even to tropical disease. It will be found, too, that the majority are, as I have already said, young soldiers, from whom, but for this pest, there would have been a probability of many years of efficient service. There is another matter which I suggest with diffidence: it is the permanent posting or attaching of a zealous and discreet clergyman to each regiment. On the present system of "station chaplains," the reliefs remove soldiers from beneficial influences arising from such men, very often just at the time that they have begun to work the most good. In connection with the subject of "securing the efficiency of troops," I have not alluded to the institution of schools, of libraries, and of savings banks; the improvement of barracks, of married men's quarters, and of hospitals; the institution of sanataria; the formation of play and garden grounds, and of swimming baths; the improvement of canteens; the encouragement of coffee rooms, &c., since much has been, and is now being done on these and other matters. But I may state my opinion, that with the exception of cholera, from 50 to 70 per cent. of the diseases admitted into European hospitals is excited, either directly or indirectly, by spirituous and other liquors, and by syphilis.

5930. (*Chairman.*) Have you formed any opinion upon the third question,—whether it is possible to admit of an exchange?—There does not appear to be much difficulty in consolidating the enlisted men of the European forces; that is, putting them under the same regulations; and if this were done, benefit might accrue to the local army, by such men of that part of the force as were unfitted for tropical service, yet who might (by removal from India, and the voyage home) become able to serve in Europe, and in temperate colonies, being transferred to regiments there serving, and benefit to the State might result if men of the line sent to England for the recovery of their health were not returned to their regiments in India, but so transferred, for not unfrequently they do not retain their health after returning to the tropics. In the case of commissioned officers there would be difficulties, for the terms of engagement and of service in the two forces are different, yet those of the line are less stringent, and, therefore, the officers of the local force would, in these matters, gain by transfer. In reference to pensions, the officers of the local force would, I imagine, suffer by transfer; but the greatest difficulty might possibly arise from the fact that there are military funds in the local service, to which all officers subscribe, in accordance with the terms of their engagement, and no such institutions (so far as I know) exist in the line; but if the officer of the local force, after transfer to the line, could, by continuing his payments, retain his privileges in the funds, or chose to abandon them, then the officer entering the local force from the line would have to make such payments as would entitle him and his family (if he had one) to the benefits of the fund. The difficulties do not appear insurmountable in as far as a change from one service to the other, for once and finally, is concerned; but there would, I apprehend, be greater difficulty in arranging for exchanges frequently from one branch of the force to the other, and back again Such as the difficulties are, however, in the single exchange even, they are matters on which actuaries could decide, and for the determination of which there are in the regulations of the Bombay Military Fund of 1857 (the only fund that I am acquainted with) rules which might be adjusted so as to meet the proposition. The rules to which I refer are, note to Article 2, section 2nd, page 9; article 20, section 2nd, page 15; articles 23, 24, and 25, section 2nd, page 15. An officer, now retiring on Lord Clive's Fund, which is a charitable pension fund for troops in India, is allowed to retain his claims on the military fund, provided he continues his subscription. I presume that all officers of the local force might be in a similar position, continuing to pay. Of course they would not rise in rank.

5931. (*Viscount Melville.*) They would not get the same pay?—Still I think it is only one day's pay monthly.

5932. (*Chairman.*) Will you have the kindness to proceed?—Upon the fourth question, I am of opinion that if the local European force were kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, the objections which I have raised to the recruiting for, and embarkation of, men for that force would be obviated; and speaking as a medical man, this would, I think, be the preferable mode. Volunteering from the line to the Honourable Company's army was formerly permitted; and I have often heard regrets expressed that it had been put a stop to. In 1822 I recollect about 100 men from the 17th dragoons transferring their services to the artillery, and, if I mistake not, likewise from the 65th.

5933. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you think that there is such a thing in India as the acclimation of European troops?—Yes, I think so, if by acclimation you mean a man becoming aware of all that preserves and all that injures health. The old or cautious resident knows it; but I do not know that residence in India gives any immunity from disease. I think that if a man remains long in India, the most healthy breaks down, and that there is a limit to endurance even of the most healthy, the most careful, and the most temperate. I think that they are worn out sooner in India than in Europe.

5934. Do you think that a European soldier on his first arrival from England is in all respects as fit for enduring the hardships, fatigues, and exposures incident to field service in India as a soldier who has been there for some years?—I think not; I think from three to five years is of advantage. I think a good deal depends upon the age at which the man is brought to India; I think none should be brought to field service or to India before the age of 22, if possible. If a man be brought at 22, he is probably after a year or two as fit as he ever will be.

5935. (*Chairman.*) I understand you to say that the change has an effect upon his habits, and not upon his constitution?—By no means; I think there is a great effect upon his constitution, but I do not think that living in the climate of India secures a man against its evils; that is what I understand acclimation to be. I think that a man living in India learns to know what he should avoid, and what he should encourage.

5936. That is to say, his habits are changed?—Yes.

5937. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) His constitution is not acclimatized?—No.

5938. (*Lord Stanley.*) But practically, be the cause what it may, there is no doubt that a much larger mortality will occur among the men of a regiment newly arrived than among men who have been three or four years in the country?—No doubt; therefore I think that the acclimatized man, or so to speak, the man who is careful in these things, should be kept.

5939. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) You mean that there is a moral acclimation, but not a physical one?—Yes, as far as regards the avoidance of various evils, such as exposure to the sun and indulgence in drink, a man knowing that by such imprudence he is likely to suffer from fever or bowel complaint.

5940. Are you of opinion that there is any such thing as the adaptation of the constitution to the climate?—Not, I think, to the degree that is generally supposed; I would not say that there is not a certain proportion, but not at all, I think, to the extent which is generally spoken of. I would mention here that I doubt very much whether men coming from warm

climates, for instance, the Mauritius or Australia, are much better fitted for India than men who are at once landed in India. I think more depends upon the age and the selection of the men than upon that sort of acclimation, beyond learning what to avoid and what to take.

5941. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Do you advocate the issue of beer in lieu of spirits to the soldier?—I certainly do; but I think it would be much better if men would take to water. I think that beer is a lesser evil than arrack.

5942. (*Col. Burlton.*) Do you think that a quart of beer daily to a good healthy soldier would do him any harm?—I am sure it would do myself harm, and I think it would him; I do not think he requires that sort of stimulus.

5943. (*Chairman.*) Would you recommend any alteration in the age at which recruits are enlisted for Indian service, so as not to take them too young?—I think so; I think benefit would be gained if no man were sent to India under 21, or I should say under 22.

5944. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Upon what ground do you rest that opinion?—I think that boys are not able to take care of themselves, and I think that they are poor helpless creatures when sick.

5945. Apart from their want of care, is it not the fact that growing men are more susceptible of disease than men of mature age?—Yes, because I think that many of the diseases of India are repelled by being in high health, and I do not think that a growing lad called on to do the full duties of a soldier can be held to have the same fitness to resist those evils as a grown man.

5946. Hitherto the mass of the European troops in India have been located in the plains, do you think that any great advantage would accrue to health if the mass of the troops were located on the elevated mountain ranges?—A very great advantage.

5947. What are your views upon that subject?—I think the elevated mountain ranges are far better fitted for quartering troops in the way mentioned than as sanitaria. Convalescence may be advanced by removal to the hills, but your plan is the preferable one.

5948. Are you of opinion that if that course were adopted the mortality of the European troops in India would be to a very great extent diminished?—I think it would.

5949. (*Viscount Melville.*) Have you ever been in the Bengal presidency?—No.

5950. Then you do not know the stations on the hills there?—No.

5951. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) You have made no allusion to dress as affecting the health of the troops; will you be good enough to state your opinion as to the best dress for European troops in India?—I think, myself, that all soldiers would be better fitted for service, and for encountering the vicissitudes of temperature, particularly if sent to the hills where the vicissitudes would be far greater than in the plains, if they wore flannel. Perhaps if a soldier had a stock of Crimean shirts, or of that sort of material, it might allow of the cotton shirts being dispensed with as superfluous.

5952. (*Viscount Melville.*) What hill stations would you select in the Bombay presidency?—I think that there are very few; I do not know that you can go much higher than Poonah. I believe that in Bombay there is not much choice over the stations which are there now.

5953. You do not call Poonah a hill station?—It is 2,000 feet above the sea, and it is about as high as you can get in that presidency.

5954. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then you cannot suggest any station in the Bombay presidency which, as regards health, you would prefer to what is occupied now?—No. There are hill forts, there are places where there might be bodies of troops, but I do not know that there would be opportunities for drilling.

5955. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) But there are mountains upon which such stations might be established, are there not?—Yes, on the Deccan, the reverse side of the Ghauts, the quantity of rain falling is about equal to what falls in Poonah.

5956. About what do you consider the most desirable elevation for the health of European troops in India?—I cannot speak of the hill stations of Bengal, some of which are above 4,000 feet high.

5957. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) From 4,000 to 7,000?—I am not acquainted with them.

5958. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) It has been stated before this Commission that in the West Indies about 2,500 feet has been found to be a sufficient elevation to make the troops safe from malaria, which engenders fevers and other diseases?—Poonah is about 2,000 feet above the sea, and there is a good deal of fever there,—there is a good deal of fever in the whole plateau of the Deccan. Therefore what holds in Jamaica, I think, will not hold in India.

5959. You consider the climate of the hills to be much more healthy than the climate of the plains?—Yes.

5960. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Are you not aware that there is a certain elevation which medical men consider to be above the line of fever?—There is; but I do not think that that elevation is attainable in the Bombay presidency, with which I am aquainted; the fever is much less, and there is much less of disease altogether, but there is not a total absence.

5961. What do you regard as that elevation which would almost exclude fever?—I should think 4,000 to 5,000 feet.

5962. (*Col. Burlton.*) If you go much higher than that, do you not get into a region where dysenteric complaints are very prevalent?—I think you do; there has been a good deal of diarrhœa and dysentery in the northern stations of India. Dysentery is most fatal in the cold months even in the plains in India.

5963. (*Chairman.*) I suppose wherever you are, both warm and light clothing would be required for the troops?—I think it might be modified. I think the troops are sometimes too much burthened with their clothes. I think no rule could be laid down for the whole of India, because it is very varied in its circumstances; I think that rules would require to be different for separate districts.

5964. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then how can you arrange about the clothing if the regiments are moved from one part to another?—I suppose it must be done by the authorities on the spot; but a soldier requires different clothes in Bombay from what he does in the Deccan.

5965. Is there any district in India where he could do without the warm clothing?—There may be some districts in Madras, I think, where he could do without the warm clothing.

5966. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) You mean the cold weather clothing?—Yes.

5967. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) With respect to the uniform of European troops, are you of opinion that such articles as Highland bonnets and kilts, shakos, bear-skin caps, stiff leather stocks, &c., are well calculated to promote the health and comfort of European troops in India?—Quite the contrary, I think.

5968. What is the average temperature in the plains in the Bombay presidency in the cold season?—The temperature varies little; I should think it is probably from 70° to 80°.

5969. Say between eight o'clock in the morning and four o'clock in the afternoon?—I think about what I mention, it does not vary much in the plains.

5970. Do you mean 70° to 80° during the twenty-four hours?—In Bombay there is very little difference between the night and the day; there may when a land wind blows be some lowering of the temperature about daylight.

5971. What is the average temperature of the table land at about the elevation which you have mentioned at the same time of the year?—I do not know that the average difference is so very striking as it may be thought, but the fluctuations are considerable; the nights are cold. The evil of the plain I take to be the uniformly high temperature, the

J. M'Lennan, Esq., M.D.
29th Nov. 1858.

wasting effects of unvarying warmth. In the Deccan, I should think much of the disease may be fairly attributable to the difference between the daily and the nightly range. I should suppose that the average temperature of Poonah is probably not more than 4° or 5° less than that of Bombay.

5972. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) In how far is the dress of the sepoy assimilated to the dress of the British soldier in India?—I think that the warm clothing of the sepoy is lighter; the trousers, I think, are lighter. I believe that arrangements have been made regimentally for dispensing with the warm trousers, and to give compensation for them to the sepoy, who is then allowed to provide himself with a lighter material.

5973. Then they wear warm trousers?—Yes; two kinds of trousers.

5974. And do they wear shakos, like the British soldiers?—They wore a cap assimilating to the shako, without a peak; it is of basket-work, it is perhaps lighter than the shako, but equally stiff and unfitted, I think.

5975. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) You are aware probably that of late years that has not been the case in the Bombay army, but that the Bombay sepoy wears only the forage cap?—I am not; I have been away for more than three years.

5976. (*Viscount Melville.*) You do not consider that it would be desirable to do away with cloth clothing for the European troops in India?—No but I think that it should be lighter than it is. I think that much of the clothing of the European is in many stations too warm, and that a thinner material would be advantageous.

5977. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you have it so for all India?—No; India is so varied in its temperature, that it seems to me to be one of the evils in the orders from home that India is viewed as a whole, and that the regulations fitted for one part of the country are misapplied to another. I think that there are stations, probably in Bengal and in the northern parts, (which I do not know myself,) where far warmer clothing would be required than at Bombay and Madras.

5978. To what orders coming from home do you allude?—I allude to the royal army. I suppose that a regiment takes out the same sort of clothing for Madras as for the northern stations of Bengal.

5979. (*Viscount Melville.*) At this time of the year the nights at Poonah are as cold to the feelings as they are here?—To the feelings, but I think not thermometrically.

5980. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) With respect to the police regulations and the lock hospitals, to which you have adverted, do you think that it would be expedient to reintroduce lock hospitals in India?—Certainly; at any stations where they were necessary. I think it absolutely necessary that the extent of the venereal should be checked, and I know of no mode of checking it but by curing the women. They may be called lock hospitals or by any other name; it is only the cure of the disease that I would recommend.

5981. You are aware that lock hospitals were formerly established at all the stations where there were European troops; do you know upon what ground the system was abandoned?—No, I have never been able to learn.

5982. You are not aware then that those hospitals were abolished in consequence of it having been found from statistical returns prepared by the Medical Boards in India that they had been almost, if not entirely, useless in diminishing the disease amongst the European troops?—I cannot myself understand why institutions for the cure of a disease, which is communicated by contact, can ever do otherwise than benefit. I cannot understand why the venereal, if preventive measures were used, might not be eradicated like the plague. They are both diseases of contact.

The witness withdrew.

Colonel Sir A. M. Tulloch, K.C.B.

Colonel Sir ALEXANDER MURRAY TULLOCH, K.C.B., further examined.

5983. (*Chairman.*) You have been requested to give some further information to the Commission upon certain points?—Yes; I was requested to give a comparison of the probable cost of an Indian European regiment and of a regiment of the line, and I herewith submit it, as follows:—

"In the comparison which I have been directed by "General Peel to make between the relative cost of a "Regiment of the Line and a European corps re- "maining permanently in India, the first point to be "considered is the establishment in each case, being—

For the Regiment of the Line, consisting of 950 privates.	For the East India European corps, consisting of 820 privates.
2 Lieutenant-Colonels.	2 Lieutenant-Colonels.
2 Majors.	2 Majors.
10 Captains.	14 Captains.
12 Lieutenants.	22 First-Lieutenants.
8 Ensigns.	10 Second-Lieutenants.

"The establishment of the non-commissioned officers and "drummers is very nearly the same in each case, except that "in the East India corps there are 30 half-pay drummers "who must be taken into account.

"In consequence of the different constitution of the two "corps, there are four captains and ten first and two second- "lieutenants more in the Indian European corps than in the "regiment of the line, who may be assumed to cost,—

4 Captains, 400*l.* a year each -	£1,600
10 Lieutenants, 250*l.* a year - -	2,500
2 Ensigns, 200*l.* a year - - -	400
	£4,500

"But not only is the number of officers "greater in the Indian corps, but the esta- "blishment of privates is fewer in the pro- "portion of 820 to 950.

For which add, say - - -	700
And for 30 half-pay drummers, say -	400
Making -	1,100

I have taken the latter at a very low rate, about 11*l.* per annum for a drummer.

Total annual excess in cost of an Indian European corps - - - -	£5,600

	£
"This extra establishment would in twenty "years (being the minimum period of an "Indian officer's service for full-pay retire- "ment) cost - - - - - - -	112,000
"But each of these officers would, in the "Indian army, have to pay his own passage "out as well as home, whereas in a line regi- "ment the passages of nearly an equal num- "ber would have to be paid for at least "twice by the public, supposing the regi- "ment to be relieved every ten years. For "this it would be necessary to deduct from "the above amount, 34 passages, twice each "way, in all 136 passages at, say, 90*l.* each, "or - - - - - -	12,240
"I have already explained that, under the "operation of the ten years' enlistment Act, "there would not, probably, be more men "to come home at the public expense "from a regiment of the line than from "a local European corps; but even sup- "posing that in the course of 20 years "one-fourth of the strength did so, say "237½ men for passage out and home, the "cost for 475 passages, at 12*l.* each, would "be - - - - - - - -	5,700
"But officers of the line, under the rank "of captain, returning invalided, have their "passages paid out and home; while in the "East Indian army, that is paid from a fund "of their own raising. On this account "add, say two passages, out and home, "per regiment, or four each way annu- "ally, for 20 years, in all 80, at 90*l.* each, "or - - - - - -	7,200
Total deductions - -	£25,140
"Leaving excess of cost in 20 years of an "East Indian European corps beyond a regi- "ment of the line - - - -	£86,860

5984. (*Viscount Melville.*) What do you put down a regiment of the line at?—I do not take a regiment of the line separately, I take the excess. I mean that the cost of the excess of the establishment in the one service as compared with the other is 112,000*l.* in 20 years. The deductions from that are 25,140*l.* leaving a total of 86,860*l.* as the excess of cost in 20 years of an East Indian corps beyond a regiment of the line. I do not take the two regiments separately, because that would involve going into more extended calculations; I merely take the excess in one case over that in the other.

"The expense for pensioning the soldier in the one "service would be almost identical with that in the "other, keeping in view, however, that in future the "Indian Government must necessarily in either case "pay the actual cost of pension, instead of a merely "illusory amount as hitherto, by which the East India "Company has been enabled to throw a very heavy "burden on the Imperial Treasury, which ought for "nearly the last half century to have been borne by the "Indian revenue. I may mention with reference to "this, that the East India Company have been in the "habit of paying 60,000*l.* a year to the British Govern-"ment to cover the pensions of all men sent home "belonging to regiments of the line and placed upon "the pension list, and also for the half-pay of officers. "The amount which ought to have been paid for the "men alone was, when I last made the calculation, as "nearly as possible 210,000*l.* a year.

5985. (*Chairman.*) You having the pensioners under your entire control?—Yes; I was appointed a member of a committee to go into the question about five or six years ago, for the purpose of fixing a larger amount for the Company to pay, more proportioned to what ought to be paid. I do not know for what reason, but the committee received notice that they need not proceed further, and the matter rested there. I at that time made the calculation, and found that about 210,000*l.* was the very smallest sum which would be required to cover the pensions of men sent home from India.

"The retired full pay of the officers in either case "next requires consideration. This, in regiments of "the line, is now attained after a minimum of thirty "years' service, without reference to what portion of it "may have been passed in India. In the Indian Eu-"ropean corps it would be attained as a minimum after "twenty-three years' service, of which twenty must "have been spent in India; but as the service of the "officer of the line in that country, or in other tropical "climates, is rarely, on an average, half as long, "though he has to complete thirty years in all, nearly "as many officers of the line may be expected to "attain a right to the full-pay retirement after that "period as in the Indian army after twenty-three "years. The rank to which they will have attained "in that time would also (setting aside the operation "of purchase) be much the same in both, namely, "that of regimental-major, with a retirement of 16*s.* "a day.

"There is, consequently, not much to influence the "calculation on either side as regards retired full pay; "but it must be kept in view that in the Queen's "service a large proportion, amounting to between a "third and a half of the officers, usually sell their "commissions in preference to accepting retired full "pay, thus leaving nothing to be provided by the "public for their services; but as there is no such "feature in the Indian army, every retirement in "that service involves considerable expense.

"What difference this would make in the ultimate "cost of the two corps under comparison it would be "impossible exactly to say, but no doubt economy "would be greatly in favour of the line regiment on "this account also. At all events the difference would "much more than cover any expense arising from "widows' pensions and compassionate allowances, "which for the line have to be provided at the cost "of the Imperial Treasury, whereas in the Indian army "they are provided by an annual contribution from "each officer.

"So far, then, as it is possible to take all the contin-"gencies into view, there can apparently be no question "that regiments of the line must be the cheapest force "in the end, principally owing to the greater establish-"ment required in the Indian army to meet the faci-"lities which it is necessary to afford officers for re-"turning to Europe from time to time, as they have "no periodical relief."

5986. I see that you charge to the regimental expense the extra officers upon the Indian establishment?—Yes; the number of officers in the East India local corps beyond the officers in a line regiment.

5987. Is not that extra number in order to cover those who are placed upon staff appointments?—That may be so to a certain extent, but it is also, I believe, to cover officers coming home, as they must occasionally. When our officers return, they join and do duty with their depôts, but the East India Company's officers have no depôts to go to. Our officers are available in this country and in India too, as may be required. That constitutes one ground of difference; staff employment may also constitute another; but Queen's regiments provide a certain number of officers for staff appointments as well as the others, though to what extent I cannot exactly say.

5988. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) Would not the fair way of reckoning the cost of a regiment of Her Majesty's service and of a Company's European regiment be, to equalize the number of soldiers and officers in each corps, and then calculate the cost per corps, instead of, as has been done, taking one corps by one strength and another of a different one? The number of officers in a Company's corps is greater, on account of the number of officers taken away for civil employment, and for other general staff situations throughout India, the pay of whom ought not to be charged to the regiment, more especially if it is not drawn for in the corps?—I can only calculate upon what is placed before me, but, as I have already mentioned, we also have officers in various employments, and they would require to be taken out likewise. If it could be said that 14 captains and 22 lieutenants are not required for regimental service, the difference might be taken out of the estimate.

5989. The pay of our officers in civil employment is not drawn for in the regiment at all; it is drawn for in the civil department?—If you can do with a smaller number of officers than regiments of the line, and yet allow your officers to come home, it will be a fair ground for affecting the calculation, but I had placed before me two establishments, and I had to calculate the difference of cost. I applied to ascertain what the establishment was in each case, and I have given the result on that basis.

5990. (*Chairman.*) In any case an increased number of officers compared with the number of men must be proportionately more expensive?—Certainly; but were it possible for an East India Company's European corps to do with fewer officers than there are in a regiment of the line, it would be seen that the officers in the latter were too many, and, of course, you would make a reduction there also.

5991. (*Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) I see that you have mentioned 200*l.* a year for each of the subalterns, but those officers at home on furlough get less pay than you have calculated upon. If those on staff employment alluded to by Colonel Tait are struck off the expense of the regiment, that must also be reduced?—Certainly.

5992. And those at home on English pay of course do not receive the 200*l.* a year which you have calculated for a subaltern, and the 400*l.* or 600*l.* for a captain. If they are at home on furlough they only draw English pay, and of course a proportion of that amount must be struck off?—Yes; but it would be necessary also to strike off precisely in the same way for our own establishment of officers at home. I can only make up the calculation upon the principle that in each case the officers are with their

Colonel Sir A. M. Tulloch, K.C.B.

29th Nov. 1858.

regiments in India, and in each case drawing the allowances of the regiments in India; but if you in the one case reduce the amount in the East India Company's army by taking off the officers who are at home and drawing a less allowance, I must do precisely the same with regard to the regiments of the line.

5993. (*Chairman.*) Have you not excluded the costs of the two depôt companies?—Entirely. I have taken out the two depôts companies; I merely include the establishments for regiments in India in each case.

5994. Ought not the cost of those two depôt companies to be added to the expense of the regiment in India?—In a strict sense it ought, but in so far as I have taken no notice of the recruiting depôts or establishments of the East India Company's service, I do not think it necessary to add the officers of the depôt, but if a very minute calculation be gone into, of course they must be taken too. I only profess to give approximate results.

5995. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Supposing the total number of officers required for civil, staff, and other detached employment in India to be 1,200, what difference can it make to the Indian revenue whether those officers are furnished from line or local regiments, the additional expense must necessarily be incurred?—There are a great number of the civil appointments which probably could be filled at a cheap rate by persons specially brought from this country for the purpose, if they were not given to regimental officers. I cannot be expected to go into the details of such arrangements; but I assume that such might be the case.

5996. At present the establishment of officers in the local regiments is fixed with the view of supplying the requisite number not only for regimental duty, but for all the civil, staff, and other detached appointments in India. Those appointments must be provided for of whatever troops the European force may be composed; how then can its particular composition in any way affect the expense incurred upon that account, seeing that 1,200 officers (supposing that to be the number of such appointments) must necessarily be provided in addition to those required for regimental duty to meet those requirements?—All that leads into considerations far beyond what I should be capable of entering upon. I had merely placed before me two establishments, and I give the results with regard to those establishments. As General Peel has remarked, I have left out the depôt companies, which I should be fairly entitled to add, and I have not left out officers away from India. I am supposing every officer to be present with his regiment. If any deduction ought to be made for those items to which you allude, I should be very glad to have it done more minutely; but I have no means of doing it, otherwise than on general principles, and I think that the one change would very nearly counterbalance the other.

5997. Still, as I understand in your estimate of the comparative expense of a line and local regiment you have counted against the latter the entire expense of those 1,200 officers on civil, staff or other detached employment?—Yes, either on staff or other employment.

5998. You do not mean to say that the line army has had 1,200 or 400, or 100, officers on staff or other detached employment in India?—I cannot say with regard to the number, but I understood that they were to have the same privileges with regard to the staff as others.

5999. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Your evidence relates to the future?—Yes.

6000. You are aware that the Queen's officers have had no staff appointments in India, excepting a few connected with Queen's troops?—Yes.

6001. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Regarded prospectively there is no reason, is there, setting aside the 1,200 officers required for detached employment, why the establishment of officers for a local regiment should be greater than that for a line one?—No; but you must always include in the calculation more officers than in Her Majesty's service, because you have to send a number of officers home on furlough and sick leave, and you would otherwise have no one to replace them.

6002. Is not that the case in the regiments of the line?—No; when an officer comes home we replace him from the depôt, and the officer coming home goes to the depôt. That has been especially done of late, when there have been facilities for sending them out overland. If you refer to the returns you will see that the army is thus kept very complete in officers now.

6003. Does not that show that for officers on sick leave you keep up two officers to do the duty when the Company only keep up one?—No, not at all; those officers at the depôts are doing duty at the depôts as other officers of Her Majesty's service; they form a part of the army of this country, and could be called upon if wanted; and when they leave to go out to India, except during the month when they are upon the passage, they are available as officers. The officers of the Company's army come home, and for three years, and sometimes for four, they are lost to the service. That is the great basis of the difference between the two services in this respect.

6004. Still regarding it merely as a matter of comparative expense, as the places of absentees on furlough or sick leave from line regiments are supplied, and the places of such absentees from local regiments are not supplied, surely the Government of India must incur a greater expense on that account for line than for local regiments?—If you are going to have European regiments out there, you must keep a proper number of officers with those regiments; and whatever number you keep and can do military duty with, the Queen's army can do with the same, or perhaps with fewer.

6005. If an officer of a line regiment falls sick, and if, instead of returning to Europe, he proceed, on leave of absence, to Simla or the Neilgherries, or any hill station in India, is his place supplied?—No.

6006. Why, then, should it be necessary to supply the place of an officer who comes to England?—Because in the one place he is within call of his regiment, and if you have any great emergency and he is able to do duty, he can return at once.

6007. If he is sick he is not efficient for duty; of what use could he be with his regiment?—That is true; but it is so with your officers also.

6008. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is it not the case that with officers sent to the hills they are not considered sufficiently sick to send them to Europe, and they will rejoin much sooner than officers sent to Europe?—There can be no question of it.

6009. (*Chairman.*) You say that the increased number of men must be considered as in favour of the line regiments?—That is to say, that though we have 34 regimental officers for 950 privates, an Indian European corps has only 820, and a larger number of officers.

6010. Therefore if you add the depôts, you must also add that additional number of men?—Yes, it might be made perfectly clear, I apprehend, by this fact, that whatever number of officers an Indian local corps can do with, a regiment of the line can do with the same; therefore, any deduction made in the one case would lead to a corresponding deduction in the other.

6011. Is there any other point upon which you have any information to give to the Commission?—The adjutant-general asked me whether I had made any calculation of the expense of the rations by the Red Sea route, and the expense of transit; I promised on the last occasion to prepare a statement more in detail than I had been able to give of the cost.

"EXPLANATION respecting the relative Cost of Cape "and Red Sea Routes for Relief of Troops in "India.

"In the calculations submitted with my evidence, I "did not enter into the cost which would probably be

Colonel Sir A. M. Tulloch, K.C.B.

29th Nov. 1858.

" incurred for the transit of the troops by rail through " Egypt, should the overland route be adopted, nor " for the cost of subsistence on shipboard by that " route ; but as the adjutant-general wished me to " make some further calculations on that head, they " will be found as under.

" The chief cost of transit hitherto both for officers " and soldiers between Alexandria and Suez, has " arisen from the railway not being completed, and " the consequent necessity for having separate con- " veyances a considerable part of the way, also from " the soldier having to be fed for a day or two ; but " next month that difficulty will be over, when there " will be no reason for a higher charge for transit " from sea to sea than on any other railway. The " charge was, I believe, at first 5*l.* per man, then, as " the railway advanced, it was reduced to 3*l.*, and " ultimately it will, I have little doubt, be at the usual " rate of 1*d.* a mile for soldiers, and from 2*d.* to 3*d.* " for officers, say about 1*l.* for the former, and 2*l.* for " the latter, for the whole distance of 216 miles.

" The distance will be got over, even at the slowest " rate of railway travelling, in about ten hours, and, " if possible, it should be at night, to avoid the heat, " consequently there would be no necessity for sup- " plies till the troops get on board, when breakfast " would be waiting for them.

" The cost of provisions per man on the voyage " has, I observe, in most of the estimates, been the " subject of miscalculation ; 1*s.* 3*d.* a day being stated " as the probable amount, but by the annexed return " of the cost of provisioning troops on shipboard ac- " cording to the prices paid by the Admiralty, I find " that it is only about $8\frac{3}{10}d.$ a day, of which 6*d.* is " stopped from the soldier, leaving a charge of only " $2\frac{3}{10}d.$ a day to be borne by the public, which for, " say, 30 days voyage is but 5*s.* 9*d.* per man. I may " add that in the statement of the cost of the rations " on shipboard there has been included all the ex- " pense of package, and everything of that sort ; 5 " per cent. has been added for that purpose, the real " cost is only about 8*d.* The return is an official one " signed by Mr. Richards.

" The officers, as in all troop ships, would be " messed at the rate of 7*s.* 6*d.* a day, of which the " public pays 4*s.*, and the officer, from his pay, 3*s.* 6*d.* ; " the former rate, for 30 days, would amount to 6*l.* " So that all the charge against the public for pro- " visions by that route would be 5*s.* 9*d.* per man on " 29,600 passages, or about 8,510*l.* ; and for 920 " officers at 6*l.* each, 5,520*l.* ; being for both 14,030*l.*

" The relative advantages, in a financial point of " view, of the two passages, will therefore be,—

" *By the Cape.*

	£
" Passage for 29,600 men, including pro- " visions	355,200
" Passage for 920 officers	82,800
" Loss of pay without serving during a " four months' voyage	282,410
"	£720,410

" *By the Red Sea.*

	£
" Costs of troop-ships annually for pas- " sage, including coals	151,800
" Railway fares for 29,700 men, at 1*l.* " each	29,700
" Provisions for men, less stoppage	8,510
" Provisions for 920 officers, less stop- " page	5,520
" Railway fares for 920 officers, at 2*l.* " each	1,840
" Loss of pay, without service, during a " month's voyage	70,602
"	£267,972

" Being from one-half to one-third of the cost by the " other route, to say nothing of the advantage of " having the men three months sooner in India to " meet any emergency which might occur there,—a " consideration beyond all price. Another advantage, " too, in the shorter route is, that owing to the limited " duration of the voyage, neither officer nor man would " require any outfit, which, for the route by the Cape, " always entails considerable expense on both.

" In this calculation, as well as in my previous evi- " dence, I have not carried the estimated expense of " the voyage beyond Bombay, because the progress " of railways will, in the course of next year, have " so far facilitated the conveyance to Madras and to " most of the up-country stations in Bengal, that it " will probably be a quicker and more convenient " route to proceed from Bombay by railway, so far as " completed, and march the rest of the way.

" I have detailed maps here of the progress of the " railways in India, if you wish to see them.

" In calculations of this kind it is admissible to " look forward a year or two, and there can be no " reasonable doubt that by that time the necessity for " distant voyages in India will have greatly, if not " altogether, ceased. It is, indeed, a striking coinci- " dence in the march of events, that just at the time " when it seemed probable that our rule in India could " only be maintained by a vast accession of European " troops, frequently relieved and maintained in the " highest state of efficiency, the progress of the rail- " ways in India is about to solve the difficulty which " must otherwise have arisen in attaining that im- " portant object. It is no less remarkable that at the " very period when the reliance hitherto placed on " our native army has been destroyed, the facilities " of transit from one part of India to another by " rail are fast rendering us, in a great measure, in- " dependent of such a force. Before two or three " years have elapsed, nearly every military station of " importance in that country will have been brought " within a day's journey of each other ; the necessity " for keeping thousands of native troops constantly " on the march escorting stores and treasure over " that immense territory will have, in a great measure, " ceased ; and if we keep the large force of Europeans " in India which is proposed, I know of no other " purpose for which native troops can be wanted ex- " cept (as in our colonies) to garrison places which " are too unhealthy for Europeans."

STATEMENT of the Value of a Soldier's Rations on board Ship, according to the Scale of May 1, 1858.

Article.	Allowance for 100 Men for 28 days.	Latest Prices.	Total Cost.	Cost per Man per Day.
		£ s. d.	£ s. d.	
Biscuits	2,800 lbs.	0 16 6 per cwt.	20 12 6	
Spirits	44 galls.	0 2 0 „ gall.	4 8 0	
Sugar	218 lbs.	30 15 0 „ ton.	2 19 10	
Chocolate	116 „	4 1 2 „ cwt.	4 4 0	
Tea	44 „	0 1 0 „ lb.	2 4 0	
Oatmeal	8 galls.	17 2 8 „ ton	0 6 6	
Mustard	8 lbs.	3 19 7 „ cwt.	0 5 8	
Pepper	4 „	50 0 0 „ ton	0 1 9	
Vinegar	8 galls.	0 0 11 „ gall.	0 7 4	
Salt Pork	1,050 lbs.	7 11 6 „ tierce	24 17 1	
Salt Beef	1,050 „	6 15 2 „ tierce	23 6 9	
Pease	39 galls.	2 19 0 „ qr.	1 16 0	
Flour	525 lbs.	2 5 9 „ sack	4 5 9	
Suet	44 „	0 0 7 „ lb.	1 5 8	
Raisins	88 „	42 0 0 „ ton	1 13 0	
			£92 13 10	
Add 5 per cent. for packages, &c.			4 12 8	
			£97 6 6	$8\frac{1}{10}d.$

N.B.—The calculation has been made for a month, instead of a week, in order to avoid loss by fractions.

(Signed) CHARLES RICHARDS.

6012. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) What has been the average annual cost to the State of retiring pensions for the commissioned officers of the East India Company's service ?—I cannot say, and if I could, it would not avail the comparison, I think.

6013. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) With reference to the question just put, the explanation which you have given in your paper, or which you have given verbally, is to this effect, that whereas there is considerable expenditure on the retirement of officers from the East India Company's service, there is comparatively

Colonel Sir A. M. Tulloch, K.C.B.

29th Nov. 1858.

a trifling expenditure on account of officers of the line service, because they do not retire?—Certainly; the effect of purchase is to provide for half, at any rate, if not more of your officers without costing the public anything.

6014. (*Viscount Melville.*) Have you no return which will show what, in common parlance, is called the dead weight of the military establishment with us, and the dead weight of the East India Company's establishment?—Yes, I have here a statement of what the aggregate cost of the retirement of the officers in the one service and in the other was at two different periods, which may be useful for the conclusions in view. I find that in the East India Company's army the number of officers on retired full-pay in 1829 was 207, and the amount was 62,919*l.*; but in 1857, 28 years afterwards, there were 730 upon retired full-pay, and the amount was 218,000*l.* The number of officers of the East India Company's army on half-pay in 1829 was 247, and the amount was 26,818*l.*; and in 1857 there were 404 upon half-pay, and the amount was 41,478*l.* There was, consequently, an increase in the retired full-pay of more than treble between 1829 and 1857. I will now give the state of the retired full-pay in our own army at these periods. In 1829, the number of officers on retired full-pay was 724, and the amount 109,000*l.*; and in 1857 it was reduced to 238 officers, and 57,000*l.*; thus showing that the numbers in our army had been reduced to one-third of their previous amount in the same period that they had trebled in the East India Company's army. It is necessary, also, to look at the half-pay. In 1829, the number on half-pay of our infantry and cavalry and of the household troops was 6,180, and the total amount paid was 590,549*l.*; but the number in 1857 was 2,102, and the amount paid was only 247,000*l.* So that while in the East India Company's army the number has nearly doubled, in the other army it had been reduced to one-third of its previous number.

6015. (*Col. Burlton.*) That proceeds, I suppose, upon there having been a state of peace here and war there during the interval?—That, I may say, has nothing to do with it. The events of the Crimean war had very little effect upon it.

6016. Can you tell us what is the annual amount received for the sale of commissions in Her Majesty's service, of all branches, household troops, cavalry and infantry?—I cannot, but General Yorke made a calculation of the value of all the commissions in the army, and it was about 7,000,000*l.*

6017. I refer to the amount actually received yearly by purchases—young officers purchasing commissions?—It would be very difficult to say.

6018. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) It must depend very much upon the number which come in every year?—Yes.

6019. (*Col. Burlton.*) You are aware that in the East India Company's service nothing is received on that account?—There is nothing; but in our service 100 commissions were sold by Mr. Sidney Herbert about two years ago, during the Crimean war. He found that he had a great many commissions to give away, and he thought it better to make a little money of them for the benefit of the public. He took the prices, and he commuted a number of old lieutenants upon the half-pay list, who were not in a condition to serve.

6020. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) In your former evidence you stated your opinion that troops of the line would be more efficient than local troops, "because as "a body they are likely to be less debilitated by long "residence in India." As recruits for the local army and recruits for the line are now enlisted for only ten years, and it may be assumed that the numbers re-enlisted into local regiments and re-enlisted or received by volunteering into regiments of the line for further service in India, would be equal, why should the local army as a body be more debilitated by long residence than the other?—If you keep them for precisely the same time I see no reason whatever for any difference; but it would depend in a great measure upon the stations where you posted them.

6021. I mean, that as recruits for both services are enlisted for ten years only, why should a local regiment be more debilitated from long residence in that country than a line regiment?—Because you contemplated, as I understood, the men remaining longer in India than regiments of the line. I think you will find that the questions led to that. You conceived that although the men might come home after ten years' service, they would not do so, but would remain in the Company's army, whereas in a European regiment that would not be the case. My position was, that if they remained they would be much more debilitated than the troops who went out fresh from this country. That was the view which I intended to give. I may here mention that a question was put to me upon that subject during the examination by one of the Commissioners, who stated that the men of the East India Company's European regiments very seldom came home. Now, it is my duty to pay them when they come home; and since I was examined I have obtained exact returns of 2,870 who are in this country. The number of those in the colonies I cannot get so readily without going into the commissariat returns.

6022. Do your returns show the number of those who are pensioned after completing 21 years' service?—I suppose from the rates of those men's pension, that almost all of them have been pensioned after 21 years' service. I can get at the information, but it would require a great deal of detail. Most of the men who come home from the East India Company's service are pensioned after 21 years' service.

6023. Can you state from memory about what is the average number of men of the Company's army who are pensioned after 21 years' service?—I should say very nearly the whole of those 3,000.

6024. But those, I understand, have been pensioned during a long series of years?—Yes; they have been coming home for a long series of years.

6025. Do you know the average number who come annually?—I cannot exactly say, for they vary so very much. In some years you have a great deal of invaliding, and send home a number of men, or the men are more disposed to come home. What I have stated, however, will be sufficient to show that the idea is very fallacious that men who enlist in the East India Company's army generally remain in India. Many, I know, remained there in former days, when you had only 12,000 men, and were able to give away a great number of good appointments to the non-commissioned officers, if they did remain; but there will not be that inducement when you have a force of 80,000 men, and the majority will come home in consequence. These men have hitherto remained in India for the same reasons that the soldiers of the line come home, viz., in the hope of getting some employment or appointment here, and I am glad to say that we do get appointments for thousands of them.

6026. Does your return show what proportion of the number who have come home pensioned after 21 years' service were pensioned from their regiments?—They are all from the European regiments; they are all men who have served in the East India Company's army, and in that army only.

6027. Does it show separately the number of men pensioned after 21 years' actual regimental service; and of these pensioned after the same period of service, but on departmental or other detached employment?—No; because the 3,000 men that I have under my charge do not include the men in India who are pensioned there; they are merely the men whom I pay in this country.

6028. But, as I understand you, of the men included in your return, some were pensioned whilst with their regiments, and some whilst on detached employment?—I do not know how they were pensioned; they came home to me with instructions from the East

India Company that they were to be paid a certain amount as pension.

6029. (*Chairman.*) They are military pensioners?—Yes.

6030. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) It includes all?—Yes.

6031. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But it does not follow that there are any of them who are pensioned from civil employment?—No.

6032. (*Chairman.*) Are the terms and amount of pension the same in what was the Company's service as in the line?—Nearly so; and, therefore, it must be military service for which these men were pensioned; besides, as we have the power of calling out those men for training the same as the pensioners of the line, I should very soon have noticed if they did not know anything about their duty.

6033. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Still you are aware that men of the East India Company's army attached to the Ordnance and other departments and on other detached employment are entitled to pensions; and that all such service counts as military service?—Yes; and it is the same in our service.

6034. Of course then there must be many men of that class among the pensioners in Europe borne upon your return?—From the Ordnance, I have no doubt of it.

6035. You have advanced as a strong reason for the employment of troops of the line in India in preference to a local army, "that the loss in line regi- "ments by deaths resulting from disease while "serving there must generally be less (if relieved "every ten years) than that in local regiments, be- "cause the former, as a body, would be composed of "younger men." As line regiments on embarking for India are composed, like the local regiments, of men varying in age from 18 to 40 and upwards, will you explain in what manner the periodical relief of the former would alter the comparative average of all ages in the two forces?—You are aware that when a regiment is about to embark for a foreign station, such as in India, you have, in the first place, a great number of men discharged from it, who are not likely to serve efficiently in India, and they are replaced by recruits. Then, a second class, who are not likely to be very efficient in India, are left at the depôt; so that when you embark a regiment for India you embark a body of almost new men, who have served, upon the average, perhaps only two or three years. I should think that at this moment, if you take the returns of any of the regiments now embarked for India, you will find the average service not more than three years.

6036. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) A regiment gets weeded?—Yes, before it goes to India.

6037. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) The mortality among European soldiers above thirty years of age is shown by the returns which you have furnished to be much greater in India in proportion to deaths below that age than in England. Coupling with this fact that of recruits for the local army being now enlisted for only ten years, does it not follow that there would be a greater number of men above thirty in regiments of the line on their first arrival in India, and for some years afterwards, than in local regiments?—No; I think that in almost every regiment which has gone out to India that I have known anything about, you will find comparatively few men of thirty years of age. A regiment goes a round of service, say, to the Mediterranean, to the West Indies, to America, and then comes home. In America, a great number of the men desert, I am sorry to say, and a great number of them accept their discharges free, having served a certain time, and a number purchase their discharges. When a regiment comes home, what with the casualties which have taken place in the West Indies, and all those changes, it probably only brings home about 300 or 400 men; then commences the recruiting; the additional 700 are perhaps men of merely two or three years' standing; and when an order for India comes, a number of the older men leave the regiment, and many want free discharges, having served their time. In that way a regiment going out to India would have very few men of 30 years of age; they are almost all young men of from 18 to 25 years of age.

6038. Assuming the casualties amongst the line and local troops in India to be equal in proportion to numbers, and the rates of bounty and levy money to the recruit to be the same in both services, the expense to the Government of the drafts sent to India to supply casualties would be the same, would it not, whether for the line or the local army?—It would be the same, provided the men belonging to the Indian European corps were to come home at the end of ten years. Perhaps I do not exactly understand the question.

6038 a. Assuming the casualties amongst the line and local troops in India to be equal in proportion to numbers, and the rates of bounty and levy money to the recruit to be the same in both services, the expense to the Government of the drafts sent to India to supply casualties would be the same, would it not, whether for the line or local army?—It would be much about the same; I do not see where the difference between the two would be.

6039. Does not it follow that if relieved periodically, as you have recommended, the Government would incur, on the completion by each line regiment of its ten years' term, the additional expense of the passage of a relieving regiment to India and of the relieved regiment to England (minus only the men permitted to volunteer from the latter into the regiments in India), and that the whole of this expense would be saved by having local instead of line regiments?—No, I do not admit that, because if there were line regiments entirely, any man who wanted to remain in India might do so by merely transferring his service to the regiment which is to remain in India; in your local European corps he would have precisely the same advantage of transferring his services if he thought proper; and my impression is, and the calculations which I have made are principally founded upon the assumption, that of those men who enlist for ten years' service the greater proportion will be disposed, as they will be in regiments of the line, to return home.

6040. Still the expense arising to the Government from drafts sent to India to supply casualties, is quite a distinct charge from the expense incurred by sending out entire regiments and bringing home entire regiments, is it not?—Yes.

6041. All that expense, then, is additional?—No; that would be to assume that none of your men who enlist for ten years come home at all; but if the men in your local European regiment want to come home, the expense will be as great in bringing them home as in regiments of the line; it is only if they are more disposed to remain in India than men of the line regiments that there will be less expense.

6042. As men enlist for ten years in both services, the men in each service who wish to come home will come home—he Government cannot prevent it?—Just so.

6043. But is it not an extra expense altogether, bringing home regiments, whether they wish it or not, and sending out other regiments to replace them?—If that takes place every ten years I cannot see that there is a greater expense, supposing those enlisting in the local European army wish to come home at the end of ten years. There is this difference, however, that in our regiments of the line which are brought home there may be some men who have not completed their ten years' service, in which case you would be bringing away men of the line who had only served five or six years in India, having gone out to replace casualties, whereas in your Indian European regiment a man must have served the whole time before he returns home. I presume that that is what you are aiming at.

6044. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) You are quite aware that when a regiment is brought home from

Colonel Sir A. M. Tulloch, K.C.B.

9th Nov. 1858.

India all the efficient men are allowed to volunteer into another regiment ?—Yes.

6045. And that the regiment comes home a perfect skeleton, whereas a perfect regiment goes out, and a similar process is carried on at each successive stage ?—Yes, I am quite aware of that.

6046. (*Major-General Hancock.*) But you have given it as your opinion, have you not, that the system of encouraging volunteering for further service in India when a regiment is ordered home is a wrong one, and ought not to be continued; that on the assumption that long residence in India leads to moral and physical deterioration, it would be a great perversion of reasoning for the Government to tempt men by the offer of bounty money to remain in India beyond 10 years? — Yes, if you fix ten years I should allow all men who had not completed ten years' service to volunteer if they chose to remain in India, but having completed ten years I think their coming home should be facilitated.

6047. When a regiment of the line is ordered home is it not optional with the authorities to allow the men to volunteer into regiments remaining in India?—I cannot say what is the present rule in India; great alterations have been made from time to time in the arrangements with respect to volunteering since I left India.

6048. Still when a regiment is ordered home, men who have served very short periods as well as those who have served longer periods in India come home with it ?—No doubt.

6049. Then, of course, the Indian Government loses the advantage of having service for the full period of ten years in India from many soldiers of regiments of the line, which is secured to it from every soldier in local regiments, for which they have their local recruits ?—Yes, but that is, I think, a very small element in the calculation.

6050. As line regiments on embarking for India are composed of men whose periods of service vary from one to ten years, and those embarked for the local army are all recruits, does it not follow that by having line regiments the Government would incur a considerable additional expense during their ten years' term in having to send home, and to supply the places of numerous time-expired soldiers after very short periods of service in India, and that this additional expense would be saved by having entirely a local army ?—From what I have already told you in regard to the condition of a regiment in respect of age when it goes out to India, there cannot be much of that. About three years is the average service of those men; the regiment is almost entirely composed of recruits. If it was a very old regiment, what you have mentioned should no doubt enter into consideration. But there is a regulation which prevents men being sent out whose time will soon expire, they remain at the depôt.

6051. Dr. Martin in his evidence made the following statement: "It is stated by Colonel Sir Alexander "Tulloch, as the result of investigations in the War "Office, made by desire of Mr. Sidney Herbert, that "amongst British officers and soldiers of the Queen's "and Company's armies serving in the East Indies "there occurred from 1815 to 1855 inclusive, a total "mortality, exclusive of casualties, of about 100,000 "men, 'the greater proportion of whose lives might "'have been saved had better localities been selected "'for military occupation in that country.'" Is that a correct extract ?—It is nearly correct as regards the number, but it includes the whole of the regiments of the line, and the men of the local European corps belonging to the East India Company, and all the different employés of various kinds—of all Europeans serving in any public capacity in India—about 100,000 died in that time. I have shown in the returns with my previous evidence 55,586 deaths from the regiments of the line alone between 1817 and 1856, and I think you will find that in the course of that time there were about 30,000 deaths of the European forces in India belonging to the East India Company; the officers have also to be included, and various persons holding appointments in India, which will, I think, very nearly make up the number.

6052. On the whole you believe that number, viz. 100,000 men to be a correct statement of the amount of actual mortality during the period specified ?—Yes, taking the whole of our employés in India. The total loss is 100,000, and my statement is, that the greater proportion of that loss would have been saved had the men been in healthy localities.

6053. (*Sir Harry G. W. Smith.*) That is your opinion ?—Yes; it is my opinion from the returns which I have given of the small mortality at some stations. You have in India high lands where the climate is very nearly the same as that of Britain. Take Bangalore, for instance, I have a return for forty years, and in the course of the forty years you only lost about 28 per 1,000, or $2\frac{8}{10}$ per cent., including all the men who went there in bad health from other stations. Therefore I think it is a perfectly fair conclusion that if you had had no men going there in bad health, but had men newly arrived from England at Bangalore, you would not have had a mortality of above $1\frac{3}{4}$ per cent., which is the loss now in London.

6054. (*Colonel Forsyth Tait.*) The height of Bangalore is about 2,800 feet above the sea, is it not ?—Yes.

6055. (*Major-General Hancock.*) Are there any statistical returns shewing that the mortality in India is smaller at the Hill Stations than in the plains, or do you rest your opinion only upon the experience in the West Indies ?—Not upon the experience in the West Indies alone. I have stated to you a number of healthy stations in the high grounds; Poonah, for instance, which is also at a very considerable elevation.

6056. 2,000 feet ?—Yes; there your loss is 33 per 1,000, inclusive of the regiments sent there in bad health. There is Kirkee, also, where upon an average of fourteen years you have only lost $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., that is healthier, comparatively speaking, than England, when you consider that you have many men going there from other stations in bad health.

6057. Do you mean that when located upon table lands elevated about 2,000 feet above the level of the sea, like Poonah and Kirkee, the health of European troops in India is equal or nearly equal to that of troops in England ?—Provided you do not send men in bad health there; provided you do not send a regiment almost decimated at another station to any of those places where the diseases contracted elsewhere terminate fatally, and add to the mortality.

6058. In so far as statistics may be depended upon, then, they appear to you to justify the conclusion that if located at hill stations elevated from 2,000 to 3,000 feet above the level of the sea, and in good health when sent there, the general health of European troops in India, would be equal to that of the troops in England ?—That is my impression; and the great advantage is that you have such places in which to put your troops, or the great majority of them, and you will shortly have railways to bring them down whenever you wish it.

6059. (*Viscount Melville.*) Those hill stations in Bengal have not proved so healthy ?—Those which are far up in the hills, at 8,000 or 9,000 feet of an elevation, are less healthy than was expected, because the men suffer from what is called a hill diarrhœa, which reduces them very much indeed; but the stations at the height of 2,800 feet or thereabouts seem to be healthy.

The witness withdrew.

Adjourned to To-morrow at eleven o'clock.

Tuesday, 30th November 1858.

PRESENT :

Major-General PEEL.
H.R.H. the Duke of CAMBRIDGE.
Lord STANLEY.
Marquess of TWEEDDALE.
Viscount MELVILLE.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir HARRY G. W. SMITH.
Major-Gen. MONTGOMERIE.
Major-Gen. HANCOCK.
Colonel BURLTON.
Colonel FORSYTH TAIT.

MAJOR-GEN. PEEL IN THE CHAIR.

JOHN POLLARD WILLOUGHBY, Esq., examined.

John Pollard Willoughby, Esq.
30th Nov. 1858

6060. (*Chairman.*) You are a member of the Council of India?—Yes.

6061. You formerly belonged to the Bombay civil service?—Yes.

6062. Will you have the kindness to state to the Commission the length of time that you were in India?—I arrived in India on the 10th of February 1819, and left it on the 3rd of May 1851. I served in India continuously without a furlough for a little more than 32 years.

6063. You have been a member of the Council of the government of Bombay?—Yes; I was for some years secretary to the government, and afterwards a member of the government.

6064. You have been furnished by the Commission with some questions upon which they desire your opinion?—I have.

6065. Will you favour the Commission with your opinion how far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as parts of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only?—The forces in India should, in my opinion, be partly local and partly of the line. It is, in my opinion, essential that the chief portion of those forces should be local. Opinions will vary as to the proportion, but I should say three-fifths for the cavalry and infantry, and the whole, or at least three-fourths for the artillery. I consider a local force essential to the safety of India; it will be far less expensive, and, judging by past experience, equally efficient. On this point I think there can be no doubt the expenses of the transport of troops to and from India, but more especially from India, are very heavy; the officers alone of a single regiment for both voyages cost, I believe, between 11,000*l.* and 12,000*l.*; the finances of India could not bear a continuous pressure of this kind, but it must be incurred if the European force required for the security of India is to be supplied wholly or in great part from the army in England. I consider it absolutely necessary that the supreme control of Her Majesty's forces in India should be vested in the Governor-General and not in any authority in this country; I mean as regards their distribution, employment, and filling up vacancies in the staff, which are at present divided between the Governor-General and the Commander-in-chief in India in Council, and the governors and commanders in-chief of the subordinate presidencies. This is not the time for diminishing but rather, if possible, for increasing the powers of the Governor-General. We should not treat India as a colony but as a distinct empire, the beneficial retention of which has been rendered far more difficult than ever by the recent calamitous events. The existence of two distinct forces excites a wholesome emulation, some may call it jealousy, in which I do not agree generally, though at times such a feeling may have been partially evinced; but if both forces are justly and impartially administered there will be no cause for this feeling. If the force were composed wholly of the line it would be liable to be re-called, in fact, to be diminished whenever any pressing emergency occurred at home. During the Crimean war we know that two regiments of infantry were withdrawn, against the strongly expressed opinion of Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General, who declared that the European force at his disposal ought not to be weakened by the withdrawal of a single soldier. Such, I should fear, would always happen, if India came to be solely dependent on England for the troops essential to her security. The opinions of the local authority will probably be overruled, emergencies and requirements on the spot, that is to say in England, will take precedence; those at a distance, namely in India, will be underestimated and not correctly appreciated or understood, not intentionally but from want of correct knowledge. I attach also the greatest importance to having in India a large European force which has been acclimatized. The mortality which occurs in regiments of the line shortly after their arrival in India is sometimes dreadful. In considering also the question of a European force for India, and whether it should be in great part a local force, or wholly furnished from the line, it is important to remember that there must of necessity always be a local native army of considerable strength, to be officered and commanded by British officers, whose *morale* will be much dependent upon their being associated with officers of a European force serving on the same terms and conditions. If they were to be the only officers condemned or rather compelled to serve all their lives in India, whilst officers of the European force were all removable for service in other quarters of the globe, they would probably look upon themselves as inferior, and would become a deteriorated body and discontented with their lot in life; whereas, if, as at present, the officers of the native army continue to be part and parcel of the whole force belonging to India, and eligible as now to the command of European regiments, they would continue to regard themselves as on an equality with their brother officers, and would therefore maintain that self respect which is so essential to a high state of efficiency. Lastly, there is a great *constitutional* question connected with this subject, into which I need not enter, but it must occur to every one.

6066. Have you formed any opinion as to the amount of European force which will be required in India?—I should say that that is a question which can only be solved in India, and it depends so much also upon the success which may attend the efforts now being made to reorganize the native armies in India and police forces. It is impossible that you can do without a native army of some kind; you never could attempt to keep India by European troops alone.

6067. Do you suppose that the amount of European troops depends upon the amount of the native army; that it is required to keep up a certain number of European troops in proportion to the native army?—I should certainly say that we ought to be more careful of the proportion than we hitherto have been, that is to say, we have learnt a lesson by the native army of Bengal having taken their opportunity when our European forces were weak to try and obtain the mastery. We should endeavour by all means in our power to prevent giving them such an opportunity again, by keeping a larger proportion of Europeans than we have hitherto had.

6068. Then you contemplate the necessity of keeping a large local European army in India?—Partly local and partly of the line.

6069. That would make a large local European force?—Yes.

6070. Where do you propose to recruit that force?—In England.

John Pollard Willoughby, Esq.

30th Nov. 1858.

6071. Do you not suppose that great inconvenience might arise to the imperial Government by having a large portion of troops raised in England, of which you would have no power to make use in case of emergency?—That arises from our peculiar position in India. The imperial interests are, I conceive, as much involved in the safety and security of India as in any other part of the Empire. There may be, of course, a difficulty in obtaining the number of recruits required both for home and for foreign purposes, but whether the troops are furnished from the line or from a local force they must be recruited from England.

6072. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would not one system of recruiting be more easily conducted than a double system of recruiting?—I am not prepared to admit that, because hitherto there have been two separate recruiting establishments not acting in competition with each other, because they are both under the orders and instructions of the same authority, namely, the Commander-in-chief in England.

6073. (*Chairman.*) What do you suppose is the origin of the restriction of the number of European troops to be employed in India by the East India Company?—I really do not know what the origin is; but I believe that it is a well-known fact that the East India Company were always anxious to increase their European forces, but could not obtain assent to it, and when assent was obtained, it was always grudgingly given. I beg to refer the Commission to a correspondence which occurred on this subject in 1814, and more particularly to a letter from the Court of Directors, dated the 15th September 1814, in which the urgent necessity of always having in India a local European force is very strongly and ably argued This necessity has, in my opinion, much increased since those days.

6074. From whom?—In this country.

6075. When was the last increase authorized?—In 1853. Our limit up to 1853 was 12,200 infantry in India, and 2,000, I think, in this country. An application had been made to make an increase by three European regiments, and the minister of the day, instead of taking merely the number that was applied for, gave a margin, and it was increased to 20,000 in India, and 4,000 in this country.

6076. Notwithstanding the great anxiety of the East India Company to raise those troops, did they ever raise them?—No; but why? The Court of Directors of their own authority had not the power to take advantage of that margin. They had, first of all, to apply to the President of the Board of Control, and get his consent, and the President of the Board of Control could not give his consent without the consent of Her Majesty's Government.

6077. Was the power to raise troops ever refused by Her Majesty's Government?—It was refused very recently. On the 19th of May 1857 the Governor-General applied for permission to raise three regiments. That was refused on two occasions; we have not obtained assent up to this time. We applied on the 9th July, and again on the 23rd July 1857, for permission to raise three European regiments, on the urgent requisition of the Governor of India, to replace six of the native regiments that had joined in the mutiny, but leave was refused in August.

6078. What is now the amount in numbers of the local European troops?—I believe that at about the time of the mutiny there were 14,400 odd.

6079. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The local troops which have hitherto existed have only been a small body. Do you not think that there would be a very great difference as regards recruiting if that body was very largely increased, and amounted to a very considerable force in proportion to Her Majesty's line forces?—There is no doubt that in proportion to the number of recruits required, it would not be so easy to obtain the number of men; but hitherto, certainly, we have never found any difficulty. On the contrary, we have often been obliged to check recruiting by imposing limits upon the recruiting officers, and within the last year and nine or ten months I believe we have sent out 10,000 recruits; and in the first seven months after the mutiny 4,854 were given in the return presented to Parliament as having been sent out. That does not indicate any difficulty. In fact, I believe that what was the Company's service, but now constituting Her Majesty's Indian forces, is a very popular service. I have a letter here, dated the 27th April 1848, during the time of the Duke of Wellington, declining to accede to a proposition of the then Court of Directors, in which his Grace acknowledges the popularity of the service, and that it would interfere with the recruiting of Her Majesty's forces in this country.

6080. Taking that very valuable opinion as a criterion, do you not think that it would cripple the resources of the empire in contradistinction to the peculiar interests of India, if you did recruit better for the local army than for the Queen's service generally?—I have been accustomed not to separate India from England, and therefore I should consider that the interests of the one were the interests of the other.

6081. If you find that the interests of the imperial army are damaged by recruiting for the local army, do you not think that the resources of the empire are thereby crippled to that extent?—If it was shown to me that the interests of England were damaged, I would probably admit that, but I doubt whether they would be damaged.

6082. Why should there be any necessity in India for that wholesome emulation to which you alluded, which you say exists between the two forces, when such an emulation has never been attempted in any other army in the world? Is there anything peculiar in the circumstances of India which requires a wholesome emulation between two bodies of European troops serving in that country, when in no country in the world have you ever had that wholesome emulation established by a double army of any description or kind?—I do not suppose that in history there is a similar case to that of a small island like Great Britain holding possession of a large empire like India. Therefore I, of course, cannot quote any instance of two armies existing together like the army of England and the army in India. When I use the word "emulation," I mean that two bodies of men serving together in the field against a common enemy will naturally have what I call a wholesome rivalry and a wholesome emulation in performing that service.

6083. (*Lord Stanley.*) You mean to speak of that kind of feeling which may exist, for instance, between soldiers and sailors when acting on a joint expedition?—Exactly.

6084. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) If that is the principle which ought to regulate the feeling of armies, why should we not have seen it extended in all the great military countries of the world?—I did not say that that was a principle to be sought after, but the two armies existing together the feeling exists.

6085. I thought you said that that was one of the reasons why you considered it to be an advantage to have a double army?—That is one of the effects.

6086. (*Lord Stanley.*) You speak of it as an incidental advantage?—Yes; certainly not as a reason for maintaining two local armies.

6087. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I believe it is generally admitted that unity of action in armies is of very great importance, and you can get unity of action more in one body than in two bodies?—I never understood, in the course of my experience or reading, that there has been any want of union in the two armies of India, if they are to be called two armies.

6088. They are under different systems; you must admit that they are two bodies, however harmoniously they may work together?—Yes.

6089. I thought that in great bodies of men it was a great advantage to get one system and one organization?—I do not think that that is the only view to be taken, because the local army is maintained for other purposes; the local army becomes more inured

to the climate; the local army becomes more acquainted with the country and its customs and manners, all of which are very useful ingredients in an army; it furnishes also a numerous class of officers unequalled, probably, in the world for the numerous situations which spring up in India, which I do not think could be filled by officers who have not that experience. These are some of the advantages of a local army.

6090. (*Chairman.*) Has there been a superiority manifested on the part of the local army over the Queen's army employed in India?—Certainly not in the field. All that I should claim would be equality. I do not know that the local army is in any way inferior, nor certainly is the local army superior to the army of the line.

6091. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Is it not an acknowledged fact that the troops of the line, as well as the local troops, have derived considerable benefit and increased their efficiency by serving together in India, that each has derived from the other various useful improvements?—I have no doubt, on the one hand, that the local army benefits by the improvements of the day introduced by the army of the line; and, on the other hand, I have no doubt that the army of the line is benefited by the experience of the local army in many respects, both in garrison and in the field.

6092. (*Lord Stanley.*) The line army has the advantage of a knowledge of the latest system of discipline, and the latest system of improvements; the local army has the advantage which the other cannot possess, of knowing the climate and the habits of the people, and you think that any exchange mutually of their experience is a benefit to both?—That is my opinion.

6093. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that the army of the line has only received that amount of benefit which it would derive from any service in the field; has it received any other benefit from the local army, excepting the knowledge acquired from actual service in the field?—Yes; I should think that in garrison it would derive great benefit. I consider that when a fresh regiment of the line arrives in India it has a great deal to learn in garrison as well as in the field.

6094. In what respect?—In the first place I should not think that the commanding officer of a regiment of the line would be so competent to prescribe the system which his men should follow in a tropical climate as an officer of the local army would be. I am not intending of course to disparage the officers of the line. They are only for a time inferior in some respects, from not possessing an experience and knowledge, which can only be acquired by residence in India, and by intercourse and communication with the natives of India.

6095. That has regard to local information, but I refer to military knowledge and acquirements?—I do not claim any superiority in that respect.

6096. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) You have dwelt somewhat upon the intercourse of the army with the natives of the army, what is the intercourse between the army of India and the natives beyond the camp servants?—In the first place, of course, many of the local army are acquainted with the language, and can converse with the natives; they have also become acquainted with their customs and prejudices, and of course if they are, as many of them are, wise they take care not to offend those prejudices and unnecessarily to irritate the natives.

6097. That I am aware of; but still it does not describe the amount of intercourse which there is between the population of India and the soldiery?—Many of the local army intermarry with the natives, and when they become entitled to pensions, more frequently settle in India. By the latest returns, I find that of the late Company's service there are 1,059 resident pensioners to 388 of Her Majesty's service. This is an element of strength in times of trouble.

6098. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do the soldiers of the line ever intermarry with the natives?—I cannot answer that question, I should think very rarely; certainly not to such an extent.

6099. (*Lord Stanley.*) As a rule is there any doubt on your mind that whether in peace or war, it is an advantage for the officers and men of an army quartered in a country to understand the habits of the people?—It is undoubtedly an advantage. It must be of immense service to the officers of a regiment to be acquainted with the people, even on an ordinary march from station to station.

6100. Can there be any doubt that that knowledge is possessed in a greater degree by the officers and men of the local army than by those of troops of the line serving in India for a few years only?—Undoubtedly it is possessed both by officers and men, but in a greater degree by the officers.

6101. (*Chairman.*) I understood you to say just now that you did not conceive that there was any superiority in the local portion of the army over the Queen's troops?—I was then talking of their qualities as soldiers in the field.

6102. That is all you require of an army, is it not?—I may have misunderstood the question; I thought your question was whether I considered the Company's army superior as an army on service to her Majesty's army. Of course I do not consider them, in the quality of soldiers, superior one over the other.

6103. As an army, you admit that the one is equal to the other?—Yes; but if you take into consideration the services to be performed, I should consider that the local army would have advantages over the other—not personal advantages. How, for instance, could we expect an officer on his first arrival in India, and altogether ignorant of the languages, customs, and manners of the inhabitants of India, would be competent to conduct with efficiency the commissariat, bazar, or intelligence departments of an army, more especially if employed in field service.

6104. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you allude to the civil services which they perform?—One advantage of a local army is of course that the local authorities are able to draw experienced officers for the numerous situations which must be filled up in India.

6105. Could not arrangements and regulations be made for them to draw from the army in general just as well as from any local force?—I do not think so, for this reason, that of course the army of the line do not look to India as their adopted country, and their energies and associations are not concentrated on India, which those of the local army are.

6106. (*Lord Stanley.*) It is not worth the while, as a general rule, of an officer of the line to study the languages, or to familiarize himself with the habits of the country?—I should say, as a general rule, it is not.

6107. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Has not that resulted from the fact of officers of the line not having opportunities worth taking advantage of; and if that field were open to them, would they not study, and be anxious many of them to remain, and make India their adopted country?—No, there would still be a great difference; in my opinion the officers of the army composed solely of the line would still not look to India alone. Whenever it suited their convenience they would return to this country.

6108. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that the officers of the line would look to their promotion more than to the chance of any civil employment?—I dare say that the officers of the line, if they were assured of civil employment, would look to it also.

6109. (*Viscount Melville.*) Is it not the fact that the officers of the line do learn the native language, and that every regiment of the line going to that country is not a year in the country before an officer qualifies himself to act as interpreter?—That is not my experience. I see to this day that officers of the local army are frequently attached to Her Majesty's regiments as interpreters.

John Pollard Willoughby, Esq.

30thNov.1858.

6110. How long?—I cannot state for how long, but the fact exists.

6111. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) With respect to jealousies and heartburnings between two armies, provided the officers of both be placed upon a perfect equality, do you see any reason why any other than a generous spirit of emulation should exist between them?—I think that what has been called the jealousy between the two armies, existed from the very cause that, until very recently, the two armies were not on an equality. There are a number of privileges which have been conceded, from 1788 downwards, and those inequalities having been removed, I do not see any reason why any jealousy which would be pernicious should exist. The rank of officers of the East India Company's service, beyond the limits of India, was only acknowledged as recently as 1855; royal commissions were first granted to officers of the East India Company's army in 1788; the honour of the Order of the Bath was extended to them in 1815, but I believe not actually conferred until 1826; brevet rank for distinguished service was first granted in 1828; the rank of general, in 1837; the highly-esteemed honour of aide-de-camp to the Queen, in 1842; and eligibility to chief commands, by the appointment of a Company's officer to command the Madras army, in 1856.

6112. Are you not of opinion that whatever jealousies or heartburnings may have existed hitherto, they are rather attributable to those differences to which you allude, than to the mere circumstance of there being two armies?—I think it very probable.

6113. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that it is human nature that two distinct and separate bodies must always have a certain amount of jealousy, whether it be wholesome jealousy or not; and which can only affect unfavourably two distinct bodies of troops?—I again say, that if the two bodies are treated with equal justice, being the common soldiers of one sovereign, that feeling ought not to prevail.

6114. Is not the very fact of a portion of the army not being allowed to perform certain duties throughout the empire, which the other portion is allowed to perform, in itself, a very great distinction, which would work prejudicially in some respects?—I think the distinction arises from our position in India, which renders it unavoidable. I do not think that unless officers become rooted, as it were, in India, the great men who have appeared on the scene, would have had the opportunities of acquiring the qualifications which brought them forward.

6115. As regards the interests of the empire, admitting, which I freely do, that India is one of the most important branches of the empire, still do you not think that the interests of the empire are paramount as regards all interests, whether Indian or any others?—No doubt the interests of the empire, taken as a whole, are paramount to every other consideration.

6116. Supposing that the interests of the empire were affected by a very large local force, do you think that the interests of India ought to predominate over the interests of the empire?—Of course I do not consider that, regarding India as a portion only of the British empire, its interests are to be preferred to those of the empire at large; but, as I said before, I consider the interests identical, and the loss of India would, I think, be grievously felt throughout the British empire.

6117. Do you not think, that the fact of a large proportion of Her Majesty's troops being shut up, so to speak, for local service in India, does cripple to some extent the powers of the empire?—I do not think so, for this reason. Of course the object of a local army is, that India should, if possible, be always placed in a state of security, but there can be no doubt that the authorities in India, on any great emergency, would employ to the utmost all their resources for the benefit of the empire at large, as they have hitherto done. The forces of India have not been confined to India; they have been to Egypt, the Mauritius, Java, China, and Persia. But all that I should contend for is this, that there should not be a power in the authorities in this country, without the consent of the local authorities in India, to withdraw the force which is specially provided for the safety of India.

6118. Do you consider then that troops which are enlisted for local purposes, service in India, for instance, as now proposed, can, without special enactment, serve in any other part of the empire?—I should say, as a general rule not, because they are raised for the express purpose which I have referred to.

6119. Then how would you get over the difficulty, supposing the empire require them elsewhere. As you have yourself very justly remarked, they have been employed, and usefully employed in Egypt and elsewhere?—I have that faith in British soldiers, that I believe that even without an enactment, if a great emergency arose, rendering it necessary to employ them elsewhere, there would be no hesitation on their part to do what they were called upon to do.

6120. (*Lord Stanley.*) They would volunteer?—They would volunteer, and be only too happy to proceed on service when ordered.

6121. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that in making great arrangements for a large army for India it would be safe to trust to the good feeling of those employed, or would you not rather trust to the right and proper feeling of a Government in not withdrawing troops from a country which they know is an integral portion of a great empire?—I am obliged still to say, that I advocate a local army, chiefly with reference to the security of India, and I do not know of any other way in which it can be provided for. I have, however, omitted to notice one thing, which I think settles the question, and that is that the finances of India will not bear the expense of an army unless a large portion of it is local.

6122. Suppose that that difficulty is got over, which after all is a matter of detail and arrangement, and suppose that arrangements are made that the one expense is not proportionately greater than the other, how will the case stand?—The facts within my knowledge answer the question; it is impracticable to make the expense of the one equal to that of the other.

6123. Why impracticable?—I can only state this, that I have looked into papers lately and find that the expense of the transport of troops would render it impracticable, if whole regiments are to be sent every year. In a letter which I have with me the Government of India advocate the raising of a local army on financial grounds, and on account of the officers being ready at hand, and they make use of the expression, that it is the only scheme financially practicable.

6124. The arrangements now made for transport are very loose and vague. Supposing new arrangements for the transport of troops were made, and it was proved that they could be made much cheaper than is now done, and supposing that, instead of going into the open market, the Government were to undertake to provide large steamers to carry the men, and various arrangements were adopted in order to make the route much cheaper than it is at present, would not that make a great difference?—My experience is that Government can never do a thing so cheaply as a private capitalist. I do not think that in a money point of view it is likely that the expense would be reduced by means of Government establishments.

6125. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) As it may be assumed that the European permanent force to be maintained in India will be fixed at the minimum deemed necessary to hold India securely, how could any portion of it be removed to meet a European crisis without risking the loss of India?—It could not be so, of course, and that is one of the reasons why I advocate a local army, that India should not be left without protection under all circumstances. I should fear that if it was wholly an army of the line the forces in

India would be reduced to a hazardous extent, whenever any great crisis or emergency arises.

6126. Regarded as an imperial question, what advantages would be gained to the state from having the whole European force composed of troops of the line, if not a single regiment could be withdrawn without endangering the loss of India? How could they be made available for service elsewhere?—They would be available for service elsewhere by order of the authority raising them, but still at the risk, of course, of endangering the safety of India.

6127. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Supposing that the empire is in danger, supposing that it is in such circumstances (which of course would be the case in such an event) as to require every available man for its safety, do you not think that in a case of that sort the authorities at home would be justified in even calling upon India?—Then it would arise that you must give up India probably; that is to say, you must incur the risk of giving it up by losing your hold on India.

6128. Without such an emergency I think you will admit that no Government would think of reducing the force in India to such an extent as to endanger India?—I have before stated that I have no doubt that no Government would do so intentionally; but I think that the Government at home of course would look at home, and not being so well informed of the requirements of India would very often recal troops against the opinion of the local authority, as was done in a late instance, although, I admit, under a great emergency.

6129. Can you state an instance in which regiments were withdrawn from India for the Crimea, excepting two cavalry regiments?—And two infantry regiments. Our force, when the mutiny broke out, was under the usual complement; it consisted of twenty-two battalions instead of twenty-four.

6130. Was it not the fact that some regiments were offered by the Government at the end of the Crimean war, and refused by the Court of Directors; was it not intended to have replaced them?—Yes; and I am not aware that the Court were opposed to their being replaced. Some delay occurred with reference to the season of the year, which is one of the chief things to be regarded. I think that they were perfectly justified in that, because if that point is not attended to the loss of a regiment is immense on arrival in India.

6131. (*Viscount Melville.*) The only two regiments withdrawn during the Crimean war were the 12th hussars and the 10th lancers, there was not an infantry regiment withdrawn, and whatever deficiency in infantry existed when the war in India broke out was in consequence of the absence of those employed in Persia.—There is no doubt that our complement, as we consider, was twenty-four regiments, and when the mutiny broke out there were only twenty-two. Of that force I am aware that 3,000 were in Persia, but by great good fortune the war in Persia terminated, and they were in time; and they, in fact, were the force with which Havelock gained his glorious victories.

6132. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Can you give any other instance of troops having been withdrawn contrary to the disposition and feeling of the authorities in India?—No, I cannot; because, with the exception of the war in the Crimea, there has been no war of importance since 1815.

6133. How was it during the great war with France; were troops then withdrawn to the extent of endangering our empire in India?—I am not aware that they were.

6134. Then, in fact, the experience which we have gained hitherto only amounts to the one instance during the Crimean war?—Yes; but if the force of the line in India were increased to a great number they would, I presume, be considered more available than they are when they are only a comparatively small number of regiments in India.

6135. Still you will admit that that entirely rests upon the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government?—Entirely.

6136. (*Lord Stanley.*) But the temptation to withdraw them would be greater?—Undoubtedly; of course when there is an emergency at home the requirements of India would be less thought of than the requirements at home, and I think that there would be an inclination to withdraw them beyond what was safe, which would be obviated by having a local army.

6137. Would not that inclination to withdraw troops from India be increased in proportion as the facilities of communication between the two countries are increased?—I should think it would.

6138. Looking at the matter in another point of view, in the event of a large European force of the line being maintained in India, would not that impose upon every officer entering the Queen's service the duty, in all probability, of passing a considerable period of his service in India?—No doubt the period at which each regiment would proceed to India would be very much shortened. The turn of service would occur more frequently.

6139. The amount of service in India relatively to the amount of service elsewhere would be greatly increased?—It would be greater—much greater.

6140. Would not that, in your judgment, have its effect on the willingness of officers of a certain class and station to enter the army?—I do not think that service in India with the large majority of the officers of Her Majesty's forces is popular.

6141. Are there not many men who now enter the Queen's service as officers who are willing to fulfil all the ordinary conditions of military duty, but who, being men of independent fortune, would object to be banished from England during a great part of their term of service?—I think so; and I have understood that whenever a regiment is ordered to India instances of that sort occur.

6142. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But there is no difficulty in those officers exchanging, if they choose to exchange?—But the exchanges take place on account of a disinclination, if it may be so called, to go to India for ordinary duty.

6143. Do you not think that that disinclination would be very much weakened if the service of India was thrown open to them. Are you not aware that hitherto the services of the officers of the line, with the exception of a few staff appointments connected with the Queen's army, have been exclusively regimental services, with no field of action whatever. Do you not think that the change of that system would make a very great difference?—That is very true; but then they are not content to pass their lives in India. I again say, with no view of disparaging the officers to whom I am alluding, that they have not the opportunity of qualifying themselves in the way that the officers of a local army have; neither can it be expected that they will feel the same interest in India, as the officers of an army specially raised for service in India, and having no views or prospects beyond India.

6144. Do you not think that they would find it worth their while to qualify themselves, and would take every opportunity of doing so, if they had a field open to them?—Still, comparatively, they would be birds of passage. A regiment of the line would go out to India to serve there a certain number of years; they would of course look forward to being relieved at the end of a certain period, which probably would be fixed whenever the nature of the service would admit of it. I do not see how they could take root in the country in the way that the officers of a local army would do.

6145. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Although some officers, who might have the prospect of obtaining high appointments in India, would be tempted to remain, you think the general effect would be that, on regiments of the line proceeding to India, the men of fortune and property would exchange into regiments at home, and that the officers who remained would be

John Pollard Willoughby, Esq.

30th Nov. 1858.

principally of the less affluent class?—I mean to say that the officers of a local army look to India solely. If the army of India was composed solely of regiments of the line, the officers of the army there would not do so, whenever it suited their interests they would endeavour to quit the country.

6146. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Does the opinion which you advocate as to the defence of India, and of Great Britain, consist in this, that India being first provided for by a local army independent of Great Britain, Great Britain will look to itself?—Yes, that is very much my opinion. My first object, having spent the best part of my time in India, is to endeavour to devise a plan, which, under all circumstances, shall maintain the safety of India.

6147. (*Lord Stanley.*) That is to say, you think that in the case of an army which, whatever its composition, is paid out of Indian revenue, India has the first claim to look to the services of such an army?—I think so; another great reason with me for a local army is that the troops become inured to the climate.

6148. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think then that a long residence in India is an advantage as far as the troops are concerned?—I have no doubt that with long residence in India for a regiment annually recruited as it is, fresh blood being infused into it both in officers and men, that regiment will stand field service and the climate much better than a recently arrived regiment. I have instances of it here, over and over again. You cannot read any medical report received from India without being struck with that fact. I will cite a few instances out of many which have come to my knowledge. Her Majesty's 28th regiment arrived at Bombay in August 1842, and a few days afterwards proceeded to Khurachee in Scinde. Cholera broke out in the regiment with intense severity, and proved fatal to a large number of the officers and men. A court of inquiry assembled, but were unable to discover any preventible cause for this sickness and mortality. No doubt the season of the year was against them. Troops on their first arrival in India are most liable to this fatal disease. Dr. G. S. Beatson, when examined before the Select Committee on East India Transport of Troops (question 2911) stated "all "fresh arrivals are very subject to outbreaks of "cholera." I have not been able to obtain the precise number who perished in Her Majesty's 28th, but I believe it to have been almost without a parallel. Again, that noble and gallant regiment, Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders arrived at Bombay from England on the 31st July 1842. Two years afterwards this fine regiment proceeded to Scinde. In a few weeks, by sickness—chiefly fever and dysentery—it was rendered entirely unfit for service, and when reduced to a remnant was obliged to be recalled. I have examined the records of the day and find the Commander-in-chief at Bombay deploring "the la- "mentable and prostrate state to which that fine "regiment, the 78th Highlanders, has been reduced "by the prevailing fever." The medical officer in charge describes the regiment "as a perfect wreck," and the superintending surgeon of the province, on the 1st February 1845, reported "the mortality in "Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders, I regret to say, "continues great, and a large number must still fall "victims to the effects of the pestilential climate of "Sukkur." At this time the strength of the regiment had been reduced to 591, of whom 328 were in hospital. The sickness extended to the women and children of the regiment; and the records of the India House show the results in abstract.

Present strength of Her Majesty's 78th Highlanders.

	April 30, 1844.	April 30, 1845.	Decrease.
Non-commissioned officers	114	64	50
Privates	857	405	452
Women	104	42	62
Children	141	32	109

On the 4th January 1845 an officer of the regiment wrote from Hydrabad,—"Since we marched from "Khurachee our loss has been 365 men, 39 women, "132 children, 2 officers, and officer's child,—making "in all 535 souls. There are 30 other men who, the "doctor says, will never see India again: 12 only "out of 1,000 have escaped the Sukkur plague; that "is exclusive of women and children." The precise number of each class who perished has since been inscribed in a memorial tablet erected in Scotland by the survivors.

Then there is the instance of the mortality which prevailed in 1849–50 in Her Majesty's 70th, 75th, and 87th regiments, the first few months after their arrival in India, to which I have already referred; and the remarkable contrast between the capability of Her Majesty's 71st regiment to endure the exposure of field service in India and the 3rd Bombay Europeans, when serving together in the affair at Koonch, to be cited in support of my argument, that acclimatized or seasoned troops are better able to undergo hard service in India, than what are technically called *green* or newly-arrived troops.

6149. (*Col. Burlton.*) It has been assumed that the local force of European troops in India are not removable without their volunteering to go, that is not the case, I believe. The soldiers of the East India Company have always been enlisted for service without any reference to India alone?—I was not aware until it was put to me in the shape of a doubt that they were anything but Queen's troops, although raised by the Company, and paid from the revenues of India.

6150. You will find that they are enlisted for general service wherever the East India Company choose to order them, and you have never, I conclude, heard of such a thing as a European regiment being asked to volunteer for foreign service, to go to Persia, China, or Java?—Never; they go with the greatest alacrity.

6151. (*Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) But the officers' commissions, I believe, have generally been considered to be eastward of the Cape, not for general service?—But that distinction was done away with, I think, in 1855: formerly one of the great grievances of the Company's officers was, that their commissions did not hold good on this side of the Cape.

6152. (*Lord Stanley.*) In point of fact, as regards the Europeans, the only difference between the armies is, that the head-quarters of the one army is in India, and the head-quarters of the other is in England?—I am not aware of any other difference.

6153. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) With respect to the danger incurred to India by the withdrawal of European troops, was it not the case that at the time of the outbreak of the late mutiny in Bengal the danger of its extending to the native army of Bombay was greatly increased by the circumstance of several European regiments and batteries of artillery belonging to the latter presidency having been withdrawn for service in Persia, and of the southern division of that army having been left, in consequence, without any European regiment?—The Bombay native army no doubt was exposed to great temptation, from the fact of so many of the European troops stationed with it being withdrawn, through the circumstance which you state.

6154. (*Viscount Melville.*) By whose orders were they withdrawn?—The Persian war was a war proclaimed by Her Majesty's Government in England.

6155. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are you not subject to that at any time?—No; we thought that it was rather an extraordinary proceeding.

6156. (*Viscount Melville.*) Who ordered it?—I think the Governor-General issued a proclamation which commenced by stating, "Under instructions received "from Her Majesty's Government in England."

6157. Was not it the Governor-General or the Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, who ordered these European regiments away for this particular service, and not the Government from home?—Most undoubtedly the war emanated from this country. Of course the Governor-General and the Governor of Bombay were obliged to obey orders. It was cer-

tainly unwise that such a drain should be made upon the usual resources of India without the consent asked or received of the local authorities, who are the best judges of what the safety of India requires.

6158. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) There is one important point with respect to the withdrawal of troops from India, which I think has not yet been alluded to. It is this, that the time of war in Europe would be that of all others, would it not, during which the necessity for maintaining the European force in India would be the greatest; and that if diminished in strength, the natives of India would be likely to take advantage of that particular time to rise in insurrection, supposing them disposed to do so?—There is no doubt that the danger to India increases whenever war is proclaimed. It may be either from the nation with which you are at war being able to aggress upon India, or it may be, as we have unfortunately learned by recent experience, that the native troops are unfaithful.

6159. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Does not that danger extend to every portion of the empire, and not exclusively to India, in case of war?—Except the danger from the native army, it will always exist, more or less.

6160. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) That is the time of all others at which troops can least be spared from India?—No doubt that is the time when European forces ought to be strongest, looking to India alone; but of course in the case of a general war, you must to some extent look to the imperial interests.

6161. (*Lord Stanley.*) Admitting what cannot be denied, that there is a power in Her Majesty's Government to withdraw the local European troops of India for service in Persia or China, or elsewhere, if necessary, I understand your argument to be this, that there is much less probability of such local troops enlisted for the defence of India being so withdrawn than there is of troops of the line being withdrawn, one of whose conditions of service it is, that they shall serve anywhere?—Yes, I think so.

6162. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you think that in order to have troops available in India for service in China, Persia, or elsewhere in Asia; it would be desirable to maintain in India a larger European force than may be considered necessary, for the secure hold of the country?—I think that the great difficulty ahead of us is the financial difficulty. I do not think that India can afford to keep up a larger force than is absolutely required for its own defence under ordinary circumstances; of course when war occurs we must increase our forces.

6163. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would any Government be justified in keeping up in any portion of Her Majesty's possessions, whether India or elsewhere, more troops than the exigencies of the State required?—No, I do not suppose they would; but that is a very large question, what the requirements are, and all the contingencies. There must be troops in reserve to meet contingencies.

6164. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) With reference to the withdrawal of troops from India, do you remember whether, during the long Peninsular war, perfect tranquillity did not prevail in India from the beginning of it to the end, beginning in 1805 or 1809, after Lord Lake's war?—We have generally had some war on our hands in India.

6165. But the European war did not affect the tranquillity of India?—Probably not directly; but indirectly I dare say it did.

6166. Did it lead Her Majesty's Government to keep more regiments in India upon that occasion, or fewer?—I have no doubt that, according to the state of India, in some years the forces were increased and in some diminished.

6167. A question previously put you implied that whenever there was a European war India was in some degree agitated, and that there was a necessity on the part of Her Majesty's Government rather to increase than to diminish their forces. During the long Peninsular war was there not perfect tranquillity prevailing in India from Lord Lake's time?—No, certainly not.

6168. (*Col. Burlton.*) What was the date of the Nepaul war?—1812. Then there were Lord Hastings' wars against the Mahrattas and Pindarrees. I think you can hardly name a year in which military operations upon a large scale were not being carried on in India.

6169. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Are you not of opinion that all the more important officers of the State in India to which officers of the army are eligible would be much more efficiently filled from a body of officers trained from their youth in India, and with no views beyond it, than from one sent to India only for a ten years' tour, free to leave it at any time by exchanging, having no abiding interest in the country, and whose hopes and aspirations would naturally turn rather to the prospects of professional advancement open to them in Europe?—I think I have rather anticipated my answer to that question in the affirmative. I am decidedly of opinion that the officers of a local army solely devoted to India are much more likely to be efficient, under the circumstances stated in the question, than the officers of the line generally.

6170. If the Indian Government no longer has the training school of a considerable body of officers at its entire disposal and with no views beyond India, which it has hitherto possessed by having a large local army, do you think that such eminent soldiers and administrators as Malcolm, Munro, Ochterlony, Henry Lawrence, Outram, John Jacob, Nicholson, and the many able and devoted men of whom those names are the type, can reasonably be looked for in India in future?—I do not think so certainly.

6171. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have you found that the empire has experienced a dearth of valuable and good men for any service that it may have required during the last century?—Certainly not, provided they have had the apprenticeship and again the experience which is one of the chief reasons why I advocate a local army.

6172. (*Viscount Melville.*) Entertaining that view does not it amount to this, that it is better to have at once two armies, and that the whole European force for India should be local, the officers of that army entering a different service from the Queen's service?—No, I do not think so.

6173. (*Col. Burlton.*) Are you not of opinion that a generous spirit of emulation between two branches of the same national army must, without any reference to history or precedent, have a most beneficial effect upon both?—I think so.

6174. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then why has it not been established in other countries?—I can only answer that question by stating that I know no parallel instance of a small island, such as that of Great Britain, having under its sway such an extensive empire as India, consisting, I believe, of 1,500,000 square miles, and 200,000,000 inhabitants.

6175. Quite admitting that there are very peculiar circumstances, I put it, as regards the question put by Colonel Burlton, why it should be necessary to have that wholesome emulation amongst armies; I am talking in a military point of view?—I do not think that it is necessary to seek for that emulation, but the two bodies existing together it does exist, and that, I think, produces a good effect.

6176. You do not think it necessary, as regards the organization of an army, that there should be two armies in order to make one emulate the other. I am speaking not as regards India, but generally upon military principles?—No, not, of course, under ordinary circumstances.

6177. (*Col. Burlton.*) You would not think it *necessary* to have that spirit of emulation, but you are of opinion that, as a general principle in human nature, not only in armies but throughout the world, a spirit of generous emulation between any two bodies whatever must be beneficial?—I have no doubt of it, and that is one of the feelings of the day.

John Pollard Willoughby, Esq.

30th Nov. 1858.

6178. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is not that wholesome emulation established in every army by the fact of having separate corps, but with this difference, that they are all one body under the same rules and regulations, whereas you want to retain the two bodies under separate rules and regulations?—But then what becomes of the local authority in India? I presume that if it is to be one army, it is, of course, to be under one authority. Now, I consider that the army in India is the right arm of the Governor-General and the Governors of the different presidencies, and that their authority must be uncontrolled save in the way in which it is controlled at present. Under the former system it was controlled to a certain extent periodically by the Court of Directors, and now by the last India Bill it is controlled, to a certain extent, by the Secretary of State in Council.

6179. Do you not approve of that control?—I quite approve of it.

6180. In what way would the control be altered; in what way would there be a difference of control?—In the first place, there would be something like a treble government established; the Secretary of State in Council must exercise a control under all circumstances; and if the chief military authority in this country exercised a control, that would be the second; and then the third would be the local authority. I am afraid that that would lead to collisions of authority and innovations which I should think very prejudicial; also to increase of expenditure.

6181. In what respect can any authority or innovation be introduced by the Commander-in-chief provided that the Commander-in-chief is in exactly the same position with reference to the Secretary of State for India as he is with reference to the Secretary of State for War, which is that such Secretary of State has entire control over the Commander in-chief?—The distance alone would make a great difference. I do not think that the armies of India can be controlled by a distant authority, in the same manner and to the same extent as the army of England is controlled by the Commander-in-chief and the Secretary of State for War.

6182. Did you not say that you thought they ought to be controlled by the Secretary of State?—There are certain branches of military administration which he can control, but everything connected with the movement of troops and appointment of officers for particular services must be left to the local authority.

6183. Granting, which I cordially do, every word which you say, that that entire control should exist there, why should not it exist there as it has hitherto done, and yet that in all that concerns the organizing an army and keeping it within certain disciplinary bounds the Commander-in-chief should have that legitimate control which he exercises over all other branches of Her Majesty's service?—I am of course giving a civilian's opinion. I think that it would be extremely pernicious to the public service if a greater control was exercised in this country than has hitherto been exercised. I think that India requires a separate administrative agency of its own in every department, and in none more so than the military department.

6184. But you admit the agency of the Secretary of State?—Undoubtedly.

6185. What is the difference between the agency of the Secretary of State living in England and the agency of the Secretary of State with the assistance of the Commander-in-chief for the European portion of the army; it would be two armies, would it not?—There would be two instead of one authority.

6186. (*Lord Stanley.*) Your case is that it is interposing an additional authority where there is already, in your judgment, a sufficiently obligatory machinery?—Yes, and where, under the existing system, everything which is required to my mind is provided for. In regard to the troops of the line in India there is a separate military and medical staff kept up for the purpose of communicating with the Commander-in-chief in England upon all matters of discipline regarding Her Majesty's regiments. The Commanders-in-chief in Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, now communicate with and receive their orders, regarding Her Majesty's regiments, as far as the discipline is concerned, from the Commander-in-chief in England, and I do not really see what more is required as far as that is concerned.

6187. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What more was suggested in what I stated than that?—I presumed that it was desired to include in the same system the local European forces.

6188. What ill effect has been produced by that state of things which now exists as regards the Queen's troops in India?—If it is confined simply to matters of discipline, and to what is now the practice, there is no objection.

6189. You would not object to that?—Certainly not to what exists at the present moment, but that is a very different thing from what I understood in the question, namely, that the troops in India were to be under the command and authority of the Commander-in-chief in England.

6190. In what respect is there a difference?—Because at present the Commander-in-chief has no voice in regard to the distribution or employment of Her Majesty's troops in India.

6191. How could he have?—Then what additional authority is required?

6192. Merely that the Commander-in-chief should, as regards local forces, have the same disciplinary action which he has now as regards the Queen's troops?—That I do not think would be desirable.

6193. Did not you tell me that no disadvantage had accrued from the existence of that power hitherto?—Over Her Majesty's troops.

6194. Why should there be any disadvantage in its extending over the local troops?—It would be introducing the English system of administration over the local troops, which I should think undesirable.

6195. In what way?—That the system of patronage in the two countries is widely different.

6196. There would be no patronage involved in it, but merely discipline?—I think that it would be rather an anomaly, a Commander-in-chief exercising no patronage.

6197. In what respect patronage?—I should say that all situations in India ought to be filled up by the local authority.

6198. Certainly?—They are not now filled up by the local authority in all cases.

6199. Which are not?—The chief commands in India.

6200. What chief commands?—Generals of division.

6201. Was it not under regulation with the Court of Directors, that a proportion should be filled up from the Queen's army and a proportion from the Indian army?—Undoubtedly it was. I am talking about the selection of individuals to fill those commands.

6202. Do you think that the selection of individuals should rest with the Governor-General and the Commanders-in-chief?—In the case of brigade commands undoubtedly.

6203. I admit it to the fullest extent. Where has been the interference of the Commander-in chief in brigade commands?—I do not say it has been so; but I am only fearing that such interference would follow the change which your royal highness seems to advocate.

6204. Why should it follow more now than it has hitherto done?—I should be apprehensive that it would follow.

6205. (*Viscount Melville.*) Am I to understand that you object to the Queen nominating general officers to command divisions as heretofore; for instance, Sir John Inglis or General Mansfield, those officers nominated by the Queen?—General Mansfield was sent out, I think, on the staff in the same way as the Queen's adjutant-general and the deputy adjutant-general.

6206. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are you aware that every appointment which is made for India in fact emanates from Her Majesty's Government?—Yes.

6207. Do you think that if the Secretary of State for India is responsible for all appointments made, there is any danger of there being any undue interference?—Yes, I am afraid there would be. My argument is this, that the local authority is much more likely to have accurate information of the qualifications and capacities of the officers in India than a distant authority; and what I should deprecate would be any diminution of the power of the local authority to select those officers.

6208. Suppose there is no diminution of those powers?—If there is no diminution of course my fears are groundless.

6209. Do you not think that it would be an advantage to get rid of the double staff?—In a pecuniary point of view undoubtedly; but the double staff never, to my mind, could be got rid of, because there must be a large native army, and the staff of the native army must be filled, I suppose, from officers of the local army, and therefore possessing Indian experience.

6210. Still you would have probably only one adjutant and quartermaster-general; you might make arrangements of that description?—That of course depends upon the extent to which the native army is reorganized, but I should fear that, in practice, you would find it difficult to establish that system.

6211. You do not think that a double staff on principle is a good thing?—Certainly not.

6212. And it is expensive?—It is expensive.

6213. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) You are aware that the appointments of Her Majesty's officers to divisional commands in India have been hitherto made in England, that those of the Company's officers have been ordinarily made by the Governments in India, and only occasionally by the Home authorities at the India House. Do you think that it would be expedient to continue that system, or as a general rule, to place the divisional commands for both services in the hands of the authorities in India?—My own impression is, that the more you can throw into the hands of the local Government the better. I certainly should not positively interdict the authorities in England from nominating to divisions, but I should prefer that, in the generality of cases, it was left to the local authorities, for the reason which I have just stated, that they are best able to appreciate the qualities of the officers at their disposal.

6214. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Are you under the impression that in the event of troops being wanted on any emergeney in this country from India, it would be done directly by the Commander-in-chief in England or by Her Majesty's Government through the Commander-in-chief?—I have no doubt that it would be in communication with Her Majesty's Government; the Commander-in-chief, I presume, can recommend.

6215. (*Viscount Melville.*) Who at present nominates the general officers of the Company's service for divisional commands in India?—As a general rule it is done by the local governments, occasionally by the home authority; the home authority has the power to nominate, but very seldom exercises it.

6216. Suppose the general officers of the Company's service selected are in England?—The home authorities have the power, and occasionally exercise it, but rarely.

6217. Has that system been found to militate in any way against the selection of a good class of officers for command in India in the Company's service?—The instances of the home authorities nominating are so rare, it is in fact the exception not the rule, and this is the system which I should on the whole advocate.

6218. Then why do you object to the home authorities nominating the general officers of the Queen's service to hold commands in India?—But the system of nomination of Queen's officers to divisions is different. I believe that they are invariably nominated from home.

6219. I want to know what is the objection?—I have no very strong objection against the system. I should be very sorry to see it extended to the local army of India, that is, that the nomination should be always here.

6220. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) You are aware that there are certain permanent divisional commands established for Company's officers and for Queen's officers?—Yes, the proportion has been fixed for each presidency.

6221. You are aware the Government of England send out a certain number, namely, two in Bengal. Those officers are sent to the local appointments, no matter what the troops consist of. As an instance, at Umballa, when I was in India, there were, I think, six British regiments, they were commanded by a Company's officer; while at Meerut there were only one regiment of infantry, and one of cavalry, which were commanded by a Queen's officer. Therefore there is not that great distinction of command or favour to the one compared with the other, when the Queen's officers were placed, as it were, in reserve, and the Company's officers were in command of the largest portion of British troops connected with India. Are you aware of that arrangement?—There probably were circumstances which induced the local authority to make that arrangement, with which I am unacquainted. The Company's officer who is put into a superior command, may be an officer of great merit and experience.

6222. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Does not that prove that the local authorities were in a position to do just as they liked?—That is exactly what I advocate, that they should have that power.

6223. The result of that would be, that there has not been any undue interference?—I did not say that there had been any undue interference; I was talking of the original nomination. The original nomination should, in my humble judgment, be with the local authority, for the reason which I have stated.

6224. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Is not it a fair argument in favour of the system of placing the appointments to divisional commands in the hands of the Indian authorities, that they would thereby fall to officers working in India, and who therefore might be justly regarded as having the best claim to them?—*Cæteris paribus*, I should say, of course, that the man who has worked himself up to the top of the tree should have the reward.

6225. I mean that, as a general rule, those officers who are doing the work should have the benefit of the commands and appointments in India?—Of course I could not say that they ought to have them exclusively.

6226. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do not you think that an arrangement could very easily be made by which, supposing that the army were altogether of the line, the rule in reference to the appointment to divisional commands should be as has hitherto existed with regard to the late Company's service, that is to say, that the Governor-General should send in his schedule, and that unless there was some very serious ground of objection to that schedule, the names in it should be adopted for the army of the line?—If such a rule could be established, that is to say, preserving the recent system, there would be no evil.

6227. It would be the same thing?—It would be the same thing; but I am very much afraid that such a rule would not long exist.

6228. Why?—Because I do not believe that it is the system in Her Majesty's army to delegate the selection of officers to divisions to any one, but the Commander-in-chief, and it is only the peculiar circumstances of India which render any deviation from that rule proper and desirable.

6229. Judging from your experience, do you think that if a public functionary, like the Governor-General of India, made strong recommendations of certain persons, they would not be attended to in preference

John Pollard Willoughby, Esq.

30th Nov. 1858.

to any other recommendations came they from where they might?—I think myself that the Governor-General should not be subject to check from any other authority in these matters.

6230. Not the Secretary of State?—I am saying that, generally speaking, his authority should be supreme in every department in India. Your Royal Highness is supposing the case of simply recommending.

6231. Would not any Commander-in-chief, be he who he may, accept, and with gratitude accept, the recommendations of the Governor-General of India and act upon them?—That of course at once is sapping the authority of the Governor-General, because he is merely to recommend. At present no one can interfere with or dispute his authority.

6232. All authority must be confirmed. All the Governor-General's authority is confirmed in some way; though he has immense power it is confirmed by authority from home. Is not it an admitted principle?—No; the Governor-General in Council at present has the power.

6233. (*Major-Gen. Hancock*) Are not his arrangements final?—Yes.

6234. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are they not subject to confirmation?—No; they do not even go through the form of a confirmation; occasionally officers may consider themselves aggrieved by the acts of the Governor-General in Council; then of course they appeal readily to authority at home, but that would be the only exception, otherwise everything is direct and positive.

6235. (*Col. Burlton.*) With your knowledge of the native character, are you not of opinion that it would detract most materially from the high authority and prestige of a Governor-General if it were known that he had not most entire and unlimited control and command over every man within his territory?—I have no doubt that it would cripple his authority amazingly, and diminish his prestige.

6236. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How is it possible that the Governor-General of India, or any Governor-General in such a position could be without unbounded authority?—If all his appointments were made subject to confirmation by a distant functionary, would not it weaken his authority to a tremendous extent.

6237. Supposing that he had that authority, would there be any difficulty in regulating it in a mode between the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-chief, which would get over all the difficulty?—There is no difficulty under the present system, and therefore I should be very sorry to change the system, and then make an attempt to obviate the difficulties which that change might produce.

6238. But you would continue a double authority?—The authority of the Governor-General in all these matters is final, with the exception above mentioned.

6239. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) You are aware that the system in India with regard to the appointment of officers to brigade and divisional commands is this—the Commander-in-chief of each army nominates, and the Government appoints. I allude to the Bengal and Bombay presidencies, the system at Madras being different?—No doubt the Commander-in-chief recommends, and the Governor in Council appoints, that is to say, he confirms the recommendation; you may say practically, that the nomination in the large majority of cases is with the local commander-in-chief.

6240. Is it not very desirable that the local Commander-in-chief, who is responsible for the efficiency and discipline of the army under his command, should have the power of selecting officers for those commands solely on the ground of efficiency without being fettered in any way?—That is the most perfect system certainly.

6241. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then you would like to see two independent Commanders-in-chief, one at home and the other in India?—The tenor of my evidence is that India is an exception to the general rule, and should continue so.

6242. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you not think that the interests of the public service imperatively require that none but fully qualified officers should ever be placed in the command of either regiment, brigade, division, or army in India?—Undoubtedly, and I am happy to say that that is a system which has recently been promulgated by the Government of India.

6243. Under the system of succession by seniority to regimental brigade and divisional commands, which obtained in India previous to the mutiny, is it not the fact that officers not unfrequently succeeded to those commands who were to a great extent incapacitated by age, or impaired health for the efficient performance of the duties?—I have known occasional instances of that kind, and in fact it arose from pushing the seniority system to an extreme, which has now been remedied.

6244. As you have had 32 years' experience as a member of the civil service, and were for some years member of Council at Bombay, will you be good enough to state whether you ever knew or heard of a single case in the native army of Bombay in which a native commissioned or non-commissioned officer of low caste failed duly to maintain his authority when on duty, or was induced by caste influence to perform any menial office for his caste superior?—Certainly not; I believe that some of our best native officers are of low caste, and have received in recognition of their services the "Order of British India," and the "Order of Merit."

6245. (*Lord Stanley.*) I will now call your attention to the second question, namely, in connection with the question as to the composition of the European army, what are the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the troops of the line, and of securing the efficiency of the local European force; will you favour the Commission with your views upon that point?—The first point I think which ought to be attended to, is to take care that you send out your reinforcements, whether as reliefs or recruits, or drafts, at the proper season of the year. It is melancholy to reflect upon the calamitous losses which have occurred in Her Majesty's regiments on their first arrival in India from a neglect of this precaution. All suffer immediately after their arrival in India until they become what is called seasoned, of which I have given a few out of many examples; but a great deal of the sickness and mortality may be avoided by their arriving in India at a proper season of the year, which is what we call the cold weather. On this important point I beg to quote the opinion of a very competent witness, an esteemed colleague of my own, in the Council of India. Before the Select Committee on East India transport of troops, Captain Shepherd, lately Deputy Master of Trinity House, in reply to question 556 stated, "There is no doubt that there is "nothing more detrimental to troops arriving in India "than to arrive at the unhealthy season, and I think "that from and after October is the proper time. I "remember when I commanded a Company's ship, "arriving in Bengal in the month of July, we did "not lose a man on the way out, and there were five "or six births on board. But, after the troops landed "and went to Fort-William, in less than a week we "heard of eight or ten deaths; and before I left for "China 10 per cent. were dead in consequence of the "heat and the exposure of the men to the sun, and "the facility they had for getting new arrack and "other pernicious spirits."

6246. (*Viscount Melville.*) From November till February?—From the beginning of November till February. Does the question involve the conveyance of troops?

6247. (*Lord Stanley.*) Certainly?—The second means, if a local army is determined upon, is of course by enlarging our recruiting establishment, and working in co-operation with the authorities in this country.

6248. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Are those establishments to be entirely independent of the Commander-in-chief in England?—I should propose that they

should be exactly as they are now; they receive their orders and instructions from the Commander-in-chief in England, and everything with regard to bounty money and levy money and enrolment money; and the standard is fixed under the authority of the Commander-in-chief in England.

6249. It is not at present fixed by the Commander-in-chief in England?—We cannot lower or raise it without communicating with the Commander-in-chief in England.

6250. But the authority has come from the Court of Directors?—Whenever we require an authority we cannot issue any order without Your Royal Highness's sanction; it of course comes to the same thing.

6251. (*Lord Stanley.*) The Commander-in-chief has a consultative authority?—Yes.

6252. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The military discipline of the establishment at Warley is not under the Commander-in-chief?—No.

6253. What number of men do you contemplate having at the depôt establishment for a large local force?—That, I think, cannot be answered until it is decided first that there shall be a local army, and secondly, what shall be its strength.

6254. But of course it will require to be largely increased?—Yes.

6255. From the proposals which have been made it would amount probably to between 10,000 and 12,000 men in depôt, if the local army be largely increased?—That certainly is more than I should have thought necessary; but that is a military question.

6256. Do you think it desirable that that large military force should be in this country without its being under the authority of the Commander-in-chief, I mean for matters of discipline merely?—I am not aware that any difficulty has arisen from the present system on its present scale, and I should not apprehend that there would be any if it was enlarged.

6257. In the event of danger to the State, say an invasion, when there was a call for every man in this country who could be made available, would it be a good system to have 10,000 or 12,000 or even 8,000 men who could not be in any way made use of? You are aware that the depôts of regiments of the line army in England for India are considerable; you are aware, also, that they are entirely under the military authorities, and that, therefore, in the event of danger of invasion they would be a portion of the force at the disposal of the home Government?—Yes.

6258. Do you think that it is a desirable thing that a large body should be in depôt in this country which could not be so made available?—But I should think that under the emergency contemplated every man from Warley would flock to the defence of his country, and act under the chief military authority.

6259. Still it would be optional for him to do so, or not, as he chose?—I cannot suppose that any practical difficulty would arise from the depôt being distinct under the authority of the Secretary-of-State and Council.

6260. Then you do not think that it signifies whether a large military body is under the direct military authority of the country or not; I am referring to the depôt?—The depôt being kept up to feed the army of India, I do not think that there is any connection.

6261. (*Lord Stanley.*) You do not look upon that depôt in the light of a large organized military force?—Certainly not; the men remain there probably, from the necessities of the State, too short a time.

6262. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You are aware that the men at the depôts for the Indian regiments of the line are also there only for a short time?—Yes.

6263. Still they would be made available in a case of emergency?—But in a case of emergency I think that the inmates of the Warley depôt would be available also.

6264. By what authority, if enlisted not for service in England?—I cannot suppose it possible that men, with the feelings of soldiers, would stickle upon any legal right of that kind to refuse.

6265. Still it would be left to the men; it would not be an act of power; the Government could not use them unless the men themselves chose, it would rest with the good feeling of the men. I admit, with you, that they probably would have that good feeling; but still it would rest with them, would it not?—I consider that the depôt is under the authority now of the Secretary of State for India, and that any orders which were issued by the Secretary of State for India in Council to the commanding officer of the depôt would be obeyed, whatever they were, and without demur.

6266. (*Lord Stanley.*) The only difference would be, in a case of emergency, that the orders, whatever they were, to be issued to the commanding officer of the depôt at Warley, must come through the Secretary of State?—That, I apprehend, is the only difference which would exist.

6267. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you know under what Mutiny Act those troops at Warley are as long as they are in England?—The officer in command of the Warley depôt is in the next room, who will better answer the question.

6268. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Perhaps you are not aware that hitherto the attestation has not been so worded as to make the soldiers available for service in India only; the word "India" does not occur in the attestation?—It so appears.

6269. (*Lord Stanley.*) Are you inclined to believe, from your experience, that soldiers deteriorate in point of constitution and physical strength after a few years' residence in India?—Certainly not. I should be disposed to hold a contrary opinion. I have many instances here of regiments on their first arrival suffering to an immense extent. I will give one instance. In the year 1849 three regiments were sent from this country, in consequence of the Punjaub war. I think Her Majesty's 87th lost 22·55 per cent., in 8 months; the 70th lost about 12 per cent.; and the 75th the same, I believe in 7 or 8 months. I have the particulars here, which I will give as extracted from the Bengal medical report for the year ending the 31st March 1850, and dated the 5th February 1852:—

"The ratio of deaths (they observe) to strength "was 7·27 per cent.;" but at the same time they call "attention to "the lamentable amount of sickness "and mortality due to the unfortunate public exigency "that led to the arrival of three strong regiments at "the most sickly and unfavourable season of the year "for Europeans (composed chiefly of young men) in "the climate of Bengal. A reference to our detailed "history of the hospital transactions, and to the "tabular returns bearing upon Her Majesty's 70th, "75th, and 87th regiments, will show the several "causes to which the frightful mortality in their "ranks, especially the 87th, are to be attributed. But "for this, the mortality would have been 2 per cent. "less; and, excluding cholera, the mortality would "have been 5.02."

Her Majesty's 70th regiment: average strength 953; deaths during eleven months 123, or in the ratio of about 12·90 per cent. to strength, caused by "the "circumstances under which they embarked from "Ireland; their landing in India, in the hottest season "of the year (May 1849), aided by the dissipation, "exposure, and unaccustomed diet, which all act "energetically on new arrivals in India."

Her Majesty's 75th regiment: average strength, 1,023; deaths during eight months 103, or in the ratio to strength of 10.06 per cent.

Her Majesty's 87th regiment: mean strength 891; deaths 168, or in the ratio to strength of 18·85 per cent. In the words of the report,—"Of late years "an unprecedented mortality." But in addition 20 deaths occurred in other hospitals, and two out of hospital, so "that the total casualties in this unfortu- "nate regiment, from the date of arrival in India in "August and September 1849, to the 31st March

John Pollard Willoughby, Esq.

30th Nov. 1858.

"1850, a period of between seven and eight months, "amounted to 190, or in the ratio of 225.5 per cent.

6270. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Admitting, which I am ready to do, that on first landing regiments are weeded by sickness and death, and that after a certain period they are more efficient for service in India, do you think that that efficiency continues beyond given number of years,—say ten; or that after ten years a residence in India makes the constitution of the men deteriorate?—That is an opinion which would be more authentic from medical men who have long resided in the East; but judging by the deeds of the regiments which have made India their home, the nine European regiments which were formerly the Company's, and are now Her Majesty's Indian forces, I should say that they decidedly do not deteriorate.

6271. You think that there is no difference?—I should think not. I should say that, judging by the deeds which they have performed in the field during the late mutiny, there certainly are no symptoms of deterioration there. On the contrary, there is a most extraordinary case in relation to the difference between the 3rd Bombay Europeans and Her Majesty's 71st regiment in the action before Koonch, on the 7th May 1858, one of Sir Hugh Rose's victories. There were 20 cases of sunstroke in Her Majesty's regiment, 7 of which proved fatal, and not one in the Bombay Europeans. I have a note of that. It is an acknowledged fact.

6272. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) Will you have the kindness to read the note, because it has been disputed?—It must be authentic, because it is from the report of a medical committee, composed of the surgeons of Her Majesty's 14th dragoons and Her Majesty's 71st regiment of Highlanders, and the assistant surgeon of the 3rd Bombay Europeans. In the *Times* of the 25th October it stated that in one of General Michel's recent pursuits of the enemy, no less than 200 men of the same regiment either died or were *hors de combat* from the same cause; that is not strictly authentic, because it is not from a medical committee.

6273. (*Viscount Melville.*) That regiment which lost 600 men had been out in India for the last 16 years, had it not?—No; it is the 71st Highlanders.

6274. Was it not the 78th?—No. I beg your lordship's pardon, the 78th was not under General Michel. The following is the statement which I have:—"That European troops cannot keep up a "vigorous pursuit in this climate has been made "painfully evident by the losses which General "Michel incurred in the effort to intercept Tantia "Topee at Ragghur. It has only been lately known "at what sacrifice this victory was achieved. General "Michel lost 200 Highlanders, dead or *hors de combat* "from sunstroke." This is taken from the letter of the Bombay correspondent of the *Times* dated October 25th 1858.

6275. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That is rather an exceptional case probably?—I only instance it as one out of many cases. I believe that the direct cause was that the one regiment was gradually inured to field service or duty, and the other was sent on field service the moment it arrived. It is a great support to my argument, that you require a degree of seasoning and acclimatization in India which is of great moment to the efficiency of the troops.

6276. Do you not think that that acclimatization of troops, as far as field service goes, is required in any campaign in any part of the world; that is to say, that any regiment taking the field at first will always suffer more largely than a regiment which has been there for some time?—No doubt; but I think it will do so more in India than in any other part of the world.

6277. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) The general result of the instances you have mentioned proves, at all events, does it not, that for some time, say two or three years after regiments of the line arrive in India they are not so efficient for service in the field as local regiments, the men of which have been for some years inured to the climate?—That is my impression, they suffer more from the exposure necessarily incident to field service in India.

6278. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That would be, probably, chiefly confined to the more sickly men and the younger men, would it not?—I am not certain. The Medical Committee, before quoted, say, "the ages of "the men who died from sunstroke on the 7th May "varied from 22 to 31 years. They were amongst "the most athletic men of the regiment. One was "noted as a 'free liver,' another 'tolerably free,' and "the remainder bore the character of 'sober.' Another argument in favour of my opinion is this, I have here several medical testimonies, that as Her Majesty's regiments become seasoned their health improves. For instance, in the year which I mentioned in which there was that excessive rate of mortality in the 87th, the 70th, and the 75th regiments, the rate of the mortality of the 22nd, the 60th Rifles, and one or two other regiments, which had been in the country eight or ten years, was very moderate indeed; I believe as low as 2 per cent. In the Bengal Medical Board's report, from which I have already quoted, I find the following details given:—

Her Majesty's 22nd regiment, encamped; strength 1,081,—deaths 26, ratio 2·40.

Her Majesty's 60th rifles, Hill Station, strength 1,040,—deaths 19, ratio 1·82.

Her Majesty's 32nd regiment, Jullundur, strength 920, deaths 34, ratio 3.70.

Her Majesty's 96th regiment, Cawnpore, strength 824,—deaths 42, ratio 5·10.

The Medical Board, accounting for this comparatively high rate of mortality by observing that this regiment arrived at Calcutta from Van Diemen's Land in two divisions in April 1849, "when the weather "was hot in the extreme—fruits of the worst descrip- "tion in abundance; and some beverages made by "the natives eagerly sought for by the men."

Her Majesty's 80th regiment, Dinapore, strength 906,—deaths 45, ratio 5.

This regiment arrived in India from New South Wales on the 16th November 1844. The surgeon of the regiment compiled tables, showing the comparative mortality during twelve years, of the East India Company's artillery, and Her Majesty's regiments stationed at Dinapore. These give the following remarkable results.

"In these tables (observe the Medical Board) the lesser "rates of mortality enjoyed by the artillery company "is placed in a clear view, and shown to be only 4·37 "per cent., whilst in Her Majesty's infanty regiments "it is as high as 8.74 per cent. of mean strength," that is exactly double.

Her Majesty's 24th regiment, Wuzurabad, strength 728,—deaths 29, ratio 3·98.

6279. Would not the same principle extend to the recruits sent out to fill up the local corps, would not they suffer?—Not to the same extent, for this reason, that recruits would be thrown at once into a body of experienced soldiers, who would teach them what to do and what to avoid to a certain extent; my impression is that the advantage consists in that.

6280. (*Viscount Melville.*) For instance, at Kurrachee, in 1846, there were the artillery who, with all the acclimatizing influences, lost 100 men out of their small force?—That was by cholera chiefly; cholera, of course, is an exceptional case, so much so that we generally give the average from ordinary causes, and then add cholera. I am quite certain of this, that it is proved beyond doubt that Her Majesty's regiments are more susceptible to outbreaks from cholera than other troops; there are numerous instances; there was the 28th, which buried, I am afraid to say how many men in one day. Almost every corps has suffered. The 28th lost about 50 men in the passage between Bombay and Kurrachee.

6281. In the year to which I am alluding, the 86th, which had been four or five years in the country, lost 235 men?—Yes. In a report of the Medical Board,

dated the 1st May 1851, I find as follows:—"The "corps which suffered most in 1842, were Her "Majesty's 22nd, at Khurachee, in April and May, "and Her Majesty's 28th, at the same station, and on "board the Zenobia, fearfully, in September; Her "Majesty's 86th, at Colaba, immediately after landing "from England, and the troops at Poona, at which "station it (cholera) prevailed almost unremittingly "from March to September."

6282. We have had two medical gentlemen here, who have given us as their opinion that there is no such thing as acclimatizing, in the way in which we have hitherto considered it, and that the European constitution decidedly deteriorates after a lengthened residence in India?—Of course people get worn out in India as well as in any other climate.

6283. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) It has been given in evidence that the rate of mortality is greater in the increasing age of manhood than it is in the age of youth; that has been the ratio given from statistical papers?—If you will allow me I will read out a little extract from amongst my notes from the Medical Board's report for 1850. Some, I am told, assert that mortality is greater as the soldier advances in service; but in their general remarks I find the Bengal Medical Board observe as follows:—"The whole force was "nearly composed of young men, recently arrived "in India, and among these it was that all this sick-"ness and mortality occurred. Of the 216 deaths "recorded, 145 were of men under twenty-four, 69 "under thirty-five, and 2 only above the latter age." That is in a very lengthy report describing the sickness of every regiment separately, and is one of the general remarks which they make. I should weary the Commission were I to adduce all the data on which my opinion is founded, that the efficiency of European troops in India greatly depends on the degree in which they have gradually become inured. I will only therefore add the opinions of two medical officers. In his report for 1850, Dr. Inglis, the surgeon of Her Majesty's 10th regiment, states—"that the health of "the men has been progressively increasing year by "year since its arrival, a fact which he is inclined to "attribute to the combined operation of acclimatization "of the mass of the strength of the corps, more "favourable geographical positions occupied latterly, "and to the more regular habits of the men; and to "the last, he thinks, may be ascribed the largest in-"fluence. The effects of climate in preparing the con-"stitution for morbific influence operate chiefly on "the young unseasoned recruits, and after a few years' "residence in this country, the constitution seems "better able to resist such influence." Again, Dr. Grant, in charge of Her Majesty's 24th regiment, in his report for 1850, attributes the improved health of his regiment "to the fact that the men's constitutions "are more acclimatized."

6284. (*Viscount Melville.*) With regard to sending out reinforcements and drafts to India, have you considered the best route?—I happened to be a member of a Committee of the House of Commons which sat upon that subject. Of course we cannot altogether disregard the question of expense; we have no surplus in India. Parliament have declared, as far as they can do, that there is no connexion between Indian liabilities and the Imperial exchequer, and therefore the conclusion at which I arrive is that the Overland route should be resorted to in times of great emergency, but that we should not rely upon it as the ordinary route. In the second place, I think that also in times of emergency steamers by the Cape route should be resorted to; but as a general rule, on the ground of finance, and also from what I have heard from many authorities, namely, that there is superior comfort to the men on board first-class sailing vessels, I think that that should be our great resource. I may state that our expenditure since the mutiny up to this date, in sending the troops to India alone, has been 2,148,336*l.*, as follows:—

Cost of the transport of troops to India since the commencement of the mutiny, so far as the same can at present be ascertained. June 1857 to November 1858.

John Pollard Willoughby, Esq. 30th Nov. 1858.

	£
Passage money of officers - -	288,850
Do. of men - - -	1,760,150
Claim by the Admiralty for transport of troops for service in India by Her Majesty's ships and in transports hired by the Admiralty - - -	80,438
Disbursements by Captain Johnson, the agent at Alexandria, up to September 1858, on account of officers and men proceeding overland - - -	18,898
	£2,148,336

6285. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What number of troops have been sent, in round numbers?—I think about 60,000. I have not got up to the very latest returns, but I have the precise numbers from Parliamentary papers. In a letter to the Government of India, dated the 9th September, they are informed that when the reinforcements then ordered arrived, the strength of the European forces in India, exclusive of officers, would be 86,968. Between the 1st July and 10th September 1857, 34,777 of all arms were sent from England, the Cape, Mauritius, and China; and between the 11th September and the 18th February 1858, a further reinforcement of 20,109; see Report of Select Committee of House of Commons, p. 266 and 270. I wish to point out, what even now, when the emergency may be said to be passing away, is the difference which it makes. By the Overland route we are paying 40*l.* per man. By the last four steamers which were sent out viâ the Cape, the rate per man was as follows:—To Bombay, per "Oneida," embarked on the 6th of August from Southampton, 27*l.* 4*s.* 10*d.*; to Calcutta, per "Calcutta," embarked 19th of September from Portsmouth, 33*l.*; to Calcutta, per "Lady Jocelyn," embarked on the 20th of September from Portsmouth, 33*l.*; to Calcutta, per "Golden Fleece," embarked on the 14th of April from Gravesend, 38*l.* By sailing vessels viâ the Cape, the rates per head were as follow:—To Calcutta, 14*l.* 13*s.* 6*d.*; ditto, 13*l.* 16*s.* 10*d.*; ditto, 11*l.* 17*s.* 9*d.*; ditto, 13*l.* 14*s.*; To Madras, 17*l.* 17*s.*; ditto, 10*l.* 16*s.* 3*d.*; ditto, 13*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.*; ditto, 10*l.* 4*s.*; To Bombay, 13*l.* 17*s.* 6*d.*; ditto, 11*l.* 14*s*; ditto, 11*l.* 4*s.* 10*d.*; ditto, 11*l.* 7*s.* 6*d.*; To Kurrachee, 15*l.* 7*s.* 6*d.*; ditto, 12*l.* 12*s.* 6*d.* Those vessels were despatched in August, September, and October 1858.

6286. (*Lord Stanley.*) So that habitually to substitute the Overland route for that by the Cape in sailing vessels, would be to increase about threefold the cost of transport?—I think so.

6287. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) It is now done by going into the open market. Supposing a regular system were established, could not that expenditure be very much reduced?—My experience of Government establishments is, that they are in the end dearer than what you can get from such a large commercial marine as we possess in England. You never find any difficulty in getting ships of the first class.

6288. Taking into account the fact of the railroad being complete throughout, could not you make an arrangement for transit by the Overland route at a cheaper rate than you have stated?—Probably; perhaps the Oriental Company, if they were asked to-morrow, would lower their terms somewhat; but the expense of maintaining transports on both sides would be very large, especially on the Suez side, the expense of coal at Suez is, I believe, double what it is even in Bombay.

6289. (*Viscount Melville.*) What is the difference in the length of time between the voyage in a sailing vessel and in a steamer?—That was all minutely ascertained by the Committee of the House of Commons, and it is recorded in this Blue-book. I cannot exactly state from memory, but I think the difference in the long run was 37 days between steamers and

John Pollard Willoughby, Esq.

30th Nov. 1858.

sailing vessels. There were three instances of the sailing vessel beating the steamer.

6290. (*Lord Stanley.*) But your case is that on ordinary occasions, when there is no pressing emergency, the saving of a few days in the conveyance of the troops is not so great an object as to render it expedient to incur a very large expenditure?—I think not, certainly; and I believe I am right in saying that the men are more comfortable on board a first-class sailing vessel than they are on board a steamer, and certainly when recruits are very young the sea-voyage does them no harm.

6291. If, in lieu of the present system of going into the market for transports, the Indian Government were to establish a regular transport service of its own, would it not be compelled to employ those ships during the whole year, whereas it could only convey troops safely and conveniently, on account of their health, during eight months at most out of the twelve?—Undoubtedly, that is a reason why a Government establishment would not answer, if exclusively devoted to India. The first thing with regard to the efficiency of a force in India, as I have mentioned before, is that it should only arrive at particular periods, excepting, of course, in cases of great emergency. I have mentioned the cases of the three regiments which suffered so much, but I did not of course intend to convey any reflection upon their being sent, because there was a great emergency, and they were obliged to be sent, whatever the consequences were.

6292. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Supposing that the transport was not an Indian transport, though made use of to take troops to India, but that it was for the general service of the empire, do not you think that that would make a difference?—That is a great question; then I am afraid that you must have such an extensive establishment that it would still be in the long run a very expensive one. You might have one or two vessels like the "Himalaya;" they might be subsidiary to the service, and perhaps of advantage.

6293. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) That would apply merely to transports used on this side, and not on the Suez side?—Just so, on the Suez side it would be exceedingly difficult.

6294. For that portion of the transport the vessels must be kept up at all seasons, although only available during part of the year?—Undoubtedly.

6295. (*Viscount Melville.*) I presume that you would always have the reliefs who were sent from here round the Cape to leave this country about June or July?—Yes, or down to August; August I think is as good a time as any. June, July, and August are the best months.

6296. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You are aware that it had been the rule latterly before the outbreak, not to send drafts excepting at that period of the year?—Yes; the representations from the local authorities in India to my knowledge were very strong, and of course the authorities of England now, whenever they can, adopt that rule.

6297. (*Lord Stanley.*) Have you formed any opinion upon the fourth head of enquiry which we have before us, namely, whether the local European force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?—I am of opinion that they should be separately recruited for, as at present. In regard to volunteers, the system of volunteering in India now does exist as far as volunteering from one of her Majesty's regiments of the line to another, but I do not believe that it exists, for what were the Company's European regiments.

6298. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you extend it to them?—I can see no objection to it whatsoever, although I should not depend upon that as a permanent resource.

6299. You think that the local force would be too large probably to be kept up in that way, or have you any other way?—My idea is, that if there is sufficient military spirit in the nation to provide for a large army, I should not apprehend that you would find difficulty in obtaining recruits for the local army, because it is a very popular service. It has always been considered so hitherto, and I believe that, except during the pinch of the Crimean war, there has never hitherto been found any difficulty; on the contrary, we have been obliged to put restrictions upon our officers recruiting. The other day the cavalry, which of course was a particular class of men, that is to say, they were of a lower standard than usual, flocked in in such numbers that we were obliged to prohibit further recruiting for a certain time; and even at this moment I believe it is under restrictions.

6300. Have you ever contemplated the idea of exchange between the officers of the local army and those of the army of the line?—Of course that is more of a military question than a civilian's; but I am sorry to think that I do not see my way to introducing that system into two armies, the system of which is so different, the one being a seniority service, and the other a service in which the purchase system prevails. Then, on the other hand, the officers of Her Majesty's local force in India are, as the Commission is aware, entitled to various rights and privileges, and pension either according to rank or length of service, military and medical widow and orphan funds, things which do not prevail similarly in Her Majesty's army, and, therefore, I cannot to myself picture even an instance where the party exchanging and the party with whom he exchanges should be upon equal terms, so that the exchange should be permitted without doing injury to the juniors under the person who exchanges. These important rights and privileges are provided for by the 56th Section of the last India Act, which I do not think can be got over.

6301. Supposing those difficulties could be got over do you think that the power of exchange would be desirable?—I cannot say that I do, on a general system, for this reason, that it would interfere with what I consider to be the great object to be attained in India, namely, concentrating a man's energies upon India alone. If you allow the purchase system, a man whenever it is his interest or pleasure will exchange to England or the colonies, and then poor India will suffer. That is the common sense view which I take of it; of course, my opinion is not worth much.

6302. You do not anticipate what has been given in evidence at various times, and has been stated in various papers, that the local force would be looked down upon, unless it had the power of exchange?—I do not think that the local force would be looked down upon if it had not the power of exchange; it would be looked down upon if it was not treated with equal impartiality as the army of the line, but not otherwise. Of course, in one respect there would be good resulting from the exchange system, as you would be able to employ officers of the local army; but that, I think, is within the prerogative of Her Majesty at the present moment.

6303. As regards the power of the late Court of Directors, had they not the power of superseding any appointment which might have been made by the Governor-General if they so thought fit?—In the last resort they had the power by Act of Parliament of dismissing, or suspending, or restoring any of their servants, civil or military.

6304. And that power is now in the Secretary of State and Council?—Yes.

6305. So that virtually they have now the power to supersede the acts of the Governor-General, though it is rarely and perhaps never exercised?—In the last resort certainly. But what I attach great importance to is that that authority should be exercised by persons possessing a knowledge of India.

6306. Has it been exercised?—Undoubtedly, there have been instances of dispensing with the services of officers, and still more of restoring officers to the service.

6307. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Is there any difference in the expense (bounty and levy money included) of a recruit sent to India to a Queen's regiment and of one sent to a Company's regiment?—Not the least; the bounty money and the enrolment money are exactly the same.

6308. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) It has been stated on several occasions here that the cost of recruits for the Company's service is very much greater than that for Her Majesty's, and that the Company's European force has always been kept below the proper complement in consequence of its being impossible to procure a sufficient number of recruits for India, are you aware that such is the case?—No; I believe that the contrary is the fact. Here is a statement which was furnished to the India house, signed by the paymaster of the depôt at Warley; it gives every expense, I believe, of a company's recruit, and the average is 16*l.* 11*s.* 10½*d.* We have never experienced any difficulty in obtaining recruits, except for a short time during the war in the Crimea. The average number of East India Company's recruits sent out to India in ten years, from 1846 to 1856, I find to have been 1,646. Since the mutiny, however, between 9,000 and 10,000 have been enlisted and despatched. During the first nine months, from June 1857 to February 1858, we sent out 4,583; namely, to Calcutta, 3,197; Madras, 644; and Bombay, 742. *Vide* Report of Select Committee of House of Commons, p. 292.

6309. (*Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) Before embarkation?—Yes. It is a statement of the expense of the depôt at Warley for the year 1857. I am told that what the Government pays now for a soldier sent to India is below that amount, but unless I see the data upon which the two estimates are formed, I cannot say whether they are true estimates or not. For instance, 18,678*l.* of this estimate is for clothing. I am not aware whether that item is included in the other estimate. Then again the kits of recruits is another item, that is 10,379*l.* I am not certain whether those two items are included in the other estimate, if they are not, of course the comparison is not a fair one.

The witness delivered in the following paper:

STATEMENT of the Expense of the Depôt at Warley for the Year 1857.

No. of Recruits borne on the Strength of the Depôt during the Year.	Permanent Staff of the Depôt, Commissioned and Non-commissioned.	Pay of Recruits up to time of leaving Depôt.	Clothing of Recruits.	Kits of Recruits.	Miscellaneous Expenses.							
					Alteration and Marking Clothing.	Repair of Arms.	Embarkations, Railway, Boat-hire, Carriage of Baggage, and Staff-Serjeants' Expenses.	Barrack Department, viz. Lights, Fuel, Bedding Straw, &c.; Alterations, Additions, Repairs of Buildings, &c.; Barrack Furniture and Utensils; Pay of Artificers and Men employed, &c.	Route and Rewards, Rates and Taxes, Petty Disbursements, &c.	Recruiting Officers' Bills.	Bounty to Recruits, and Allowances to Serjeants escorting Recruits.	Conveyance of Recruits from Districts to Depôt.
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
4,541	3,064 6 9¾	19,336 4 4¼	18,678 19 0	10,379 19 5	713 6 7	58 7 4	896 18 9½	1,889 14 2½	1,588 7 10¾	7,950 9 10½	6,315 12 6	2,478 14 8½
					Total Miscellaneous Charges - - - - £21,891 11*s.* 11*d.*							

Total expense of the depôt at Warley for the year 1857 was - - - - £75,351. 1*s.* 6*d.*
Average cost of 4,541 men is - - - - £16. 11*s.* 10½*d.* per man.
This Return does not include the cost of the Sappers and Miners sent from Warley for training at Chatham.

(Signed) JOHN T. LESLIE, Colonel Commandant. H. STEVENS, Lieutenant-Colonel and Paymaster.

6310. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you see any reason why the expense of the recruits for the two armies might not be prospectively equalized?—Not the least; if there is any difference, which I am not aware of, in what is given either to the men themselves or to the recruiting officers, I do not see the slightest reason why they should not be equalized.

6311. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) You advocate a large European local force in India. Have you conceived any mode for raising, organizing, and commanding such a force?—One of my reasons for thinking that there is no other way of raising the force necessary for India is, that we have a body of officers already provided whose services you cannot dispense with, and as the officers of a regiment constitute the chief portion of the expense, in no other mode do I think, under the present state of the finances of India, that a local force can be raised. If the Commission will allow me, I will read a paragraph of a letter from the Government of India, which explains much better than I am able to do why it should be so. This is a letter from the Government of India to the late Court of Directors, dated the 6th of June 1857. After recommending that a large increase of European strength should be made, they proceed as follows:—"It appears to us that the only means by which an adequate increase to the European troops serving in India can be made, and a safe balance between the European and native armies can be obtained without such an increased expenditure as the resources of the country will not support, is by employing the European officers of the lost native regiments to officer new levies of Europeans, to be added to the Company's establishment. The current revenues of India, of course, will be unable to meet the large increase of current expenditure which this augmentation will involve. It may be (although looking at the great population and the immense extent of territory to be guarded, and the very large native force of regulars and irregulars to be overawed, we cannot flatter ourselves that such a result is possible), that when the strength and the reputation for strength of the British Government is restored, and the native army is reorganized, some small diminution of this augmented strength may be possible as a permanent arrangement; but it may be taken as certain that the greater part of the augmentation is permanently necessary. In order permanently to provide for this large increase of our European troops, we know of no available resource, but to save an equal or nearly an equal amount, by an equivalent or nearly equivalent reduction of our native troops. The officers of a regiment of regular troops, whether Europeans or natives, cost a large proportion of the whole cost of the regiment; and the European officers in the Company's service must be retained, whatever becomes of their men. Therefore we regard the employment of the European officers of the native regiments which have mutinied, or which may mutiny, or which may be found untrustworthy, as officers of new regiments of Company's Europeans, not only as in all respects the best possible arrangement, but also as the only arrangement financially possible. It is already too apparent that this arrangement, if adopted, will relieve the Indian finances from all burden on account of at least a large proportion of the augmentation proposed. The remainder, if there shall be any remainder, may be provided for by an extension of the

John Pollard Willoughby, Esq.

30th Nov. 1858.

system, or by a moderate augmentation of the number of Her Majesty's regiments on the establishment, or by both methods combined." I have seen another paper, a long minute by Mr. Peter Grant, of the Bengal Council, in which he has worked that out very strongly. This letter is of more authority of course, it being from the combined Government.

6312. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Supposing that you could employ these officers fairly to themselves in any other way. the financial difficulty, as far as the officers were concerned, would be got rid of?—It would be, as far as the officers, but not as far as the expense went.

6313. Why not?—There would be an addition to fill up their places. If the officers were otherwise provided for, you must still have European officers for the increased force.

6314. Supposing you were obliged to employ so many more persons that it would absorb the whole of the officers who are without men, would you not then get over the difficulty?—Not the financial difficulty—certainly not; they say, "We have not got the "money."

6315. For instance, we are now raising local police corps?—Yes.

6316. They must have a certain number of officers. Suppose that a large proportion of the officers were so employed—suppose, again, that you adopted the system of *seconding*, by which means all the places in the regiments of officers in civil employment were filled up, a large number of officers would be so absorbed. Supposing that in those modes the officers were absorbed, would not it meet the financial difficulty as regards the officers?—It would meet in part the difficulty; but I cannot suppose that the employment of by far the larger proportion of the officers of the 74 Bengal regiments, can be provided for in that way.

6317. But suppose that it could?—By that hypothesis, of course the case would be met, but I do not myself perceive how it can be realized.

The witness withdrew.

Colonel J. T. Leslie, C.B.

Colonel JOHN T. LESLIE, C.B., further examined.

6318. (*Chairman.*) You have command of the depôt at Warley?—Yes.

6319. Have you any information to give to the Commission upon the subject of recruiting?—Nothing further than that, as far as we are concerned, it has gone on most favourably. Within the last seventeen months we have sent within 100 of 10,000 men of all arms to India, and we have found no difficulty.

6320. Are you in a position to say what the amount of the European local force in India is now?—About 22,000 I should say, as nearly as possible, exclusive of the Queen's regiments.

6321. Would not that exceed the number allowed by Act of Parliament to be raised for India?—I think not; as nearly as I can calculate it is from 20,000 to 22,000, at present.

6322. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What does the Act say on that point?—I cannot say, it was altered.

6323. You do not guide yourself by the Act?—No; the requisitions for men are sent from the India House. We send them out as ordered, but we keep recruiting as fast as we can; there is no limit whatever to the recruiting.

6324. Was there never any limit?—There is a limit occasionally, but since the disturbances there has been no limit.

6325. (*Chairman.*) Are the men recruited for the different services and for different presidencies and regiments?—Not for the different presidencies or regiments, but for the different arms, artillery, cavalry, and infantry.

6326. How is it arranged as to the presidency?—That is done at the India House according to the demands of each presidency.

6327. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Who apportions the men?—When they get out they are put to regiments from the Adjutant-general's office.

6328. Supposing 300 men are wanted for Bombay, 500 for Bengal, and 300 for Madras, you get an order to send out those drafts respectively; how do you select those men?—Sometimes I get an order to send so many artillery and so many cavalry; sometimes it is left entirely to me, and I send them according to the proportions at the depôt at the time.

6329. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Does a man understand that he is enlisted for Her Majesty's general service or for the Indian service alone?—For the Indian service exclusively.

6330. (*Chairman.*) Where are the services of the men confined to?—To India alone.

6331. (*Col. Burlton.*) There is nothing about India in the attestation?—But it is an understood thing; the men understand it so. The question put to them in the attestation is as follows: "Are you "willing to be attested to serve in the Artillery (or "otherwise) of Her Majesty's *Indian* military forces," &c.

6332. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Supposing that a regiment was ordered from India to China, and supposing that some of the men refused to go, would they be liable to be punished?—I think they would be bound to go; the oath is exactly the same as for the troops of the line.

6333. What makes you think then that the service is understood to be for India only?—I do not know that I have any further reasons to give, but simply that the men are considered available for service in China or anywhere in the East.

6334. (*Lord Stanley.*) When you speak of the men understanding that they are available for service in India only, you mean that their understanding is that they are to join an army, the head-quarters of which are in India, and which after any expedition beyond the frontier will return to its head-quarters?—Precisely; they are a local army to all intents and purposes, but available for any service in the immediate neighbourhood; there has never been an instance of any regiment coming further than the Cape of Good Hope, and no objection was made at that time.

6335. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I have no doubt that the good feeling of the men would always make them do it, but do you think that they are compelled to do it?—I think so, certainly.

6336. (*Lord Stanley.*) They are enlisted, I apprehend, without any limit as to the part of the world in which they shall serve?—I think so. I should say that they would not consider themselves bound to come to England again for service, although I do not believe that they would object to it. I consider that it is a local army, and for service to the east of the Cape of Good Hope entirely.

6337. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Under what authority do you carry on the discipline of the recruits at Warley?—Under the articles of war for Her Majesty's service; we are under the Horse Guards entirely as to discipline.

6338. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Who confirms your courts-martial?— All our district courts-martial are held at Chatham, and are confirmed by the Commander-in-chief.

6339. (*Chairman.*) What is the average length of time of a recruit being at Warley before he goes out?—It is quite exceptional. The men go now almost as soon as they come in. We embark about 650 men a month, and have done so for the last twelvemonth as regularly as possible. A man is perhaps a fortnight or three weeks at the depôt, but before the late occurrences the general average was from four to five months.

6340. Then he goes out now without any drill whatever?—Yes; all we can do is to clothe him and get him clean.

6341. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Have you not an efficient establishment of non-commissioned officers?—Yes, and quite sufficient; but we are so limited for room that to supply the numbers required in India we must keep sending them out. We can only take 1,200 men.

6342. Is that establishment of non-commissioned officers retained permanently in England?—Yes.

6343. They never go to India?—No; we send the recruits as non-commissioned officers.

6344. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that that answers well?—It answers when the men have been here a few months and gained a little experience, but latterly we have been obliged to get pensioners to go out with the recruits.

6345. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) They merely have, I suppose, what is called lance promotion?—They get up to be lance serjeants, and receive pay accordingly while at the depôt.

6346. Suppose they go to India?—Their rank is then all gone; they lose everything on landing.

6347. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) But they are very soon promoted?—Yes, if they are well behaved.

6348. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Can you give us any comparative statement of the expense of a soldier enlisted for local service under you, and a soldier of the moveable army who is enlisted by us?—No; I do not know what it is in the Queen's service, but as far as I recollect it is about 16*l.* a man for the Company's service before he embarks from the depôt; I gave it all in figures some time ago.

6349. You do not know the comparison?—No, but I should imagine that the amount is about the same.

6350. (*Chairman.*) Do you give the same bounty money on enlistment as is given in the Queen's service?—Yes.

6351. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) A certain amount is given to the officers, is it not?—Yes, for each man; when it began we had, I believe, a difficulty in getting recruits, the officers appointed to that service were very few, and that allowance has been continued ever since; they get 1*l.* per man, and it certainly has worked well, because in all difficulties, we have been able fully to keep up the Indian force by recruiting here. We have only eight recruiting officers for the whole service.

6352. We generally recruit for you, do not we?—No.

6353. (*Chairman.*) How then does it happen that the number of your recruits is shown in our return every week?—We send in a return of the number recruited every week by our own people.

6354. (*Lord Stanley.*) The recruiting agency is separate, although it is under the same command?—Yes.

6355. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) It is under the inspection of the general field officer?—Yes, so far as the discipline goes, and the inspecting field officer passes all the recruits.

6356. (*Chairman.*) What is the expense of a recruit arriving at Warley?—It is merely the intermediate levy; of course in that I would include the officer; I have not given it as a separate thing, but I have given the expense for the whole up to the time of the recruit leaving Warley. I could give information as to the expense up to the time of the recruits coming to Warley, if thought necessary, by reference to the books.

6357. With what clothing do you supply the recruits on their going out?—Exactly the same as in the Queen's service, with the exception of the recent order. We have not given them the light clothing yet, because it has not yet been taken up, that I imagine will follow.

6358. There will be a suit of light clothing for them to take out as well?—Yes.

6359. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you not think that the light clothing is got much better in India?—I have seen a suit of the light clothing. I think the change is a very good one, but I think the material will very soon break to pieces, it is a jean.

6360. (*Chairman.*) Do you give the recruits the same sea-kit as you have been accustomed to give them?—We have done so hitherto; we have not changed it yet, but if we take up what has been taken up in the Queen's service we shall of course change it.

6361. Under what stoppages are your men put for the sea-kit?—I do not know how that has been calculated, the men have always received on arriving in India a balance of 19*s.* 10*d.*, which has been supposed to be the balance after all expenses of feeding and clothing them; that was adopted many years back, and it has still gone on. We do not account to the men for the pay which would be issued on the voyage. We give them the sum of 19*s.* 10*d.* on their landing, it is put to their credit after going round the Cape.

6362. The way in which it is done in our service, I believe, is to advance three months' pay?—I think that that has been a recent order in the Queen's service, but we do not do so; we do not account to the men for their pay, we give them the balance after the voyage.

6363. You provide them with everything?—Yes.

6364. Including the sea kit?—Yes, and then give them a balance of 19*s.* odd.

6365. Out of that does the soldier provide his suit of light clothing on his arrival in India?—That is left entirely to the commanding officer. As soon as the men join the regiment he provides them with what happens to be convenient to the regiment.

6366. Does the soldier pay for the suit of light clothing?—Yes, whatever is the custom of the regiment he has to pay for it.

6367. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) It is not furnished him by the Government?—No; but there had been no general rule for any light clothing up to the time when I left India. Every commanding officer had his own plan.

6368. Therefore in that respect the recruit for the local service is put exactly in the same condition as the soldier of the ordinary service, excepting that his pay is not accounted for?—Precisely so.

6369. Do you think that it would be an advantage that the recruits should be longer here, that they should be more fully drilled than they are?—I think it would be an advantage to a certain extent, but not beyond a certain number of months. I think that formerly when it was four months, it answered very well. If men are kept too long desertions increase, especially at present. I think the men may be got into a very efficient state in four months.

6370. (*Chairman.*) Have you any desertions now?—Very few, owing to the rapid way in which the men are sent out.

6371. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have there not been numerous instances of men deserting from the army of the line and re-enlisting with you?—Yes, a very great many.

6372. Has not the fact of the facility of being sent out to India and therefore not being discovered, rather encouraged that?—I dare say it may have done so; I could not say positively, but it has always been the case that when we have sent recruits out rapidly we have had deserters from her Majesty's service.

6373. Which no doubt is owing to the fact of their getting the double bounty?—Undoubtedly, but a great proportion of them desert again.

6374. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) Before they start?—Yes, in fact it has been so bad that since I have commanded the depôt I have invariably endeavoured to find a means of keeping those men from receiving their bounty until about to embark.

6375. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are your men armed with the Enfield rifle?—Yes.

6376. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do they go out armed?—No; we send a certain proportion of arms on board for their drill, and those are returned into store on

Colonel J. T. Leslie, C.B.
10th Nov. 1858.

arrival in India; they are not armed till they get to the regiment.

6377. Are they taught shooting before they go?—Yes, if we have them long enough. We have very efficient drill masters. All our staff-serjeants have been through the drill; they are very efficient in that respect.

6378. Would it not be of great advantage that the men should be taught?—Undoubtedly it would; but we cannot retain them long enough. We have only room for 1,200 in the barracks, and we must keep sending them out, or we must stop recruiting.

6379. (*Chairman.*) If the amount of the local force in India were much increased, it would be necessary to add very much to your accommodation?—Very much.

6380. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What per-centage do you think would be required at the depôt in proportion to the force in India?—I have reported 15 per cent., which is a large per-centage; but I believe that in actual practice 10 or 12 per cent. would be enough.

6381. (*Chairman.*) What staff have you?—The commandant, a second in command, a paymaster (who is effective as a duty officer), an adjutant, two subalterns, a surgeon, and an assistant-surgeon.

6382. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is that sufficient?—It is sufficient for the way in which we carry on the duty at present. We have a large number of very efficient staff-serjeants.

6383. Then in fact the staff sergeants do the duty of officers?—Yes.

6384. Do you think that a good plan?—It has answered admirably with us. They are a very superior class of men, and generally men who have been for some years in Her Majesty's service; we take them on for the special purpose after being pensioned.

6385. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you send the men out at all seasons of the year?—We have sent them at all seasons lately.

6386. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Did you say that the staff sergeants were chiefly pensioners from Her Majesty's service?—Yes.

6387. Is there any reason why you should employ them; could not you take men from the local service?—No, we find that men who have been in India are not effective in that respect; men who have earned a pension in India are generally too much worn out for the active duties of a place like our depôt.

6388. (*Chairman.*) Do you know what you pay for the free kit which you give?—Three guineas; that is supposed to be the price of the free kit. We do not know exactly what is paid for it to the contractor, but we charge in that proportion for any that is lost. Our storekeeper supplies all these things. I have no means of knowing the actual cost, it may be three guineas, or more or less, but three guineas is supposed to be the value of it, and if a man is accused of receiving a free kit unlawfully he is charged with three guineas upon his trial.

6389. What balance of the man's bounty do you give, what do you pay in money?—Three pounds; it has been increased lately, it is the same bounty as the Queen's. The free kit is either three pounds or three guineas.

6390. Is the uniform the same in all the local regiments in India?—No; the infantry uniforms are all red, of course, but with different facings.

6391. How do you supply the men with clothing before they go out there?—It is merely depôt clothing which they have here; when they get to their regiments they are supplied from the clothing agency in each presidency.

6392. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What becomes of the clothing which they take out?—It is given to them, they use it for drill.

6393. What do you give them?—A tunic and drill jacket.

6394. That is used merely to take them out?—Yes; it is now comparatively new by the time the man lands, because he goes so rapidly; but formerly the man had it perhaps a year before he arrived.

6395. (*Chairman.*) He now gets a new suit of clothes on coming to you, and another when he lands?—Yes, and he is entitled to a new suit from the clothing agency when he lands.

The witness withdrew.

C. Raikes, Esq.

CHARLES RAIKES, Esq., examined.

6396. (*Chairman.*) You belong to the Bengal civil service?—I do.

6397. Will you have the goodness to state to the Commission the length of time you have been in India?—I have been 27 years in India, in the North-western Provinces and Punjaub. I have been attached to the North-western Provinces of the Bengal presidency for that period.

6398. From what year?—From 1831; I have also been in the Punjaub. I was Commissioner of Lahore for three years.

6399. You have had some questions submitted to you from the Commission?—Yes; I received them two or three days ago, but they are on military matters with which I am not acquainted. I may state that I was called upon by Mr. Colvin to submit a scheme for the re-organization of the police in the fort of Agra, last August, which I did, and my scheme has, I believe, formed the basis of Lord Canning's present operations with regard to the police, but it has been altered and modified by other people.

6400. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What is your view as regards the police, without entering into detail?—I think that the civil police is very inefficient, and that it would be much improved by having a military organization or a *quasi* military organization; that thus the men would be better paid, and therefore better servants of the public altogether. I would also take off all those duties which have been hitherto imposed most unnecessarily on the army, or it would be unnecessary in future to impose such duties upon the army, namely, the duties of guarding treasuries, escorting treasure from place to place, furnishing guards at the civil offices; all duties of that kind should be imposed upon the organized police, and thereby the native army might be, in my own opinion, most materially educed, thus the expenses which have been thrown away upon policemen of no sort of use in protecting the country, would be lessened and the public peace very much better secured.

6401. Do you contemplate that the police force which you propose should be so well organized that fewer men would be required, and that in fact it would be a diminution of expense, or would it be an additional expense?—A diminution of the native army, I think, could be made, and the sum saved by that diminution when added to the sums now paid for the native police would, on the whole, allow a considerable diminution of expense with an immense increase of force.

6402. (*Chairman.*) Do you think that the police would do as a substitute for the native army in the same proportion?—I would certainly reduce the native army in the same proportion as the police were organized.

6403. How would you arm the police?—With light muskets, as they were in the Punjaub.

6404. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then, in fact, to all intents and purposes, they would be a military organized body, somewhat on the principle of irregular infantry or cavalry, or whatever it would be?—Yes; or if there is an objection to the term "military police," they would be a kind of organized police.

6405. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Would you make any difference in the arming of the police?—I do not see why there should be any difference.

6406. Would you give the police the same military training as the men of the line?—Yes, the same military training.

6407. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In taking into account the relative force of Europeans to the natives, you would, according to your views, have to take into account the number of police?—Yes. I would have them counted as so many soldiers.

6408. What force of armed Europeans would you have to natives, both the troops and police combined?—I consider that we should have one-third European soldiers to secure the country, supposing the artillery to be exceedingly strong. If the artillery was kept in our hands, I should feel that India was perfectly safe. But I also think (on which I have thought a good deal) that as regards the native portion of the army, particularly the part which is to be the regular native army, if there is a regular native army, an immense deal depends upon throwing separate nationalities into separate companies or troops in every regiment. I am satisfied that the principle upon which the guide corps was raised, upon which I have often conversed with my friend Sir Henry Lawrence, is a most important one, and gives us in a native regiment almost the power of a European regiment. You might have one company of Sikhs, one company of Nepaulese, one of Hindostanees, and so on. It is easy to get up to six or seven tribes or nationalities; men will enlist in companies, when they will not enlist to be thrown together into a regiment.

6409. You would prefer that?—Yes; they will not enlist otherwise.

6410. (*Chairman.*) How are the police organized, in battalions or companies?—I have been accustomed to see them in regiments.

6411. With what number of officers?—There were a captain of police, a native commandant, and a native adjutant.

6412. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) What number of men were there in a regiment?—I think 800.

6413. (*Chairman.*) And only three officers?—The police of which I speak, in the Punjaub, had one captain over two or three regiments, and there were a native commandant and a native adjutant, and several subordinate native officers.

6414. Where were the men taken from?—Some of them were Runjeet Singh's old regiments, and some of them were raised in my division whilst I was there; they were magnificent regiments.

6415. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you contemplate the local police being exclusively under the civil authorities, or in any respect under the Commander-in-chief?—I have hitherto contemplated their being under the civil authority.

6416. Exclusively?—Yes.

6417. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) I believe in your book you propose to have more than one European officer?—Yes. I merely speak of what has been the case in the Punjaub.

6418. I think you propose to have a commandant and adjutant, and one or two officers?—Yes.

6419. That is four or five officers?—Yes. I would have an officer at each district, and a regiment, as it were, for a division.

6420. A certain number of police battalions to compose a division?—Yes.

6421. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Do you contemplate having a civil police as well as a military police?—I think that the detectives for civil duty should be taken from the military police. I would have no other police except the village Chokeedars. I would have detectives taken from the best men of the military police, and paid more highly.

6422. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Have you witnessed the revolt of the troops?—Yes.

6423. Do you think it safe to place arms in the hands of these natives whom you call police?—I think they are just as dangerous to the State as any sepoys would be.

6424. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) What force of military police would you contemplate having for the Bengal presidency?—I have never considered that matter.

6425. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you propose that the police should have the same advantages with regard to pensions as soldiers of the line?—I think they should.

6426. (*Col. Burlton.*) And the same pay?—I think so.

6427. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) With what powers to reward and punish do you propose to invest the commanding officer of a police corps?—I would make him as nearly absolute as any man can be with safety.

6428. Have you formed any opinion as to the particular powers which you would give?—Yes; I would give the commanding officer the absolute power of dismissal without any court-martial; he should be an *ex-officio* magistrate, and he should have the power as a magistrate, if any man committed an offence against the civil law, of punishing him at once.

6429. To what extent would that give him power with respect to corporal punishment?—That would give him no power, but I think that corporal punishment should also be added. Our ordinary regulations would not give him any power over a man to inflict corporal punishment except in the case of theft; but I think that he should have that power, and that the native soldier and the British soldier should be in the same category as far as that is concerned. I think it a great mistake that the power of flogging native soldiers was ever taken away, and I think it should be given to those officers commanding regiments.

6430. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Would there be any difference between the military police which you contemplate and the sepoy regiments, except giving the commanding officer greater power?—It would have fewer officers; it would be less costly.

6431. It would have fewer officers compared with a regular regiment; would it have fewer compared with an irregular regiment of infantry?—It would have fewer officers in either case, I think.

6432. I understand you to contemplate 800 men as the force of a regiment of police?—Yes; whatever was the number of police organized they would require comparatively a less number of officers than a regular regiment.

6433. They would be just as dangerous as the sepoy would be in the event of another outbreak?—Yes; wherever they were organized they have behaved quite as badly in Oude lately, and therefore I suppose they would; the very jail guards who were organized immediately considered themselves sepoys for the nonce.

6434. Can you give us any idea of what would be considered for the peace of that presidency to which we are alluding, the proportion that there ought to be of armed natives to armed Europeans?—I can answer for the north-western provinces, excluding the Delhi division. In my opinion 8,500 cavalry and 20,000 infantry would be sufficient; that is, for Meerut, Rohilcund, Agra, Allahabad, and Benares divisions (civil). I say that we want one European to two native soldiers, and then I count the armed policeman as a native soldier.

6435. Will you be good enough to tell the Commission what number of civil policemen you would require for the Bengal presidency?—I should say that for each district we require 100 horse (I am speaking of organized police) and 400 foot.

6436. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Are you still speaking of military police?—Entirely.

6437. (*Viscount Melville.*) How many districts are there in Bengal?—There are twenty-seven districts in the north-western provinces.

6438. (*Col. Burlton.*) You are not acquainted, I imagine, with the lower provinces—Bengal proper?—I merely have a small acquaintance with them. I am convinced that the same force would be amply sufficient for Bengal. I have been speaking of the north-western provinces.

C. Raikes, Esq. 30th Nov. 1858.

6439. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In the aggregate, how many police do you think would be requisite for the whole of the Bengal presidency, organized in the way you propose?—I have put down the numbers which I thought would answer for the north-western provinces, and I should say about three times that force.

6440. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) What was the number which you put down?—I put down 2,700 police, horse, and 10,800 foot; three times that number, I should think, would be sufficient.

6441. That would be 8,100 horse and 32,400 foot?—Yes.

6442. (*Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) You would probably want fewer horse in certain parts?—Yes.

6443. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Would you arm in any way the civil policemen?—I would arm the cavalry, like irregular cavalry, with carbines and pistols, and swords; and the infantry with a light percussion rifle or musket.

6444. Then the civil police would be military also?—I have so proposed. The total which I have given was supposing there to be an organized auxiliary force; it does not include all the burkundazes—the constabulary force. If the Government converted that into an organized police it would be a great advantage to the country, and a saving of expense, and the numbers would be increased.

6445. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) Would the number be very much increased?—Yes.

6446. Would it be double?—No, it would not be double; but it would be one-third as much again, I should say.

6447. That would be 11,000 more?—Yes.

6448. Making about 52,000 altogether?—Yes.

6449. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) What amount of force do you contemplate maintaining as a native army in addition to these 52,000 police for the whole of the Bengal presidency?—I should say about the same number.

6450. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In round numbers 100,000 men?—Yes.

6451. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) You have said that you have no greater faith in the loyalty of the police than you have in the loyalty of the sepoy. Why do you think it necessary to give them fire-arms at all, if you have no faith in them?—We must have a native army. The native army, in my humble opinion, should be organized, as I stated before, of different nationalities, and then I do not think that mutiny is possible. I think that it becomes a moral impossibility. With reference to the police, it is necessary, certainly, to have natives speaking the same language as the inhabitants of the country in which they are employed.

6452. Why would you trust them with fire-arms?—Merely in order to enable us to dispense with a certain number of regular sepoys, in order to avoid keeping up so very large a regular army.

6453. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Could the duties which you contemplate for the police be performed without fire-arms?—I always found the police very much more efficient when they had fire-arms; and I always drilled them well and armed them with fire-arms. I will give a remarkable instance of it. I remember a large village near Ghazeepore, which contained 6,000 Brahmin cultivators; they rose against the rajah who had purchased their village, and hunted his agent from one place to another, and murdered him. The magistrate did not know how to deal with these fellows; he sent up to Mr. Montgomery, who was then magistrate of Allahabad, and said, "For God's sake "lend me 25 of your red-coated fellows." Mr. Montgomery had a jail guard who had muskets and looked like soldiers; he sent down 25 of those men. The consequence was this, that those 6,000 men all left their village, and ran away and hid themselves in the jungles, and yielded most implicit obedience to the local authorities. They had already driven away the burkundazes from the place, and laughed at them; but the appearance of a military force had such an effect upon them that they at once gave no more trouble. There was not a single creature in the place except some old women. This was all done with 25 or 30 of Mr. Montgomery's jail guard, who wore red coats and had muskets, and looked like soldiers.

6454. Do you think that for 800 men, considering what those police would have to perform, one European officer would be sufficient?—No. I merely said that that was the case in the Punjaub.

6455. How many European officers do you think there should be to that proportion of men?—I think that there should be one officer in each district; that is to say, one officer to 100 horse and 400 foot.

6456. That would be about three officers to the 800 men?—Yes.

6457. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you consider that the military discipline of this organized police force would be equally maintained in a police corps as in a regiment of the line?—It could not be in all respects equal, because the men would be very much detached; but for all useful purposes, for the purposes of fighting, it has been proved over and over again during the last twelve or eighteen months, that these police corps are just as useful as any other more elaborate regiments.

6458. As you advise that the military police corps should have the same arms and the same high military training as regiments of the line, and should be, in fact, in all respects as nearly equal as possible to them in military efficiency, would not these police corps be more dangerous to the Government than the regiments of the line, inasmuch as the latter would be under strict military discipline?—I think that the duties of local police are so fascinating to the native mind, that I am convinced that the service would be highly popular.

6459. Still do you not think that such a force would be more dangerous to the Government than regiments of the line, the latter being under strict military discipline?—I do not consider that they would be more dangerous, from the very fact that they would be so much dispersed; I think that there would be less probability of combination amongst them against the Government. But it is almost impossible to look forward to the organization of an army, if we are to suppose that that army is to turn against us. I therefore recommend that such precautions should be taken as should render that probability almost nil.

6460. I understood you to say that the men of the police force should be of the same nationalties as the people of the district in which they are employed?—No. I say that they must be able to speak the same language, but they certainly should not be of the same nationality; they should be brought from a distance. You cannot introduce into the police force the same distribution of companies by nationalities which I would recommend strongly for the regular native army, for this reason, that the policemen must all be able to speak the language of the country in which they are employed.

6461. Do you recommend that the police force to be employed in any district should not be men belonging to that district?—I recommend that they should be brought from a considerable distance, at least 200 miles, if possible.

6462. Would you always locate them in the same district or change them from one district to another?—I would change them.

6463. Throughout the presidency?—Throughout the provinces in which men of their own language were to be found.

6464. (*Viscount Melville.*) In the event of a war and a campaign taking place, do you contemplate this police force acting as a military body in any way?—I contemplate their being at the disposal of the Government for any military duties whatever.

6465. What military duties would they perform; they could not act as regiments?—They have acted most admirably as regiments before Delhi lately.

6466. They might do as baggage guard, and for that sort of duty?—They went into action constantly; they have been constantly engaged in all the actions

which we have had lately before Delhi and in Oude, and other places.

6467. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In what respect would they be different from the sepoys in former days except from the fact of their being more dispersed ?—They would be employed for police duties.

6468. Were not the sepoys employed a good deal in charge of treasuries, and things of that sort ?—Yes.

6469. Therefore a great proportion of those duties were performed by sepoys formerly which you now contemplate for the police ?—Yes ; but they were not used for guarding out stations.

6470. Otherwise as an organized body, would there be much difference between them and irregular regiments of sepoys ?—Except in their duties, I cannot say that there would be much difference; I think that they would be quite as efficient.

6471. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Is not the reason why you proposed that there should be military police, because the police duties which were formerly performed by the sepoys, made them loose and unlike soldiers ?—No, that is not my reason ; I think that we must have a native army, and we also must have a native police, and if you can make the police subsidiary to that army so as to reduce the expense of the army, you gain a point. I do not want to see an immense native army again, and you must have a police; therefore, I would rather have good policemen well paid, and the most useful that we can have.

6472. Where do you contemplate getting your commanding officer of the police corps ?—I contemplate getting him from either the line or the local regiments of India. Any man who is available I should say should have that appointment.

6473. Do you not think that it would be taking away the ablest officers from the regular army if you took them to command the police corps ?—I consider that this is a *quasi* military duty. I would not recommend that men should be withdrawn for purely civil duty, but this is a *quasi* military duty.

6474. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) What difference do you contemplate making in the pay of a soldier of the military police and of a soldier of the line ?—No difference at all.

6475. You also said that they should be put upon an equality with respect to pensions ?—Yes.

6476. Then in what respect would the Government gain by reducing 52,000 men of the line, and substituting 52,000 policemen ?—These men would be available for local civil duties, and would supersede the old and comparatively useless Burkundazes, who could not be employed in any way offensive or defensive as soldiers, whereas these men, I think, are fitted for that employment.

6477. Then the Government would benefit to the extent of the saving of the pay in dismissing a certain number of Burkundazes ?—Yes.

6478. What amount of Burkundaz force do you contemplate being reduced ?—The Burkundaz force is very large indeed, and the saving would be a material one, but I am not prepared to state the number of Burkundazes.

6479. Can you state about what number of Burkundazes would be necessary in addition to the 52,000 organized military police which you have recommended for the Bengal presidency ?—I recommend that the Burkundazes should be abolished.

6480. Do you mean that the 52,000 men would be in lieu of all the Burkundazes ?—No. I was not prepared to answer that question. I merely say that I myself would recommend that the Burkundaz should be abolished, and that in his place you should have a military or a *quasi* military constable, like the police of Ireland, for instance; a man who could help the Government in time of danger, and who would not be more likely to turn against them at all events than any other.

6481. If I understand you, the difference to the Government between 52,000 line soldiers, and the same number of military police would be that whilst the former would be available only for military duty the latter would be a force armed and trained as soldiers under the immediate orders, and at the entire disposal of the civil authorities ?—They would be available for the Government in case of war.

6482. As they would not be amenable to the articles of war, nor subject, therefore, to the rules of army discipline, you do not suppose that they would be equally available with troops of the line for war service ?—Experience has proved that they have been.

6483. I do not mean efficient ; I mean available ?—I do not understand the difference ; they would be at the command of the Government ; they could be taken away from their districts in case of need.

6484. If you collect them from all the different provinces where they are employed on civil duties, how are you to supply their place ; suppose you take 20,000 men, and place them under the command of the Commander-in-chief of India ?—That is what I should propose to be done, and other levies raised by the magistrates of districts.

6485. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How do you propose that the discipline of these 50,000 men is to be conducted ?—I would propose that there should be an officer in each district with native subordinate officers whose duty it should be to discipline and equip these men ; that in all matters of dress and discipline they should be entirely under him ; that in case of misconduct the magistrate also should have the power of dismissing from this body, so that they should feel that they were not irresponsible to the magistrate ; but that he should not interfere in matters of their dress or of their drill ; that is a military matter which a magistrate can know nothing about. Of course he would locate them, and dispose of them as he pleased.

6486. Under whom should the young officers be ?—Under a divisional officer at the head quarters of the civil division, who would be a captain commandant of police.

6487. Who is to work the whole of this force, because of course they must be all under the same regulation ?—There should be one superintendent-general of police for the north-western provinces. I would say the same for Bengal, and the same for the Punjaub. Under the superintendent-general there should be divisional commanders of police, and under them again, in each district, there should be a district commander, who should also have the powers of a magistrate to assist the chief magistrate.

6488. (*Viscount Melville.*) Would there be any difficulty in having this police under the same sort of regulation as the constabulary in Ireland, that the superintendent should have the absolute power of dismissal, and that it should be the same as in London ?—I think that he should have full power ; I think that a court-martial should not be considered necessary, but that fine and dismissal should be in his power.

6489. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) You seem to think that the armed police will be equal in discipline to the regiments of the line ?—Nearly equal and nearly as efficient.

6490. Will the 800 men be trained to move in battalion ?—They are taught to move in battalion.

6491. And to move in brigade ?—They will not have an opportunity of learning to move in brigade, but they will have an opportunity of learning drill, and they will learn the manual and platoon exercise, and to move like soldiers.

6492. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Where would they be quartered, at head quarters ? — They would be distributed to various Tehsil stations in each district, the majority being at the district head-quarters, and they would be all brought in in turn for drill ; that is what is now done ; that is what is always done in the Punjaub.

6493. (*Viscount Melville.*) In the Punjaub the native troops, I believe, were not relieved from taking the Kutcherry duty and other duty ?—Yes, they were.

C. Raikes, Esq. 30th Nov. 1858.

I had no sepoys ; all my Kutcherries were guarded by organized police, and the treasuries were guarded by organized police in the Punjaub ; that was the case in the Lahore division.

6494. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you contemplate all the civil treasuries being placed under the charge of the military police ?—Entirely.

6495. What would be the average amount of treasure under the charge of each police guard in a district ?—At the chief treasury of the district there might be sometimes two lacs of rupees ; at the small detachments never above 10,000.

6496. But at none more than two lacs ?—No, not in the Sudder treasury.

The witness withdrew.

Adjourned to Thursday next at 11 o'clock.

Thursday, 2nd December 1858.

PRESENT :

Major-General PEEL.
H.R.H. the Duke of CAMBRIDGE.
Lord STANLEY.
Marquess of TWEEDDALE.
Viscount MELVILLE.
Lieut-Gen. Sir HARRY G. W. SMITH.
Lieut-Gen. Sir GEORGE A. WETHERALL.
Major-Gen. MONTGOMERIE.
Major-Gen. HANCOCK.
Colonel BURLTON.
Colonel FORSYTH TAIT.

MAJOR-GENERAL PEEL IN THE CHAIR.

The Earl of Ellenborough, G.C.B. 2nd Dec. 1858.

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH, G.C.B., examined.

6497. (*Chairman.*) Your lordship has been so kind as to furnish the Commission with written answers to the questions submitted to you, and for my own part, I may say that those answers are so full and explicit that I should not have thought it worth while to trouble you by asking you to come here, but several other members of the Commission wished for the opportunity of having further information from you, and we have therefore asked you to attend ; I perfectly understand the meaning and purport of the answers which you have given. I understand from them that you consider it absolutely necessary that there should be two armies in India, having to a certain degree distinct and separate interests ?—Certainly.

6498. That you consider it necessary for the welfare of India that there should be a portion of movable forces, and a portion of her Majesty's army distinct from that, and raised solely for local service in India ?—Yes.

6499. And that your opinion is that for certain reasons, those two portions, the local and the moveable portion of the Queen's army should be of equal force ?—That they should be balanced.

6500. The grounds for that opinion being that, " notwithstanding its great inferiority in European " troops, the many advantages which the Company's " army has hitherto exclusively enjoyed from the " favour of the Court of Directors, have secured to it " high consideration ; but that the Company being " gone, and the local army having no longer exclusive " advantages, real strength can alone secure to it " proper consideration ?"—I think so ; that is my opinion.

6501. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) As it may be assumed that the permanent European force to be maintained in India, will be fixed at the minimum deemed necessary for the secure hold of the country, are you of opinion that any additional force should be maintained in India for the purpose of meeting calls for foreign service in Affghanistan, Persia, Burmah, or elsewhere within the limits of Asia?—I think it would be very desirable, if you could afford it, to have a reserve, but when you have five regiments as I suggest, at Calcutta, that is to a certain degree a small reserve. I have always thought that it would be desirable to have a reserve in England ready for instant service. I would always have at least 5,000 men at Chatham destined for India, understanding that they were to be ready for instant embarkation.

6502. Does your lordship mean for the purpose of supplying the place of any force which may be sent on service to Persia, or elsewhere beyond the continent of India ?—Not merely that, but likewise for any circumstances occurring rendering an immediate reinforcement necessary ; they should be ready for instant embarkation. Indeed, 5,000 was the number which I used to think was necessary years ago; I would have a larger number now if it were possible to have them.

6503. Regarded as an imperial question does your lordship think that it would be advisable to maintain any considerable body of troops in India, say 10,000 men, in addition to the minimum force deemed requisite for the protection of India, for the purpose of giving them a training field, in view to increase their efficiency for service ?—I think that circumstances will give you field enough without sending 10,000 additional men for the purpose of learning the art of war. I do not see the end of it. But you are brought up by the financial difficulty; indeed, you are brought up by that even in doing what may be considered necessary.

6504. Assuming, then, that the permanent force to be maintained in India will be fixed at the minimum deemed necessary for the protection of India itself, how could any portion of that force be made available to meet a European crisis without endangering the loss of India ?—I think it would be strong to say that it would endanger the loss of India ; but, of course, it would be a matter of very serious inconvenience to detach from India any troops whatever, if the establishment was reduced to a minimum ; it must be a subject for the consideration of the Government at the time ; it might be that it was much more important to retain the troops in India than to send them to Burmah or Persia, or anywhere else, and, of course, the Government must attend to that which was of most importance.

6505. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that a decision come to of that description would rest upon the responsibility of the Government of the day, and would be an imperial question, and not solely an Indian question ?—It is, in the first instance, an Indian question, because the Governor-General must decide what he will do with the troops confided to him ; but, subsequently, it becomes a question here ; there is very easy communication, and he cannot do much without having further assistance from hence.

6506. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) In advising that the European force in India should be composed in future partly of troops of the line and partly of local troops, did your lordship intend to include the artillery and engineers, or that the whole of this portion of the force should be, as heretofore, of the local army ?—I wrote what I submitted rather hurriedly, perhaps, but my in-

tention was to express the opinion that the same principle which I laid down for the division of the infantry should be adopted for the division of the cavalry and artillery; that there should be an equality of force. There can be no doubt that the introduction of the Queen's artillery has led to an enormous increase of expense in the maintenance of the Company's artillery, but it has, at the same time, created, probably, a wholesome rivalry.

6507. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Could not that additional expense be very much diminished by regulations; by regulating the amount of artillery per company and troop, and diminishing the staff, which perhaps at the present moment is larger than would be the case if the artillery were permanent?—I should think that there might be, no doubt, a reduction of the staff; but when you have once given an allowance to a soldier it is an awkward thing to reduce it.

6508. Is there any additional allowance to the royal artillery beyond what there is to the artillery of the Company?—The additional expense in consequence of the necessity of raising the allowances of the Company's artillery to those of the Queen's, I understand, has been very considerable. It is a great increase of expense.

6509. There was no difference, was there, in the regiments of the line?—No. There never had been any Queen's artillery there, or hardly ever.

6510. Then am I to understand that the local artillery of India was not at a higher rate of pay than the line of India?—I cannot say what the rate of pay was in the artillery, but I know that altogether the advantages of the artillery service of the Company were very considerably inferior to those of the Queen's artillery.

6511. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Would it not be the case that the time during which a European war was being carried on, would be the time of all others at which the European troops could least be spared from India?—No doubt; and the time at which the advantage would be most felt of having a local army.

6512. Considering the great importance of the artillery branch of the service in India, together with the circumstance of the opinion being almost universal, that in future the mass of the artillery in that country must be European, would it not be the arm that could least be spared, and which, from being the most powerful, would be, in all probability, the first to be indented upon in the event of a war in Europe?—I am rather inclined to think not. I think that it would be absolutely necessary to establish so very large a force of artillery in India permanently that it would be adequate to meet any difficulty which might arise.

6513. There would be this difference between the artillery and the cavalry and infantry branches of the service, that the Government of India would be able to supply, to a certain extent, by increasing the native force, the place of cavalry and infantry withdrawn, but if it be ruled that there shall be no native artillery, could not supply the place of artillery?—Yes; no doubt the Government of India by itself has no power of adding to the artillery.

6514. I allude to native artillery?—It cannot add to the artillery if there is to be no native artillery.

6515. But they would be able to supply the place of a few infantry regiments without producing any serious risk?—If the Government of India were to raise new infantry native regiments it would be violating the principle upon which the whole future establishment of the army is, I apprehend, to rest, because while there is to be a balance between the local and the regular army, there must also be a balance between the native troops and the European. It would never do when the danger was increasing to be adding to the native troops, which would tend to create more danger.

6516. Still after a lapse of years when the present excited state of feeling in India is quieted, I imagine your lordship is of opinion that the Government of India would have a margin left with respect to native troops. It may not be necessary always to maintain the native army at the full strength at which it might be maintained without exceeding the proportion to the European force that may be fixed as a safe maximum; and it would seem advisable that the Government of India should have a margin for augmenting the native troops in time of war, as, for instance, by increasing the strength of native infantry regiments from 800 to 1,000 men, as has always been done on such occasions?—I think it quite sufficient for us to deal with matters which are likely to occur during our own lives. I will not pretend to say what a Government of India may do when quiet is re-established as it used to exist in India. That will never happen in our lives,—we must look forward to a state of disquiet and apprehension of war as long as we live.

6517. (*Col. Burlton.*) Supposing that a very serious irruption should take place into our territories, from Nepaul, for instance, or Affghanistan, and that your lordship should be at the time at the head of the Government, you would, I consider, feel yourself fully justified in raising any amount of levies of natives to meet that difficulty?—I hope that, whoever is at the head of the Government, will do whatever he thinks necessary for the public service without regard to any orders or rules; it is his duty to do so.

6518. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) With respect to the question whether or not the European permanent force in India should be composed in future exclusively of troops of the line, do you not think that all the more important offices of the State in India to which officers of the army are eligible would be more efficiently filled from a body of officers trained from their youth in India, and with no views beyond it, than from one sent to India only for a ten years' tour, free to leave it at any time by changing, having no abiding interest in the country, and whose hopes and aspirations would naturally turn rather to the prospects of professional advancement open to them in Europe?—Nearly 30 years ago my view was that it would be expedient to draw the whole of the civil service through the army. I was in fact preparing a plan, which if the Government of the Duke of Wellington had lasted I should have laid before them, for effecting that purpose. The Government was dissolved, and the details were never entirely worked out; but I adhere to the opinion that the best education for every civil servant in India is service in the army, especially in the native army. He acquires a better opinion of the natives there than he ever will do by contact with them as a civilian only.

6519. With reference to the difficulty which your lordship has expressed of dividing the Bengal army, will you allow me to ask, whether, if a plan could be devised for effecting such division by which the interests of the officers concerned would be fully respected, and without any additional cost, you consider that the division would be a desirable measure as affects the interests of the State?—I really do not at present see the advantages of it; I have never heard them stated; it is a new question altogether to me.

6520. Assuming that the Madras and Bombay armies will in future be composed to a great extent of men enlisted in Southern India, and therefore having no sympathies in common with the northern tribes, would it not materially strengthen the hands of the Government of India were troops from those presidencies pushed up to the north-west frontier?—Very likely it might so happen, and it would so happen; but there always would be a jealousy on the part of the Bengal army at having its stations taken from it by the Madras and Bombay troops, more especially as I think some of the best stations would be taken.

6521. (*Col. Burlton.*) Does your lordship not think it probable that if such a measure were adopted and the troops from Madras and Bombay were pushed up into constant communication and personal intercourse with the sepoys of Hindostan, they might in a short time be inclined to coalesce together, instead of

The Earl of Ellenborough, G.C.B.

2nd Dec. 1858.

remaining with their present feelings of dislike to one another?—I cannot pretend to say what might be the result. I should have as little communication between them as I could.

6522. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) I imagine your lordship would be of opinion that as there would be only a comparatively small portion of those armies stationed in the north-west provinces, as regiments would be there only for a limited period, say two years, and the same men probably not live to go there again, that objection would not prevail to any great extent?—I am unable to speak with respect to it.

6523. Do you not think that if the three armies were equalized in strength the Bengal army would be of a much more convenient size for efficient supervision and control than it has been hitherto, and that it would greatly diminish the danger of the recurrence of so extensive a combination as we have lately witnessed?—I really am unable to give an opinion upon that subject. The Punjaub is very different, and separated to a degree from the north-western provinces; and both the Punjaub and the north-western provinces are separated from Central India. There must be a very large force in all those three divisions; there is very little down in Bengal. The Commander-in-chief must occupy a central position no doubt up above, if he is to look personally after those three armies. But I do not much like division of authority. I am rather inclined to think that an able man would do the whole thing better with absolute power than several individuals.

6524. Assuming that there will be a considerable addition to the European local army in India, and that the officers of the three presidencies might be thrown into one list for the purpose of the augmentation consequent thereon, would not the whole of the officers derive considerable immediate advantage in promotion?—I am quite unable to give an opinion upon the subject. I know that officers do not like changes; they would rather be left as they are.

6525. Whether the European force in India be composed for the future of line or local troops, or of both combined, I presume your lordship is of opinion that the army patronage as regards Indian appointments should remain as heretofore in the hands of the Indian authorities?—No doubt about it.

6526. Your lordship is aware that hitherto the appointments of officers of the Queen's army to divisional commands in India, and occasionally those also of the Company's officers, have been made by the home authorities. Do you think that it would be expedient to continue that system, or that in future the appointments to the several commands-in-chief only should be made in England?—I am not aware of the home authorities having had anything to do with giving the appointments to the Company's officers in India; the Crown has named Queen's officers who were to hold divisional commands and so forth in India, but it has had nothing to do with the appointment of any Company's officers.

6527. I allude to the home authorities at the India House as well as others?—They had nothing to do with it; the governors appointed to all the commands.

6528. I understand your lordship to mean that you think it expedient to continue the existing system with regard to the Queen's officers, but that with regard to the Company's officers they should be appointed only in India?—I do not see how it is possible for the Governor-General to select a Queen's officer from England, and desire him to be sent out; that must rest with the home authorities no doubt, but I think that every appointment of a local officer should rest entirely with the Governor-General.

6529. (*Chairman.*) And it always has done so?—Always, I believe. I never heard of any interference with it. There has been a bad system; a sort of right has been supposed to exist upon the part of officers to be appointed according to their seniority to commands, which of late years has been very properly broken through.

6530. Broken through by the authorities in India?—Yes.

6531. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you not consider that the interests of the public service in India imperatively require that none but fully qualified officers should ever be placed in the command of either a regiment, brigade, division, or army?—No doubt it is a matter of the greatest possible importance.

6532. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that that rule holds good with every portion and any portion of Her Majesty's army, whether it is in India or elsewhere?—No doubt; and I can recollect that great inconvenience arose from the high comparative rank of some of the officers sent out in the command of some of the Queen's regiments, that when they were brought together with Company's troops there was no possibility of avoiding giving them brigade commands. I wrote home to represent to the Duke of Wellington that it was a very necessary thing to have regard to the efficiency of officers when they had a certain rank, and were sent out to command regiments. It led to their having higher commands, for which they were unfit.

6533. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Under the system of succession by seniority to regimental, brigade, and divisional commands, which obtained in India previously to the mutiny, is it not the fact that officers not unfrequently succeeded to those commands who were to a great degree incapacitated by age, impaired health, or other causes, for the efficient performance of the duties?—No doubt that must have happened, but it was to a certain degree obviated by the management of the Governor-General, who placed those officers who must be appointed, but who at the same time were not very efficient, in situations in which it was not at all likely that they would be called upon to do anything.

6534. Still they were placed in commands, where, in such a crisis as has lately occurred, it would have been of the highest importance to have efficient officers?—No doubt, for instance, at Benares, Saugor, and some other places.

6535. Considering how much the due maintenance of discipline and efficiency depends upon the entire fitness of the officers in command of brigades and divisions, do you not think that in future all such appointments should be made by selection for efficiency alone, and that the several Commanders-in-chief and Governments in India should not be fettered as they have been hitherto by regulations requiring them to recognize mere negative merit when backed by seniority as giving a claim to such appointments?—I should think that any person who is responsible for the good government of the country would desire to have the power of selecting the most efficient men to carry out his views; and although no doubt there may be some little apprehension of favouritism, I think that it would be better to overlook that and to give the chief authority the power of selecting the fittest men.

6536. Your lordship is aware that under the system which has existed hitherto, the Commanders-in-chief in Bengal and Bombay have had the nomination and the Government the appointment to brigade and divisional commands?—The Commander-in-chief in India has no authority at all, he cannot do a single thing without the Government; he recommends, but he can do nothing whatever; he cannot make the smallest appointment without the authority of the Government; it always confirms. I recollect an instance which happened within the first week of my arrival in India where an officer was recommended by the Commander-in-chief erroneously, he was not aware of the character of the individual; a courteous representation was made to him, and he withdrew the recommendation. There has always been an understanding that certain appointments were to be given by the Commander-in-chief, and I dare say the cases have been very rare in which any representation has been made, but he cannot actually make the appointment without the confirmation of the Government.

6537. Considering that the Commanders-in-chief are held responsible for maintaining the efficiency and discipline of the troops under their command, do you think it just that they should be fettered with regulations giving officers individual claims to such important appointments as the commands of brigades and divisions upon the ground of their seniority?—If I was a Commander-in-chief I would much rather be without any restraint at all myself.

6538. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But does not your lordship think that those are subjects of general army regulation which must hold good in every part of the world; and that if you make such a regulation it ought to extend to every portion of Her Majesty's troops?—I apprehend that in England the Commander-in-chief may, with what consent I do not know, appoint whomever he pleases. I believe that the Horse Guards may select any man. There is not the restraint which exists in India.

6539. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) I apprehend that your lordship considers it would be very desirable to establish a rule by which officers selected by the several Commanders-in-chief, and appointed by the several Governments in India to the higher commands, might have temporary rank conferred upon them sufficient to dispose of the inconvenience now sometimes experienced from there being senior officers in their way?—That is a purely professional question. There is no point upon which there is so strong a feeling, I believe, among soldiers as that of what they call supersession; and I speak with great hesitation of doing anything upon that subject.

6540. Still is it not the existing system in England for the Queen's Government to appoint selected officers to commands, and to confer temporary rank upon them whilst so employed?—A higher rank is often given during the tenure of a command, but I apprehend that it rarely has involved the supersession of any other officer.

6541. Then it would be in conformity with that system were the practice introduced in India?—It would.

6542. (*Chairman.*) It appears to me that the system is very much the same in India and in England; his Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief recommends an officer for the command of a division or brigade, and if there is no objection on the part of the Government he is appointed?—Just so.

6543. The same thing is done in India; the Commanders-in-chief recommend to the Governor-General, and if he does not see any reason to dissent from their views he at once adopts them?—I think the recommendation in India is more authoritative than here; it is never departed from, except the case is extremely strong.

6544. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The power of a Commander-in-chief in India would be greater than in England?—It is in practice. I know that I felt that the authority given to the Commander-in-chief was inconveniently extensive, because I think that I had but a single regiment of irregular cavalry to which I could appoint an officer, and I thought that rather inconvenient, because many cases occurred of officers who merited reward, and I had very limited means of rewarding them in that manner.

6545. But would not you think that as a general principle it would be extremely inconvenient that one portion of the army should have a system of selection or appointment different from the rest of the army?—I see no advantage in it.

6546. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) With respect to honours in reward for distinguished service, do you not think it would be best for the public interests that officers of the local army should look to the Government of India alone as having the power to decide upon their claims to be recommended to Her Majesty for those distinctions?—I appprehend that now the recommendation of the local Government is very favourably considered by the home authorities, and that the cases would not be numerous in which the home authorities would disregard that recommendation; at the same time, I must say, that considering the pressure upon the Governor-General, and the desire which he may have of giving attention to claims of that description, I think it very advisable that there should be a second opinion upon the subject, and there may be cases in which it would be desirable that the authorities here should not accede altogether to the recommendations from India, but I believe that generally they do.

6547. Would your lordship advise that in future those recommendations should come from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India; I imagine that is the channel through which you would recommend them to come?—I really do not know what the rule may be; I rather think that the recommendation would be submitted first to the Secretary of State for India, and that he would then communicate with the Secretary for War and the Horse Guards, as has always been the case; in fact, there is no alteration; the alteration practically effected by the recent changes is a very small one indeed in the conduct of business.

6548. (*Lord Stanley.*) As regards the authority exercised over the local army of India, the change actually produced by the late Act is none whatever, I apprehend?—I hope not.

6549. You have anticipated my next question, which is, whether you think that any change is desirable?—I think the relations between the local army of India and the Secretary of State and the Council should be precisely the relations which existed before between the army of India, the Board of Control, and the Court of Directors.

6550. Then you are entirely opposed to placing the Commander-in-chief in India under the direct authority and control of the Commander-in-chief here, as a question of general policy?—I do not see how things could go on if there were two such authorities existing as the Governor-General and the Commander-in-chief here. The Governor-General must place his Commander-in-chief wherever he thinks he is of most use; he must be able to order him to Calcutta, if necessary, or send him to the north-west; he must do whatever he pleases with him; he must have the same authority over the Commander-in-chief in India which the civil Government here has over the Commander-in-chief in England; there must always be a supremacy in the civil authority.

6551. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You are aware that the Commander-in-chief in England has control, to some extent, over the troops of the line serving in India, as regards discipline, and as regards promotion?—Certainly.

6552. Do you object to that?—Not at all; I should be extremely sorry to have any interference whatever with the royal army in India; I would leave it exactly as it is.

6553. If that is all that is meant by the authority of the Commander-in-chief at home you do not see any objection to such an arrangement?—I have no objection whatever to leaving things exactly as they are now, with respect to the royal army.

6554. As regards the local army, do you see any objection to that power being extended merely as respects discipline and promotion under regulation?—I am for keeping the local army as it is, and making no alteration at all in it. It is a part of my principle to keep up two totally distinct armies, and the local army should look to the Secretary of State for India as the authority to decide in all cases respecting it.

6555. Do you not think that that produces a great deal of heartburning and feeling of jealousy, which is objectionable in any army?—I never saw any; I never heard of any. It was impossible for two armies to go on more agreeably than they used to do.

6556. On the principles of human nature, do you not think that two distinct bodies are disposed even on small grounds to be jealous of one another?—I wish to preserve a degree of jealousy which should prevent combination. I desire that there should be

The Earl of Ellenborough, G.C.B.

2nd Dec. 1858.

two interests and two feelings. I do not think that it would interfere with the conduct of the public service; but I think that the local army would feel more satisfied if it had an authority here which it considered as its protector.

6557. Do you not think that that local army would feel that it was equally protected, and that equal justice was done to both services, if the Commander-in-chief at home was not supposed to have any particular interest in the army of the line; do you not think that the fact of the Commander-in-chief at home being exclusively identified with the army of the line, would give the local army an impression that he might be less disposed to serve it, and more disposed to push forward the officers of the line than the local officers?—I have no such apprehension; I think the local army would rather remain just as they are. The Commander-in-chief at the Horse Guards has nothing whatever to do with them, and never has had anything to do with them, and they desire to remain in that position, I should think. The only case in which it is possible that the Horse Guards can interfere in any degree with their interests or wishes is in the distribution of honours, and I never heard of a single case occurring in which they had reason to complain of the Horse Guards, that I must say. I think honours have been given most liberally to the Indian army on all occasions.

6558. You, no doubt, would attach very great weight to anything coming from the Duke of Wellington?—Yes.

6559. Are you aware that there is a letter dated 12th March 1812, of the Duke of Wellington to Lord Melville?—No, I have no recollection of it.

6560. If you look at that letter you will see what I allude to as regards European troops?—That the whole European army should consist of Queen's troops. That was my own opinion until the necessity occurred for having so very large a European army. When a third battalion of Europeans was added to each presidency, I wrote strongly against it, and when it was understood that there were to be large additions two or three years ago to that army, I wrote to Lord Panmure, or some person in the Government, against it. But the very reasons which induced me then to object to it, induce me now to press it forward, because I thought it desirable to preserve a balance between the Company's and the European force, and that balance would have been overthrown if there had been any large addition then to the Company's army, because the Queen's force was so small; but when the Queen's army becomes so large, and the Europeans of the line so numerous, then in order to preserve a balance there must be an addition to the local army. The principle is exactly the same.

6561. You would feel no apprehension of the army of the line in India, would you?—I believe it is very prudent always to take precautions against persons who have great power in their hands. The power in the hands of that army is now absolute—there is no possibility of resisting them. The state of things is totally altered by the revolution which is now taking place in India; and I think it highly desirable to look well to the right and the left, and to secure all possible means that we can obtain for ourselves of balancing the strength of each of those armies, providing against anything that may occur to them in the exercise of the authority and power which they actually possess.

6562. Have we had any instance of mutiny in the Queen's army?—No, I believe not.

6563. Have we ever had any instance of mutiny in the Company's army?—Yes.

6564. More than one?—There was a very great one at Madras. There were several in early times. There has been occasionally a good deal of ill feeling; but there was a mutiny at Madras, and the Duke of Wellington told me that if there had been hill stations at that time where there could have been white families, it would have led to a separation.

6565. Is not that danger increased in a local army which is so very large as compared to the army of the line? Do you not think that so far from its being the other way, the danger is more increased if you make a very large local army whose interests are solely connected with India?—I think that if you exactly balance that local army by a Queen's army of equal strength, no apprehension is to be entertained, and the Queen's officers will equally with the local officers (not to the same number probably) be entitled to command the irregular native corps.

6566. You would throw it open?—Certainly, supposing them to be competent from a knowledge of the language. I think that everything should be equal with regard to appointments between the two forces. I think it would be very unjust to the Queen's army not to make it so.

6567. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) In proportioning the appointments I imagine that you would consider it just to have regard to the advantages open to the officers of the line in England and in the colonies with respect to commands and appointments?—I am not aware what the great advantages are. I of course must put myself into the position of a Governor-General, and as Governor-General I should desire to be able to appoint to every situation in India the fittest man, no matter whence he came, whether from the Queen's army or from the local force, and to reward his service.

6568. As I understand your lordship, then you would have it the rule that all appointments should be made upon the ground of merit and efficiency alone?—I think so.

6569. (*Lord Stanley.*) Practically that opening of all such appointments as those which you mention to officers of the general service army would not be a very large change, because the number of those who would qualify themselves by a sufficient knowledge of the native languages, would, I presume, be small?—It would be smaller, I apprehend, than in the local army, but still when a regiment is sent there certainly for ten years, and perhaps for a longer period, if an officer felt that by making himself acquainted with the native languages he would have an opportunity of obtaining some civil or political employment, I think it is contrary to reason, that those officers should not, in a very great number of cases, qualify themselves, because there is no very great difficulty in it.

6570. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The fact, I suppose, being that hitherto they having been excluded from those appointments, they have never thought it worth their while to study, whereas now they would?—No doubt hitherto until this revolution commenced the Queen's troops were necessarily placed in certain cantonments; there were no means of housing them anywhere else; they were compelled to remain in certain cantonments, and, unless in the event of war, there they remained, having nothing at all to do; they were certainly in a most deplorable condition, and naturally they looked upon war as a godsend; it gave them something to do; but they had not the same means or necessity for communication with the natives which the officers of the local army had, and very naturally, having nothing to gain by it, the cases must have been very rare in which they acquired a knowledge of the languages, and a knowledge of the language is enormous in real practical value. I recollect that the late Sir Charles Napier and myself happened to come to the same conclusion as to its value. I said 10,000 men,—he said, "that "is my impression too; I would rather be able to "speak the language than have 10,000 men."

6571. (*Lord Stanley.*) Does not your lordship consider that the power of employing Queen's officers in civil and political situations requiring a knowledge of the native languages, would be valuable not only as giving the Governor-General a larger field of selection for such appointments, but also as greatly increasing the knowledge of the country, and therefore to some degree the military efficiency of those

officers?—Certainly; it would give those officers the great advantage when they were on detached service of being able personally to communicate with the chief people of the district.

6572. (*Viscount Melville.*) Under the present regulations the Queen's officers are not eligible for any political appointments?—Not under the Company's regulations, I believe; I think Lord Hardinge introduced a novelty, that of appointing a very few Queen's officers to irregular corps, but it was contrary to the rule.

6573. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And to the supervision of roads, I believe?—I do not know about that.

6574. But not to any higher positions?—No.

6575. Contemplating a double army of Europeans, do you propose that the two services should be under the same articles of war, the Queen's regulations, as well the local force as that of the line?—I am not acquainted with the Queen's regulations so as to be able to speak upon that point, but I see no reason why they should not, and great reason why they should be under the same articles of war. It seems to me that it might be productive of very serious inconvenience if in the same force an offence committed by a European of the local army was to be punished differently from the manner in which it would be punished in a Queen's regiment.

6576. (*Chairman.*) I suppose you anticipate that the European portion of the local army is to be raised in this country?—Yes.

6577. Seeing that there is a limit to the number of men whom we can raise by voluntary enlistment in this country, do you not think that there must have been some limit put to the number who would be tied up, as I may say, and whom there would be no power in the Government to remove in case of emergency?—As long as they remained here you could use them. One of the last things which I did at the Board of Control was to increase very largely the establishment of the European army, and it was an understood thing that we should always endeavour to have the whole of the reserve of 4,000 men, which was allowed by Act of Parliament, at Chatham, and have the force at disposal as long as it remained in this country.

6578. If they are only enlisted for service in India, can you call upon them to serve on the continent?—Not on the continent, but in England; they are a force at our disposal, I apprehend.

6579. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that that force ought to be at the disposal of the Commander-in-chief in England?—Certainly, as long as it stays here. If there is any doubt upon that point it should be made clear by Act of Parliament. There cannot be any reason why that force should not be at his disposal, and there are many reasons why it should. I should certainly consider that the Secretary for War had the entire disposal of those troops upon any service of emergency within England.

6580. (*Chairman.*) Supposing it was anticipated to raise, say so large a force as 60,000 men for local service in India, do you not think that that might be a matter of great inconvenience to the Secretary for War?—I think not; there are a good many men who will enlist in the local army who will not enlist in the Queen's; I believe it is a more popular service; I have always understood that it is.

6581. The evidence before us generally is that the recruits for the Indian service are not certainly of a higher character than those who enlist in the Queen's service?—I apprehend that their is no great deal of difference. I saw a Company's European regiment, and the fault seemed to me to be that they sent them out too young. I could see no other fault. Sir Charles Napier had the highest opinion of the European regiments in the Company's service. In internal organization they are somewhat inferior perhaps from the reason which I have mentioned, namely, that some of their best men are taken away for other duties, but otherwise they are extremely well conducted excellent troops. I made a representation on the subject of the youth of the recruits sent out, because no doubt they frequently did not acquire their full strength, and they were more subject to disease than men three or four years older would have been. Indeed I once had an idea (I am speaking of thirty years back) from seeing how many of the very young men fell victims to the climate, at the time when the force in India was much more limited than it must be now, of filling up the regiments in India by volunteers from the regiments at home, and not sending out any man who was not twenty-five years of age.

6582. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would not that be difficult if there were a double army?—It would be impossible, and the force now required in India will be too large to be so recruited.

6583. (*Chairman.*) Then you think it would be an advantage if the depôts here were on a larger scale, so as to allow the men to attain a greater age before sending them out to India?—I have no doubt about it. It is cruel to see how many men die on their first arrival, especially the young.

6584. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would like to see them thoroughly efficient as soldiers before going out at all?—It is very desirable. I saw the 9th lancers; 100 men died in that regiment in a year who had never seen the enemy. A good deal of that seemed to me to be in consequence of tight lacing; a great deal of it was apoplexy.

6585. How would you do with the young cadets to be appointed? Do you think that they should all be first appointed to the depôt in England, or should they go out at once?—With regard to the officers, I think the sooner they go out the better, because they are more likely to acquire native habits, and to like the country if they go almost as boys to it. They settle down more easily, I think.

6586. But do you think it of importance that they should all be first attached to European troops before they had anything to do with native troops?—My impression had been the reverse. I fancied it better for those about to command natives that their first service should be with a native regiment. Supposing you are to have no native regiments constituted as they are now, but only irregular corps, then, no doubt, you would not employ any very young officer in an irregular corps. You would have ascertained his capabilities in some European corps before you ventured to send him to a native corps, where any mistake is of such very serious consequence. When I thought of drawing the civil service through the army, I had never contemplated that a man was to be entirely taken away, and put into the civil service; that there should be no power of putting him back to a regiment if he turned out not to be competent. My idea was, that those who were detached for civil service should rise in a sort of skeleton corps, which would make their promotion much less rapid than if they remained with their regiments. I think that the result of the plan which I had in my mind would have been that an officer would have risen to the command of a regiment by the time he was 40. It would then have been always a question with the officer whether it was not better for him to remain in his regiment, and take his chance of promotion there instead of going to the civil service. I think it made sixteen years difference in promotion.

6587. (*Chairman.*) Did you anticipate that after he had been a certain time in the civil service, there should be the power of his returning to his regiment?—That there should always be a power on the part of the Government of sending him back again.

6588. If he had been employed 15 or 16 years on the civil service, would it not be a great disadvantage for him to return?—I am afraid that that disadvantage is encountered now. A man very often remains absent from his regiment a great length of time, and goes back to command it, knowing nothing about military service. I recollect an instance of an officer of high rank acting in a civil situation, and he had not a military coat, and never had had, I believe, from the time when he landed in India.

The Earl of Ellenborough, G.C.B.

2nd Dec. 1858.

6589. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Assuming that the army is to be a double army quite distinct, how would you regulate the intercourse of the Commander-in-chief in India with the Commander-in-chief at home as regards the moveable regiments of the line, if that officer should happen to be an officer of the local service, and therefore, in fact, not at all under the authority of the Commander-in-chief at home ?—In that case, perhaps, the business relating to the moveable regiments of the line might be conducted through the senior officer of that portion of the Queen's forces ; or the Commander-in-chief in India, being a local officer, might conduct it through the Adjutant-general of the Queen's moveable army, just as, being a Queen's officer, he has hitherto conducted the business of the local army through the "Adjutant-"general of the army" who has been a Company's officer.

I apprehend, that except as regards the internal economy of the Queen's regiments, the Commander-in-chief in India has been in no respect under the authority of the Commander-in-chief at home. The Queen's army in India has been practically in the position of an allied subsidiary force serving under the direction of the local government. The Company's army has been in the position of a national Indian army, and the Governor-General in council (subject of course to orders from the home Indian authorities) has stood in the same relation to that force in which the Crown stands to the army in England and in the colonies.

6590. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Your lordship is aware that every officer in the local army holds Her Majesty's commission ?—Yes.

6591. Why, then, could not he be placed under the Commander-in-chief in England equally as well as any other officer ?—The whole system of the local army is entirely different from that of the Queen's, there are no promotions in it, they all rise by seniority; the Commander-in-chief has nothing to do with the internal organization of a regiment.

6592. Still, as every officer in the local army holds Her Majesty's commission, what is there to prevent his being placed under the Commander-in-chief in England equally as well as any other officer ?—I do not know why he holds Her Majesty's commission, he never uses it for any purpose. I suppose it is to give him a certain station.

6593. But your lordship is aware that he holds Her Majesty's commission, and that in virtue of that commission he commands Queen's as well as Company's troops in India ?—Yes ; but he has no communication with the Horse Guards.

6594. He has had no communication with the Horse Guards hitherto, because no officer of the local army has ever held the chief command in India ; but it appears to me that, holding the Queen's commission, he might have such communication, if Commander-in-chief in India, just as well as an officer of the line army ?—Those are really professional matters.

6595. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Your lordship contemplates a double army of Europeans, local and of the line, the local army being entirely distinct from the authority, limited though it may be, of the Commander-in-chief at home ?—Yes.

6596. Presuming that a local officer is made Commander-in-chief of the whole of the forces of India, I want to know how, he not being under the authority and never having been under the authority of the Commander-in-chief at home, is to be put in connexion with the Commander-in-chief at home in such a case ?—I do not at present see any necessity for his being so.

6597. But as regards the Queen's troops ?—As regards the Queen's troops, I think it would be far better that the senior officer should communicate with the Horse Guards ; the local officer knows nothing at all about the Queen's regiments. The promotions in the Queen's regiments are almost a science of themselves, I believe, I do not pretend to know anything at all about them ; and I should very much doubt whether a local officer would, and he could not advise the commander-in-chief upon the subject.

6598. It would necessitate a double command ?—I think so ; it would merely be a separate command for the transaction of that business, which would not at all affect the operations going on.

6599. You see no objection to it ?—I see none.

6600. There would not be a clashing of authority ?—Not the slightest : it could not affect military operations in any way.

6601. Why should there be any inconvenience in the commander-in-chief at home having that control over the local army which would not interfere with the local army further than keeping it up to the regulation ?—I think the local army would rather be where they are under their own head as they always have been, and I do not see what the commander-in-chief here has to do with them for the reason which I have stated, namely, that their promotion is all by seniority.

6602. The question has regard to the articles of war and interior discipline, nothing more ?—I see no reason why it should be altered. I should prefer leaving it as it is. You must always recollect that in fact the Governor-General does a great deal there ; all the promotions which take place in the Company's army pass through the Governor-General in Council ; that is the case with every appointment ; he does the whole business ; upon the Governor-General in Council is thrown the whole government, which is here divided into a great number of departments. Everything that the commander-in-chief here does is done by the Governor-General as regards the local army, not as regards the Queen's ; with that he has nothing to do ; it never comes before him.

6603. As regards the interior economy and the European discipline of regiments, which I think your lordship will admit is of considerable importance in a professional point of view, do you not think that the Governor-General is hardly the person who can carry that on efficiently, that is to say, that it would be out of his province ?—The interior discipline of the regiments is with the commander-in-chief in India, he looks after that, he would make a representation if anything was to be done by the Governor-General ; but there is not a single appointment which does not pass through the Governor-General in Council.

6604. Would it not be still an advantage that all the European force should be under one code, and that therefore that code should be administered by one head, and that head the commander-in-chief at home, to that extent only ?—I cannot take upon myself to say so ; I think it would be desirable that the code should be the same ; I think it would never do to punish two men serving together in a different way for the same offence.

6605. (*Chairman.*) This local army is equally a Queen's army with the other ?—No doubt ; it is as much a Queen's army as the marines. The marines never come under the notice of the commander-in-chief.

6606. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) When they serve ashore they do ?—They are much more under the Admiralty than they are under the commander-in-chief. The Ordnance used to be under a separate officer altogether. I rather think that all the military force which does not consist of regular troops of the line is under the Home Department ; the Home Department here has a great deal of power. I believe your Royal Highness cannot move any troops without the knowledge of the Home Department.

6607. I do not assume any power at all ; I am only speaking of the internal regulation and economy of regiments which, as a military man, I certainly should think would be better conducted under one system than under two. I want to know whether there would be any objection to that, without any reference to other interference of a local character, which naturally could never take place, and which indeed cannot, as your lordship states, take place even at home, for the

Secretaries of State are responsible for their different departments?—The Commander-in-chief in India, who I believe always has been a Queen's officer, has full authority as regards the internal discipline of the local army, both native and European; all the courts-martial go to him.

6608. There is no difficulty as long as he is a Queen's officer, but suppose he is a local officer, will there not be a difficulty?—The case has never occurred, and I am not at all aware whether or not there would be a difficulty. There is at the present moment a Commander-in-chief at Madras, who is a Company's officer, whether that has led to any inconvenience or not I am not aware.

6609. It has not, because he is under the Commander-in-chief of India as regards Queen's troops, therefore he is under the authority of a Queen's officer?—I should mention that my view always had been that it would be desirable that the Governor-General should be captain-general and head of the army; Lord Wellesley was so. The great difficulties have never occurred which might by possibility have occurred, but nothing would be so serious as any practical clashing of authority in India between the Commander-in-chief and the Governor-General; and with a view to the possibility of any such difficulty I always thought that the Governor-General should have in his pocket the commission of captain-general.

6610. (*Lord Stanley.*) Do you think that you would find men of eminence, who, in addition to the civil administration of a great empire, would take upon themselves the command-in-chief of a great army?—There have been cases in which a general officer has been Governor-General and Commander-in-chief at the same time. Lord Hastings was so. There may have been others. Lord William Bentinck was so. Lord Wellesley never interfered in the slightest degree in the internal details of the management of the army; they were left entirely to the Commander-in-chief, to Lord Lake; but I rather think that the courts-martial used to be sent to Lord Wellesley. I have heard that they were.

6611. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that the courts-martial should hereafter go to the Secretary of State or to the Commander-in-chief?—I think that all matters relating to the Indian army should go to the Secretary of State; such, for instance, as an application for a revision of punishment, or for a restoration. All those things came before the Board of Control when I was there.

6612. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you mean for the Queen's army?—No, for the Company's army; I used always to communicate with the Duke of Wellington with respect to those matters.

6613. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you think that it is a desirable thing to have the means of communication with the Commander-in-chief?—The reason of my communicating with the Duke of Wellington was not because he was Commander-in-chief, but because he was prime minister, and because he knew a great deal better than anybody else.

6614. (*Lord Stanley.*) Is there any doubt that if points of military discipline arose the Secretary of State would think it his duty to consult the Commander-in-chief?—He would always go to the best advice that he could.

6615. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You think that that would be desirable?—Yes, of course he would do so. I cannot imagine a man not doing it. I recollect one very useful piece of advice which the Duke of Wellington gave me with respect to these courts-martial. When it was suggested that an officer should be restored, he said, "Never forgive drunkenness." I never did; I never sent back any man, or relaxed the punishment of any man who had been drunk.

6616. You are of opinion then that a certain intercourse on military and technical points alone should be carried on between whoever is Secretary of State for India and the highest military authority?—No doubt about it. There must be frequent communication. There always was such communication between the President of the Board of Control and the officer at the head of the army.

6617. You would not think it advisable that any great organic change should be made in the armies of India as regards the European portion of them, which had not been determined upon in concert and after due deliberation with the highest military authorities in England?—I would not establish any legal restriction; but I would regard it as a matter of course that every man in a public office does what he considers best for the public service, and he could not carry on the service well unless he communicated in that way.

6618. Might it not lead to very great difficulties on the spot, if an organisation was adopted for the one which was not extended to the other. Take the case of a warrant. Suppose that a new warrant was introduced into the local army which was not adopted in the Queen's army, the relative position of officers might be very considerably changed by it, and it might work very unfavourably towards one service or the other. That would be a great disadvantage, would it not?—I apprehend that now no such thing would be allowed, that both armies belonging to the Queen, both being European, in any such case as that, the warrant would be made applicable to both armies. I cannot conceive it possible that the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-chief should not always communicate, and act together.

6619. Then practically as far as any home questions are concerned the Commander-in-chief would to a certain extent be taken into council, though not by any law or regulation, but by the necessities of political daily life?—I should think so. I should object to a law, for I think it might lead to embarrassment. All these things have been conducted hitherto without any inconvenience for the benefit of the public service.

6620. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) With reference to the doubt which your lordship has expressed of an officer of the local army being able efficiently to conduct the duties of the chief command in India with respect to the troops of the line, you are aware that, consequently on the abolition of the East India Company, the officers of the local army will henceforth hold only one commission, namely, the Queen's commission?—Yes.

6621. Do you see any reason why any officer of the local army who may hereafter be appointed to the chief command in India should not be able to conduct the duties with respect to the troops of the line fully as well as an officer of the line army, appointed to that command, would be able to conduct the duties with respect to the local troops, European and native?—As I have mentioned, the constitution of the two armies is totally different, one rising by seniority, and the other in a different manner. The officer in command of the Queen's troops in India has had nothing to do but to deal with the discipline of the regiment. The local officer would, I think, be very much embarrassed, if he had to deal with questions of promotion and all those other matters which are now transacted between the Commander-in-chief and the home authorities; he would not know anything at all about them; it would embarrass him, and occupy a great deal of his time in consequence of his not being acquainted from early youth with the machinery of the Queen's army, which no one, I believe, who has not entered very early knows at all.

6622. (*Chairman.*) I take for granted that you consider that Her Majesty's prerogative with regard to the one army would be entirely the same as with regard to the other?—No doubt of it.

6623. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) You advocate a considerable European local force; who do you propose should organise and command that force?—The Commander-in-chief in India. I should desire that all the troops sent out to India for the local army should be retained as long as possible here in order to make

The Earl of Ellenborough, G.C.B.

2nd Dec. 1858.

them good troops, and that they should not be sent out very young, so that when they arrived they should be fit for any service.

6624. Then they should be organised in England?—As far as possible, and when they arrived they should be entirely under the command of the officer commanding in-chief.

6625. Your lordship has intimated that there is some danger in a considerable body of Europeans being so far distant from England as India. Do you not think that if any danger of that sort is to be apprehended, it is much more to be apprehended from a large body of troops invariably local than from a large body of troops of Her Majesty constantly being relieved and imbibing English notions?—But in point of fact they are not relieved, and do not imbibe English notions. There is the 10th regiment which, I believe, is ordered home; there is not one man in that regiment who went out with it. They exhaust themselves in about ten years, and if the regiments remain, as many of them do, for a longer period, in point of fact there is an end of them.

6626. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Your lordship will admit probably that one of the great beauties of the British army is the *esprit de corps* of that army?—Yes.

6627. Do you not think that that is much more maintained by the prospect of relief even if distant than if a corps is doomed to one locality?—I am not aware. If a man is once sent to India he passes a very great portion of his life there.

6628. (*Chairman.*) What do you suppose that the power exercised by the Commander-in-chief here over that portion of the army which has been located in India has been hitherto?—Nothing whatever. I am not aware of any sort of communication between them. I believe I had occasionally the opportunity of sending to the Horse Guards information with respect to Queen's regiments with which they were not already provided.

6629. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You are aware that with the exception of the interior economy and discipline of the regiments with regard to regulation and promotion, there is no intercourse between the Commander-in-chief here and the Commander-in-chief in India?—No.

6630. (*Col. Burlton.*) No inconvenience has arisen from that system hitherto?—No, no one could tell who was Queen's officer and who was Company's officer.

6631. Then you see no reason why an alteration should be made in that respect?—No, unless recent events have made an alteration necessary.

6632. (*Sir Geo. A. Wetherall.*) The local army being as much under the Crown as the moveable portion, would you have it recruited as now under the orders of the East India House or of the Commander-in-chief?—I would keep the recruiting quite distinct. There is an officer who would give excellent information to the Commission if they desired it with regard to the recruiting for the East India Company's service, namely Col. Thompson, who is at Cork; he is a very able officer, and he has been there a good many years. Col. Thompson raises the recruits there.

6633. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Is there any reason why in former Acts of Parliament the number of Europeans of the Company's service was limited?—I suppose that there was some little jealousy upon the subject, but I am not at all aware of the reason. I thought at the time that they had rather more than they need have.

6634. Then your reason for modifying your opinions as regards the relative proportions of local troops and troops of the line has been in consequence of recent circumstances?—Entirely.

6635. In what respect do you think that those circumstances bear on this great increase?—They make it necessary to have so very much larger an army there than we had there before. I assume that 70 battalions will be required; of course it is impossible to say exactly what the number shall be; hitherto there have been twenty-four usually of the Queen's and until very recently only six of the Company's; thirty was the total number. There will therefore be required forty battalions more than we had before, besides a great increase in cavalry and artillery. The army, I should think, would be tripled in effective force.

6636. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) If the officers of the local army be held eligible in future for appointment to the chief command in India, are you not of opinion that there will always be officers in that army who will qualify themselves in every respect for conducting the duties with respect to the troops of the line?—They have always been eligible at all times; the Queen could at any time make a Company's officer Commander-in-chief in India.

6637. Do you not think that officers of the local army would fully qualify themselves for conducting the duties of Commander-in-chief of India with respect to troops of the line, if held eligible for that appointment?—Indeed I do not. I think they would consider it such a very unlikely thing that they should get that appointment, that I doubt very much whether they would give themselves any trouble upon the subject.

6638. (*Sir G. A. Wetherall.*) You have said that the reserve of the local force for India, of 4,000 or 5,000 men, or whatever the number might be, should be disposed of while in England for any purposes in the United Kingdom. Under whose orders would they be placed while they were here?—While in this country they must be under the same orders as those under which the Queen's army is placed, and I think it would be highly desirable to take authority to that effect in the ensuing session of Parliament. I believe there is ground for the doubt which has been expressed, whether at the present time they could be so employed.

6639. Then you would give the Commander-in-chief power over the depôts at Warley, or wherever they might be?—I think certainly they should be disposed of wherever they were wanted. For instance supposing there were an invasion, it would be perfectly monstrous to imagine that 4,000 or 5,000 men were not to be moved. I see no reason for maintaining a separate authority for the India House as to that matter. In point of fact, it would be an understood thing between the departments; but the Act, if passed, would be extending the service of these men who are now engaged for the purpose of being disciplined here, and serving in India. I, under certain circumstances, would require them to serve here; it would only be, I apprehend, in case of invasion, or any outbreak, quite in a case of emergency.

6640. (*Lord Stanley.*) Would it not be within the power of the Secretary of State, by orders sent to the commanding officer at Warley, in such a case of emergency as you speak of, to place any force there at the disposal of the Commander-in-chief?—I should think not. I should not think it advisable to leave that question unsettled by law.

6641. (*Chairman.*) Would not it become more necessary in proportion to the number to which you increased the local army in India?—No doubt about it. If the number of recruits here formerly was 4,000, which was in the proportion of 4 to 24, and if the strength of the army was raised, there might be a reserve of 8,000 or 10,000 men there by possibility.

6642. (*Sir G. A. Wetherall.*) Under whose superintendence would their discipline be carried on?—I apprehend it is now under the authority of the Council of India; there is no reason why it should not be so. The only case in which it would be necessary to use them, would be on an emergency, but there ought to be a legal power to do so; I think, especially in the case of riot, that it would be a most serious inconvenience to have a doubt whether those men could be legally moved or not.

6643. (*Lord Stanley.*) Then you do not propose to transfer Warley from one department to another, but merely to take power for the Secretary of State to

transfer the force there into the hands of the Commander-in-chief in case of emergency?—Yes.

6644. (*Chairman.*) I take for granted that you would have the same bounty and advantages given to the soldiers of both forces on recruiting, or you would have two systems of recruiting going on at the same time, bidding one against the other, which would be, of course, very inconvenient?—I think the bounty ought to be the same; I do not think the standard has always been the same. There is a difference as to the pensions between the two services, and I believe a very marked one; my impression is, that the Queen's service is better off than the Company's, as regards pensions. I know that I have had a great many complaints from men who have been dismissed from the Company's service without pensions; and it occurred to me that if they had been in the Queen's service they would have had something, when they got nothing in the Company's service.

6645. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) With your military knowledge you are aware of the axiom, never to carry on two wars by the same Government. Upon the same principle, do you not think it impossible to carry on two recruiting systems in the same country?—Not if you have the same bounty. You have now a very large recruiting for the marines.

6646. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The marines have great advantages over the line?—It is a different thing altogether. The marines of late have got up to their establishment, formerly they never were so.

6647. They are much better off than men of the line?—I rather think that the concession has been made to them which I wanted and endeavoured to gain for them 12 years ago—something with regard to pension or pay.

6648. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) You have said that there would be probably 10,000 men at one period as recruits in reserve for India?—It is a possible thing.

6649. How is it possible that those 10,000 recruits can be under any other authority than that of the Commander-in-chief, organized by him, officered by him, and sent out to India?—I see no necessity for organization or officering, or anything of the kind. I would leave them just as they are now. I never heard of any confusion, they go on very quietly.

6650. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would more organization be required for 10,000 men than for 1,200 or 2,000?—I am not aware that there is any practical interference; they are under their own officers there. I suppose they would be under the authority of the officer in superior command at Chatham if sent there. If what I desired had been carried out, it would have been absolutely necessary to come to some new arrangement, because Warley could not hold 10,000 men. The East India Company raised a number of men this year. They did their duty very fairly. They recruited in proportion to their establishment quite as well as the Queen's service. I forget the exact number, but it was a large number.

6651. (*Col. Burlton.*) One of the reasons which your lordship has given for advocating two armies, one local and the other of the line, is, that in the event of any mutinous disposition being manifested, whether in the line or the local army, the Government might rely upon the support of the other. Your lordship has mentioned one instance in which the Queen's troops were brought to bear upon an unsatisfactory state of affairs in the Madras presidency nearly 50 years ago?—I am not aware that there was any collision.

6652. Does your lordship happen to remember an instance in which one of the Queen's regiments in a mutinous state was compelled to lay down its arms by the troops of the East India Company, and was brought as prisoners in boats down the Ganges from one station to the other?—I am not aware of it.

6653. Your lordship probably recollects a case in which one of His Majesty's regiments being in a very unsatisfactory state in consequence, as was supposed, of disaffection towards the commanding officer, advanced to the breach of a certain hill fort, and then refused to go on, thereby endangering the life of a most distinguished officer?—I was not aware of it. Before this revolution, (mutiny, I cannot call it,) the Government of India might have depended upon every native soldier against the Queen's army or against the Europeans, every man would have stood by the Government.

6654. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The same feeling existing among the local Europeans and the native army of India, which would be one and the same body, would not it produce a very great preponderance of weight on the side of the local army against the army of the line?—They would not be absolutely equal, but very nearly equal, supposing the numbers of the cavalry, infantry, and artillery to be nearly equal, there might be some little superiority in the number of the local officers employed with the irregular corps, but it would not be very large.

6655. The whole native army of India would be on the side of the local army; I am talking of the European officers?—That would not be so, because I assume that the Queen's officers would be eligible to command the native corps, and as they acquired the native languages they would obtain those commands.

6656. Does not your lordship take into account the regular native regiments which have been largely officered hitherto?—But there would be no regular native regiments, or not above five, I think. I cannot imagine that any new native regiment would be created, and there are not above five which can be said to be in existence in the Bengal army.

6657. In the event of there being a proportion, say 20 or 25 regiments, or whatever the number might be, established upon the old system of European officers, would not that induce your lordship to think that it would be giving a preponderating element to the local army compared with the army of the line?—I think it would, if there was to be a new native army officered as the old native army was, and of course, under the same conditions as the local European force, it would lead me to modify that opinion which I have expressed as to the necessity of perfect equality between the two European forces, and a portion of the local European force would be in that case taken away; but I do not apprehend that that state of things will exist in Bengal certainly.

6658. (*Chairman.*) If there are now 300,000 native troops and police, do you not imagine that there is some danger to be apprehended from that amount of force?—The police would not be very different from the irregular corps; there would be rather fewer officers. I apprehend that the police will have, probably, one officer for 800 or 900 men, that was the police which I was establishing; you cannot find sufficient officers to have more, it would be desirable if you could; therefore, it would be an inferior sort of irregular corps, and the Queen's officers might be appointed to it just as well as the local officers.

6659. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Does your lordship contemplate prospectively converting the regular native regiments of Bombay and Madras also into irregular corps?—I know nothing of the native regiments of Bombay and Madras, and I cannot pretend to speak upon the point; but I would alter as little as possible. I would leave all things standing which I could leave standing. In Bengal you are obliged to imagine a new system because the old one is all gone.

6660. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Then you would not extend to Madras and Bombay any large increase of European local troops?—No; I see no necessity for it. There would not be a large increase of European troops. I would follow the same principle there, I think, as I would elsewhere. The Queen's troops do not always remain there. They are moved about from Madras to Bengal, and so on. They do not always remain in the presidency to which they are originally sent.

6661. (*Viscount Melville.*) The local Europeans do generally?—They occasionally move them about from one to the other.

The Earl of Ellenborough, G.C.B.

2nd Dec. 1858.

6662. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) I thought that the Bombay Europeans were only employed in Bombay, and those of Madras in Madras, excepting as now, in a case of emergency?—Yes; the local Europeans are so, but the Queen's are more moveable.

6663. Would you increase the European local troops of Madras and Bombay?—I should like to know what was to be done with the native armies of Madras and Bombay. If those armies remained upon the same principle as now, I should adhere to my former opinion, and would not in the same way increase the European corps in the Bombay and Madras presidencies. I want a balance.

6664. Your lordship's opinion goes to the one side being counterbalanced by the other, and you would be sorry to see either party overbalance the other?—I think a balance highly desirable.

6665. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Assuming that the permanent European force in India will be maintained at a much greater strength than heretofore, I conclude that your lordship contemplates a considerable reduction being made in the native armies of the three presidencies?—No doubt; I have said that I should consider two native regiments for one European the utmost limit to which it would be desirable to go, and I am not at all certain that it would be necessary even to go to that extent, except for purposes of war. Military men can speak on that point better than I can, but I think that a European corps requires two native corps with it, that there are so many guards to be taken that there would not be much more than one regiment actually disposable to go into the field by the side of the European regiment.

6666. You are aware that it is usual to calculate three native regiments?—That has been because there were so few Europeans, but what I considered right was to have a European regiment and a native regiment on each flank; if you had a third regiment, that third regiment would take the guards, and it would give you effective for the field two native regiments for one European, and if they were kept together and on service those native regiments would become nearly equal to the Europeans; when they have been long acting together the native will go wherever the European goes, he will do exactly the same thing.

6667. Do you contemplate the police being armed in the same way, and having the same military training as the troops of the line?—Not the same military training; a very inferior military training, and very inferior arms, so as not to be exposed to much danger from them.

6668. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you give them a musket or only a pistol; would you give them firearms?—Certainly.

6669. (*Col. Forsyth Tait.*) The old musket?—Some old flint musket, perhaps, would do for them.

6670. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) More as a defence to the person than anything else?—Yes. Nothing could be more wretched than what they were; they cost an enormous sum; there were as many men, civilians, in the service of the Government as there were soldiers, and, as a military body, they were utterly useless; they plundered the people, and did no good.

6671. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Would you have the police placed upon the same footing as men of the line, with regard to pay and pensions?—No. I established some battalions of police, eight or nine of them; I was beginning and intended to carry it throughout India. I found that by having a more efficient police I could dispense with a large portion of those who had been formerly employed, and I gave a better pay; I think I gave four or five rupees. I know that by reducing the numbers the increase of charge was very small; there was a great increase of efficiency and a very small increase of charge, and I, on one occasion, obtained this great convenience:—A regiment was disbanded for mutiny, and in the course of three weeks I had a new regiment taken by drafts from the battalions of police; it was called the service battalion, and it was just as good a battalion as any other.

6672. You have expressed your opinion that the large addition which it will be necessary to make to the permanent European force in India will enable the Government considerably to reduce the native armies of the three presidencies. If the population generally be disarmed throughout the country, the Government will be enabled still further to reduce the native armies, will it not?—I cannot venture to say what will be the state of India; we do not see daylight at all; I think it is impossible to look forward. When I say that seventy battalions are required, I suppose that there is a certain degree of settlement. It is impossible to say, with precision, what shall be done, I think.

6673. Your lordship is aware that hitherto the Commanders-in-chief at Madras and Bombay have held independent commands as regards the European local troops as well as the native armies of those presidencies?—Yes.

6674. Would you recommend that that system be continued, or would you put the local European and native troops of Madras and Bombay under the immediate authority of the Commander-in-chief of India?—They should be, to a certain degree, under the command of the Commander-in-chief of India, because I recollect one instance in which a senior officer being in command at one of the presidencies, thought it necessary to resign when a junior officer was the Commander-in-chief. The communication between them is very small, I believe, but there is some subordination.

6675. But you are aware that practically the Commander-in-chief in India never has interfered with the discipline and government of the local armies of Madras and Bombay?—He has not interfered practically, but still there was that case. Sir Willoughby Cotton resigned the command at Bombay because Sir Charles Napier, a junior officer, was then Commander-in-chief in India, although, no doubt, communication between them could scarcely ever have existed.

6676. But there was this difference, that Sir Willoughby Cotton was only ieutenant-general commanding the Queen's troops at Bombay, and it was solely in that respect that he was under the Commander-in-chief in India?—Yes.

6677. Then it was with reference to the supersession in the command of the Queen's troops, and not that of the local army of Bombay, over which the Commander-in-chief in India never has exercised any authority, that the resignation took place?—Just so; but I apprehend that the Commander-in-chief has scarcely ever occasion to give any direction to one of the local Commanders-in-chief. I can hardly imagine a case in which it would occur, unless the two armies were acting together on service, and it is not a very likely thing that the two Commanders-in-chief would be in the field.

6678. If I mistake not, the warrants of the Commanders-in-chief in India formerly gave them power to interfere with the commands at Bombay and Madras only in the event of their being personally present within those presidencies?—I am not aware. That, of course, would be the case, if the Commander-in-chief in India went to Madras or Bombay, as he did formerly to Seringapatam. In that case, of course he must take the personal command of the whole army.

6679. Your lordship has expressed a very strong opinion that with a view to obviate all ill feeling between the officers of the line and local armies, both should henceforth be placed upon a perfect equality; you have also, I think, stated your opinion that with respect to the staff and civil appointments in India, officers of the line should henceforth have an equal share in proportion to numbers with those of the local army?—No; not an equal share in proportion to numbers; that would put an end altogether to my principle. My principle is that the

Governor-General should be at liberty to take the ablest men he could find anywhere—that they should be eligible, but have no rights.

6680. (*Lord Stanley.*) You do not admit in short the right on the part of any set of men to say, "Here "is a certain proportion of these appointments to be "set aside for us?"—No, it is contrary to reason.

6681. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) The opinion which you have expressed, if I understand your lordship, amounts to this, that without laying down any definite rule, you advocate the adoption of the system of equal favour to the officers of both armies?—Certainly; favour to nothing but the public; that is my principle.

6682. Upon that principle there is one point which I wish to bring to your lordship's attention, and to ask your opinion upon. As the officers of the line in India will have the advantages of being able to exchange into regiments at home, and of having commands and appointments open to them in England and the colonies from which the officers of the local army will be altogether excluded, do you not think that those advantages ought to be taken into consideration in determining their fair proportionate participation in the appointments in India?—No, I do not. As long as officers of the line remain in India they have the same advantages as the officers of the local army. They are all equal. As soon as they leave India they are a different body altogether. India has nothing to do with them. I would not diminish the advantages in India while they are doing the same service, because they have other advantages when performing another service in a different place. I do not think it would be fair.

6683. (*Chairman.*) The only advantage which they have in India is that they are eligible if they are the best men?—Yes.

6684. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Have the European artillery and infantry of the East India Company's army been found in any respect inferior as regards efficiency for service in the field to the artillery and infantry of the line army?—As far as I am aware, never—I believe not; all commanders-in-chief have spoken in admiration of the artillery. They have said that they have never seen any artillery superior to that of the Company.

6685. Have the officers on the staff of the army in India, and belonging to the East India Company's forces, been found in any respect inferior, as regards efficiency for service in the field, to the officers on the staff of Her Majesty's army, whether in Europe or Asia?—Not that I am aware of. They have had greater advantages. The officers of the Company's army have acquired a much more extensive knowledge in fact. The probability is, that in former times till this great revolution took place, the officers of the Company's army would have been, as soldiers, superior to the officers of the Queen's army. They had seen a great deal more; they had more enlarged minds, because they had a great deal more to do.

6686. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) It would be an immense disadvantage to the army of the line if they had not the opportunity of the field of India as well as the local army, and the State would suffer by it?—It would be an enormous disadvantage. It is the greatest field for soldiers that ever existed in the world.

6687. It would therefore be a great detriment to the State if the general army of the country were debarred that field?—A very great disadvantage; and I think that it is a very great advantage that circumstances should lead to the employment, notwithstanding the expense, of a portion of the Queen's artillery, and likewise of a much larger portion of the Queen's cavalry. The fact is, that we are learning war, and teaching it to all the world; there is not a doubt about it.

6688. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Have the European officers and soldiers of the East India Company's army ever failed to uphold equally with those of the royal army the honour of their Queen and country when employed in the field?—I believe not. The European regiments in the Company's service have noble records of their achievements. I believe they have done their duty as well as any troops ever did.

6689. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you think that any European army in India ever equalled or came near the Peninsular army, either in movement, or fighting, or anything else?—I do; and I do so because the Duke of Wellington told me that the English army in India came nearer his idea of what the Roman legions were than any troops which he had ever seen in his life. I recollect particularly his saying so, and I do not think that he confined his remark to the Europeans, but that as an army there was no army superior to the English army in India.

6690. (*Chairman.*) Of what period was he speaking?—He was speaking of what he knew when he was there.

6691. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Your lordship may recollect, perhaps, that the late Duke of Wellington in his place in Parliament gave very strong testimony, so far as his opinion went, to the admirable state of efficiency in which the Bombay division under the command of Lord Melville arrived at Mooltan in 1848, as shown in the fact of those troops having on the very next day taken their place in the line, and carried some of the works which defended the city, and stated that he mentioned that fact as one of the remarkable circumstances of the campaign?—I do not remember it.

6692. I think your lordship will admit that we may safely take as a test of the efficiency and discipline of an army, the state in which the troops are brought into line in the field?—I conclude so. I apprehend that no army has ever done more, and perhaps never so much, as our army has done in the last eighteen months—nothing like it.

6693. I imagine you consider that the perfect fitness of the officer at the head of an army is the very foundation of its efficiency and discipline?—No doubt about it. If you look at the Duke of Wellington's despatches, you will see clearly that no man but he could have done what he did, in India especially; he was at the head of every department, he was his own commissary-general and his own quartermaster-general, he did everything himself.

His Lordship withdrew.

Major-General Sir CHARLES YORKE, K.C.B., Military Secretary to the General Commanding-in-Chief, examined.

6694. (*Chairman.*) What are the powers possessed and exercised by the Commander-in-chief in England over the Commander-in-chief in India as regards that portion of the troops which have hitherto been the Queen's troops?—It has respect to all matters of discipline, and in regard to promotions. I think it is very much confined to that.

6695. There has never been the slightest interference with regard to the movement of troops?—Certainly not.

6696. (*Lord Stanley.*) You say it has respect to all questions relating to discipline. What is the course of proceeding on such occasions; a court-martial of course decides upon the spot?—It does. The Commander-in-chief in India has the power of approving of general courts-martial, even to the dismissal or cashiering of officers, and the power of life and death. The proceedings of general courts-martial on officers are always sent home to the judge-advocate-general in England, and he lays them before the Commander-in-chief, and makes any observations upon the case which he thinks it desirable to submit.

Maj.-Gen. Sir C. Yorke, K.C.B.

2d Dec. 1858.

6697. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And those observations of the judge-advocate-general are communicated to India?—Yes, whenever there is any irregularity; anything which affects discipline, or to which it is desirable to draw the attention of the Commander-in-chief in India. A copy is sent to him.

6698. (*Lord Stanley.*) As regards the case of an officer who is tried by a court-martial, if he is acquitted on the spot of course there is an end of the matter?—Yes.

6699. If he is condemned by the sentence of the court-martial, the sentence is, I presume, put in force by the Commander-in-chief on the spot?—It is.

6700. Is that sentence altered or not by the Commander-in-chief here?—Certainly not.

6701. There is no power of altering it?—The Queen has the power, on grounds being shown to warrant it, to remit the sentence, or, as far as the articles of war authorize an interference, to interfere with the sentence of a court-martial; that power is not lost.

6702. But practically the power is never exercised?—I would scarcely say that. I do not remember any case, certainly, since I have been in the office where it has been exercised.

6703. As regards the case of an individual officer who is tried by court-martial in India, his case is decided upon on the spot?—It is.

6704. And it is considered in practice to be finally decided upon on the spot?—It is considered in practice to be final; if there is any reason, when the proceedings of the court-martial are sent to England, to induce the judge-advocate-general or the Commander-in-chief to think that there are any grounds in favour of the prisoner, it does not prevent those grounds being considered, and his having the benefit of them.

6705. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But it is only an informality, in fact, which would be noticed?—Only an informality.

6706. (*Lord Stanley.*) Then in practice the interference of the Commander-in-chief here with the discipline of the Queen's troops in India limits itself to this, that he either on the recommendation of the judge-advocate-general, or on his own account, makes any comments upon sentences which have been passed and acted upon, which may seem to him fit for the future regulation of discipline?—For the future regulation of discipline. If ground were shown that a sentence was irregular or disproportionately severe, or anything of that sort, the Queen's power would still remain to do justice in the case.

6707. (*Chairman.*) If a court-martial takes place in this country the Queen's pleasure is taken upon it before the sentence is carried into effect?—Certainly.

6708. Is that the case when it is transmitted from India?—No, the Commander-in-chief on the spot approves of it.

6709. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) The Commander-in-chief on the spot has virtually more power in that respect than the Commander-in-chief at home, inasmuch as he can confirm when the Commander-in-chief at home cannot confirm?—Just so.

6710. (*Lord Stanley.*) Will you explain to us in what respect, as regards the discipline of the Queen's troops in India, the power of the Commander-in-chief here is more than nominal?—He receives all reports from the Commander-in-chief in India, and if he thought that there were irregularities going on, that the Queen's regulations were violated, or anything of that sort, he would certainly draw the attention of the Commander-in-chief in India to it, and request that it might not occur again.

6711. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In fact, he would draw the attention of the Commander-in-chief, would he not, to any deviation from the Queen's regulations?—Certainly.

6712. And by that means would maintain the same system of discipline for the Queen's European troops in India as exists in any other portion of Her Majesty's dominins?—Exactly so.

6713. (*Lord Stanley.*) Would he give any direct order to the Commander-in-chief in India, or would it be regarded merely in the form of a recommendation or an admonition?—If he found it necessary to give a direct order to prevent a violation of the Queen's regulations, he certainly would do so.

6714. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And that only?—Yes; to see that the regulations of the service were carried out.

6715. (*Chairman.*) Are any orders issued direct from the Commander-in-chief here to the army in India without coming in the name of the Commander-in-chief there?—Certainly not.

6717. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In your experience at the Horse Guards you are not aware of any direct orders excepting on matters of discipline and regular regimental promotion having ever been sent to India from the Commander-in-chief here?—Certainly not since I have been at the Horse Guards.

6718. In that respect there is a direct communication to the Commander-in-chief?—Yes.

6719. But in none other?—In none other.

6720. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) The authority of the Commander-in-chief in England extends to all matters referred to in what are called the army regulations?—Yes; to see that those are carried out.

6721. Have the Commanders-in-chief at Bombay and Madras had the power of confirming sentences of capital punishment?—No; only the Commander-in-chief in India.

6722. They have never had that power that you are aware of?—Not that I am aware of.

6723. (*Col. Burlton.*) You are aware that the Governor-General in Council must concur before the capital execution of a soldier can take place in India?—Yes; but the Governor-General confirms the sentence of the court-martial.

6724. (*Lord Stanley.*) You say that the interference of the Commander-in-chief here with the discipline of the Queen's troops in India is to enforce the observance of the regulations of the service?—Yes.

6725. Is there any power vested in him of altering those regulations?—No; Her Majesty alone alters them.

6726–7. It is done by the authority of the Crown, with the concurrence of the Secratary of State for War?—Yes.

The witness withdrew.

Adjourned to to-morrow at 11 o'clock.

Friday, 3rd December 1858.

PRESENT :

Major-General Peel.	Lieut.-Gen. Sir George A. Wetherall.
H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge.	Major-Gen. Montgomerie.
Marquess of Tweeddale.	Major-Gen. Hancock.
Viscount Melville.	Col. Burlton.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir Harry G. W. Smith.	Col. Forsyth Tait.

Major-General PEEL in the Chair.

Edward Francis Elliot, Esq. examined.

E. F. Elliot, Esq.

3rd Dec. 1858.

6728. (*Chairman.*) You were formerly in the royal engineers?—Yes.

6729. And you have been employed at the head of the police at Madras?—For many years.

6730. For how many years?—I was 38 years in the police at Madras, and 19 of them at the head of it.

6731. (*Marquess of Tweeddale.*) What other situation did you hold? What were your duties?—I held also an appointment in a civil court, that of head Commissioner of the Court of Small Causes at Madras.

6732. (*Chairman.*) Will you be so good as to give the Commission any information in your power respecting the formation and organization of the police in India?—I have come quite unprepared. I was not aware that I was about to be examined. I got the Secretary's letter only on Tuesday morning. I was in France at the time, and I came over immediately, being told that my attendance would be required on Wednesday.

6733. (*Marquess of Tweeddale.*) Although you have not had an opportunity of bringing home your papers, you will have no difficulty in answering any questions?—I do not expect that I shall have much difficulty.

6734. (*Chairman.*) Will you have the goodness to proceed to give us any information that you can upon the organization of the police?—My duties were with the police of the town of Madras; I had nothing to do with the rural police.

6735. (*Col. Burlton.*) Had that Madras police any military organization?—None whatever, it was purely civil.

6736. (*Chairman.*) Will you state what its organization was, and the duties performed by that police?—They were as nearly as possible what the duties of the police are in London.

6737. (*Marquess of Tweeddale.*) Have you had any means of comparing the duties of the police in India with the duties of the police in other parts of the world?—Yes. In 1846 I was sent home under the Government of your Lordship, and did duty in London for two or three months; and from thence was sent to Ireland, where I remained for two months, and where I had an opportunity of seeing the complete working of the constabulary under Sir Duncan McGregor, who gave me every facility.

6738. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Have you formed any opinion with respect to the general system of police which it will be desirable to establish throughout India in future?—It is upon that point that I should wish to speak. In 1838, when India was extremely disturbed, just about the time of the Affghanistan war, when it was overrun by emissaries of all kinds, I sent up certain suggestions to Government for a more efficient system of police. Those notes were sent to Bengal; they were afterwards acted upon to a certain degree in the north-west, but never in our part of India, because there was always the financial difficulty to be overcome, how it was to be paid. Within the last four or five years the Madras Government has urged upon the supreme Government the absolute necessity of doing something to obtain an efficient rural police. I remained in India for some time, in hopes that authority would be obtained to carry out the suggestions, but finding that nothing was done, I resigned the service in April 1856. At the beginning of this year I received a communication from Lord Harris, stating that he had received sanction for the re-organization of the police, and inviting me to come out in order to form a police for the whole of the presidency of Madras; but for reasons which I need not state here I declined the offer. The Madras presidency consists of 20 districts, containing about 140,000 square miles, with a population of 22,000,000. For this vast territory I proposed a police of 22,000 men, besides about 5,000 mounted men; the force to be divided among the districts according to circumstances; each district to be under a military officer, termed a superintendent. I lay stress upon military officers, because I wish it to be understood that whatever police there is established for India, I believe it is absolutely necessary that its control should be quite distinct from the civil administration of the provinces. At present what is called police in the districts of Madras are the peons under the magistrate, who is also the collector of revenue. The collection of the revenue is his principal object, and the peons in executing this duty oppress the people and neglect their police functions. In fact, there is no regular system of police in the provinces, and therefore one of the first things which I proposed was to divide the duties entirely from the magistrate and to put it under the control of a chief commissioner of police, who should have immediate and direct communication with the Government.

6739. (*Col. Burlton.*) Do you mean a civil commissioner?—A commissioner for police only. I ought to remark that many particular duties of police in the presidency of Madras have hitherto been performed by sepoys, viz., gaol duties, the escort of treasure throughout the whole country, and to keep the peace on great festivals, all which is simply and solely the duty of a police, if there is a police. But the great difficulty in establishing a police of this kind, as I said before, was the supposed expense. Yet from late returns it would appear the expense would not be so great as first apprehended, inasmuch as the present police force, officers and men, in the provinces, exclusive of village police, consists of 13,111 men, costing 69,556 rupees; performing other duties as well as police, 4,525 men, costing 14,926 rupees; and this is exclusive of the presidency town police; so that there are now 17,600 men employed as police. If these men were brought under control on a uniformity of system, drilled and disciplined, more than half the number of men are already at command.

6740. (*Marquess of Tweeddale.*) Is there any part of the present police in the Madras presidency which you can consolidate with a reformed police?—Yes, there is a native institution of police, which may be rendered most valuable.

6741. Will you explain it?—I mean the Talliari system, which is that of the village watchman. Every village has its hereditary watchman; most valuable men, but unfortunately they are not employed in their legitimate duties, but are the fags of the villages for all manner of purposes.

6742. (*Chairman.*) How do you propose to divide this body of 28,000 men; into companies or into battalions?—One force, drafted into the several districts, according to size or circumstances. Some of the districts are very large; for instance, Bellary contains 13,000 square miles, with a population of 1,229,600;

L. F. Elliot, Esq.

3rd Dec. 1858.

North Arcot, 5,790 square miles, with a population of 1,485,900 ; whereas Chingleput is only 2,900 square miles, with 583,462 souls.

6743. Do you propose that they should be officered by Europeans ?—By European superintendents certainly. There must be European supervision. There must be a superintendent in each district, with two subordinates under him.

6744. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How many would there be probably in the aggregate to the number of men ?—I should think that a superintendent ought to have 1,000 or 1,200 men under him, with two deputies.

6745. There would be about three European officers to 1,000 men ?—Yes.

6746. And you would take those gentlemen from the class of officers ?—The superintendents, certainly.

6747. So as to have a thorough system of military discipline ?—Yes, with a certain amount of drill.

6748. (*Chairman.*) What would be the relative expense of this police compared with native regiments? —As far as I can remember as 7 to 10; let the sepoy be 10, the policeman would be 7.

6749. You propose that they should do some of the duties now performed by the native regiments?— Yes, for gaols and treasure escort.

6750. If this police were established it would reduce the necessity for so large an amount of native force ?—So I apprehend.

6751. (*Marquess of Tweeddale.*) To what extent would it reduce them?—It is difficult to say, because the Madras army is constantly called on for duty beyond the boundary of what is generally called the Madras presidency ; but when the Madras army is within its legitimate bounds, I think six or eight regiments might be spared.

6752. (*Chairman.*) How do you propose to arm this police ? — With small carbine, which they can swing over their shoulders, never to be without it.

6753. What kind of engagement would you make with them ?—To make the service at all popular you must have a pension or a superannuated list.

6754. Would you take any oath from them ? — Yes.

6755. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you have them under the native articles of war?—No ; I would have them take the common oath of a police officer.

6756. You would not put them on the same footing, as far as discipline goes, as the army ?—I would not drill them to the same extent. Nothing can be better than the discipline of the constabulary of Ireland.

6757. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) You intend to make a marked difference between the arming and the extent of military training of the police and of the line? —Certainly.

6758. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In fact you wish to take the Irish constabulary as the basis ? — Yes ; I thought it was the exact thing for India.

6759. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you propose to give the police any arms in addition to the carbine ?— Yes, a short sword.

6760. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) More like a cutlass ? —Yes.

6761. (*Chairman.*) In what position do you contemplate placing the officers attached to these police? Would they have promotion ?—Their military promotion would not be interfered with.

6762. In their regiments ?—Certainly.

6763. You would detach them from their regiments to do duty with this police ?—Yes.

6764. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you contemplate the whole of the police throughout India being a military police, or do you contemplate there being also a civil police ?—At the three presidency capitals, where there are supreme courts, and where the law of England holds good, it would never do to have an armed police. Dublin has its distinct police.

6765. In the villages you would have them armed? —There I would have entirely an armed police.

6766. (*Col. Burlton.*) Quite distinct from the civil administration ?—Yes.

6767. Would you not allow the magistrate of a district to have anything to say to them ?—Not as to their discipline or where they should be placed ; but they would be at his requisition if he called for them.

6768. Would you not give the superintendent, or one of the officers, magisterial powers ?—I think not.

6769. (*Chairman.*) Then how are they to detain the prisoners ?—They would be handed over to the civil authorities.

6770. The magistrates are so much more numerous? —There are several authorities in India who have power to deal with offences.

6771. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Would not the magistrates in the different districts be under the chief commissioner, and be deputed by him to exercise authority ?—The chief commissioner of police would have no power whatever, except in the control of the police force.

6772. What would be the extent of area of the district over which one commissioner would be placed? —The districts are very different in their sizes.

6773. What do you contemplate as being about the average size ?—About 7,000 square miles.

6774. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How many men would you have in such a district ?—From 800 to 1,200 men.

6775. Supposing you take a man up, where are you to take him to ?—You must take him to the nearest competent authority,—civil authority.

6776. At what distance would the nearest magistrate be ?—It depends upon the locality. In some districts within a very few miles, in others at a great distance.

6777. As I understand you, you want to have this force quite independent of the magistrates as far as organization goes ?—Entirely ; the magistrates having nothing at all to do with the discipline.

6778. The police are in fact to be the assistants to the magistrates, but still the magistrates are not to interfere with their organization or training?—Certainly not.

6779. (*Chairman.*) You do not propose that they should interfere with magistrates' administration of the law ?—Certainly not ; if I understand the position right, a magistrate who wants assistance would call on the superintendent of the district, who would be bound to obey it.

6780. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) For a district about the size of North Arcot, the establishment of police would consist of a commissioner and two military officers, and about 1,200 men ?—Not a commissioner, a superintendent, and two officers under him.

6781. Do I understand you rightly that the commissioner would give his orders only through those two officers ?—Through the superintendent.

6782. You think that that would suffice for a district about the size of North Arcot ?—So I have calculated.

6783. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Are you of opinion that the doubled-barrelled carbine would be a very efficient arm for the police ?—It is the weapon I should select for the purpose.

6784. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Have you seen the Cape double-barrelled carbine ?—Yes.

6785. (*Viscount Melville.*) Have you seen what the Scinde horse use ?—No.

6786. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) In the event of the population being disarmed throughout India, a measure which, it is understood, the Government has in contemplation, what necessity would there be for arming the police with the best arms?—The best arms for the purpose.

6787. Do you think that it is impracticable for the Government to disarm the whole of India ?—No, I think it could be done very easily.

6788. Then why would you arm the police with the most efficient weapons ?—Because police may be called to act at any moment, in times even of profound peace ; and when I advocate an efficient weapon,

I mean one for the special duty; I do not ask for the longest range, but a light handy arm.

6789. But would not the magistrate always have the power of making a requisition upon the military authorities for detachments of the line to meet an exceptional occasion?—Yes; but notwithstanding the police is liable to be called on very suddenly, in dacoity, for instance.

6790. Surely the Government could authorize such arms being furnished for special occasions to such extent as might be deemed expedient?—Yes; but an emergency at a distance of, perhaps, 500 or 600 miles from the seat of government should not find the police unprepared.

6791. Still, having regard to recent events in India, do you not consider that it would be decidedly expedient for the Government to place the best description of arms only in the hands of soldiers under military discipline?—When I say the best description of arms, I mean for the work required. A policeman should never appear without his arms, and should sleep with them by his side. They should be very light, and strong at the same time.

6792. But as the police generally are intended to act only against an unarmed population, there cannot be the same necessity for their being all armed with superior weapons as in the case of soldiers, who have to act against men as efficiently armed and highly trained as themselves?—I can only repeat that I do not mean a weapon with all the advantage of very long range, but a useful efficient arm; and if I had to select, I should give each man a short double-barrelled carbine.

6793. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) You do not want a weapon of war for the police—you want a handy sort of thing—a remarkably good description of arm for the bush or any such purpose?—Just so. I want something which is light, and portable, and handy.

6794. (*Viscount Melville.*) I suppose you consider that it is just as necessary to have the police efficiently armed in India as it is in Ireland?—Certainly; probably more so.

6795. (*Chairman.*) How do you propose to dress those police?—I would certainly dress them as natives, not as Europeans.

6796. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) I imagine you see no necessity for dressing up policemen in the uniform worn by the soldiers of the army, with the view of impressing the natives generally with a greater dread of them?—On the contrary.

6797. (*Marquess of Tweeddale.*) Have you no fear of trusting a superior quality of arms in the hands of the natives. I refer to the police?—I should have no fear myself with the men that I had under my own control.

6798. (*Col. Burlton.*) But one person could not control so large a body as 20,000 or 30,000 men?—Certainly not. Each superintendent I suppose would be an efficient man.

6799. Do you not, after what has occurred, think it dangerous to have so large a body of men as you are contemplating armed with the most efficient weapons, dispersed all over the country, far away from the immediate supervision and control of European regiments?—These men could not easily combine. I am speaking of an extent of country upwards of 1,000 miles long, inhabited by distinct races, with distinct languages and habits.

6800. That may be the case in Madras, but not in Hindustan?—I am speaking of the Madras presidency.

6801. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Supposing that the police generally were armed like the Irish police, and only a certain proportion of them as military police, for the purpose of furnishing gaol and treasure guards, and for the other special duties to which you have referred, do you not think that the public safety would be sufficiently secured by such an arrangement?—I do not; for as I have already observed, the police in India may be called on at any moment to act in districts where it is absolutely necessary to have armed men, even in dealing with gang robberies, so common over all India.

6802. With respect to the establishment which you propose for a district of about the size of North Arcot, would it not suffice were only a portion of the 1,200 men to be armed with fire-arms, and the rest as ordinary police?—The object is to secure one system of discipline throughout the whole body of police, efficient for all purposes; and I would avoid introducing a scheme which would tend to render a portion of the establishment non-combatants.

6803. We were supposing that the population generally throughout the country will be disarmed; hitherto the Government has permitted them to have any arms they chose without restriction; does not this make a very material difference?—I should think not, in the arming of a force of that sort.

6804. Are you of opinion that the marauding tribes will succeed in evading the orders of Government, and will still obtain arms sufficient to enable them to commit depredations and to attack parties of police employed in escorting treasure from one station to another?—You have never been able to put down dacoity to this hour, and it will be still more difficult in the disturbed state of the country.

6805. From whence do you suppose that they wil obtain arms?—They will find means to get them.

6806. Is there not an essential difference between what constitutes a good policeman and a good soldier?—The greatest.

6807. The policeman being intended to act individually and in one particular district, to acquaint himself, not only with the people generally, but with the particular classes residing in towns and villages and their vicinity, and to gain every kind of local information; while the soldier is intended to act, not individually, but as part of a body, and against men trained like himself, to be perfectly free from all local ties and sympathies, to be available wherever the Government may require his services, and under the bond of a severe discipline, is made to regard implicit obedience to orders as his sole duty?—I think that the distinction between a policeman and a soldier is the same in all countries, whether the man is a native or not. I look upon a regularly trained and good policeman to be worth ten soldiers not properly trained.

6808. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) For his special duties?—The responsibilities of which are immense.

6809. You mean to say that a policeman would be a very bad soldier, and that a soldier would be a very bad policeman?—I believe a good policeman would prove the best of soldiers.

6810. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Is it not the case, in your opinion, that in proportion as a policeman is taken beyond his own sphere of duty, by giving him the superior arms and military training of a soldier, and in proportion as a soldier is approximated, by giving him inferior arms and training, to the position of a policeman, both must be rendered less efficient for the performance of their own proper duties?—I do not see it in that light, as far as the policeman is concerned.

6811. Do you not think that there should always be a marked line drawn between a native policeman and a native soldier?—Yes, in training.

6812. In everything?—I would not make the policeman inferior to the soldier in anything. On the contrary, the more you can make the policeman understand that his responsibilities are great and what is expected of him, the better; and his duties are most important.

6813. Surely then the policeman would be more dangerous to the Government than the soldier, from his being only under civil discipline?—But I would not put him under a civil discipline, I would put him under a military control and superintendence.

6814. Still he would be only under the civil power he would not be in any way under the Commander-in-chief of the army, nor under any person in military

command ?—No ; he would be under the immediate control of Government.

6815. (*Chairman.*) To what extent do you propose that the police shall drill and discipline ?—Very much the same as in Ireland ; I would enable them to form line, and to act very much like like infantry, so as to know how to take advantage of the best places, to cover themselves.

6816. In Ireland they are divided into companies, are they not ?—No.

6817. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) They are a body of men taken from head-quarters in Dublin, and distributed throughout the country, and entirely depending upon the state of the country ?—Yes.

6818. (*Col. Burlton.*) Do you contemplate having any European non-commissioned officers to assist the superintendent ?—No, I do not think they are required.

6819. (*Chairman.*) What class of natives do you propose to take ?—All classes and castes.

6820. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In striking an average of European troops, as regards native troops, would you take into account the police force ?—Certainly, because they would perform duty that the native force have been doing already.

6821. What proportion of European troops do you think there should be to native troops in India ?—India is a large question. If you will allow me to give my experience in the Madras presidency, I can speak with more certainty. With regard to the Madras presidency, I should say that you never can be efficiently protected under eight European regiments at the least. At present there are 52 native regiments ; with a well-trained, disciplined police in the districts, eight regiments might be spared ; however, the Madras army furnishes troops for Burmah, Malacca, Penang, Singapore, and so on, and occasionally also they are sent across the Bengal boundary. The Madras troops are frequently taken out of their own presidency.

6822. If you add those 28,000 police to which you allude, you will have a very large proportion of armed natives to armed Europeans ?—But the police would be armed men in more than 1,000 miles in extent in the Madras presidency alone.

6823. (*Col. Burlton.*) The eight regiments are still more scattered ; they have the same area?—Yes.

6824. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) About what do you think would be a safe proportion to establish between the European and native troops ?—I should say one in five.

6825. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Including the police ?—Yes.

6826. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do your eight regiments include artillery and cavalry ?—No, infantry only.

6827. (*Marquess of Tweeddale.*) You know that there has been a great revolution in India lately ?—Yes.

6828. Supposing that the force which you contemplate now to raise as a military police had been in existence previously to the revolution, or should exist at any future time, would you not know a great deal more about the proceedings of the natives than would be known by the same number of officers commanding sepoy regiments ?—If the police is efficiently trained and handled, every information would be obtained. I am not aware that officers in command of regiments turn their attention to such matters.

6829. To what extent would you know ?—It depends very much upon the ability of the officer who is with them.

6830. Do you remember an occasion in India when there was very nearly a revolution, about the year 1840 or 1841, when the police were the parties who got the information of what was going on ?—Certainly.

6831. Will you be good enough to state that case ?—I think it was in the year 1838 or 1839, when an outbreak was expected every hour throughout all India. Information was sought for, particularly from Hyderabad in the Deccan, and through the Madras police (I am speaking of the town of Madras), we got documents of the very rebels themselves, if I may so term them.

6832. You mean the police belonging to the town of Madras ?—Yes, Fort St. George. Information was obtained of what was going on in the very heart of the town of Hyderabad, and their papers were brought down lithographed by them, and put into the hands of Government ; they were tested and found to be perfectly correct. The information thus obtained led to the taking of Kurnool ; and the same agency was employed in different parts of India with great success. This was all done by native agency,—native policemen. I mention this merely to show that police can be worked in India ; and I may say, in justice to those people, that they are the best qualified for police purposes in the world ; they are vigilant, shrewd, persevering, and loyal as far as I know.

6833. (*Viscount Melville.*) Considering the particular circumstances of the mutiny, do you think that your police would have joined in it in any way ?—I cannot tell. I should have had no fear of them myself.

6834. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) As regards the advantages of the Government obtaining information of any intrigues or plots that might be going on amongst the natives of India, of course such information might be obtained through the agency of the police equally well whether it was a military or civil police ?—No doubt ; the point is to have a trained police.

6835. (*Col. Burlton.*) Do you contemplate the employment of a particular sort of people called Nuzzerborses ?—Not as a distinct body.

6836. I mean spies ?—So I understood.

6837. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Would not the particular advantage before referred to be gained, perhaps, to a still greater extent by establishing a portion of the police force as detectives ?—Yes, I would always have a detective police ; but the Talliaris are such from caste. I propose that the whole body of village watchmen should be brought into the police establishment.

6838. And you would have the detective police selected from that class of men, as possessing superior qualifications for that particular service ?—No ; they are hereditary watchmen,—they are born policemen.

6839. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) The Chokeedars and those sort of persons would be absorbed in the police ?—Yes.

6840. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) With respect to the country judicial courts they have their police peons, the collector has his police peon, would they be done away with ?—Certainly. I speak with the utmost respect, but it is well known that peons of the public establishments are employed by functionaries in their private households. The object is to bring every man under control in his own calling.

6841. (*Col. Burlton.*) You would recruit your police force from the same class of men notwithstanding, would you not ?—Yes, wherever I found an intelligent man.

6842. Do you think that the simple fact of giving him a different arm and organizing him a little would make him a different man from what he is as a Burkundaz ?—I do not say that ; but proper discipline would make him useful.

6843. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Would you enlist your policemen from the district in which they are to be employed ?—That is a question upon which I am doubtful. In Ireland I believe a man is never employed in the county to which he belongs ; but in India it is different, and for this reason, that the languages are so different. For instance, if you take the men north of Fort St. George, they speak one language; in the south they speak a different language altogether; to the west, they speak another language ; on the Malabar coast there are three or four different languages ; it must be modified according to the judgment of the officer at the head of the district.

6844. On that account I imagine you consider it essential that a policeman should be able to speak

pretty thoroughly the language of the district in which he is employed ?—No doubt.

6845. That opinion goes in favor of enlisting the men in the province in which they are to act ?—It does not follow that the men should be employed in their own districts, for the same language is spoken in many districts.

6846. If I understand you, you would have the main body of the police enlisted from the district in which they are to be employed, but you would bring a certain proportion from outside ?—I would not employ the men in their own immediate country, amongst their relatives. I would move them beyond the influence of family pressure.

6847. Would you not also mix the nationalities ?—Certainly, Mahomedans and Hindoos.

6848. (*Marquess of Tweeddale.*) How do you propose to control them ?—By the officers who would be over them; the captains, who would be the superintendents, should have the control of them, just the same as in the command of a regiment; the promotion should rest with them, always in communication with the chief commissioner.

6849. (*Viscount Melville.*) For misconduct you would dismiss a man at once ?—Yes, the chief commissioner ought to have the power, always reporting it to the Government; I believe that that holds good in Ireland. With regard to the pay of these policemen, there ought to be certain grades. I would have three classes of peons or privates, to commence with five rupees a month, then to rise to six, and then to seven; as long as they have something to look forward to, they will do well. The naicks and duffadars would of course have higher pay.

6850. Do not you think five rupees very low ?—Five is not so very low to a young man who has not a family to provide for, and he is always looking forward to an increase.

6851. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) How would you punish them; how could you punish them, extended as they would be over very large tracts of ground ?—There are particular regulations for that; there are fines, and that is a severe punishment to a native; then you are always able to hold dismissal over their heads.

6852. (*Col. Burlton.*) What grades would you have; would you have, what we might call native commissioned and commissioned officers ?—Duffadars and naicks.

6853. (*Marquess of Tweeddale.*) What was the number of police which you commanded ?—The Madras police was about 850 effective men.

6854. How were they constituted in point of rank ?—They were peons and naicks and duffadars.

6855. Do you propose the same organization ?—Very nearly the same; I would have superior native officers.

6856. (*Major-Gen. Montgomerie.*) Would you have European constables also ?—Not in the provinces; at the presidencies it is necessary, because the police come in contact with Europeans. A European hates to be touched by a native; he would walk away quietly with a European, whereas he would knock down a native, if he touched him.

6857. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) I think that you misunderstood my question with respect to the selection of men for the detective police; are you not of opinion that it would be expedient to select men for that particular branch of the police who by natural endowments may possess superior qualifications for that service ?—If you will allow me, I will answer that question by an example. About the time of which my Lord Tweeddale spoke just now, there was a great desire to know what was going on in a particular fort, Golconda; it was shut up at the time, and things were supposed to be going on there of which no intelligence could be obtained. I selected a common policeman, a Mahratta, named Beem Singh, a shrewd determined man, though he could not read or write. He undertook cheerfully to proceed to Golcondah, between 700 and 800 miles from Madras, to endeavour to get service there, for the purpose of getting the required information. I never heard of him for about six months, when he returned, and made an excellent report, having been in Golconda for some weeks.

6858. You selected that man, as I understand you, because you perceived that he was a man of extraordinary shrewdness ?—Not extraordinary, but of shrewdness and courage.

6859. But it was on the ground of his shrewdness, his shrewdness struck you as particularly qualifying him for that service ?—Yes, but there were fifty others that I might have selected.

6860. Still it was a selection ?—Yes, but for a special purpose. Some might have possessed the shrewdness without the courage, others the courage without the intelligence.

6861. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) But he had had no special training ?—None whatever.

6862. He was an ordinary policeman, and had had no special training for that duty ?—Yes. I mean that an efficient officer should be sufficiently acquainted with the qualifications of his men, to employ the right man.

6863. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) I think you mentioned a particular tribe of men in the Madras presidency whom you considered especially qualified for the detective police, from having hereditary occupation of that kind ?—Yes, I alluded to the Talliaris, the native watchmen of the villages. He knows everybody and everything in the village; nothing escapes his notice; he is born and bred to his calling. These men could be rendered most useful; they should be enrolled and placed under the same control as the district police, to ensure uniformity of action, but these men should never be moved from their own homes; it is [redacted] their services might be made invaluabl[redacted]

6864. D[redacted]r to prove that their superior qu[redacted]led upon a natural, as well as a[redacted]de for the particular service all[redacted] mean to say that these men have [redacted]tions for the duty, but experience [redacted] them observing, and for local informa[redacted]ble.

6865. (*Sir [redacted]herall.*) All those mysterious commun[redacted]h had been going on just preceding this [redacted]ere passed from village to village by coco[redacted] other mysterious signs ?—Yes.

6866. Which mu[redacted]'e been done with the knowledge of these very [redacted]alliaris ?—No doubt it must have been perfectly well known to them, and had they been under the control of a ruling power, the facts would have been duly reported; you would have had accurate information on the state of the country and the feelings and sentiments of the people.

6867. (*Marquess of Tweeddale.*) You suppose that if there had been a connection between the military police of whom you speak and these Talliaris, you would have had some knowledge of what was going on ?—Certainly.

6868. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Is it not the case that the several Governments in India have all adopted the principle of giving employment in the civil police and in the military police corps, to these Talliaris, and to other tribes, such as the Bheels, Ramooses, and Coolies, whose hereditary occupation is that of plundering and thieving ?—I do not know that the principle has been adopted by Government, but private individuals employ such men in certain districts.

6869. (*Marquess of Tweeddale.*) Is it true that the policemen at Madras were accused of being guilty of torture in the execution of their duty ?—In 1855 the Government of Fort St. George appointed a committee to inquire into the question of torture. The report of the committee has been published, from which it appears plain that much persecution exists, arising principally from the police peons being employed to collect the revenue. The evidence clearly proved

E. F. Elliot, Esq.

3d Dec. 1858.

great oppression generally, and many instances of positive torture to elicit evidence in criminal cases.

6870. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you consider that that arose from any defect in the system of collecting the revenue, or from the want of a sufficiently strict supervision over the persons employed in its collection ?—From a most pernicious system, which placed the police under the magistrate, who, in the Madras presidency, is also collector of revenue.

6871. But as every village, I believe, is visited annually by a civil officer of some description; how do you account for the parties who were oppressed and tortured not coming forward and complaining to him ?—Natives do not complain, and will not complain, because they are afraid of the consequences.

6872. Do you believe it to be the fact, then, that until the exposure of the system, two or three years ago, no complaint of that kind ever reached the Government ?—Many complaints reached the Government, I think you will find in the book to which I have alluded; but the evil was in the defective system, not from any desire on the part of the Europeans to support the practice.

6873. Do you know whether it is a part of the duty of the collector or commissioner who annually visits the village in each district, to enquire of the villagers whether they have any complaints to make against the police or others ?—He supposes himself to be accessible; any one may address him.

6874. Are any means adopted to inform the people of the villages that they are free to come and make such complaints, to the visiting officer; and to prevent the Peons and other officials from interfering to hinder their so doing ?—The people universally know that we do not recognise the practice, and if they do not complain it is their o[redacted]

6875. But, are any m[redacted] o obviate their being prevented by th[redacted] er persons from coming forward a[redacted] ts, if they have them ?—No; I th[redacted] particular measures.

6876. (*Duke of Cam[redacted]* not think that the probability is tha[redacted] ed more by a fear of the results after [redacted] collector or commissioner has gone, t[redacted] ctual fact of being prevented from comi[redacted] rse.

6877. It is not that a m[redacted] You must not "come up," but it is very w[redacted] that if a complaint is made, the person c[redacted] d of, if it is in his power, will wreak his ven[redacted] nce upon the party making the complaint ?—Yes. One general way of doing it is this: the native authority will keep a man in attendance for days, nay, sometimes for weeks, marching about the district; never allowed to go to his home, kept from his family and business; he is distressed, often ruined; this may not be torture, but certainly dire oppression.

6878. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Will you be good enough to state any other modes that you know of by which the villagers are prevented from obtaining access to the collector on his annual visit ?—There are many hundreds have been examined on this very subject, and the result has been published. The whole system is foul.

6879. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) If a native is discharged from the Government service, either as a sepoy or as a policeman, does it affect his caste when he returns to his village ?—No.

6880. (*Col. Burlton.*) You attribute this oppression in a great measure to the police, but if you reflect I think you will find that it is done by the collector's people; they are not policemen ?—In the Madras presidency the police and revenue establishments are so blended that they are the same.

6881. It is not so in Bengal. The magistrate has the police under him; the collector is quite distinct. In some districts there is a joint officer, both magistrate and collector, but the police are entirely under the magistrate, not under the collector ?—In Madras the collector and magistrate is the same person.

6882. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you contemplate that in the event of war these policemen are to be concentrated into battalions and to form a portion of the moveable army ?—The Madras army covers nearly the whole peninsula of India to the south of 22° of lat.; in case of its being called on to move in support of the other armies, the Madras presidency would be denuded of troops. In such an emergency, a well-organized police, accustomed to discipline, would be most valuable.

6883. How would you supply their places for the ordinary purposes of a police force ?—By additional levies.

6884. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) I understand you that you would make the police available to assist the troops when required; but would still keep them under the authority of the commissioner and the officers under him; you would not make them over to the officers commanding the troops ?—No, except as a local militia.

6885. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) They would not be under any military authority ?—The police would be under the immediate control of Government.

6886. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) You mean that the Government on such occasions would give the officer commanding the troops authority over the officers in charge of the police ?—I am not aware how the police corps now on active service in Oude and elsewhere are managed, but I presume that the officer in command of the army has full power over their movements.

6887. (*Marquis of Tweeddale.*) Do you think that the new system of police which you propose will have the effect of preventing all the abuses which you state ?—No, I do not expect that, there is something more required besides that.

6888. You think that it is in the nature of the people ?—Yes, oppression.

6889. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Will you be good enough to state what more you think necessary ?—A change or reform in the system of land revenue, the collecting of which causes many of the abuses and much of the oppression on the part of the native revenue servants, who have the control of the police; but this is a subject of vast magnitude and quite foreign, I apprehend, to the object of the present inquiry.

6890. (*Chairman.*) Will you furnish the Commissioners with a copy of the proposal which you have made ?—As nearly as I can, I will do so. (*Vide* Appendix, No. 11, p. 17.)

The witness withdrew.

Colonel R. B. Wood, C.B.

Colonel R. B. Wood, C.B., Secretary to the Commission, examined.

6891. (*Chairman.*) Will you state what you were in India ?—I have been 24 years in the army. I have served in cavalry and infantry. I was seven years secretary to the late Lord Hardinge; three years when he was Secretary at War, and four years as his military secretary in India. Since I came home from India I have been employed at the cavalry depôt at Maidstone, and in the adjutant-general's department. I was assistant adjutant-general in Kilkenny, in the year 1848, at the camp at Chobham in 1853, and at the Horse Guards during the war, and lately I have been deputy adjutant-general in Ireland.

6892. Will you favour the Commission with any opinion which you have formed as to the possibility of amalgamating the two armies ?—I think that the amalgamation may be prospectively carried out by adopting the principle of promotion for service for the officers employed in India, on the staff and in civil

appointments, as well as with the native troops, in contradistinction to the present system of promotion by regimental succession.

The Indian army, under the suggestions contained in the accompanying memorandum, might at once be made a branch of the royal army.

The patronage of first appointments to this branch of the service (if thought desirable) might remain with those to whom it is now by law entrusted; but the change which would be effected by making the Indian army a branch of the royal army would be that the executive of the Crown would be exercised towards this army through Her Majesty's Commander-in-chief, instead of through the Secretary of State and Council for India.

The administration also of the Indian army, as regards recruiting, discipline, and control, whilst serving in this country, &c., &c., would be carried on by orders issued from the Horse Guards, instead of from the Council of India, thereby securing a uniformity of system and economy, and avoiding collision and jealousy between the two services.

Her Majesty's Commander-in-chief would stand, with reference to the army employed in India, towards the Secretary of State for India, in the same relation as he did in former days to the Secretary at War, with reference to the royal army. Not one European soldier could be withdrawn from India, nor one additional soldier beyond the authorized establishment placed on the charge of the revenues of India, without the concurrence and authority of the Secretary of State for India.

The local European regiments now in India should be numbered the 101st, 102nd regiments, and so on; but as they are composed of officers and men who have been engaged for local service, they must for the present be employed in that country, as must also the officers now belonging to the Indian army. Should there be more officers belonging to that service than are required for the new native army in Bengal and for the general staff of the army, they might be attached to European regiments serving in India, and some of the officers of those corps brought home for the purpose of raising such second battalions as may be required.

The artillery and engineer officers of the Indian army would, as explained in the memorandum, rise in their respective regiments, but the cadets entering the service would be all posted to the royal corps.

Even should it be considered expedient to continue permanently the local European force in India, still the proposed amalgamation of the two armies would be most desirable.

The patronage of all the civil and military appointments should rest entirely with the authorities in India, the Commander-in-chief at each presidency, subject to the approval of the governor of the presidency, exercising the military patronage; and the local governors, on the recommendation of the local Commanders-in-chief, making the civil appointments within their respective presidencies.

These appointments should be reported home direct from the local Governors and Commanders-in-chief for approval and confirmation, the Supreme Government of India and the Commander-in-chief in India being kept informed of such changes.

The Commander-in-chief of each presidency should correspond direct with the home authorities, and under their control exercise supreme authority towards the European portion of the army on all matters of discipline. As regards the native portion of the army the authority of the Commanders-in-chief would be governed by laws and regulations which would be framed by the Legislative Council and Supreme Government of India.

The civil Government of India, as at present, would be responsible for all the materiel of the army, and in case of active operations in the field, all reports would continue to be transmitted through the Governor-General to the Secretary of State for India, as well as all recommendations for honours.

Colonel R. B. Wood, C.B.
3rd Dec. 1858.

By these arrangements it is thought that the vested interests of those now in the service will not be disturbed, and the authority of the Governor-General and civil Government of India in no way curtailed; but that jealousy and collision between the two services will be avoided by the prospective complete amalgamation of the two armies.

The memorandum * alluded to has been circulated amongst the members of the Commission; it is as follows:—

Vide Appendix, No. 12, p. 19.

"Referring to the last paragraph of my memorandum of the 28th September, and to the suggested head of inquiry, "whether it be possible to consolidate the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other, and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company.

"It is submitted that as the officers now in the service have entered the Indian army on the faith that they are to rise to the emoluments of a regiment strictly by seniority, no arrangement can be made admitting of an exchange between the senior officers of both services, which would not disturb this seniority system.

"Again, no officer of any standing would voluntarily relinquish the high retiring allowances of the Indian army, nor would he forego the advantages he derives from the military fund, to which he has been compelled to contribute during the whole time he has been in the service, and forfeit the pensions to which his widow and family would be entitled from this source on his decease, for the purpose of serving in another part of the empire on a lower rate of pay.

"In the junior ranks of the army, with subalterns not above a certain standing, the case may, perhaps, be different; an option of transfer here into the royal army might be acceptable, and the officer might be induced to relinquish his claims on the Indian funds and pensions on being allowed to reckon the service he had already passed in the Indian army as service in her Majesty's army.

"The following suggestions, it is submitted, would facilitate such an arrangement.

"The emoluments to be derived from service with native troops should be higher than those for service with Europeans, so as to induce officers to seek employment in native corps, and to qualify for such appointments.

"The officers now in the service selected for employment on the staff or for duty with native troops should maintain their places in their original regiments, and be promoted in them irrespective of the manner of their employment.

"Those hereafter entering the service to be placed on general lists at each presidency; they should be employed in any manner in which their services may be required; they should receive a step of rank after certain periods of actual service in India, to be fixed by regulation. An exception to this system of promotion might be made in favour of extraordinary merit or good service, on the recommendation of the Commanders-in-chief in India to the home authorities; there being no regular establishment of officers, promotion given out of the regular course would in no way retard the advancement of others, whilst the check on its being conferred would, it is thought, prevent any partiality being shown on any occasion.

"An officer entering the Indian service on these terms would be eligible, should his health fail in India, or should he tire of service in that country, to be employed in any part of the empire.

"As these officers could not be called upon to subscribe to the military funds in India, and as those funds are largely supported by the entrance fees

* Memorandum, October 5, 1858.

Colonel R. B. Wood, C.B.

3rd Dec. 1858.

"of cadets, Government should guarantee to the "present subscribers all the advantages which the "funds hold out to them.

"Officers of Her Majesty's royal army, under the "proposed arrangement, would be eligible for em- "ployment with native troops, or in staff appoint- "ments in India. The officers now belonging to "the Indian army, whose promotion it is thought "must advance in accordance with existing practice, "being available for the immediate requirements of "the Government of India, time will be afforded for "framing regulations which should govern the selec- "tion, promotion, and retirement of such officers of "the line as may be so employed.

"The selection for appointments would rest, as "now, with the authorities in India.

"If it be considered desirable that service with "native troops should commence at an early age, "young officers might, under the proposed scheme, "be told off to do duty with native corps, on a lower "scale of allowances, and be eligible for the higher "rate of pay proposed for such service only when "they are pronounced by competent authority to have "the requisite qualifications.

"It would be expedient also, for the efficiency of "the service, that the Governments of India should "have the power of compelling an officer to retire "who is reported by the military authorities to be "inefficient, without the report of a medical board of "his incapacity.

"Officers selected for the commissariat, pay, or audit "departments, or for the secretariat or civil employ- "ment, after twelve or eighteen months' probation in "such offices, should be removed from the combatant "list of the army, and be ineligible for military com- "mand. They should receive certain retiring allow- "ances. As it is not proposed to interfere with the "claims and privileges of officers now so employed, "time will be afforded for the preparation of regu- "lations on this subject.

"The principle of promotion after certain fixed "periods of service, it is suggested, should be applied "to the officers of artillery and engineers hereafter "entering the service; and who are employed in India, "on civil or political duties. Officers of the Indian "army would then be available for service in any "part of the empire. This arrangement, while it "would secure to the State the services of an effi- "cient and valuable corps of officers, would also, "it is believed, be in accordance with the feelings "and wishes of the officers themselves."

6893. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Are we to understand that the armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay are, as now, to be distinct?—Certainly.

6894. Are the promotions to go in the line army direct from one presidency to the other, and by whom are they to be made?—The promotions of the European troops would go regimentally under the control of the home authorities, as they are now. When a man was promoted in the royal army, I would have the promotion gazetted in the presidency, and it would come home and be confirmed or not, as is now the practice.

6895. Would there be throughout the whole of India one general army list under the Queen, of native regiments and line regiments?—There would be a list of the native army at each presidency; there would be officers on the Madras list, officers on the Bombay list, and officers on the Bengal list.

6896. Supposing they wished to enter the European troops, one captain can exchange with another?—Certainly.

6897. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Am I correct in understanding you to advise that the commands at Madras and Bombay should be under separate Commanders-in-chief? You spoke as if you intended there should be direct communication between them and the Commander-in-chief in England?—Certainly.

6898. Then do you mean that the Commander-in-chief at Madras and Bombay should exercise their commands independently of the Commander-in-chief in India?—Yes; with the European troops in each presidency; they would be all under the control of the authorities at home.

6899. Both line and local?—Yes.

6900. (*Viscount Melville.*) Then what is the use of a Commander-in-chief in India?—He would have control over the troops if moved out of their respective presidencies, and be the military adviser of the Supreme Government of India.

6901. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you mean then that the three Commanders-in-chief of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras, are to be equal in point of authority and power over the troops, and not, as at present, the one superior to the two others?—Yes; the Commander-in-chief in India being, of course, kept informed: to keep the Supreme Government also informed of what is going on in the other presidencies.

6902. (*Chairman.*) Then you contemplate a much more direct interference on the part of the Commander-in-chief here than takes place at present?—I do not know that; all the confidential reports would come from each presidency, instead of going up to the Commander-in-chief in India and then coming to England.

6903. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Are you of opinion from the experience which you have had with the Governor-General, and also with the Commander-in-chief in India for the same period, that the system in India would work well if there were three Commanders-in-chief; could the resources of that immense country be rallied together so well with three commanders as with one commander?—I do not see why not, it would always be under the civil Government, no troops can move without the authority of the Government.

6904. There would be a correspondence between the three Commanders-in-chief which would impede the public service beyond measure. There must be in one country a supreme authority?—That is the Governor-General.

6905. (*Chairman.*) Do you propose to give to each of these separate Commanders-in-chief the power now held by the Commander-in-chief in India: that of confirming courts-martial, and all the other powers which were formerly held by the Commander-in-chief in India?—Certainly, subject to the control of the home authorities.

6906. The courts-martial are confirmed out there?—Yes; but the appeal against the sentence would be to the Sovereign through the Commander-in-chief in England.

6907. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You are aware that at present the discipline of the royal troops in India, whichever presidency they may be in, is virtually under the Commander-in-chief in Bengal, that is to say, the Commander-in-chief of India?—Yes.

6908. You are aware that he alone can confirm courts-martial on royal troops?—Yes, where a commissioned officer is sentenced to suffer death or to be cashiered.

6909. Do not you think that that is a very good system, and do not you think that the effect of a treble confirmation of courts-martial would be extremely inconvenient?—It would not be treble.

6910. If every Commander-in-chief had the power to confirm courts-martial, and even the power of the confirmation of life and death now vested in the Commander-in-chief of India, would not it cause a very great inconvenience and a great difference of system, whereas now there is but one system and one authority?—There would be the same system, only there would be three instead of one.

6911. Is that an advantage?—If the discipline of the army is under the control of the home authorities, as the royal army is at present, I do not see any objection to it.

6912. You are aware that the control over the royal army is, as was given in evidence yesterday, next to nothing?—Yes.

6913. As the control is so small, do you think that it is desirable to take away from the authority of

the supreme head in India, and to divide it into three?—I think that the communication to England is now so quick that the control exercised here would be quite as efficient as the control exercised in India; that is to say, the Commander-in-chief might confirm a court-martial at Madras or Bombay. The proceedings would come home for your Royal Highness's information; and if there was any appeal, it would be under the consideration of your Royal Highness.

6914. Are you aware what the power of the Commander-in-chief at home is as regards courts-martial in this country, or any other portion of Her Majesty's dominions, irrespective of India. Are you aware that the Commander-in-chief has not the power to confirm courts-martial?—Yes; the Commander-in-chief has only the power of making a recommendation to the Crown upon matters of discipline.

6915. But he has not the power of confirmation?—He has not the power of confirmation.

6916. That power of confirmation rests entirely with the Sovereign?—Yes.

6917. Upon the advice of the judge-advocate-general?—Yes, on legal points, but of the Commander-in-chief on matters of discipline.

6918. But you are aware that the power of the Commander-in-chief in India is to confirm courts-martial?—Yes.

6919. Therefore that is a great power?—Yes.

6920. Do you think that it would be advisable to increase, to the extent of trebling, that great power by placing it in three different heads. Do you think that that is a good military arrangement, there being the unbounded power of life and death?—The Commanders-in-chief at the minor presidencies have, I believe, now the same powers as the Commander-in-chief in India, except in the disposal of the sentences of courts-martial on officers of the line adjudged to suffer death, to be transported, or to be cashiered.

6921. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) If I understand you correctly, you advise that there should cease to be a Commander-in-chief in India, but that there should be a Commander-in-chief over the army of Bengal, another over the army of Madras, and a third over the army of Bombay?—I would have a Commander-in-chief of India. The Commander-in-chief of India would be the military adviser of the Governor-General, who must be supreme, and who would determine how to use the armies of the other presidencies, and the Commanders-in-chief of those presidencies would have to obey the orders of the Commander-in-chief of India. But as far as concerned all the detail work, and all the confidential reports, and all matters of discipline, I would have them sent to the home authorities, instead of sending them all the way up to Simla perhaps, and back again to London.

6922. Then you would have a fourth Commander-in-chief, in fact.—No.

6923. You would have one over each presidency, and the Commander-in-chief of India over the whole?—No, the Commander-in-chief of Bengal would be the Commander-in-chief for India.

6924. Would it not amount to this, that you would have a Commander-in-chief in Bengal called the Commander-in-chief in India, but having no immediate authority over the Commanders-in-chief at the other presidencies?—Yes; not in matters of detail.

6925. Still it is part of your plan that the Commander-in-chief at the Horse Guards should communicate directly with the Commanders-in-chief at Madras and Bombay, instead of through the Commander-in-chief in India?—Yes, on matters of detail.

6926. If I understand you correctly, whether the European force in India be composed entirely of troops of the line, or partly of line and partly of local troops, you would advise that all appointments in India, civil and military, should be made subject to the approval and confirmation of the home authorities?—Every appointment in India is made in that way at present. They have never yet interfered, but the home authorities have the power to interfere.

6927. Do you mean that the appointments should not be considered final until they have been approved by the home authorities?—Yes. In some appointments they could not be final. For instance, a man taken from a line regiment, after having passed any examination which may be hereafter determined upon, in order to prove his qualifications for duty with a local corps, would be removed to that local corps, and put in orders in India; but the appointment would come home for final confirmation. You could not take a man out of a regiment of the line without the approval of the home authorities.

6928. If I understand you, you advise that in the event of there being a local force, the officers for that force should be appointed as now by cadetships in England, and should be afterwards permitted to exchange with the officers of the line army?—I propose that there should be no local European force.

6929. But in the event of its being decided that the European force shall be composed partly of line and partly of local troops, in what manner do you propose to officer the local European and native armirs?—All officers with the European portion of the army would rise regimentally. I propose that the appointments should rest with those in whom they are vested by law at present.

6930. But how do you advise that they should be vested by law?—There is the law.

6931. What authority; the authority of the Secretary of State and Council of India?—I have said that the patronage of first appointments to this branch of the service, if thought desirable, might remain with those to whom it is now by law intrusted.

6932. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) That being the Secretary of State and Council of India?—Yes.

6933. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Then you mean that the officers of the local army should be appointed as heretofore by cadetships in England?—If though advisable.

6934. I am asking what you would advise?—I contemplate leaving the appointments as by law vested, if thought desirable.

6935. (*Viscount Melville.*) As you propose that the officers serving with the native troops are to receive a higher rate of pay than those serving with Europeans, do you not consider that it will have a tendency to lower service with a European regiment instead of to raise it, and to make the officers consider that service with a European regiment is a degradation when a higher reward is given for service with the natives?—I would have the native force all on what is termed the irregular system, and then there would be much fewer officers; they would be all selected officers.

6936. Cavalry and infantry?—Yes; I would have one European officer to every company of infantry.

6937. (*Col. Burlton.*) You would consider an appointment to a local regiment as a sort of staff appointment?—Yes.

6938. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would, therefore, consider it advisable that such an appointment should have the advantages attached to a staff appointment?—Yes.

6939. In what way would it degrade European corps that there should be a higher rate of pay? I suppose you imagine that the duties to be performed by those parties are more important than the mere routine of ordinary duties?—I think that it requires higher qualifications, and unless you hold out some inducement to these officers to do duty with native corps, of course they will not qualify.

6940. (*Viscount Melville.*) Are the officers to be taken indiscriminately from the local force and from the line force for service in native regiments?—The officers doing duty with the native corps must be placed upon the Indian list; that list must be established by the Government of India, and no addition could be made to that list without the sanction of the civil Government in India. Officers put upon that list must pass a certain test, a certain qualification, and the patronage of that list would rest with the local Governments in India.

Colonel R. B. Wood, C.B.

3rd Dec. 1858.

6941. Then in the event of a line regiment being withdrawn, and a certain number of its officers serving with these irregular corps, are those officers to be removed from their regiment which is withdrawn from India, or in what way are they to be dealt with?—Officers placed upon that list would always be withdrawn from their regiments, and their places in their regiments would be filled up.

6942. Then how is their promotion to go on?—By service, a step of rank being given after fixed periods.

6943. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Would you have a general list?—The whole principle of my plan is, that promotion should be given for service, instead of the present system of promotion by means of regimental succession.

6944. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do you mean to put every officer in the present Queen's army list, whose regiment is serving in India, upon one general list?—Certainly not. I would take officers out of that army list, and put them on the Indian list of the presidency in which they may be selected to do duty in staff appointments, in civil appointments, or with native troops.

6945. Then in what way is the promotion of an officer to go on in the line if his regiment is withdrawn from the country; in what way is that officer to be dealt with?—He would not belong to a regiment.

6946. You have taken him out of the service?—Out of his regiment; not out of the service.

6947. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) As I understand you, you propose that any officer could be taken out of any regiment of the service for special service with a native corps, or on the staff of India. When once taken for that service, an officer is placed on a separate list of officers altogether, very much, I will suppose, as in the corps of engineers; namely, officers without men, so many field officers, so many captains, and so many subalterns?—I would fix the number of officers, but not the number in each grade.

6948. And they would rise in promotion on that general list in India?—Yes. They would be promoted on that list for service.

6949. (*Viscount Melville.*) If an officer of any regiment were taken out of the regimental army list and put upon the Indian list, where would that officer stand in the line service?—He would stand in the same position as he does at present on the unattached list of the army. For instance, a captain of six or seven years' service is employed, and placed on the Indian list; he would take that six or seven years' service with him to the Indian list, and, after a certain fixed period of further service in India, he would be entitled to a step of rank, and he would rise in the royal army as an unattached officer.

6950. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Am I to understand that you do not intend to limit the grade of officers on the general list for Indian service?—No; I do not think you can limit it. I would give rank for service; the aggregate numbers must be limited by the civil authorities of India.

6951. How could you then prospectively hold out a chance of promotion, unless you limited the number of field officers, captains, and subalterns, as the case may be?—Because promotion would be given for length of service.

6952. Then, in short, the working of that would be very irregular. For instance, supposing a young captain were to be put upon that list, it would take him much longer to get on, and many men might go over his head, than if you put an old captain on that list?—It would not interfere with his promotion at all; a young captain would take his service with him on to the Indian list as well as the captain of long service; they would both take from the line service into the Indian service the service which they had got, and it would be a question for consideration, whether service in the colonies should carry with it the same claim *pari passu* as service in India.

6953. What is your opinion upon that point?—That is a question which must be decided by regulations carefully drawn up.

6954. On what would the officers' claims depend, in your opinion?—Service in India in some cases has been allowed to count two years for three.

6955. (*Viscount Melville.*) Would you establish that as a rule?—It would be matter of detail; it must be carefully gone into in drawing up the regulations which are to govern this promotion.

6956. (*Sir G. A. Wetherall.*) Of course there will be but one army list now for all officers?—Yes.

6957. If an officer is taken out from that army list and is put upon the special list for special and separate employment, he foregoes all his promotion regimentally?—Certainly.

6958. In the hope of getting promotion by brevet for services performed in his new line of duty?—Yes.

6959. (*Viscount Melville.*) Supposing an officer who has been taken out from a regiment serving in India and placed in this general list, for some reason or another wants to come back to his regiment, how is it to be accomplished?—In the same way as an officer would come back from the unattached list at present.

6960. Paying the difference?—Officers do not always pay the difference.

6961. If he cannot do it without, is he to be subject to paying the difference between half-pay and whole pay?—Officers may be brought from half-pay to full-pay, and often are brought, without paying the difference.

6962. But not as an invariable rule?—Not as an invariable rule, because the Secretary for War sometimes objects.

6963. An officer wants to get back to a line regiment from the special Indian list, I want to know distinctly how that is to be managed?—I can only say in the same way as an officer is now brought from the unattached list to full-pay.

6964. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In the plan which you contemplate, would you not consider the general list for India as a full-pay list, and would you not so far from considering it as bringing a man from half-pay to full-pay, consider it as an exchange between a regiment of Europeans and the general list of which you speak?—Certainly.

6965. (*Viscount Melville.*) In order to do that, must an officer coming from this general list for India make an exchange with an officer in a regiment, or in what way can he be appointed?—He would be selected by the Commander-in-chief, and put into any vacancy which might occur.

6966. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) He might effect an exchange with an individual, might he not, provided the individual exchanging came up to the qualifications requisite?—Certainly.

6967. Of course, I apprehend that no officer would be placed upon the general list for service in India who had not shown qualifications for such service, and passed through an examination?—It could not be done. The number of that list, not the grades, must be fixed by the civil Government of India, because those officers would be all chargeable to the revenue of India whilst they were on that list.

6968. (*Viscount Melville.*) On what list are the officers of artillery and engineers to stand?—The officers of artillery and engineers would rise in their own respective regiments in India. Those coming into the service would be all posted to the line.

6969. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) In fact, you contemplate an entire amalgamation of the officers of the local and line service?—Yes; the whole army of India would be amalgamated with the army of the line prospectively.

6970. How would you then manage the promotion of the officers who have been in the service?—They would rise by regimental succession as they now stand.

6971. What is regimental succession when the regiments do not exist ?—They would still keep in those regiments.

6972. You would keep skeleton regiments ?—Yes, cadres.

6973. Would you go on appointing the young cadets to these regiments ?—Certainly not ; you would appoint them on a different system of promotion ; promotion for service actually performed, in contradistinction to the seniority regimental system.

6974. (*Viscount Melville.*) Then am I to understand you that as a regiment the artillery is not to exist, but that it is merely to be a general list of officers without a regiment, and that they are to rise in one general list ?—The officers hereafter appointed would rise regimentally in the line artillery.

6975. But if the regiment does not exist how are they to rise regimentally, if they are to be put upon a general list with all other officers of the army ? You say that you would have one general list, if all the artillery officers, all the engineer officers, and all the officers serving with cavalry and infantry, are to be on a general list, how are they, in the first instance, to be appointed, and how are they to be promoted ?—The artillery would not be on the general list ; the artillery would be all the line artillery.

6976. (*Col. Burlton.*) Would you have the artillery rise by the seniority system, as is the case at present with the royal and the Company's artillery ? —Yes.

6977. (*Viscount Melville.*) There would be the artillery serving in India, and there would be the artillery serving in other parts of her Majesty's dominions, but all in one list ?—Yes.

6978. Then if a vacancy takes place in the West Indies, the man to be promoted may be in India, is he to be moved out of India to the West Indies ?—That would be controlled by the authorities at home.

6979. How are you to keep companies in different parts of the colonies ?—Two or three vacancies may occur, one at Gibraltar, one at Corfu, and one in the West Indies, or at Woolwich, the officers next in succession are in India; how would you propose to fill up all those vacancies if there is one general list ?—It is the case now, there would be no difficulty, I think, in arranging that.

6980. There is difficulty now, and the difficulty would be increased ?—I do not think it would.

6981. (*Col. Burlton.*) Do you propose that the young cadets who may be hereafter appointed should go out on the same terms of service and the same amount of pay and allowances and pensions. as have heretofore been granted to the officers of the Indian army ?—I think so. I think that the lower grades in India are rather under-paid than over-paid.

6982. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Then do you contemplate cadets being appointed in England to the native army as a separate service ?—If the inducements are not sufficient to make men qualify in the line army for the local service in India, then you may appoint them as heretofore.

6983. Then you would first of all make the experiment of officering the local troops from the line ? —I would.

6984. And in the event of that failing, you would then recur to the existing system of appointing cadets direct to India for the local service only ?—Yes.

6985. (*Viscount Melville.*) Do I understand you correctly that the engineers and the artillery are to have separate general lists, and the line a third general list including cavalry and infantry ?—I would have all line artillery. As they would be all Europeans and no natives, they would not be upon the general list. The officers on the general list would be only those employed with native troops.

6986. Then am I to understand that there is to be no local artillery whatever ?—No, I think not. At all events if there is local artillery, it will be European, and I contemplate that the promotion of the officers doing duty with Europeans would be regimental, and not for length of service.

6987. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Supposing, as is the case, I believe, that a great many of the officers of the local artillery are employed in civil positions, that their services are very valuable, and that many of them are some of the most eminent men in India, how are they to be retained specially in India, if their companies are moved to another portion of Her Majesty's dominions ?—With respect to those in civil employ at present belonging as they do to the Indian army, no alteration would be made in their position, because I do not interfere or propose to interfere with anybody now belonging to the Indian army ; everybody now in the Indian army I contemplate rising to the emoluments of full colonel on the Indian establishment as it now stands. The arrangements which I propose are all prospective, and ample time would be given for framing the regulations which would govern the promotion of these officers.

6988. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) How do you propose prospectively to meet the difficulty suggested by his Royal Highness when officers of artillery of the line shall be holding those important offices under the Government to which his Royal Highness has alluded? —Then they must be put upon the Indian list.

6989. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you contemplate that on this general Indian list all military officers holding civil appointments of a permanent character are also to be placed ; I understood you to say that that list was to be confined to officers serving with native troops ?—My own idea is that officers in civil employ should be out of the category of combatant officers, and should have special allowances given to them.

6990. Do you not think that that very fact would prevent many able men from wishing to take civil employment if they were by virtue of that employment excluded from the prospect of returning to military service ?—I do not think so in general. I would not put political officers on the civil list.

6991. You will admit that there are no civil appointments more important than the political appointments to which you allude, and therefore of all officers those are the last whom you would wish under any circumstances to withdraw from their civil occupations in India ?—It would rest entirely with the Government whether they were withdrawn or not. I would not make them ineligible for military commands.

6992. How are you to deal with military officers so circumstanced, are you to call upon them to give up all their military advantages, or are you to expect the Government to allow those officers to return to the service whenever they choose ?—Officers holding political appointments should, I think, be eligible at all times for military command.

6993. Then how do you meet the difficulty of their regiments, or if they are artillery officers, their companies, being removed from India, and their being militarily called upon to make their election ?—The officers in political employ would be placed upon the Indian list.

6994. Then the conclusion at which I arrive from your answers is, that you would consider that the officers holding the civil political appointments of India should be placed upon your proposed general list ?—Yes.

Adjourned to Wednesday next, at Eleven o'clock.

Wednesday, 8th December 1858.

PRESENT:

Major-General Peel.
H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge.
Lord Stanley.
Marquess of Tweeddale.
Viscount Melville.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir Harry G. W. Smith.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir George A. Wetherall.
Major-Gen. Montgomerie.
Major-Gen. Hancock.
Colonel Burlton.
Colonel Forsyth Tait.

Major-General PEEL in the Chair.

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

8th Dec. 1858.

Colonel Henry Marion Durand, C.B., further examined.

6995. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Ought not the public interest, in your opinion, to be made the only consideration in appointing officers to such very high and responsible positions as the commands of brigades and divisions of an army?—The public interests are, I think, always the main thing considered. In my reply to question No. 5536, I said, "I was speaking from "the practice which I had myself seen when I was "in connection, as private secretary, with Lord "Ellenborough, at a time of very great danger in "India, when a great variety of military operations "were going on, and when references were made by "the Commander-in-chief in usual course to the Go-"vernor-General; and it became a question as to who "should have command. With every disposition to "give the utmost attention to the claims of senior "officers, Lord Ellenborough made it a rule, that the "claims of the public service were paramount to "everything else, and that the thing which must be "done upon these occasions was to secure the ser-"vices of a competent officer, the officer who he "thought was the fittest for the command; therefore "the practice of selection was carried into effect for "commands;" and that, I think, is the proper course to be pursued.

6996. Then, if I understand you, you consider that the public interests ought to be made the paramount consideration, but not the only consideration, and that the claims of individual officers ought also to be taken into consideration with respect to appointments to those very high commands?—I think that you have to take into consideration two classes of things; first, you have to take into consideration necessarily the public interests; and the second thing is, that the organization of all great armies depends, in a great measure, upon attention being paid to officers of a certain rank. You utterly cut away the whole object of the organism of armies, if you entirely put aside attention to the just claims of officers.

6997. As the principle of selection for efficiency only is made the rule by the Government of India in respect to all staff appointments from the adjutant of a regiment up to the adjutant-general of an army, why should not the same principle be adopted in respect to appointments which are so much greater in importance, as the commands of brigades and divisions? Why should individual claims of negative merit backed by seniority be brought to fetter the Commanders-in-chief and the Government in selecting the men whom they deem the fittest to exercise those commands with advantage to the public service?—I think that the question assumes as a fact that which I am not at all sure is a fact. Necessarily Commanders-in-chief must pay attention to the claims of the public service—they are paramount—but also, without any attention to mere personal claims, but with attention to the great general question of maintaining the discipline of an army, I think Commanders-in-chief are bound to pay some degree of attention to that which forms an essential part of the organism of an army; and I do not view it as a purely personal question at all—I view it as having a bearing upon the general tone of that service—upon the hopes and interests of the whole of that service; therefore I do not admit that it is from purely personal motives.

6998. Are you not of opinion that if selection for efficiency only were made the rule, brigades and divisions of the army would be more efficiently commanded than under the system which you recommend of giving consideration to the claims of seniority on the part of individual officers?—No, I am not sure that they would, and for this reason, that the matter of selection depends entirely upon the person who selects, and therefore it depends entirely upon the experience of the person who selects, upon his knowledge of the men among whom he has to select; it depends upon a great variety of questions how far the person who is charged with selection makes a good selection.

6999. May it not be assumed that the Commander-in-chief of the army is the fittest person to make selections for the commands of brigades and divisions of the army under his command?—That may not always be assumed: for instance a new Commander-in-chief, a person quite new to India and therefore ignorant of the whole service, would be placed under very difficult circumstances if he had to select entirely without reference to anything but his own selection of individuals.

7000. You are aware that the rule is that the Commander-in-chief nominates, but the Government appoints?—That I know.

7001. Therefore were a Commander-in-chief to send up the name of an officer known by the Government to be inefficient of course the Commander-in-chief's nomination would be set aside, and he would be called upon to nominate another officer, would he not?—That is the practice. The Commander-in-chief recommends a certain number of names, and I have no doubt that if all those officers were deemed incompetent the Government have the power of refusing to appoint any one of them.

7002. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) Do you not think that it would act very unbeneficially to the service in general, and cast a great damper upon all the best energies of many valuable soldiers in the army, if it was commonly understood that seniority was in no respect whatever to be considered?—I intended to convey that in my answer, in stating that it was not purely personal motives which made the Commander-in-chief pay attention to seniority—that it was general motives.

7003. Would it not lead to the fear that, at all events, an impression would go through an army that favouritism was more considered than actual merit in many instances, particularly if very young men were put up suddenly?—It would certainly lead to the impression that there was a great deal of jobbery.

7004. (*Lord Stanley.*) In short, you put it in this way: that a reasonable amount of respect shown to the claims of seniority, if it is on the one hand a check upon a Commander-in-chief or a Governor-General in appointing the best men, is, on the other hand, a great security against favouritism or jobbery?—Exactly.

7005. And that, therefore, you think it equally undesirable to adhere rigidly to the rule of seniority on the one hand, or to treat with entire disregard the claims of seniority on the other?—Yes, I would subordinate the considerations of seniority to the consideration of the requirements and the good of the public service. Your lordship has put it exactly as I would express it.

7006. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Am I to understand that you would make selection the rule in future, and

seniority the exception; or would you leave it as it has hitherto been, seniority being the rule, and selection the exception?—The question assumes that seniority has been the rule. I, so far as my own experience is concerned, do not admit that seniority has been the rule; the two have gone concurrently.

7007. (*Lord Stanley.*) In point of fact, there has always been an admixture of selection and seniority, has there not?—Always, as far as my own knowledge goes.

7008. And the only point in dispute is, what amount of relative importance has, at different times, been ascribed to the claim of merit, or the claim of seniority?—Yes.

7009. (*Sir H. G. W. Smith.*) Admitting that either system be adopted, either seniority or selection, are you of opinion that many commanders fail from their abilities not having been previously ascertained?—That is a difficult question to answer, for several reasons; one is, that it is sometimes very difficult for any one to ascertain the abilities of commanders before they are actually tried in the field; therefore the very best-intentioned Governor-General and the very best-intentioned Commander-in-chief may entirely fail in his selection, because a man, when tried under fire, may be quite a different man from the man when you see him at a table.

7010. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) Sir Harry Smith has in some degree met the question which I was going to put, but have you any knowledge of any instances of officers turning out eminent men when employed officially as officers in the field, who were not previously known, and whose merit was only supposed to be negative, there being nothing against them, but nothing in their favour, because they had no opportunity of exercising their talents?—I should have to think it over a good deal, I could not answer the question off-hand; I might do injustice to some men.

7011. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Still, as a general rule, are you not of opinion that the abilities for command of an officer who has been from 20 to 30 years in an army are well known to his own Commander-in-chief and Government?—I think they are known to a certain extent; it depends very much upon what the nature of that 20 or 30 years' service has been; if the greater part of that 20 or 30 years' service has been entirely cantonment peace service, the Government may know that the man is quite competent for the ordinary military duties of peace, but it does not at all follow that that man when thrown into active service will turn out what may have been expected of him.

7012. (*Chairman.*) The best regimental officers may not turn out the best officers for command?—Just so.

7013. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) And *vice versâ*, there have been instances of officers supposed to be good officers who have turned out badly, and those who have been supposed to be careless and indifferent officers have, when responsibility has been thrown upon them, been found the best officers?—Yes.

7014. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Are you of opinion that the Commanders-in-chief at Madras and Bombay should exercise their commands over the local army, European and native, independently of the Commander-in-chief in India as heretofore?—The question I consider to have been answered on the two occasions on which I quoted Lord Elphinstone's words, having reference to maintaining the power of the Governor-General and the governors intact, which implies that the Commanders-in-chief will be in their present relative positions.

7015. Do you consider that the Bengal presidency, extending, as it does, from Calcutta to Peshawur, a distance of some 1,500 or 1,600 miles, is not too large for efficient supervision and control by one Commander-in-chief?—No, I think that the disadvantages, attendant upon the separation of the command, making it two commands, are greater than the disadvantages which arise from the mere length of the command, especially in the present day, when telegraphic communication is so rapid.

7016. Can you state whether it is intended by the Government of India to disarm the population generally throughout India?—I cannot reply to that question.

7017. Are you of opinion that the population of India generally ought to be disarmed?—That is a very large question, and when the habits of the people of India are considered, and when their enormous number is considered, and when the comparative paucity of ourselves and troops is considered, it becomes a very nice question to answer that generally; there may be parts of the country where it is advisable to disarm them if we have the power and can do it thoroughly, but I think it is a very difficult question to answer generally.

7018. It has been carried out to a certain extent already, has it not?—It has been carried out to a certain extent in the Punjaub, and it has been partially carried out, I believe, in other places; I do not know the whole of the districts in which it has been carried out, therefore I cannot state the districts in which it has been carried out.

7019. It has not been carried out throughout the Bengal presidency?—Not to my knowledge.

7020. Do you know how far it has been carried out in the Madras and Bombay presidencies?—I do not.

7021. Upon what system would you advise that the police, military and civil, should be henceforth constituted throughout India?—That again is a general question, covering an enormous field, and I certainly do not feel myself competent to reply to that question, with reference, for instance, to the Madras presidency, or with reference to the Bombay presidency; and I do not think that it can be answered in the same way for Bengal Proper, for Hindostan, and for the Punjaub, in the same way for Scinde. I look upon it that it must depend partly upon the nature and the character of the people; it must depend upon the temper of the people; it must depend upon their own institutions, how far their own police institutions are still existing; therefore, it is a very complicated question, and I think that it has to be treated separately and distinctly for each province; the province of Bengal, the province of Hindostan, the province of the Punjaub, and the province of Scinde; I mean, that I cannot give a general answer to that question.

7022. It may be assumed that in those parts of India in which the population are disarmed, there will not be a necessity for having the same amount of military police as in other districts in which they are armed?—Certainly.

7023. In what manner would you recommend that the military police should be armed?—That I would make dependent upon the character of the people, and whether they were armed or not; because, your police, if they are in districts with an unarmed population need a very different arm from what they require if they are in districts inhabited by a people who still retain their arms; therefore, it would depend upon the character and the social state of the people and their feelings towards the Government.

7024. Would you give the military police as good arms and as high a military training as you would give irregular regiments on the strength of the army?—No.

7025. Are you of opinion that the native armies of India should be armed in future with the same weapons as the European troops of corresponding branches of the service, should have the same military training, and retain the same high status generally in relation to the European army which has been hitherto accorded to them?—I think that the native troops of the three armies should have the same military training as the European troops, otherwise they could not move and act with those troops in the way in which they ought to act. But the question how those troops should be armed is a different one, and there I think that it is perfectly practicable to consider the advisa-

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.

6 Dec. 1858.

bility of always maintaining a superiority of arm in the hands of the European troops.

7026. With what description of arms would you arm the native infantry?—I do not think that it is necessary that the whole of the infantry should have the best rifle, for instance, the best arm that we can make, continual advancement being made in the rifle at present; I would keep in the hands of the European troops the very best arms that England can furnish. In the hands of the native armies I should be content with a musket, which would be an inferior weapon. I do not mean by that, that I would give them the old musket, but I can quite understand that it would be possible to give them a musket of effective range, say, of 600 or 800 yards, and to reserve the rifle, which is a weapon good for 1,200 or 1,500 yards, and its improvements, in the hands of the European.

7027. (*Lord Stanley.*) That is to say you would arm them so as to be superior to any native force with which they were likely to come into collision, and at the same time markedly inferior to the European?—"Markedly inferior" is perhaps a strong expression. I would rather that it should not be very markedly inferior; but my meaning is, that I would keep as far as practicable the superiority of arms in the hands of the European troops.

7028. Do you think that that could be done without producing ill feeling among the native troops?—For instance, in every regiment if it was thought an object to study the appearance of showing them confidence, it might be possible to give the light companies equally good arms with the Europeans, but I do not think it necessary, and I do not think that the effect upon the native troops would be great. It was some time before any of them got the Enfield rifle.

7029. (*Chairman.*) Naturally any new improvement would be placed first in the hands of the Europeans?—Yes.

7030. And therefore, practically, there would be no difficulty whatever in keeping them to a certain degree armed in a superior manner without showing any marked distinction?—Certainly. I think that all improvements in the small arms should be kept to the Europeans.

7031. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Am I to understand you to mean that prospectively, at some indefinitive time, you would arm the native troops with the same weapons as the European troops?—No; I am not speaking prospectively.

7032. With what object do you recommend that the native soldiers shall not be armed with arms equal in efficiency to those given to the European troops?—For this reason, that we can never forget, or at any rate ought never to forget, how very small a number of European troops are in India. However vigilant we may be, after what has happened, no Government can ever be sure that there may not be a recurrence of revolt, and it is extremely advisable that all the superiority which you can reasonably maintain in favour of the European, should be maintained.

7033. Then you would make two-thirds of the entire Indian army comparatively inefficient for war purposes, with the view of rendering them less dangerous to the Government in the event of another insurrection?—I do not admit that to be the case, because I look upon it that for war purposes and for what is requisite in action, the arms which I say should be given to the natives are quite sufficient, for this reason, that the practice with the improved small arms of long range requires a great deal of training, and under ordinary circumstances, if you put those improved arms into the hands of the masses of your troops, I look upon it that in a great measure, as soon as it comes to active operations, they do not answer the purpose for which you put them into their hands, and an inferior weapon answers the purpose for which you put a weapon into their hands.

7034. Are you of opinion then that a native soldier could not be brought by training to use the rifle equally as well as a European soldier?—I think that many of them may.

7035. Speaking generally?—Speaking generally, I do not think that you will train a large body of natives to the use (I will instance the Enfield rifle) of the rifle, so that when they really come into action they will use it as effectively.

7036. Do you think that European soldiers generally, by training, learn to use a rifle better than native soldiers?—I have not seen them compared or tried.

7037. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) What your answer tends to, I suppose, is this, that the arms which you propose for the native troops, although in some respects inferior to those of the Europeans, are still so superior to the arms of any troops which could be met with by our native army in India, that they would still feel that amount of superiority which would make them efficient troops?—Quite so.

7038. In giving your opinion that there should be two arms, I have no doubt that you would state that it is very desirable that the same calibre should be maintained?—Certainly.

7039. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) In the event of there being occasion again to employ the native troops on service beyond India, in Affghanistan, Persia, Burmah, or elsewhere, do you consider that they would be as efficient with the inferior arms which you propose to give them as they would be if armed with the same arms as the European troops?—I think they would be perfectly efficient for what they had got to meet.

7040. (*Col. Burlton.*) In short, you mean that in either of those countries they would meet with nothing at all to be compared to the ordinary percussion musket?—Quite so.

7041. (*Sir George A. Wetherall.*) Is it not desirable, in your opinion, that the European part of the forces in India should be in every respect held and kept superior to every part of the native armed force, and would you not, therefore, arm them with a superior weapon?—That, in fact, is what I have answered.

7042. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) You would wish the native in every respect to look up to the European?—Yes.

7043. And the fact of there being some advantages even in the arming of the European, you think, would make the native look up to him?—I think that it would tend to give a feeling of superiority.

7044. Which you think would be desirable?—Which, I think, is no disadvantage at all.

7045. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Surely you are of opinion that, were the native troops armed and trained in every respect equally with the European troops, the European army would still be immeasurably superior to the native army in power?—Most certainly I think that the European army would be superior, because I consider that the courage and all the qualities of a soldier are higher in the British soldier than they are in the sepoy.

7046. Then it is not at all necessary to give the native soldier a less efficient weapon, in order to maintain that superiority of the European over the native soldier?—I do not agree with that, because it is not alone the native sepoys whom you have to bear in mind, but the masses of people who may join them; supposing there is a revolt, you have a small number of Europeans in a very large empire.

7047. Do you think that it is expedient that any portion of the military police should be dressed in uniform like soldiers of the army, or have military training to the same extent as native soldiers?—I have said before, I believe, that I do not think that the police should be trained equally well with the native troops.

7048. If I understand you, you would have a marked distinction kept between the two in every respect?—Yes, I would have a marked distinction kept, and I would have not an equal military training or arming.

7049. I think you have stated your opinion that it would be expedient in future to make native promotions in the Bengal army partly by seniority and partly by selection. Will you be good enough to state in detail the system which you would recommend to be adopted in that army in making promotions from the private up to the commissioned grade ?—I have not come sufficiently prepared to answer that question, for it is one which involves considerable detail to go into it.

7050. Have you any objection to state your opinion as far as you have formed it ?—As far as the commissioned grade, I would make the merit of the soldier who was promoted always preponderant in every way. When once the native became an officer, and had a commission, then I think that it would be proper to give more consideration to seniority.

7051. By "merit" I understand you to mean efficiency ?—Yes.

7052. Are you of opinion that it would be advisable to require native regiments to recruit in particular districts within their own presidencies, or would you allow all native regiments to recruit throughout their own presidencies generally ?—That is a subject I think of very great importance, and one which requires grave consideration on the part of all the three Governments, and therefore in answering the question generally, I would qualify my reply by saying that there may be many circumstances in that great empire, in which what I now state could not very well be carried out; in those cases you must modify it, but as a general rule I would prefer that regiments were made to confine their recruiting to particular districts, and I hold that view with reference to what I have observed myself amongst natives, which is, that there is always a strong local feeling. With the native there is perhaps less of the general national feeling than there is among European nations, but there is a great deal of the purely local feeling—his own village, his own community round about his village; that is a thing which has great effect upon him, and therefore I would rather keep the recruiting to particular districts. I think that it would be in favour of *esprit de corps*, and also as there are usually more or less jealousies between neighbouring districts, it would not be disadvantageous with reference to the corps being more distinct.

7053. (*Col. Burlton.*) You state it as your opinion, that it would be highly desirable to maintain the European element generally on a superior footing to that of the native; has it ever occurred to you, looking back to the proceedings of the Bengal sepoys for some years past, that their habits of insubordination, their grumbling at orders received, may in a great measure be traced to the fact of their having been led to suppose themselves of much greater value and importance to the State than they ought to have been; that they have acquired a high opinion of themselves, which would not perhaps have existed if they had been kept altogether in an inferior status with reference to the European troops ?—I think that that has had an effect, and I would instance what appeared to me always a distinguishing circumstance among the officers in command of native regiments in Bengal,—it was their pride to think and say that their regiments were perfectly good to act without the presence of Europeans.

7054. (*Duke of Cambridge.*) From the answer which you have given, am I to understand that the European officers more immediately connected with the native army of India, I will not say looked down upon, but did not think very highly of the European troops as troops ?—That was not my intention at all; on the contrary they thought very highly of them, and it was their pride to raise their men up to that mark, and their pride to think and say that they could take their troops into action without European troops.

7055. In short, they put them very nearly on an equality in consequence of the efficient manner in which they had trained them ?—It must be remembered that they spoke of taking them into action, not against European troops, but against native troops.

7056. (*Lord Stanley.*) It is not that they looked down upon Europeans, but they thought well of their own men ?—It was very far from looking down upon Europeans, but they thought exceedingly well of their own men.

7057. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) To what extent do you consider that the powers of reward and punishment possessed by officers commanding native regiments should be increased ?—My impression is that the powers of officers in command of native regiments, both for reward and for punishment must be very greatly increased; there has been a great deal written upon that subject in the replies which were laid before the Commission, and the general feeling was certainly that those powers must be very greatly increased; in the Punjaub the powers which are exercised by the officers in command of the native regiments are very great, but they are limited in the degree pointed out by Sir John Lawrence, in his evidence; that may be considered an irregular service, therefore it is a question how far the same degree of power may be extended to the regular native army; but I am convinced that it must be extended in a very great degree to the officers in command of the regular regiments of native infantry; the exact extent of that I am not prepared to state, because it involves the consideration of altering the native articles of war, under which all the native armies at present are; to alter those articles of war to the extent which I think should be done, would require on my part very careful diction and very careful consideration, but I have no hesitation in saying that I think that the powers of officers in command of regiments of native infantry must be very greatly increased.

7058. Will you favour the Commission with your opinion regarding the system of native courts-martial, do you consider that it would be expedient to continue that system ?—My opinion is unfavourable to native courts-martial; I think that the commanding officers of corps should exercise those powers themselves.

7059. How would you deal with offences which were considered too serious to be disposed of by regimental commanding officers on their own authority ?—I would prefer having courts composed of European officers.

7060. How would it affect the feelings of the native army, do you suppose, if that great change were introduced ?—With respect to an army to be re-organized, and the men coming under that system, I do not think that it would affect them at all unfavourably, quite the reverse; with respect to the Madras and Bombay armies it is another question, and there whatever changes are made must be made after full consideration and gradually; that was one reason why, when the general question was put, which involved doing away in part with the present articles of war, I said, that I could not answer that question without a very great deal of consideration, because in these questions you have to bear in mind that two armies are existing, and those two armies under the native articles of war, in the same manner that the Bengal army was under the native articles of war.

7061. Still you are aware that the Government of India has always possessed and has freely exercised the power of altering the native articles of war ?—Quite so.

7062. Do you consider that it would be expedient to continue the system of administering the oaths of fidelity to the native soldiers on enlistment, or would you confine the arrangement to a simple contract, without requiring them to be sworn in under their colours ?—I think that you require a covenant contract, whether in the form of an oath, or in the form of a covenant contract, or partaking of both, I really do not think matters much. The essential thing is, that there is a well-understood covenant contract.

7063. Would you maintain the existing native pension system as it stands, or what alterations would you introduce into it ?—That, I think, is a very great

Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B.
Dec. 1858.

subject, and requires very careful examination. My present impression is (but I consider it open to modification by future inquiry) that it would be a very legitimate opportunity to mark the difference between an army which has revolted and two armies which have not revolted, making very serious modifications in the pension establishment, and especially in connection, if it were carried out, with a recommendation of the Commander-in-chief that sepoys should be enlisted for 10 years, open to having another 10 years if their conduct was approved of, and so forth; and, after a certain period of service, then, I think, that if a man had deserved a pension, a pension might be granted; but I would not establish the pension as a matter of right. However, my opinion is open to modification hereafter, upon further investigation, for I think it a very delicate subject, and I think it a subject which, in fact, merits especial investigation in India.

7064. (*Viscount Melville.*) For what period are the sepoys now enlisted; for life or for a term of years?—For life.

7065. (*Major-Gen. Hancock.*) Do you think that if enlisted for short service, as you propose, there would be the same tie and the same attachment to the Government on the part of the native soldiers, generally, which have existed hitherto under the system of enlistment for unlimited service, with the certainty of being pensioned for life when no longer fit for active duty?—I think that it would be a great encouragement to men to behave well. If they liked the service, they would behave well in order to be kept in it, and to aim at obtaining a pension. If they were bad and troublesome men you would get rid of them, and the service would be free of them. I look upon it that there is one disadvantage about that system, which is this, that you teach and train a good number of men, a portion of whom may leave your service at the end of 10 years and go back to their own villages.

7066. Has not the system of enlistment for unlimited service been found to afford one of the best securities to the Government for the fidelity of the native army by leading the men to make their regiments their home? Has it not been found that by long service with them the men have become attached to their regiments, attached to their European officers, attached to the Government, and separated, in a way, from the rest of the native community?—The effect in Bengal was not to lead men to make their regiments their home, for the sepoys of Bengal never had their families with their regiments.

7067. But you are aware that in the Madras and Bombay armies the men enlisted in southern India usually have their families with them, and do make their regiments their home to a very great extent?—Yes.

7068. They take a furlough occasionally to visit their own district, but 20 or 30 years of their lives are passed actually with their regiments, their wives and children, fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, being constantly with them?—I am aware of that, but it does not militate with me against the advantages which I think would be offered by the system of enlistment for 10 years.

The witness withdrew.

Adjourned to 11th January next, at 11 o'clock.

APPENDIX.

I.—PAPERS LAID BEFORE THE COMMISSION.

APPENDIX No. 1.

CONDITIONS on which the OFFICERS of the EAST INDIA COMPANY'S ARMIES accepted SERVICE.

CONDITIONS of NOMINATION as CADETS.

A candidate must have attained the age of sixteen years. He is not eligible to be appointed a cadet after having attained the age of twenty-two years, unless he shall have been, for the space of one year at least, a commissioned officer in Her Majesty's service, or in the militia or fencible corps when embodied, and have been called into actual service, or shall have been in the company of cadets of the royal regiment of artillery. Such persons are eligible for the appointment of cadet, provided their age does not exceed twenty-five years. (A commission in the Guernsey militia, or in other corps similarly circumstanced, is not a qualification.)

A candidate who has been so employed must produce his commission, together with a certificate from the War Office or commanding officer of his regiment, of his having actually joined and done duty with the regiment for the full term of one year and upwards; and that he was neither dismissed nor resigned his regiment in consequence of any misconduct.

No person who has been dismissed or obliged to retire from the army or navy, the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, or from any other public institution, on account of immoral or ungentlemanly conduct, can be appointed a cadet.

The following are the points upon which candidates are to be examined before they are passed as cadets :—

1. Each candidate will be required to write English correctly from dictation.

2. He should possess a competent knowledge of the ordinary rules of arithmetic, including the rule of three, compound proportion, simple and compound interest, vulgar and decimal fractions, and the extraction of the square root. He should also have read the first three books of Euclid.

3. In languages he should be able to translate into *English* passages from Cæsar's Commentaries, or from the first four books of Virgil's Æneid, and he will be further expected to parse, and show his knowledge of grammar and syntax.

The candidate will be required to translate from *French* into English an extract from one of the following works, viz. :— Telemachus, Voltaire's Charles the XII. and Peter the Great. But the candidate will have the option of being examined in the Hindustani, in lieu of the French language; and in that case he will be required to translate from Hindustani into English, an extract from one of the following works; viz., Bagh-o-Bahar, and Tota Kuhanee.

4. In history he should be prepared to pass an examination in Keightley's Histories of Greece and Rome, in Gleig's History of England, and in the History of British India, contained in vols. 1 and 2 of the Edinburgh Cabinet Library.

5. In geography he should possess a competent knowledge of the modern divisions of the world; the principal nations in Europe and Asia; the names of the capital of each nation in Europe, and of the chief cities of Hindustan; and the names and situations of the principal rivers and mountains in the world.

6. In fortification he should have read some elementary work on the subject (Straith's Introductory Essay to the Study of Fortification, or Macaulay's Field Fortification), and have received some instruction in drawing.

The evidence to be required from candidates of their having acquired "some knowledge of drawing," is that they shall trace correctly upon paper, in presence of the examiners, a front of fortification, according to Vauban's first system, and also the profile of a rampart and parapet.

The examination of the candidates will take place before a Board of Examiners to be convened for that purpose at the Military College at Addiscombe, near Croydon.

If not qualified on their first examination, they may be allowed a second trial within the next ensuing twelve months; and if not then found qualified, their nominations will revert to their patrons, and they will be deemed ineligible for another nomination for a direct appointment.

Candidates who have passed the prescribed examinations at Sandhurst for commissions in Her Majesty's cavalry or infantry, within one year from the date of their being presented to the political and military committee as cadets, and have not failed at the final examination at Addiscombe, are eligible to appointments as cadets, on producing certificates from the professors at Sandhurst of their having duly passed the prescribed examination in the several subjects, without being required to pass an examination at Addiscombe.

If the candidate has been confirmed as a member of the Church of England, he will be required to make a declaration to that effect. If not so confirmed, or if not a member of the Church of England, he will be required to produce a certificate from a minister, stating that he has been well instructed in the principles of the religion in which he has been brought up.

The candidate will also be required to produce testimonials of good moral conduct, under the hand of the principal or superior authority of the college or public institution in which he may have been educated, or under the hand of the private instructor to whose care he may have been confided; and the said testimonials shall have reference to his conduct during the two years immediately preceding his presentation for admission.

Any person who shall be nominated to a cadetship, and who shall have obtained such nomination in consequence of purchase, or agreement to purchase, or of any corrupt practice whatever, either direct or indirect, by himself, or any other person with or without his privity, will be rejected from the service, and ordered back to England, if he shall have proceeded to India before a discovery of such corrupt practice be made; and if such appointment shall have been so corruptly procured by himself, or with his privity, he will be thereby rendered incapable of holding that or any other situation whatever in the said service. Provided always, that if a fair disclosure of any corrupt transaction or practice of the nature before described, wherein any Director has been concerned, shall be voluntarily made by the party or parties engaged in the same with such Director, the appointment thereby procured shall be confirmed by the Court.

All direct cadets appointed or sworn in before the committee for passing military appointments between the 10th March and 10th June, or between the 10th September and 10th December (or the days which may be fixed on for the public examination of the Addiscombe cadets), take rank after the Addiscombe cadets who may pass their said examinations, provided the latter sail for their respective destinations within *three months* after passing their said examinations.

N.B. All cadets who may be appointed between the dates of public examination at Addiscombe and the 10th March or 10th September, will be allowed to rank from the date of their sailing, provided this takes place within three months after their being passed and sworn.

All cadets in Bengal are required to become subscribers to the Military Orphan Society, and to the Military Widows' Fund at that Presidency.

All cadets appointed at Fort St. George and Bombay are required to become subscribers to the Military Fund at their respective Presidencies.

All cavalry and infantry cadets who fail to apply at the cadet office for their orders for embarkation within three months from the date of their being passed and sworn before the committee, or shall not actually proceed under such orders, are considered as having forfeited their appointments, unless special circumstances shall justify a departure from this regulation.

When the whole of the said certificates, duly filled in and signed, are delivered at the cadet office, the authority for the cadet's examination at Addiscombe will be issued to the candidate.

If no parish register can be found, it is provided as follows, viz. :—

"That if no register can be found, a declaration, pursuant "to the act passed in the 5th and 6th year of his late "Majesty William the Fourth, of that circumstance, shal "be made by the party himself, with his information and "belief, that his age is not under sixteen years, and doth

" not exceed twenty-two years." (Act of the 33 Geo. 3.) Forms of the declaration may be obtained at the CADET OFFICE, at the East India House.

When the cadet is ready to embark, he must apply at the CADET OFFICE for a certificate of his having passed; which certificate will direct him to the secretary's office, where he will obtain the certificate of his appointment. He will then hold himself in readiness to embark, either previous to the ship's departure from Gravesend, or at the last port from whence the ship shall be ordered to take her departure from England.

It being in contemplation to establish new regulations under which ensigns will not be promoted to lieutenancies until they have passed an examination, to be prescribed for that purpose, notice is hereby given, that all cadets passed and sworn in at the East India House after the 8th July 1857, will be subject to those regulations, when established.

CONDITIONS with respect to PROMOTION.

The officers of the artillery and engineer corps rise in their respective arms by seniority.

In the cavalry and infantry they rise by seniority in their respective regiments to the rank of major. They then take their place in the gradation list of their respective branches, and are promoted by seniority therein to the regimental rank of lieutenant-colonel. They continue in these separate regimental gradation lists for succession to regiments, and to the colonel's allowance.

The whole of the lieutenant-colonels of artillery, engineers, cavalry, and infantry are arranged in one gradation list for promotion to the brevet rank of colonel and general officer; and promotion to these grades is regulated according to the provisions of the Royal Warrant of October 1854. This brevet rank does not affect their succession to the colonel's allowance.

Subalterns, after fifteen years from the date of their first commissions, are promoted to the rank of captain by brevet.

CONDITION as respects of REGIMENTAL PAY and ALLOWANCES of the Officers of all Branches of the Service in India.

TABLE OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES FOR ANY MONTH.

CORPS AND RANK.	In Garrison or Cantonment, within 200 miles of direct distance from the seat of Government of each Presidency.					In the Field, and in Garrison or Cantonment, beyond 200 miles of direct distance from the seat of Government of each Presidency.				
	Pay and Indian Allowance.	Regl. House Rent.	Horse Allowance.	Tent.	Total.	Pay and Indian Allowance.	Extra Batta.	Horse Allowance.	Tentage.	Total.
Horse Artillery and Cavalry.	RS. A. P.	RS.	RS. A. P.	RS.	RS. A. P.	RS. A. P.	RS. A. P.	RS. A. P.	RS.	RS. A. P.
Colonel	1158 7 0	0	120 0 0	200	1478 7 0	1158 7 0	0 0 0	120 0 0	200	1478 7 0
Lieutenant-Colonel	582 10 0	100	120 0 0	150	952 10 0	582 10 0	304 6 0	120 0 0	150	1157 0 0
Major	461 1 10	80	120 0 0	120	781 1 10	461 1 10	228 4 6	120 0 0	120	929 6 4
Captain or Surgeon or Vet. Surgeon, 20 years' service	306 11 4	50	90 0 0	75	521 11 4	306 11 4	91 5 0	90 0 0	75	563 0 4
Lieutenant or Assist. Surgeon or Vet. Surgeon, 10 years' service	194 6 0	30	60 0 0	50	334 6 0	194 6 0	60 14 0	60 0 0	50	36 4 0
Cornet, or Vet. Sur., under 10 years' do.	154 15 10	25	60 0 0	50	289 15 10	154 15 10	45 10 6	60 0 0	50	310 10 4
Foot Artillery and Engineers.										
Colonel	1065 5 0	0	30 0 0	200	1295 5 0	1065 5 0	0 0 0	30 0 0	200	1295 5 0
Lieutenant-Colonel	547 14 0	100	30 0 0	150	827 14 0	547 14 0	304 6 0	30 0 0	150	1032 4 0
Major	410 14 6	80	30 0 0	120	640 14 6	410 14 6	228 4 6	30 0 0	120	789 3 0
Captain, or Surgeon	267 5 0	50	0 0 0	75	392 5 0	267 5 0	91 5 0	0 0 0	75	433 10 0
Lieutenant, or Asst. Surgeon	154 14 0	0	0 0 0	50	234 14 0	154 14 0	60 14 0	0 0 0	50	265 12 0
Second Lieutenant	117 10 6	25	0 0 0	50	192 10 6	117 10 6	45 10 6	0 0 0	50	213 5 0
European and Native Infantry.										
Colonel	1065 5 0	0	30 0 0	200	1295 5 0	1065 5 0	0 0 0	30 0 0	200	1295 5 0
Lieutenant-Colonel	547 14 0	100	30 0 0	150	827 14 0	547 14 0	304 6 0	30 0 0	150	1032 4 0
Major	410 14 6	80	30 0 0	120	640 14 6	410 14 6	228 4 6	30 0 0	120	789 3 0
Captain, or Surgeon	249 1 0	50	0 0 0	75	374 1 0	249 1 0	91 5 0	0 0 0	75	415 6 0
Lieutenant, or Asst. Surgeon	145 12 0	30	0 0 0	50	225 12 0	145 12 0	60 14 0	0 0 0	50	256 10 0
Ensign	107 1 11	25	0 0 0	50	182 1 11	107 1 11	45 10 6	0 0 0	50	202 12 5

East India House, August 23, 1858.

FURLOUGH REGULATIONS.

The furlough regulations were revised in 1854, and all officers entering the service since that date come under the operation of the revised rules. The following are the rules:—

FURLOUGHS ON PRIVATE AFFAIRS.

Every officer will be allowed a furlough to Europe, or elsewhere beyond sea, for a period of two years at the expiration of ten years' service, and for a second period of two years after twenty years' service in India.

The second furlough of two years will only be granted after ten years' service in India, from the date of the return to duty after the first furlough of two years. These furloughs are not to be cumulative under any circumstances, but are limited to two years. Officers who have taken leave of absence on sick certificate to Europe, or elsewhere beyond sea, will be ineligible to a furlough on private affairs until they have served six years from their last return to duty. This rule does not apply to short leaves to sea.

All grants of furlough on private affairs are subject to the exigencies of the public service, and to the regulations framed for the preservation of the efficiency of each regiment by limiting the number of absentees.

Officers holding staff or other detached appointments may be allowed furlough for a period of six months without losing their appointments; but, during that period, they will not be entitled to any portion of their staff salary, which will be drawn in full by the officers officiating for them.

All officers, whether staff or regimental, while on furlough on private affairs, will be entitled to "Furlough Pay" only.

Leave of Absence on Sick Certificate.

Leave of absence on sick certificate will be granted for a term not exceeding eighteen months, whether it be to any place in Europe, or elsewhere out of India.

Extensions of such leave may be granted, as at present, on production of medical certificates, for further periods not exceeding eighteen months in the whole.

An officer holding a staff or other detached appointment will be allowed to be absent on sick certificate in England, or elsewhere beyond sea, for a period of fifteen months, without losing his appointment; and, during the first six months only of such absence, he will be entitled to draw half the staff salary of his appointment, the officer officiating for him drawing the remainder half salary during the first six months, and the whole salary during the remainder of the time.

An officer's claim to half staff salary for six months, as sanctioned in the preceding rule, will not be affected by his subsequently retiring from the service in Europe, or elsewhere.

No portion of command allowance, medical staff salary, or other similar allowance, which under the old rules was inadmissible to officers absent from their corps or stations at the Cape or elsewhere, will be allowed to absent officers under these regulations.

All officers, whether staff or regimental, while on leave of absence on sick certificate, will be entitled for a period of six months to the same rate of Indian pay and allowances as was allowed under the old regulations to officers proceeding to the Cape on medical certificate, and for the remaining period of their leave they will receive furlough pay only.

If the leave on sick certificate be extended, furlough pay will be continued; but under no circumstances for a longer period than three years altogether, from the commencement of the absence.

Staff Officers.

The term staff officer applies to all officers holding staff or detached appointments, military (general or regimental), political or civil: also to general officers commanding divisions, members of the Medical Board, superintending surgeons, and others who, under the old rules, were entitled to draw half staff allowance when absent at the Cape.

Staff officers absent on leave beyond the periods stated in Rules 9 and 13 respectively, cannot retain their appointments and allowances except on special grounds, to be sanctioned by the Government of the Presidency. Any such special grant of leave is to be reported at once to the Honourable the Court of Directors, with the reasons for it, and to be subject to their approbation.

The privilege of retaining staff appointments during leave of absence on sick certificate, or on furlough on private affairs, will not be available a second time, if the fresh leave is on sick certificate, until an officer has been three years, or if on private affairs, until he has been six years in the discharge of the duties of his appointment from the date of last return to it.

This rule, however, does not apply to leaves of absence, whether on sick certificate or on private affairs in India, or for brief periods to Ceylon, the Mauritius, or other places out of India.

Officers commanding troops of Horse Artillery and Light Field Batteries, and officers generally in employment, will be allowed leave out of India under the same rules with respect to allowance and tenure of command or office as regulated the grant of leave to the Cape to such officers under the old regulations, except as to the duration of those advantages, the time for their continuance being subject to the provisions of the new regulations.

Date of Furlough and Advances of Pay.

The period of furlough on private affairs, or leave of absence on sick certificate, is to be calculated from the date of the departure from India of the ship in which the officer proceeds.

Advances of pay and allowances, staff and regimental, to officers proceeding on leave of absence on sick certificate, who may be entitled to them, will be made in India for three months from date of embarkation. Payments in continuation will be made in England at the rates of exchange fixed annually for repayment of advances made on account of Her Majesty's Government. Furlough pay will continue to be issued in advance for six months when required by officers obtaining furlough on private affairs.

25. The existing regulations regarding passage money to officers are not affected by these rules.

The certificates issued to officers who are granted furloughs on private affairs, or leave of absence on sick certificate, are to specify the time each officer has been absent on leave within Indian limits, as well as the time of his previous absence in Europe; but will not include the periods allowed for proceeding to the Presidency or port of embarkation, and to enable officers to rejoin their regiments or stations after their return to India, nor the leave of one month's absence in six months as authorized by the regulations. The last pay certificate of all officers proceeding to England on sick certificate is to specify the rate of regimental pay and allowances and staff salary to which they would have been entitled under the old regulations if proceeding to sea on medical certificate. This information is necessary in order that no difficulty may arise in the Pay Department of the India House in adjusting the several payments which may be done.

Officers of H.M.'s Service.

Officers of Her Majesty's service in India, whether employed regimentally or in staff or detached situations, are entitled to the advantages above laid down in respect to allowances and tenure of office when on furlough or leave of absence.

In the case of officers of Her Majesty's service on furlough or sick certificate in England or elsewhere, who may retire or exchange into regiments not on the Indian establishment, the grant to these officers of Indian allowances will cease from the date of their retirement or exchange, if it take place before the expiration of six months from the date of quitting India.

Periods of Absence allowed to be Counted as Service for Retiring Pensions.

In order that all officers quitting India on furlough or sick certificate may be placed on an exact equality as regards loss of time, the period allowed by regulation for proceeding to the Presidency or to the nearest port of embarkation, as well as the time to enable officers to rejoin their corps or station after their return to India, will be considered as time counting for service for the retiring pension.

No furlough or leave of absence, as announced in General Orders, exceeding two years in twenty years' aggregate service, three years in twenty-five years' service, and four years in thirty years' service, shall be allowed to count as service for the retiring pension; and no difference will be made in this respect between leave of absence taken in Europe or elsewhere, in or out of India, or whether the leave be on sick certificate or on private affairs.

In the term "Leave of Absence as announced in General Orders" is to be included all leave of absence, except the period allowed in Rule 39, and the ordinary indulgence of one month's leave in six months, as authorized by the existing regulations, and which are in all cases, whether of regimental or of staff officers, to be allowed to count as service for the pension. All leave to a greater extent, granted by political and other authorities, which may not hitherto have been published in General Orders, must be so announced hereafter.

Officers to be entitled to retire on the full pay of their regimental rank (under the regulations of 1796), must have served twenty-two years in India, out of which leaves of absence for two years in the aggregate, and not more, will be allowed to count as service for the retiring pension.

Officers to be entitled to retire on the full pay of captains and majors (under the regulations of 1835-7), must have served twenty and twenty-four years respectively; out of which time leaves of absence for two years in the aggregate, and not more, will be allowed to count as service.

Officers to be entitled to retire as lieutenant-colonels must have served twenty-eight years; out of which leaves of absence for three years in the aggregate, and not more, will be allowed to count as service.

Officers to be entitled to retire as colonels must have served thirty-two years; out of which leaves of absence for four years in the aggregate, and not more, will be allowed to count as service.

The scale for medical officers and veterinary surgeons of privileged furlough and leave of absence as counting for the retiring pension, will be as follows:—

Years.	Months.	
1	8	in 17 and under 20 years' service.
2	0	in 20 ,, ,, 25 ,, ,,
3	0	in 25 ,, ,, 30 ,, ,,
4	0	in 30 and upwards.

It is to be distinctly understood, that under no circumstances whatever will an officer be permitted to retire on full pay until he has completed the *full time of service* above specified, whether he be in England at the close of his service or elsewhere.

The privileged time of absence may, with the permission of the local government, be taken at any time subject to these regulations. If, therefore, at the end of twenty years' service, of which eighteen had been passed on actual duty in India, an officer should be on furlough or sick certificate in Europe or elsewhere, he will be entitled to retire on the full pay of a captain without returning to India, and so in the other terms of service for the higher pensions. In like manner, a medical officer on furlough or sick certificate in Europe, or elsewhere, at the end of seventeen years' service, fifteen years and four months of which have been passed on actual duty in India, will be entitled to retire on the lowest rate pension without returning to India, and so in the other terms of service for the higher pension.

These rules do not in any way affect the existing regulations regarding the grant of leave in India, or for short periods to sea, whether on private affairs or on sick certificate, except as to the periods of such absence being taken into calculation in the time allowed to count as service for retirement on full pay.

Under the Act 33 Geo. III. cap. 52. sect. 70. an officer who does not rejoin the presidency to which he belongs within a period of five years from the date of quitting is no longer in the Company's service.

Retiring Regulations.

Full Pay.

All officers after a service in India of 22 years are entitled to retire on the pension of their rank. This rank must be the regimental rank attained in India, or the regimental rank (if on furlough) they may attain within the period of 12 months from the date of arrival in England.

The rates of full pay pension are:—

Colonel .	25*s.* a day .	£456 5*s.*	a year.
Lieut-Colonel .	20*s.* ,, .	365	,,
Major . .	16*s.* ,, .	292	,,
Captain . .	10*s.* 6*d.* ,, .	191 12*s.* 6*d.*	,,
Lieutenant .	6*s.* 6*d.* ,, .	118 12*s.* 6*d.*	,,

After certain specified periods of service in India, officers are entitled to retire on the following pensions, whatever may be their rank, viz:—

After 20 years' service,	on the pension of	Captain.	
,, 24	,, ,,	,,	Major.
,, 28	,, ,,	,,	Lt.-Colonel.
,, 32	,, ,,	,,	Colonel.

Half Pay.

Without any fixed period of service being required, regimental captains, majors, and lieut.-colonels, whose ill state of health renders them unable to continue to serve in India, are allowed to retire on the half pay of their rank. The rates are :—

Captains	7*s.* a day	£127	15*s.* a year.
Majors	9*s.* 6*d.* „	173	7*s.* 6*d.* „
Lt.-Colonels	11*s.* „	200	15*s.* „

A lieutenant after 10 years' service in India, an ensign after 6 years' service in India, can retire on the half pay of their rank, if unable to continue to serve in India. The rates are :—

Lieutenant	4*s.* a day	£73	a year.
Ensign	3*s.* „	54	15*s.* „

A lieutenant, after 6 years' service in India, if compelled by health to leave the army, may retire on ensign's half pay.

Officers compelled to quit the service by "wounds received in action, or by ill health contracted on duty," after 3 years' service in India, are permitted to retire on the half pay of their rank.

Lord Clive's Fund.

By the rules of Lord Clive's Fund, established before any General Retiring Regulations were framed, officers incapable of continuing to serve in India are entitled to pensions as follow, without stipulation as to length of service, viz. :—

Retiring Regulations.

Colonels	12*s.* 6*d.* a day	£228	12*s.* 6*d.* a year
Lt.-Colonels	10*s.* „	182	10*s.* „
Majors	7*s.* 6*d.* „	136	17*s.* 6*d.* „
Captains	5*s.* „	91	5*s.* „
Lieutenants	2*s.* 6*d.* „	45	12*s.* 6*d.* „
Ensigns	2*s.* „	36	10*s.* „

The pensions from Lord Clive's Fund being lower than the half-pay rates, the benefits of the Fund are now claimed only by officers not entitled to the higher rates.

Officers cannot receive the advantages of both the General Retiring Rules and Lord Clive's Fund.

In all cases of retirement on half pay and Lord Clive's Fund, medical testimony is required of the necessity for the etirement.

Conditions with respect to the Funds of the several Presidencies.

All Officers of the East India Company's service are required, as a condition of their appointment, to subscribe to the Military Funds of their respective Presidencies. These Funds are as follow :—

Bengal	Military Fund.
„	Military Orphan Fund.
Madras	Military Fund.
Bombay	Military Fund.

The benefits derivable from them are twofold, viz. :—

Those to the subscribers themselves; those to their widows and children.

The benefits to the Subscribers are :—

Passage Allowance from and back to India, if on furlough on sick certificate, restricted to the grades of captain and subaltern, when not provided with passages by Government.

An allowance in aid of pay while in Europe on sick certificate.

To the widows and families on the decease of the Subscribers, pensions as follows :—

	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.
	£	£	£
Widow of a Colonel	281	235	205
„ „ Lieut.-Colonel	225	208	175
„ „ Major	168	181	145
„ „ Captain	112	136	120
„ „ Lieutenant	84	102	102
„ „ Ensign	66	81	81
Children, an annual allowance varying from	30 to 45	20 to 60	22 to 60

In the case of widows this is exclusive of the pensions * to which they are entitled from the East India Company's Military (Lord Clive's) Fund, stated below :—

Widow of a Colonel	£114	a year.
„ „ Lieut.Colonel	91	„
„ „ Major	68	„
„ „ Captain	45	„
„ „ Lieutenant	22	„
„ „ Ensign	18	„

* These are, however, dependent on their husband's property not exceeding certain stipulated amounts.

The pensions to the widows of officers of Her Majesty's service, and of the East India Company's service, as derived from the Government, are as under :—

	From Her Majesty's Government.	From the East India Company.
	£	£
Of a Colonel	90	114
„ Lieut.-Colonel	80	91
„ Major	70	68
„ Captain	50	45
„ Lieutenant	40	22
„ Ensign	36	18

The pensions of the widows of the officers of the Company's service derived from their own fund and the Company's pension may be stated, taking the Bengal fund as an example, as follows, viz. :—

	From the fund to which the officers subscribed.	From Clive's Fund.	Total.
	£	£	£
Of a Colonel	281	114	395
„ Lieut.-Colonel	225	91	316
„ Major	168	68	236
„ Captain	112	45	157
„ Lieutenant	84	22	106
„ Ensign	66	18	84

The pensions from the officers' own fund have been gained by subscriptions, of which the following table will furnish an illustration :—

Table of Monthly Subscriptions.—Bengal Fund.

	In India.		In Europe.	
	Married.	Unmarried.	Married.	Unmarried.
	Rs.	*Rs.*	£ *s.* *d.*	£ *s.* *d.*
Colonels	62½	28 2	3 15 0	1 13 9
Lieut.-Colonels	45	20 4	2 10 0	1 2 6
Majors	35	15 12	2 0 0	0 18 0
Captains	20	9 0	1 6 3	0 11 10
Lieutenants	12½	5 10	0 16 3	0 7 4
Ensigns	10	4½ 0	0 13 2	0 5 11

Bengal Military Orphan Fund.

Colonels	£2 10 0
Lieut.-Colonels	2 0 0
Majors	1 10 0
Captains	1 0 0
Lieutenants	0 12 6
Ensigns	0 10 0

Special pensions are in both services assigned for the widows of officers falling in action. The amounts are the same in both armies, viz.—

Colonel's widow	£200 a year.
Lieut.-Colonel's widow	200 „
Major's widow	120 „
Captain's widow	70 „
Lieutenant's widow	60 „
Ensign's widow	46 „

Indian Army Commission,
August, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 2.

Lord Ellenborough's Answers to the several Questions proposed to be put by the Commissioners as to the Bengal Army.—Aug. 24, 1858.

1. *The proportion of European to Native force to be maintained in the Bengal Presidency.*

Apparently there will be established throughout the Bengal presidency a military police similar to that of which some battalions were raised in 1843, and many duties heretofore improperly thrown upon the army will henceforth be taken by this police, so as to leave only military duties to the army.

Formerly in some localities regiments were so much dispersed as to make the maintenance of discipline impossible.

The dispersion of an irregular regiment, having only three officers, almost does away with European superintendence.

Assuming that our army is to be maintained henceforth for fighting purposes only, the proportion between Europeans and natives should be such as renders a military force most efficient, and a brigade of one European regiment and two native regiments would answer all purposes in war; it being understood that the arms of the Europeans are to be of a very superior description to those of the Natives, and that all the artillery is to be European.

This proportion has of late always been considered desirable for service in the field. The deficiency of our troops may have occasionally rendered unavoidable the having of a native brigade; but generally the object has been attained. No doubt in recent times native troops, be the cause what it may, have seemed to require the support of Europeans much more than they did in early times, when great actions were achieved by native troops alone.

When Lord Lake moved from Cawnpore for that glorious campaign in which he took Delhi and Agra, he had but one European regiment of infantry with thirteen native battalions. In European cavalry he was stronger, having three European and five native regiments. At Assaye, Sir A. Wellesley had 1,752 Europeans and 6,978 natives, besides 1,010 gun lascars and pioneers. Lieut.-Col. Stevenson, who co-operated with him, had only 898 Europeans, and 7,013 natives, besides 478 gun lascars and pioneers, all natives. So that in the whole of the army under Sir A. Wellesley there were 2,650 European soldiers, 13,991 natives, besides 1,488 native gun lascars and pioneers. Thus, inclusive of these last, the Europeans formed only one-fifth of Sir A. Wellesley's army.

It can hardly happen during our lives that a great military operation can be again safely entrusted to a force with so small a proportion of Europeans, still less that Saugor, Bundelcund, Rajpootana, and Mewar can be left, and safely left, as they were in 1844, with two companies of European foot artillery, and no other force of Europeans, in the midst of native troops amounting to more than 35,005 men, besides four regiments of military police.

Hereafter wherever we have native troops we must have Europeans at hand; and these Europeans must have provided for them at all times ample means of movement.

Wherever we have any European force it should be complete in itself, with cavalry, infantry, and artillery; the artillery being in proportion to the total force, and all European. At every station there should be a work capable of receiving all who could not move into the field, the baggage and stores, so that leaving a company there in security, the rest of the Europeans might move out at once for operations.

We have seen the utility lately even of the miserable places of defence at Neemuch, Mhow, and Saugor.

Either friendship or enmity will grow up between European and native troops constantly brigaded together. If enmity, they must be separated; if friendship, as is probable, the natives will become equal to the Europeans when acting with them, as they did in Affghanistan.

The force at a station consisting of one European and two native regiments of infantry, with a proportional force of European and native cavalry and artillery, could be formed by wings into two brigades, one of which might stand fast while the other moved out.

Assam might probably almost always be left to native troops; but, on the other hand, the five European regiments at and near Calcutta would require only two Native regiments to serve their guards, so that the proportion of one European to two native regiments might still be really preserved throughout the army.

2. *What amount of force will be required in the Bengal presidency when the country is settled?*

Until we know what sort of settlement takes place, we cannot with any degree of accuracy decide what amount of force will be sufficient; but we know what limits it cannot permanently exceed,—those of the revenue by which it is to be supported; and we cannot reasonably expect that the financial means of India will for many years be what they were in 1856, in which year there was a surplus of receipt over expenditure.

There are two new and increasing demands upon the Indian Treasury:—

First, the guaranteed interest upon the sums invested in railways and some other public works.

Secondly, the interest upon the extraordinary loans, lately raised here and in India on account of war charges and loss of treasure and revenue.

The capital of which the interest is guaranteed amounts to thirty millions. About sixteen millions have been paid up, and upon this sum the Government of India pays five per cent., receiving only yet about 100,000*l.* a year on account of the railways in working order. The interest payable will increase as the capital is paid, and rapidly, while the receipts from the railways are distant and uncertain. A period of many years must elapse before, even if the railways should all succeed (a somewhat hazardous assumption not justified by experience elsewhere), the receipts for them are equal to the amount of guaranteed interest.

Under any circumstances it is not reasonable to expect the same amount of revenue from the land for a number of years.

There has been much wanton destruction on both sides, and so total a ruin of all public buildings, that the outlay to restore them must press very heavily upon the revenue.

There are besides large claims for compensation on account of losses arising out of the rebellion.

There are confiscations, no doubt, but there are also many loyal persons to be rewarded by the assignment of confiscated territory and the remission of revenue.

The loans during this year in India and in England will have amounted to about thirteen millions.

It is to be expected that the loans next year to meet the charges of the coming campaign, and the winding-up of the military charges, always far beyond their estimated amount, will not be less here and in India than ten millions; and it would be rather a sanguine view of affairs to assume that before any real settlement takes place less than thirty millions will have been borrowed to meet extraordinary charges, at an average interest of five per cent., making a new annual charge of 1,500,000*l.* a year.

It would be prudent to assume that on the returns of the railway and other speculations guaranteed by the Government, the loss will be one-third or half a million a year, even when the whole are in operation; until then, the annual loss will be much greater.

Public works on private account and these loans taken together can hardly be expected to bring upon India a smaller new charge than two millions a year.

Now, irrespective of financial considerations, what force would be sufficient to guard against all dangers, the Bengal presidency, including the Saugor and Nerbudda territory, Meywar, and Rajpootana?

Calcutta, the seat of government, should at all times be in security; and to effect this, it is desirable that at Dum Dum, Barrackpore, and Chinsura there should be stationed five European regiments, which must hold Raneeguuge as an outlying port.

Calcutta should also be the head-quarters of a naval brigade of 1,000 men (partly perhaps composed of natives of the east) with steam gunboats.

This naval force would hold Dacca, and pierce all the country as far as the depth of water would allow, being generally in movement.

In addition to this force,—a naval pontoon corps is much required. Berhampore, Dinapore, Ghazipoor, Rajghat, the new fortified position at Benares and Allahabad, each requires, under present circumstances, one European regiment, and two are required for Juanpoor, Azimghur, and Goruckpore.

With these twelve regiments, and the auxiliary native battalions attached to them, and the naval brigade, we could firmly hold Bengal and Behar, with their rich plains and vast population, and by far the most valuable country we have in point of revenue; the country, in fact, of which the surplus revenue enables us to supply the great deficiency elsewhere.

Oude, with Cawnpore, would at present require eight regiments. Calpee, Mynpooree, Etawah, and Allyghur must be occupied in the Dooab; and Bareilly and Shahjehanpore in Rohilcund, as well as Futtehgurgh on the Ganges; these several services at least require five regiments.

At the commencement of the insurrection there were at Meerut, and to the west and north of it, twelve regiments of European infantry.

The same number will be still required; and, in addition, Delhi must be occupied in ample strength, so as not only to secure it, but to exhibit there, in the pride of established sovereignty, the British Government, which there first suffered loss and dishonour. Less than three regiments there and in the immediate vicinity would hardly accomplish this object.

There remains to be held the whole of the Saugur and Nerbudda territory, with Bundelcund, Rajpootana, and Meywar. In this territory troops are required at—

Agra,
Gwalior,
Jhansi,
Jubbulpore,
Saugur,
Mhow,
Sehoor,
Neemuch, and
Nusserabad.

There may be other points requiring temporary occupation. Less than ten regiments would not suffice for this district. According to this calculation there would be required for the territory under Bengal 50 regiments of European infantry. There were 15 regiments of European infantry in the same territory at the commencement of the insurrection. More may be required in some quarters, less in others, than has been above set down; but their adjustments will balance each other, and it will not be found that a smaller force of European infantry than has been estimated would give the desired security.

It will probably not be found that less than 25 regiments of European cavalry, each of 600 men, divided into wings, would suffice for this force of European infantry. Each regiment of European infantry would thus have attached to it 300 European cavalry, and at least a battery.

Cavalry would not be required at Calcutta. There would therefore be some disposable force of European cavalry for the upper country.

In 1844 the Bengal army consisted of—

Sappers - - -	1,506
Artillery - - - -	5,767
Cavalry - - -	16,820
Infantry - - -	103,000
	127,093

Of these about 15,586 were Europeans, and 111,507 natives; but there were eight battalions of military police, which being deducted, there were of regular and irregular native troops 103,507. Since that period there had been added eight regiments of irregular cavalry, the infantry regiment of Loodianah and Ferozepore, five regiments of Punjaub cavalry, six of Punjaub infantry, four of Sikh infantry, and the corps of guides, besides the Oude force, now gone. On the other hand, the Bundelcund legion had been reduced.

These several additions had probably created a net increase of 28,000 men to the native army employed in the territory under Bengal between 1844 and 1857, making the total force of that army about 131,500 men at the commencement of the insurrection.

There is no reason to suppose that that force was numerically too large to meet all the various duties imposed upon it, while it may be hoped that these duties will be lightened by the general establishment of a military police; other duties will, at least for the present, be imposed, arising out of the insurrection; and we must make everything thoroughly secure, so as not to afford the smallest inducement to renew the attempt to overthrow our power.

3. *Whether the Native force in the Bengal Presidency shall be on the regular or irregular system, or both combined?*

There are some few faithful regiments, the 31st, 47th, 65th, 70th, besides the newly-formed regiment of Lucknow, composed of the remains of the faithful sepoys who fought at Lucknow.

There may be one or two more.

These should be maintained on the regular establishment.

It will be a distinction, and there will be a convenience in it.

These regiments on the regular establishment will each afford six selected officers for detached employment, military or political; and I cannot but think that the early service of an officer with a native corps must tend to qualify him better than service with an European corps for future command of native troops. The remainder of the native army should be on the irregular system. It is cheaper, and with well selected officers, at least equally efficient. The early, and perhaps the greatest achievements of native troops were performed by regiments having few officers; in fact, the presence of many officers with a native regiment constitutes an European society, the intercourse with which takes the officer away from his military duties. In an irregular corps he has nothing to do but to attend to his men, and must do it. His familiar intercourse must be with the native officers.

But an irregular regiment should have five instead of three officers to provide against casualties, furlough, and the hospital, and to enable the corps to act in wings, having each at least one, if not two European officers in command.

4. *Whether any Native artillery shall be allowed in the Bengal army?*

It appears to be the concurrent opinion of all men that we should keep the artillery wholly in our own hands.

The natives have a genius for casting and working guns, and we should not afford them the means of indulging it. We should endeavour to induce all friendly princes to rely upon our artillery, and not to have more guns of their own than they want for salutes.

The natives die at their guns. Their practice in this war is allowed to have been at least as good as our own.

Our European artillery must be increased, so as to more than make up for the loss of the native branch. It must be borne in mind that, be the cause what it may, the Indian artillery procures recruits of a very superior class. It is known to be a noble corps, nobly commanded. Many gentlemen's sons, unable to live in England, enter the Indian artillery. They impart their spirit to the whole corps: it fights as if it was all composed of officers.

It must be recollected that Indian service affords opportunities for advancement which are not to be found elsewhere. It is not impossible that it may be found both convenient and safe to have a proportion of natives employed in every battery; but it should be a small proportion, not beyond the necessity of the case. This is a matter for Indian officers who have served with the European artillery to decide.

5. *The same question with regard to Sappers and Miners.*

As sappers and miners are mostly at work at night, perhaps Europeans may be available to some extent; but obviously the natives must be more essential in this line than in any other, as hard work in the sun for many days together would prostrate the European.

The corps would probably be composed of low caste men, and might therefore seem to be more safely trusted; but our native sappers were amongst the first to mutiny.

6. *Whether the Bengal Native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion?*

The fewer elements of combination there are in the Native army the better; and therefore, the more nationalities, and castes, and religions, the more secure we shall be. Discipline alone should bind the army together. Our means of recruiting will be for some time much reduced. We might as well re-enlist mutinous sepoys as enlist principally, as we used to do, in Behar and Oude. We have too many Sikhs already. We may trust the Hindoos of Rohilcund, and the Rajpoots and Afghans (of whom there are a good many in the cavalry), and we may recruit in the Deccan.

It would be very advisable also to have some corps of natives of the east not Hindostanees, or largely to mix such men in our native Indian regiments.

It is distressing to think that we must abandon the hope of ever again seeing a native army composed like that we have lost. It was an army which, under a general it loved and trusted, would have marched victorious to the Dardanelles.

7. *Whether the native army in Bengal is to be enlisted under a new code?*

I must leave the decision upon this point to practical military officers: nor indeed is it easy to form any opinion without knowing to what points in the present code objection is taken. It must be remembered that we have in irregular corps a very large army in Bengal now, and that all the men in those corps are entitled to the terms of their enlistment. They cannot be sent beyond sea without their consent, if they have enlisted for home service. Many opinions have been given in favour of enlisting only for general service: but when it is considered how very small a portion of the native army of Bengal can ever be wanted for service beyond sea, it is open to much question whether it is advisable to give general alarm, and to impair the means of recruiting (thus forcing ourselves to take an inferior class of men), in order to establish a right to move all where not a tenth can by possibility be required, and in all probability not a twentieth, for service beyond sea. If one of the points in the present code which is called in question be the trial of offences by native courts-martial, I confess I should be unwilling, without a very general concurrence of Indian officers, to abolish or even materially change the present law. It is obvious that it must give great confidence to the native soldier; it tends to raise him in his own estimation, and to elevate his character; and whatever may have been their recent crimes, no doubt the sepoys do acquire, through military service, a character far superior to that of ordinary natives. There was at the commencement of these troubles one instance of the awarding of an inadequate punishment by a native court-martial; but there were others of the awarding of death. And generally, when we refer to the remarks made by successive Commanders-in-chief upon the finding of European courts-martial, we should hardly be just if we did not admit that there is much in practice defective even in them.

8. *Whether the Bengal army ought not to be divided into two or more armies?*

This, too, is very much a question to be left to the decision of practical men.

Such a division could not be effected without altering the present chances of promotion; and above all things, in dealing with military men, it is necessary not only to be strictly just, but to make it quite clear that we are so. Some would in practice be benefited, some injured; but all would be alarmed, and fear injury. We should add the danger of a discontented body of officers to that already existing of a discontented soldiery.

In any case, all below Allahabad must be held by regiments recruited in the upper provinces, for Bengal proper supplies no recruits, and at present none can be prudently taken from Behar.

The divided armies must still act together.

9. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?*

I apprehend that the system of promotion by seniority did not prevail rigidly in the Bengal army, for I can recollect many instances of petitions from sepoys complaining of their being passed over by their juniors; but the principle no doubt was that of promotion by seniority; and where it was departed from in consequence of the unfitness of any one, the next fit man was taken; the tendency of this system is to make a contented, but not the most efficient regiment. It might perhaps be improved by making seniority (where there is not unfitness) the rule in a large proportion of cases (two-thirds?) and merit in the rest. It must be observed, that there will be extensive promotion *for merit* from the native army into the military police, of which probably one-third of the officers or more will be taken from the army, so that there will be new inducements to enter the army, even if the rules for promotion in it be not altered. I can recollect the late Duke of Wellington speaking to me once, as I thought, with approval, of the practice formerly prevailing in the Madras army, of having what he termed a "black commandant." This commandant was of course a subordinate to the European commanding officer of the regiment; but his allowance was very large, and, as I understood, he must have had the substantive rank of major, and could in no case be commanded by a captain; but I have never investigated the subject, and do not know how the system was introduced, or why it was abandoned. Probably the "black commandant" was a gentleman of large property who raised the regiment. It may be worth while to make inquiries upon the subject.

I see no reason why native gentlemen should not be admitted at once as officers into the army; I see many reasons why they should be so. There are native gentlemen in the irregular cavalry, and nobly they behave. I made one of them, who, in the Bolan Pass had saved a convoy, my aide-de-camp, and I never had any ground for regretting the appointment. His presence at durbars on the footing of equality with English aide-de-camps, struck the native princes very much, and seemed to have a very good effect.

I had the intention of adding to the body guard (which had been raised to 600 selected men, and was commanded by ten of the finest young officers I could find) a body of irregular cavalry, to be composed altogether of gentlemen and officered by princes; a noble guard, of which the officers would have had the rank of aide-de-camp, and would, on all occasions, have accompanied the Governor-General.

Treated on a footing of equality, they would have been proud of being made in a manner part of the government. What they learnt in the Governor-General's camp, through friendly communication with the principal officers there, they would have carried back to their own countries and taught to their sirdars.

Practically it is only, or certainly most efficiently, through military service, that education can really be given to the highest classes in India.

If we desire to retain the empire we have acquired without incurring a cost far exceeding its value, we must conciliate those who are the natural leaders of the people,—we must abandon the exclusive British system, and nationalise our government. I know no better way of doing so, than by bringing the first gentlemen in the country into the army. It is entirely in accordance with all eastern feelings to make military service the great road to honour and to power: and we cannot greatly err, if, in the endeavour to obtain the same objects, we adopt generally the same policy as every successful conqueror, from the time of Alexander to that of Akbar.

APPENDIX No. 3.

ANSWERS to suggested HEADS of INQUIRY.—By the Earl of ELLENBOROUGH.

1. *How far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service; and how far of troops raised for service in India only.*

Until the commencement of this mutiny, there has always been some balance of strength between the Queen's army and that of the Company, and enough of jealousy and of divergent interests to prevent combination, without impeding the public service in operations against the enemy.

It is necessary to preserve this state of things. It affords the only security for the continued maintenance of the dependence of India upon England. But the present war in India has produced great changes in our position. There must at all times hereafter be a very much larger force of European troops in India than has hitherto been deemed sufficient. We can no longer rely upon the fidelity of our native army. That of Bengal is gone. The native army would heretofore have remained faithful under any circumstances of European mutiny. Now no one can tell whether it would act with or against the Government.

We had till lately 22 or 24 battalions of Queen's troops, and nine of Company's European troops in India. We have now about 75 battalions of Queen's troops, and (with the late additions) twelve battalions of local European troops, in all 87 battalions.

It is reasonable to look forward to the time, and that not very distant, when a portion of this force may be withdrawn; but it would be very sanguine to expect that we could safely leave India without 70 European battalions. There were at the commencement of the mutiny 22 Queen's battalions, and nine of the Company's. To the latter three have been added. Together these make 34 battalions, and therefore 36 are to be supplied.

Recently 27 battalions have been added to the Queen's army. If all these were to be stationed in India, still nine more would be required to give the requisite force in India, and leave the Queen's army as it was for the defence of England and our dominions abroad.

All these nine battalions at least should be raised for local service in India.

The comparative strength of the Queen's army and of the local army would then be 49 and 21 battalions respectively, and generally the officers of the native army would have the same interests as the officers of the local European army, for they must, on account of their knowledge of the language, be more commonly taken from the local than from the Queen's European regiments.

It would be far preferable, however, to raise the local European regiments to an equality in number with those of the Queen,—to have 35 Queen's battalions and as many local battalions. This would render necessary the raising of 23 battalions for local service.

The home and foreign demands for troops would in truth hardly be met by this, which would be a practical addition of 14 battalions to the Queen's army, for to 22 in India in May 1857 would be added 13, and 27 have been raised.

It is to be feared that unless the local army were raised to an equality in point of strength with the Queen's army, it would come to be considered an inferior service. Notwithstanding its great inferiority in European troops, the many advantages which the Company's army has hitherto exclusively enjoyed from the favor of the Court of Directors, which protected it, have secured to it high consideration. But the Company being gone, and the local army having no longer exclusive advantages, real strength can alone secure to it proper consideration. It would be a source of great danger if the officers and men of the Queen's army were to acquire notions of superiority to the local army in India.

They must mutually depend upon each other. There is no safety to either but in a good understanding and mutual respect. Equality of strength and equality of advantages will ensure this result.

There were in the Bengal army 74 battalions of native infantry. Of these, probably 5 may be maintained in an integral state; 6 have been absorbed in the three new European regiments. If 23 battalions are added to the local European army, these would absorb the officers of 46 more regiments, so that in all 57 regiments would be disposed of, and 17 only would remain as skeleton corps whose officers might partly be employed in irregular corps and the police, and on other detached service, and partly be attached to regiments weak in officers.

Perhaps it would be found advisable to use the cadres of some of these regiments in officering further new regiments of

European cavalry. The same principle of equality which it is proposed to apply to the European infantry should be applied also to the cavalry and artillery.

2. *In connexion with this question, the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter.*

The proposed equalization of strength between the Queen's and the local army would remove all difficulty about the periodical relief of the former. The amount of the reliefs would be increased only about one-third, and if the whole of the 27 battalions newly raised were, as is suggested, to be retained, there would be a new force of 14 regiments in England and elsewhere to furnish reliefs for 13 new battalions stationed in India.

If the whole force were relieved every ten years, three or four battalions in alternate years would effect the object. If the 70 battalions were to be all of the Queen's army, double that number of battalions would be required for the annual reliefs. The charge would be much increased, and from the extent of the demand the reliefs would be very irregular.

The only point, it is believed, in which the local European troops are now inferior to the Queen's, is in the quality of the non-commissioned officers. This has been occasioned by the withdrawal of some of the best men from those regiments for civil employment. That source of deterioration will now be much diminished, for the number of such civil employments remaining as it is, the number of Europeans, from amongst whom the persons to fill such employments must be selected, will be greatly increased, indeed including the additions to be made to the European cavalry and artillery, nearly quintupled; for it may be expected that hereafter the men of the Queen's army will be eligible for those appointments as well as those of the local army. Further, there will hereafter be extended means of employing the less efficient men in invalid corps; for at every principal station, and even at the minor posts, there will be small works and fortified houses such men could defend very well.

In the hills there may be some attempt to locate such less efficient men as have families. It will ultimately fail to create a self-supporting colony; but it will tend to weed the ranks. There does not, upon the whole, seem occasion to apprehend that the local European corps will be less effective than they have been,—on the contrary.

3. *Whether it be possible to consolidate the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other; and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company.*

Practical officers alone would seem to be competent to answer this question, and especially the second branch of it. A man without such practical knowledge of the service can only venture to say, that to an officer it can little signify whether one above him exchanges, provided the one who comes in his place has no better a life than the one who goes out. If he should have a better life, his introduction into the regiment must injure those below.

The public is interested in being enabled to employ military ability in whichever branch of the army it may appear in any part of the world. The precedent has been lately established of bringing into the Queen's service distinguished officers of the Indian army, and the Queen has always exercised the power of appointing her officers to command in India.

The proposed exchange would seem rather to concern the interests of individuals than those of the public.

4. *Whether the local European force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain.*

If the local force of Europeans should be extended as proposed above, it would be impossible to keep it up otherwise than by separately recruiting for it at home.

Three or four regiments going home every year could not supply with the necessary volunteers a body of more than 10,000 men.

Young soldiers do not, it is apprehended, volunteer for other regiments when their own leave India. It is the old soldier with a native family and half native habits who most readily remains. Such men brought together would make the worst regiments, but dispersed, and especially when attached to regiments newly arrived, they are very valuable. They teach the young soldiers how to live in a hot climate, and give them all the advantages of their own experience in Indian warfare. The ignorance of newly-arrived officers and men left to themselves leads to fearful losses.

Further, men's tastes are various, and must be considered in raising recruits. Many would enter the local army who would not enter the Queen's. There has rarely, if ever, been any difficulty in raising recruits for the Company's army.

APPENDIX No. 4.

1. *The proportion of European to Native force to be maintained in the Bengal Presidency.*

In Bengal, one-third at least of European soldiers for the next few years; until it is seen whether the old feeling of the natives, of deference and respect for Europeans, can be re-established. If the European character is again suffered to fall into contempt, through the slight estimation and disregard in which for years it has been, perhaps unintentionally, the custom of the governments in India to hold the European officer, a larger force of British troops will be necessary. If our "empire of opinion" can be restored, fewer national troops will be requisite; but we must never again rely solely on this prestige, which is highly useful and desirable in its way, as a moral aid, but which it was all along a most unwise procedure to build upon so almost exclusively as our support and protection, to the neglect of a more material guarantee in the shape of an *adequate European force*. It is presumed that in future the Native troops will be employed in the common every-day details, and as an auxiliary and inferior body. The writer of this paper has often heard distinguished officers serving in India remark as a matter of reproach, at reviews and on other occasions, upon the inferiority of Native troops to the European, in the evolutions of regiments and brigades, and in point of smartness, dress, arms, accoutrements, &c. &c. To this he was accustomed to reply, that it was "desirable it "should be so; that it was a mistake to endeavour to place "the Native soldier on an equality with the European; that "our policy as conquerors and foreigners should be to "maintain most carefully the superiority of our national "troops, and to use more freely the Native soldiery in those "ordinary duties which, in addition to their usefulness, "would also in part serve to mark the distinction between "the two; that to puff up the Sepoy with a notion that he "was equal to his European brother soldier was a fatal "error." Unhappily this error *was* introduced into the system: the Sepoy officers (Europeans) naturally adopted it; commanders-in-chief and their staff thought in general that they were best advancing the interests of the Indian service in insisting upon these non-essentials. If the Native troops had been kept in their proper place, if they had not been petted, pampered, flattered, and indulged, until they came to regard themselves as quite on an equality with the British soldier, a mutiny might not have occurred for another hundred years; but when, without any adequate reason, his pay, already ample, was so injudiciously increased; when it was discovered that he must not escort treasure in the hot winds or rains; when it was forbidden to furnish the customary nightguard for his European officer, or to proceed with him "on command as his escort" when travelling; it was only natural that an inflated self-sufficient spirit should by degrees have been generated: add to these and other petty causes the insane abolition of the lash by Lord William Bentinck, and no one need wonder that "the quiet well-conducted" sepoy became a Prætorian. If, therefore, this unwise system is again to be re-introduced, we shall require a far larger proportion of European troops; if it is discouraged and prohibited, the proportion I have indicated will, after the restoration of tranquillity, be probably found to suffice.

2. *What amount of force will be required in the Bengal Presidency after the country is settled.*

In Bengal, of British infantry, the amount, in the opinion of the writer, ought not to be less than 40,000 even in times of profound peace; and if 50,000 could be maintained, the number would be by no means excessive, the vast extent of country subject to our control in this Presidency being considered, and the necessity which exists of being to a certain extent prepared for external attack as well as internal revolt or insurrection. Of European cavalry, 5,000 might with advantage be maintained, and the same number for the artillery and engineer corps. British "Light Horse," accustomed and trained to much more active and independent action than has hitherto prevailed with the European cavalry in India, would prove a most useful and efficient arm; and instead of shutting them up in barracks every opportunity should be taken to make their presence practically known in the provinces. They should be most carefully and efficiently armed, and no sacrifices whatever made to mere show and tinsel. Of *Native* troops the numbers should be limited as much as possible; and, as connected with this subject, it is to be observed that the

force requisite must mainly depend on the system pursued by the government of India. If railroads, steam communication on the rivers, and the electric telegraph are freely introduced and maintained, fewer Native troops will be requisite. The rail will lessen the necessity for escorts; a change in the currency system of India would further obviate the necessity of large guards to protect treasure; and if the circulation of gold or notes in lieu of the present exclusive use of silver is not introduced, at least the accumulation of treasure at scattered and distant points all over the country should be interdicted; all in excess of the amount requisite for current use ought to be transmitted by rail to the principal stations, and it should be established as a principle that treasure must be guarded, if not exclusively, at least always in part by Europeans. There can be no doubt that in the late revolt many Native regiments were tempted to mutiny by the large amount of silver accumulated at isolated stations.

As in the past the government of India neglected to take obvious precautions; as, in their pride of place and position, those in authority refused to benefit by warning and suggestions, it may not with reference to the future be deemed superfluous to suggest that the railroads will need European protection. To this end, at various points, which should be timely decided upon, barracks should be constructed, and these ought always to be occupied by British soldiers; it will not be necessary to have them in large numbers, but such posts should not be too widely separated, and might be composed in part of cavalry, a troop or squadron at each according to local circumstances. The danger to the rail will be chiefly from the local attempts of the natives in times of commotion, in preventing which cavalry would prove most useful; but they must be cavalry we can depend on, not the common "irregulars," far less the "Bengal native cavalry," if any of this latter body be suffered to remain in the service. Mounted Seiks, of whom, it is believed, we have a large force, and for whom we must find active occupation, might be employed in this way in the Lower and North-west provinces, in Scinde and in Oude, European cavalry being kept at the principal stations of the various lines of rail and wherever treasuries are established. The Native (Seik) cavalry might be made to answer a double purpose; they could be used for the escort of civilians visiting their districts and the number of sowars in civil employ be thereby greatly reduced, for these last are the very reverse of a reliable body, and we ought to reduce their numbers to the lowest scale. We must not get into the old system, either, of pampering and flattering the pride of our Native soldiery, Seiks or others, but *use* them freely. If posts of the kind above advocated are adopted into our system, a considerable portion of the cavalry might be disposed of in this way. A well-qualified *inspector* ought to be appointed to see to their efficiency and to maintain a careful watch over them. It is undesirable to retain more Native cavalry than is absolutely required, and there can be little doubt that the numbers now in our pay could be greatly reduced. This opinion is only in keeping with that expressed officially by the writer *before the late mutiny*, when he advocated the reduction of the "light cavalry" (so called), and the substitution of *permanent* European cavalry regiments, *permanently attached*, that is, to the local Indian army. It is presumed that the necessity which must always continue to exist of possessing absolute and not merely implied security, is at last too generally admitted to need any further advocacy, and that fortified posts will be constructed to dominate over every large town or civil station occupied by Europeans; and these posts should be exclusively garrisoned by European troops as a *principle*, or where that from circumstances is difficult or undesirable, then by other reliable troops, such as the Goorkah regiments. The railway military posts before recommended will not be needed where these dominating positions exist.

To conclude this reply: the writer cannot say, and believes that no man can say, at present in so many arbitrary words, of what numbers the Native armies, regular and irregular, should in future consist; but his sentiments may be understood from this, that if still in office in India and permitted so to occupy himself, his study would be quietly and guardedly to reduce to a minimum the Native troops of all arms, and in all the Presidencies.

They appear to be again, as before, *overwhelming*; and if attention is not given to the subject at once, we may shortly experience as much danger from Seikhs and others as from the ill-understood and wilfully mispraised Sepoy.

3. *Whether the Native force in the Bengal Presidency shall be on the regular or irregular system, or both combined.*

It would appear that the Native force to be maintained must be necessarily of both systems combined; although in fact the *name* by which the component parts may be designated is quite immaterial, and "regulars," in the British acceptation of the term as applied to British infantry and cavalry, we can never, strictly speaking, hope to possess. Nor is it indeed at all desirable to construct regiments of Natives after the strict model of our British regulars. What is requisite is an efficient body of Native troops, both of regulars and irregulars, having reference to the uses and services for which such force is required, and having regard also to the material, habits, and the nature of the climate in which it is to be employed. We are placed in a peculiar and anomalous position in India; we require troops for the protection of our vast frontier, if need be for purposes also of aggression, and for the maintenance of internal tranquility. The Native troops are not in many respects so well qualified as we could desire for either purpose. Nevertheless, their employment in our service is a necessity, and, combined with our European troops, they have answered tolerably in many instances, despite the system, which was fortuitous and the work of no single man's hand or brain. As, during our career of conquest, where we found Native camps and towns, there we at once at haphazard formed our stations and cantonments, so in like manner we constructed our military system. In Bengal the Sepoys disliked the sea; service on that element was not, therefore, demanded of them; and, in short, an impolitic deference to Hindoo feeling and prejudice was unwisely suffered to pervade the military body on which our security depended. The reply offered to any observation of this sort was invariably to the effect, that "although no doubt faulty in theory, it was in practice "found to answer admirably." The system pursued may be likened to that of constructing a house on a foundation of wooden piles: while the wood lasts, the superstructure appears to be perfect; but the decay and rottenness inherent in the material will ultimately manifest itself, the whole structure nods to its fall, and to repair or rebuild is alike difficult. The late crisis showed the utter worthlessness of our boasted but hollow system—the revolt dispersed to the winds, as if of no weight, all the undue dependence which was placed on the assumed influence upon the Sepoys of our pension establishment, good-conduct pay, &c. The great error in India appears to have been that of making the Native troops the principals; these, on the contrary, should have been retained in limited numbers as simple auxiliaries, and kept subordinate in every respect to our national troops. The course pursued appears very naturally to have originated in the delegated authority exercised by the Court of Directors of the East India Company. If the government had been conducted by officers of the Crown there can be no doubt that the system would have been quite different in many respects—other views must of necessity have prevailed—that jealousy on the part of the Horse Guards of adding European troops to the Company's army would not have existed; and in place of the ill-advised augmentations of the Native troops we may without hesitation assume that a sounder view would necessarily have been taken of our position, and that our empire in the East would not have been placed in jeopardy by the enlistment of overwhelming and disproportionate bodies of natives, while our real strength, our national British troops, were kept at a minimum figure. There is no denying the fact that a vulgar and sordid principle pervaded the system of the India House, and through them their governors-general, who thus imbibed the habit of regarding everything connected with government from the expense view of the subject. Thus Native troops were assumed to be "cheaper" than European; irregulars were cheaper than regulars; it was too great an expense to maintain an inspector of cavalry, and so on! The government, moreover, was a strictly civil government; it had no military knowledge or ideas; the few military men in the Court have been for the most part diplomatic agents at foreign Courts, or Engineer Officers without the least practical knowledge of military details. Thus the civil business of the empire was that which chiefly interested and engaged the attention of the governing body. In a system of military conquest and progression, the military were degraded, or at the least occupied a most inferior position; while the "covenanted" civilians in the employ of the company were as unduly and unwisely elevated in the scale of rank and estimation: and army details were thus made distasteful, and shuffled through or neglected in consequence. All this at home might have been unimportant, comparatively; but, in India, where we have to maintain our supremacy by force of arms and conquest over various races and nationalities, it has been well-nigh fatal. Will the same errors be persisted in? If they are, our empire in the East will be lost. Another such revolt, and our prestige will be so thoroughly used up and expended, that no efforts we are capable of will suffice to

re-establish our authority; and with the loss of empire in the East who will be found to deny that we shall have then "culminated?"

4. *Whether any Native Artillery shall be allowed in the Bengal army.*

The writer has always been strongly averse to the enlistment of Natives for the regular artillery in Bengal; and even for local purposes they should be *very sparingly employed*, if at all. The existing Native regular artillery could, however, be readily disposed of for the present, by employing them as local batteries, and absorbing those at present so designated; but the authorities on the spot will best know how these details can be carried out, and they alone can judge of the exceptional cases calling for a departure from the general principles to be established for guidance in the future.

5. *Whether any Native sappers and miners should be allowed.*

For the mere manual labours of the corps, Natives will be required; the Seikhs entertained since the revolt are probably the best material of which it can be composed. But it would not be politic to dismiss the men of this regiment who were faithful and did good service, or to have only Seikhs in it. Perhaps an equal number of companies of each race would be the best plan. It may be here remarked that it does not appear to be judicious to introduce to the knowledge and practice of our Native Indian soldiery, all the scientific and professional improvements of European armies. These we should use and employ to maintain, in the hands of our national troops, our national superiority. The mistake committed hitherto has been in supposing that it was judicious to instruct in every respect alike the British and the Indian soldier. The native should be well instructed in that discipline and in those things which it is considered necessary for him to know, but in these alone. The retention of the very superior arms recently manufactured, for instance, in the hands of our British troops exclusively, ought to have been our object; we should have so neutralized in some measure the overwhelming force of armed Natives so idly and impolitically maintained. But no; in place of any such common-sense arrangement, the whole Native army, notwithstanding the uneasy feeling known to pervade it, was to have been armed with the best description of rifles. To what end? To be opposed ultimately to ourselves; for they cannot be opposed in India to highly armed and organized troops, for such nowhere exist.

These remarks and suggestions if worth anything apply alike to the three Presidencies. It is weakness to suppose that the Native troops of Madras and Bombay are for ever to prove faithful; to have no cause real or assumed for discontent or disaffection. *That* was the argument assumed and acted upon in the case of the Bengal Sepoy; and we have seen the result.

6. *Whether the Native Army of Bengal should be composed of different nationalities or castes.*

Talk as we will of the beneficial effects and paternal character of our rule, we never can alter the fact that in India we are foreigners and interlopers; and while we remain what we are, the Natives of Hindostan what they are, the haughty and offensive conscious manner, the consequence of our superiority, morally and intellectually, will remain indelibly stamped in the bearing and character of the European, outweighing all the material benefits we can confer; and it is opposed, therefore, to all experience and to common sense to suppose that ever under any circumstances the Natives in their inmost hearts can become really reconciled to our rule as a class. Some few indeed may—shopkeepers, camp followers, and a few others whose existing modes of livelihood are dependent on our presence; but the ineradicable feature of colour must always remain to mark and distinguish the foreign troops, and will for ever act as an incitement to our ejection, when time and circumstances are thought to present a favourable opportunity for again trying conclusions with us. The introduction of Christianity even, if that in the course of time should be brought about; the cultivation of the European sciences, learning, and the arts—nothing of all this will ever render our presence palatable. When we have civilized and nationalized India, we shall have to withdraw; and until then we must remain to a certain extent on the insecure footing of which we have so recently experienced so sad a specimen. This has never been sufficiently understood or insisted upon; nevertheless it is and will be found ultimately to be the truth; and it speaks forcibly for the strong necessity which exists for so dividing and separating into distinct bodies the "different nationalities or castes" the rulers in our Eastern dominions may deem it safe and expedient to entertain in our armies, so as to render them as little dangerous as possible to the State which they undertake so solemnly and faithfully to serve, but to which solemnity *they*, be it always remembered, attach little or no real meaning or importance, and by which, as we have now seen, they are in no way really bound.

Seikhs, Rajpoots, and Goorkahs constitute perhaps the best description of men for soldiers in Bengal, and there are endless varieties of others; while the low castes will doubtlessly meet with great favour, after the events we have experienced so recently. It is, however, essential to be alike cautious with them all; and especially we should be most guarded and watchful with the Seikhs. Of these one fourth part would prove an ample proportion; of Goorkahs and Hill men generally a like number if procurable, but the real Goorkah is not to be found in any large numbers; another fourth part of low caste men of all sorts, and the rest must, it is presumed, be made up of the endless varieties of Hindostanees and Mussulmen usually employed. The introduction, however, of other different elements would be advisable, if it can be done—Africans, Malays, and Arabs; anything, in short, to divide and so neutralize the strength of the "castes and nationalities" which compose our armies in the East.

7. *Whether the Native army of Bengal is to be enlisted under a new code.*

Assuredly; but under what code shall we enlist all that alarming crowd of new levies and police corps raising for civil purposes? It is stated on reliable authority that in Oude alone the force thus to be raised, under the civil government, will in October amount to no less than 9,000 foot and 3,000 horse, the infantry of this force to be all armed with percussion muskets, and regularly and efficiently drilled. Now, who is to control and watch these civil soldiers? Your London commission is making inquiries; but already a *civil army* is being formed, without any proper rules and discipline to guide it. In our next revolt, if this goes on, we shall have a civil army in mutiny opposed to the military force of the State; or if these last should be the first to turn against us, then as assuredly we shall have them siding with the mutinous and ill-disposed levies, horse and foot, on no arranged system, police battalions, local corps, mounted police, &c. &c., ad infinitum. In short, any man who can collect one hundred sweepers together, put them into a coloured tunic, and a "fancy pugree," is called a "commandant," and intrusted with their charge. If all this is not speedily looked into, we shall have a second deadly revolt on hand in no time; but having, without the least effect, directed attention to what was before preparing for us, the writer despairs of the least adequate attention being given to this new, great, increasing, and pressing danger.

8. *Whether the Bengal army ought to be divided into two or more armies.*

It would seem to be a very injudicious proceeding to divide the troops in Bengal into two distinct armies. Innumerable reasons appear to make against it, and none of any real weight in favour of such a change. In the first place, in the reconstruction of the army much will depend on the wisdom, ability, and firmness of the commander-in-chief; for, whatever may be the plans and rules laid down here at home or by the government of India, the carrying out of the new system effectively and consistently must be intrusted to one responsible head; and the formation of two or more distinct armies must naturally interfere with this, for it is impossible that two chiefs would have exactly the same views, or be likely to adopt the same measures of detail. To start, therefore, a second army and chief would be merely to complicate and confuse matters, already *alarmingly* complicated and confused. The expense moreover would be very great—utterly thrown away; while in the necessary arrangements great difficulties may be anticipated, and all the evils of delay, uncertainty, and confusion must be inevitably incurred,—in the event of such a plan being carried out;—it will be a "double government" of the army, with the usual result. One consistent system for the whole of the Bengal Presidency should be introduced, and with as little delay as the importance of the subject will admit of. The governor and commander-in-chief—besides the attention to be given to the thorough suppression of the revolt (which is still on our hands, and far from ended, despite the seeming lull and quiet,)—will have to form opinions, and decide on plans innumerable connected with the re-organization of the system, and the re-establishment of peace; for the due arrangement of all which the consistency derivable from one plan and one head is essential.

9. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.*

The writer four years since, in a demi-official paper of suggestions which he prepared for Lord Dalhousie, recommended and advocated the eventual extinction of the Native commissioned officers, and his opinion to this effect has only been strengthened by late events. In time, additional good-service pay can be given to deserving non-commissioned officers, who should be formed for the purpose into classes. The details will be best arranged in India.

To conclude: The Bengal army may be likened to a watch that has stopped, that will no longer go—the *mainspring has snapped;* while our rulers, amidst the conflict of plans and opinions submitted to their judgment, sit melancholy and depressed, in doubt as to the best course to be pursued for its renovation. Of this at least they may be assured, that the preservation of our dominions in the East must depend on our retaining there an "adequate European force;" on the retention in the hands of our European troops solely the power and superiority conferred by the possession of artillery (which, if possible, should in no instance be entrusted to Natives); and generally in making it a point and matter of recognized policy never to arm prematurely with the superior weapons which the science and genius of this country is always producing, *any* Natives, whether they be of the old regiments of Madras or Bombay, or the new levies of Bengal; on the enforcement of a system of strict discipline and effective and efficient command over the Native troops of all denominations; and, finally, in everywhere throughout the country disarming the Natives—a measure which can and ought to be carried out, despite the sneers and objections at such a proposal by those in authority in India, too timid and too vacillating to adventure on a bold and decided course, although justified, even in the eyes of the Natives themselves, by the late barbarous and calamitous revolt.

H. T. TUCKER,
Major-General.

Puckaster Niton, I.W.
Sept. 18, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 5.

ANSWERS of Major-General TUCKER to QUESTIONS submitted to him as to the selection of Officers for commands.

1. *As you held the appointment of Adjutant-General of the Bengal army from the year* 1850 *to* 1856, *will you be good enough to state whether previously to that period seniority did not form the rule, and selection for efficiency the exception, under the established system of appointing officers to brigade and divisional commands in that presidency?*

The practice was as above stated.

2. *Was it not in consequence of a strong and earnest representation by the Commander-in-Chief in India, of the evils resulting from a system under which mere negative merit when backed by seniority was considered to give officers a claim to appointments of so great importance and responsibility, that the then Government of India sanctioned selection for efficiency being made the rule in future, and was this rule subsequently fully carried out?*

Yes; precisely as above stated, and the records at the head-quarters of the Bengal army will be seen to prove that the suggestion to change the old system was first made and suggested by me, as Adjutant-General (*vide* the schedules in which this subject is referred to). But I cannot conscientiously say that in my opinion the new rule introduced was "fully carried out," in the broad, full, and complete extent originally contemplated.

H. T. TUCKER,
Major-General,
Late Adjutant-General of the Army in Bengal.

Puckaster Niton,
December 13, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 6.

MEMORANDUM by Major MEREWETHER on the CONSTITUTION of the SIND HORSE.

The brigade of Sind Horse consists of three regiments, 801 strong each, formed on what is called the irregular system.

In each regiment there is a commandant, second in command, an adjutant, and an assistant-surgeon. These are the only European officers.

Detailed strength of one Regiment of Sind Horse.

European Commd.	1 Commandant.	
	1 Second in command.	
	1 Adjutant.	
	1 Assistant-Surgeon.	
Native Commissioned.	4 Russuldars.	
	1 Wordee Major.	
	4 Russaidars.	
	8 Naib Russuldars.	
	8 Jemadars.	
Native Non-Commd.	8 Kote Duffadars.	
	8 Nishan Burdars (Standard Bearers).	
	64 Duffadars.	
	8 Trumpeters.	
	688 Sowars.	
		801

There are twenty-five native commissioned officers in each regiment, as marginally shown. This gives three officers to a troop, besides the Wordee major or native adjutant. The senior commands the troop, is either a Russuldar or Russaidar, and is held strictly responsible for its complete efficiency in every respect. If any men belonging to the troop wish to prefer complaints or to make any application, the troop commander brings them up before the commandant at the regimental orderly room, when the merits of the cases are openly discussed, and at once decided on. The subalterns assist the commander in maintaining discipline in the troop. There are besides to each troop, a Kote duffadar (troop orderly serjeant), a pay duffadar (non-effective), who keeps the accounts, Troop Order Book, &c., &c.; a Nishan burdar, and eight duffadars (serjeants). No naiks (corporals) were allowed in the establishment sanctioned by government; but, as duty could not be properly carried on without them, ten were appointed to each troop; they receive no extra pay, but the position is the stepping stone to further promotion.

Nature and Mode of Enlistment.

The men are enlisted from all parts of India, but principally from the Delhi districts and from Rohilcund. They are enlisted for general service and without limit as to time. The mode of enlistment is this:—On a vacancy occurring, candidates for admission into the ranks, of whom there are always a number present with the head-quarters of the regiment, appear before the commandant; he selects those who from their looks and make are likely to make the best soldiers. These are then placed on horses, bare backed, with merely a bridle and bit in their mouths, and are made to ride over a course in which there are several sharp turnings; the man who comes in first gains the vacancy. This not only tries their powers of riding, but also shows whether they have proper boldness or not. After approval the recruit has read to him a declaration, which he signs, to the effect that he binds himself to abide by all rules at present existing, or that may hereafter be made by the commandant for the good of the whole; and that in the event of his being discharged from the regiment for misconduct, all stoppages on account of clothing, arms, &c., will be forfeited by him. The recruit is then considered duly admitted, and is sent to learn his drill, which he generally manages to do in from three to four months.

Horses, how obtained.

Horses are obtained from the Punjaub, Affghanistan, Beloochistan, Sind, and Cutch. A set of dealers have established themselves at the head-quarters at Jacobabad, who have always horses ready for sale. The purchase is managed by the soldier himself entirely. The commandant merely has the horse brought before him to see if it is fit for the ranks. On its being approved the regimental brand is applied and the horse admitted. All new horses are sent to the drill until they will remain steady in the ranks. To aid in the purchase of a horse to replace one that has died from natural causes, the man receives a certain sum (Rs. 100) from a fund to which he subscribes monthly.

Rate and Nature of Monthly Pay.

Government gives to each sowar Rs. 30 per mensem; with this sum he has to supply himself with clothing, arms, accoutrements, keep, clothe, and furnish trapping for his horse, and to maintain carriage, so as to be able to move at a moment's notice wherever he may be ordered to go.

Manner of Clothing and Arming.

At first clothing, arms, accoutrements, &c., were picked up where the men could, and were of the worst possible description. Several attempts were made to remedy this on the spot, but they ended at last in General Jacob, at the request of the native officers, getting everything from England of the best quality. Clothing, issued every two years, is obtained through the clothing agent of the army.

Accoutrements: a plain strong black leather belt and pouch, a plain strong black leather sword belt with frog; strong jack-boots, strong white leather bridles and stirrup leathers, iron bits and stirrup* irons from Messrs. Garden and Son, Piccadilly, a good serviceable double-barrelled carbine, and a good curved sabre, old dragoon pattern, with strong leather scabbard, from Messrs. Swinburn and Co., Birmingham. Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers carry one good double-barrelled pistol. Ammunition is supplied by government.

Cost of Equipment, how defrayed.

To meet the cost of the above articles, a certain sum is deducted monthly from each man's pay until the whole are paid for. If a man, after a term of service, took his discharge with the consent of the commandant, his arms, accoutrements, &c. for which he had by that time paid, were returned into the regimental stores, he receiving value for them according to the condition they were in; this being decided by a committee of native officers appointed for the purpose. In case of the death of a soldier the same course is pursued, the value being paid to the estate.

If a man is discharged in disgrace, his arms, accoutrements, &c. are taken from him, and his forfeited stoppages are paid into the regimental fund.

Repair of Arms, &c.

To keep the arms, &c., in thorough repair, a regimental workshop is kept up, and moves with the regiment wherever it goes; the expense is partly paid by government and partly by regimental contribution. Every evening on the roll-call parade the troop officers carefully inspect the arms and accoutrements of their men: any requiring repair are brought next day before the commandant at orderly room and sent to the workshop. Spare articles are kept in store to meet these cases, so that no one should for any time be unprovided with arms, &c.

Inspection and Use of Arms.

Once a week—every Saturday—troop officers inspect *every* article belonging to the men of their troops, and report on their state personally to the commandant on the following Monday. To accustom the men as much as possible to their arms, a troop turns out every evening all the year round for ball practice on foot. The men are also encouraged to use them for private practice at a mark, or in pursuit of game.

Means of keeping up the condition of the Horses.

Each owner is made individually responsible for the good and serviceable condition of his horse. Should it from want of proper care become unserviceable the horse is cast by the commandant, and the owner has to replace it without assistance from the fund. It is his interest, therefore, to keep the animal in the most efficient state.

Nature of Instruction.

The regiments parade once a week all the year round for exercise—more if necessary; but this is generally found quite sufficient to keep them up to their work. The men are thus not fagged and disgusted by perpetual drilling; they take an interest in their work, and all strive to do well. The awkward and careless on parade are sent to the drill which is carried on daily under the adjutant, and they remain there until reported qualified by the adjutant.

Communication between Officers and Men.

There is daily orderly room at 10 A.M., at which all the European officers attend, and any native officers who may have business. Any man can come and communicate with the commanding officer accompanied by his troop officer;—justice is openly done to all, the orders for the day are issued in the presence of all who like to attend, and matters affecting the welfare of the regiment are generally discussed and disposed of.

Every evening there is roll-call parade, excepting on Sundays; troop officers inspect their troops, orders are read out, and one troop has ball-practice.

Powers of Commandant.

The commandant has the power of enlisting and discharging, promoting and reducing. He selects from the non-commissioned ranks, and recommends to the Commander-in-chief those he considers best fitted for commissions. These recommendations have always been attended to.

Promotion.

The system of promotion is this:—Every soldier must first pass an examination before the adjutant, showing he is qualified to perform the duties of naik (corporal) and to command a guard. A general roll is kept, showing the character of every man in the regiment. A certain number of the best characters among the passed are picked out, and the one who on examination proves the best of these is promoted. And so on throughout, only that the standard of efficiency is of course raised as you go up the list.

Other Rewards.

The commandant has, besides promotion, another means of rewarding, viz., by the presentation of "assamees" (right of property—holding a horse in the regiment) forfeited from misconduct or from other reason. These are in his gift, and can be bestowed on the deserving. This belongs, however, solely to the Sillidar horse system.

Punishments and Trials.

In such a system as that in vogue in the Sind horse, punishment is comparatively rare: for minor offences, punishment drill, or confinement to the quarter guard for a few days, being found amply sufficient. More serious offences are tried by regimental punchayet, a court consisting of five native commissioned officers, who thoroughly investigate the case, record evidence, and lay their finding before the court, with a recommendation as to the nature of punishment to be awarded. This, in case of unsoldierlike crimes, is almost invariably dismissal from the service. This is approved or not by the commandant, as the case may seem to demand.

The commandant of the Sind horse is also a magistrate, and his officers deputy magistrates, so that where further punishment is necessary after dismissal, the offender can be tried and punished by the civil power for the crime of which he has been guilty.

The proceedings of a punchayet are regularly recorded in the vernacular, and when completed are read out publicly before the commandant at orderly room, and his decision is then pronounced.

Articles of War.

The Sind horse are at present under the articles of war for native troops, but it is to be hoped that these articles will now be done away. They are totally inapplicable to such a state of affairs as exists in the Sind horse.

Conclusion.

The effect of such a system as prevails in the Sind horse is to produce the best and most satisfactory state of discipline. It excites perfect trust, confidence, and mutual respect on all sides. It teaches the soldier to look up to his own officers as those in whose hands his well-being, comfort, and honour are placed. It makes him feel that he is not merely a machine but a reasoning being, whose labours are of use, and whose efforts are appreciated by those with whom he works. He feels proud of being a soldier, and whatever powers he has he willingly devotes to sustain the credit of that regiment to which he feels it an honour to belong.

W. L. MEREWETHER, Major,
Commandant 1st Sind Horse,
and Assistant Political Superintendent,
Frontier of Upper Sind.

August 25, 1858.

NOTES.

1. A most valuable addition to the establishment of a regiment of Sind horse would be that of a Russuldar Major (the same as Subadar Major in the line) and of a Kote Duffadar Major (corresponding with the Serjeant-Major of the line).

General Jacob repeatedly applied for these, pointing out the advisability of the former and the indispensability of the latter, but the request was always refused, because such ranks did not exist in similar regiments in Bengal.

2. The Silladar system might be made applicable to the infantry as well as to cavalry, indeed is being so now by General Jacob, who is raising two rifle regiments on that plan for service on the frontier of Upper Sind. Its great advantages are, that by making soldiers provide everything for themselves, carriage included, it increases their intelligence and activity, saves them from helplessness, and teaches them how to maintain themselves wherever they may go.

W. L. M.

* The Native saddle is used.

APPENDIX No. 7.

NOTES on certain PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS in the NATIVE ARMY of INDIA.—By Colonel HOLLAND.

1. Almost all officers of Indian experience concur in the opinion that the regular native army is not in the same

satisfactory state of discipline it once was; that there is not the same zeal and esprit de corps among the officers, nor the same ready, unhesitating, and cheerful obedience among the men; that all classes feel duty irksome, and look forward with hope to the time when they may retire on their pensions. Many causes have, doubtless, combined to produce this state of things. The thoughts and wishes of the European officers have, during the last thirty years, more and more tended to home, with the rapidly increasing means of communication. Every year sees an increase in the proportion of married officers; the improved habits of life, by decreasing mortality, and the additions that have from time to time been made in the number of subordinate officers, have rendered promotion to the higher grades slower and slower. As regards the men, the bonds of discipline have been much loosened by the injudicious abolition of corporal punishment in the native ranks, while retaining it in the European; by the constantly increasing tendency to withdraw power from the hands of commanding officers (the necessary consequence of permitting, as is too often the case, unfit men to occupy that position); by the introduction of the technicalities of British law in military criminal procedure, and by injudicious tampering with, and alteration of, the rates of pay, batta, and pension. While those whose advice has been mainly followed as to the best mode of remedying defects are usually officers of high rank in the royal army, often able and distinguished men, but unqualified by their antecedents to form sound opinions on such subjects, and the remedies have been such as officers conversant with English troops only would naturally suggest; viz., more officers, more drill, more entire assimilation with the English system; and the result has been an increase of the outward seeming of discipline, in Bombay at least, with a gradually increasing feeling of discontent, and a vast increase to the cost; while in the Bengal army, even the form and appearance of discipline seem to have vanished.

2. The remedies which I would venture to suggest for this state of things consist in retracing our steps to some extent, while adopting all improvements found in practice to work well; in recognizing and acting on the fact, that rules which may be admirable for English soldiers may not be adapted to Asiatics, and in placing before all ranks and classes the stimuli of hope and fear suitable to their condition.

3. I consider the native army, although overworked, very much larger than is necessary. It performs at present most of the police duties of the country, by no means so well as could be done by local police raised and trained for the work, and at very much greater cost. I would, therefore, increase and improve the police, and considerably reduce the numerical amount of the native army; the individuals composing the force so retained could then be selected with more attention to thews and sinews, want of height being disregarded, and the Bombay practice of mixing and enlisting all castes and classes in the same regiment retained and improved on.

4. The force so reduced, and no longer required to be broken up into detachments for the security of gaols and civil stations, should be cantoned in large masses at a few well-selected stations, with a view to training and facility of movement by land or water, in various directions, rifle practice and the constant use of the spade and pickaxe taking the place of many of the useless and wearisome pedantries of drill. No man should be enlisted who is not ready to go anywhere, and to do anything he is ordered; and all hesitation, murmuring, or doubtful obedience, to be punished promptly and severely, not by the tedious and uncertain process of court-martial, but by the will and order of the commander.

5. The dress should be modified, by substituting a turban for the uncomfortable schako, and an "angurka" (which is simply a loose tunic without collar) for the tight-fitting European coat; the belt should be of uncoloured well tanned leather, without breastplate, for the white is troublesome to clean, and forms an admirable mark for an enemy's marksman, while the black composition stains the cloth and rots the leather. In regimental organization a company should be selected of the crack shots, in lieu of forming rifle *regiments*; for the qualities which make a man a first-rate marksman, though they may be greatly improved by training, must be innate, and cannot be created. We may as well expect that teaching will make a first-rate painter, musician, or poet, as a marksman. At present we enlist 1,000 bumpkins indiscriminately, clothe them in green (not the best colour, it may be remarked, for riflemen), put an expensive rifle in their hands, and, by dint of great pains, make really good shots of about one-tenth of the number, and indifferent shots of the remainder. In the cavalry we can hardly improve on the dress and equipments of the best of the irregular horse, and their example should be followed. An English light dragoon rides on an average more than 18 stone; an Indian regular light cavalry soldier about the same, and an irregular horseman about 14 stone.

6. The real discipline of the best of our irregular corps is at least equal to that of the regular army; officers and men in the former, as a general rule, are more contented and zealous, and in action they have proved themselves second to none in gallantry. These results are generally attributed to the fact that the European officers, though few, are selected men, with handsome pay, and that to the system which drains the best men from regular regiments for detached duties may be attributed alike the excellence of the irregular, and the deteriorated state of the regular army; that, in fact, the latter is sacrificed to supply officers for detached employ.

7. There is some truth in this view, but it is not the whole truth, and the remedy often proposed, of creating staff corps, so as to leave every regiment with its full complement of officers, with no duties of interest or importance to occupy their minds and thoughts, with far less prospect than at present of detached employ, would be far worse than the disease; it would create, at a vast addition of cost, one dead level of hopelessness among regimental officers. The example of irregular corps proves not only that it is not *more* officers that are wanted, but that regiments could well spare many they have, provided the means were found of making the few left take an interest and a pride in their duty. The desire to rise above regimental employ may, undoubtedly, under the existing system occasionally spoil a regimental officer, but it has produced many eminent men, and we should be very careful how we deal with a system which has wrought such effects.

8. Further, in irregular regiments the native officers have duties of importance to perform, and are more suitably paid than in the regular service; they are, therefore, more respected by the men, and have more self respect, and mix more on a footing of equality with their European comrades; they are in all corps (in Bombay) selected for fitness alone, a practice of incalculable value.

9. Prior to 1824 the native infantry possessed a regimental organization of which the most was certainly not made, but which had advantages and capabilities we should do well to avail ourselves of. Each regiment consisted of two battalions, the European officers of which rose in one general line of promotion, and could be drafted from one battalion to another, as occasion required. In order to give some temporary impetus to promotion, this system was altered, each battalion was converted into a distinct regiment, with its own colonel; and for this trifling object, which could have been gained equally well by a mere change of name, an immensely increased amount of supercession, with its attendant heart-burnings and disgusts, was created.

10. I propose to revert to and extend the battalion system. Each regiment should consist of three battalions of about 800 men; officers and men to be interchangeable as required. When any battalion is engaged on distant service, one of those left in quarters should serve as a reserve or depôt; should keep it complete by drafts of trained men; should receive from the service battalion all partially worn-out men, such as are now (in Bombay) sent to the veteran battalions, fit for easy garrison duty, but unfit for active service, men sent for recovery from the seat of war; and all families unable or unwilling to return to their homes should be taken charge of by it.

11. The establishment of European officers of a native infantry regiment is 26 of all ranks; this number multiplied by three, for a regiment of three battalions, gives a total of 78; or, omitting the colonels of battalions as not on the working strength, of 75 officers. The establishment I propose admits of a reduction of fully 18 officers in a regiment, leaving 57 to be disposed of as follows:—

For the staff of three battalions*	-	15 officers.
„ detached (staff and other duties)	-	21 „
„ absent on furlough and sick	-	12 „
		48
Unemployed	-	9 „
Total	-	57 „

12. The officers left by the proposed arrangement "unemployed" would consist partly of young officers learning their regimental duties, and of others returned from fur-

* The establishment for each battalion should be the same as it was prior to 1839; viz.,—

9	field officers.
5	captains.
8	lieutenants.
4	ensigns.
Total - 19	

lough, &c.; they should not, however, be allowed to interfere with the command of companies. Arrangements should be made and facilities afforded for such unemployed officers as desired it, to be temporarily attached to the cavalry, artillery, and sappers, to the commissariat and other departments, in order to qualify for employment on the staff.

13. The commandants of battalions to be selected without reference to seniority from among the most active and best qualified field officers, who should be all on the same footing that lieutenant-colonels now are in the Indian army; viz., available for duty with *any* regiment. The pay of those officers to be increased, and with their pay their powers of reward and punishment; the great majority of offences now tried by court-martial to be adjudged by the commandants, and, as regards the remainder, a much more simple code and form of procedure to be adopted. The commandants should have the selection, subject to the approval of the commander-in-chief, of their own staff, including two captains, an adjutant and a quartermaster and paymaster. Interpreters, under a better system, should be dispensed with, for no officer should be considered qualified to undertake any duty in a native battalion who is not able to converse with reasonable ease and fluency with his men. The whole of the staff of battalions should be paid on the same average scale as general staff officers of corresponding grades, both to attach them to their duty, and to render removal a thing to be avoided.

14. The selection of officers for general staff and detached duties should be made subject to the usual restrictions as to a certain amount of regimental duty, but the test of fitness should embrace more than a knowledge, often very superficial, of one or more native languages. A candidate for the general staff should be required to go through an examination as to a competent practical knowledge of cavalry, artillery, field engineering, and infantry duties, (with which view, officers desirous of qualifying should be permitted to serve for a limited term with various corps,) and a colloquial and idiomatic knowledge of Hindostanee. The qualifications of candidates for the civil staff and miscellaneous employments should be adapted to the special requirements, so that every man possessed of a fair share of industry, ability, or useful knowledge of any kind might find an opening for its development, and benefit the state and himself by its exercise.

15. Cadets should, on arrival in India, be sent immediately to a battalion to do duty, and complete their military education. The suggestion to train young officers for a year or two with a European regiment before commencing their career in the native army, I consider most injudicious, as the probable result would be a distaste and contempt for the troops among whom they would have to pass their lives. Should any young officer, after a year passed with his battalion, be reported on so unfavourably as to render his continuance in the service clearly inexpedient, he should be furnished with a free passage to England, and be struck off the strength of the army. Promotion from the grade of lieutenant to captain should, as a rule, proceed by seniority, subject, however, to the passing over of a senior officer unfavourably reported on, and to the occasional promotion out of his turn of a junior who may be specially noticed for any distinguished course of conduct. Promotion to the grade of field officer, however, should in all cases be by selection, and no length of service or respectability of character should authorize the advance to this important grade of any captain who may not be considered fully qualified to perform its duties.

16. An invalid list, much on the present footing, should be retained, and all officers of good character unfitted for the duties of their profession by wounds, sickness, or other infirmity, should be transferred to it. The fact of having been absent from duty, on account of ill health, for more than a certain number of months within any given number of years, should render invaliding compulsory. Officers on the civil staff who might be reported on as fit for and useful in their present duties, although not fit for active service, should also be transferred to the invalid corps, and still be capable of retaining their appointments, should the Government desire to make use of their services.

17. The rules, according to which pensions are now given according to rank, or to service irrespective of rank, should still remain in force; but it should be in the power of the Government, and the power not unfrequently made use of, to require any officer to take his pension whenever, from whatever cause, it may be considered no longer desirable to retain him on the strength of the army.

18. With such rules, strictly carried out, the promotion of qualified officers for the higher grades would be sufficiently rapid, and the stimulus of hope on the one hand, and fear of removal to the pension list or of supercession on the other, would draw forth the best energies of all; activity and zeal would take the place of the indifference, weariness, and distaste now unhappily too prevalent—and not without cause,—among regimental officers; a distaste which no assertion in general orders, that an officer's most honourable position is with his regiment, and that it is unsoldierlike to desire a transfer from it, will ever effect.

19. Believing the best of the irregular cavalry to be equal to the best of the regular, and on the average better fitted for the required duties, and at a cost per man of little more than half, I would place the whole of the native cavalry on the footing of the best of the irregular or Sillidar horse, with somewhat larger pay, so as to ensure a better class of horses; their European officers to be drawn, as at present, from all the services, commandants being allowed to select their own staff.

20. One general evil which all the armies of India have suffered from has arisen from the fact of the Governor-General and Commander-in-chief of all India having been governor and commander of the Bengal presidency and army. This evil, so far as regards the Governor-General, has been modified by the creation of a separate government for Bengal; but the supreme controlling power of the Commander-in-chief in India has been constantly extended, while he is still commander of the separate army of Bengal, which has been taken as a model on which to mould the others, much to the detriment of all; while jealousy has been justly felt at the higher scale of allowances granted to almost all grades of officers of the favoured army. This should be remedied by making the commander of each army quite independent of the others.

21. The plans above suggested involve much larger powers and a much greater degree of confidence than is at present reposed in commanders-in-chief, and, through them, in officers commanding divisions, brigades, and regiments, and a much more summary removal of any of those functionaries for inefficiency or abuse of trust. Hitherto the practice has been frequently to nominate unfit men, and then to multiply checks on a probable abuse of power, ineffective as regards those they are intended to restrain, but destructive of the usefulness of energetic and honest commanders, anxious and able, if only unfettered, to do their duty by the service they may be said to reign over, but not to govern. There is no want of qualified men, if inquiry be made for them, and no object be regarded but the good of the service.

Doubtless no system that man can devise can be free from error, and in spite of all endeavours, private influence, prejudice, or indolence will sometimes override the claims of the public for the services of the fittest man. But so much seems clear, that if we establish a system, in itself vicious, however much we may try to counterbalance its effects in the practical working, the result must be unsatisfactory.

J. HOLLAND.

Bombay, February 1849.

NOTE.

The foregoing memorandum (with some subsequent modification) was written some years since. I see little in it to alter in remodelling the native army, but the considerable increase to the local European force now called for, by giving more regiments from which to select officers for detached employ, and thereby reducing the number required to be taken from any one, renders it possible still further to diminish the establishment of officers of native regiments. A still further reduction can be made in the absentees on furlough, as stated below, and thus a very important saving effected, while providing for the officers of a much more powerful and efficient army. According to my judgment, the large number of officers now attached to native regiments is an unmixed evil; not only do they do no good, but from want of interest and occupation they individually deteriorate; and in place of teaching the native soldiers to look up to and respect the European character, they, in too many cases, present the humiliating spectacle of idle, discontented, or dissipated officers, most of whom, under a better system, would have exhibited the fine qualities which a fair field of action rarely fails to develop in the English gentleman.

The subjoined tables give the strength, composition, and establishment of the Indian army, such as, combined with a general disarmament of the population, and an extensive addition to the police force, would suffice, in my opinion, for the future wants of India.

STATEMENT of the Strength, in Non-commissioned and Rank and File, of the Indian Army, as the same stood before the Mutiny, and as proposed to stand when the Country is settled; including Troops of the Line and Local Corps, but exclusive of Sappers and Miners.

ARM.	Strength before the Mutiny.				Proposed Strength.				REMARKS.
	Line.	Local Troops.		Total European and Native.	Line.	Local Troops.		Total European and Native.	
	European.	European.	Native.		European.	European.	Native.		
Artillery - -	—	6,500	9,000	15,500	—	12,000	6,000	18,000	
Cavalry - - -	2,500	—	30,500	33,000	2,500	5,000	20,000	27,500	
Infantry - - -	21,000	8,000	190,000	219,000	20,000	20,000	124,800	164,800	
Total - -	23,500	14,500	229,500	267,500	22,500	37,000	150,800	209,300	

STRENGTH of the Indian Local Army, in Regiments, Battalions, and Officers, before the Mutiny, and as now proposed. The Engineer Corps and Colonels of Regiments not included.

ARM.	Before the Mutiny.			Proposed Establishment.			Increase.			Decrease.			Maximum Number of Officers for detached Duty.		REMARKS.
	Regiment or Battalion.	Officers.		Regiment or Battalion.	Officers.		Regiment or Battalion.	Officers.		Regiment or Battalion.	Officers.		Per Regiment, &c.	Total.	
		Field.	Captains and Subalterns.		Field.	Captains and Subalterns.		Field.	Captains and Subalterns.		Field.	Captains and Subalterns.			
Artillery Battalion or Brigade -	24	2	22	30	3	24	6	42	192	—	—	—	7	210	The number of Staff given for the Artillery includes their own peculiar Ordnance appointments.
European Cavalry Regiment -	—	—	—	10	4	32	10	40	320	—	—	—	9	90	
Native Cavalry Regiment -	21	2	20	—	—	—	—	—	—	21	42	420	—	—	
European Infantry Regiment -	9	4	46	25	6	44	16	114	686	—	—	—	12	300	The total number of officers reduced amounts to 2,153, less 1,394; or 759.
Native Infantry Regiment -	155	2	23	52	5	37	1	—	—	—	50	1,641	12	624	
Total - -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	196	1,198	—	92	2,061	—	1,224	

The proportion of field officers to those of the lower grades is here increased from 1 to 10, as it stood in 1857, to about 1 to 8, as it stood prior to 1839, since which time successive augmentations have injuriously increased the disproportion.

The allotment of officers to the different regiments I propose as follows, strongly advocating the abolition of the regimental grades of major and ensign as superfluous, and as an injurious distinction between the ordnance and the other corps.

Artillery Battalion, 6 Companies.	European Cavalry Regiment, 8 Troops.	European Infantry Regiment, 10 Companies.	Native Infantry Regiments, 3 Battalions, 10 Companies.
3 Field Officers	4 Field Officers	6 Field Officers	5 Field Officers
6 Captains	10 Captains	14 Captains	12 Captains
6 2nd Captains	22 Lieutenants	30 Lieutenants	25 Lieutenants
12 Lieutenants			

The native cavalry being entirely on the irregular system, the officers will be supplied, as at present, by selections from other corps.

The number of officers employed on staff and other detached duties throughout India, previous to the mutiny, was 1,237; but as the proposed system will reduce a portion of the irregular cavalry and nearly all the local infantry, and as it will doubtless be advisable to throw open more appointments to qualified officers of the line than have hitherto been allotted to them, the number above shown, 1,224, is more than is likely to be required. Should they be so, there is an ample reserve at all times in the native infantry, the officers of which will stand as follows:—

For regimental duty - - - - -	15
For detached employ - - - - -	12
Absent on furlough - - - - -	5
Available - - - - - - -	10
Total establishment of regiment -	42

In the original memorandum to which this is appended I allowed twelve absentees, on account of furlough, to a regiment; I have now ascertained that in 1851, the latest account I can procure previous to the mutiny, the total number of absentees on this account, including the engineers, but exclusive of colonels of regiments, was 688, or 12·2 per cent. on the total establishment of 5,638 officers. Applying this per-centage to an establishment reduced by 759 officers, as above proposed, the total number of absentees on furlough may hereafter be reckoned at 595; or from the native infantry establishment of 2,184 officers, 266 officers, or 5 per regiment.

Before detailing the mode in which it is proposed to pay the officers doing duty with native regiments on about the same scale as officers on the general staff, I think it necessary to explain the plan on which I would recommend the staff to be organized.

It seems to have been a part of the policy of Government hitherto to place the civil department of the Indian army on a higher footing in respect of allowances than the military staff,—a policy very mistaken, in my opinion, as regards Indian service,—by which the fighting portion of the army has been habitually unduly depressed. It is sometimes argued that civil staff, having the disbursement of public monies should receive compensation for the risk of loss owing to imperfect accounts; but even supposing this argument sound, it would only apply to a portion of the number; and it is, perhaps, not sufficiently considered that this risk is reduced to a minimum where the civil staff officer is fully competent for the performance of the duties for which he receives pay, and that as a rule none but the ignorant or careless suffer, so that additional pay is, in fact, a compensation to incompetent men for the effect of their own incompetency. It can never be meant that the office of paymaster or auditor, whose qualifications are those of a clerk and accountant, is of more importance than that of the staff officer of a division, on whose sagacity, watchfulness, and active energy the well-being, and often the safety, of a force depends; and that the one should, as he does at present, enjoy much higher pay than the other, is a matter which I conceive ought to be amended.

There is also a very considerable and very unnecessary complication of accounts, owing to the different scales of staff pay to different departments, and also of the items composing staff and regimental pay, under the heads of horse allowance, half and extra batta, presidency and ordinary house rent, net pay, tent allowances, and gratuities, &c., while staff allowances are in some cases given in addition to, and sometimes in substitution of, part or a whole of the regimental allowances; so that a glance at the pay table conveys no information as to the actual amount enjoyed by any individual, and the unnecessary consumption of time and foolscap paper, and of clerk's labour in preparing and examining pay abstracts, is excessive.

I conceive that the whole subject may be very beneficially simplified, by classifying staff-officers of whatever departments into a few well-defined divisions, with but one scale of pay to each class, admitting but two heads for all pay, staff or regimental, viz., garrison and field, the latter to be given only when in the field or marching, or when required

to be in readiness to march, and to be of sufficient amount to cover the reasonable expenses of movement, which a subaltern's or captain's batta certainly is not.

Under these views, I should recommend the arrangement of the staff of an Indian army, and the allowances to officers serving with native cavalry and infantry regiments, to be somewhat on the following scale:—

CLASSIFICATION of STAFF OFFICERS and SCALE of MONTHLY PAY, as also of Officers serving with Native Regiments.

Class.	Designation.	Pay.	Batta.	Remarks.
		R.	R.	
1	Brigadier Military Secretary to Government. Adjutant-General Quartermaster-General Chief Engineer Commandant of Artillery Commissary-General Auditor-General	2,500	300	All appointments not enumerated herein to be placed in one of these four classes.
2	Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding Regiment. Deputy Military Secretary to Government. Deputy Adjutant-General Deputy Quartermaster-General. Judge Advocate-General Dep. Commissary-General Deputy Auditor-General Paymaster-General	1,400	200	
3	Captain with Native Regiment. Assist. Adjutant, Quartermaster, Commissary, and Auditor-General. Deputy Judge Advocate-General. Paymaster	700	100	
4	Regimental Staff Deputy Assistants Aides-de-camp	450	75	

Under the proposed plan of massing the troops at a small number of stations, many brigade commands would be reduced, the remainder might be all of one class, and paid on one scale.

The officers of the adjutant and quartermaster-general's departments, if not possessed of sufficient army rank, should have it conferred upon them with their appointments, to be withdrawn or confirmed on their vacating them after a certain term of years, if specially recommended. I consider *bonâ fide* military rank to be highly desirable in such appointments for the more effectual performance of duty, and have known many cases in my experience where the want of it has been a serious impediment.

Adjutant and quartermaster-general and brigadier to be brigadier-general.

Deputy adjutant and quartermaster-general to be lieutenant-colonel.

Assistant adjutant and quartermaster-general to be major.

Deputy-assistant adjutant and quartermaster-general to be captain.

London, October 1858.

J. HOLLAND,
Colonel.

APPENDIX No. 8.

An ESTIMATE of the COST of converting a SAILING 80-GUN SHIP into a SCREW SHIP, with Engines of 400 horse-power, for the CONVEYANCE of TROOPS, and also of the ANNUAL CHARGE for WEAR, TEAR, &c. (Referred to in Col. Tulloch's Memorandum, Evidence, Question, 4529.)

Adaptation and Outfit of Ship.

	£	
Hull	16,000	This estimate is based on the assumption that the work is done in a dockyard; but if done by contract, from 12 to 15 per cent. should be added to the amount for fitting the ship.
Masts and yards	1,000	
Rigging and stores	10,000	
Machinery, 400 horse-power	24,000	
Armament, twenty 32-pounders for the upper deck, about	2,000	
	£53,000	

Annual Charge for Wear, Tear, &c.

	£
Wages and provisions for crew, about 150 men	9,351
Wear and tear—Hull	2,500
„ Masts, yards, rigging, and stores	2,000
„ Machinery, 400 horse-power	2,400
„ Armament	80
	£16,331

The charge for coals should be estimated for the number of days under full steam-power at the rate of about 40 tons a day.

It should be observed that although line-of-battle ships could be converted into screw troop-ships at a comparatively small expense, they would not be so efficient or suitable as iron ships built especially for the purpose, with lofty decks capable of receiving horses; neither would they be suited as regards speed for the carrying of mails.

October 23, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 9.

MEMORANDUM for Sir A. TULLOCH, K.C.B.

1. Is it likely that the railway will be completed by April next?

The railway is completed from Alexandria to Suez, with the exception of a break at the Nile, where the troops cross by a steam ferry. A bridge is being built, which will be finished by June 1859.

2. What reduction in the expense of transit from Alexandria to Suez is likely to be effected in consequence. May it be assumed that the fare will not exceed 1*d.* a mile for soldiers and third-class passengers, that being the usual rate of conveyance by rail in other countries?

The Government of Egypt is most anxious to facilitate the passage of troops through the country, but it is not to be expected that they can be carried at the same rate as in England, as the expenses of the line are very heavy, all carriages, engines, rails, &c. coming from England. Platelayers and artizans are Europeans as well as the drivers; they all receive very high wages, and it is necessary for the safety of the troops that these situations should not be filled by Arabs, at least for the present.

I do not know what work is done for the 1*d.* a mile mentioned in the query, but in this country the whole of the embarkation and disembarkation of the troops, as well as their conveyance by rail, has to be done by the transit administration; and as the ships at Suez are four miles from the shore, it is necessary to employ a steamer to convey the soldiers on board.

The present allowance of baggage is 2 cwt. for each officer, and 1 cwt. for each man; this includes his arms, which are packed in cases, and his knapsack which is in a sack.

In any future arrangement I have no doubt that the arms and knapsacks would not be weighed, so that the whole of the allowance would go towards carrying the heavy baggage of the regiment, as well as any extra ammunition or arms that it might be thought necessary to send. Suppose a regiment to be 800 strong, with complement of officers, say 32; their allowance would be 44 tons 4 cwt., which is nearly 20 tons more than is allowed to a regiment by the Queen's regulations.

I think the Government might be induced to lower their terms to 4*l.* for an officer and 2*l.* for a man, including everything except food, so that the English Government would be at no further expense for the men during the transit.

With respect to the food, a great saving can be made, as at present there is a heavy additional charge of between 14*s.* and 15*s.* a man that may be entirely done away with, and the men might carry their own rations; I should, however, suggest that one meal or some refreshment should be given them on their transit, as in case of accidents on the desert, the provisions they carried with them would then be available.

3. Could the distance be got over in ten hours, so as to admit of the soldiers being conveyed at night during the hot season, or what is likely to be the shortest period of transit?

The distance between Alexandria and Suez is about 226 miles, and including a delay of half an hour crossing the Nile, it can be accomplished easily by a special train in from ten to twelve hours.

4. As the expense of coals adds greatly to the cost of steam conveyance after leaving Suez, are any arrangements in contemplation when the railway is completed for coals being conveyed by it across the isthmus, so as to supply all the stations on the eastern route from Alexandria?

With regard to the conveyance of coal, the transit administration is making every effort to have it as efficient as possible; but owing to the great expense of conveying water for the use of the engines from Cairo to Suez, a distance of 96 miles, the Suez water being too brackish to be used by the locomotives, it will be unable to carry coal at a cheap rate; I should think at not less than from 26*s.* to 28*s.* a ton; even at this rate in time of war, or any sudden emergency, a great saving might be made.

G. D. MALCOLM.

APPENDIX No. 10.

(6.)

RETURN showing the STRENGTH, NUMBER, and GENERAL COMPOSITION of all CIVIL, LOCAL, and POLICE CORPS of the Three Presidencies.

NOTE.—The documents annexed have been furnished from the Judicial department of the East India House, in answer to this requisition.

MEMORANDUM.

There is but one police battalion in Bengal of which there is a return. The return is here annexed, together with the only statement that has been received of the police in the North-west provinces with anything of a military organization. The president in council, however, writes in a minute, dated 13th May 1858, "The pressure of circumstances has forced the Government suddenly and very largely to have recourse to a measure long in contemplation, namely, the levy of a police corps having a military organization more or less similar to that of the Punjab police corps for service in the North-west provinces and Bengal. An application for a levy of ten thousand men for this purpose, for service in the lower provinces, is now before the Government of India from the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. There is already one admirable police battalion in Bengal; and more levies have been for some months in progress in several districts of the lower provinces. In the North-west provinces we know that large levies in the form of police corps are on foot, and in actual service. In the central provinces alone, four police corps of foot and one of cavalry were formed or forming before I left them." He further states, in a minute of the 21st of the same month, that twenty or thirty thousand soldiers will soon be on foot in Bengal and Hindostan in the numerous military police regiments now raised and raising.

In the presidency of Madras there is no police having anything of a military organization, except the Sebundee corps and irregular horse included in the annexed return. Orders were, however, sent to Madras in a despatch, dated 30th September 1857, entirely to re-organize the police in the presidency. No report has yet been received of the measures taken or the progress made, in pursuance of those orders.

The police of Bombay underwent a complete re-organization five years ago. It is under the charge of district superintendents of police, who are all military men; and as the whole of the police, with the exception of that for the presidency town, has something of a military character, it has been included in the annexed returns. The statement for the Punjab and Scinde contain such information as the records of the India House afford in regard to the military police of those places.

The statement for Scinde has the peculiarity of including what is there called the "rural police," which is believed to be under military discipline, and is in fact a quasi-military force.

ABSTRACT of MILITARY POLICE.—MADRAS.

For 1855-56.		
—	European and Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers.	Men.
Vizagapatam, Golcondah Sibbendy	26	127
Kurnool, Irregular Horse	53	294
Ganjam, Sibbendy	36	249
Malabar, Local Corps	31	159
	146	829

BOMBAY POLICE as per Return dated 1st May 1855.

District.	Number of Officers: European.	Number of Officers: Native.	No. of Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.
Tannah	2	14	1,220
Rutnagherry	1	7	519
Surat	1	9	857
Broach	1	7	485
Ahmedabad	1	17	1,127
Kaira	1	9	843
Belgaum	1	—	186
Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse	4	24	753
Dharwar	1	—	386
Poona	7	8	1,133
Sholapore	1	3	488
Ahmednuggur	1	14	1,213
Kandeish	1	25	1,826
Sattara Regiment of Native Infantry	1	14	649
Total	24	151	11,685

ABSTRACT STATEMENT of the PUNJAUB POLICE, HORSE and FOOT, showing the Number of Men employed and the total Expense.

—	Police Battalions. Native Commanders.	Adjutants.	Soobadars.	Jemadars.	Havildars.	Naicks.	Bugles.	Sepoys.	Mounted Police. Ressaldars.	Jemadars.	Duffadars.	Naib Do.	Sowars.	Grand Total.
Total	7	7	70	70	350	350	70	5,600	27	54	108	108	2,700	9,521

NOTE.—The above is taken from a return dated 5th August 1854, the last which has been received. Since that time, however, there has been a considerable increase in the police force of the Punjaub. The report of 1855—56 states generally that "the organized police, with a military system and discipline, and performing duties partly civil and partly military, consists of two corps of irregular infantry, seven battalions of foot, one regiment Punjaub cavalry, and twenty-seven troops of horse. Their aggregate strength stands at 12,853 men, and their annual cost amounts to rs. 18,61,572 or 186,157*l.* on a population of twelve and three-quarter millions." The number of foot and horse are not given separately, but their relative proportions probably approximate to those of the above figured statement.

APPENDIX No. 11.

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION of a POLICE for the MADRAS PRESIDENCY.—By Mr. ELLIOT.

The Madras presidency occupies a great portion of the peninsula of India from Cape Cormorin up to 20° of N. lat., formed by the annexed 20 districts, containing about 140,000 square miles, and a population of about 22,000,000. This vast territory, upwards of 1,200 miles in length, is inhabited by various nations or tribes, with distinct languages, habits, and customs.

It is proposed to raise and organize a police or constabulary, for duty in these districts, on one uniform system of discipline, under an officer styled

The Chief Commissioner of Police,

vested, in direct communication with Government, with the direction, discipline, and internal economy of the force, with an office establishment at the seat of Government for the efficient control of the department.

Superintendent of Police.

Each district to be under a military officer of experience, styled superintendent of police, who should be master of the language of the district.

Deputy Superintendent of Police.

Two or more deputy superintendents of police in each district, according to its size and population. These officers to be selected from the military service or elsewhere by the Governor in Council.

The chief commissioner, superintendent, and deputies to be invested with the power of a justice of the peace.

Native Officers.

The native officers to be classed as jemadar majors, jemadars, duffadar-majors, duffadars, and naics; in the proportion of 1 jemadar major, 4 jemadars, 10 duffadar-majors, 50 duffadars, and 50 naics for every 1,000 men.

Peons.

Able-bodied men between 20 and 30 years of age, to be entertained without respect to class or castes, preference to be given to men who can read and write, to be styled peons.

Pay.

The jemadar-major - -	35	rupees per mensem.
The jemadars - - -	30	„
The duffadar-majors -	20	„
The duffadars - -	15	„
The naics - - -	12	„

The peons to be in three classes:—

1st class or ¼ of the force	6	rupees per mensem.
2nd class or ½ of the force	7	„
3rd class or ¼ of the force	8	„

Men for the superior class to be selected for intelligence and good conduct, and liable to be put back for misbehaviour. The superintendents to recommend men for promotion to the rank of officers, which is not to be restricted to the district.

Dress.

The dress to be strictly native in every respect, and uniform throughout the force, only the quality or material worn to be adapted to the climate of the district. The men to be clothed by Government, under regulations for that purpose.

Arms and Accoutrements.

The peons to carry a short light carbine, slung over the back or shoulder; a strong, handy, serviceable weapon, not liable to get out of order, long range not required. A short sword, something like a ship's cutlass, but not quite so heavy and unconfined in the handle.

A single waist-belt for both sword and pouch, the plate to bear the name of district and number of the wearer.

The duffadars and naics to carry a double-barrelled carbine.

Register.

On being entertained each man will take the usual oath of a police officer, and when registered the code of regulations for the management of the force will be read to him, and he will be made fully acquainted with the terms of the engagement, and with the penalties to which he will be liable for misconduct. The code to be published by Government and distributed to the force for information and guidance.

Discipline and Drill.

Previous to the men being drafted for duty in the tannahs, detachments varying from 200 to 300 men to be assembled at the principal towns in the district for the purpose of being instructed in their powers and duties as policemen, to learn the use of their weapons, and to undergo a certain amount of drill, to form line, to move in a compact body, to extend into skirmishing order, to take advantage of ground or cover, to defend buildings, to act in streets, and particularly every information for vigilant patrolling.

Distribution.

Much will depend on the efficient distribution of the force; by reference to the size and population of the districts, it is evident that to follow strictly the usual proportion of 1,000 police for every 1,000,000 of souls would scarcely give a sufficient number of men to occupy the larger districts in beats of controllable dimensions; for instance, Bellary, containing 13,000 square miles, with a population of 1,200,000, would have a police of 1,200 men, whereas Tanjore, of 4,000 square miles, with a population of 1,600,000, would have 1,600 men; and Malabar, of 6,000 square miles, with a population of 1,500,000, would have 1,500 policemen. The strength for each district should, therefore, be left to be fixed when the system has commenced to work. The shape of the district must be also held in consideration when it is divided into beats. Many of them are slips, much greater in length than breadth. Headquarters, or the office of the superintendent, should be as centrical as possible, and his deputies should be again placed in the same manner in their several jurisdictions. For the easier working of the whole, the distribution should adhere as much as practicable, to the talook division of the district, with which the inhabitants are familiar, and if possible each talook should have a superior native police officer. The number and extent of the beats must depend on the formation and other circumstances connected with the district, but the tannahs should be within reach of easy communication, say, each station should have a radius of 5 or 6 miles where there is a population; in partially cultivated spots the distance could be extended considerably, though daily communication between bordering beats should be imperative.

At head-quarters there should be always a reserve for urgent calls, and at all principal towns and high roads there should be a sufficient number of men to furnish escort parties, &c. If the police are to furnish guards for the large convict gaols, the force must be increased protionably in such districts, and the calculation ought to provide also for the collecting of a body of men to attend at the annual festivals of certain temples or shrines where people congregate in multitudes. At certain fixed points in each district the police should be located in buildings (express) which could be defended in case of need, especially at the principal court station where the treasury and record office are established.

The number of men in a tannah should never be *less* than 8, in charge of an officer, either a duffadar or naic; some of the stations would require 12, 16, or even 20, and in towns the force ought to be equal to the preservation of the peace. Some of the outlying tannahs in wild districts should be located in mere huts, to be moved at certain seasons, or called in for special purposes. A portion of the force in each district should be in flying or movable stations, whereas others should be firmly and permanently fixed. There should be daily reports to the chief station in each talook, to be forwarded to head-quarters of the district; hereafter this communication may be perfected by a police telegraph throughout the whole system to insure *daily* information to the chief commissioner at the presidency.

The men in the tannahs to be mixed, both in regard to religion and language. In some districts where the Mahomedan population is scant, the proportion may be three Hindoos to one Mahomedan. In other districts, Bellary and Cuddapah, for instance, the division ought to be more equal; and in some districts it will be advisable to have a considerable portion of Mahrattas; and in all tannahs there ought to be a man or two from distant parts, to obtain the language, for the convenience of travellers or strangers. The men should not be employed in their *own immediate* district, but moved beyond local or family influence.

In addition to the force thus disposed, it is proposed to have a mounted body, in proportion of 100 to each 1,000 peons; not an expensive cavalry appendage, but mounted on the small Mahratta horse or pony (the best hack in the world), with the native bridle and saddle, celerity and endurance being the desideratum; the men to be disposed and armed exactly the same as the rest of the corps. This species of force would be invaluable in following up gang robbers, and also in keeping up a regular communication by relays of orderlies, especially in the larger districts, where the tannahs would necessarily be spread at greater distances.

In suggesting the formation of a concertive police of the above description, it is not intended to abolish the native institution of village watchmen or talliars. The office of the village watchman is hereditary; he is a professional police man from birth; he has land in the village; he is generally shrewd, intelligent, and active, and his local knowledge is perfect. It is proposed to register these men, and place them under the immediate control of the police authorities. It is true that one who understood the question intimately has recorded his opinion, that—"No "system of police (in the Madras presidency) will be "efficient, unless the subordinate duties be conducted by "the talliars or village watchers; secondly, that the talliars "will act only with effect under the head inhabitants; "and, thirdly, that the head inhabitants will act only "willingly under the amildars and collectors," that is to say, under the revenue officer; but this is a fallacy. Do not deprive these men of existing privileges or perquisites, give them a fair small salary, and their services can be commanded. It will not be necessary to clothe or arm them like the police, for they would not be called on to serve beyond the boundary of their own villages. For local purposes, under judicious control, these men are a ready made detective body. There are upwards of 40,000 villages in the districts, and probably there are upwards of 30,000 men at present depending on the State, whose services could be rendered most important by a very simple organization. The talliar should have all the powers of a policeman, but remain what he is, viz., a watchman; he should not be entitled to pension, for he has land by right,—but reward good service handsomely.

In the Madras presidency the police in the Mofussil is

under the control of the collector of revenue, and all the evils of such an arrangement are well known. In proposing to place it under an officer specially appointed for that purpose, it is not intended to trench on the powers of the collector; he would still remain the political head of his whole province, and retain all his power and authority as a justice of the peace and magistrate; but he would be relieved from *all* interference with the management of the force. Police involves a duty entirely distinct from magisterial. It is, to all intents and purposes, in its nature executive, and although not absolutely incompatible with that of magistrate, it had better be kept separate, for it necessarily involves acts against which appeal should be open to a magistrate; but when the magistrate is also the collector of revenue, the offices are beyond doubt incompatible, for the administration of the criminal law should not be subservient to the collector of revenue; therefore it is proposed to place the police under the command of an intelligent officer, who should give his whole undivided time and energies exclusively to that object. Under vigilant European supervision, every allegation of ill-treatment would receive instant attention and investigation, and be followed, whenever detected, by prompt and adequate punishment.

The material for police purposes in India is excellent. The natives are very intelligent, shrewd, patient, and persevering, and by constant attention on the part of active European supervision, an admirable constabulary, preventive and detective, could be speedily organized; indeed such are the institutions of society in India that, with a police constituted and commanded as suggested above, scarcely any crime, however minute, could be perpetrated without discovery of the offender by perfectly legal and justifiable means.

This sketch of what is proposed does not touch on the working of the police in connection with legal procedure, in the arrest and disposing of prisoners—for this the established law provides.

In conclusion, it may be mentioned that a rural police is now organizing at Madras on the above plan, and that the following salaries have been sanctioned by the supreme government:—

Chief commissioner - -	2,500	rupees per mensem
A superintendent for each district - - - - -	700	„ „
A subordinate officer for each district - - - - -	300	„ „
Or two, at - - - - -	150	„ „

The existing police force, officers and men, amounts to 13,111, costing 69,556 rupees, and there are other peons performing other duties (revenue) as well as police duty, amounting to 4,525 men, costing 14,926 rupees.

This force of 17,500 men is exclusive of a police corps in the district of Malabar, 2 or 3 corps of sebundies in the Northern Circars, and a body of horse in Kurnool, besides the peons employed as military police at the several cantonments.

The presidency town police must remain distinct from the proposed force for duty in the districts.

DISTRICTS FORMING THE MADRAS PRESIDENCY.

—	Square Miles.	Population.	Talooks.	Villages.
Ganjam - -	6,400	926,930	9	1,272
Vizagapatam -	7,650	1,254,272	3	609
Rajahmundry -	6,050	1,012,056	16	841
Masulipatam -	5,000	520,866	10	635
Guntoor - -	4,960	570,083	14	1,040
Bellary - -	13,056	1,229,599	17	2,758
Cuddapah - -	12,970	1,450,921	14	1,833
Nellore - -	7,930	935,690	17	2,066
Chingleput - -	2,993	583,462	10	1,890
North Arcot -	5,790	1,485,873	15	4,771
South Arcot -	7,600	1,006,005	13	3,376
Trichinopoly -	3,243	709,196	8	1,467
Tanjore - -	3,900	1,676,086	16	5,670
Madura - -	10,700	1,756,791	8	1,035
Tinnevelly - -	5,700	1,269,216	13	1,298
Coimbatore - -	8,280	1,153,362	15	1,593
Salam - - -	8,200	1,195,377	14	4,015
Malabar - -	6,060	1,514,909	18	2,781
Canara - -	7,720	1,056,333	11	2,281
Total -	141,202	21,607,987	—	41,231

E. F. ELLIOT.

APPENDIX No. 12.

PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT.

Native Infantry for Bengal.

	Rupees per mensem.
1 commandant - - -	1,500
5 captains at 800 rupees - -	4,000
5 subalterns „ 500 „ - -	2,500
1 adjutant - - - -	700
Quartermaster - - -	500
Serjeant-major - - -	51
Quartermaster-serjeant - - -	45
	9,296
1 subahdar-major, pay and batta -	60
9 subahdars at 50 rupees - -	450
10 jemadars „ 30 „ - -	300
10 pay havildars „ 20 „ -	200
60 havildars „ 14 „ - -	840
60 naicks „ 12 „ - -	720
1,200 privates „ 7 „ - -	8,400
	20,266

The pay of the European officers to be a consolidated allowance, and drawn on the same conditions as staff pay. Though the proposed rate of pay for the European officers is considerably higher than that which regimental officers now receive, yet as there will be only 13 officers instead of 25 employed, the aggregate expense will not be increased. There will also be a saving in the charge for Native officers.

Regiments organized on the above establishment would each cost about 24,000*l.* a-year. Regiments organized on the present regular establishment of 1,000, including the European officers, cost 28,000*l.* each regiment.

The Government have now the opportunity of selecting for the new corps to be raised for Bengal, the officers most fitted for the command of Natives. The proposed rate of pay being high, service with these corps would be much sought after. The promotion of the officers selected would go on as they stand in the regiments to which they now belong.

In all Native corps the officer commanding the company should have the appointment of the naicks; the selection of havildars to rest with the officer commanding the regiment, in whom also should be vested the power of reduction without court-martial.

The appointment of the commissioned grades should be made, on the recommendation of the officer commanding the regiment, through the commander-in-chief to the Government.

Promotion to be entirely by selection, which, it is thought, would tend much to increase the intercourse between the European and Native officer.

This organization, if approved of, might by degrees be extended to the Native infantry of Bombay and Madras; and regulations might easily be framed which would govern the promotion of those officers who are hereafter appointed to the service.

R. B. WOOD, Colonel.

September 29, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 13.

MEMORANDUM by Colonel W. E. BAKER, BENGAL ENGINEERS, on the RE-ORGANIZATION of a CORPS of NATIVE SAPPERS for the BENGAL ARMY.

The corps of "sappers and miners" was combined with that of "pioneers" about 10 years ago; previously, the duties of the two corps had been nearly similar; both were employed on the construction of military roads and fortifications, but the sappers were not required to work on cantonment roads and drains, and the pioneers had no practice or instruction in throwing up fieldworks.

One of the companies of sappers was raised by the late Major Broadfoot, in Affghanistan, and, since the mutiny, a body of Feruzbee Sikh sappers was raised in the Punjaub, and did good service at Delhi. Of the united corps of sappers and pioneers, some have remained faithful, but the greater part, I believe, joined the mutineers.

The following are my recommendations:—

I. That native sappers should be retained, but in reduced numbers.

1. Because Europeans could not work under an Indian sun.

2. Because, though a portion of the field engineering operations of a campaign can be performed with untrained labour under scientific European direction, yet much must be done under fire, at a risk of life which a common labourer could not be expected to incur.
3. Because I attach little weight to the objection that, in case of another mutiny, the scientific instruction imparted to native sappers might be turned against ourselves. Native troops, without European teaching, have always shown themselves apt in mining and throwing up breastworks and batteries; but skill in constructing fieldworks avails little without courage to defend them.
4. I would, however, limit the strength of the native sappers to 700 or 800 men, because, as before observed, part of the work usually devolving on native sappers may be performed by common labourers; for instance, during General Havelock's operations, Captain Crommelin threw a bridge of boats over the Ganges at Cawnpore during the floods of the rainy season without the aid of sappers.

II. That the corps of sappers should be employed in constructing roads and fortifications, and should be trained and practised in all branches of field engineering, but that it should be exempted from the duties of camp conservancy.

I recommend this exemption because I believe that liability to be employed as camp scavengers would lower the credit of the corps, and would limit the field of selection to the lowest castes. I would not say that men of low caste could not be made into good soldiers and intelligent sappers, but I would not wish to exclude altogether the more respectable classes.

III. That a body of trained labourers (bildars) be attached to the sappers, and be held available for cantonment and camp conservancy, for road-making, and for field operations; that they should not be obliged to work under fire, but might volunteer to do so; that they should not be armed, and that they should have no more of military organization than may be necessary for purposes of discipline.

IV. That both sappers and bildars should be recruited without reference to caste.

V. That the sappers should receive higher pay than the line, but that the pay of the bildars should be considerably lower.

VI. That men of the bildars distinguishing themselves for good service and intelligence should be eligible for promotion into the sappers.

VII. That the number of European sappers should be increased; that they should be trained during the cool season in the actual operations of field engineering; and at all seasons in the *direction* of such operations, the labour being performed by untrained labourers of different classes.

The number of European sappers latterly sent out by the Honourable Court to Bengal was, I believe, about 40 or 50 per annum, but most of these, as they acquired the native languages, were drafted off as overseers in the public works department. As overseers they are still liable to be recalled for military duty with the sappers, and, in the public works department, have been habituated to the direction of native labour. I would not, therefore, discontinue this practice, but would recommend that the number of European sappers present with the corps should not in future be reduced below 150.

W. E. BAKER,
London, Sept. 13, 1858. Colonel, Bengal Engineers.

APPENDIX No. 14.

GENERAL ENLISTMENT ORDERS.

GENERAL ORDER by the RIGHT HONOURABLE the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA in COUNCIL.

(No. 1,012.) Fort William, 25th July 1856.

EVERY recruit on enlisting into a native regiment is required to take an oath that he "will never forsake or "abandon his colours," and that he "will march wherever "he is ordered, whether within or beyond the Company's "territories."

It has been the practice of Government to consider this oath, when not otherwise explained at the time of enlistment, as not in itself binding the soldier to proceed on service beyond sea; and therefore, whenever regiments have been raised for service beyond sea, no man has been drafted or enlisted into them but with his own consent, and with a full and clear understanding of his engagement to serve beyond sea when required to do so. From this practice the Government will not depart.

It is with a full and clear understanding of this engagement to serve beyond sea, when required to do so, that the native artillery, horse and foot, and six regiments of native infantry, the 25th, 40th, 47th, 65th, 67th, 68th, which are the only corps of the Bengal army available for general service, have been recruited.

The cheerful alacrity with which these regiments have at all times done their duty, wherever it has called them, and the distinction which they have won for themselves, are well known to the army, and will never be forgotten by the Government of India.

Neither does the Government forget how often, when it has needed the service of its troops in foreign countries, the native officers and soldiers of other regiments have come forward to form volunteer battalions, or to proceed as entire corps, to serve beyond sea.

The readiness with which they have done so is honourable to themselves, and is thankfully acknowledged by the Government.

But it has become very inconvenient to the Government, and it is hurtful to the state, that a small portion only of the native army of Bengal should be surely available for the service of the state beyond sea; and this inconvenience is not much diminished by the fact that the entire armies of Madras and Bombay are enlisted without any limitation of their place of service.

For this reason the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council will not henceforward accept the services of any native recruit for a regiment of light cavalry, of irregular cavalry, of infantry of the line, or for the Kelat-i-Ghilzie, Ferozepore, and Loodianah regiments, in the army of Bengal, who does not, at the time of his enlistment, distinctly undertake to serve beyond sea, whether within the territories of the Company or beyond them.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will be requested to take the necessary measures to ensure the due fulfilment of this determination of the Governor-General in Council, by enjoining officers commanding the regiments above mentioned to be strictly careful that, from and after the 1st September next, no recruit shall be enlisted except for general service; and that each recruit, on taking the prescribed oath, shall be made clearly to understand the conditions on which he is enlisted.

By the COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

2. The following rules are to be entered in the Military Regulations, in substitution of the present articles 31 and 32 of section 31, with effect from the 1st September 1856; and the Commander-in-Chief will hold commanding officers responsible for the strictest observance of the same:—

31. All recruits for cavalry, regular or irregular, or for the infantry of the line, or for the corps named in the margin, are to be enlisted for general service; and no man is to be entertained for any of the above named corps who does not distinctly undertake to serve beyond sea, whether within the territories of the Company or beyond them.

Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment.
Regiment of Ferozepore.
Regiment of Loodianah.

32. The liability to be sent on foreign service, and the peculiar obligations in this respect under which they voluntarily place themselves, is to be distinctly explained to all such recruits at the time of their being originally entertained, and also at the time of their being required to take the prescribed oath under the colours of their regiment upon parade. The benefits and indulgences which are accorded by the Government to men who proceed on foreign service, as detailed in the regulations,* are also invariably to be fully made known to these recruits before they are sworn in.

* G.G.O., No. 96, 25 March 1825. G.G.O., No. 1,190, 21 November, 1855. Pay and Audit Regulations, 1849.

AN ACCOUNT of the MILITARY FORCE employed under each PRESIDENCY in BRIT

	ROYAL TROOPS.															
	DRAGOONS.			INFANTRY.				ENGINEERS AND SAPPERS.				HORSE.				
	Number of Regiments.	Officers.	Non-commissioned and Rank and File.	Number of Regiments.	Officers.	Non-commissioned and Rank and File.	TOTAL.	European Officers.	European Non-commissioned.	Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned, and Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Number of Brigades.	Officers.	European Non-commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned, and Rank and File.	
1852:																
Bengal - -	3	89	2,103	15	540	14,830	17,562	88	85	1,107	1,280	3	61	1,037	459	
Madras - -	1	28	673	4	143	3,959	4,803	68	61	825	954	1	32	481	216	
Bombay - -	1	29	674	5	179	5,077	5,959	38	32	443	513	1	24	472	—	
	5	146	3,450	24	862	23,866	28,324	194	178	2,375	2,747	5	117	1,990	675	
1853:																
Bengal - -	2	59	1,392	15	558	14,250	16,259	91	84	1,311	1,486	3	63	1,035	461	
Madras - -	1	34	733	4	150	3,945	4,862	60	58	790	908	1	26	517	216	
Bombay - -	1	26	690	5	174	4,854	5,744	48	24	456	528	1	21	483	—	
	4	119	2,815	24	882	23,049	26,865	199	166	2,557	2,922	5	110	2,035	677	
1854:																
Bengal - -	2	57	1,377	16	604	15,726	17,764	96	58	1,394	1,548	3	63	983	456	
Madras - -	1	23	505	4	143	3,952	4,623	60	61	813	934	1	32	507	225	—
Bombay - -	1	24	644	4	136	3,844	4,648	46	25	447	518	1	20	487	—	99
	4	104	2,526	24	883	23,522	27,035	202	144	2,654	3,000	5	115	1,977	681	449
1855:																
Bengal - -	2	56	1,419	15	517	14,373	16,365	120	60	1,371	1,551	3	66	1,052	459	351
Madras - -	—	—	—	4	114	3,812	3,926	63	76	985	1,124	1	32	479	216	—
Bombay - -	1	28	720	4	120	3,844	4,712	48	15	462	525	1	17	480	—	99
	3	84	2,139	23	751	22,029	25,003	231	151	2,818	3,200	5	115	2,011	675	450
1856:																
Bengal - -	1	23	695	15	474	14,446	15,638	120	71	1,328	1,519	3	66	1,018	457	351
Madras - -	—	—	—	3	86	3,170	3,256	69	81	1,097	1,247	1	31	478	212	—
Bombay - -	1	24	687	4	106	3,869	4,686	48	9	537	594	1	21	478	—	100
	2	47	1,382	22	666	21,485	23,580	237	161	2,962	3,360	5	118	1,974	669	451
1857:																
Bengal - -	2	56	1,310	15	473	13,956	15,795	120	88	1,289	1,497	3	63	999	447	351
Madras - -	1	34	605	3	102	3,039	3,750	74	7	1,189	1,270	1	33	502	212	—
Bombay - -	1	25	656	4	118	3,919	4,718	57	15	565	637	1	23	528	—	98
	4	115	2,571	22	693	20,884	24,263	251	110	3,043	3,404	5	119	2,029	659	449

East India House, 12th April 1858.

APPENDIX No. 16.

A RETURN showing the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the Local European Troops in India in each Year from 1843 to 1856, inclusive.

Years.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total India.
1843	4,790	3,667	3,127	11,584
1844	4,778	3,551	2,855	11,184
1845	4,905	3,510	2,559	10,974
1846	4,328	3,447	2,850	10,625
1847	4,331	3,487	2,576	10,394
1848	5,153	3,946	3,327	12,426
1849	5,121	4,211	3,294	12,626
1850	5,505	4,114	3,423	13,042
1851	5,418	4,114	3,422	12,954
1852	5,330	4,289	3,633	13,252
1853	5,537	4,206	3,608	13,351
1854	5,625	4,327	3,531	13,483
1855	5,751	4,759	3,900	14,410
1856	5,750	4,800	4,264	14,814

W. E. BAKER, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

Military Department, East India House, January 25, 1859.

APPENDIX No. 17.

RETURN showing the Numbers of the Troops, regular and Irregular, which were serving in the three Presidencies immediately before the Mutiny,

	Royal Troops.		East India Company's Troops.												Total
				Artillery.			Native Cavalry.		Infantry.						
	Cavalry, (4 Regts.)	Infantry, (22 Regts.)	Engineers and Sappers.	Horse, (5 Brigades.)	European Foot, (12 Battalions)	Native Foot, (6 Battalions.)	Regular, (21 Regts.)	Irregular, (33 Regts.)	European, (9 Regts.)	Native Regular, (155 Regts.)	Native Irregular (45 Regts.)	Veterans.	Medical Establishment.	Warrant Officers.	
Officers	115	693	251	119	231	138	284	106	335	2,769	152	163	814	..	6,170
European non-commd. officers, rank and file	2,571	20,884	110	2,029	4,390	37	60	..	8,103	259	59	..	..	..	38,502
European veterans	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	465	..	..	465
Native commd., non-commd., rank and file	..	..	3,043	659	..	3,517	9,532	20,941	..	149,832	35,215	3,613	..	..	226,352
Gun lascars	..	..	..	449	1,658	343	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2,450
Ordnance drivers	..	..	..	..	1,489	848	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2,337
Apothecaries and stewards	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	434	..	434
Native doctors	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	651	..	651
Warrant officers, (Ordnance, &c.)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	385	385
	2,686	21,577	3,404	3,256	7,768	4,883	9,876	21,047	8,438	152,860	35,426	4,241	1,899	385	277,746
Totals....	24,263		3,404	15,907			30,923		196,724			4,241	1,899	385	277,746

Indian Army Commission.

Total Europeans—Officers - 6,170
" Men - 39,352
Natives - - - 232,224
277,746

R. B. WOOD,
Colonel and Secretary.

APPENDIX No. 18.

STRENGTH of TROOPS of Her Majesty's Regular Army on the INDIAN Establishment.

Adjutant-General's Office,
October 15, 1858.

	EFFECTIVES—All Ranks.								
	Cavalry.	Foot Guards.	Infantry.	Royal Artillery. Horse.	Royal Artillery. Foot.	Royal Engineers.	Military Train.	Medical Staff Corps.	Total.
EAST INDIES:—									
Bengal	3,269	—	49,310	429	2,670	259	239	73	56,249
Bombay	3,384	—	15,616	247	1,211	226	—	—	20,684
Madras	1,345	—	10,484	238	713	—	—	—	12,780
Total in India and on passage out	7,998	—	75,410	914	4,594	485	239	73	89,713
Depôt of Regiments on Indian Establishment	1,595	—	12,081	—	—	—	—	—	13,676
Total	9,593	—	87,491	914	4,594	485	239	73	103,389

G. A. WETHERALL,
Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX No. 19.

RETURN showing the Strength of the European Local Force in India, to the latest date at which it can be given.

BENGAL. (Sept. 1, 1858.)	Infantry		2,743
	Artillery and sappers, including recruit battalion		3,187
	Light cavalry		1,522
	Camel corps		152
	Invalid battalion		146
	Yeomanry cavalry and other irregular horse		599
	Eurasian battalion		75
			8,424
MADRAS. (July 1, 1858.)	Infantry	2,745	
	Artillery and sappers	2,110	
	Veterans	318	
			5,173
BOMBAY. (Jan. 1, 1858.)	Infantry	2,656	
	Artillery and sappers	1,832	
			4,488
	Total		18,085

East India House,
December 1, 1858.

W. E. BAKER, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

APPENDIX No. 20.

RETURN showing the EFFECTIVE STATE of the CAVALRY REGIMENTS in INDIA, and their TOTAL STRENGTH, including the MEN at the several DEPÔTS.—Adjutant-General's Office, 3rd September 1858.

Regiments.	Rank and File.				
	In India.		On passage out.	Total Strength including Depôt.	Establishment.
	Fit for Duty.	Sick.			
BENGAL:—					
2nd Dragoon Guards	467	51	100	733	676
6th Dragoon Guards	464	96	74	712	676
7th Dragoon Guards	365	56	110	692	676
7th Hussars	326	80	78	721	676
9th Lancers	413	55	79	625	676
	2,035	338	441	3,483	3,380
MADRAS:—					
1st Dragoon Guards	446	39	42	645	676
12th Lancers	515	51	57	679	676
	961	90	99	1,324	1,352
BOMBAY:—					
3rd Dragoon Guards	537	72	70	739	676
8th Hussars	414	25	56	799	676
14th Light Dragoons	540	88	10	672	676
17th Lancers	410	40	58	703	676
	1,901	225	194	2,913	2,704
Total	4,897	653	734	7,720	7,436

G. A. WETHERALL,
Adjutant-General.

RETURN showing the EFFECTIVE STATE of the INFANTRY REGIMENTS in INDIA, and their TOTAL STRENGTH, including the MEN at the several DEPÔTS.—Adjutant-General's Office, 28th August 1858.

Regiments.	Rank and File.				
	In India.		On passage out.	Total Strength of Regiment.	Establishment.
	Fit for Duty.	Sick.			
BENGAL:—					
5th Foot, 1st Bat.	577	92	125	1,075	
6th " "	425	136	292	998	
7th " "	995	82	133	1,302	
8th " "	651	67	141	1,087	
10th " "	698	28	16	917	
13th " "	699	111	279	1,265	
19th " "	924	62	151	1,290	
20th " "	601	142	232	1,143	
23rd " "	687	181	324	1,293	
24th " "	815	49	208	1,276	
27th "	709	182	121	1,146	
29th "	744	87	166	1,121	
32nd "	376	51	49	1,047	
34th "	549	154	306	1,434	
35th "	632	138	143	1,080	
37th "	495	107	136	977	
38th "	660	234	181	1,260	
42nd "	633	137	138	1,145	
52nd "	710	125	345	1,267	
53rd "	672	161	203	1,204	
54th "	503	235	258	1,300	
60th " 1st Bat.	536	99	236	1,037	1,200
60th " 2nd "	687	9	142	909	
61st "	532	121	237	1,064	
64th "	689	58	318	1,327	
70th "	799	83	110	1,116	
73rd "	654	53	58	867	
75th "	632	85	237	1,177	
77th "	490	28	130	786	
78th "	662	28	16	865	
79th "	611	227	133	1,136	
80th "	604	86	226	1,000	
81st "	885	53	67	1,112	
82nd "	781	132	194	1,259	
84th "	623	77	83	1,058	
87th "	863	72	73	1,118	
88th "	695	108	128	1,104	
90th "	593	155	126	1,018	
93rd "	703	122	111	1,068	
94th "	748	58	212	1,244	
97th "	622	115	306	1,265	
98th "	783	23	131	1,077	
Rifle Brigade 2nd Bat.	717	149	182	1,167	
Rifle Brigade 3rd "	784	125	174	1,156	
	29,448	4,627	7,577	49,557	52,800

Regiments.	Rank and File.				
	In India.		On passage out.	Total Strength of Regiment.	Establishment.
	Fit for Duty.	Sick.			
BOMBAY:—					
4th Foot, 1st Bat. (part)	*241	44	165	872	1,000
18th " "	1004	65	49	1,178	
33rd "	842	23	238	1,303	
51st "	840	48	270	1,296	
56th "	743	62	119	1,038	
57th "	695	74	63	1,006	
71st "	808	32	80	1,046	1,200
72nd "	880	44	100	1,131	
83rd "	946	65	99	1,215	
86th "	723	224	123	1,156	
89th "	588	67	290	1,163	
92nd "	914	41	120	1,232	
95th "	667	18	282	1,151	
	9,891	802	1,998	14,787	15,400
MADRAS:—					
1st Foot, 1st Bat.	1,096	60	124	1,369	
43rd "	871	61	84	1,104	
44th "	718	122	172	1,249	
60th " 3rd Bat.	987	76	125	1,247	1,200
66th "	862	35	215	1,355	
68th "	681	76	259	1,439	
69th "	689	55	143	1,024	
74th "	839	49	124	1,120	
	6,743	534	1,246	9,907	9,600
Total Infantry	46,082	5,963	10,821	74,251	77,800

N.B.—The following regiments having but recently proceeded from the colonies to India, are not yet fully recruited to their augmented establishment; viz., 4th foot (1st battalion), 87th, 57th, 60th (2nd battalion), 73rd and 77th.

* Exclusive of six companies (327 rank and file), stationed at the Mauritius.

W. F. FORSTER,
Deputy Adjutant-General.

The above returns show that in eleven cavalry regiments on an establishment of 676 each, amounting to 7,436, and that establishment being not only complete, but 284 rank and file in excess, the strength of these regiments being 7,720, there are only effective fit for duty in India 4,897, the difference between effectives and total strength, amounting to 2,823, being absorbed by sick, on passage out, and training at the depôt.

In 65 regiments of infantry on an establishment of 1,200 each, amounting to 77,800 rank and file, and that establishment almost complete, there are only 46,082 effectives in India, the difference between effectives and actual strength amounting to 28,169.

Though the number returned as on passage out, 10,821, is large, yet when a force is stationed at a distance from home there must always be a large number in transit to and fro.

If the European regiments serving in India were placed on a lower establishment, the effective force would be in proportion reduced without a corresponding saving in expense being effected, for the charge for officers and staff would remain as it is at present.

R. B. WOOD,
Colonel and Secretary.

Sept. 13, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 21.

RETURN showing the NUMBER of REGIMENTS serving in the THREE PRESIDENCIES in INDIA.

ABSTRACT.

NUMBER of REGIMENTS serving in INDIA.

—	European Corps.		ative Corps.	
	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Queen's	11	65	—	—
Company's	4	*12	12	88
" Irregular Corps	-	-	52	92
Total	15	77	64	180
Civil Corps	—		5	47

* Three in course of being raised.

August 1858.

RETURN of the NUMBER of REGIMENTS serving in the THREE PRESIDENCIES in INDIA under the MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

—	Regiments of Her Majesty's Dragoons.	Regiments of Company's European Dragoons.	Regiments of Her Majesty's Infantry.	Regiments of Company's European Infantry.	Regiments of Regular Native Cavalry.	Regiments of Irregular Cavalry.	Regiments of Regular Native Infantry.	Regiments of Local, Extra, and Irregular Native Infantry.
		(a)		(b)		(c)	(d)	
Bengal	5	4	44	3	2	46	7	78
Madras	2	—	8	3	7	(e) 1	52	10
Bombay	4	—	13	3	3	5	29	4
	11	4	65	9	12	52	88	92

(a) Recruits for four regiments have been sent; but it is not known how many corps have been organized.
(b) Three more regiments have been authorized, and now are being raised.
(c) Including the following four European corps; viz., Bengal yeomanry cavalry; volunteer cavalry, Rajshaye; Calcutta volunteer guards (cavalry part), and the Meerut light horse. Also including the four regiments cavalry Hyderabad Contingent.
(d) Three of these regiments are now in China.
(e) Four troops Madras Volunteer Guards, Europeans.

Lists of the Corps of Irregular Horse and Foot included in this return are annexed.

RETURN of CORPS serving in the THREE PRESIDENCIES in INDIA under the Civil Authorities.

—	Regiments of Native Cavalry.	Regiments of Police Infantry, &c.
Bengal	3	26
Madras	—	—
Bombay	2	21
	5	47

Lists of Corps included in this return are annexed.

LIST of REGIMENTS of IRREGULAR CAVALRY.

BENGAL.

EUROPEAN.

	Military or Civil.
Bengal yeomanry cavalry	M
Volunteer cavalry at Rajshaye	M
Calcutta volunteer guards (cavalry portion)	M
Meerut light horse	M

NATIVE.

1st Regt. irregular native cavalry	M
2nd "	M
3rd (part) "	M
7th "	M
4th "	M
6th "	M
1th "	M
86th "	M
17th "	M
18th "	M
Corps of guides (cavalry portion)	M
Sikh cavalry, 4 regts.	M
Punjab " 5 "	M
Ramghur batt. (cavalry portion)	M
Jodhpore Sikh horse	M
Benares horse	M
Beatson's " 2 regts.	M
Mead's "	M
Behar "	M
Rohilcund "	M
Peshawur light horse	M
Lahore "	M
Towanah horse	M
Hodson's " 2 corps	M
Pathan " (Jat.)	M
Mynpoorie irregular horse	M
Mooltanee regt. (cavalry portion)	M
Bunnoo horse levies	M
Dera Ismael Khan do.	M
Nimar police corps (cavalry part)	C
Lahore mounted police	C
Mooltan	C

Under the Governor General and the Resident at Hydrabad.

Hydrabad contingent, 4 regts.	M

MADRAS.

EUROPEAN.

1 corps (4 troops) Madras volunteer guards	M

BOMBAY.

NATIVE.

Poona irregular horse	M
Sind " 3 regts.	M
South Mahratta irregular horse	M
Guzerat irregular horse	C
Kutch " "	C

LIST of REGIMENTS of Irregular Infantry, Native Police Corps, &c.

BENGAL.

EUROPEAN.

	Military or Civil.
Calcutta Volunteer Guards, Infantry portion	M

NATIVE.

Regt. of Khelat-i-Ghilzie	M
" Lucknow	M
" Ferozepore	M
" Loodiana	M
Sikh volunteers	M
Kemaon	M
Nusseree	M
Nepal Ghoorkas	M
1st Extra Ghoorkas	M
Kemaon levies	M
Landour rangers	M
Hill rangers	M
Assam corps, 2 regiments	M
Mhairwarah "	M
Mhair "	M
Sylhet light infantry	M
Aracan battalion	M
Shekawattee battalion	M
Pegu light infantry	M
Munneepore regiment	M
Kamroop "	M
Mynpoorie infantry levy	M
Futteyghur "	M
Cawnpore "	M
Allahabad "	M
Hansi "	M
Govgaira infantry levy	M
Sealkote levy	M
Goordaspore "	M
Jhelum "	M
Infantry levy Mithun Kote	M
Bunnoo levies	M
Dehra Ishmael Khan levies	M
Mooltanee regiment (infantry portion)	M
Ramghur light infantry	M
Sebundy sappers and miners (Darjeeling)	M
Corps of guides (infantry portion)	M
Resident's escort—Nepal	M
Malwa Bheel	M
Meywar "	M
Rattray's Sikh police corps	M
Sikh infantry—4 regiments	M
Punjab irregular infantry—24 regiments	M
Sikh police corps	C
Punjab police battalions, 4	C
Nimar police corp (infantry portion)	C
Kookey corps	C
Divisional battalions, 19	C

Under the Governor-General and the Resident at Hydrabad.

Hydrabad contingent—6 regiments	M

MADRAS.

EUROPEAN.

Madras Volunteer Guards, 10 companies	M
European Veterans, 1 company infantry, 1 company artillery	M

INFANTRY.

3 extra regiments Native Infantry	M
Madras Sapper Militia	M
Madras Rifles	M
Native Veterans, 2 battalions	M
Native police battalion for Pegu	M

BOMBAY.

NATIVE.

Marine battalion	M
Native veteran battalion	M
1st Belooch battalion	M
2nd " "	M
Guzerat police corps	C
" Cooly ditto	C
1st Kandeish Bheel corps	C
2nd " "	C
Ghaut police corps (Tannah)	C

Sawunt Warree local corps	C
Kolapore infantry „	C
Rutnagherry rangers „	C
Kutch legion	C
3 Sind police corps	C
Poona „	C
Ahmednuggur police corps	C
Surat Sebundy „ „	C
Sattarah irregular infantry	C
Broach police corps	C
Belgaum „	C
Dharwar „	C
Sholapoor „	C
Kaira „	C

APPENDIX No. 22.

RETURN showing the NUMBER, CASTE, and COUNTRY of the Native Officers and Soldiers of each Regiment, Regular and Irregular, of each Presidency, confined to Regiments borne on the Returns of each Army respectively; so far as can be stated from the Records in this House.—East India House, Sept. 1858.

BENGAL.

HORSE AND FOOT ARTILLERY.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		*Caste.*	
Mahomedans	11	Mahomedans	427
Brahmins	2	Brahmins	124
Rajpoots	3	Rajpoots	159
Gwallah	1	Gwallah	0
Hindus of inferior description	1	Hindus of inferior description	289
	18		999

NATIVE INFANTRY, 7 Regiments, viz.:—21st, 31st, 47th, 65th, 66th, 70th, and 73rd.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		*Caste.*	
Mahomedans	25	Mahomedans	1,170
Brahmins	52	Brahmins	1,878
Rajpoots	39	Rajpoots	2,637
Hindus of inferior description	23	Hindus of inferior description	2,057
		Sikhs and Punjaubees	54
	139		7,796

IRREGULAR AND LOCAL INFANTRY, *12 Regiments, viz.:—Regiment of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, Regiment of Ferozepore, Regiment of Loodianah, Simoor Battalion, Kemaon Battalion, Nusseree Battalion, Hill Rangers, Assam Light Infantry Battalion, Mhairwarrah Battalion, Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion, Arracan Battalion, and Shekhawattee Battalion.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		*Caste.*	
Mahomedans	38	Mahomedans	1,185
Brahmins	23	Brahmins	849
Rajpoots	59	Rajpoots	2711
Hindus of inferior description	43	Hindus of inferior description	2,247
Sikhs	17	Sikhs	1,309
Hill men	16	Hill men	1,112
Mughs	6	Mughs	705
Burmese	1	Burmese	6
Munniporees	1	Munniporees	167
		Jhats	48
	204		10,339

MADRAS.

HORSE AND FOOT ARTILLERY.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		*Caste.*	
Christians	0	Christians	2
Mahomedans	21	Mahomedans	514
Mahrattas	0	Brahmins & Rajpoots	97
Brahmins & Rajpoots	5	Mahrattas	26
Telingas (Gentoo)	3	Telingas (Gentoo)	214
Tamil	1	Tamil	242
Other castes	0	Other castes	98
Indo Britons	0	Indo Britons	15
	30		1,208

* No Returns of the Castes of other Regiments have been received.

Country.		*Country.*	
Hindoostan	5	Hindoostan	69
Northern Circars	7	Northern Circars	65
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	15	Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	702
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	2	Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	181
Baramahal	0	Baramahal	11
Ceded districts	1	Ceded districts	46
Mysore	0	Mysore	82
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	0	Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	52
	30		1,208

NATIVE CAVALRY, 7 Regiments.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		*Caste.*	
Mahomedans	68	Christians	32
Mahrattas	6	Mahomedans	1,956
Rajpoots	3	Rajpoots	90
Indo Britons	0	Mahrattas	300
		Other castes	2
		Indo Britons	159
	77		2,539

Country.		*Country.*	
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	64	Hindoostan	22
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	7	Northern Circars	67
Mysore	3	Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	1,841
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	1	Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	205
Ceded districts	2	Baramahal	48
		Ceded districts	54
		Mysore	212
		Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	90
	77		2,539

SAPPERS AND MINERS.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		*Caste.*	
Christians	5	Christians	115
Mahomedans	0	Mahomedans	51
Brahmins & Rajpoots	1	Brahmins & Rajpoots	6
Mahrattas	0	Mahrattas	2
Telingas (Gentoo)	3	Telingas (Gentoo)	99
Tamil	4	Tamil	177
Other castes	2	Other castes	356
Indo Britons	0	Indo Britons	8
	12		814

Country.		*Country.*	
Hindoostan	0	Hindoostan	26
Northern Circars	1	Northern Circars	64
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	7	Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	352
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	2	Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	160
Baramahal	0	Baramahal	20
Ceded districts	0	Ceded districts	19
Mysore	1	Mysore	81
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	1	Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	92
	12		814

NATIVE INFANTRY, 52 Regiments.

NATIVE OFFICERS.		NON-COMMISSIONED, RANK AND FILE.	
Caste.		*Caste.*	
Christians	4	Christians	1,853
Mahomedans	584	Mahomedans	15,272
Brahmins and Rajpoots	83	Brahmins and Rajpoots	1,922
Mahrattas	12	Mahrattas	385
Telingas (Gentoo)	242	Telingas (Gentoo)	15,371
Tamil	97	Tamil	4,275
Other castes	8	Other castes	1,616
Indo Britons	0	Indo Britons	1,011
	1,030		41,705

Country.		*Country.*	
Hindoostan	51	Hindoostan	1,938
Northern Circars	317	Northern Circars	16,938
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	239	Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	8,841
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	177	Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	4,760
Baramahal	29	Baramahal	1,022
Ceded districts	32	Ceded districts	1,705
Mysore	59	Mysore	2,698

Country.	
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	119
Deccan and Mahratta	7
	1,030

Country.	
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	3,617
Canara, Moulmein, Jaulnah, and Belgaum	28
Deccan and Mahratta	99
Portugal	1
Other parts	58
	41,705

BOMBAY.

Horse and Foot Artillery.

Native Officers. *Caste.*	
Mahomedans	7
Brahmins and Rajpoots	10
Mahrattas	5
Telingas (Gentoo)	0
Tamil	0
Other castes	25
Indo Britons	0
	47

Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. *Caste.*	
Christians	5
Mahomedans	300
Brahmins and Rajpoots	330
Mahrattas	405
Telingas (Gentoo)	1
Tamil	0
Other castes	894
Indo Britons	1
	1,936

Country.	
Hindoostan	36
Northern Circars	1
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	1
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	0
Deccan	3
Concan	7
Mysore	0
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	0
	47

Country.	
Hindoostan	1,151
Northern Circars	26
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	21
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	5
Deccan	388
Concan	331
Mysore	6
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	0
Guzerat	4
Malabar	1
Cabool and Affghanistan	3
	1,936

Sappers and Miners.

Native Officers. *Caste.*	
Christians	0
Mahomedans	2
Brahmins and Rajpoots	0
Mahrattas	1
Telingas (Gentoo)	1
Tamil	0
Other castes	4
Indo Britons	0
	8

Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. *Caste.*	
Christians	0
Mahomedans	44
Brahmins and Rajpoots	63
Mahrattas	102
Telingas (Gentoo)	48
Tamil	0
Other castes	196
Indo Britons	1
	454

Country.	
Hindoostan	4
Northern Circars	0
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	0
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	0
Deccan	2
Concan	1
Mysore	0
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	0
	8

Country.	
Hindoostan	198
Northern Circars	1
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	6
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	1
Deccan	192
Concan	56
Mysore	0
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	0
	454

Native Cavalry, 3 Regiments.

Native Officers. *Caste.*	
Christians	1
Mahomedans	12
Brahmins and Rajpoots	9
Mahrattas	1
Telingas (Gentoo)	0
Tamil	0
Other castes	12
Indo Britons	1
	36

Non-Commissioned Rank and File. *Caste.*	
Christians	66
Mahomedans	459
Brahmins and Rajpoots	252
Mahrattas	118
Telingas (Gentoo)	0
Tamil	0
Other castes	508
Indo Britons	22
	1,425

Country.	
Hindoostan	29
Northern Circars	1
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	2
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	0
Deccan	2
Concan	1
Mysore	0
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	0
Bombay	1
	36

Country.	
Hindoostan	1,073
Northern Circars	21
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	30
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	0
Deccan	125
Concan	114
Mysore	0
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	0
Guzerat	14
Persia	1
Lisbon	4
Africa	2
Bombay	4
Punjaub and Scinde	21
Cabool and Affghanistan	15
Europe	1
	1,425

Native Infantry.—29 Regiments.

Native Officers. *Caste.*	
Christians	5
Mahomedans	111
Brahmins and Rajpoots	188
Mahrattas	116
Telingas (Gentoo)	6
Tamil	1
Jews	3
Other castes	130
Indo Britons	0
Purwarrees	3
	563

Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. *Caste.*	
Christians	270
Mahomedans	2,048
Brahmins and Rajpoots	6,421
Mahrattas	7,980
Telingas (Gentoo)	107
Tamil	55
Jews	12
Other castes	7,728
Indo Britons	22
Purwarrees	170
Mochees	29
Sikhs	28
	24,870

Country.	
Hindoostan	268
Northern Circars	7
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	37
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	13
Deccan	57
Concan	173
Mysore	4
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	0
Guzerat	4
	563

Country.	
Hindoostan	11,089
Northern Circars	135
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	412
Southern Carnatic, (Trichinopoly)	203
Deccan	1,820
Concan	10,878
Mysore	36
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly	33
Mysore and Punjab	28
Guzerat	80
Scinde, Punjab, and Rajpootana	155
Europe	1
	24,870

1st Belooch Battalion.

Native Officers. *Caste.*	
Christians	0
Mahomedans	0
Brahmins and Rajpoots	14
Mahrattas	1
Telingas (Gentoo)	0
Tamil	0
Other castes	0
Indo Britons	0
	15

Non-Commissioned, Rank and File. *Caste.*	
Christians	0
Mahomedans	807
Brahmins and Rajpoots	85
Mahrattas	11
Telingas (Gentoo)	0
Tamil	0
Other castes	1
Indo Britons	0
	904

Country.	
Hindoostan	2
Khoorasan	10
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	0
Southern Carnatic	0
Deccan	0
Concan	1
Punjaub	2
Scinde	0
	15

Country.	
Hindoostan	104
Khoorasan	530
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	5
Southern Carnatic	0
Deccan	8
Concan	6
Punjaub	138
Scinde	113
	904

2nd Belooch Battalion.

Native Officers.		Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	
Caste.		*Caste.*	
Christians	0	Christians	2
Mahomedans	9	Mahomedans	808
Brahmins and Rajpoots	5	Brahmins and Rajpoots	23
Mahrattas	0	Mahrattas	2
Telingas (Gentoo)	0	Telingas (Gentoo)	0
Tamil	0	Tamil	0
Other castes	0	Other castes	23
Indo Britons	0	Indo Britons	0
	14		858
Country.		*Country.*	
Hindoostan	5	Hindoostan	66
Guzerat	1	Guzerat	3
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	2	Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	12
Affghanistan	2	Affghanistan	255
Deccan	0	Deccan	6
Punjaub	0	Punjaub	155
Concan	0	Concan	3
Beloochistan	1	Beloochistan	76
Scinde	3	Cutchee, &c.	32
		Scinde	217
		Bhawulpoor	33
	14		858

Marine Battalion.

Native Officers.		Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.	
Caste.		*Caste.*	
Christians	1	Christians	9
Mahomedans	12	Mahomedans	180
Brahmins and Rajpoots	0	Brahmins	0
Mahrattas	2	Mahrattas	4
Telingas (Gentoo)	0	Telingas (Gentoo)	0
Tamil	0	Tamil	0
Other castes	5	Other castes	671
Indo Britons	0	Indo Britons	0
	20		864
Country.		*Country.*	
Hindoostan	0	Hindoostan	31
Northern Circars	5	Northern Circars	17
Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	0	Central Carnatic, Madras, Vellore, &c.	35
Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	0	Southern Carnatic, Trichinopoly	0
Deccan	6	Deccan	72
Concan	8	Concan	697
Mysore	0	Mysore	0
Tanjore, Madras, and Tinnevelly	1	Tanjore, Madras, and Tinnevelly	12
	20		864

APPENDIX No. 23.

Present Employment of the Officers of the Bengal Native Infantry Regiments, as shown by the Army List, dated July 10, 1858.

	Colonels.	Lt.-Cols.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieuts.	Ensigns.	Total.
Doing regimental duty	—	26	19	104	176	17	342
On leave, chiefly sick	57	22	20	92	120	4	315
On staff employ	1	17	24	200	150	—	392
Engaged temporarily on detached duties arising out of the mutinies, and with Her Majesty's regiments.	—	4	11	125	251	166	557
Unemployed	17	4	—	—	—	—	21
Wanting to complete the establishment of regiments.	—	6	—	3	109	178	296

East India House, Dec. 18, 1858.

W. E. Baker, Colonel, Military Secretary.

Return showing the Establishment of Officers now sanctioned for the Bengal Artillery, the Number of Officers of the Corps now unemployed, and the Number required to complete the Establishment, as per Army List for April 1858.

Establishment now sanctioned.	Officers. Unemployed.	Temporarily employed on Services arising out of the Mutinies.	Employed Regimentally, including Ordnance Commissariat.	Permanently employed on Duties other than Regimental.	Absent in Europe.	Wanting to complete the Establishment.
Colonels - 12 Lt.-cols. - 24 Captains - 72 2nd Capts. 72 Lieuts. - 168 348	No officer is recorded in the Army List as "unemployed." See next column.	34	150	29	42	93
		255				

East India House, December 1, 1858.

W. E. Baker, Colonel, Military Secretary.

APPENDIX No. 24.

Return of the number of the Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry Cadets appointed and embarked for India since May 1857.

	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.	Total.
Artillery	89	47	37	55
Cavalry	33	16	6	
Infantry	172	125	60	357

East India House, Dec. 1, 1858.

W. E. Baker, Colonel, Military Secretary.

APPENDIX No. 25.

Return showing the total Number of regular Regiments and Battalions (European and Native) belonging to Her Majesty's and the East India Company's Armies respectively, borne on the Establishment of each Presidency immediately before the Mutiny; also showing the total Number of European Commissioned Officers of each Service and Presidency, and the relative Proportions in which established Divisional and Brigade Commands were then allotted in each Presidency to Her Majesty's and the East India Company's Officers respectively.

Presidency.	Her Majesty's.				East India Company's.												Total.			
	Dragoons.		Infantry.		Engineers.		Horse Artillery.		European Ft. Artillery.		Native Ft. Artillery.		Native Cavalry.		European Infantry.		Native Infantry.		Her Majesty's.		East India Comp.'s.	
	Regiments.	Officers.	Regiments.	Officers.	Battalions.	Officers.	Brigades.	Officers.	Battalions.	Officers.	Battalions.	Officers.	Regiments.	Officers.	Regiments.	Officers.	Regiments.	Officers.	Regiments.	Officers.	Regiments.	Officers.
Bengal	2	80	15	660	5	125	3	75	6	150	3	75	10	230	3	153	74	1,924	17	740	104	2,732
Madras	1	40	3	142	3	75	1	48	4	96	1	24	8	184	3	153	52	1,352	4	182	72	1,932
Bombay	1	40	4	176	3	75	1	24	2	48	2	48	3	69	3	153	29	754	5	216	43	1,171
Total	4	160	22	978	11	275	5	147	12	294	6	147	21	483	9	459	155	4,030	26	1,138	219	5,835

COMMANDS and their ALLOTMENT to QUEEN'S and COMPANY'S OFFICERS respectively.

		Divisional.		*Brigade.*
Bengal	7	2 Queen's, 5 Company's	16	3 Queen's, 13 Company's.
Madras	6	2 Queen's, 4 Company's	12	2 Queen's, 10 Company's.
Bombay	*4	1 Queen's, 2 Company's	10	2 Queen's, 8 Company's.
Total	17	*the 4th (Sind) being held alternately by a Queen's and Company's officer.	38	
Queen's	5		7	Queen's.
Company's	11		31	Company's.

East India House,
November 1858.

W E. BAKER, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

APPENDIX No. 26.

1. RETURN of the Number of Officers tried by General Court-martial, from May 1, 1849, to December 31, 1854.

Period.	Abroad.		Home.	Total.
	India.	Elsewhere.		
From May 1, to December 31, 1849	10	4	2	16
From January 1, to December 31, 1850	13	9	2	24
1851	3	6	3	12
1852	5	7	1	13
1853	7	4	6	17
1854	3	3	3	9
Total	41	33	17	91

Sept. 22, 1858. J. L. S. MOWBRAY.

2. RETURN of the Number of Soldiers who were tried in India and elsewhere by Courts-martial, compared with the Effective Strength of the Army during the Period from January 1, 1849, to December 31, 1854.

Years.	Effective Strength of the Army in India.	Number of Men tried in India.	Effective Strength of the Army elsewhere.	Number of Men tried elsewhere.	Proportion of Trials to the Effective Strength.	
					India.	Elsewhere.
1849	24,883	1,276	106,114	8,714	1 in 19	1 in 12
1850	28,197	1,307	97,956	7,449	1 in 21	1 in 13
1851	27,607	1,008	95,757	6,692	1 in 27	1 in 14
1852	27,251	926	97,694	7,013	1 in 29	1 in 13
1853	25,767	916	99,914	6,791	1 in 28	1 in 14
1854	26,099	841	104,523	5,158	1 in 31	1 in 20

Average per annum on the six years:—

Effective Strength in India	26,634	1 in 25
Number of Men tried in India	1,045	
Effective Strength elsewhere	100,326	1 in 14
Number of Men tried elsewhere	6,969	

G. A. WETHERALL,
Adjutant-General.

Horse Guards, S.W.,
October 12, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 27.

RETURN of the EAST INDIA COMPANY'S REGIMENTS of EUROPEAN INFANTRY in each Year from 1843 to 1852.

Year.	Number of Regiments.	Establishment, 1st January.	Wanting to complete.	Recruits embarked.	Number of Deaths.	Number invalided and discharged.	Number removed to Non-effective List or other Corps.
1843	6	5,436	296	197	262	227	22
1844	6	5,432	283	260	304	154	23
1845	6	5,434	477	256	342	176	41
1846	6	5,446	914	675	333	204	64
1847	6	5,450	1,115	1,360	192	111	36
1848	6	5,450	387	605	282	145	34
1849	6	5,448	13	850	397	182	23
1850	6	5,448	3	492	305	106	50
1851	6	5,448	—	232	249	126	45
1852	6	5,448	14	379	219	119	28

Average Establishment - - - 5,444
Average—wanting to complete - - 350

APPENDIX No. 28.

RETURNS showing the total Number of European non-commissioned Officers and Soldiers borne on the Town Major's Non-effective List in each Presidency, and the number employed in each Department, Civil and Military.

BENGAL.		MADRAS.		BOMBAY.	
Serjeants-major and quarter-master serjeants of native corps.	245	Serjeant-major and quarter-master serjeants	138	Serjeant-major and quarter-master serjeants of native corps	20
Public works	208	Public works	12	Public works	59
Commissariat department	28	Store serjeants	46	Commissariat department	41
Electric telegraph department	15	Commissariat department	35	Electric telegraph department	14
Police	10	Laboratory serjeants and corporals	6	Police	24
Adjutant-general's department	5	Key serjeants	6	Adjutant and quarter-master general's departments	8
Quarter-master general's department	3	Hospital serjeants	1	Gun carriage department	5
Clerk in ordnance department	1	Serjeants	42	Ordnance department	157
Locally employed (as bazaar serjeants, barrack serjeants, &c. &c.)	153	Corporals (1) privates	23	Locally employed (line serjeants, barrack serjeants, &c. &c.)	40
Governor-general's band	16			Land transport corps	8
Insane	2			Medical stores	2
No position or rank stated	2			Garrison band	41
				Indian navy	3
				Insane	5
Total	678		309		427

East India House,
Dec. 1, 1858.

W. E. BAKER, Colonel,
Military Secretary

APPENDIX No. 29.

RETURN showing the Comparative Amount of CASUALTIES amongst the QUEEN'S REGIMENTS of INFANTRY on the INDIAN ESTABLISHMENT and the EUROPEAN INFANTRY in the Service of the EAST INDIA COMPANY, as deduced from the Number of Deaths, Discharges in India, and Men invalided and sent to this Country during the Ten Years from 1843 to 1852.

YEARS.	The Queen's Troops.						Honourable East India Company's European Troops.					
	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.	Dead.	Invalided and sent Home.	Discharged in India.	Total Casualties.	Per-centage.	Strength.	Dead.	Invalided or Discharged.	Non-effective List.	Total Casualties.	Per-centage.
1843	29,846	2,179	551	148	2,878	9·6	5,140	262	227	22	511	9·9
1844	27,884	1,745	922	122	2,789	10·0	5,149	304	154	23	481	9·3
Sikh War 1845	29,447	2,931	982	161	4,074	13·8	4,957	342	176	41	559	11·2
Sikh War 1846	27,645	2,594	896	162	3,652	13·2	4,532	333	204	64	601	13·2
1847	26,157	1,196	1,037	271	2,504	9·5	4,335	192	111	36	339	7·8
Punjaub Campaign 1848	23,617	975	548	178	1,701	7·2	5,063	282	145	34	461	9·1
Punjaub Campaign 1849	25,398	1,906	508	117	2,531	9·9	5,435	397	182	23	602	11·7
1850	26,947	1,186	706	170	2,062	7·6	5,445	305	106	50	461	8·4
1851	26,614	1,052	719	152	1,923	7·2	5,448	249	126	45	420	7·7
1852	26,645	1,399	872	255	2,526	9·4	5,434	219	119	28	366	6·7
Total for 10 years	270,200	17,163	7,741	1,736	26,640	—	50,938	2,885	1,550	366	4,801	—
Annual average	27,020	—	—	—	2,664	—	5,093	—	—	—	480	—

Casualties per cent.: Queen's Troops, 9·8; East India Company's European Troops, 9·4; or the casualties amongst the Queen's Troops are ·4 per cent. greater than amongst the East India Company's European Troops.

Average strength of the Queen's Troops for the above years was	27,020
Average establishment	25,677
Excess of strength over establishment	1,343
Average establishment of the six European regiments of the Company's service	5,444
Average strength	5,093
Excess of establishment over strength	351

It is to be observed that some of the men of the Queen's troops returned and sent home as invalids recover their health, and again return to the service in India. In the Indian army all men sent home are at once discharged.

The number of men who *purchase* their discharge from the Queen's army in India is considerably larger than the number in the Company's. The following is a Return of the number of such discharges for the years 1843 and 1848.

	1843.		1848.	
	Queen's Army.	Company's Army.	Queen's Army.	Company's Army.
Number of Men purchasing their discharge in India	46	3	65	12

Some of the men also of Her Majesty's regiments have, perhaps, served seven or eight years before they are sent to India. The men sent for the Indian regiments are all new recruits.

These will more than account for the small excess of wear and tear in Her Majesty's regiments.

Adjutant-General's Office, Horse Guards,
September 23, 1858.

G. A. WETHERALL,
Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX No. 30.

Adjutant-General's Office,
October 15, 1858.

RETURN of the Number of Men who have volunteered in India between the Years 1843 and 1852.

Number of men who have volunteered in India from 1843 to 1852, both years inclusive - 5,515

G. A. WETHERALL,
Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX No. 31.

RETURN showing the Strength and Number of Deaths of Non-commissioned Officers and Men of Her Majesty's Forces serving in India annually during the Fifteen Years from 1843 to 1857 inclusive.

Years.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.	
	Strength.	Deaths.
1843	33,224	2,530
1844	32,380	1,853
Sikh War 1845	33,547	3,362
Sikh War 1846	32,291	2,856
1847	29,620	1,413
Punjaub Campaign 1848	27,423	1,091
Punjaub Campaign 1849	31,293	2,063
1850	30,692	1,377
1851	30,275	1,175
1852	30,455	1,479
1853	29,035	1,626
1854	29,464	1,048
1855	27,758	875
1856	23,995	1,198
1857	35,191	2,589
Total for 15 years	456,643	26,535
Annual average -	30,442	1,769
	Deaths, 5·8 per cent.	

Adjutant-General's Office, November 18, 1858.

G. A. WETHERALL, Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX No. 32.

RETURN of the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File belonging to Regiments serving in India, who have purchased their Discharge in each year, from 1843 to 1856.

Year.	Number of purchased Discharges.	Year.	Number of purchased Discharges.
1843	249	1851	166
1844	217	1852	187
1845	264	1853	275
1846	369	1854	215
1847	211	1855	75
1848	144	1856	85
1849	124		
1850	165	Total -	2,746

Total strength for 14 years, - 421,452.
Total discharges by purchase, 2,746.
One in 153.

W. F. FORSTER, Deputy Adjutant-General.

Adjutant-General's Office, Horse Guards, November 27, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 33.

A RETURN showing the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the East India Company's Troops, Artillery, and Infantry, who have purchased their Discharge in each Year, from 1843 to 1856.

Year.	Number of purchased Discharges.	Year.	Number of purchased Discharges.
1843	24	1851	42
1844	35	1852	48
1845	37	1853	62
1846	38	1854	44
1847	54	1855	62
1848	41	1856	49
1849	31		
1850	45	Total -	612

Total strength in 14 years, 175,119.
Total discharges, - - 612.
One in 286.

Military Department, East India House, December 17, 1858.

W. E. BAKER, Colonel, Military Secretary.

APPENDIX No. 34.

RETURN showing the Strength and Number of Deaths during the first Year of Service in India, in such of Her Majesty's Regiments as have arrived there from Australia and the Cape of Good Hope, from 1843 to 1857.

Adjutant-General's Office, November 18, 1858.

Regiments.	Strength on Embarkation.	Reinforcements from England.	Volunteers from Regiments in India.	Total Strength.	Station from which embarked.	Date of Arrival of Head-Quarters in India.	Number of Deaths during first year of Service in India.
80th Foot . .	983	78	124	1,185	Australia	1844: Nov. 16.	132
51st „ . .	964	68	119	1,151	Australia	1846: Oct. 7.	72
96th „ . .	935	89	.	1,024	Australia	1849: April 26.	60
12th Lancers .	338	20	151	509	Cape of Good Hope	1854: Jan. 12.	8
74th Regt. .	556	269	126	951	Cape of Good Hope	Jan. 12.	62
43rd „ . .	574	353	201	1,128	Cape of Good Hope	Jan. 30.	44
89th „ . .	768	178	.	946	Cape of Good Hope	1857: Sept. 11.	34
13th „ 1st Bat.	763	216	.	979	Cape of Good Hope	Oct. 3.	73

APPENDIX No. 35.

RETURN showing the Number of Deaths during the first year of residence in Eight Regiments which have proceeded direct to India from Great Britain.

Regiments.	Strength.	Number of Deaths in first year.
70th Foot .	1,003	128
83rd „ . .	1,163	62
87th „ . .	1,034	229
75th „ . .	1,064	137
52nd „ . .	1,066	70
81st „ . .	1,066	82
27th „ . .	770	109
35th „ . .	692	49
	7,863	866
Average .	982	108

G. A. WETHERALL, Adjutant-General.

RESULT of the preceding Return.

No. of Regiments.	Whence proceeded.	Strength.	Deaths during the first year of Service.	Average Deaths per Cent.
3	Australia . .	3,360	264	7·8
5	Cape of Good Hope	4,513	221	4·8
8	England . .	7,863	866	11·0

Indian Army Commission, Dec. 1858.

APPENDIX No. 36.

RETURN showing the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the under-mentioned *Ages*, that composed, at the Time of Embarkation,* the Six Regiments of Infantry of Her Majesty's Army which were last sent to India, previously to the War with Russia.

Adjutant-General's Office, November 24, 1858.

Regiments.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.						
	Under 20 Years.	20 to 25.	25 to 30.	30 to 35.	35 to 40.	40 Years and upwards.	Total Strength.
87th Regiment -	67	449	197	109	27	8	857
75th „ -	124	339	433	39	12	2	949
52nd „ -	270	363	256	149	63	5	1,106
81st „ -	222	407	230	129	55	4	1,047
74th „ -	151	266	199	192	81	13	902
43rd „ -	105	293	313	246	91	4	1,052
Total - -	939	2,117	1,628	864	329	36	5,913
Average per Reg. of all ages -	156	352	271	144	54	6	985

G. A. WETHERALL, Adjutant-General.

* The above particulars cannot be stated at the time of embarkation, and the information is given from the first report received from each regiment after its arrival in India.

APPENDIX No. 37.

RETURN showing the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the under-mentioned *Ages*, on the 1st January 1856, that composed the 1st and 2nd Bengal, Madras, and Bombay European Infantry Regiments.

—	Under 20 Years of Age.	20 to 24.	25 to 29.	30 to 34.	35 to 39.	40 and upwards.	Numbers in each Regiment.
BENGAL.							
1st European Fusileers	52	234	353	125	33	6	803
2nd „ „	55	189	285	106	84	6	725
MADRAS.							
1st European Fusileers	—	35	226	221	177	70	729
2nd European Light Infantry - - -	24	102	315	262	166	33	902
BOMBAY.							
1st European Fusileers	40	68	385	284	76	8	861
2nd European Light Infantry - - -	71	120	388	260	71	5	915
Total - -	242	748	1,952	1,258	607	128	4,935
Average per Regiment of all ages - -	40	124	325	209	101	21	822

W. E. BAKER, Colonel, Military Secretary.

East India House, December 1858.

APPENDIX No. 38.

RETURN showing the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the under-mentioned *Ages*, that have composed any two of Her Majesty's Regiments of Infantry in each Presidency, after Ten to Fifteen Years' Service in India.

Adjutant-General's Office, November 24, 1858.

Presidency.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.						
	Under 20 Years.	20 to 25.	25 to 30.	30 to 35.	35 to 40.	40 years and upwards.	Total Strength.
BENGAL.							
10th Foot - - - - - - -	66	230	340	200	144	9	989
22nd „ - - - - - - -	41	130	325	429	59	5	989
MADRAS.							
25th Foot - - - - - - -	37	67	375	378	123	22	1,002
84th „ - - - - - - -	46	156	198	385	131	11	922
BOMBAY.							
78th Foot - - - - - - -	21	133	474	282	50	3	909
86th „ - - - - - - -	57	134	320	295	113	4	923
Total - - - - - - -	268	850	2,027	1,915	620	54	5,734
Average per Regt. - - - - -	44	141	337	319	103	9	955

W. F. FORSTER, Deputy Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX No. 39.

RETURN showing the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the under-mentioned *Service* that composed, at the time of Embarkation,* the Six Regiments of Infantry of Her Majesty's Army which were last sent to India, previously to the War with Russia.

Regiments.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.													
	18 yrs. Service and upwards.	14 to 17 yrs.	12 to 13 yrs.	10 to 11 yrs.	9 yrs.	8 yrs	7 yrs.	6 yrs.	5 yrs.	4 yrs.	3 yrs.	2 yrs.	Under 2 yrs. Service.	Total Strength.
87th Regiment	27	20	39	55	13	20	29	55	77	96	208	120	98	857
75th „ -	11	37	31	47	26	24	38	47	73	256	54	144	161	949
52nd „ -	14	103	60	89	44	25	101	43	58	60	47	83	379	1,106
81st „ -	18	65	46	69	36	36	107	38	42	41	67	195	287	1,047
74th „ -	39	87	48	65	74	42	79	58	51	45	61	97	156	902
43rd „ -	28	167	83	80	32	60	77	83	61	57	80	100	144	1,052
Total -	137	479	307	405	225	207	431	324	362	555	517	739	1,225	5,913
Average per Regiment	23	79	51	67	37	34	72	54	60	92	86	123	204	985

* The above particulars cannot be stated at the time of embarkation, and the information is given from the first report received from each regiment after its arrival in India.

W. F. FORSTER, Deputy Adjutant-General.

Adjutant-General's Office, November 30, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 40.

RETURN showing the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the under-mentioned *Service* that composed the First and Second Bengal, Madras, and Bombay European Infantry Regiments, at the date of the last Returns.

Presidency.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.													
	18 Years' Service and upwards.	14 to 17 Years.	12 to 13 Years.	10 to 11 Years.	9 Years.	8 Years.	7 Years.	6 Years.	5 Years.	4 Years.	3 Years.	2 Years.	Under 2 Years' Service.	Total Strength.
BENGAL - 1st European Fusileers	8	67	16	87	47	46	132	62	13	103	11	162	123	877
BENGAL - Ditto	1	102	9	12	41	87	119	18	8	78	17	156	166	819
BENGAL - Average per Regiment	4½	84½	12½	44½	44	66½	125½	45	8	90½	14	164	144½	848
MADRAS - 1st European Fusileers	41	210	44	188	47	0	15	51	46	7	5	6	78	748
MADRAS - 2nd European Lt. Infantry	12	325	1	147	58	1	30	113	34	1	2	116	78	918
MADRAS - Average per Regiment	26½	267½	22½	167½	52½	½	22½	82	40	4	3½	61	78	833
BOMBAY - 1st European Fusileers	30	117	39	159	59	0	69	74	2	4	1	273	6	893
BOMBAY - 2nd European Lt. Infantry	3	150	29	84	93	172	9	78	0	0	0	320	0	938
BOMBAY - Average per Regiment	16½	163½	34	121½	76	86	39	76	1	2	½	269½	3	915½

East India House,
December 3, 1858.

W. E. BAKER, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

APPENDIX No. 41.

RETURN showing the Number of Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File of the under-mentioned Service that have composed any Two of Her Majesty's Regiments of Infantry in each Presidency after 10 to 15 Years' Service in India.

Presidency.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.													
	18 Years' Service and upwards.	14 to 17 Years.	12 to 13 Years.	10 to 11 Years.	9 Years.	8 Years.	7 Years.	6 Years.	5 Years.	4 Years.	3 Years.	2 Years.	Under 2 Years' Service.	Total Strength.
BENGAL - 10th Regiment	14	107	135	100	61	82	140	85	41	45	60	45	74	989
BENGAL - 22nd „	12	82	199	145	28	126	108	27	52	60	13	49	88	989
BENGAL - Average per Regiment	13	94½	167	122½	44½	104	124	56	46½	52½	36½	47	81	989
MADRAS - 25th Regiment	69	98	144	345	92	38	58	65	22	10	12	5	44	1,002
MADRAS - 84th „	51	181	227	92	25	30	56	9	25	57	47	53	69	922
MADRAS - Average per Regiment	60	139½	185½	218½	58½	34	57	37	23½	33½	29½	29	56½	962
BOMBAY - 78th Regiment	17	105	102	71	357	85	5	6	11	3	46	62	39	909
BOMBAY - 86th „	20	153	123	175	41	24	175	24	10	8	33	26	111	923
BOMBAY - Average per Regiment	18½	129	112½	123	199	54½	90	15	10½	5½	39½	44	75	916

Adjutant General's Office,
November 30, 1858.

W. F. FORSTER,
Deputy Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX No. 42.

A RETURN showing the STRENGTH and NUMBER of DEATHS of NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, and RANK and FILE, in the EAST INDIA COMPANY'S ARMY, at each of the STATIONS in BENGAL PRESIDENCY occupied by that Force, from 1843 to 1857 inclusive.

MILITARY STATIONS.	1843–44–45–46.			1847–48.			1848–49.			1849–50.			1850–51.			1851–52.			1852–53.			1853–54–55–56–57.		
	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.
Dumdum	The Returns showing details at each Station for these years have not been received.			504	23	4·56	533	36	6·75	297	29	9·76	399	14	3·51	The Returns showing details at each Station for this year have not been received.			73	4	5·48	The Returns for these years showing details at each Station have not been received.		
Dinapore				71	2	2·81	100	3	3·00	85	4	3·53							75	3	4·00			
Benares				120	6	5·00	153	3	1·96	308	17	5·51							76	3	3·94			
Chunar				336	19	5·65	331	16	4·83	298	12	4·02							—	—	—			
Cawnpore				884	33	3·73	789	117	14·82	497	45	9·05	85	1	1·17				92	2	2·17			
Meerut				216	6	2·77	361	13	3·60	116	3	2·58	103	3	2·90				106	—	—			
Agra				90	1	1·11	99	1	1·01	1,079	97	8 98	1,090	28	2·56				1,077	38	3·52			
Umballa				427	13	2·04	913	89	9·74	279	4	1·43	193	3	1·55				377	18	4·77			
Subathoo				1,091	43	3·94	709	68	9·59	—	—	—	—	—	—				—	—	—			
Loodianah				323	12	3·71	159	11	6·91	111	5	4·50	102	7	6·88				—	—	—			
Ferozepore				182	7	3·84	62	2	3·22	147	12	8·16	140	4	2·85				249	6	2·40			
Hosheapoor				100	2	1·98	104	1	0·96	76	5	6·56	94	—	—				—	—	—			
Jullundur				189	4	2·11	191	5	2·61	219	2	0·91	207	3	1·44				191	2	1·04			
Lahore				349	12	3·43	207	18	2·69	1,388	110	7·92	1,440	209	14·51				528	21	3·97			
Nusseerabad				71	1	1·40	74	4	5·40	—	—	—	—	—	—				—	—	—			
Mhow				76	3	3·94	76	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				—	—	—			
Darjeeling				—	—	—	71	6	8·45	57	8	1·40	71	2	2·81				78	1	1·28			
Laudour				—	—	—	103	11	10·67	137	20	1·46	122	16	13·11				104	8	7·69			
Wuzeerabad				—	—	—	—	—	—	192	8	4·16	86	8	9·30				—	—	—			
Mooltan				—	—	—	—	—	—	139	6	4·31	128	9	7·03				85	2	2·35			
Peshawur				—	—	—	—	—	—	581	19	3·27	636	26	4·08				614	27	4·39			
Sealkote				—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	82	2	2·43				177	4	2·25			
Gobindghur				—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				77	1	1·29			
In Burmah				—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				996	83	8·33			
Murree				—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				100	5	5·00			
TOTAL				5,029	187	3·71	5,035	404	8·02	6,006	406	6·75	4,978	335	6·72				5,075	228	4·49			

NOTE.—The number of deaths in this and the following statements is exclusive of "killed in action," though probably deaths arising from wounds or from diseases contracted in actual warfare are included.

Record and Statistical Department, East India House, December 14, 1858.

(Signed) M. HORNIDGE.

A RETURN showing the STRENGTH and NUMBERS of DEATHS of NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, RANK and FILE, in the EAST INDIA COMPANY'S ARMY, at each of the Stations occupied by that Force in the MADRAS PRESIDENCY, from 1843 to 1857 inclusive.

MILITARY STATIONS.	1843.			1844.			1845.			1846.			1847.			1848.			1849.			1850.			1851.			1852.			1853.			1854.			1855.			1856 & 1857.		
	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Rates of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.
Madras	404	20	4·95	439	17	3·64	419	12	2·86	377	7	1·85	464	17	3·66	199	4	2·01	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,276	36	2·82	The returns for these years have not been received.		
St. Thomas Mount	1,446	52	3·59	1,313	63	4·79	641	9	1·40	697	20	2·86	883	49	5·54	860	28	3·25	534	20	3·74	795	19	2·69	690	33	4·78	539	30	5·56	390	13	3·33	600	29	4·83	—	—	—			
Trichinopoly	138	8	5·79	131	—	—	934	43	4·60	908	18	1·98	1,027	13	1·26	1,155	22	1·90	1,122	37	3·28	89	7	7·86	92	4	4·04	102	1	·98	—	—	—	—	—	—	203	3	1·47			
Bangalore	1,263	27	2·13	1,121	16	1·42	1,128	28	2·48	708	14	1·97	209	4	1·91	257	3	1·16	221	2	·90	252	5	1·98	289	7	2·42	141	15	10·6	117	7	5·98	203	5	2·46	277	8	2·88			
Cannanore	19	1	5·25	23	1	4·78	17	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	21	—	—	—	—	—	7	1	14·2	11	—	—	8	1	12·5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Bellary	104	5	4·80	54	2	3·70	105	5	4·76	474	8	1·68	989	9	·91	1,126	9	·79	1,148	27	2·35	1,023	25	2·28	1,123	16	1·42	132	5	3·78	220	5	2·27	823	46	5·58	84	—	—			
Secunderabad	218	—	—	337	7	2·07	303	3	·99	293	14	4·77	189	7	3·69	265	4	1·95	210	5	2·38	1,171	32	2·73	1,193	63	5·28	1,177	14	1·18	1,168	18	1·54	988	16	1·61	1,091	25	2·28			
Jaulnah													102	1	·98	104	3	2·88	109	3	2·75	111	3	2·70	127	1	·78	117	—	—	109	—	—	111	—	—	117	1	·85			
Kamptee	313	6	1·91	350	10	2·85	298	12	4·02	360	13	4·33	284	5	1·76	307	5	1·62	316	9	2·84	306	14	4·57	320	2	·62	332	6	1·80	307	6	1·95	334	3	·89	377	10	2·65			
Saugor	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	76	4	5·26	69	4	5·79	76	—	—	86	2	2·32	105	2	1·90	119	3	2·52	196	5	2·55	108	2	1·85	103	2	1·94	101	2	1·98			
Mhow	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	102	—	—	100	4	4·00	6	1	16·6	86	2	2·32	91	3	3·29	100	1	1·00			
Moulmein	152	9	5·92	143	3	2·09	95	8	8·42	90	9	10·00	100	—	—	106	1	·94	101	1	·99	96	3	3·12	110	2	1·81	105	18	17·1	96	7	7·29	97	2	2·06	94	2	2·12			
Penang, Singapore, and Malacca	47	2	4·25	56	2	3·57	66	1	1·51	51	5	9·97	57	1	1·75	61	—	—	58	—	—	52	—	—	78	—	—	83	1	1·20	44	—	—	57	2	3·50	47	1	2·12			
Rangoon	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	171	3	2·75	125	4	3·20			
Tonghoo	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	801	33	4·11	687	33	4·80			
Palaveram	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	111	3	2·70	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	40	1	2·50	—	—	—			
Poonamallee	951	19	1·99	495	28	5·65	444	29	6·53	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	84	10	11·9	276	7	2·53	164	19	11·5	181	14	7·73	96	4	4·16	—	—	—			
Cuddalore	493	37	7·50							163	11	6·74	—	—	—	—	—	—	47	—	—	—	—	—	11	2	18·1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Vellore	63	4	6·34	70	2	2·75	56	4	7·14	52	9	17·3	40	4	10·00	—	—	—	9	2	22·2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Ongole Varcoé	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	2	66·6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Nagpore	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	23	—	—	10	—	—	12	—	—	11	—	—	11	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Vizagapatam	137	6	4·37	152	6	3·94	195	3	1·53	167	7	4·19	168	6	3·57	43	—	—	13	1	7·69	15	—	—	9	—	—	30	3	10·00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Aden	—	—	—	96	3	3·12	94	3	3·19	111	7	6·30	112	1	·89	66	—	—	129	1	·77	135	1	·74	130	1	·76	117	—	—	116	—	—	104	5	4·80	—	—	—			
Palamcottah	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	4	—	—	4	1	25·00	4	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—			
Camp Hingole	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	92	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Masulipatam	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	28	1	3·54	21	2	9·52	18	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Labuan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	20	1	5·00	18	2	11·1	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Burmah	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,051	73	6·94	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Southern Mahratta Division.	238	4	1·68	277	14	5·05	183	13	7·10	192	7	3·64	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—			
Total	5,035	181	3·59	5,513	165	2·99	5,029	172	3·42	4,940	171	3·46	4,993	137	2·74	4,596	79	1·71	4,239	111	2·61	4,359	124	2·84	4,718	146	3·09	3,273	120	3·66	4,011	149	3·71	4,623	154	3·33	4,579	126	2·75			

Record and Statistical Dept., East India House,
December 14, 1858.

M. HORNIDGE.

A RETURN showing the STRENGTH and NUMBER of DEATHS of NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, RANK and FILE, in the EAST INDIA COMPANY'S ARMY, in each of the Stations occupied by that Force in the Presidency of BOMBAY, from 1843 to 1857.

MILITARY STATIONS.	1843, '44, '45, & '46.			1847.			1848.			1849.			1850.			1851.			1852.			1853.			1854.			1855.			1856 and '57.		
	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.	Average Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio of Deaths to Strength.
Bombay -	The returns showing details have not been received for these years.			114	21	18·42	157	17	10·82	193	38	19·68	157	22	14·00	75	6	8·00	221	6	2·71	543	27	4·97	No return for this year has been received.			146	4	2·74	No returns for these years have been received.		
Poona -				251	7	2·78	732	8	1·09	1,057	33	3·12	1,431	37	2·58	1,320	23	1·74	1,020	12	1·17	560	8	1·42				1,051	11	1·04			
Ahmednugger				541	8	1·47	354	6	1·69	353	14	3·96	381	6	1·57	505	5	·99	463	5	1·08	435	8	1·83				268	5	1·86			
Poorundhur -				—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	43	2	4·65	78	4	5·02				68	—	—			
Deesa -				109	2	1·83	105	5	4·76	103	2	1·94	—	—	—	109	3	2·75	109	5	4·60	102	2	1·96				99	—	—			
Aboo -				—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				74	—	—			
Belgaune -				—	—	—	29	—	—	976	30	3·01	1,059	24	2·26	1,249	21	1·68	1,165	34	2·91	117	2	1·70				124	2	1·61			
Sholapoor -				77	3	3·89	99	2	2·02	99	—	—	105	—	—	105	1	·95	111	2	1·80	105	1	·95				95	—	—			
Kurrachee -				889	16	1·79	—	—	—	136	6	4·41	121	7	5·78	143	3	2·09	144	3	2·08	1,123	29	2·58				1,107	18	1·62			
Hyderabad -				—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				873	21	2·40			
Nusserabad -				—	—	—	—	—	—	106	1	·94	105	3	2·85	102	1	0·98	110	2	1·81	122	—	—				105	2	1·90			
Aden -				731	35	4·78	487	12	2·46	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	132	—	—	513	8	1·55				118	8	6·78			
Vingorla -				—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	40	2	5·00	66	6	9·09	29	5	17·3	—	—	—				—	—	—			
Bhooj - -				96	2	2·08	—	—	—	—	—	—	102	10	9·80	104	3	2·80	105	1	·95	109	2	1·83				—	—	—			
Peshawur -				—	—	—	1,153	36	3·12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				—	—	—			
Mooltan -				—	—	—	176	3	1·70	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				—	—	—			
Kolapoor -				88	—	—	98	3	3·06	104	—	—	101	4	3·96	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—				—	—	—			
TOTAL -	-	-	-	2,896	94	3·24	3,390	92	2·71	3,127	124	3·96	3,602	115	3·19	3,778	72	1·90	3,650	77	2·10	3,807	91	2·39	-	-	-	4,128	71	1·72			

Record and Statistical Dept., East India House,
December 14, 1858.

M. HORNIDGE.

APPENDIX No. 43.

A RETURN, showing the STRENGTH and NUMBER of DEATHS in the EAST INDIA COMPANY'S EUROPEAN FORCES, ARTILLERY and INFANTRY, in BRITISH INDIA, in each Year from 1843 to 1857.

Years.	BENGAL.			MADRAS.			BOMBAY			TOTAL for INDIA.		
	Average Annual Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio per Cent. of Deaths to Strength.	Average Annual Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio per Cent. of Deaths to Strength.	Average Annual Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio per Cent. of Deaths to Strength.	Average Annual Strength.	No. of Deaths.	Ratio per Cent. of Deaths to Strength.
1843	17,986	1,604	8·97	5,035	181	3·59	5,022	272	5·41	28,043	2,057	7·33
1844	16,548	834	5·03	5,513	165	2·99	3,667	244	6·65	25,728	1,243	4·83
1845	15,315	1,678	10·96	5,029	172	3·42	8,608	687	7·97	28,952	2,537	8·76
1846	19,009	1,123	5·90	4,940	171	2·46	9,253	864	9·33	33,202	2,158	6·49
1847	5,029	187	3·71	4,993	137	2·74	2,896	94	3·24	12,918	418	3·23
1848	5,035	404	8·02	4,596	79	1·50	3,390	92	2·71	13,021	575	4·41
1849	6,006	406	6·75	4,239	111	2·59	3,127	124	3·96	13,372	641	4·79
1850	4,978	335	6·72	4,359	124	2·84	3,602	115	3·19	12,939	574	4·43
1851	Not received.			4,718	146	3·09	3,778	72	1·90	—	—	—
1852	5,075	228	4·49	3,273	120	3·66	3,650	77	2·10	11,998	425	3·54
1853	5,629	456	8·10	4,011	149	3·71	3,807	91	2·39	13,447	696	5·17
1854	5,752	274	4·76	4,623	154	3·33	Not received.			—	—	—
1855	—	—	—	4,579	126	2·75	4,128	71	1·72	—	—	—
1856	† —	—	—	† —	—	—	* 8,966	186	2·07	—	—	—
1857	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

* The Queen's and Company's European Troops cannot be distinguished in these years.
† The Returns from India for these years have not been received.

Record and Statistical Department, East India House,
14th December 1858.

M. HORNIDGE.

APPENDIX No. 44.

COMPARISON of the STRENGTH and DEATHS in the EAST INDIA COMPANY'S EUROPEAN FORCES and in HER MAJESTY'S ARMY serving in the EAST INDIES during the same Period; the former taken from the Return of Mr. Hornidge, dated the 14th December 1858, and the latter as extracted from the War Office Sanitary Returns.

Year.	Presidency of Bengal.				Presidency of Madras.				Presidency of Bombay.			
	E. I. Company's European Forces.		Her Majesty's Army.		E. I. Company's European Forces.		Her Majesty's Army.		E. I. Company's European Forces.		Her Majesty's Army.	
	Strength.	Deaths.	Strength.	Deaths.	Strength.	Deaths.	Strength.	Deaths.	Strength.	Deaths.	Strength.	Deaths.
1843			Omitted because the information has not been given for the East India Company's European Forces.		5,035	181	7,699	427	5,022	272	6,066	468
1844	Cannot be obtained separately from that of Her Majesty's troops.				5,513	165	7,850	276	3,667	244	6,323	824
1845					5,029	172	7,535	351	Cannot be obtained separately from Her Majesty's troops.		Omitted because the information has not been given for the East India Company's European Forces.	
1846					4,940	171	5,772	264				
1847	5,029	187	12,349	781	4,993	137	6,040	227	2,896	94	5,556	139
1848	5,035	404	11,502	1,190	4,596	79	5,321	125	3,390	92	6,208	179
1849	6,006	406	14,703	1,306	4,239	111	5,014	159	3,127	124	6,619	310
1850	4,978	335	17,307	911	4,359	124	4,838	110	3,602	115	5,872	165
1851	As above.		As above.		4,718	146	4,162	88	3,778	72	5,774	194
1852	5,075	228	16,659	1,196	3,273	120	4,548	304	3,650	77	5,688	194
1853	5,629	456	16,191	950	4,011	149	4,598	215	3,807	91	5,306	102
1854	5,752	274	17,087	782	4,623	154	4,357	143	As above.		As above.	
1855	As above.		As above.		4,579	126	3,209	80	4,128	71	4,423	80
Totals	37,504	2,290	105,798	7,116	59,908	1,835	70,943	2,769	37,067	1,252	57,835	2,655
Ratio per 1,000 of strength	61·1		67·2		30·6		39·0		33·7		45·9	

These results, however, are subject to the corrections stated in the following Observations.

Observations on the preceding Comparison of the Relative Mortality among the European Forces of the East India Company's and Her Majesty's Army, from 1843 to 1855.

To ascertain the relative loss in Line regiments in India and in the East India Company's European force there, the strength and deaths as given on the last page of Mr. Hornidge's return, dated 14th December last, have, been placed opposite the same information obtained from the War Office sanitary returns for the same years, as given in my evidence. For any years in which that information could not be given in the former, it has also been omitted in the latter; but before drawing conclusions, corrections must also be made for the following circumstances.

The loss of Her Majesty's army in Bengal in 1848 and 1849 includes 360 killed in action, and 67 died of their wounds in the campaigns of the Punjaub, who must be deducted, as in no way affecting the comparison in view. The number of deaths remaining to be compared is thus reduced to 6,689.

Next comes a deduction on account of the loss in the second Burmese war, in which two corps from this presidency, the 18th and 80th, suffered severely, chiefly from disease and casualties consequent on that service, for which the following corrections have to be made:—

	Strength.	Deaths.
From the total of Bengal of - -	105,798	6,689
Deduct 1852-3 18th Regiment -	850	260
„ „ 80th „ - -	900	197
„ 1853-4 18th „ - -	707	111
„ „ 80th „ - -	754	143
Total Deductions - -	3,211	711
Showing the results, exclusive of the Burmese and Punjaub wars, to be - - - -	102,587 or $58\frac{2}{10}$ per 1,000.	5,978

It is shown by the returns received from the Indian House that about 996 of the latter force were also employed in the Burmese war in 1852-3, and that the loss was 83, but this would only reduce the total mortality to $60\frac{5}{10}$ per thousand against $58\frac{2}{10}$ in Her Majesty's army.

It forms, however, a much more important consideration that all the deaths which have taken place among that portion of the East India Company's troops borne on the town major's list in Bengal appear to have been omitted, and till the necessary correction has been made on that account, no accurate conclusions can be drawn as to the relative loss in the two forces.

It may serve as an illustration how much such peculiarities require being attended to in these comparisons, that out of 304 deaths recorded as having occurred in the establishment of Her Majesty's troops in the Madras presidency in the year 1852-3, 225 took place in 51st regiment, then serving in Burmah,

	Strength.	Deaths.
So that from the total in the comparison of - - - - - -	70,943	2,769
There must be deducted for this corps alone, in 1852-3 - - - -	812	225
And in 1853-4 - - - - -	444	69
Showing the results in the Madras presidency, exclusive of the Burmese war, to have been - - - -	69,687	2,475

or in the ratio of $35\frac{6}{10}$ per thousand against $30\frac{6}{10}$ per thousand in the East India Company's European force.

The East India Company had also about 1,051 of their European force employed in Burmah in 1853, of whom 73 died, but even if these are deducted, it will leave the mortality of that class 30 per thousand, as on margin.

Total as in Comparison.	Strength.	Deaths.
	59,908	1,835
Deduct -	1,051	73
Remains -	58,857	1,762
or 30 per thousand.		

There are other considerations also which affect comparisons of mortality quite as much as the casualties of warfare, though it is impossible here to take them into account, such as the salubrity of the barracks occupied by Her Majesty's and the East India Company's armies respectively at the same station. As an illustration of this, it is shown in a report by the Deputy Inspector-General at Madras in 1843, that owing to the extremely unhealthy locality of the barracks occupied by the former at Secunderabad, their loss had during the preceding ten years averaged $7\frac{3}{10}$ per cent., while among the European artillery it only averaged $3\frac{4}{10}$, or less than half as much. This cause of extra loss has now, I understand, been removed, but the fact is important as showing how many contingencies have to be taken into account in comparisons of this kind.

Owing to the enormous mortality in the campaign of Scinde and the sickness which followed, and occasioned a loss of 525 men in one regiment (the 78th) in a single year, it has become necessary in the Bombay presidency to omit any notice of the results for the year 1843 and 1844, as we have no means of knowing to what extent the East India Company's European force suffered from the same causes on the same occasions.

Therefore from the total of:—

	East India European Force. Strength.	Deaths.	Her Majesty's Army. Strength.	Deaths.
	37,067	1,252	57,835	2,655
Deduct, 1843	5,022	272	6,066	468
And 1844	3,667	244	6,323	824
Remains -	28,378	736	45,446	1,363

being in the ratio of $29\frac{9}{10}$ per thousand in Her Majesty's army against $25\frac{9}{10}$ per thousand in the East India Company's Europeans.

From the former a few deaths in action should have been excluded, but they are not sufficiently numerous to influence the results.

After all these sources of discrepancy have been removed, it appears that so far as regards the usual mortality to which European troops are exposed, exclusive of what results directly or indirectly from warfare, the loss in the East India Company's European force has been greater than that of Her Majesty's Army in Bengal by above $2\frac{3}{10}$ per thousand, and less in the Madras and Bombay presidencies by $5\frac{6}{10}$ and 4 per thousand respectively.

These results, however, would be subject to a further modification tending to increase the rates in the East India Company's European force, should it be found that the returns of that service refer only to the deaths recorded by the medical department, which usually omits all who did not come into hospital. In the War Office returns every death, from whatever cause, is included.

The invaliding and transfers to invalid establishments have been higher among the East India Company's Europeans in the proportion of 28 to 21 per thousand throughout India, and their mortality would probably have been more strongly indicated also in this comparison, but for the larger proportion of men of long service in Line regiments which have been above 10 years in India, as is shown by the following summary of the Horse Guards and India House returns on that head, viz.:—

	Of and above 10 years' Service.	Under that Service.	Total Strength.
On the average of six of Her Majesty's regiments in India there were - -	1,383	1,484	2,867
On the average of the six East India Company's European regiments - -	967	1,629	2,596

This peculiarity in the longer services of the men in Her Majesty's corps arises from the operation of volunteering, which tends to bring into them from other regiments returning home numbers who, having been for many years in India, are subject to high rates of mortality, but which is not likely to be the case when there is no longer a bounty on volunteering, and the service of Her Majesty's regiments there is reduced to 10 years. The men will then as a body necessarily be of less deteriorated constitution and younger than any local European force maintained permanently in the country, and consequently better fitted to contend against the influence of the climate.

Alex. M. Tulloch.

War Office, January 1859.

RETURN showing the Extent of Invaliding in the East India Company's European Armies in the Presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, for each year, from 1825 to 1844 inclusive; extracted from a Return to the House of Commons, dated June 16, 1845.

Year.	Bengal.		Madras.		Bombay.	
	Strength.	Invalided.	Strength.	Invalided.	Strength.	Invalided.
1825	4,512	167	4,350	108	1,928	56
1826	4,357	295	4,548	159	1,727	55
1827	3,793	248	4,982	97	1,895	91
1828	4,177	217	5,216	34	2,227	113
1829	4,466	205	5,007	114	2,216	118
1830	4,550	202	5,265	124	2,576	85
1831	4,757	154	5,325	120	2,243	120
1832	4,342	108	5,019	76	2,424	35
1833	4,220	85	4,739	81	2,285	103
1834	3,806	76	4,481	85	2,151	2
1835	4,084	70	4,749	84	1,990	82
1836	4,269	89	4,574	95	1,907	19
1837	4,324	129	4,645	122	1,861	91
1838	4,303	148	4,901	69	2,266	40
1839	4,098	113	4,696	126	2,043	60
1840	4,754	236	5,045	134	2,374	62
1841	4,751	220	5,785	132	3,479	77
1842	4,777	147	6,083	130	4,706	121
1843	5,016	166	5,917	121	5,022	201
1844	5,034	152	5,883	90	3,667	80
Totals	88,380	3,227	101,210	2,101	50,987	1,611
Ratio per Cent.	3·65		2·08		3·16	

Grand Total	Strength.	Invalided.
	240,577	6,939

Ratio per Cent. 2·88

RETURN showing the Number of Men discharged at Chatham as Invalids from Troops of the Line serving in the several Presidencies in the East Indies; extracted from pages 481 and 483 of Appendix to Report.

Year.	Bengal.		Madras.		Bombay.	
	Strength.	Invalided.	Strength.	Invalided.	Strength.	Invalided.
1840	-	372	-	176	-	91
1841	-	255	-	161	-	169
1842	-	173	-	74	-	182
1843	-	104	-	110	-	86
1844	-	125	-	96	-	123
1845	-	104	-	110	-	86
1846	-	260	-	142	-	244
1847	-	316	-	166	-	300
1848	-	563	-	112	-	121
1849	-	275	-	160	-	93
1850	-	126	-	71	-	167
1851	-	134	-	100	-	291
1852	-	126	-	75	-	190
1853	-	144	-	143	-	285
1854	-	119	-	75	-	245
Totals	188,407	3,196	87,486	1,771	84,670	2,673
Ratio per Cent.	1·69		2·02		3·15	

Grand Total	Strength.	Invalided.
	360,563	7,640

Ratio per Cent. 2·11

This information cannot readily be obtained for precisely the same period as is given above, but the results will be sufficient for an approximation.

APPENDIX No. 45.

ESTABLISHMENT of ROYAL ARTILLERY in INDIA per Estimates 1858-9.

Establishment.	Establishment of a Troop of Royal Horse Artillery.	Establishment of a Field Battery.	Establishment of a Company.	Bengal.				Bombay.				Madras.				General Total.
				2 Troops Royal Horse Artillery.	9 Field Batteries.	2 Garrison Companies.	Total.	1 Troop Royal Horse Artillery.	7 Field Batteries.	3 Garrison Companies.	Total.	1 Troop Royal Horse Artillery.	2 Field Batteries.	1 Garrison Company.	Total.	
Lieutenant Colonels	–	–	–	2	2	1	5	–	3	–	3	–	1	–	1	9
Lieutenant Colonels on Majors' Pay	–	–	–	–	–	1	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1
Senior Surgeons and Surgeons	–	–	–	1	1	1	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2
Assistant Surgeons	1	1	–	2	9	–	11	1	7	–	8	1	2	–	3	22
Veterinary Surgeons *	–	–	–	–	6	–	6	–	4	–	4	–	1	–	1	11
Captains	1	1	1	2	9	2	13	1	7	3	11	1	2	1	4	28
Second Captains	1	1	1	2	9	2	13	1	7	3	11	1	2	1	4	28
Lieutenants	3	3	3	6	27	6	39	3	21	9	33	3	6	3	12	84
Staff Serjeants	2	–	–	4	1	–	5	2	–	–	2	2	–	–	2	9
Company Serjeants	–	1	1	–	9	2	11	–	7	3	10	–	2	1	3	24
Serjeants	10	11	8	20	99	16	135	10	77	24	111	10	22	8	40	286
Corporals	4	9	6	8	81	12	101	4	63	18	85	4	18	6	28	214
Bombardiers	6	9	6	12	81	12	105	6	63	18	87	6	18	6	30	222
Gunners	90	115	115	180	1035	230	1445	90	805	345	1240	90	230	115	435	3120
Drivers	70	60	–	140	540	–	680	70	420	–	490	70	120	–	190	1360
Trumpeters	1	2	2	2	18	4	24	1	14	6	21	1	4	2	7	52
Farriers and Carriage Smiths	1	1	–	2	9	–	11	1	7	–	8	1	2	–	3	22
Shoeing and Carriage Smiths	6	6	–	12	54	–	66	6	42	–	48	6	12	–	18	132
Collar Makers	3	3	–	6	27	–	33	3	21	–	24	3	6	–	9	66
Wheelers	3	2	–	6	18	–	24	3	14	–	17	3	4	–	7	48
Total	202	225	143	406	2035	289	2730	202	1582	429	2213	202	452	143	797	5740

* Of the Veterinary Surgeons shown as belonging to Field Batteries, One is attached to each Troop of Royal Horse Artillery.

APPENDIX No. 46.

Detail of a 6-Pounder Troop of Royal Horse Artillery for Service in India.

	Officers.			Men.											Horses.	Ordnance and Carriages.											Rounds of Ammunition per Gun.		Carbines.	Ammunition Rounds per Carbine.
																Guns.		Waggons.												
																				Spare.									
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Assistant Surgeon.	Staff Serjeants.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers.	Gunners.	Drivers.	Farriers.	Shoeing Smiths.	Collar Makers.	Wheelers.	Trumpeters.		6-Pr. Guns.	12-Pr. Howitzer.	6-Pr. Gun.	12-Pr. Howitzer.	6-Pr, Gun.	12-Pr. Howitzer.	Store Limber Waggon.	Forge.	Store Cart.	Medicine Cart.	Light Forage Waggon.	6-Pr. Gun.	12-Pr. Howitzer.		
Establishment -	2	3	1	2	9	6	9	90	70	1	6	3	3	1	182	4	2	4	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	231	236	12	470
Total - -	6			200											182	6		9				5					231	236	12	470

Allotment of Men.

	Serjeants.	Rank and File N.C. Officers.	Gunners.	Drivers.	S. Serjts.	Serjeants.	Rank and File N.C. Officers.	Gunners.	Drivers.	Artificers	Trumpeters.	Total.
4 Guns, with their Waggons - - each	1	2	10	6	–	4	8	40	24	–	–	76
2 Howitzers, with their Waggons - - "	1	1	10	6	–	2	2	20	12	–	–	36
3 Spare Ammunition Waggons - - "	–	–	2	3	–	–	–	6	9	–	–	15
1 Store Limber Waggon - - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3	–	–	–	3
1 Forge - - - - - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3	–	–	–	3
1 Store Cart - - - - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	1
1 Medicine Cart - - - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	1
1 Light Forage Waggon - - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	–	–	2
1 Staff Serjeant: Serjeant Major - -												
1 " Quartermaster Serjeant - -												
1 Serjeant Conductor of Stores - -												
1 Hospital Serjeant - - - -												
1 Farrier - - - - -												
6 Shoeing Smiths - - - -	–	–	–	–	2	2	–	1	–	13	1	19
3 Collar Makers - - - -												
3 Wheelers - - - - -												
1 Trumpeter - - - - -												
1 Gunner, Acting Trumpeter - -												
In charge of Waggons and Carriages. Spare Men to attend to spare Horses, and to cover Casualties -	–	–	–	–	–	1	5	23	15	–	–	44
Total - -	–	–	–	–	2	9	15	90	70	13	1	200

Allotment of Horses.

	Officers'.	Troop.
Officers' - - - - - - -	12	–
6 Guns, at 6 each - - - - -	–	36
6 Waggons, at 6 each - - - -	–	36
3 Spare Ammunition Waggons, at 6 each - - -	–	18
5 other Carriages - - - - -	–	20
2 Staff Serjeants - - - - -	–	2
6 Gun Detachments, at 8 each - - - - -	–	48
2 Trumpeters - - - - -	–	2
1 Farrier - - - - - - -	–	1
3 Shoeing Smiths - - - - -	–	3
Spare Horses, estimated at 1–10th - - - -	–	16
	12	182

Note.—This Return shows that in a Troop of Royal Horse Artillery of 6-Pounders there is one more Officer, 88 more Men, and 13 more Troop Horses than in a Troop of Horse Artillery on the Bengal system. Native Drivers are not employed in the European Troops of Horse Artillery in Bengal, but every gun-horse is mounted: to each Gun and Waggon there are two sets of horses,—the spare horses being under the charge of the syces. A Troop of Royal Horse Artillery has nine Ammunition Waggons and five other carriages. The Bengal Troop has 12 Ammunition Waggons and 3 other carriages; but the Royal Artillery carry 231 rounds per Gun and 236 rounds for the Howitzers, against 224 rounds per Gun and 140 rounds for the Howitzer in the Bengal Artillery.

DETAIL of an EUROPEAN TROOP of BENGAL HORSE ARTILLERY equipped for FIELD SERVICE.

	Commissioned Officers.			Trumpeters.		Gun Lascars.			Ordnance.		Waggons.				Ammunition Rounds per Gun.				Spare Carriage.	Carbines.	Ammunition.—Rounds per Carbine.	Carts.		Bullocks.	Artificers.						
	Captains.	Subalterns.	Assistant Surgeon.	Full Pay.	Half Pay.	Havildars.	Naicks.	Privates.	6-Pr. Guns.	12-Pr. Howitzer.	6-Pr. Guns.	12-Pr. Howitzer.	Spare. 6-Pr. Guns.	Spare. 12-Pr. Howitzer.	6-Pr. Guns.	Spare. 6-Pr. Gun.	12-Pr. Howitzer.	Spare. 12-Pr. Howitzer.	12-Pr. Howitzer.			Store.	Quartermaster's.		Mistry Smith.	Firemen.	Filemen.	Hammermen.	Mistry Carpenter.	Workmen Carpenter.	Bildars.
Establishment -	1	3	1	2	2	1	2	24	5	1	5	1	5	1	128	96	80	60	1	12	26	2	1	75	1	2	2	2	1	2	4
Total -	5			111		27			1		328		169		6		12		224		140	1	12	26	3		75	14			

ALLOTMENT OF MEN.

Per Gun and its Waggon - { 1 Serjeant. 1 Corporal. 1 Bombardier. 10 Gunners.		
and with spare Horses - 2 ditto.		
Total - 15 × 6 = - - -		90
Staff Serjeant - - 1		
Farriers - - 2		
Stable Orderly - - 1		
Trumpeters - - - 4		
8 - - - - -		8
Allowing for Sick, &c. - - - - -		13
Total - -		111
GUN LASCARS.		
Per Gun - - - 2 } = 3 × 6 - -		18
Per Waggon - - 1 }		
Allowing for Sick and for Stores - - - -		9
Total - -		27

ALLOTMENT OF HORSES.

Per Gun, 2 sets of 6 each and 1 spare = 13 × 6 - -		78
Per Waggon, 2 sets of 6 each and 1 spare = 13 × 6 = -		78
1 Staff Serjeant - - - 1		
6 Serjeants - - - 6		
2 Rough Riders - - 2		
2 Farriers - - - 2		
2 Trumpeters - - 2		
Total - - 13 -		13
Total - -		169

ALLOTMENT OF BULLOCKS.

1 Spare Howitzer Carriage, and 6 Ammunition Waggons.	
7 at 8 each = - - - - -	56
2 Store Carts at 7 each = - - - - - -	14
1 Quartermaster's Cart at 5 - - - -	5
Total - -	75

APPENDIX No. 48.

Detail of a 9-Pounder Field Battery of Royal Artillery for Service in India.

	Officers.			Men.											Horses.	Ordnance and Carriages.										Rounds of Ammunition per Gun.		Carbines.	Ammunition Rounds per Carbine.
																Guns.		Waggons.										
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Assistant Surgeon.	Staff Serjeants.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers.	Gunners.	Drivers.	Farrier.	Shoeing Smiths.	Collar Makers.	Wheelers.	Trumpeters.		9-Pr. Guns.	24-Pr. Howitzers.	9-Pr. Guns.	24-Pr. Howitzers.	Spare Gun Carriage.	Store Lumber Waggon.	Forge.	Store Cart.	Medicine Cart.	Light Forage Waggon.	Guns.	Howitzers.		
Establishment	2	3	1	2	8	6	9	100	70	1	6	3	2	2	140	4	2	6	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	176	174	60	460
Total	6			209											140	6		11		6						176	174	60	460

Allotment of Men.

	Serjeants.	Rank and File N.C. Officers.	Gunners.	Drivers.	S. Serjeants.	Serjeants.	Rank and File N.C. Officers.	Gunners.	Drivers.	Artificers.	Trumpeters.	Total.
6 Guns, with their Waggons - each	1	2	12	7	–	6	12	72	42	–	–	132
1 Store Lumber Waggon - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3	–	–	3
1 Forge - - - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3	–	–	3
1 Store Cart - - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	1
1 Medicine Cart - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	1
1 Light Forage Waggon - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	–	–	2
5 Spare Ammunition Waggons - each	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	10	–	–	–	10
1 Serjeant Major - -												
1 Quartermaster Serjeant - -												
1 Serjeant Conductor of Stores -												
1 Hospital Serjeant - -												
1 Farrier - - - - -	–	–	–	–	2	2	–	–	–	12	2	18
6 Shoeing Smiths - -												
3 Collar Makers - - -												
2 Wheelers - - - -												
2 Trumpeters - - - -												
In charge of Waggons and Carriages, and spare Men to attend to spare Horses -	–	–	–	–	–	–	3	18	18	–	–	39
Total -	–	–	–	–	2	8	15	100	70	12	2	209

Allotment of Horses.

	Officers'.	Troop.
Officers - - - - - - - - - - - -	6	–
6 Guns at 8 each - - - - - - - - - -	–	48
6 Waggons at 6 each - - - - - - - - - -	–	36
5 other Carriages - - - - - - - - - -	–	20
Spare Gun Carriage - - - - - - - - - -	–	6
Mounted Non-commissioned Officers - - - - - - - -	–	14
Trumpeters - - - - - - - - - - -	–	2
Farrier - - - - - - - - - - - -	–	1
Spare Horses, estimated at 1-10th - - - - - - - - -	–	13
Total -	6	140

N.B.—Second Line of Ammunition Waggons not horsed.

* The spare Gun Carriage (which requires 3 Drivers) has lately been sent out to each Field Battery.

Note.—This Return shows that a Field Battery of 9-Pounders of the Royal Artillery comprises 6 Officers, 209 Non-commissioned Officers, Gunners, and Drivers, and 140 Troop Horses; and that a Field Battery on the Bengal Establishment contains 5 Officers, 85 Europeans, 60 Native Drivers (making a total of 145, exclusive of the Officers), and 130 Troop Horses. The Royal Artillery have 11 Ammunition Waggons and 6 other carriages. The Bengal Artillery have 12 Ammunition Waggons and 3 other carriages. The Royal Artillery carry 176 and 174 rounds per gun and howitzer, the Bengal 168 and 112 rounds.

APPENDIX No. 49.

DETAIL of a HORSE FIELD BATTERY on the BENGAL WAR ESTABLISHMENT;—viz. 130 HORSES.

	Commissioned Officers.			Buglers.		Gun Lascars.			Drivers.					Ordnance.		Waggons.				Ammunition Rounds per Gun.				Spare Carriage.			Carts.			Articles.						
	Captain.	Subalterns.	Assistant Surgeon.	Full Pay.	Half Pay.	Havildars.	Naics.	Privates.	Havildars.	Naics.	Drivers.	Syces.	Grass Cutters.	9-Pr. Guns.	24-Pr. Howitzer.	9-Pr. Guns.	24-Pr. Howitzer.	Spare. 9-Pr. Guns.	Spare. 24-Pr. Howitzer.	9-Pr. Guns.	Spare. 9-Pr. Guns.	24-Pr. Howitzer.	Spare. 24-Pr. Howitzer.	24-Pr. Howitzer.	Carbines.	Ammunition Rounds per Carbine.	Store.	Quartermaster's.	Bullocks.	Mistry Smith.	Firemen.	Filemen.	Hammermen.	Mistry Carpenter.	Workmen Carpenters.	Bildars.
Establishment	1	3	1	2	2	1	2	24	3	3	60	70	130	5	1	5	1	5	1	96	72	64	48	1	12	26	2	1	75	1	2	2	2	1	3	4
Total	5			85		27			266					130	6	12				168		112		1	12	26	3		75	14						

ALLOTMENT OF MEN.

Per Gun and its Waggon: 1 Serjeant. 1 Corporal. 1 Bombardier. 8 Gunners.		
Total	11 × 6 =	66
Staff Serjeant	1	
Farrier Serjeant	1	
Assistant Farrier	1	= 7
Buglers	4	
Allowing for sick and spare Men	12	
	19	19
	Total	85
GUN LASCARS.		
Per Gun 2 / Per Waggon 1	3 × 6 =	18
Allowing for Sick, and with Stores		9
	Total	27

ALLOTMENT OF HORSES.

6 Guns at 10 each	60
6 Waggons at 10 each	60
For Outriders	5
Spare	5
Total	130

ALLOTMENT OF BULLOCKS.

1 Spare Howitzer Carriage, and 6 Ammunition Waggons	
7 at 8 each	56
2 Store Carts at 7 each	14
1 Quartermaster's Cart at 5	5
Total	75

APPENDIX No. 50.

RETURN showing the Expense incurred on account of Troops and Invalids of Her Majesty's and Company's Services going out and returning from India, for the last 15 years, viz., from 1843–44 to 1857–58, inclusive.

—	*Troops Outward, including Recruits. H.M.'s Service.	Recruits Outward. Company's Service.	Invalids Homeward. H.M.'s Service.	Invalids Homeward. Company's Service.
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
1843–44	36,289 6 6	12,010 2 3	20,898 0 9	6,469 19 6
1844–45	52,808 11 3	9,102 11 3	16,487 19 0	4,659 6 9
1845–46	49,538 12 3	11,085 18 9	25,649 3 3	6,471 19 0
1846–47	68,535 9 6	23,716 18 0	13,977 6 9	6,165 5 0
1847–48	39,413 9 8	29,070 5 9	15,376 14 6	5,461 9 0
1848–49	67,531 18 9	11,995 13 0	21,669 6 0	4,161 6 9
1849–50	63,010 19 9	21,815 16 0	6,650 2 6	3,077 3 3
1850–51	17,028 1 3	12,436 18 9	14,829 3 6	2,857 18 0
1851–52	17,975 3 9	8,846 3 6	14,635 17 0	4,064 12 3
1852–53	26,198 15 9	15,943 16 3	22,308 7 0	3,860 15 0
1853–54	92,229 2 9	46,067 19 3	37,427 16 0	3,925 0 0
1854–55	55,308 18 9	29,030 10 3	29,974 11 0	9,503 0 0
1855–56	22,744 16 0	15,190 18 0	33,690 9 9	8,949 10 0
1856–57	23,044 9 9	17,481 17 6	22,153 1 9	6,286 0 6
1857–58	1,261,943 15 11	110,913 6 4	24,757 12 0	8,132 2 0

* The recruits of the Queen's service proceed to India as soldiers on the strength of a regiment, and are not distinguishable as recruits, the cost of their transport, therefore, cannot be separately given.

East India House, December 16, 1858. G. FRIEND, Accountant-General.

APPENDIX No. 51.

DETAILS of EXPENSE of a REGIMENT of the East India Company's European Infantry, on full Batta, in Bengal, as per last annual Military Statement, viz., for 1855–6, if complete to its full establishment as at present fixed.

	Per Month. Rs. a. p.	Per Ann. £
1 Colonel		1,124
1 Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding	1,432 4 0	
1 Lieutenant-Colonel	1,032 4 0	
2 Majors, at 789 3 0	1,578 6 0	
14 Captains, at 415 6 0	5,815 4 0	
22 Lieutenants, at 256 10 0	5,645 12 0	
10 Ensigns, at 202 12 5	2,027 12 0	
1 Adjutant	257 0 0	
1 Interpreter and Quartermaster	177 0 0	
1 Surgeon in charge	715 6 0	
2 Assistant Surgeons, at 286 10 0	573 4 0	
Rupees per month	19,254 4 0	
„ per annum	2,31,051 0 0	23,105
Effective Staff:—		
1 Serjeant-major	44 7 10	
1 Quartermaster-serjeant	38 7 10	
1 Schoolmaster-serjeant	42 7 5	
1 Armourer-serjeant	22 7 5	
1 Orderly-room Clerk	29 14 8	
1 Hospital-serjeant	22 7 5	
1 Drum-major	22 7 5	
10 Colour-serjeants, at 29 15 6	299 11 0	
40 Serjeants, at 22 7 5	898 8 8	
50 Corporals (under 14 years), at 15 15 0	796 14 0	
20 Drummers, at 14 2 9	283 7 0	
20 „ (on halfpay), at 7 1 4	141 10 8	
800 Privates (under 14 years), at 11 12 6	9,700 0 0	
Rupees per month	12,342 15 4	
„ per annum	1,48,115 8 0	14,811
20 Puckallies, at 9	180 0 0	
10 Bheesties, at 5	50 0 0	
20 Sweepers, at 4	80 0 0	
Allowances to Officers commanding companies, at 30	300 0 0	
Ditto, for repairs of gun and stationery, at 20	200 0 0	

APPENDIX No. 52.

DETAILS of EXPENSE of a REGIMENT of Her Majesty's Infantry of the Line, on full Batta, in Bengal, according to the last annual Military Statement, viz., for 1855–6, if complete to its full establishment as at present fixed.

At the Depot in England.			Monthly Expense. Rs. a. p.	Per annum. £
		Colonel		1,000
		1 Lieutenant-Colonel in command	1,433 4 0	
		1 Lieutenant-Colonel	1,033 4 0	
		2 Majors, at 789 3	1,578 6 0	
2	2	10 Captains, at 415 6	4,153 12 0	
2	2	12 Lieutenants, at 256 10	3,079 8 0	
		8 Ensigns, at 202 15 5	1,622 3 4	
		1 Paymaster (under 5 years)	524 7 0	
		1 Adjutant	257 0 0	
		1 Quartermaster (under 10 years)	359 14 0	
		1 Surgeon in charge	715 6 0	
		3 Assistant Surgeons, at 286 10	859 14 0	
		Interpreter	100 0 0	
6	41	Rs. per mo.	15,716 14 4	
		Rs. per ann.	1,88,602 0 0	18,860
		Effective Staff.		
		1 Regimental Serjeant Major	45 2 10	
		1 Quartermaster-serjeant	38 15 2	
		1 Paymaster-serjeant	22 14 1	
		1 Armourer-serjeant	22 14 1	
		1 Schoolmaster-serjeant (under 10 years)	22 14 1	
		1 Hospital-serjeant	27 15 1	
		1 Orderly-room Clerk (under 7 years)	22 14 1	
2		10 Colour-serjeants, at 30 8	305 0 0	
8		40 Serjeants, at 22 14 1	915 3 4	
		60 Corporals, at 16 3 10 (under 14 years)	974 6 0	
		1 Drum-major	22 14 1	
4		20 Drummers, 10 at 14 6 10, 10 at 13 7 8	144 4 4	
			134 12 8	
200		940 Privates (under 14 years service) at 12 0 2	11,289 12 8	
214	1078	Rs. per mo.	13,989 14 6	
		Rs. per ann.	1,67,878 0 0	16,787
		Non-Effective.		
		Non-Commissioned Staff, viz.:—		
		1 Drill-serjeant	14 0 0	
		10 Pay ditto, at 7	70 0 0	
		1 Drill-corporal	7 0 0	
		2 Assistant Schoolmasters, at 10	20 0 0	
		1 Schoolmistress	22 8 0	
		1 Librarian	8 0 0	
		1 Provost-serjeant	10 2 0	
		1 Savings' Bank Clerk	20 0 0	
		130 Wives of soldiers (12 per cent.) at 5	650 0 0	
		130 Children, at 2½	325 0 0	
		Bazar Establishment	25 0 0	
		1 Tindal	11 8 0	

APPENDIX No. 51—*continued.*

	Per month. Rs. a. p.	Per Ann. £
Non-effective Staff:—		
1 Drill-serjeant	14 0 0	
1 Drill-corporal	7 0 0	
10 Pay-serjeant, at 7	70 0 0	
2 Assistant Schoolmasters, at 15	30 0 0	
1 Schoolmistress	15 0 0	
1 Librarian	8 0 0	
1 Provost-serjeant	10 2 0	
1 Clerk, Savings' Bank	8 0 0	
Wives of soldiers, at 12 per cent.,		
of whom 80 at 5 0	400 0 0	
34 at 3 8	109 0 0	
Children, estimated at 144, at 2½	360 0 0	
Establishment under quartermaster	8 0 0	
Bazar servants	25 0 0	
Allowance for butts and targets	4 0 0	
„ for petty stores	1 8 0	
„ for a mess	150 0 0	
Good conduct pay (average)	850 0 0	
Head money for 947, at 25 per cent.	235 0 0	
Rupees per month	3,114 10 0	
„ per annum	37,375 8 0	3,737
Victualling 947 men, at 7½	7,102 0 0	
Rupees per annum	85,224 0 0	8,522
Clothing estimate		2,500
Charges for recruiting, including clothing and the whole expenses incurred up to time of embarkation		
Pay or "ship money" for recruits, for voyage, average for years 1853 to 1856, per annum 24*l.* 2*s.* 1*d.*, each at 12 per cent., or 112 men		2,700
Passages of drafts, including women and children, 128 at 14*l.* each		1,792
Passages home of invalided soldiers who are all discharged in India, at 7 per cent., 67 at 25*l.* each		1,675
Passages of officers coming home on sick certificate		360
Barracks estimated at		12,637
Total		£72,963
Estimated additional cost if the number of rank and file were raised to 1,000		8,899
Total		£81,862
The Government of India calculate on having 12 of the officers available for staff and other detached employment; their pay and allowances are, when so detached, not properly chargeable on the regiment; for one major, three captains, and eight lieutenants, at the rates charged in the account, the deduction will amount to		4,905
Total		£76,957

NOTE.—The estimated cost of pensions is omitted, as they are not included in the statement of a Queen's regiment. The cost of bedding, of hospital attendants, of medicine [illegible] camp equipage, ammunition, and stores, wear and tear of arm[illegible] of punkahs and tatties, are not included in this account.

W. E. BAKER, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

East India House, December 1858.

APPENDIX No. 52—*continued.*

	Monthly Expense. Rs. a. p.	Per annum. £
10 Lascars	67 8 0	
20 Puckalliers	180 0 0	
20 Sweepers	80 0 0	
Contingent allowance to Officers commanding companies, at 50	500 0 0	
Allowance for petty stores	1 8 0	
Ditto for butts and targets	4 0 0	
Mess allowance	150 0 0	
Head money for 1,078 Europeans, at Rs. 25 per 100	270 0 0	
Good-conduct pay to European Non-commissioned Officers and Privates, average	1,000 0 0	
Rs. per mo.	3,436 2 0	
Rs. per ann.	41,233 0 0	4,123
Victualling 1,078 men, at Rs. per month 7½	8,085 0 0	
Rs. per ann.	97,020 0 0	9,702
Clothing, estimated at		3,000
Charge for the levy money, &c. of all men embarked with regiments for India, and a corresponding credit for men landed with regiments from India in the same year. The proportion who came home in ordinary times may be taken at ⅔ of those who go out. The charge on the rate of 1854–5 was 13*l.* 14*s.* 10*d.* each man. This for 1,124 men would amount to 14,883*l.* 12*s.* 8*d.* Two fifths of this would be 5,952*l.* The difference between these two sums divided over 10 years, the probable future time of service in India would give per annum		893

The approximate Annual Charge for an Infantry Depôt in England, as per statement from the War Office, enclosed in a letter dated the 13th instant, is as follows:—

	£ s. d.	Per annum. £
Pay to officers and men (220)	4,945 15 0	
Average charge for beer money, lodging allowances, &c., levy money, and contingent expenses	907 12 10	
Staff charges, 17 per cent. on the above charges, exclusive of pay of officers	845 2 5	
Barrack accommodation, at 1*l.* 15*s.* 6*d.* per man	379 17 0	
Excess price of bread and meat, beyond the stoppages from men's pay	173 19 10	
Charge for clothing	569 8 0	
Ditto for accoutrements	18 7 1	
		7,780
Passages and Reliefs:—		
The expenses under this head will be taken on the scale of the Cape route. The passage money of the officers, out and home, averages	10,000 0 0	
The conveyance of the regiment in ordinary times, at 14*l.* a man, including women and children, would cost	16,912 0	
To bring back ⅔ of the number would cost, at 25*l.* per man	12,050 0 0	
The pay of a regiment, including officers, whilst on their voyage out	5,500 0 0	
The pay of all officers ⅔ of the men for the voyage home	3,400 0 0	
	47,862 0 0	
Divided over 10 years		4,786
The passage of officers to supply vacancies, and of officers coming home on sick certificate, and returning, estimated at		600
The passages out of drafts, at 12 per cent., and at 14*l.* per head, including women and children		2,030
Pay of the drafts on voyage out		528
Passages home of invalid soldiers estimated at		1,925
Barracks estimated at 5 per cent. for outlay, and 5 per cent. for keeping up		15,000
		87,114
The Government of India are allowed, with the concurrence of the Commander-in-Chief in India, and under rules laid down by the Horse Guards, to appoint a certain number of officers of H. M.'s regiments to detached appointments, if qualified in the native languages; estimate three to be withdrawn, viz., one major and two captains, at the rates above charged, the deduction will amount to		1,943
		£85,271

NOTE.—The pensions are omitted, as there are no data here upon which to calculate the actual amount chargeable upon the Indian and the Imperial revenues on this account. The cost of bedding, of hospital attendants, of medicine, of camp equipage, ammunition and stores, wear and tear of arms, of punkahs and tatties, are not included in the account.

W. E. BAKER, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

East India House, December 1858.

APPENDIX No. 53.

OBSERVATIONS on Colonel BAKER'S Estimate of the relative Cost of a Regiment of the Line serving in India and a Local European Corps, by Colonel Sir A. TULLOCH; with Colonel BAKER'S Note thereon.

COLONEL SIR A. TULLOCH'S OBSERVATIONS.

A.

Supposing it admissible that the pay and allowances of 12 officers should be deducted, on account of staff and other employment, from the establishment of a local European corps in India, while three only are deducted, for the same reason, from the service companies of a line corps, still there are many other items in Colonel Baker's comparison which appear objectionable, and are likely to make an important difference in the results.

I find, for instance, the cost of barracks for a regiment of the line stated at 15,000*l.* a year, while that of a local European corps is estimated at . - 12,637

Both sums appear enormous, but I can discover no reason for so great a difference in the relative amounts, seeing that the quarters of both are not unfrequently interchanged. The utmost that could be contended for is, that the charge should be proportioned to the relative strength of the two corps, in which case it would be annually for a line Regiment - - - - - - - - - £14,380

Instead of - - 15,000

Difference to be deducted - - 620

B.

In like manner the expense of clothing in each case, calculated on the same principle, would be £2,846

Instead of - - 3,000

Difference to be deducted - - 154

C.

It is also necessary to point out that an equal proportion, viz., 12 per cent. annually, has been calculated upon, in both forces, as necessary to replace the annual waste by deaths, invaliding, and limited service expiring. But it requires no demonstration to show, that if regiments of the line are to be relieved every ten years, as charged for in the comparative estimate of Colonel Baker, the proportion, both of invalids and time-expired men returning annually, must be much less than from a corps in which *there is no periodical relief*. Even so far as regards invaliding, this tends to keep the annual ratio in the Line below that of an Indian local corps, in the proportion nearly of two to three,* and it must have a still more prominent effect, in regard to limited enlistment men, because in regiments of the line, which are largely recruited just before proceeding to India, comparatively few can have attained ten years' service before the period of relief for the corps arrives, and as the General Commanding has always the power of extending the service for two years longer, he no doubt would do so, to prevent the necessity for sending home soldiers before their regiment.

Keeping these considerations in view, there can be no question that, whatever may be the per centage of passages to be provided annually for draughts to a regiment of the line, it will be at least three per cent. below what is required for a local European corps, and that the relative charge for the former should therefore be - - - - - £1,521

Instead of - - - 2,030

Difference to be deducted - 509

D.

The passages home of invalided and time-expired soldiers have, for precisely the same reasons, been either much under-estimated for the local European corps, or over-estimated for the Regiment of the line. If 1,675*l.* annually be sufficient for the former, half the amount should be enough for the latter, or £837

Instead of, as charged by Colonel Baker 1,925

Difference to be deducted - - - 1,088

Carried forward - - £2,371

* See Return of Invaliding, Appendix No. 44, p. 39.

COLONEL BAKER'S NOTE THEREON.

A.

The estimate of 15,000*l.* a year for a regiment of the line of the full establishment may appear very large, but it is nevertheless correct, the barrack accommodation of soldiers in India having been greatly improved within the last eight or ten years. The reduction proposed on account of the lesser sum fixed for a Company's regiment is inadmissible; for the difference has been already accounted for and charged in the estimate for a Company's regiment under the head—"if the number of rank and file were raised to "1,000," amounting to 8,899*l.* per annum.

B.

The original estimate for clothing is believed to be correct, but at all events the difference occasioned by bringing up a local regiment to the standard of 1,000 rank and file has been accounted for in the sum stated in the preceding note.

C.

It cannot be admitted that a less supply of recruits will be required for a regiment of the line than for a local regiment. Regiments proceeding to India take with them all their old soldiers, and in the first few years of their service in India unquestionably suffer more from sickness than regiments which have been acclimated. A proportion of 12 per cent. annually has been reckoned for a long course of years as requisite to keep up both establishments.

D.

The passage home of invalided soldiers has been estimated at 7 per cent. on both establishments. The difference to raise the proportion for a regiment of the local infantry to the same establishment of rank and file as a regiment of the line has been already brought to account under the head referred to in note A.

COLONEL SIR A. TULLOCH'S OBSERVATIONS.

Brought forward - - £2,371

E.

Another considerable item must be disallowed as originating in mis-calculation, viz., the pay of drafts on the passage out, which is nothing more than an advance of part of the annual pay already charged at the depôt *for the same men*, on which account, therefore, must be deducted - - - - - 558

F.

The pay of a regiment, including officers on the passage out, and the pay of two-fifths of the regiment on its return home is also objectionable as a charge, at least to the extent of about three-fourths, in so far as it is by no means necessary that the reliefs should be sent by the Cape, which tends to make this charge three times more than it would otherwise be, while the same object can be effected at even less expense by steam conveyance and troop ships by the Red Sea route. On this account, therefore, there would have to be deducted three-fourths of 890*l.*, or, - 666

G.

At a time when steerage passengers are conveyed by steam from Ireland to New York for 6*l.* 6*s.*, provisions included; and cabin passengers at 16*l.* 16*s.*, with a mercantile profit, there appears no reason why the Government might not, with vessels of its own, convey troops to and from India, by the Overland route at a corresponding rate, proportioned to the distance, being about 14*l.* in the one case, and from 50*l.* to 60*l.* in the other, which would make a reduction of at least one-third in the 10,000*l.* estimated for the passages of the officers belonging to a single regiment. The stoppages from both officers and men while on ship-board on account of provisions, appear also to have been left out of view. For all which an annual deduction is claimed of at least - - - - - - - 500

H.

I now come to the last and most important items respecting the pay of the depôts, in regard to which Colonel Baker appears to have fallen into some serious mistakes.

In 1855-56, the period to which his comparison relates, the depôts of regiments in the East Indies consisted, as they had done for a long series of years, of but one company each; and it was not till two years afterwards, that they were raised to the strength he has stated.

The events of the Sepoy insurrection having rendered it absolutely necessary for a time to add to the means of recruiting, the establishment at the depôt was doubled in July 1857; but under no circumstances can it be admitted that this extra establishment, caused for a specific object, should be brought into a comparison which relates to the year 1855-56.

If one company at the depôt was found sufficient for 30 or 40 years, no doubt it would be so again, when the present emergency is over; and therefore a deduction is claimed to the extent of half the cost of the two companies erroneously taken into this comparison, or - - - - - - - - - 3,890

General Total - - - £7,985

I.

It may be necessary also to point out as affecting this branch of the subject, that whatever the establishment of a depôt may be *nominally*, it is well known, that both the force there and at head-quarters, are never likely *all* to be in receipt of pay; that two or three months must elapse before vacancies occurring at head-quarters can be regularly reported; and at least an equally long period before recruits can be raised to fill these vacancies; but Colonel Baker's comparison charges the pay on both establishments, against the line force, *as if complete*, while on the other hand he has, apparently, charged only the cost of the recruits actually raised, which must make a difference, more than sufficient to turn the scale, which has now been brought within a few hundred pounds.

COLONEL BAKER'S NOTE THEREON.

E.

The pay of drafts during the passage out has not been included in any of the other charges in the estimate now under review.

F.

Sir A. Tulloch has not taken into account the great difference which exists, and which must necessarily exist, between the cost of carrying passengers overland by steamers hence to Alexandria, and from Suez to India, and that by sailing vessels round the Cape. The difference of pay by the saving of time might possibly be 666*l.*, as here assumed; but the increase of passage expenses could not be less than 33,000*l.*

G.

The estimate here given of what the Government could do "in vessels of their own" may form a subject for separate consideration. According to the experience of the India Department the estimate is entirely gratuitous.

It is a mistake to suppose that the stoppages of both officers and men, whilst on shipboard, on account of provisions, appear to have been left out of view. The net amount of pay, less the stoppage for rations, has been charged. The cost of the rations is included in the passage money.

H.

No mistake whatever has been made in these items. The Royal Commissioners expressly called for a statement of the cost of a regiment, if complete, according to the present establishment. What the cost may be, including the depôt, in future years, when the establishment may be reduced, has not yet been computed.

I.

Recruiting is carried on in anticipation of vacancies, otherwise it is not possible to keep numbers complete at head quarters.

Colonel Sir A. Tulloch's Observations.

K.

In this comparison I have avoided all notice of the relative expense for pension in the two forces, but it may be useful to keep in view that in the European local corps the widows of soldiers receive pensions of from 2½*d.* to 4½*d.* a-day, according to the rank of their husbands, and that all men discharged as unfit, from disability, after 14 years' service, receive permanent pensions of from 9*d.* to 1*s.* a-day, whereas, in the line, it is only in certain cases, dependent on good conduct and severe disability, that they receive any other than a temporary pension, and, if permanent, the rate seldom exceeds 7*d.* a-day, except in the case of non-commissioned officers. After 21 years' service in India, too, the private of the Indian army is entitled to a pension of 1*s.* a-day, whereas in the line he is only entitled to from 8*d.* to 1*s.* a-day, according to his good conduct.

L.

These additional boons are no doubt necessary, considering the prolonged service of the East Indian soldier in a tropical and unhealthy climate; but while, on the one hand, all the expenses attending the reliefs of regiments of the line are estimated with such scrupulous minuteness, it is necessary, on the other, to take into account the expense of those boons which have been found necessary in local European corps, to induce men to forego the chance of returning to their native land before they are completely disabled. If this consideration be kept in view, as should, it is submitted, be the case, the local force will be found to have nothing to recommend it on the score of economy, whether present or prospective.

Alex. M. Tulloch.

War Office, Dec. 31, 1858.

M.

It will be observed that I have taken no notice, in this comparison, of the more expensive retirement allowed to the East India Company's officers, than to those of the line; because, having already adverted to that subject in my evidence, it seems unnecessary to repeat it, or again to enforce the conclusion that no deductions can be drawn as to the relative cost of the two armies, unless this important feature be taken into consideration.

A. M. T.

Colonel Baker's Note thereon.

K.

Some years since an inquiry was made to ascertain whether the pensionary advantages to the soldiers of the local service were greater or less than in Her Majesty's service, and it was found that on the average of all ranks there was no difference of any importance. For the Queen's service (1855) the average rate of pensions was 11¾, for the Company's 11½. The pensions to the widows are of very small importance. Soldiers' widows marry again, in most cases, a few weeks after their widowhood.

L.

It is believed to be quite an error to suppose that the so-called "boons" here mentioned have anything to do with the inducements of men to enlist into the local force. That force is a favourite service, chiefly as holding out prospects to deserving men of obtaining promotion in various departments of the government of India.

M.

All considerations of the difference of cost of pensions has been postponed. It remains to be seen whether the dead weight of the Queen's service, or of the local service, is proportionably the greater of the two.

W. E. Baker, Colonel,
India House, Jan. 22, 1859. Military Secretary.

Colonel Sir A. Tulloch's Remarks on Colonel Baker's Notes.

A. and B.

These conclusions can only be admitted when it is shown that the proportion of the 8,899*l.* referred to will bring up the charge for the barracks of the line regiment to 15,000*l.* and for the clothing to 3,000*l.* The addition of about the eighth part of 8,899*l.* on one side of a comparison can obviously never compensate for an addition of about a fifth part of that sum on the other, which is the excess complained of.

The statement annexed of the cost of building 11 barracks, each for a regiment of the line in India as given by Mr. Melvill only a few years ago appears also to afford a strong presumption that the estimated charge of 15,000*l.* annually is high, as the erection of each of these barracks only cost on an average 22,000*l.*, and most of them being permanent, they would last, of course, for many years.

C. and D.

Regiments of the line do not take with them all their old soldiers, except when hurried abroad at such a crisis as occurred last year; they leave behind many to be discharged as worn out. The statement of such regiments suffering from want of acclimatization, though alleged to be *unquestionable*, is contrary to all statistical evidence, as is proved by the great reduction in mortality which has taken place in the West Indies since corps have been relieved every *third* year, and by the fact that in the East Indies, ensigns, among whom the majority must be unacclimatized, die at the rate of only 23 per thousand annually, while the captains, well acclimatized, die at the rate of 34 on the average of a long series of years.

It will *not admit of doubt* that regiments composed of men enlisted for 10 or 12 years' service, and regularly relieved at the end of 10 years must necessarily have fewer men to send home periodically on account of service expired than corps which remain for ever in India, and this fact must influence both these deductions, to the extent at least for which I have taken credit.

E. and I.

If Colonel Baker refers to the fourth charge for depôts on page 3, he will find 528*l.* stated for the pay of drafts on the voyage out, while the very first depôt charge on page 2 includes the pay of officers and men *for a whole year*, though it may be not half of them are raised in that period. If the recruits are not men from the depôt establishment, where do they come from? The recruiting in advance, to which he refers in "I.," is only allowed occasionally to the extent of a small per-centage, and recruits are rarely so plentiful as to admit of any excess being sent out from that source.

F. and G.

These calculations refer to prospective payments. I may be wrong in supposing that what seems likely to prove the cheapest arrangement will be carried through, but Colonel Baker is surely just as much so in assuming that there will be any necessity for losing four months' pay on a voyage which may be made in one, or in concluding that the enormous amount paid for the conveyance of troops by steam during a period of unexampled pressure should be considered an equitable basis for estimating the probabilities of future expenditure by the Red Sea route.

H.

Whatever number of men the Indian Government find sufficient at home to keep up their local regiments to the proper establishment, *precisely the same number will suffice for Her Majesty's Depôts;* but if it be required that recruits of line regiments should be more completely trained than those of the Indian establishment at Warley, the superior efficiency thus obtained should be considered an equivalent for the expense, in which case the charge of 7,780*l.* on the one side of the comparison, and 2,700*l.* on the other, for the respective depôt establishments ought to be left out of the calculation.

K.

In such calculations as this the probable duration of the pension requires to be taken into account, quite as much as its average amount. In the line the soldier frequently receives a pension of from one to three years for the same service, which would give to the soldier of the East India Company's army a pension for life, usually extending to between 22 and 23 years, an important distinction, which does not appear to have been adverted to in Col. Baker's note.

In conclusion, I beg to submit the annexed comparison by Mr. Melvill, in 1832, of the relative cost of a regiment of the line and local European corps, which shows that at that period the latter was considered rather the more expensive of the two, which character, I apprehend, it will be still found to retain.

ALEXANDER M. TULLOCH.

War Office,
February 3, 1859.

MEMORANDUM on COST of different BARRACKS in INDIA, extracted from a STATEMENT by MR. MELVILL in the Supplemental Appendix to Reports from the Select Committee on Indian Territories.

Stations.	When built.	Cost.
		Rs.
Hazareebaugh (partly temporary)	1843	111,584
Moulmein (temporary)	1841	54,901
Meerut	1843	140,925
Subathoo	1843	230,427
Kussowlie	1843	215,669
Dugshai	1847	349,031
Bellary	1850	236,745
Poonah (two regiments)	1842	641,164
Sukkur	1845	167,990
Hyderabad (Scinde)	—	295,053
Total for 11 regiments		2,443,489
Average		Rs.222,135

The accommodation has been for one European infantry regiment in each case, except at Poonah. When the extent of the force could not be ascertained by regiments, the station has been omitted to avoid any risk of error.

According to this statement the average cost of building barracks for a whole regiment is only about 22,213*l.*; five per cent. on which for outlay and five per cent. for keeping up, being the basis adopted by Colonel Baker in his calculation, would only make the expense of these barracks 2,200*l.* a year instead of 15,000*l.*, though they appear to have afforded about 1,200 cubic feet of space per man, exclusive of the verandahs.

COMPARISON, by Mr. Melvill, of the relative Cost of a Regiment of the Line and a Local European Corps in 1832 according to the Numbers actually present with each Corps; extracted from p. 242 to 247 of Appendix to Report of Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 1832.

	Bengal Establishment.		Madras Establishment.		Bombay Establishment.	
	A regiment of His Majesty's infantry, consisting of ten companies. No. of officers and men, 844.	A regiment of Company's European infantry, consisting of eight companies. No. of officers and men, 783.	A regiment of His Majesty's infantry, consisting of ten companies. No. of officers and men, 844.	A regiment of Company's European infantry, consisting of eight companies. No. of officers and men, 782.	A regiment of His Majesty's infantry, consisting of ten companies. No. of officers and men, 844.	A regiment of Company's European infantry, consisting of eight companies. No. of officers and men. 781.
	St. rupees per month.	St. rupees per month.	Madras rupees per month.	Madras rupees per month.	Rupees per month.	Rupees per month.
Actual cost of numbers present, per military statement of 1830	22,066	20,039	26,743	30,282	21,424	34,290
Deduct surplus the establishment	—	—	—	1,110	—	2,237
	22,066	20,039	26,743	29,172	21,424	32,053
Add, for deficiency in complement	4,181	5,177	1,165	—	10,173	—
Calculation for rations	3,188	2,952	3,587	3,325	—	—
„ for clothing	—	1,616	—	1,760	—	1,754
	29,435	29,784	31,495	34,257	31,597	33,807
£ per month	3,261	3,300	3,599	3,915	3,554	3,803
or, per annum	£39,132	£39,600	£43,188	£46,980	£42,648	£ 45,636
Clothing allowance issued in England	2,300	—	2,300	—	2,300	—
Recruiting charges „ „	2,200	2,200	2,200	2,200	2,200	2,200
Calculation of passage to India; whole regiments and recruits; also reliefs and return of invalids (as respects European troops).	5,000	2,400	5,000	2,400	5,000	2,400
Proportion of pensions, &c.	2,500	2,300	2,500	2,300	2,500	2,300
Colonels' pay	613	—	613	—	613	—
Cost per annum	£51,745	46,500	55,801	53,880	55,261	53,536

REMARKS BY SIR A. TULLOCH.

From this Return there can be no doubt that the line force was at that time considered the least costly of the two, for on raising the local European corps to the same strength, namely, from 782 to 844

	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.
The cost would have been	£50,122	£58,151	£56,773
But the cost as above for a regiment of the line was	51,745	55,801	55,261
Being more in regiment of line	1,623	—	—
Less in do.	—	2,350	1,512

Showing on the average of every three regiments throughout India a difference in favour of the line of £2,239 annually, or £746 per regiment.

MEMORANDUM.

Having carefully re-examined all the items in my estimate of the cost of a regiment of the line serving in India, and having inquired into the objections made by Colonel Sir A. Tulloch, for the purpose of diminishing the amount of that estimate, I now desire to state that I find the estimate to be essentially correct.

But on reviewing the estimate of the cost of a local European regiment, I find that I have stated it too high by 1,390*l.* per annum, under the head "Estimated additional "cost, if the number of rank and file were raised to 1,000, "8,899*l.*"

The correct details of this head are as follows:—

	Per Month. R.	A.	P.	Per Month. R.	A.	P.
Corporals, 10, at	15	15	0	159	6	0
Privates, 140, at	11	12	6	1,645	4	6
Women, 18, at	5	0	0	90	0	0
Children, 12, at	2	8	0	30	0	0
Good conduct pay				150	0	0
Head money				35	0	0
Per Month				Rs. 2,109	10	6

	£
Or per annum	2,531
Victualling	1,180
Clothing	500
Recruiting and ship money	433
Passage out of 18 additional recruits	252
Passage home of 10 additional men	250
Barracks, to raise the amount to 15,000*l.*	2,363
Total	£7,509
Instead of	8,899
Difference	£1,390

	£
The estimated cost of a regiment of the line of the present strength is	85,271
Do. of a local European regiment	75,567
Difference per annum	£9,704

The estimate quoted by Sir Alexander Tulloch, as presented to the House of Commons in the year 1832, is inapplicable to the present time.

The statements quoted by Sir A. Tulloch of expenses of European barracks are also wholly inapplicable to present circumstances. I have had, in my late office of Secretary to the Government of India, in the Department of Public Works, peculiar opportunities of knowing the cost of permanent barracks for European regiments on the enlarged scale lately introduced; and I am satisfied that the annual cost will not be less than the amount specified in the estimate, viz., 15,000*l.* per annum per regiment. Indeed, the amount will be greater, as the estimate does not include any part of the cost of a church, which will be required at every new fixed station of a European regiment. The erection and maintenance of a church, exclusive of a chaplain, cannot be stated at less than 250*l.* per annum.

W. E. BAKER, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

India Office, Feb. 18, 1859.

III.—PAPERS RECEIVED FROM INDIA.

APPENDIX No. 54.

Proposed Formation of a Commission in India.

The Court of Directors of the East India Company to the Governor-General of India in Council.

(No. 235.—Military.) November 25, 1857.

1. We trust that when success, by the blessing of Divine Providence, shall have attended your efforts to put down the mutiny of the native army of your Presidency, and to re-establish the authority of the Government in the disturbed districts, you will be enabled to take advantage of the services of select officers of ability and experience to assist you, by investigation and by practical counsel founded thereon, in forming wise conclusions on the most important subject, which must soon press for decision; namely, the proper organization of our army in India.

2. To this end we authorize you to appoint, as soon as circumstances will permit, a Commission, composed of military officers of the armies of the three Presidencies (with whom should be associated officers of the Queen's army who have had experience of Indian service), on whose knowledge, experience, and judgment you can rely; together with one or more civil servants, whom you may consider to be specially qualified for such a duty by their knowledge of the native character and general administrative experience.

3. In framing instructions for the guidance of this Commission we are desirous that the following heads of inquiry should be specified, in addition to any others which you may consider to deserve their attention:—

1st. Should corps be raised, each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

2nd. Should corps be composed of troops or companies, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes; or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole regiment?

3rd. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of a native regiment?

4th. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations relating to tribes and castes, with a view to determine the future composition of the native army?

5th. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India, with the natives of the country; and, if so, should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies, or otherwise?

6th. Whether, in native infantry regiments, the discontinuance of the grades of native commissioned officers, and the substitution of an European serjeant and corporal to each company, is advisable; and, if so, whether, in lieu of the prospect of distinction and emolument arising out of these grades, it would be advisable to establish graduated scales of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service?

7th. Whether the system of promotion generally, by seniority, to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained), should not be altered and assimilated to the systems in force at Madras and Bombay.

8th. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organization for each branch respectively?

9th. Have the powers of commanding officers of native corps, and the powers of officers in charge of companies, been diminished? What consequences have been the result? Is it desirable that those powers should be increased, or what other measures should be adopted for the improvement of discipline?

10th. Should cadets be trained and drilled in European regiments before they are posted to native regiments; or what would be the best mode of drilling and training cadets before they are posted to native regiments?

11th. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army, or ought there to be any, and what, changes in those rules, or in the system of punishment?

12th. How can the demands for European officers for staff and detached employments be best provided for, without injuring the efficiency of regiments?

4. It is to be understood that the inquiries to be made by the Commission, and the opinions to be offered by them are to have reference to the several branches of the native army—Infantry, regular and irregular; Cavalry, regular and irregular; Artillery, and Sappers and Miners; and with respect to the Artillery and Sappers and Miners, whether they should be composed, as heretofore, of Europeans and natives, or be entirely European.

5. To aid your Government in forming an opinion as to the proportion which the European should bear to the native portion of the army in India generally, and at each presidency separately, we would recommend that your Government should call upon the Commission to give their opinions on this very important question; and we can entertain no doubt that the enlarged knowledge and experience of the members of the Commission will enable them to furnish you with valuable information on this head.

6. Having obtained opinions on all these heads of inquiry, and on such other heads as you may deem to be essential to the thorough development of the important questions at issue, you will refer the views of the Commission for the consideration of the Commander-in-chief, and will then furnish us with the results of your careful deliberation upon the whole of the measures which should, in your judgment, be taken for the organization and maintenance, in the utmost practicable state of efficiency, of whatever military force you may think it desirable to form.

7. The Commission itself may be instructed to make to the Governor-General in Council any suggestions or recommendations which occur to them, although not on matters comprised in the specified heads of inquiry.

We are, &c.
R. D. Mangles.
F. Currie.
&c. &c.

From the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department with the Governor-General.

(No. 1,085, Military.)

Sir, Head-Quarters, April 23, 1858.

Ordered in Council on April 23, 1858. The attention of the Honourable the President in Council having been drawn to the military letter from the Honourable the Court of Directors, No. 235, of the 25th November last, relative to the reorganization of the Indian army, and suggesting the appointment of a Commission to inquire into the several heads noticed, I am directed to request that you will ascertain from the Right Honourable the Governor-General whether this is one of the subjects his Lordship desires to dispose of himself, as his Honour in Council is of opinion that the time has arrived for entering into the inquiry, and that the Commission to be appointed should commence its duties with the least possible delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. D. Atkinson,
Major Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department.

Council Chamber, Fort William, April 23, 1858.

To the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, Calcutta.

(No. 369, Military.)

Sir,

I am directed to acquaint you, for the information of the Honourable the President in Council, and with reference to your letter No. 1,085, of the 23rd ultimo, that finding it impracticable to constitute a Commission, as suggested by the Honourable Court in their letter No. 235, of the 25th November 1857, to consider and report upon the important subject of organizing the Indian army in the three presidencies, the Right Honourable the Governor-General has determined to take into his own hands the direction of the inquiries necessary to be made in order to arrive at a just conception of the measures proper to be suggested for the placing of the armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay on such a footing as the interests of Her Majesty's territories in India may seem to require.

2. His Lordship has selected Lieut.-Colonel H. M. Durand, C.B., of the Bengal engineers, an officer of great ability and experience, who has not only been much distinguished by his services in the field, but has also acquired that knowledge of the native character which political employment at native courts is so well calculated to give, to aid his Lordship, and to communicate under his Lordship's immediate instructions with the several personages and officers, civil and military, whom it will be necessary to consult in furtherance of the great object in view.

3. The instructions given by his Lordship to Lieutenant-Colonel Durand, who arrived at Allahabad on the 13th

instant, will be seen in the accompanying copy of my letter to his address, No. 238, dated the 16th instant.

4. It is the Governor-General's intention to solicit the assistance of the President in Council in ultimately determining on the report to be made and the measures to be proposed for the consideration of the home authorities.

5. Meanwhile his Lordship has directed that the questions which are to be submitted to the several witnesses whose evidence will be called for shall be sent to each member of council individually for such replies as each may desire to give.

6. The Governor-General is sure that his honourable colleagues will readily consent thus to contribute to the information and testimony upon which an ultimate decision will be founded.

I am, &c.
(Signed) R. J. H. BIRCH, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Military Department, with Governor-General.

Allahabad, May 22, 1858.

To Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. DURAND, C.B., on Special Duty with the GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

(No. 238, Military.)

SIR,

I AM directed to acquaint you that the Right Honourable the Governor-General has been pleased to require you to repair to his head-quarters, in order that he may avail himself of your services in the special duty of collecting information by means of which the Government of India may be enabled to devise measures for the proper organization of the army in India.

2. The Honourable Court of Directors, in their despatch No. 235, dated the 25th of November 1857, suggested to the Governor-General in Council the expediency of taking advantage of the success which under Divine Providence it was anticipated would attend the efforts of his Lordship in Council for the suppression of the mutiny of the Bengal native army, and for the re-establishment of the British authority in the disturbed districts under this presidency; to appoint a Commission composed of the military officers of the armies of the three presidencies (with whom were to be associated officers of the Queen's army who had had experience of Indian service), together with one or more civil servants specially qualified for such a duty by their knowledge of the native character and general experience.

3. A copy of the Honourable Court's despatch is herewith transmitted for your information.

4. Circumstances having rendered it impracticable, notwithstanding the successes which have attended our troops in the field, and the important advance which has been made towards the re-establishment of the power of Government in this presidency, to constitute such a Commission as the Honourable Court desired to see appointed, the Governor-General has determined to adopt the alternative of obtaining in writing, from eminent and experienced officers, civil and military, their opinions on certain heads of inquiry to be distinctly specified, and to which their attention shall be particularly called.

5. The Honourable Court's despatch specifies twelve heads of inquiry on which they are desirous of obtaining information with a view to ultimate measures, and to these heads others are to be added which may be considered to deserve attention.

6. It will be your duty, under the immediate instructions of the Governor-General, to frame such questions for the consideration of the persons whom his Lordship may determine to consult as may best conduce to elicit their opinions on the various important points involved in the great subject of the proper organization of the Indian army, and to develope the mass of information which the experience and observation of such officers may enable them to bring to bear on the general subject.

7. These opinions will be received by you, and will be submitted by you to the Governor-General, in such mode as his Lordship may be pleased to direct.

I am, &c.
(Signed) R. J. H. BIRCH, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India,
in the Military Department with
the Governor-General.

Allahabad, May 16, 1858.

MINUTE by the Honourable Major-General Sir JAMES OUTRAM, G.C.B.

Re-organization of the Army.

ON the 25th November 1857, the Honourable the Court suggested that "when success, by the blessing of Divine Providence, "should have attended our efforts to put down the mutiny "of the native army, and to re-establish the authority of "Government in the disturbed districts," or, "*as soon as* "*circumstances should permit*," a commission should be appointed to assist the Government of India "by investi- "gating and by practical counsel founded thereon in form- "ing wise conclusions on the most important subject which "must soon press for decision, viz., the proper organization "of the army in India."

The Court directed that the report of the Commission should be submitted for the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief. And his Excellency's opinion having been obtained, the Government was required to furnish to the Honourable Court "the results of its careful delibe- "ration upon the whole of the measures which should, in "its opinion, be taken for the organization and mainte- "nance in the utmost practicable state of efficiency of "whatever force it might think desirable to form."

No action up to that date having been taken in the matter, we, on the 23rd April, proceeded to ascertain from the Right Honourable the Governor-General, "whether this "was one of the subjects which his Lordship desired to "dispose of himself, as his Honour in Council was of "opinion that the time had come for entering on the "inquiry, and that the Commission to be appointed should "commence its labours with the least possible delay."

After the lapse of a month we learned through a printed circular, dated 21st of May, giving cover to a series of queries, and received by us individually, that the Governor-General had seen fit to entrust to a single officer those momentous duties which the Honourable Court wished to have confided to a board of "select officers of experience," taken from the Company's armies of the three presidencies and from Her Majesty's service, aided by "one or more "of the civil servants, whose knowledge of the native "character and administrative experience specially qualified "them for such a duty."

And on the 22nd of May, the Governor-General directed the military secretary to acknowledge the letter of the 23rd of April, and to intimate that his Lordship had resolved "to take into his own hand the direction of the inquiries "requisite to be made," and to conduct them through the agency of the officer, copies of whose circular had been addressed to us on the previous day.

It is far from my wish to disparage the merits of the very able officer on whom his Lordship's choice has fallen, for whose gallantry, talents, and accomplishments I entertain a high respect. But I cannot recognize any single individual as competent to discharge those onerous and important duties of inquiry, comparison, analysis, deliberative and practical counsel, assigned by the Court to that mixed Commission of widely diversified experience, the appointment of which it had recommended.

I am ignorant of the reasons which have induced the Governor-General to regard as impracticable the appointment of such a Commission.

In my present state of information, I can myself perceive no insuperable difficulty to the adoption of the Court's recommendation, and its non-adoption, if at all practicable, is, I think, greatly to be regretted. For the sample given in the first series of interrogatories that has been issued of the mode in which the momentous inquiry, ordered by the Court, is likely to be conducted, has begotten in my mind very serious apprehensions for the results. What, for example, can be more unreasonable than to apply to each of the scores of "eminent and experienced public servants, "civil and military," to whom the circular questions are addressed, for information regarding the number and distribution of the European troops of each arm now serving in the Bengal presidency (question 1.); or the number and distribution of the native troops of each arm serving within the same area (question 3.); or the proportion which the regular, irregular, and police divisions of the native Bengal army bear to each other (question 5.); or their ethnological affinities (question 5.), or the adequacy of the existing barrack accommodation for the European troops now serving in the Bengal presidency (question 9.); or whether an alteration in the number of troops would require an augmentation of barrack accommodation (question 10).

A Commission would have at once ascertained these, and many other *matters of fact* from the adjutant and quarter-master general, and have communicated them to the "eminent and experienced public servants, civil and mili- "tary," whose *opinions* were sought in reference to the future organization of the army.

No Commission constituted on the principles laid down by the Court would, I think, have issued (question No. 2.) in its present form, "What number of European troops of "each arm do you deem necessary for the Bengal presi- "dency, and what should be their ordinary distribution;" for they would have seen that no opinion of any value could be given which did not view the regiments of the Bengal army in relation to those of the entire Indian Em-

pire, and estimate its proper European strength, in reference to the strength of the European element deemed requisite for the armies of the other presidencies, the latter being a point which the typographical construction of the circular justifies us in assuming that the officers of the Bombay and Madras armies have severally been invited to discuss with a similar disregard of the provision to be made beyond the limits of their respective presidencies.

No commission such as that contemplated by the Court would have called for off-hand answers to question No. 4: "What number of native troops do you deem necessary for "the Bengal presidency, and what should be their ordinary "distribution?" Nor do I think that any officer whose opinion is worth having would choose to answer it except in a very round-about manner. He would first state the minimum native force, which, in his opinion, would suffice in co-operation with the maximum European force recommended by him for the maintenance of our military interests. He would then proceed to specify the particular *organization* of the native army, by the adoption of which the relative proportion of native troops might, in his opinion, be augmented with safety and advantage to the state. And he would then state the maximum native force which, were his views of *organization* adopted, might with propriety be maintained. Yet the circular letter which gives transmission to the queries specially states that there is "no necessity for "touching on the many important particulars to which the "letter of the Honourable Court adverts," particulars specially relating to the proper method of RE-ORGANIZING the native army.

I might considerably extend my illustrations of the imperfections of the circular list of queries now under notice, and of the inappreciation it seems to me to exhibit of the general bearing and mutual dependence of the points suggested for inquiry and settlement by the Honourable Court of Directors; but I abstain from doing so, for it is in the last degree painful to me to criticize unfavourably any document issued under the sanction of the Right Honourable the Governor-General. I feel, however, so acutely the tremendous nature of the interests which are at stake that I consider I should most signally fail in my duty did I abstain from recording my dissent from the manner in which the investigation urged on this Government by the Court of Directors, and so long delayed, is at length being carried out.

The Governor-General, through the military secretary, has expressed his confidence that each of us "will readily consent "thus to contribute to the information and testimony upon "which an ultimate decision will be founded." And I would right gladly furnish my humble quota of advice on the questions submitted to me, inappropriate and defective as I consider them to be. But as his Lordship intimates that it is his intention "to solicit the assistance of the Pre-"sident in Council in ultimately determining on the report "to be made and measures to be proposed for the consider-"ation of the home authorities," it appears to me that my opinion would be more worthy of his Lordship's notice, and their expression more calculated to conduce to the public interests, if deferred until I had had the advantage of examining the recorded views of the various persons whom his Lordship proposes to consult; and I cannot but think it unadvisable that I should commit myself intermediately to opinions which I may see fit to modify or withdraw when I shall have studied and pondered over that body of evidence which it is his Lordship's intention to submit to us.

May 30, 1858. (Signed) J. OUTRAM.

MINUTE by the Honourable J. P. GRANT, President of the Council of India in Council.

June 4, 1858.

Re-organization of the Indian Army.

1. WE have been informed, in reply to the question conveyed in our Secretary's letter of the 23rd of April, respecting the inquiries ordered by the Home Government to be made upon this subject, that the Right Honourable the Governor-General has determined to take into his own hands the direction of these inquiries; that his Lordship has found it impracticable to constitute a Commission for this purpose, and will proceed by the method of written questions and answers, and that he intends to avail himself of the assistance of the Council in ultimately determining upon the report to be made, and the measures to be prepared, to the Home Government.

2. Our honourable colleague Sir James Outram has recorded a strong opinion in favour of proceeding by Commission, and we know that there is no man whose opinion on this subject ought to carry and will carry more weight with it. There can be no doubt that, if practicable within the time we have to spare, the inquiry would be best conducted in the first instance by a Commission taking evidence *vivâ voce*, and testing by cross-examination the grounds of all opinions advanced. For this reason, and because this is the method laid down in the instructions of the Home Government, there can be no doubt that this would have been the method to adopt, if practicable. The Right Honourable the Governor-General, however, who has given his mind to the subject, has come to the conclusion that it is impracticable to constitute such a Commission as was desired, and has opened the inquiry otherwise. I am not myself in possession of information which enables me to form a judgment worthy of my own or of any other person's attention on the question of present practicability, and I consider the method of inquiry a point which, for the moment at least, is settled. For these reasons I do not now propose to enter upon the discussion of this point.

3. Further, the view which I take of the urgent necessities of the case makes this point in my eyes one of secondary importance in the business which now presses itself upon Government. I believe that if we are to hold Hindostan, we must reorganize the Bengal army without a day's delay. I think there has been as much delay as is prudent in regard to the whole of this subject already. I have no fear that any organization *ad interim* which we may hurriedly adopt will impede the free action of a future Government when the time comes for putting into practice *the* mature system which it is hoped may be ultimately elaborated by the united wisdom of many minds, applied for a long time to this difficult subject. On the contrary, I am convinced that the possibilities of the position are so narrow, and the indications of the way of safety so clear, that in the main, if we do not allow our attention to be distracted with remote objects which in no way concern our present difficulties, we cannot go materially out of our course.

4. Before the mutiny our military expenditure was the main part of our whole expenditure. I am not one of those who think that our financial situation was then bad. On the contrary, I believe that, making proper allowances for new and extraordinary public works, which directly and indirectly would do more than pay the interest of the money spent upon them, it was a not unsatisfactory situation, though certainly improveable; but it gave us no actual surplus for a reserve, and for any reserve in prospect there were large demands for important civil objects, second in urgency only to military protection. At the same time, our military establishment was below the fixed scale, and consequently, our military charges were below the average. We were short of our establishment by two European regiments, and the European regiments we had were in strength much below their complements. Exclusive of the European artillery, the deficiency in three presidencies was nearly 6,000 men, or say one-sixth of our whole European establishment.* The native army, as then constituted, was not believed to be in excess of the wants of the country. The result of the financial question then is, that there is no money for an Indian army on a new establishment beyond what was expended upon it on the old establishment, and what is true of the whole Indian army is true of the Bengal army, which is the greater part of the whole. Now, this financial question must rule the entire subject; whatever theories are approved, whatever system of organization is adopted, must be such as can be compressed within the bounds prescribed by the financial considerations, the short result of which I have stated.

5. A great part, not far from half of the current monthly expense of every regiment, whether of Europeans, of the Queen's or the Company's army, or of native regulars, is on account of the European commissioned officers; this, I believe, is not the case with the great military nations of Europe; but that it is the case with the Company's regular army in India, and with Her Majesty's army in India, is a fact, and it is with the fact that we have to do;† whatever may be the theories of individuals, we cannot speculate upon such a reform as would alter this fact, and indeed even if the system of the great military nations were adopted, one of the effects of which would be to reduce by one half or more the comparative number of commissioned officers, the expense of the officers would still be a very large proportion of the whole expense of the army in India. Now we have, and we should be thankful to Providence that we have, the European commissioned officers of the Bengal army on hand. They must be made use of, and no system will be possible, as an ultimate system, which does not make use of them, and provide for them very much as they have been heretofore provided for; here then we have out of the three items of expenditure, so far as Bengal is concerned, the whole of that part of the expenses of the army which consisted in the cost of the Queen's troops, and the whole of that part which consisted in the cost of the Company's Europeans, and about half of that part which consisted in the cost of the native army,

* See Appendix A., which is formed from information furnished by the military offices.

† See Appendix B.

a fixed quantity. Thus it is but a small portion of the whole that gives any scope for the theories of an army commission. This argument appears to me to be applicable equally to the armies of all the presidencies. But it is only the Bengal army that demands immediate re-organization.

6. I have never heard of one Bengal officer, or of one Bengal official civilian, or of one English resident in Bengal, or of one English statesman, who doubts that the late disaster has proved the absolute necessity of largely increased European force in India, and especially in the Bengal presidency. I have never heard but of one Indian officer of any presidency who has a different opinion. There was never a chain of cause or effect more apparent than was the connexion in this revolt of the explosion as the effect, and of the insufficiency of the European element in the mass of the army as the immediate cause. In the Punjaub was collected nearly the whole of the European force on this side of India; whether the proportion there of European to native troops were adequate or not may be made a question, probably it was less than will ever hereafter be thought sufficient in any part of India; still it was not inconsiderable, and therefore it kept down the revolt. The revolted class was more numerous in the Punjaub than anywhere else, and it was quite as hostile there as elsewhere. But the greater part of what European force we had on this side was there also, and this was enough to repress the outbreak, and to enable the great administrator of the province to look for strength from another native source. In the Agra provinces and Oude there were very few Europeans, and the proportion of European to native troops was small,* and there the revolt ran through the country as a lighted train beyond all human control. It may be a difficult question for discussion what should be the strength of the Indian army hereafter. I myself believe that it must be an army numerically very weak according to all European standards, and that nevertheless such an army will be found sufficient. But I apprehend that all sober minds will now agree that a large proportion of that army, whatever may be its gross strength, must be composed of Europeans.

7. If my argument has been followed I believe it will be conceded that there are only two sources from which this indispensable increase of European force can be provided, namely, the European officers of the native army, and the money formerly spent upon the regular sepoys, which is about half the cost of the European officers. Now it seems to me, this being so, that fifty army Commissions might sit for fifty years, and at the end of that time they could only say what we may all as safely say now, viz., that in respect to the most important point of all, namely, the European element, the only possible course is to raise European regiments, as many as need be, with money saved from the pay of the regular sepoys, and to officer them with the necessary number of European officers of the native army, for more Europeans we must have, and there is no possibility of paying for more Queen's troops than the old establishment, unless Parliament chooses to pay for them, which I do not think it will do.

8. How many thousand men must be raised in this manner is a most fit subject for discussion, whether by a Commission or otherwise. But it is certain that a great many thousand, say twenty thousand, infantry at the least possible minimum must be thus raised in Bengal alone. The raising of these men will take some considerable time, and during that time discussion and inquiry as to the precise number to be raised will be useful. But I do most earnestly deprecate the loss of time, whether in discussion or in inquiry, or in anything else before accepting the principle which is proved beforehand to be one of the necessities of the case, and commencing at once vigorously to carry it into execution, so far as it certainly must be carried at last, by enlisting men as fast as possible, and organizing regiments in time to receive the men as fast as they are enlisted.

9. This measure, so far as it was justified by then existing circumstances, was recommended by us in our despatches of the 19th of May and the 6th June 1857, just after the first outbreak of the mutiny had occurred. We have now been honoured by the receipt of the Honourable Court's despatch of the 21st April last, informing us, that in accordance with our recommendation in the first of our despatches aforesaid, three new regiments of Bengal Europeans are to be provided, who will be officered from the officers from six regiments of the old Bengal native infantry. I earnestly hope that there will be no obstacle to the further and speedy progress of the Government in this inevitable course. I shall be forgiven, where the stake is so great, in remarking, that if our recommendation had been adopted when it was made, the three new regiments now actually determined upon, would have been by this time in fact, and several other regiments not yet determined upon would have been by this time far advanced towards completion; those only who are as intimately acquainted as we are with the existing difficulties of the Government can know how valuable such an additional force would have been at this moment.

10. I may also be pardoned for mentioning, that this very same principle was proposed by me for adoption in the case of the regular native cavalry of three presidencies long before an universal mutiny of any native army had been thought a possible contingency; though my case then was consequently much weaker than it now is, my arguments were the same. Though I had then the misfortune to differ from Lord Dalhousie, for whom, as an Indian statesman, my respect is unbounded, I never doubted the soundness of my argument. The measure I then recommended has now been adopted in great part by converting eight out of the ten Bengal cavalry regiments into European dragoons. If that conversion had been made before, we should have had no cause to regret it.

See Military Cons. df. 11th, Aug. 1854, Nos. 346 and 349.

11. So much for the part of the coming system which is manifestly certain, namely, the European element. It appears to me that it will be found, after a little reflection, that the main features of the native element of the future army are equally certain, as being equally the necessary consequences of the present state of things. A native army there must be, but it need not be an army of regulars, even if it were desirable to adhere to the old regular native infantry model; the new native regiments could not be fully officered by European officers as heretofore, because there would not be nearly officers enough for the purpose. The native army, exclusive of all civil and police corps, cannot at the least be much less numerous than the European army; let us say it cannot be less than two-thirds of the Queen's and Company's European troops in India. As the greater part of the only officers available will be required for additional European regiments, and as there is no money wherewith to procure more officers, it follows that there will be comparatively few officers for distribution amongst the whole of the native regiments. Necessity is our master; and on this point it is useless to call upon professional gentlemen to inquire and debate about the best possible system, when there is no choice of systems. The native army must be so far on the irregular model, as to have no more than two, three, or four European officers to a regiment.

12. I do not suppose that this is to be regretted, for I believe the best military authorities are unanimous, or almost unanimous, in thinking that for native troops, the irregular model is the best. In fighting, the most fully officered regular native regiment has never equalled the conduct of some Sikh regiments in these last battles, with only two or three Europeans to lead them. In loyalty, the most fully officered regulars have no comparative excellence to boast of since our mouths have been opened respecting sepoys; I have never heard it denied that it is a waste of money and strength to use up the services of a score of European gentlemen in officering a battalion of natives.

13. If this be so, there is another great limb of the coming system shaped out to our hands by circumstance, without putting us to the necessity of inquiry or debate. We must raise from amongst the untainted classes of loyal districts irregular native corps, with a very few selected officers to each, in order that by help of this cheap and safe succedaneum our Europeans, men and officers, may be made the most of.

14. It is true that the classes from which to draw these native troops, the combination or separation of the several classes, the localization or otherwise of the regiments, and all the details of management, are the legitimate subjects of such inquiry and discussion as are proposed. But whatever may be the ultimate determination on these very important points, it seems to me that with a little care a native army may be now raised, so that it may, without much inconvenience, be put hereafter into any shape that may be determined upon eventually; some leading principles, I believe, may be taken for granted. For example, whatever may be resolved upon in regard to the native army generally, some corps, I apprehend, will certainly consist exclusively of particular tribes, or groups of tribes, such as Goorkahs; whatever may be resolved upon as to the exclusion or admission of the Poorbeeah sepoy class, now infamous, it will be necessary to raise men for the most part of other classes at present, for obvious reasons, and this makes it necessary to go to distant places, and even to other presidencies, for the supply of present wants in Hindostan; whatever proportions may be allotted for different tribes eventually, it may safely be assumed that no one tribe, such as Sikhs, will be armed in such comparatively large numbers as to become in themselves a source of dan-

* See Appendix C.

ger, and this, too, makes it necessary to provide, as soon as possible, the means of gradually but largely reducing the Sikh element, which is now confessedly too strong for a permanency. Again, whether the principle be adopted of mixture in the elements of battalions, and consequent uniformity in the battalions themselves, or the contrary principle of having the greatest possible variety of battalions, each battalion being itself homogenous, it will be prudent to act in the meanwhile on the latter principle as much as possible, because it will always be easy to mix up, and always difficult to separate. But with a little thought and prudence upon such points as these, I can see nothing likely to interfere materially with the system to be ultimately elaborated, whatever it be, in commencing in earnest the re-establishment of a trusty native army to-morrow.

15. To recapitulate my argument, I hold that as our military expenditure was our main item of expenditure before, when we had no surplus, and no proper means of saving in other departments generally, we have no more money to spend on the Indian army now than we had before the mutiny; and I hold, that as the great element of our military expenditure is the pay and pensions of the European officers, and as we have a very large body of such officers, who must be used, paid, and pensioned in our lands, it follows that we are constrained by the state of our finances to use as many as necessary of these officers for the requisite number of additional European regiments, leaving the rest to afford a small number of officers to each of the new native regiments to be raised.

16. My earnest recommendation is that without advertence to the proceedings of any military Commission, or to any military inquiry conducted in any other manner, measures of the most energetic nature be immediately instituted in England in respect to Europeans, and in India in respect to natives, for the reconstitution of the Bengal army upon the principles above indicated.

17. We have for the moment, but only for the moment, an additional force of Queen's troops in India of considerable strength. But the cost is terrible; and still we have not strength enough. I tremble to think of what would be the certain consequence to India if whilst India remains in this dependent condition England should be called upon to arm. It seems to me to be tempting our good fortune, which by the Divine blessing has been hitherto almost miraculous, to be still discussing military theories instead of re-establishing an army.

(Signed) J. P. GRANT.

June 4, 1858.

APPENDIX A.

STRENGTH of EUROPEAN REGIMENTS serving in BENGAL before the Mutiny.

January 1, 1857.

Regiments.	Established Strength of Non-commissioned Officers, Farriers, Trumpeters, Drummers, and Privates.	Actual Strength of Non-commissioned Officers, Farriers, Trumpeters, Drummers, and Privates.	Short of established Complement.
Her Majesty's 6th Dragoons	743	634	109
,, 9th Lancers	703	676	27
,, 8th Foot	1,067	935	132
,, 10th ,,	1,067	948	119
,, 24th ,,	1,067	999	68
,, 27th ,,	1,067	1,016	51
,, 29th ,,	1,067	908	159
,, 32nd ,,	1,067	864	203
,, 35th ,,	1,067	652	415
,, 52nd ,,	1,067	954	113
,, 53rd ,,	1,067	948	119
,, 60th ,,	1,067	963	104
,, 61st ,,	1,067	1,021	46
,, 70th ,,	1,067	808	259
,, 75th ,,	1,067	1,006	61
,, 81st ,,	1,067	904	163
,, 87th ,,	1,067	995	72
,, 1st Europ. Fusiln.	977	863	114
,, 2nd ,, ,,	977	583	394
,, 3rd Europ. Regt.	977	808	169
	20,382	17,485	2,897

N.B. *One whole Regiment short in Bengal*—1,067.

STRENGTH of EUROPEAN REGIMENTS serving in BOMBAY before the Mutiny.

March 1, 1857.

Regiments.	Established Strength of Non-commissioned Officers, Farriers, Trumpeters, Drummers, and Privates.	Actual Strength of Non-commissioned Officers, Farriers, Trumpeters, Drummers, and Privates.	Short of Established Complement.
Her Majesty's 14th Lt. Dgns.	743	656	87
,, 16th Foot	1,067	1,089	22 excess.
,, 78th Highlan.	1,067	957	110
,, 83rd Foot	1,067	942	125
,, 86th do.	1,067	945	122
,, 1st Fusiliers.	977	885	92
,, 2nd do.	977	1,158	181 excess.
,, 3rd Eur. Reg.	977	777	200
	7,942	7,409	736
	Deduct excess		203
	Actual deficiency		533

MADRAS.

Her Majesty's 12th Lancers	743	609	134
,, 43rd Foot	1,067	1,109	42 excess.
,, 74th Highlan.	1,067	973	94
,, 84th Foot	1,067	892	175
1st Madras Fusiliers	977	1,002	25 excess.
2nd European Lt. Infantry.	977	979	2 excess.
3rd European Regiment	977	964	13
	6,875	6,528	416
	Deduct excess		69
	Actual deficiency		347

N.B. There was one whole Regiment short in the Madras Presidency—1067.

APPENDIX B.

COST of an INFANTRY REGIMENT of HER MAJESTY'S SERVICE.

	Rs.	As.	P.	Rs.	As.	P.
Officers.						
37 Officers'	14,734	14	3			
Staff and Establishment	4,515	12	4			
Command and other allowances	2,528	8	0			
				21,779	2	7
Men.						
117 Non-commissioned officers	2,289	4	5			
950 Privates	11,203	8	4			
Rations, clothing, and other charges	12,506	11	3			
				25,999	8	0
N.B. The Queen's 93rd Foot has 12 officers in excess, costing Rs. 2,917·15·3 monthly				47,778	10	7
Per mensem, yearly				5,73,343	15	0

COST of a REGIMENT of NATIVE INFANTRY.

	Rs.	As.	P.	Rs.	As.	P.
Officers.						
26 European officers	9,861	2	1			
20 Native officers	940	0	0			
Staff and establishments	1,209	1	4			
Command and other allowance	1,517	5	2			
				13,527	8	7
Men.						
140 Non-commissioned officers	1,780	0	0			
1,000 Sepoys	7,000	0	0			
Charges	826	14	0			
				9,606	14	0
Monthly				23,134	6	7
Yearly				2,77,612	15	0

APPENDIX C.

STATEMENT showing the Number of EUROPEAN and NATIVE TROOPS in the PUNJAUB and in the AGRA and OUDE PROVINCES in March 1857.

Punjaub.

European Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry	13,335
Native ditto - - - -	50,214

In Agra and Oude Provinces.

European Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry	4,260
Native ditto - - - -	27,263

STRENGTH of EUROPEAN ARTILLERY serving in BENGAL before the Mutiny.

January 1, 1857.

Regiment.	Horse and Foot Artillery.	Established strength, Horse and Foot.	Short of complement.
European Artillery .	2,886	3,000	114

STRENGTH of EUROPEAN ARTILLERY serving in the MADRAS Presidency.

May 1, 1857.

Regiment.	Horse and Foot Artillery.	Established strength, Horse and Foot.	Excess of complement.
European Artillery .	1,856	1,792	64

STRENGTH of EUROPEAN ARTILLERY serving in the BOMBAY Presidency.

May 1, 1857.

Regiment.	Horse and Foot Artillery.	Established strength, Horse and Foot.	Excess of complement.
European Artillery .	1,473	1,292	161

MINUTE by the Honourable H. RICKETTS.

Organization of the Army. I AGREE generally in what has been said by the honourable President and Sir James Outram. It appears to me improbable that a satisfactory result should be arrived at by the method of inquiry it is proposed to pursue. Each person consulted will forward a plan of his own; when all these plans come to be compared, they will be found so inconsistent one with the other, and founded on such different data, that further reference will be necessary to all the writers, and the questioning will be interminable. There must be very great delay.

I would strongly recommend the appointment of a committee, as originally intended. Provided there be no change in the secretary to the committee, it does not, I think, much signify how often the members of the committee may be changed. I do not see why a committee of three members should not commence at Murree, and when they have examined all those whom it might be considered desirable to question at that place, should it be inconvenient to bring all or either of them away from thence, other three might take it up at Umballa, and when they had completed the examinations at that place other three might take at Meerut, and so on at Agra, and Allahabad, and Calcutta, each member leaving on record his sentiments on quitting the committee. I am by no means certain that this would not be better than having the same three men throughout, provided, as I have said, the secretary remain unchanged.

An opinion extracted by the questioning of a committee is generally much more valuable than an opinion recorded in the closet. The wits of the witnesses are sharpened by the questioning, and the wits of the members are so sharpened by one good witness, that they are enabled to turn to good account the incomplete suggestions of many less competent witnesses; doubts and discrepancies are at once cleared up and reconciled, and opinions which, if collected in the manner proposed, would be impossible of reconciliation and useless, may be sharpened and modified till they contribute to the formation of a serviceable whole.

As the Right Honourable the Governor-General has expressed his wishes to consider the subject in council, I cannot think it good that the members of council should record their opinions on the questions propounded; a person must naturally be disinclined to place on record an opinion as a witness with very incomplete information, when he will shortly have to give his opinion as a councillor with complete information before him. On the other hand, with his opinion as a witness recorded, he would be disinclined to acknowledge that he was wrong.

Had the Right Honourable the Governor-General declared it to be his intention to dispose of the subject while separated from the council, on that case there could be no objection to a declaration of his sentiments on the part of a councillor, for he would have no concern with the fixed award.

The information alluded to in questions 1, 3, 5, and 9, can only be procured from the departments concerned. I have placed in the hands of the secretary to Government in the military department a memorandum of the information necessary. He will procure it as quickly as may be from the several departments, and when complete, a copy might be sent to Colonel Durand to be forwarded to all those to whom the questions have been sent.

I quite agree with the honourable the President in thinking that practically the inquiry must be limited to a very narrow range. We must have an army of Europeans completely officered, and we must have an army of natives, with not more than two or three European officers in each corps (I would have several corps with only one European officer, but that question need not be discussed here). Indeed, we already have an army of natives complete within a few thousands. At this moment there must be considerably more than 100,000 men with our arms in their hands in the Bengal presidency, including the Punjaub, of which 65,000 (with police corps) are Punjaub men; a very few thousand in addition to those must complete the native force, for, as shown by the President, the finances will not admit of the employment of more men.

It certainly is necessary that, without any reference to the inquiry, whether carried on as commenced or by a committee, the recruiting of English soldiers for India should be urged on as fast as possible, and that without delay they should be sent out to be formed into regiments to be officered by the officers of the late sepoy army. I never was more surprised than when I read the papers received by the last mail that the standard for recruits had again been raised an inch; were there 20,000 men ready for embarkation now they would not be one more than we want. There is not a single province on this side of India in which more European troops are not required; in Bengal, in Behar, in the Doab, in Oude, in Central India double the force now available would not be too many. With 65,000 armed Sikhs the Punjaub and the Sutledge states should not be held by less than 20,000 Englishmen.

I believe that when the disturbances shall have been put down 50,000 European infantry and 10,000 European cavalry will be considered necessary to hold the country from Peshawur to Arracan. The precise number and how many of them should be Queen's troops, and how many troops recruited for service in India, may be questions for discussion, but I subscribe to the President's most earnest recommendation "that measures of the most energetic "nature be immediately instituted in respect to the European "troops," so much and so immediately needed.

(Signed) H. RICKETTS.

June 5.

MINUTE by the Honourable B. PEACOCK.

Organization of the Army. IF the question were an open one I should very much prefer a Commission, such as that suggested by the Honourable Court, to the method of inquiry which the Right Honourable the Governor-General has determined to adopt; but I understand that that question has been finally determined. If a Commission were to be issued, I think a constant change of Commissioners would very much detract from its usefulness.

I am disposed to think that it will be better that the members of Council should not be called upon to answer the questions propounded, if they are to consider and form their opinions upon the whole of the evidence which may be elicited from officers of experience for their consideration and guidance. If, however, it be still desired, I will willingly answer the questions to the best of my ability.

I earnestly join in recommendation of his Honour the President, that without advertence to the inquiries which may be found necessary, with reference to the proper organization of the army in India, the most energetic measures be adopted for providing an increase of European troops; but I think we should be careful not to increase too much the number of native troops.

His Honour the President remarks:—"The native army "cannot at the least be much less numerous than the "European army; let us say it cannot be less than two-"thirds of the Queen's and Company's troops in India."

We might safely I think exceed that proportion of natives; but at present, according to the last return made up to the 15th April last, there are in the Bengal presidency, including the Punjaub :—

Native troops armed	72,419
Do. disarmed	17,463
Total	89,882
Whereas there are only European troops	49,581
Of whom only were effective	44,581
And sick	5,000

(Signed) B. PEACOCK.

June 10, 1858.

MINUTE by the Honourable Major-General Sir JAMES OUTRAM, G.C.B.

Re-organization of the Army, 2nd minute.

I HAVE read with much attention and deep interest, the minutes of his Honour the President and my honourable colleagues, which reached me yesterday evening; and in returning them I am anxious to offer a few observations supplementary of those previously recorded by me.

Had I construed the Honourable Court's suggestions as implying that the Commission of inquiry should necessarily proceed by *vivâ voce* interrogation, I should have acquiesced in the opinion of the Right Honourable the Governor-General, that the appointment of such a Commission as the Court recommended, was impracticable at a time when active operations were being conducted at so many different and widely distant points.

But I did not, and I do not, so construe the Court's letter.

The Honourable Court doubtless expected that the Commission should, whenever practicable, summon before it those officers whose opinions it desired to ascertain and test. But it appears, I think, to have contemplated, as regards the overwhelming majority of officers to be consulted, that the consultation should proceed through the medium of written queries, so contributed and elaborated as to secure most of the advantages to be derived from conversational cross-examination. And it is, I think, easy to understand the reasons which induced the Court to recommend that an inquiry thus conducted, should be intrusted, not to an individual, but to a Commission.

Very different principles of recruitment and promotion have obtained in the native armies of India. These differences have led to widely discrepant systems of discipline and management: and before we proceed to reorganize our military establishments, it is desirable that we should thoroughly understand the various systems that have hitherto been in force in our native armies; that we should have a just insight into their effects immediate and remote; that we should fairly appreciate their respective advantages and disadvantages; that we should accurately determine how far the more laudable features of our system should be engrafted on the others; and that we should ascertain how far the various reformatory changes that have from time to time been recommended, are practicable and judicious: to what extent and with what results may they have been experimentally tried; how far their success or failure when thus tried was referable to the personal qualities of the experimentor, to local advantages, or to the material experimented on; and how far they are compatible with each other and with existing systems.

Though I possess a tolerably wide military acquaintance I am unable to indicate any of our officers whose thorough acquaintance with the material constitutions, traditions, and practical working of the three armies, and of the various forces, regular and irregular, of which these armies are composed, and whose freedom from presidency service or personal prejudices qualify him for so framing his interrogatories as to test the reasonableness and grounds of the widely dissonant views that obtain amongst military men of reputation, or for furnishing a lucid and thoroughly impartial analysis of and judgment on these dissonant opinions and reasonings, such an analysis and judgment as the Commander-in-chief and the Government could advantageously report on with a view to action.

To secure such a full, intelligent, impartial, and *practical* inquiry as I have described, it is, I think, indispensable that a Commission should be formed, such as the Honourable Court suggested; such a Commission would, I believe, be able to present their report within three months. And as I have already stated I am not personally aware that any insuperable obstacle exists to the formation of such a Commission authorized to conduct its labours in the manner I assume to have been intended by the Court.

Acquiescing in very much of what our honourable President says, I beg to record my hearty concurrence in his most "earnest recommendation that measures of the most "energetic nature be immediately instituted in respect of "the (additional) European troops," whose presence is so desirable. For only the fear of exceeding my legitimate functions, and of appearing to interfere with those of the Governor-General and Commander-in-chief, has hitherto prevented my pressing this subject on the attention of Government. I am not wont to take gloomy views of public affairs, but I freely confess that I regard with uneasiness our present condition and prospects, even apart from the contingency of a European war. Every week's delay in the restoration of order adjourns consummation for months, weakens our moral influence, and proportionately augments the amount of physical force which will be necessary for the effectual maintenance of our authority in India, while the events of the last twelve months remain fresh in the memories of the discontented, the ambitious, and the warlike. The truest economy will be found in the maintenance, for some time to come, of such a strong European force as shall not only enable us to crush the bands now in arms against us, but confirm our numerous native levies in their allegiance. It will be so, should the peace of Europe remain unbroken. How much more so, should that peace be disturbed!

Whatsoever be the proportion finally resolved on between the local and Horse Guards European regiments, the number of the former for India generally will not, I presume, be less than thirty; and I should be happy to hear that enlistment for at least that number, and for a corresponding augmentation of the local European artillery, proceeded rapidly, while the Queen's regiments in India were being kept up to their full strength. The officering of the local European regiments recruited for Bengal would be a mere matter of official routine.

(Signed) J. OUTRAM.

June 12, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 55.

MEMORANDUM by VISCOUNT CANNING.

The appointment of a Royal Commission in England to consider the question of the reorganization of the Indian army, induces me to send to England immediately the officer who, for some time past, has been specially employed in obtaining and collating the opinions of the Governors and Commanders-in-chief of Madras and Bombay, of the Commanders-in-chief in India, and of officers of rank and recent experience in the civil and military services of the East India Company.

2. In doing so, I consider it advisable to enable Lieutenant-Colonel Durand to lay before Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, not only the opinions which have been given in India in answer to the questions circulated under my instructions, but also my own views on some of the principal heads of inquiry, which will be submitted to the Royal Commissioners. For this last purpose this memorandum is placed in Lieutenant-Colonel Durand's hands.

3. In expressing these views, however, I must, for the present, abstain from entering into details. Time will not admit of this. Moreover, I have not yet been placed in possession of the opinions of some of those to whom the questions were referred; and the views and suggestions of others of high authority have been received too recently to allow of my giving to them the consideration which they deserve.

4. I should have been glad that my own general opinions, as now expressed, should have been accompanied by those of my honourable colleagues in the council; but it has not yet been possible to submit to the consideration of the President in council at Calcutta the papers which have been laid before me, and which, though still incomplete, are very voluminous. This will, however, be done as quickly as circumstances will admit, and I trust that before long I shall be enabled both to place it in the power of the members of council to express their opinion on the several points involved in the reorganization of the army in India, and to transmit to Her Majesty's Secretary of State my own views in regard to them in fuller detail.

5. I understand that the Commission will be instructed to inquire into the following points :—

(1.) The terms on which the army of the East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown.

(2.) The permanent force necessary to be maintained in the Indian provinces respectively, after the restoration of tranquillity.

(3.) The proportion which Europeans should bear to native troops, in infantry, cavalry, and artillery, respectively.

(4.) How far the European portion of the army should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as parts of

the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only.

(5.) In connexion with this question, the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter.

(6.) Whether it be possible to consolidate the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other; and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company.

(7.) Whether there should be any admixture of European and native forces, either regimentally or by brigade?

(8.) Whether the local European force should be kept up by draughts and volunteers from the line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?

(9.) Whether it would be possible to raise any regiments in the colonies, either for temporary or permanent service in India?

(10.) Whether the native troops should be regular or irregular, or both, and if so, in what proportions?

(11.) Whether any native artillery corps should be sanctioned?

(12.) Whether cadets sent out for service with native troops should, in the first instance, be attached to European regiments, to secure uniformity of drill and discipline?

6. It appears to me that these points of inquiry are divisible into two branches, those which should be decided by Her Majesty's Government directly and absolutely, and those which the Government of India should be empowered to decide on, in accordance, of course, with any general instructions which may be issued by Her Majesty's Government, and subject to its approval, but with liberty to the Government of India to act upon its own decision, where early action may be necessary.

7. On the first point of the inquiry to be instituted by the Commission,—"The terms on which the army of the "East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown," I consider it unnecessary that I should offer any opinion. It refers, as I understand it, to terms which must be adjusted between Her Majesty's Government and the East India Company, and is one on which Her Majesty's Government can alone decide.

8. For the same reason I do not propose to offer any opinion on the fifth and eighth points; the fifth, relating to "the best means of providing for the periodical relief of "the portion of the European army which is to be com- "posed of troops of the line, and of securing the efficiency "of that portion which is to consist of troops raised for "the service in India only;" the eighth, relating to the "keeping up the local European force, whether by draughts "and volunteers from the line, or by separate recruiting in "Great Britain, as at present."

9. The remaining points appear either to require an expression of my views, or to embrace subjects which might be most conveniently committed to the discretion of the Government of India.

10. And first, in regard to the second point,—"The per- "manent force necessary to be maintained in the Indian "provinces respectively after the restoration of tranquillity."

11. At the time of the outbreak at Meerut, the Bengal army numbered about 119,000 native troops of all arms; that of Madras 50,000, and that of Bombay 31,000. The aggregate of the Madras and Bombay armies was therefore less than that of the Bengal army by 38,000 men.

12. We are now emerging from the state of anarchy consequent on the revolt of the Bengal army, mainly through the strength and exertions of our British forces, but partly by the aid of the Punjab troops.

13. Exclusive of the disarmed corps, the Bengal army now amounts to about 80,000 men, and if the militarily organized police be included, it amounts to about 130,000 men; that is, some 11,000 men more than at the time of the outbreak at Meerut; of these 130,000 men, about 75,000 are Punjabees; and of these Punjabees probably 23,000 are Sikhs. The difference, therefore, between our position in 1858 and our position in 1857 is, that there is now a larger native force, and that the bulk of it, instead of being drawn from Oude, is drawn from the Punjab.

14. When the police of Madras is complete, there will be in all India about 300,000 native troops, regular, irregular, and police militarily organized.

15. In this state of things, the demands for European troops put forward by the various Governments, as at present necessary, are not excessive. The whole number does not much exceed the number which will be in the country when the draughts and reinforcements of the season arrive, viz., about 100,000 men.

16. I consider that the force of European Infantry ultimately requisite for the permanent occupation of the Bengal presidency, may be estimated at forty-five regiments. I do not think it possible that the ground which the Bengal army will have to hold, can be sufficiently covered by less than that number. I should wish to see this force composed of thirty local regiments, and fifteen regiments of the line; the local regiments would be strong enough, if of the strength of 800 rank and file.

17. There are now in the Bengal army three European regiments of the Company's service, and three are in course of formation, being officered by European officers of six native infantry battalions. Therefore, for the other 24 regiments of local European infantry to be raised for service in Bengal, there remain available 68 cadres of battalion officers. If two of these cadres are taken for each European regiment, 48 cadres will be absorbed, and a surplus of 20 cadres will be left, after the European infantry shall have been provided for.

I propose that upon these 20 cadres there should be formed 20 regiments of regular native infantry; and further that the 30 regiments of local European infantry should furnish the officers required to officer on the irregular system 30 regiments of irregular native infantry.

18. In time of peace, it will, I believe, be found sufficient if these regiments are limited to a strength of about 700 each. This would give 50 native battalions for purely military service, and it would leave the 30 local European regiments, and the 20 regular native regiments, well able to supply officers for the command of the military police battalions, which have already been largely raised, and which, when once fully organized, will relieve the native troops of many of the non-military duties hitherto imposed upon them.

The same regiments will also be able to supply officers for general staff purposes.

19. In regard to native cavalry for Bengal, none but irregular corps are to be desired, and this arm of the service must be kept up on its present scale. It will be necessary that with each of the European regiments of local cavalry a corps of irregulars shall at all times be quartered, to relieve the European regiments of some of those duties which press heavily upon a small European corps.

20. In regard to European cavalry for Bengal, I have already represented to the Home Government, in a despatch of the 8th July last, that it is very desirable that the cavalry regiments of the local army should be ten of 440 sabres each, rather than five of 818 sabres each, as originally ordered by the Honourable Court of Directors. Should this proposal be complied with, it will still be necessary that not less than three regiments of cavalry from the English army should be retained in Bengal for the present.

21. In regard to artillery, I have given my opinion fully in a minute of the 9th of August last. I wish to see 78 batteries allotted to the local army.

22. Passing to Madras, and including with that presidency the province of Pegu and the Straits, I believe that 12 regiments of European infantry will suffice for its service.

23. Of European cavalry, I am of opinion that Madras requires for the present three regiments from the English army; but I recommend that eventually the eight native regiments of light cavalry be converted into three regiments of European cavalry, raised for the local army of Madras, of about the same strength as has been already recommended for Bengal, and that from the officers of the light cavalry remaining undisposed of, five regiments of irregular cavalry be officered. I say eventually, because, before this or any other change which will raise discontent, and which is not immediately urgent, is attempted in the native armies of Madras or of Bombay, the new Bengal army ought to be well in hand. This caution applies to all changes which will entail the disbandment of any large number of native troops in those presidencies. It will be better to incur for a year or two the expense of maintaining an extra European force drawn from the English army than to run the risk of the results which dissatisfaction and excitement may produce if we disturb the soldiery of Madras or Bombay before the great army of Bengal is reconstructed on safe principles. It would be a great error to suppose that we have now throughout India a tabula rasa, upon which we can build up any new military establishment which may be deemed proper, and to forget that, in prudence as well as in justice, the native armies of Madras and Bombay, which are still standing at their full numbers, and have shown themselves on the whole loyal, must be treated cautiously and considerately in the introduction of changes.

24. I have given my opinion respecting the artillery of Madras and Bombay in separate minutes, and I would not recommend that the changes to be made in this arm should be deferred.

25. In the matter of the European force to be allotted to Bombay, I am not in possession of the views of Lord Elphinstone; I therefore abstain from giving any positive opinion upon it. His Excellency the Commander-in-chief

of Bombay, Sir H. Somerset, estimates the required number of regiments at fifteen of infantry, and three of cavalry; the former at the full complement of 1,077 rank and file each, and the latter at 748 sabres each. I believe this requirement to be unnecessarily large, even though Rajpootana should be held by the Bombay army.

26. In regard to the 3rd point of inquiry, viz., "the "proportion which European should bear to native troops "in infantry, cavalry, and artillery respectively," I am of opinion that, as a general rule, the proportion should not be less than that of two to five, reckoning the military police as troops. It does not seem necessary to lay down any particular rule as to the proportion to be observed between Europeans and natives in each particular arm of the service, especially as, in the case of the artillery, the arm of paramount importance, it has been determined that in Bengal no appreciable strength of native artillery should be maintained.

27. The 4th point has already been noticed, so far as regards the army of Bengal.

28. The 6th point is this, "whether it be possible to con- "solidate the European forces so as to allow of exchange "from one branch of the service to the other, and what "regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect "this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers "now in the service of the East India Company."

29. The difficulties of amalgamation, arising out of the two distinct systems of promotion, by purchase and by seniority, obtaining respectively in Her Majesty's army and in that of the East India Company, are very great. I can suggest no satisfactory solution of them. But it appears to me to be most important that, in the event of an amalgamation of the local army with the line being found to be too difficult for adjustment or too expensive, or, for other reasons, not advisable, some arrangement should still be provided, by which the local European army should be made to feel that it is composed of the same stuff, and is in all respects in an equally honourable position with the line. I think it very desirable that officers should be enabled to pass from the one into the other, though here also difficulties are not slight; that there should be a clear understanding that the senior officers whose service and ability may render them fit for such marks of Her Majesty's confidence shall be permitted to serve Her Majesty out of India as well as in this country, and that divisional and brigade commands should be distributed between the two armies in a fair proportion. On the other hand, the officers of the line should have a larger share of staff employment than they have hitherto had.

30. On the subject of staff and civil employment I would here say a few words.

31. I think that in order to remedy the chief evil resulting from the Indian system of staff and civil employment, it will be found necessary to adopt the plan of *seconding*, as followed in Her Majesty's service. It would probably suffice to adopt it in regard to officers taken from their regiments for civil employ alone, and not in the case of those taken for the staff departments connected with the army. I doubt whether a staff list would work so well as *seconding*. The latter is equally encouraging to the regimental officer. It preserves to Government the advantages of the present system, and is more in accordance with the organization of the Indian service.

32. I do not share all the objections which have been very generally made to the withdrawal of officers from regiments for staff employ. I think that the disadvantages of the system are counterbalanced by great advantages which it would be unwise to sacrifice; and that the former admit of much mitigation, without departure from the system.

33. Considering the frequency and suddenness of calls for active operations in India, it is convenient to be able to strengthen a regiment with officers at short notice. At the same time it is desirable that officers whose presence with their corps is not required in time of peace, should be saved from the many evils attending an idle garrison life. Both these objects will be most cheaply and better accomplished by retaining with proper checks the system of civil employment for military officers.

34. Civil employment, and the prospect of it, give to officers a much greater interest in and knowledge of the country than they would otherwise acquire.

It places an officer in situations of responsibility and trial, of which he would otherwise have no experience; it sharpens his intelligence and makes him readier, handier, and more self-reliant, and therefore eventually a better soldier, than he would otherwise be. Some of the ablest and most distinguished men of the Indian service are those who have had the benefits of this system. Of those of the present day, it suffices to name Outram, Nicholson, and Edwardes; other names of more or less note might be added. Looking to the Queen's army, the mention of Sir Hugh Rose and Sir W. Mansfield is enough to show that military ability is in no way impaired by a course of civil service.

35. And it is further to be recollected, that if the system of placing military officers in civil situations be discontinued, the inevitable consequence will be that the civil service must be largely increased, and considerable additional expenditure be occasioned thereby.

36. The 7th question, "whether there should be any ad- "mixture of European forces, whether regimentally or by "brigade," may with advantage be left for experiment and decision in India. Admixture in brigades seems scarcely avoidable—in regiments it does not appear to me desirable; and in proposing, as I have already done, that a body of irregular cavalry should invariably be associated with each European cavalry regiment, I do not contemplate that the connexion should be permanent, but that the body of irregulars should be changed from time to time as may be most convenient.

37. In the evidence will be found a suggestion from Colonel Keith Young, for attaching to each European regiment a company of native infantry, selected from the cook boy class. Such a body would no doubt be useful in relieving the European soldiers of some duties which are wearing to the men, not beneficial to their discipline or health, and equally well performed by a native. The experiment is worth trial; but I think it would be found that nearly the same convenience could be obtained by a less close association, and that it is not an advantage to either party that the European and the native soldier should be forced into habitual juxtaposition.

38. In regard to the 9th head of inquiry, viz., "whether "it would be possible to raise any regiments in the colonies "either for temporary or permanent service in India," the possibility of raising these troops can be satisfactorily considered by Her Majesty's Government alone; but I earnestly hope that, even if the facility should prove greater than it has yet been found to be, no systematic introduction into India of African, West Indian, or foreign Asiatic troops may take place.

39. Fifteen months ago a West Indian or an African brigade would have been of great service, morally as well as physically. Our native regiments were turning against us daily. The natives in general were incredulous of our ability to supply their places, and to hold our own, with Englishmen. Any manifest proof that we had resources hitherto unknown to them, from which we could draw soldiers as impenetrable by the climate as themselves, and equal to them in bodily strength and discipline, would have operated very usefully. But the case is altered now. It has now become at least as necessary to inspire confidence and goodwill, as fear. Few measures could be more destructive of the first-named feelings than the suspicion that that which they consider the most honourable employment which we can offer them is, under a new order of things, to be put in other hands.

I quite concur in the objections which are urged by most of the witnesses to the adoption of this measure.

40. The tenth point has already been answered, so far as I am able to do so at present.

41. The eleventh is to this effect, "whether any native "artillery corps should be sanctioned." I understand this to have been ruled generally in the negative. As regards Bengal, it will be easy to make the change, and I am of opinion that it will not be wise to make any exceptions to it unless in one or two outlying districts, such as the Trans-Indus frontier, Assam, and Arracan.

42. In Madras and Bombay the transition from native to European artillery must be made gradually; but I would begin to make it with as little delay as possible. The Scinde frontier, like that of the Punjab, would furnish an exception; but of the soundness of the policy which shall make the native army feel that nearly every piece of ordnance in the British territory is in our keeping, I have no doubt whatever. No change that we can make will be a surer source of security.

43. The twelfth point of inquiry is, "whether cadets sent "out for service with native troops, should, in the first "instance, be attached to European regiments, to secure "uniformity of drill and discipline."

44. It has been already ordered, that cadets for the native infantry are to be attached for the first six months to European corps. The rule is an excellent one, though I doubt whether the term is long enough. But I am strongly of opinion that some measure more effective than this is necessary to make our young officers what they ought to be.

45. Cadets have hitherto joined their corps as half-educated youths; and it is more surprising that many have turned out well than that many early acquire indolent habits, which unfit them for an active career, and for posts of responsibility. It would be a great improvement if a

higher scale of education were exacted from candidates or nominees, and if it were further required that, before a young officer came out to India, he should qualify himself by being attached for a time to a Queen's regiment in England, in all the professional knowledge expected from an efficient subaltern.

46. I have now touched briefly upon the points of enquiry which I understand to have been submitted to the royal commission; but many collateral questions spring out of these; the castes and races from which the native army shall be mainly recruited; the proportion to be observed between them; the extent to which the recruiting for each regiment should be confined to a particular district, so as to give a local character to the corps; the grouping of different castes and races in the same regiment, or in the same company; the retention of native commissioned officers; the enlargement of the powers of commanding officers; the changes desirable in the system of courts-martial; the continuance or modification of the pension system.

47. Upon all these heads much valuable information will be found in the evidence which Lieutenant-Colonel Durand carries to England, although it is in many respects incomplete; and I am of opinion that upon nearly all of them a large discretion and the power of final action should be placed in the hands of the Government of India, subject to any guiding principles which Her Majesty's Government may think fit to prescribe.

48. Meanwhile the raising of troops mainly Hindostanee must continue, if only to provide a counterpoise to the present preponderance of the Punjabee and Sikh soldiers, upon whom during the disquietude of Hindostan we have been compelled to draw so largely, and whose number cannot be reduced until others are ready to take their place.

This is being done in such a manner as to avoid as much as possible any prejudgment on important points in the general reorganization.

CANNING.

APPENDIX No. 56.

MINUTE by the GOVERNOR-GENERAL of INDIA.

Allahabad, August 9, 1858.

1. On the 12th of May it was requested of the Court of Directors that immediate measures might be taken to increase each European battalion of artillery in India by one company, and to add one battalion to the European artillery at each of the three presidencies.

2. On the 26th of May* the Commander-in-Chief expressed his opinion, in a letter from the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General of the army, that it would be advisable to raise as many additional European troops and companies as will suffice to replace all the native troops and companies, regular and irregular. His Excellency further recommended that the rank of officers in the Company's artillery should be assimilated to that of officers in the Queen's artillery; and that, to that end, the grades of major and second lieutenant should be abolished, and the grade of second captain created in the Company's artillery, with such an additional rank of lieutenant-colonels as would place the latter on the same footing with the Royal artillery.

3. At this time a series of questions regarding the constitution of the artillery had been addressed to many distinguished officers, military and civil, in connection with the general scheme of a reorganization of the army; and answers to those questions have now been received from several functionaries of high authority.

4. After a careful examination I am of opinion that, as regards the artillery required for Bengal, to the consideration of which this minute is confined, very little can with safety be deducted from the Commander-in-Chief's proposal, that the whole number of native companies and troops must be replaced by an equal number of European companies or troops.

5. Before the mutinies broke out, the regular Bengal artillery was composed of thirty-six batteries of all denominations.

6. These batteries were served, and other general duties of the artillery corps performed, by a force consisting of fifty-five troops and companies, European and native.

Horse Artillery.—Three brigades, comprising nine European and four native troops.

Foot Artillery.—Nine battalions, comprising twenty-four European and eighteen native companies.

* Letter from Deputy Adjutant-General, May 26, 1858.

7. There was, besides, the irregular artillery force, or artillery of the contingents, consisting of twenty-three companies:—

Gwalior	5	Punjaub	5
Malwa	1	Nagpore	2
Bhopal	1	Hyderabad	4
Joudpore	0½		
Kotah	0½		23
Oude	4		

8. This gives, in all, seventy-eight companies or troops.

9. I do not believe that any reduction worth counting can safely be made in this number. With every allowance for the greater trustworthiness, and, in some respects, greater efficiency of European artillery, the ground which has to be covered is the same; and I know no spot under the charge of the Bengal army where guns have hitherto been placed from which they could in prudence be withdrawn. A new distribution of our artillery force, both in our own provinces and in Central India, will be necessary. Less than five batteries will suffice for Gwalior; but Oude must have more than four, and addition must be made to the artillery in Bengal. Upon the whole, I see no hope of a dimininution of the aggregate force.

10. It will be seen, in a return ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on the 16th April 1858, that from the year 1852 to 1857 the strength of the Bengal artillery was as follows:—

Year.	No. of Brigades and Battalions.	European Officers.	European Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-Commissioned, and Rank and File.	Gun Lascars.	Ordnance Drivers.	Total Europeans.	Total Natives.	Grand Total.
1852	12	237	3,406	2,339	1,152	1,236	3,643	4,727	8,370
1853	12	242	2,530	2,262	1,146	1,221	3,772	4,629	8,401
1854	12	252	3,446	2,321	1,131	1,322	3,698	4,774	8,472
1855	12	244	3,268	2,311	1,128	1,277	3,512	4,716	8,228
1856	12	244	3,138	2,320	1,131	1,268	3,382	4,719	8,101
1857	12	241	2,925	2,283	1,125	1,223	3,166	4,631	7,797

There were, therefore, at the time of the mutiny in 1857, 605 European artillerymen less in the Bengal presidency than in 1853.

11. According to a distribution return of the adjutant-general of the army for the 1st May 1858, the strength of the Company's European artillery was as follows:—

	Officers.	Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.
3 Brigades Horse Artillery	46	967
5 Battalions Foot Artillery	66	1,512
	112	2,479
Add approximation for 6 Battalions Foot Artillery	13	302
	125	2.781

Total - - 2,906 European Artillery.

12. Therefore, notwithstanding the draft of 1,407 men sent out for the artillery subsequently to the 1st January, 1857, a large proportion of which must have come to this presidency, the Bengal European artillery was, on the 1st May, 1858, about 140 men weaker than in 1857.

13. There were, however, on the 1st May, 1858, in the Bengal presidency, two troops, and thirteen companies of royal artillery, mustering 95 officers; 2,362 non-commissioned officers, rank and file. Total, 2,457 royal artillery.

14. The grand total of European artillery on the 1st May, 1858, may therefore be taken as about 5,363.

15. Of native artillery, on that date, the adjutant-general's return shows: 25 European officers, and 13 European non-commissioned officers. Total, 38.

1,363 native artillerymen; 1,071 gun lascars attached to European horse and foot artillery. Total, 2,434.

16. This native artillery consists of three troops of horse artillery; one battalion of three companies of foot artillery; five batteries, including the Peshawur mountain-train of the Punjaub irregular force, and No. 4 garrison company of artillery of the same force. The 7th and 9th battalions of foot artillery are, however, omitted by the adjutant-general, no returns having been received; but as both battalions mutinied, they need not embarrass calculations.

17. It will be seen from the appended extract from the general remarks transmitted by Sir John Lawrence, Brigadier General Chamberlain, and Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes, in reply to the questions which have been addressed to them, that they recommend the maintaining of five and a-half

batteries of native artillery for frontier purposes; that the retention of native drivers and gun lascars, with all the European artillery of the local army, is advocated mainly as a measure of economy; that it is not suggested that the royal artillery should have native drivers and gun lascars, but that they should have European drivers as usual; and that the opinion is expressed that it is desirable always to have some of the royal artillery serving in India, not merely as a field of exercise for that arm, but to excite emulation in the artillery of the local army.

18. The commander-in-chief of the Madras army states that, when certain arrangements have been carried out, "all native artillery may be, and ought to be, dispensed with." In a memorandum dated Calcutta, August 11, 1857, Sir P. Grant observes, "I have said, in my memorandum of the "29th of June, that guns ought never again to be manned "by natives: I will now add, that neither ought natives to "be employed as syce drivers; a corps of European artillery "drivers should be formed." The remark had reference to what was occurring at the time in the Bengal army.

19. Brigadier J. Jacob, in a printed letter to Sir C. Trevelyan, delivers his opinions as follows:—"The whole of the "artillery in India should be European, with the exception "of a few troops and batteries, formed for special service in "particular localities where European troops could not live, "such as this frontier of Scinde."

The strength of the "artillery in India should be increased. "All the native artillery in the armies of the three presidencies should be replaced by Europeans, the gun lascars "attached to whom should be replaced on their old footing, "as they were in 1828; a full and complete company of gun "lascars being attached to each European company. These "men are most useful, and save the European artillerymen "from fatal exposure and fatigue, while they themselves are "not of a class ever likely to become dangerous to us."

20. Major-General Sir S. Cotton touches upon the subject in the following words:—"It is scarcely necessary to make "any allusion to the artillery branch of the service, which "requires, perhaps, no reorganization, excepting that in no "way in future should the natives of the country be entrusted "with British artillery, nor should any native of India be "instructed in the use of such dangerous weapons; the "native drivers are good horsemen, and the gunners most "excellent, but they cannot be trusted; they have a "religious veneration for their guns; and, in proportion as "they are most valuable to the government they serve, so are "they more formidable when they choose to be rebellious."

21. The argument in favour of a few batteries for frontier purposes is a valid one, and applicable to the Indus frontier of the empire, both in Scinde and the Punjaub; but that in favour of native drivers, based on the good conduct of those at Delhi, and on the presence of a European cavalry escort, does not convince me. It must be borne in mind that elsewhere than at Delhi the defection of native drivers paralyzed European batteries, or very greatly embarrassed them; and, also, it should be remembered that the presence of an escort of European cavalry, however desirable, cannot always be accounted a certainty. The drivers are the masters of the motive power of the artillery, and, although the non-commissioned officers of a gun, riding alongside with loaded pistols, or a cavalry escort of European dragoons, may control the native drivers, it is far from desirable that artillery should be wholly dependent for its efficiency on such extraneous aids: it cannot be too self-reliant. Although the weight of opinion militates against the continuance of native drivers, it is in favour of the continuance of gun lascars, who may, with advantage, be kept up.

22. The maintenance of a few frontier batteries, as recommended by Sir John Lawrence, does not modify materially the augmentation requisite for the Bengal artillery; the large number of contingent batteries which have been lost to the State, and which must in a measure be replaced by European artillery, leaves the question almost unaffected by the five and a half native batteries required for the Punjaub frontier.

23. Except by Sir John Lawrence and his coadjutors, Brigadier-General Chamberlain and Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes, the employment of Royal artillery in India, for the sake of emulation, is not advanced. During the present crisis, its services have proved most valuable, and it must be some time before its co-operation can be dispensed with, either in this or the other presidencies. Royal artillery, in order to be useful in India, requires to be provided with the establishments of the Company's artillery; it has to be horsed and equipped; it requires a separate staff; it needs interpreters in every battery; and in a variety of ways increases unnecessarily the complications of the military department, both in the field and in the office. Considerations of this nature, and the known efficiency of the artillery of the Indian armies, to which Sir Colin Campbell has so strongly and so frequently borne testimony, render it doubtful whether Government might not purchase the advantage of emulation at too great cost and inconvenience, by carrying on a double system of Ordnance corps in India. Amalgamation, though full of difficulties and sure to be costly, might in the end prove more economical than a double system of Ordnance corps perpetuated in India.

24. The strength of European artillery on the 1st of May 1858 actually serving in the Bengal presidency was 5,363 as shown in paragraph 6. In addition to this there were 1,363 native artillerymen, besides 1,071 lascars. Before the mutiny, there were 2,283 native artillerymen, besides 1,125 gun lascars and 1,223 drivers; this omits all note of the irregular or contingent artillery, which, as I have already shown, counted twenty-three batteries. I do not think that the Bengal presidency can be made safe with fewer batteries than the late existing number of seventy-eight, nor with fewer artillerymen than may suffice these seventy-eight batteries, with a reserve for siege ordnance, for garrison and other duties.

25. This object may be attained with thirteen battalions of eight companies; six companies at 120 men, 720; two companies at 70 men, 140; total per battalion, 860 men; the grand total would then be 11,180 European artillerymen. These numbers include drivers. The six strong companies would be attached to batteries, and the two weaker companies would form reserves, from which the others would be kept up to their strength, and the requirements of magazines and depôts supplied.

26. The strength here proposed for the companies is, I am satisfied, the minimum. Indeed, I fear that it would be found that batteries would be often undermanned with companies on this scale, but I would commence with it experimentally.

27. The necessity for a large proportion of officers in the Bengal artillery, as compared with the strength of men, is even greater than in the royal artillery; the latter has fewer field batteries in proportion to its numbers; the colonies and stations at which it serves, when out of England, are healthier generally than India, and consequently the officers absent on sick certificate are fewer; further, there is not the same demand upon its officers to furnish men for civil and staff employment. Although, therefore, the home government may be averse to increase the number of battalions, it is absolutely essential to augment the number of officers; and this may be most conveniently done by assimilating the corps to the royal artillery.

28. The grade of colonel-commandant which exists in the royal artillery is, at present at least, entirely uncalled for in the Indian armies. The greater want of our artillery is in captains and lieutenants; and bearing this in mind, and assuming that the additional battalions already asked for is conceded, the assimilation which I would propose is as follows:—

	Existing State.	Proposed Assimilation.
Colonels	12	13
Lieutenant-Colonels	15	26
Majors	12	–
First Captains	72	91
Second Captains	–	91
First Lieutenants	132	286
Second Lieutenants	60	–
Total	303	507

It will be observed that the whole augmentation lies in the grades of captains and lieutenants, and that to the amount of 204 commissioned officers.

29. In regard to cost, a regiment of Her Majesty's infantry, of nine companies, and 1,068 bayonets, costs about 61,000*l.* per annum.

A battalion of artillery of 860 men, and with fewer field officers, may, therefore, be reckoned to cost about 53,000*l.*

This will give, for thirteen battalions, a total of 689,000*l.*

The present cost of the artillery force of Bengal is 457,000*l.* per annum for the regular artillery, and about 80,000*l.* for the artillery of the contingents; in all, 537,000*l.*

The increase of cost would, therefore, be about 125,000*l.*, to which would have to be added the cost of the Punjaub native artillery, if this should be retained for frontier service. It may be reckoned at 18,000*l.*

The whole increase in such case would be 170,000*l.*, a large sum, doubtless; but an expenditure from which, or from something approximating to it, I see no escape; and which, by securing to Bengal a strong and thoroughly reliable artillery establishment, will go further to maintain the tranquillity of the country than a larger sum spent upon any other arm.

The saving which might be effected by retaining native drivers, and proportionately diminishing the strength of the six full companies of each battalion, would not be very considerable. It certainly would not exceed 10,000*l.* per annum.

30. Brigadier-General J. Jacob recommends that there should be no difference of pay between horse and foot artillery; and many officers, I believe, support this view, as also the abolition of horse artillery as a separate branch.

This, however, is a question of technical detail into which it is unnecessary here to enter. I also pass by other points of detail, such as uniformity of material throughout the three presidencies, the greater use of elephant draught, and other matters.

My present object is to place before the Court my opinion as to the extent to which the European artillery of Bengal should be increased, and the footing on which it should be re-organized. It is the arm of greatest moment to our military power in India, and the thorough establishment of it on a footing of efficiency is of urgent importance.

CANNING.

EXTRACT from GENERAL REMARKS by Sir J. LAWRENCE, Chief Commissioner of the Punjaub, Brigadier-General CHAMBERLAIN, and Lieutenant-Colonel EDWARDES.

26. Profiting by the experience of the past year, it is proposed to transfer the mass of the artillery from the hands of native to those of European gunners. The value of artillery, is, perhaps, greater in Asia than in any other part of the world. Guns are an object of intense fear to the natives of India, and, for that reason, become objects of attachment and worship to the Indian gunner. A small European force, with a powerful artillery, should be irresistible; and no mutiny of a native army without guns could hope to be successful. Many officers would, for this reason, object to any artillery at all being left in the hands of the natives; but, in practice, it is not expedient to go to this extreme; the frontier must be excepted. Here, in the first place, a mountain-train is necessary, and an European mountain-train in India is an anomaly. The men are not able to undergo the fatigue that is involved; and they require an amount of carriage and supplies which render prompt or rapid movement impossible. The Peshawur mountain-train was originally manned by Europeans, but natives were substituted after the very first expedition in which they were engaged. Again, for similar reasons, the defence of the frontier requires native irregular cavalry and infantry; and it would be as unwise to brigade European artillery with native troops only, as to tell a frontier force that it could not be trusted with guns. Throughout the crisis of 1857, there were eighteen field-guns manned by native irregulars upon the line of the Indus; and their conduct was so good that to disband them would be unjust. Moreover, if native artillery be not allowed, European artillerymen must be located in the Derajat, which is as unhealthy as Peshawur, and European infantry be employed to guard them. For these reasons, it will be observed that, in the present scheme, the native infantry of the frontier has been maintained; and so long as the mass of our artillery in India is manned by Europeans, we need not fear to have a few native guns upon the border.

27. It is recommended, however, to reduce the size of each Punjaub light field-battery from six to four guns; a number which it is believed will suffice at Kohat, Bunnoo, and Derah Ishmael Khan. This reduction in the three existing batteries would give six out of the eight guns required for Peshawur, leaving two to be provided;* two more required at Derah Ghazee Khan; and there will be twenty-two native field-pieces on the frontier, instead of eighteen, as heretofore. The details of the former and proposed arrangement are shown in the subjoined comparison:—

FIELD GUNS on the FRONTIER.

Before				Proposed.			
Stations.	European.	Native.	Total.	Stations.	European.	Native.	Total
Campbellpore	–	–	–	Campbellpore	12	–	12
Nowshera	–	–	–	Nowshera	12	–	12
Peshawur	24	–	24	Peshawur	–	8	8
Kohat	–	6	6	Kohat	–	4	4
Bunnoo	–	6	6	Bunnoo	–	4	4
Derah Ishmael Khan and Derah Ghazee Khan	–	6	6	Derah Ishmael Khan	–	4	4
				Derah Ghazee Khan	–	2	2
Total	24	18	42	Total	24	22	46

Total increase, 4 guns native.
The mountain trains of Peshawur and Hazara remain as before, and are not included in this statement of field artillery.

* Supposing Government to approve the withdrawal of the European troops from Peshawur to Nowshera.

28. The only inconvenience that arises from this proposal is, that there is no battery from which to take the two guns for Derah Ghazee Khan. They need never be moved, and might be a separate subaltern's command.

29. Before quitting the subject of artillery, attention should be drawn to the great saving in expense which would result from retaining native drivers and gun lascars, with all the European artillery of the local army. If the gunners and cavalry escort are Europeans, there can be no fear of the drivers. This was strongly shown at Delhi, where their conduct was admirable. Drivers are not of the sepoy class, but of the syce class, and it is an incidental advantage to give an opening to the artillery syces for promotion. The royal artillery of the line would have European drivers as usual.

30. And here we would add, that it is desirable always to have some artillery from the line, serving in India, not merely as a field of exercise for that arm, but to excite emulation in the artillery of the local army.

APPENDIX No. 57.

MINUTES by the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

Referring to my minute of the 9th August 1858, in which I stated in detail my view of the proper strength and composition of the artillery of the Bengal army, and to the reasons therein given for my opinion, I now proceed to specify the force of artillery that I deem necessary for the army of Madras.

The Madras artillery at present consists of seven battalions of officers, each having—

1 colonel.
1 lieutenant-colonel.
1 major.
6 captains.
10 lieutenants (first).
10 lieutenants (second).

The number of horse brigade and battalions is six, viz.:—

1 horse artillery brigade.
4 European troops.
2 native troops.
4 battalions European foot artillery, 4 companies each.
1 Golundaz battalion.
6 companies.
2 supplemental companies.

8

I do not consider that a less force would suffice for the Madras presidency than 26 batteries, with a sufficient number of European artillerymen to man and drive them; and also to furnish a reserve large enough for siege ordnance, the defence of fortresses, and other important duties.

To obtain this object the Madras artillery should consist of six battalions of men, each of eight companies.

Of these companies, six, each 120 strong, would be attached to the batteries as gunners and drivers; and two, each of 70 men, would form reserves.

Total for the six battalions - - 5,160

The proportion of reserve artillerymen required is large, but this is unavoidable, because the artillery force in garrison in Pegu and in the Straits, which must be periodically relieved, is furnished by the Madras presidency.

The number of officers absolutely essential for the command of the proposed force should be seven battalions, giving a total of—

Colonels	7
Lieutenant-colonels	14
First captains	49
Second captains	49
Lieutenants	154
	273

Being an increase of 105 over the present establishment.

(Signed) CANNING.

September 13, 1858.

Having, in my minute of the 9th of August and of the 13th September 1858, specified the force of artillery required for the Bengal and Madras presidencies, I will now state

the number and composition of that arm, which I consider indispensable for that of Bombay.

The Bombay artillery is at present established at a strength of five battalions of officers, and of four battalions and a horse brigade of artillerymen.

The battalions of officers consist each of—

1 colonel.
1 lieut.-colonel.
1 major.
6 captains.
10 first lieutenants.
5 second do.

24

Making a total of one hundred and twenty.

I would propose for this presidency a force of twenty-four batteries of field artillery, which is the number, including the troops and batteries of the royal artillery, now belonging to it.

It will be necessary to substitute European gunners for Golundaz in two of the battalions, and European drivers for native throughout the force. For this purpose an increase of 1,954 serjeants, rank and file, will be required: an addition of 75 European officers is also necessary for the proper performance of the full duties of the corps.

The establishment of artillery for the Bombay presidency would then be as follows:—

4 or 5 battalions of officers.
5 colonels.
10 lieut.-colonels.
35 first captains.
35 second do.
110 lieutenants.

Total - 195

Five battalions of artillerymen, each consisting of eight companies, viz.:—

6 companies at -	- 120
2 do. do. -	- 70
Total for battalion	- 860
Do. do. 5 do.	- 4,300

The artillery required for the defence of Scinde and for the garrison of Aden is supplied by Bombay. It might also, in times of emergency, be necessary to send an artillery force from that presidency in steamers up the Indus to the Punjaub, the maintenance of a reserve of gunners over and above the minimum number required for the field batteries, and ordinary garrison duties, is therefore indispensable.

(Signed) CANNING.

September 14, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 58.

LORD CLYDE'S REPLIES to the FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, and FOURTH SERIES of QUESTIONS on the REORGANIZATION of the INDIAN ARMY.

INFANTRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. *What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the infantry of the native Bengal army is composed?*

I am informed, almost exclusively Hindostanees from Beher and the Doab, except that of late years a proportion of Sikhs and Punjaubees have been introduced; that is, regiments serving in the Punjaub were told to complete vacancies by enlisting Sikhs and Punjaubees, not exceeding two hundred in number per regiment. The principal castes of Hindoos in the army were Brahmins, Rajpoots, and Aheers. The Hindoos formed the great majority, only from 100 to 200 men in a regiment being Mahomedans.

2. *What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?*

This appears to have been answered in No. 1.

3. *Have any races, tribes, and castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Bengal army?*

Yes, several of the lower castes were not allowed to be enlisted.

4. *Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected, or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Bengal army?*

The field from which recruits were obtained was too limited. I think men should be taken of every caste, or of no caste (if there are such people), and from every district. There cannot be too great a diversity.

5. *What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?*

I am informed that generally there was no difficulty in obtaining recruits without special agency. The men who went on leave brought back recruits to a considerable extent, and when regiments were in certain localities men flocked for enlistment.

6. *On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?*

Those ordered by regulation.

7. *When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoys, or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?*

No special precautions were considered necessary, nor does any good appear to have arisen from any of the precautions taken, as referred to in the preceding question.

8. *What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops in the Bengal army?*

All allusion to caste in any general recruiting regulations should, in my opinion, be done away with, and physical fitness be ordered to be the main point to be looked to. I mean that all castes should be admitted to the service, but it would perhaps be a wise plan to have regiments of several castes, as well as regiments of mixed castes. For instance, Rajpoot regiments, Mahomedan regiments, Brahmin regiments, &c. &c. In the mixed regiments recruits should be taken from every religion and caste.

9. *What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bengal army?*

That prescribed in the Articles of War.

10. *How long has this form been in use in the Bengal army?*

I have no idea.

11. *Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruits for the native infantry of the Bengal army?*

Appears to be a matter of much indifference. We seem to be the only people in the country who think the oath of consequence. The sepoys evidently do not.

12. *Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bengal presidency of seafaring habits, and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?*

Doubtless, from all I have heard, a marine corps could be formed if such is wanted. Whether it would be of use, proportionate to its expense, is doubtful.

13. *Has the Bengal presidency any marine corps; and, if so, of what strength, and whence recruited?*

I am told not.

14. *Should each infantry corps be raised, each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?*

Some might be; more might not. There ought to be no fixed rule. Corps should differ as much as possible; one be of all castes, one be of some particular caste, one from a particular district, another from every district, and of every caste. Uniformity in such matters is dangerous. When corps consist of various castes, then might often with advantage be formed in separate companies.

15. *Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?*

Appears to have been answered in No. 14.

16. *Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe or caste?*

Appears to have been answered in No. 14.

17. *If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as it may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste? Or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?*

Appears to have been answered in No. 14.

18. *If corps are not homogeneous but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?*

Appears to have been answered in No. 14.

19. *If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts?*

The police should be recruited generally in their own district, without excluding men of other districts.

20. *Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?*

Certainly not. The discipline and system of the police must be different from that of the line.

21. *What agency should be employed for recruiting in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?*

No special agency would be found requisite. Commanding officers would be perfectly able to keep up their corps, save in the case of regiments being taken from some particular district, and stationed elsewhere. In such a case a small regimental depôt, where recruits would be received, might be desirable in the proper district of the corps.

22. *Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency?*

The recruiting should be carried on separately.

23. *What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the army of the Bengal presidency?*

It seems to be a matter of little moment.

24. *Should similar or different precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for police corps in the Bengal presidency?*

It seems to be a matter of little moment.

25. *Will it be be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country; and, if so, should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies, or otherwise?*

It is believed they would cost too much to be used to any extent, and that the recruiting would be very difficult, and the supply of men willing to enlist limited.

26. *If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?*

Answered in No. 25.

27. *What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?*

Answered in No. 25.

28. *Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?*

They had better be kept separate, I think.

29. *If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief?*

Answered in No. 14.

30. *Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops?*

Answered in No. 14.

31. *Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?*

They would be inconvenient.

32. *How should such companies be armed, with similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated?*

If they were associated with native troops they should be armed with a superior weapon to that given to the natives.

33. *How should the native infantry of the Bengal presidency be armed?*

With ordinary percussion muskets.

34. *How should police corps in the Bengal presidency be armed?*

A light percussion musket, fusil, or carbine.

35. *Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?*

It is doubtful whether there are any advantages whatever. Probably the reverse would be the more advantageous of the two, to a certain extent.

36. *How should the native infantry of the Bengal army be dressed, with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?*

With a loose dress or tunic, loose trousers, and turbans. The tunic and trousers of light material in summer, and of some warm cloth in winter.

37. *It has been proposed that to every European local regiment a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached; what is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxilliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?*

It might be tried as an experiment; but there does not seem to be any advantage promised from it. It might perhaps consider itself entitled not to be employed except with its European corps, which would be a great disadvantage.

38. *Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers present any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?*

There appears to be no analogy. The European and native regiments, it is presumed, would stand in line together, share danger alike, and perform much the same duties. The drivers and gun lascars are looked upon as inferiors by the gunners, and consider themselves so.

39. *How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?*

If such a corps was established, the lines and barracks should be near each other, but separate.

40. *Would such a system be favourable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength?*

I do not think the adoption of the system would have much effect one way or the other; but I can see no particular advantage from it.

41. *How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?*

It might be made to dovetail, but sometimes inconvenience, would arise from it, if, as a matter of course, a European regiment was always attended by its own native regiment.

42. *Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?*

They must be trained to act occasionally with no Europeans, save their own officers. There is no fear of their looking down upon European troops, but we should never again rely upon their *feelings* of dependence on Europeans, or on any other of their supposed *feelings*, but place it altogether out of their power to do serious mischief, which I believe to be by no means incompatible with getting good service out of them.

II.—Military Code and Rules of Discipline.

1. *Can you suggest improvement in the Articles of War in use in the Bengal native army?*

The powers of commanding officers should be greatly increased. It is doubtful if there should be such a tribunal as a native regimental court-martial, and it might without inconvenience be abolished, if the powers of commanding officers were adequately increased.

2. *Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?*

No; decidedly not. It is impossible to assimilate them, and therefore unwise to attempt it.

3. *Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bengal army?*

No; I should say not. Commanding officers have been too much hampered by them, and offenders have often escaped through some trivial error in the proceedings of courts-martial. This is most undesirable, especially with natives.

4. *What means are adopted to acquaint the native troops of the Bengal army with the military code under which they live and are governed?*

The Articles of War are directed to be periodically read out to the men.

5. *What proportion of the native troops can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the Articles of War?*

Quite impossible to say; but of those who could read, I am told, very few probably ever perused the Articles of War.

6. *Under what military or civil code are police corps in the Bengal presidency?*

I have not the least idea.

7. *How is discipline maintained, and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the Bengal presidency?*

I know nothing of these police corps.

8. *Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps, and the authority of their European and native officers, sufficient, and the working satisfactory?*

I know nothing of these police corps.

III.—Organization, Promotions, and Rewards.

1. *In the native regiments of the Bengal native infantry, what is the system of promotion? Is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?*

I am informed, and can also state from my own knowledge, that promotions went much by seniority; but sometimes men were promoted out of their turn for smartness, gallantry, &c. In some corps commanding officers promoted out of turn more than in others. A good deal had been done at head quarters of late years to encourage promotion by seniority, save in cases where the men were disreputable or very incompetent. There was an old order that men should not be promoted who could not read and write. This, in most cases, used to be a dead letter, but was very generally enforced after the publication of the new military regulations in 1855, and occasioned much dissatisfaction amongst men who had expected promotion, and were thus suddenly superseded owing to the revival of this rule.

2. *Are the native officers of the native infantry of the Bengal army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?*

Not generally so. There are exceptions, however.

3. *Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen?*

I am informed that their qualifications originally were identical; but having been non-commissioned officers for several years, before obtaining commissions, they usually have learned more of their duty than they knew when sepoys, and many of them can drill a company very well. This I can state from my own observation.

4. *Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?*

None.

5. *Does the intervention of the native officers, between the European officers and their men, weaken the influence of the European officers?*

Does a full complement of the European militate against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officers?

Not necessarily so, to both questions.

6. *Has it been found in the native infantry of the Bengal army, that on the occurrence of mutinies the native officers have given timely information, or been of any use in aiding the European officers to check mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?*

No; from all the information I have obtained, the native officers have gone with the men.

7. *Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the native infantry of the Bengal army?*

Must be continued, unless the number of European officers present with the native corps is to be immensely increased, which seems neither possible nor desirable.

8. *Is the substitution of an European sergeant and corporal to each company of a native regiment in lieu of its native officers advisable?*

I should say this would be inexpedient.

9. *If the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument thus closed to the native soldier, would a graduated scale of good service pay, and retiring pensions claimable after specified periods of services, be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?*

The abolition of the grade of native officer does not seem advisable, but a graduated scale of good service pay, and retiring pension claimable after specified periods, as a compensating encouragement, would, in my opinion, be injudicious. Men would cling on, when past work, to obtain higher pensions; and experience shows that commanding officers will not always prevent this.

10. *Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?*

Not at all. The idea always previously entertained that the pensions ensured the loyalty of the army has proved to be utterly fallacious. Men who had just obtained pensions at the time of the mutiny, and could in no way be affected by the "greased cartridge" question, at once joined the rebel ranks. The number of pensioners that have come forward to support us, is believed to be very small.

11. *Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?*

It is very doubtful if this is advisable. From all I have gathered from officers of experience in the Company's service, we do not know the natives sufficiently, and are more likely to promote a smart rascal than a good reliable soldier. The promotion should be by seniority to a certain extent; that is, the senior fit for promotion should be taken; and only occasionally, for great merit, or for distinguished gallantry, should a sepoy far down the list be advanced.

12. *Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?*

The system of pensions should be altogether modified. I would recommend that men should be enlisted for a certain number of years, ten or twelve say, and only those who were considered good men in every way should be allowed to remain beyond that period, and then as a favour. These, of course, would be the only men who would eventually obtain pensions. Even the men who were allowed to remain (who should be limited), should only be re-enlisted for ten years more, and so on. After 22 years service, if a man was not allowed to re-enlist (owing to physical unfitness, or otherwise), and his conduct had been good throughout his service, a trifling pension might be given. After 30 years service a well conducted man might claim a pension. Some such system would make the men anxious to conduct themselves well, and would make promotion tolerably rapid. Thereby doing away with the great evil of aged non-commissioned officers.

13. *What is the charge to the state of military pensions to native officers and men of the Bengal native army?*

I have no idea.

14. *Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in courts-martial?*

Generally not.

15. *Are native commissioned officers on a par with European sergeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?*

Generally not; but the native commissioned officers are usually very old and worn out; European sergeants and corporals are usually in the very flower of life.

16. *If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organization for the military corps?*

The Punjaub organization for military corps answers well, but more European officers than four are needed, and on service commanding officers of these regiments generally apply for others to be attached. There should not be less than eight European officers *present* with a corps of infantry. It is often absolutely necessary that detachments of a troop or company should have a European officer.

i. *Should they be fully officered by native commissioned grades, as well as with European officers, or—*

i. A full proportion of native officers; European officers as above.

ii. *Fully officered with European, but have no native commissioned grades, or—*

ii. If on the Punjaub system, need not be fully officered with European officers, but should have full proportion of native officers. If on the old regular system, must have full proportion of European officers (at least one a company, besides staff), besides native officers.

iii. *Be officered like irregular corps, viz., have the full complement of native commissioned officers, with but a few European officers?*

iii. Already answered.

17. *How should the police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades?*

A commandant and adjutant should be sufficient European officers for a police corps, with the usual proportion of native officers allowed to irregular infantry and cavalry.

18. *If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned officers, but only good service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits?*

Naturally not; the corps that are required to fight alongside of European regiments, and to move about India, should be on a more advantageous footing as regards pay, and on an equal footing at least as respects proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers, with police corps. In those of the latter, now raising, it is believed the sepoys receive as much as in the regular army or the Punjaub corps. Of course men will prefer the police, for many reasons.

19. *In polite corps, is there on first admission any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing, or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades, or on promotion to commissioned grades?*

I have no means of knowing.

20. *Has the distinct organization and the difference of system, regulations, and component races, in the three native armies proved favourable to our power in India?*

The distinct organization I believe to have been a benefit. If we had possessed *one* army in 1857, instead of three, (or with the Punjaub, we may say four,) armies, we should have lost India.

21. *Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate governments, to time, and to local circumstances, be allowed; or should endeavours be made to assimilate or even to amalgamate the three armies?*

To amalgamate or to assimilate the three armies would, I believe, be dangerous and impolitic. A craving for uniformity has already done much mischief in the native army. What seems to be wanted is, *not* uniformity, but dissimilarity. We should therefore have corps of all races, and under different systems; but all governed by a few broad general rules.

IV. European Officers.

1. *Within your experience, have the powers of commanding officers of native corps been increased or diminished in the Bengal army; and state the orders, or measures, or changes in the practice of the service to which you attribute such effect?*

They have been diminished practically, though not avowedly. Commanding officers have been much hampered with regard to promotions; and courts-martial sentences, approved and carried out by them, have been constantly upset, either in consequence of petitions to headquarters, or owing to flaws discovered in proceedings. The Deputy Judge Advocates of divisions are principally employed in endeavouring to discover mistakes in regimental courts-martial, in which they are often successful. Then again, a commanding officer sees his best officers often withdrawn for staff employ when he can ill spare them. At other times, the bad officer, who has set him at defiance and neglected his duty, is taken away without the commanding officer being consulted. All these things tend to weaken a commanding officer's authority, and are believed to have increased of late years.

2. *During the above period have the powers of officers of European or native corps been increased or diminished?*

They have been restricted.

3. *What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps upon the discipline of corps in the native infantry of the Bengal army?*

The result has been, I will not say the "mutiny," for that is doubtless owing to many things, but certainly the result has been to render the commanding officers almost cyphers, and their position undesirable. The commanding officer being thus crippled, found his only means of getting influence with the men was by flattering and coaxing them, and thus discipline was still further shaken. In truth, it was only when it suited the pleasure and convenience of the sepoy that he went heartily with commanding officer.

4. *What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of captains, or officers in charge of companies?*

The result necessarily must be bad.

5. *Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distant authority of head quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers commanding companies, and of the commanding officer of the regiment?*

The discipline of the regiment must mainly depend upon the influence of the commanding officer, and of the officers commanding companies.

6. *Should the power of commanding officers, and of officers in charge of companies, be increased or diminished?*

Rather increased than diminished.

7. *What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?*

I have already suggested enlarged powers being conferred on commanding officers. They should have authority to discharge a sepoy, to reduce a non-commissioned officer, or to confine a sepoy for days, and with stoppages of pay for the days in confinement, as in the Queen's service, always recording the circumstance in their regimental orders, and stating the nature of the offence. They should have power to stop a man's furlough. But above all, they should be as little interfered with as possible by superior authorities in matters of regimental detail. The Asiatic soldier must look to his commanding officer as very powerful. If a regiment is in bad order, and the commanding officer obviously inefficient, the Commander-in-chief should be able to deprive him of command at once, and to place an efficient officer in his stead. This will answer much better than a constant vexatious interference.

8. *Is the influence of the European officers among native troops greatest in time of peace or in time of war?*

The good officer will *always* have influence; but with native troops most so in time of war, because he is then thrown more with them. They know him better, and he becomes more acquainted with his men individually.

9. *What conclusion do you draw as to the course to be pursued with native troops in times of peace, with regard to the strength at which regiments should be maintained, the occupation to be found for them, and the like?*

Regiments should not be too strong; 640 or 700 sepoys is ample for infantry, 420 or 480 troopers for cavalry. If the native army is maintained on such a reduced scale, as it is hoped will be the case, there will be ample employment for it in the various duties of guards, escorts, detachments, &c.

10. *Has the strength of the native infantry of the Bengal army ever been so great in times of peace that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere military duties?*

No, it is believed not; but this has arisen not from *necessary* employment, but from the innumerable and most unnecessary guards and escorts required to be given by regiments.

11. *Would it have been practicable to employ the troops upon public works?*

Not as the army was constituted, and it does not seem desirable to maintain so large a native army as to have any number available for public works. A regiment of 640 sepoys will have, say,—

Sick - - - - - -	30
Recruits - - - - -	50
On regimental employ - - -	32
On regimental guards - - -	40
On garrison guards (a small estimate) -	50
On escorts or detachments (a small estimate) -	50
	252

leaving, if not a man was on leave, only 392 men in the lines, to relieve 90 on guard, and to be in reserve to furnish detachments, &c. The above would be a *most favourable case*, and it will be seen there are none to spare for public works.

12. *In apportioning European officers to native troops,—*
   i. *Should native corps have a full complement of European officers, according to the present scale, besides a full complement of native commissioned officers, or,—*
   ii. *A full complement of European officers, and no native commissioned officers, or,—*
   iii. *A smaller number of European officers than at present, and a full complement of native officers?*

Already answered in question 16, section 3, of "Infantry."

13. *If a full complement of European officers, would you attach cadets at once to native corps, or first to European corps?*

All cadets should do duty with a European corps for *at least* a year before joining native troops; a longer period, perhaps, would be better.

14. *If a smaller number of European officers is assigned to native corps, how would you train them to this special employment?*

They should learn their military duty as officers of companies with a European regiment; their subsequent complete training should be with natives.

15. *Is the efficiency of regiments affected by the number of officers taken from corps for staff employments?*

It has been grievously so.

16. *Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable, in the course of mutinies, between the conduct of regiments with few, and those with many European officers present.*

The officers generally seem to have had more *esprit de corps*, when many were left with the regiment; but as respects the mutinies, the men made up their minds to rise, and neither number of officers nor the efficiency of commanding officers appears to have affected the course they took one way or the other.

17. *How can the demand for European officers for staff and detachment employment be best provided for, without injuring the efficiency of regiments?*

By having an unattached list for the staff.

18. *Would it be advantageous to the efficiency of the officers of the army as regimental officers to cut off the inducement which the hope of staff employment affords to young men to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the State?*

No; and it is presumed the State must have officers for special employment. There is no other sufficient source of supply open; certainly not on the same terms.

19. *Would the standard of acquirements amongst the officers of the army at large be lowered by any measure having such a tendency?*

It possibly would, as there would then be no inducement for officers to obtain proficiency in many branches of knowledge in which they now qualify themselves.

C. CAMPBELL, General,
Commander-in-chief.

ARTILLERY.

I.—RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF THE ARTILLERY.

1. *What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the native gunners of the Bengal army are composed?*
2. *What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the gun lascars of the Bengal army are composed?*
3. *What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the drivers of the Bengal army are composed?*

There is a much larger infusion of the Mahometan element than in the infantry. Some men (particularly gun lascars) come from Lower Bengal, which furnishes hardly any soldiers to any other branch of the army. These are Mahometans. The artillery generally come from Oudh, the Dooab, Rohilcund, and the districts of Agra, &c.

4. *Should native gunners or golundazes continue to be enlisted, and to form part of the artillery of the Bengal army?*

The artillery should be entirely European.

5. *Should native drivers continue to be employed with European artillery?*

Certainly not. The native drivers are often a source of anxiety, and have the means of doing much harm.

6. *From what districts are the several races, tribes, or castes which enter into the golundaze drawn?*
7. *From what districts are the races, tribes, or castes which compose the gun lascars drawn?*
8. *From what districts are the drivers taken?*

Already answered in Nos. 1, 2, 3, of this section.

9. *Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded by regulation or practice of the service from the golundaz of the Bengal army; and, if so, for what reason?*
10. *The same question is repeated, both with respect to gun lascars and drivers.*

I am not aware of any castes, races, or tribes having been excluded.

11. *Supposing that native artillerymen were continued in the Bengal army, are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from whom recruits for the golundaz might with advantage be enlisted?*

I cannot contemplate their being retained, as I understand there can be no doubt that they will be done away with, and no more enlistments are taking place.

12. *What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the golundaz of the Bengal artillery, for the gun lascars, and for the drivers?*

They are believed to come forward and offer themselves for service.

13. *On enlistment of recruits for the golundaz, the gun lascars, or the drivers of the Bengal artillery, what precautions of registry and other forms are taken before the local authorities of districts?*

Those laid down in the regulations, it is presumed.

14. *Would you suggest any alterations in the recruiting regulations or practice, if golundaz continue to be enlisted?*
15. *The same question is put with regard to gun lascars and drivers.*

Reply seems unnecessary.

16. *What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his being admitted into the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?*

Those laid down in the native articles of war, I presume.

17. *The same question is repeated with regard to gun lascars and drivers.*

Those laid down in the native articles of war, I presume.

18. *How long has this form of oath been in use in the Bengal artillery?*

I have no idea.

19. *Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the golundaz, gun lascar, or driver when first enrolled? or would you substitute any form of engagement for the oath?*

It seems a matter of indifference.

20. *If native artillerymen continue to be used, should the different battalions be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only, or be recruited over a wide area irrespective of districts?*
21. *The same question is repeated with regard to gun lascars and drivers.*
22. *Should the battalions or troops of golundaz be homogeneous, to race or caste, or composite, having all tribes or castes mixed together?*
23. *If composite, in what proportion should the various races, tribes, or castes be entertained?*
24. *The two foregoing questions are repeated with reference to gun lascars and drivers?*
25. *What agency should be employed for recruiting golundaz, gun lascars, and drivers?*
26. *What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, when enlisting recruits for the golundaz, gun lascars, and drivers?*

Answers seem unnecessary.

27. *If native drivers be discontinued would you replace them by Europeans, raised for that duty as part of their exercise, or by Anglo-Indians enrolled for this special duty?*

All the European artillerymen should be trained as gunners and drivers, and the lightest men should act as drivers.

II.—Rules and Discipline and Military Code.

1. *Are the same articles of war applicable to the European gunners and to the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?*

No, certainly not.

2. *Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use of the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?*

The same as suggested for the infantry.

3. *Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war as respects the European artillery?*

They must be kept assimilated to the Mutiny Act, and articles of war for Her Majesty's forces; any difference is undesirable.

4. *Are the gun lascars and drivers under the same articles of war as the golundaz; and do any improvements suggested comprehend these classes?*

Yes, and the same improvements are desirable.

5. *Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?*

To assimilate the rules for natives with those applicable for Europeans is out of the question.

6. *Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the native artillery of the Bengal army?*

I should suppose as unsatisfactorily in the native artillery as in the other branches of the service.

7. *What means are adopted to acquaint the golundaz, gun lascars and drivers with the military code, under which they serve?*

The articles of war ordered to be read to them periodically.

8. *What portion of the golundaz, gun lascars and drivers can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?*

I have no means of answering this.

III.—Organization, Promotion, and Rewards.

1. *In the Bengal artillery, what is the system of promotion in force for the gun lascars, golundazes, and drivers? Is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?*

The system of promotion is believed to be much the same as in the infantry.

2. *Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the golundaz generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?*

Some are understood to be efficient; and during the mutiny the native batteries have been efficiently worked against us.

3. *Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the golundaz, from among whom they have risen?*

I am not aware that they are. They have of course had more instruction.

4. *Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?*

I am not aware of there being any.

5. *Do the golundaz of all grades undergo systematic instruction in anything else than ordinary gun drill? Are they practised at laying guns and mortars; at cutting fuses; at judging distances; adopting charges to mortars, &c.; or do European officers themselves execute these details?*

They appear to understand all these things.

6. *Can the golundaz of the Bengal artillery frequently read English and write it?*

I believe not often.

7. *Is it advisable that native gunners should be conversant with laboratory work?*

No; but it would be inconvenient to have a battery with no one in it but the officer who understood laboratory work; therefore do away with the native artillery altogether.

8. *Does the intervention of the native commissioned officer between the European officer and his men weaken or strengthen the position and influence of the European officer?*

Answered under the head of "Infantry."

9. *Have the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of golundaz been found on occasions of mutiny to evince cordial fidelity, to give timely information, and effectively to aid their European officers in checking or quelling mutiny? Have the native officers passively or overtly sided with the mutineers, or with the Government they had sworn to serve, and with the European officers?*

All arms of the native army have been proved (as a rule) faithless, whatever their rank or caste.

10. *If native artillery be continued in the Bengal army, should the grade of native commissioned officers be maintained or abolished?*

It would in my opinion make very little difference in the amount of danger to the State arising from native artillery, whether these were native officers or not.

11. *Would the substitution of such a number of European non-commissioned officers as would give one to each gun of a battery, in lieu of the native commissioned officers of golundaz, be advisable?*

Simply throwing away the services of good men.

12. *If the abolition of the grades of golundaz commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the golundaz, would a graduated scale of good service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement and as efficacious as commissioned grades?*

Answered under the head of "Infantry."

13. *Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the golundazes to the British service and the British rule?*

Answered under the head of "Infantry."

14. *Do the drivers and gun lascars receive pensions?*

Yes.

15. *Have the drivers and gun lascars of the Bengal artillery been found faithful in times of mutiny?*

With native batteries, the drivers have joined the mutineers. With European artillery, both gun lascars and drivers have done good service in many cases, but they have been a source of anxiety, and always were narrowly watched. They knew that the slightest symptom of treachery would immediately cause their death. It is not desirable that our European artillery should be hampered by having such men attached to them.

16. *Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained or modified, or prospectively abolished?*

Answered under the head of "Infantry."

17. *Can you state the charge upon the finances of the Bengal presidency on account of military pensions to the native artillery of the Bengal army?*

I have no means of knowing.

18. *Should not the system of promotion, generally by seniority, to the grade of native commissioned officer (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?*

19. *Are commissioned officers of golundaz generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?*

20. *Are native commissioned officers on a par with European sergeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?*

Answered under the head of "Infantry."

21. *Under the supposition that artillery be wholly European, would it be advisable to assimilate it as far as practicable with the royal artillery?*

Most desirable, with one exception. The Bengal horse artillery should, as at present, have every man able to serve as gunner and driver, and not have, as the royal artillery, a separate body of drivers unarmed, and who are not required to work a gun.

22. *What would this assimilation involve in changing the system of the Bengal artillery?*

It would involve an increase of officers and men (Europeans), and therefore add greatly to our strength.

23. *What would it involve of change in the material of the Bengal army.*

It would involve but little change. The Indian pattern ordnance is preferred as being lighter. The Bengal carriage is nearly the same as the royal carriage.

24. *What modifications would it be expedient to maintain in the organization of the Bengal artillery when assimilating it to the royal artillery, in consequence of the nature of the country, climate, and service?*

The modifications expressed in No. 21. It would be desirable also that a few store lascars and native artificers (non-combatants) should be attached to each troop or battery.

25. *Need the matériel of the Bengal artillery, if assimilated to that of the royal artillery, be at all modified in consequence of climate and service in India?*

Answered in reply No. 23. But the carriages should be made in India of timber properly seasoned.

26. *Do you advocate the maintenance of horse artillery at its present strength?*

It does not appear very excessive. There were 9 European and 4 native troops. The old European troops stand, a native troop is still employed, and 2 European troops have been formed by volunteers from the infantry, in lieu of two of the three mentioned native troops. Twelve troops are hardly too much for so enormous a country.

IV.—European Officers.

1. *Within your experience, have the powers of the commandants of native battalions of artillery, and of officers in command of golundaz batteries of the Bengal artillery, been increased or diminished?*

2. *What has been the result upon the discipline of the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?*

3. *If golundaz artillery is continued, what measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline, and the confirmation of the influence and authority of the European officers?*

The replies made to these questions under the head of "Infantry" are equally applicable here.

4. *Is the efficiency of the Bengal corps of artillery affected by the number of officers taken away from corps duties for staff employment?*

Most lamentably so.

5. *How can the demand for European officers of artillery for staff and detached employment be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of the corps of artillery?*

By having an unattached list, and by "seconding" officers, as in the royal artillery. Every troop and battery requires four officers at least always present; and any system which fails to insure this is defective.

6. *Would the general standard of acquirements be lowered by any measure which, by removing the hope of staff employment, cut off the inducement which young artillery officers now have, to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches of knowledge useful to the State?*

The staff should be open to the artillery as to other branches.

C. Campbell, General,
Commander-in-chief.

ENGINEER SOLDIERS, OR SAPPERS AND MINERS.

I.—Recruiting and Composition.

1. *What is the present constitution of the corps of sappers and miners of the Bengal army, as respects the European and the native elements?*

The companies are composed of natives. The full complement is twelve companies; each company *should consist* of—

1 soubadar.
1 jemadar.
6 havildars.
8 naicks.
2 buglers.
100 sepoys.

There is a European sergeant-major and a European quartermaster-sergeant to the corps, and two serjeants and ten corporals (European) trained at Chatham, and attached to each company or in such proportion as they may be available. There is a commandant and an adjutant always engineer officers; an interpreter, and quartermaster, who may belong to the engineers or to the infantry, and usually several young engineer officers are attached to the corps. There is also a conductor—an old sapper.

2. *What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the native sappers and miners of the Bengal army are composed?*

Mostly Hindostanees until lately. The sappers and miners at present are several hundred below the proper complement; and those who have been enlisted during the last year are believed to be generally Sikhs and Punjaubees. The Hindostanees who used to enlist were of all kinds, but there were probably fewer higher caste Hindoos than in the infantry.

3. *What districts are the races, tribes, and castes drawn from?*

From the usual recruiting districts, it is believed, of the North-western provinces.

4. *Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment either by the regulations or practice of the Bengal army?*

No such rule is known of.

5. *Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the sappers and miners?*

None; it is believed now that Sikhs and Punjaubees are employed.

6. *What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits?*

None necessary.

7. *On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are taken before the local authorities of districts?*

The forms prescribed by regulation.

8. *When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoys or the followers of corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?*

It is not known that any particular precautions are taken.

9. *What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition and efficiency of the engineer soldiers?*

In the sappers, all races who will come forward should be admitted; each race formed into a separate company or companies.

10. *What are the words of the oath administered to the engineer recruit on his entering the ranks of the sappers and miners?*

Supposed to be that laid down in the native articles of war.

11. *How long has the form been in use in the sappers and miners?*

Not known.

12. *Can you recommend any improvement in the matter or wording of the oath administered? or do you think an oath useless? Would you substitute any form of covenant or engagement?*

No.

13. *Should the companies of engineer soldiers be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or cast; or be composite, and have them mixed up; and if composite, in what proportion should the different classes enter?*

The companies might be of separate races or castes.

14. *What agency should be employed for recruiting?*

None is believed to be necessary.

15. *What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality?*

The same as heretofore prescribed by regulation.

16. *Has the recruiting of native engineer soldiers been hitherto from unskilled men, and is it practicable in the Bengal presidency, with reference to the habits and qualities, moral and physical, of the people, to adopt to any extent the system of the royal sappers and miners, by enlisting artificers and recruits conversant with some trade or special kind of labour?*

There would seem to be some difficulty in enlisting trained artificers in the sappers. One reason must be that the trained artificer earns more than the sapper receives as pay, and remains at his home. The old system seems to have worked well, and to have produced a very useful body of men.

17. *Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for hard labour and services in India, with the natives of the country, and if so, should they be formed in separate companies, or mixed up throughout the companies?*

Seems unnecessary, and they would probably require high pay.

18. *If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries for engineer soldiers, which are the countries and races to be preferred?*

Answered by answer 17.

19. *What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting.*

Answered by answer 17.

20. *Are the native engineer soldiers in sufficient strength for the requirements of service in the field.*

The corps of Bengal sappers and miners, if complete, and the two corps of Punjaub pioneers, would give upwards of 3,000 men, and this, with two or three companies of royal engineers, would probably be sufficient for the Bengal presidency.

21. *Is there any reason why all native infantry should not be trained to the ordinary work, in the execution of trenches; and be taught much now confined in general to sappers and miners?*

There seems to be no reason, save the disinclination of natives to do anything of the kind.

22. *Is any portion of the native infantry of the Bengal army accustomed to work in the execution of trenches, batteries, &c., and is the work done willingly?*

None are accustomed to the work in time of peace; sometimes native troops are so employed in time of war, but seldom have worked willingly.

23. *Has the sufficiency or insufficiency of the engineer soldiers of the Bengal army noted by you reference to the peculiar aptitude or the reverse of the native infantry of the line, or is your opinion based purely on the fair engineer wants of the service, irrespective of considerations connected with the efficiency of the line in siege and field works.*

The engineer soldiers, as before stated, seem to be sufficient for ordinary operations. In sieges, the line (European and native) must be called upon to work, and have done so generally; but the native infantry soldier of the regular army has never worked willingly.

24. *Have the sappers and miners of the Bengal army as many European sappers and miners, non-commissioned officers and privates as is desirable?*

Six European non-commissioned officers to a company of native sappers seems sufficient.

25. *How many European sappers and miners, and of what grades, should be attached to a company of native sappers and miners?*

The present number (six) is sufficient.

26. *Are you aware of any advantage which occurs from making the dress of the native sappers and miners closely resemble that of the European infantry?*

There is no advantage, that I am aware of.

27. *How are the corps of Bengal sappers armed?*

With carbines and swords.

28. *How should the engineer soldiers of the Bengal army be dressed and armed?*

Their present arms do very well, but the carbines would be, of course, more efficient if rifled. If other native troops have a smart dress, the sappers should have one likewise; but their working dress should be plain, as it is at present, in fact.

29. *What proportion of the native Bengal sappers and miners can read and write their own vernacular?*

I cannot say.

30. *What proportion can understand or speak English, or read and write English?*

I cannot say.

31. *Besides practice in sapping, mining, and field operations, have the Bengal sappers and miners any schooling?*

I believe so. They are apparently sufficiently trained for all practical purposes.

32. *Do you consider that they are to be classed as skilled engineer soldiers?*

Sufficiently so, as far as I can judge.

33. *With reference to the numerous demands for skilled European overseers and subordinates in the department of public works, and to military requirements, is it advisable to have, in addition to natives, a corps of European sappers and miners? If so, of what strength, and how officered?*

If companies of the royal engineers remain in India, the establishment of any other corps of sappers seems unnecessary. A reserve of European sappers should, however, be kept at head quarters to supply deficiencies in the non-commissioned officers with native companies, whether caused by death or by appointment as overseers.

34. *Could the corps of Bengal engineers furnish the requisite number of officers?*

That must depend upon the number of officers required and taken for the department of public works; but for the wants of Bengal, the number of engineer officers is too small.

II.—Rules of Discipline and Military Code.

1. *Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war in use in the Bengal army?*

Answered under the head of "Infantry."

2. *Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?*

Alterations are desirable, but the rules should not be assimilated to those of the British army.

3. *Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bengal sappers and miners?*

No more satisfactorily than in other branches.

4. *What means are adopted to acquaint the Bengal sappers and miners of the military code under which they serve?*

The same as in other branches. See "Infantry."

III.—Organization and Rewards.

1. *What is the system of promotions in the corps of Bengal sappers and miners; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?*

Much the same, it is believed, as in other branches.

2. *Are the native officers of the Bengal sappers and miners generally of that intelligence and efficiency which renders them useful in the field?*

It is believed they make themselves useful, but they are too old.

3. *Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade? or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?*

It is not known whether there is any examination. There appears to be no general regulation for it.

4. *Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the sappers and miners from among whom they have risen?*

They must have had more instruction.

5. *Does the intervention of the native officers between the European officers and the men weaken the influence of the European officers?*

The answer already given to similar questions under the head of "Infantry" appears to apply to the sappers.

6. *Has it been found on the occurrence of mutinies that the native officers of sappers and miners gave timely information, and were of use in aiding the European officers to maintain discipline? Have they sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?*

The answer already given to similar questions under the head of "Infantry" appears to apply to the sappers.

7. *Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the Bengal sappers and miners?*

The answer already given to similar questions under the head of "Infantry" appears to apply to the sappers.

8. *When the European non-commissioned officers of sappers come on duty with the native commissioned officers, do the native commissioned officers or the European non-commissioned officers command in the absence of any European commissioned officer?*

An European non-commissioned officer would command, it is believed.

9. *Is the substitution of a full complement of European sergeants and corporals of sappers and miners to each company in lieu of its native officers advisable?*

The proportion now allowed is ample, and if native officers are allowed in other branches, they must be continued in the sappers.

10. *If the abolition of the grades of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the native sappers, would a graduated scale of good service pay and retiring pension claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement, and as efficacious as commissioned grades?*

The answer to this question, under the head of "Infantry," applies equally to the sappers and miners.

11. *Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?*

Not at all.

12. *Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained, or modified, or abolished?*

Modified, as suggested under the head of "Infantry."

13. *If native commissioned officers are retained, should the system of promotion generally by seniority be altered, and promotion by merit and efficiency be the rule?*

Answer as under head of "Infantry."

14. *Are native commissioned officers of sappers and miners generally fit to take part in courts-martial?*

Answer as under the head of "Infantry."

15. *Are the native commissioned officers of sappers and miners on a par, in professional intelligence and efficiency, with the European non-commissioned officers and privates of the sappers and miners?*

Answer as under the head of "Infantry."

16. *What is your opinion of the system of appointing officers of the native infantry to the command of companies of native sappers and miners? Does it work well with the engineer soldiers? And is it advantageous as training to the European officers nominated to the duty?*

There seems no objection to it, if the native infantry officers are competent; but there ought to be sufficient engineer officers to render it unnecessary.

17. *Has the distinct organization, and the differences of system, regulations, and component races in the three native armies proved favourable to our power in India?*

Answered already, under the head of "Infantry."

18. *Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate governments, to time, and to local circumstances, be allowed, or, should endeavours be made to assimilate, or even to amalgamate, the three armies?*

Answered already, under the head of "Infantry."

IV.—European Officers.

1. *Within your experience have the powers of commanding officers of sappers and miners increased or diminished in the Bengal army?*

The answer given under the head of "Infantry" equally applies to the sappers and miners.

2. *During the above period, have the powers of officers of companies been increased or diminished?*

The answer given under the head of "Infantry" equally applies to the sappers and miners.

3. *Has the discipline of the corps of Bengal sappers and miners been influenced by the above causes?*

It would seem that it must necessarily have deteriorated.

4. *Upon what does the discipline of a body of sappers and miners mainly depend during a campaign? Upon the distant authority of head quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the commanding officer of the corps?*

The answer given under the head of "Infantry" equally applies to the sappers and miners.

5. *Should the powers of commanding officers and of officers in charge of companies be increased or diminished?*

The answer given under the head of "Infantry" equally applies to the sappers and miners.

6. *What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of the discipline and efficiency of the corps of Bengal sappers and miners?*

The measures that have been suggested for the infantry are desirable for the sappers; but is most essential that a selected commandant should be always present with the sappers, and a portion of experienced European officers.

C. Campbell, General,
Commander-in-chief.

APPENDIX No. 59.

CAVALRY.

I.—The Recruiting and Composition of Corps.

1. *What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army is composed?*

The Mohamedans, as I am informed, compose the large majority. Rohilcund, Delhi, and neighbouring districts furnished a large portion of the cavalry.

2. *What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from?*

3. *Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, either by the regulations or the practice of the service?*

I am not aware of any rule to this effect. Practically, the number of Hindoos has been small.

4. *Are there any races, tribes or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

I am not aware of any, but in the old irregular cavalry, Sikhs, Punjaubees, and Affghans were few, while in the Punjaub cavalry, they predominated.

5. *What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

They came forward freely without any special agency.

6. *On enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?*

Those laid down by the regulations should have been observed.

7. *When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers, or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?*

There seems to be no general rule on this head.

8. *What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

No regulations seem necessary, and uniformity in the composition is not desirable. The sources of supply are considered ample.

9. *What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

That laid down in the Articles of War, I presume.

10. *How long has this form been in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

I have no idea.

11. *Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army when first enrolled?*

No; and from all I can learn, it is a matter of little moment.

12. *Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?*

No; but it would probably be a good plan to have troops in squadrons of particular races.

13. *Or should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?*

They should be recruited *generally* over India.

14. *Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be homgeneous as to race or caste?*

No; but they might be so as to troops or squadrons.

15. *Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be composed of ressalahs, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes; or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in whole corps?*

Answered above.

16. *If the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportions should the races, tribes, or castes enter?*

Uniformity is undesirable. Corps should differ in this respect.

17. *What agency should be employed for recruiting?*

None is believed to be necessary.

18. *What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

The usual precaution should be taken of ascertaining from the district officers that the recruits really belong to the villages that they state they came from.

19. *Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Bengal army?*

It does not appear necessary. When practicable on service there should generally be a proportion of European cavalry, but I think it does not seem *necessary* to form them in regiments with irregular cavalry.

20. *If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European cavalry corps, and subject to periodical relief?*

Answered above.

21. *How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed?*

Answered above.

22. *Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?*

It would be inconvenient decidedly, for native cavalry corps or wings of corps are required at places where we send Europeans; and to have a commissariat would hamper efficiency and be otherwise inconvenient.

23. *How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed? with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers, with whom they would be associated?*

If there were such troops or squadrons they should be armed like other dragoons.

24. *How should the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be armed?*

Carbines and swords generally, but there need not be uniformity. Some corps might have lances, swords, and pistols.

II. Rules of Discipline and Military Code.

1. *Can you suggest improvements in the Articles of War now in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*
2. *Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?*
3. *Does the system of native courts' martial work satisfactorily in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*
4. *What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the Bengal irregular cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed?*
5. *What proportion of the troopers of the Bengal irregular cavalry can read and comprehend the Articles of War in their own vernacular?*

Answered under the head of "Infantry."

III. Organization, Promotion, and Rewards.

1. *In the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, or seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?*

Seniority, it is believed, was less regarded in the irregular cavalry than in other branches, but still carried weight in promotion.

2. *Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?*

Generally more so perhaps than in other branches.

3. *Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen?*

Originally not; but they have had more training, and to some extent were selected men.

4. *Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade; or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?*

None laid down.

5. *Cancelled.*

Not required.

6. *Has it been proved on occasions of mutiny, that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check a general mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?*

Perhaps rather more than in the regular branches.

7, 8, 9. *Cancelled.*

Not required.

10. *Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?*

No.

11. *Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?*

Answered under the head of "Infantry."

12. *What is the charge upon the finances of the State on account of military pensions to the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

I have no means of knowing.

13. *Should the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?*

Commanding officers should be left very much to their own judgment in making promotions in the irregular cavalry.

14. *Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?*

I should say only very moderately so.

15, 16. *Cancelled.*

Not required.

17. *Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

Each troop should have a ressaldar, a noib ressaldar, and a jemadar.

18. *Among the classes which enter the regular and irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, which is the most popular, the regular or the irregular? and what reasons are assigned by the natives for the preference?*

The irregular with some classes; the regular cavalry with others; that is, with those who do not possess and cannot purchase horses, or have not relations in the irregular. There was no difficulty in obtaining candidates for either.

19, 20. *Cancelled.*

Not required.

21. *Under the supposition that irregular cavalry should be the only native cavalry in the Bengal army, should part be mounted by Government, or the whole placed on the usual footing of irregular cavalry in this respect?*

The whole should be on the usual footing of irregular cavalry, and none of the horses should be provided by Government.

22. *What is the average cost to Government of the horses on which the troops of the regular native cavalry of the Bengal army were mounted?*

I have no idea.

23. *Where are the horses obtained? and of what breeds are they?*

Principally stud bred.

24. *Whence does the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency draw its horses?*

From every part of the country where corps may be stationed.

25. *What is the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency?*

I do not know, but it varies much at different periods, and in different provinces: perhaps ranging from rs. 100 to rs. 250.

26. *Are the requirements of the mounted branch of the Bengal army adequately met by the system pursued for obtaining horses?*

The stud does not produce sufficient horses for the force of dragoons and artillery required for Bengal.

27. *Can you suggest any improvement in the system of obtaining horses for the European cavalry and artillery of the army of the Bengal presidency?*

Arrangements should be contrived to procure horses from the Cape and Australia; also to purchase Arabs at Kurachee, and Cabul horses at Peshawur. These four sources and the studs would give sufficient horses, it it believed.

28. *It is advisable that the Government studs should be maintained, or should they be abolished, and Government rely on the markets of India, of foreign countries, and of British colonies, for a supply of horses for the army of India?*

I think it would be prudent that the studs should be retained.

29. *What is the pay of the troopers of irregular cavalry in the royal army?*

Twenty rupees per month.

30. *Has that pay proved sufficient to enable a corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field, during a protracted campaign?*

It is insufficient, and the men are consequently much involved until they obtain promotion. It has been recommended that it should be raised to rs. 25 per month.

30. *b. Have corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army been embarrassed by debt or free from debt?*

Some very much embarrassed.

31. *Should any alteration be made in the pay of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?*

An increase of rs. 5 per month to sowars is desirable, and a small increase to the higher grades.

32. *What is the system of the Bengal irregular cavalry with respect to Assamees, and the market value of the Assamee? Are there any restrictions upon the numbers which any native officer or capitalist of the corps may hold? Do you advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of such large vested interest, or not? are they favourable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps in horses and in equipments, and to the conduct of duty?*

It is believed that the system varies much. Native officers are restricted in the number of their bargeers, but possibly they may secretly evade the rule, and have more bargeers than they ought. It seems objectionable that the bargeer system should be at all extended.

33. *What is the pay of mounted police in the North-west Provinces?*

I do not know.

34. *What is the organization of the mounted police of the North-west Provinces?*

35. *Of what races, tribes, or castes is the mounted police of the North-west Provinces composed?*

36. *How is the mounted police recruited, that is, what is the agency employed; the precautions taken before, or by the local authorities in entertaining men?*

37. *Where districts are large and duty heavy, has the pay of the mounted police at rs. per month been found adequate, and the police proved well mounted and efficient?*

I have no means of knowing.

38. *Is the difference between the pay of horse police, and that of irregular horse, such as to ensure the latter the superior mounting essential for his peculiar service?*

There should be such a difference. If an irregular cavalry trooper received rs. 25 per month, a police sowar certainly should not have more than rs. 22.

IV. European Officers.

1. *Within your experience have the powers of commandants of corps of irregular cavalry in the Bengal army been decreased or diminished?*

They have been practically diminished.

2. *Cancelled.*

Not required.

3. *What has been the result upon the discipline of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps?*

Those who ought to know best say that the result has been unfavourable.

4. *Cancelled.*

Not required.

5. *Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? upon the distant authority of head-quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in charge of troops, and in command of corps of regular or irregular cavalry?*

Answered already under the head of "Infantry."

6. *Should the powers of commanding officers and of troop officers be increased or diminished?*

The powers of commanding officers should be increased. The troop commanders are natives, but they should have powers entrusted to them nearly akin to those of European officers of companies.

7. *What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?*

Those suggested already for the infantry.

8, 9, 10, 11, 12. *Cancelled.*

Not required.

13. *If a few European officers are assigned to a native corps of cavalry, whether regular or irregular, how would you select and train them?*

The original selection of officers to do duty with irregular cavalry should depend upon a man being a good horseman and linguist, and showing a taste for the branch. He should be with the irregular cavalry for a year on probation before he was finally appointed. Not one officer in ten is really suited for irregular cavalry.

14. *Cancelled.*

Not required.

15. *Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies in the conduct of corps (whether regular or irregular cavalry), whose complement of European officers was short or full?*

Answered under the head of "Infantry."

16, 17, 18, 19, 20. *Cancelled.*

Not required.

21. *Would it be practicable and advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a body of native irregular horse?*

It is doubtful whether this should be done. Opinions vary, and probably efficiency would be as well obtained by having separate cavalry corps, but there is no reason why both systems should not prevail.

22. *If so, what proportion should the native body bear to the European dragoons of the corps? how should it be armed? how mounted? how officered.*

If native cavalry form part of the same regiment as dragoons, the natives should not exceed two-fifths of the whole. They should be on the irregular system, armed as in other cases, and have at least one selected European officer for each squadron.

C. CAMPBELL, General,
Commander-in-chief.

APPENDIX No. 60.

MINUTE by the Hon. Lieut.-General Sir J. OUTRAM, G.C.B.

September 30, 1858.

Governor-General's Memorandum on the Re-organization of the Army.

Our Hon. President has sent me these papers, in the expectation that I should first record my views on the subjects embraced in his Lordship's minute. But only a very small portion of the evidence then before the Governor-General has yet come to us, and not nearly the whole had been obtained when his minute was perused. I do not think therefore that I should be warranted in yet expressing my views on the whole question, for the reasons which I stated in my minute dated 30th May last, viz., as his Lordship intimates that it is his intention to solicit the aid of the President in Council in ultimately determining on the report to be made and measures to be proposed for the consideration of the home authorities, it appears to me that my opinions would be more worthy of his Lordship's notice, and their expression more calculated to conduce to the public interests, if I deferred until I had had the advantage of examining the recorded views of the various persons whom his Lordship proposes to consult, and I cannot but think it undesirable that I should commit myself intermediately to opinions which I may see fit to modify or withdraw when I shall have studied and pondered over that body of evidence which it is his Lordship's intention to submit to us.

We had relied moreover on the commission appointed by the Governor-General furnishing us with an analysis of the dissonant opinions, reasonings, and recommendations of the numerous military and civil officers of reputation whose opinions have been called for, and communicating his judgment thereon. That officer, we are informed, has been employed for some time past in collecting and *collating* information on the subject, but as yet we possess but a modicum of his collection, none of his collation, which latter should be called for, so far as it may yet have been prepared by Colonel Durand, whose sole attention has been devoted to the subject, thereby saving us from loss of time in wading through and comparing such a mass of conflicting statements.

As the Governor-General's 4th paragraph shows that he does not expect us to express an opinion on the several points involved in the re-organization of the army until more complete evidence is before us, I would defer entering on the subject until we are furnished with the entire evidence.

October 16, 1858.

I now learn, that at the rate the copies of the evidence are being furnished to us, it may be weeks before the whole is completed. I think, therefore, I ought no longer to defer recording my views on some of the more important points discussed in the Right Hon. the Governor-General's memorandum, on which my decision is already formed, and not likely to be altered by any addition to the opinions we have obtained, especially as regards the very important questions of the proposed amalgamation of the army of India with the royal army, of the constitution of the staff, and the reform of the Madras and Bombay armies, which measures I consider of such vital importance, that I am anxious my honourable colleagues and my own views on those particular subjects, should be laid before the Home Commission before its final decision regarding them, if they are to be finally decided by that body. I purpose, therefore, now briefly submitting my general views on the several measures mooted by the Governor-General, and will hereafter consider more in detail these and the various supplementary measures contemplated, when the whole of the evidence called for by Colonel Durand is before us.

The first portion of the Governor-General's memorandum down to paragraph 16, and paragraphs 22 and 23, calls for no remark from me beyond the expression of my general concurrence in his Lordship's opinions as to the advisability of leaving certain points of the inquiry involved in the re-organization of the army, to the consideration of the Government of India, subject to the approval of Her Majesty's Government, and as to the permanent European force necessary to be maintained in the Indian provinces after the restoration of tranquillity.

Paragraphs 17 and 18.—Formation of the Bengal Army, European and Native.

I quite concur with the Governor-General as to the organization of the European portion of the Bengal army proposed in this 17th paragraph to comprise 30 regiments, which will absorb all the officers of the Bengal native army, with the exception of 20 cadres of regiments. But I would advise a different organization of the native portion of the Bengal army to what his Lordship proposes. I would not re-establish regular native infantry for Bengal, and would retain on the regular footing only the regiments which remained faithful, and those composed of the loyal remnants of other regiments; these I think should have higher pay than the rest of the native army comprised of irregular and police corps, who will generally, I understand, have nearly, if not quite, the same rates of pay as the line formerly received, and every reasonable distinction should be conferred on these regiments as a reward for their fidelity, and which regiments alone remaining *regular* and constituted on the old footing as to native officers, pensions, increasing pay on length of service, and all former privileges, would be a lasting memento of what the Bengal native army was.

By substituting 20 irregular for the 20 regular native regiments proposed by his Lordship, a considerable body of surplus officers would be supplied for general staff purposes and civil employ, who otherwise would have to be drawn from regiments, and no confusion would arise from these surplus officers being retained on the strength of the army if the "seconding" system is introduced, proposed by the Governor-General in his 31st paragraph.

The abolition of regular regiments in the army of Bengal, would cause the retention of the regular regiments in the Madras and Bombay armies to be regarded by the latter as a distinction secured to them by their fidelity.

Madras and Bombay Armies.

This reference to those armies brings me to the consideration of the Governor-General's remarks in his 23rd paragraph, to which I earnestly entreat the attention of the Home Commission; most thoroughly do I concur in the opinion therein expressed by his Lordship, that it would be a great error to forget that in prudence, as well as in justice, the native armies of Madras and Bombay, which are still standing at their full numbers, and have shown themselves on the whole loyal, must be treated continuously and considerately in the introduction of changes; not merely do I say with the Governor-General "that before any change which will "raise discontent in these armies, the new Bengal army "ought to be well in hand," but I go further; I consider that *no* change should be attempted, nor should it be allowed to appear that any such is contemplated, so long as those armies evince no symptom of disloyalty. The system and discipline maintained in those armies is in a great measure free from the blemishes which produced the revolt of the Bengal army, and I doubt whether any great change for the better could be introduced for many years to come; certainly no material change could be attempted, especially such as would entail the disbandment of large bodies of troops, without causing discontent and excitement which might lead to disastrous consequences; nor would I introduce even trifling changes just now in any branch of the armies of those presidencies, for any such would excite mistrust

and suspicion that greater changes were about to follow. On the contrary, I would proclaim to those armies how highly Her Majesty appreciates the loyalty they have evinced throughout the late trying crisis, in consideration for which they are assured that no alteration whatever shall be made in their organization, and that their constitution and privileges will be maintained so long as they continue loyal, &c., pointing to the utter extinction of the Bengal army as the consequence of disloyalty. Some such assurance is, I think, necessary, and should not long be delayed, for our native troops throughout India cannot otherwise than feel anxiety lest the misconduct of the sepoys of Bengal may cause us to discard from our service all of their caste and creed in other parts of India, so soon as we can conveniently do so.

Doubtless it is desirable to turn the regular cavalry into irregular or Selladar cavalry, and to reduce the native artillery in those armies; but even that I would not venture to do, so long as they continue loyal. The fate of the Bengal army will, it is to be hoped, deter those branches of the sister armies from following its example, and in accordance with my proposed proclamation, so long as they display no disloyalty, I would allow them to remain as they are.

If, however, the reform of those arms in Madras and Bombay must be carried out, the utmost that should be ventured with that view should be to allow the native artillery gradually to die and pension off, the pensioners to draw their pensions at head quarters, recruiting being stopped, and no future artillery instruction to natives being allowed; and by opening the ranks of Selladar irregular cavalry to volunteers from the regular cavalry, with the advantage of obtaining selladarships (assamies) without purchase, numbers would thus be induced to leave the regulars, and by, at the same time, ceasing to recruit for the regular cavalry, it also would gradually become extinct without the risk being incurred, which a more summary change might involve.

Native Cavalry, paragraphs 19 and 20.

I concur in what the Governor-General states in his 19th and 20th paragraphs, as to the necessity of maintaining irregular native cavalry, and none but irregular cavalry in the Bengal army; and I think great advantage will result from the organization proposed by his Lordship for the European local cavalry, viz., 10 regiments of 440 sabres each, instead of five of 818 sabres; as to the proportions which European and native cavalry should bear to each other in cantonment and field service, and the mode in which they should be connected, &c.; all such points will be considered when hereafter I enter into details.

European Artillery, paragraph 21.

I entirely approve of the artillery augmentation and organization for Bengal, proposed by his Lordship in his minute, dated 9th August, referred to in the 21st paragraph. Minor points remain for decision, such as the abolition of the distinction between horse artillery and field batteries, &c., which will be considered with the other details.

European Cavalry and Infantry for Madras and Bombay, paragraphs 22, 23, *and* 25.

The Governor-General's estimate of the European cavalry and artillery required for Madras and Bombay calls for no remark from me, beyond the expression of my general concurrence.

Artillery of Madras and Bombay, paragraph 24.

The Governor-General's minute respecting the artillery of Madras and Bombay, here referred to, have not been received. I have already shown why I deprecate any immediate interference with any branch of the armies of those presidencies. But that, if the native artillery are to be abolished, they should be allowed to die or pension off; future instruction of natives will be prevented by ceasing to recruit for the artillery; were the existing native artillerymen to be discharged, they would be available to instruct rebels, and to serve rebel guns.

Staff and civil employ, paragraphs 30, 31, 32, *and* 34.

In the Governor-General's views regarding staff and civil employment I entirely concur; I think with his Lordship that the advantages secured to the State by the system of supplying officers from the army for civil duties, and to officer the regular and police corps, greatly counterbalances the disadvantages to the army of having a portion of its officers withdrawn from regimental employ. It would be well if the demand could be more limited, but I would not deprive the Government of the advantage of such a field of selection, and I would not close the door to such a wholesome incentive to mental exertion as the prospect of civil employment, and to the exercise of physical powers; and the hope of employment with irregular corps stimulates in young officers, without which the idle life of mere garrison duty in time of peace, under the relaxing climate of India, would cause all not naturally of strong or superior minds to deteriorate both mentally and bodily, and of course the morale and discipline of the Indian army would suffer in proportion to the inefficiency of its officers.

The disadvantage resulting from too largely denuding regiments of officers may, however, be greatly remedied by introducing, as proposed by his Lordship, the system of *seconding* followed in the royal army, so far as in the case of officers removed for civil employment, not army staff. This would be as advantageous and encouraging to regimental officers, as a staff corps, and far less costly to the State.

The mode of "seconding," I am informed, is, when an officer obtains a staff appointment of a certain class, his name is retained on the list of officers, but promotion is made in his room, adding to the grade in which the staff officer is, that is the staff officer is borne on the strength of his corps as a supernumerary, though his place is filled up, and affords the same promotion to all below him as if he were struck off. The rule in the British army is, I believe, that for the first two years that they hold civil appointment they are not "seconded," and draw their regimental pay. After two years they are seconded, and cease to draw military pay. They continue in this position ten years, after which (or a total of 12 years) they must either retire from the military service or return to their regiment. If they return they rejoin with the position they may have attained on the list, their promotion having gone on as if they had remained with the regiment.

I see no difficulty in introducing this arrangement, somewhat modified, perhaps, into the Indian army.

Proportion of European to Native Troops, paragraph 26.

I agree with his Lordship in thinking that the proportion of European to native troops, should not be less than that of two to five for the present, if ever hereafter it may be reduced; under the designation native troops, I include armed police.

Amalgamation of the Indian Army with the Royal Army, paragraphs 28, 29.

The amalgamation of bodies so differently constituted as the British and Indian armies,* I deem to be impossible without injury to the interests of the latter, especially of its officers. But were it practicable to effect the amalgamation with perfect justice to it and to them, I consider that the measure would be most impolitic. In the first place, to assimilate the two armies the system of purchase must be introduced into the Indian army, which would be detrimental to its moral, but more particularly would it be injurious to the Indian army, as creating a spirit of restlessness among young men (the officers) naturally desirous of changes and a feeling of instability in their position in India, which would deprive officers of heart in the service, it would destroy that *esprit de corps* which now animates our Indian army. The officers composing that army should regard India as their home, the only sphere in which they can acquire or hope for promotion and distinction, and to reconcile themselves to that home, care should be taken not to lower the India army in respect of dignity, privileges, and advantages not merely below, but even to an equality (in those respects), with the British army. Both the Indian local army (I mean its officers) and the portion of the British army serving in India, should enjoy superior advantages to what the British army possess in Europe, to reconcile them to service in India, and as being permanently fixed in India; the Indian officers should have guaranteed to them a larger share of staff employment than what would be secured to them by their mere numerical proportion to the officers of the British troops serving in India. For all staff appointments beyond the general staff of the army, the local experience of Indian officers ought to render them more eligible than officers of the British army whose sojourn in India is uncertain and more limited.

With a view to training officers *for India*, and leading their thoughts and wishes from early youth *to India*, I would retain on an enlarged scale the Addiscombe institution as the military college for India; where it should be incumbent on all candidates for the Indian army to undergo a course of education adapted for the career before them, for at least two years.

Although I would deprecate any change which would admit of officers of the Indian exchanging into the royal army, at any rate under the rank of a field officer, I concur with his Lordship in thinking that "senior officers," whose

* By thus styling our army the Indian army, in order to distinguish it from the existing British army, I do not mean to fix that designation on it. It ought, I think, to be styled "British Indian Army."

services and ability may render them "fit for such marks of "Her Majesty's confidence shall be permitted to serve Her "Majesty out of India as well as in this country," and that "divisional and brigade commands should be distributed "between the two armies in fair proportion."

Above the rank of lieutenant-colonel, exchanges might perhaps be allowed without disadvantage.

One great advantage of thus employing a portion of the officers of the Indian army in civil and other State service is, that for those occupying civil offices in India a military training may often prove of great advantage, as on occasions of sudden demands, that in times of war it enables Government at once to strengthen regiments with officers.

Admixture of European and Native Forces, paragraph 36.

I agree with the Governor-General in considering that this point ought to be left for decision in India. I will now merely observe, reserving for future consideration the many practical objections there are to the intermixture of European and native troops, that I think a close and intimate association of natives with the European soldiery, except in the field, should be avoided as much as possible; the closer the association with the lower class of our countrymen, the less respect is inspired by the latter; the closer the association with officers and educated Englishmen, on the contrary, the greater is the respect secured.

Native Colonial Troops for Service in India, paragraphs 38, 39.

I quite concur with the governor-general in deprecating the employment of native colonial troops in India for the reasons stated in his 38th and 39th paragraphs; and I heartily endorse his Lordship's opinion thus expressed:—it "has now become, at least as necessary to inspire confidence "and good-will as fear. Few measures could be more de- "structive of the first-named feelings than the suspicion that "that which we consider the most honourable employment "which we can offer them is, under a new order of things, "to be put in other hands.

Native Artillery, paragraphs 41 *and* 42.

I am of opinion with the Governor-General, that all the native artillery of the Bengal army should be abolished, with the exception of the few guns required at certain frontier posts, and in positions where Europeans could not live. But, for reasons before stated, I would rather retain the native artillery of Madras and Bombay, or, if it must be got rid of, I agree with his Lordship, that "the transition from "native to European artillery must be made gradually." But, I would urge very gradually, I would turn no trained artillerymen loose upon the country.

Cadets to do duty in the first instance with European Corps, paragraphs 43 *and* 44.

I am disposed to doubt the policy of attaching young officers for the first six months to European corps, which has been ordered. After a cadet has been well grounded in his military education at Addiscombe, I think that the sooner he is sent to do duty with a native corps under a good commander, the better. He will the sooner acquire a knowledge of the native languages—can only there obtain an intimate acquaintance with the native soldier, which will enable him to distinguish and appreciate his better qualities, and to discourage and counteract his evil tendencies. I am surprised to see that General Jacob advocates (cavalry) officers on first joining to serve for a year or two with an European regiment, for he elsewhere dwells on the advantage of "the officers of the European and native troops "thoroughly understanding the Asiatic soldiers, and treating "them accordingly;" and he most truly says, "when the "native soldier feels that he is understood, and justly "appreciated by officers whom he also respects, there is "nothing which he will not readily do or submit to. But "under other conditions a little misunderstanding might "lead to fatal mischief."

Now I maintain that early association with European troops is of all things that most calculated to prevent the officer acquiring the understanding and appreciation of the Asiatic character which is so essential to his personal influence over the native soldier. By sending young officers on their entry into the service to European regiments, they naturally imbibe the feelings and prejudices of those with whom they are associated, and it is an undoubted fact, that even in former times, before the late lamentable events had impressed the European mind, and especially the European soldier, with a contempt and hatred for the native character, it was seldom an officer could be found, whose early training had been in European regiments, who had not imbibed a *distaste* to the native, which no length of after service with a native regiment would remove; what then could now be expected from a young man, whose first years or months in India are restricted to European association alone? Would he not be more disposed to foster than to ameliorate the better feelings which now unhappily have arisen between the governing and the subject races, until which are obliterated we cannot hope that our rule in this country will be satisfactory or profitable, either to England or India.

The greater proportion of the officers of the Bengal army will now be required from its European regiments, but I would rather that at least a moiety of the cadets should do duty with native corps on their first arrival in India, than that all should be attached in the first instance to European regiments. The system of selection for command now introduced will ensure their being well looked after by able and good officers, and by the time those finally posted to European regiments join their corps, they will have acquired some knowledge of, and probably some taste for, the languages, which will induce many to continue their studies, while at the same time their prejudices against the natives will have become much modified, if not removed.

But the selection of officers for civil and police duties, &c., will be much reduced in the Bengal presidency by so great a proportion being occupied by the local European army. I would draw more largely on the Madras and Bombay armies, therefore, for the officers required for such duties in the upper provinces, Oude and the Punjaub. Especially should Madras be called upon to supply more, which at present provides so small a portion. A larger share of those much coveted appointments would compensate the officers of those presidencies, in some measure, for the greater advantages in promotion, &c., which the Bengal army has lately acquired.

Questions remaining for after consideration, paragraphs 45, 46, 47, *and* 48.

The remaining portion of the Governor-General's minute refers briefly to the many minor and collateral questions remaining for consideration. This I shall notice when the whole of the evidence is before us.

There is one subject on which his Lordship has not touched in this memorandum, which I look upon as one of the most important questions that has to come under the consideration of the Home Committee, viz., the continuance or modification of the pension department, on which I wish to make a few observations.

I so entirely concur in General Jacob's opinion on this subject, that I will premise by quoting his views as my own:—"The pensions must have had and have consider- "able effect in attaching men to the service. But in this "case, as in all others, throughout the Indian services, the "attempt to prevent the possibility of abuse has crushed "all life out of the system; and under a better arrange- "ment the effect of the same amount of public expenditure "in pensions would assuredly have been tenfold greater "than it is under existing regulations. The pensioners of "each regiment should remain attached to that regiment; "every man after 20 years' service might be allowed a "moderate pension, and after 30 years' service a more "liberal allowance. The commanding officer, in consul- "tation with his medical and other officers, should have "power to transfer men to the regimental pension list "after the prescribed period of service, and such pensioners "should be borne on a separate roll as pensioners of such "a regiment. It should at all times be discretional with a "commanding officer to discharge any man without pen- "sion. The pensioners should be considered as belonging "to the regiment, and no other than the regimental autho- "rities should have anything to do with them. They "should reside and receive their pensions at regimental "head quarters only."

This arrangement is somewhat dependent on regimental head quarters being fixed as recommended by General Jacob and of the advantage and advisability of which I am fully impressed, but that is a matter which may be left for discussion hereafter; suffice it here to observe, that with free permission to visit the place of their birth occasionally, such an arrangement would not be unpopular with the sepoys, and would secure a colony of rising generations of sepoys with every regiment. It would undoubtedly be a great saving to Government in the cost of pension, paymasters, with their costly establishments, marching batta, &c.

But my principal object in now adverting to the subject of pensions is to express my hope that a system which has just been introduced may be at once put a stop to. I observe that the officer commanding the Lucknow regiment has been instructed to inform all new enlistments that their obtaining pensions will depend on their conduct up to the time of their retiring from the service. With sepoys such an intimation is tantamount to telling them that pensions have ceased, for suspicious as they now are of any really generous intentions towards their class on our part, they will have no

confidence whatever in any promise coupled with a condition. In the sincerity of nothing but a distinct pledge without any reservation will they place any faith, and even if convinced of our sincerity in making the promise, what reliance can they have on ever acquiring a pension when subjected to the caprice of every commanding officer under whom they pass their service, who, they would say, might form a dislike to them from any trivial cause, and record something against them which after the completion of their service would be brought forward as an excuse for debarring them from pension.

It appears to me that any intimation of the sort is quite unnecessary, and is only calculated to weaken the hold we possess over those who enter our ranks. The mere fact of a sepoy passing through the length of service which entitles to pension is a guarantee that he deserves it, for with the power of summary dismissal now vested in commanding officers no undeserving man will be retained in the service, and it is but just, as it is politic, that the sepoys should be assured and feel as a certainty that on completing certain terms of service, and it is but just as it is politic that the sepoys should be assured and feel as a certainty that on completing certain terms of service they will secure certain amounts of pension.

(Signed) J. OUTRAM.

October 16, 1858.

(True copy.)

APPENDIX No. 61.

REPLIES by Major-General BIRCH, C.B., Military Secretary, GOVERNMENT of INDIA.

RE-ORGANIZATION OF ARMIES OF INDIA.

The Heads of Inquiry in the Court's Despatch may be classed as follows:—

I. The Recruiting and the Composition of Corps.
II. The Military Code and Rules of Discipline.
III. Organization, Promotion, and Rewards.
IV. European Officers.

INFANTRY.

I. THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Bengal army is composed?

1. They consist of mussulmans, brahmins, chuttrees, rajpoots, gwallas, aheers, and a great variety of Hindoo castes besides.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?

2. I am not able to answer this question. There are men of all tribes and castes which are admitted into the army to be found in every district in which we recruit.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment either by the regulations or the practice of the Bengal army?

3. Extract General Regulations of the Bengal army, published in 1855, sec. XXXI., clause 6:—"It is not "considered desirable to have too large a proportion "of brahmins in any regiment; but in other respects "commanding officers, when enlisting Hindoos of the "respectable classes, are not to be biassed in favour of "any particular religion or caste; special care, however, "must be taken to reject all men of the inferior castes, "such as bunneeahs, kyeths, naees, telees, thumolees, "gurrereas, lodhs, bhojoahs, kahars, mooraees, kandors, "malees, kachees, and any others habitually employed in "menial occupations."

Clause 7. "The number of Punjabees in a regiment is "never to exceed 200, nor are more than 100 of them to be "sikhs."

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected, or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Bengal army?

4. Goojurs, jâts, gwallas, boatmen, the men along the right bank of the Indus and from Bundelcund might with advantage be more numerously entertained; but they are not excluded.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?

5. Parties are sent from regiments to recruit in districts with the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief. Native officers and men proceeding on furlough are made use of to bring back with them recruits.

6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

6. Native officers are required by the regulations to take each recruit, after enlistment, to the tehseeldar in whose jurisdiction the village he belongs to is situated, in order that the tehseeldar may inquire and verify that his name, caste, parentage, and residence have been duly stated. Lists, with the tehseeldar's signature, are to be shown to the district officer that he may satisfy himself and record that the returns are formal and correct. A nominal roll, in a prescribed form, will then be prepared by the district officer and handed to the recruiting officer for delivery to the commanding officer of his regiment. General Regulations, sec. 31.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments or taken from the families of sepoys or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?

7. They must be well known in the regiments to which their relatives are attached. They are subjected to surgical examination, but as to registry, I do not believe that any particular precautions are taken. Few recruits are entertained in this way, I believe.

8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes (with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry) of the native troops in the Bengal army?

8. I see no occasion for much alteration. It is now the fashion to advocate the admission of low-caste men; I confess to entertaining an opinion adverse to their admission into the native army, and I beg to state some reasons for this opinion.

In the first place, I cannot conceive the possibility of maintaining discipline in a corps where a low-caste non-commissioned officer will, when he meets off duty a Brahmin sepoy, crouch down to him with his forehead on the ground, I have seen this done. The sepoy thus treated is the master of the officer.

Secondly. To ally ourselves with the lowest castes is to separate ourselves even more thoroughly than we are already separated by our religion and customs from the native chiefs of the country, and from the very numerous respectable tribes. The prejudices of caste can never be diminished, but will be exasperated by our doing so.

Thirdly. I doubt whether those who most strongly advocate the enlistment of the lowest castes would themselves like to serve with a regiment of domes or hullalkhores, exclusively so formed.

Fourthly. I would not proscribe from our ranks brahmins and other men of high caste. Their numbers should be kept within moderate limits; but if we enlist largely among the lowest castes, it will amount to a practical exclusion of the highest classes of Hindoos and the most respectable Mohamedans,—the best soldiers.

Fifthly. However we might for other branches of the public service make use of men of low castes, to trust the military defence of the country to them would be very unwise, because extremely hazardous. It is yet to be seen how such men would behave in the hour of danger; I fear they would quail before a native enemy showing a determined front. The depressing influence of caste cannot but render such men deficient in that self-reliance which is an indispensable quality in a soldier.

Sixthly. It will not be a willing service that men of respectable castes will render to us, if associated with men of low castes. They will enlist because they desire to gain a livelihood, and not from any predilection for military employment; and it will be a very difficult thing to maintain the due observance of caste prejudices between one set of men and another in the same regiment, whose mutual forbearance is one element of the internal well-being of every corps. I have heard this idea scouted as one unworthy of our attention; but nevertheless it appears to me to be one of which we cannot set aside the consideration. It is one thing to look with pity or surprise, or even with condemnation, on the system of caste, and no one is more alive to its disadvantages and its demoralizing tendencies than I am. No favouritism would I tolerate as respects any one of them. Even-handed justice should be unhesitatingly administered

among them all, and discipline enforced with entire impartiality. But it is quite another thing to throw aside all consideration for the prejudices of caste, and to attempt to amalgamate races which are antagonistic and abhorrent the one to the other. There is nothing like caste in any other country, and no analogy whatever to be drawn from the fusion of races and tribes of other countries as a guide for us here.

But one thing is certain, that our disregarding the prejudice of caste will never induce the natives themselves to disregard them; and that, after all, is the main point.

Seventhly. The argument from the case of the Madras and Bombay armies, where castes are fused together to a certain extent, does not appear to me to militate with any force against the views I venture to entertain. The differences of caste are much more marked in the Bengal presidency, and the state of the community at large is different from that of the communities of the other presidencies.

Eighthly. The mutinies have *not* been occasioned by the influence of caste. Fears for their religion, from a firm, though mistaken, persuasion that the British Government intended to compel them to become christians, have universally prevailed alike among Mahomedans and Hindoos; but the different races, and those whose religious persuasions would under ordinary circumstances keep them widely asunder, have united in rebellion against our authority; a fact that clearly proves the hold of religious persuasions on the native mind, but refutes the notion that any one caste more than another has stirred up the rebellion.

Ninthly. The turbulence of the brahmins may be controlled by not enlisting too many of them, and by the strict and judicious exercise of command over those who are admitted into the ranks. But beyond this I see no wisdom in adopting measures with the avowed object of annihilating caste,—an object utterly unattainable by any measure we could adopt. I fully coincide in the propriety of the general order issued by Lord William Bentinck, on the 31st of December 1834, in these words:—"The Governor-"General of India in Council is pleased to direct that all "objections to men belonging to the respectable classes of "the native community, or preferences among such classes, "on account of caste or religion, shall cease to operate in "respect to their admission into the ranks of the Bengal "army." Further than this I see no occasion for concession.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bengal army?

9. Oath:—"I, *A.B.* inhabitant of ———— village "———— pergunnah ———— subah ———— "son of ———— do swear that I will never forsake or "abandon my colours; that I will march wherever I am "directed, whether within or beyond the Company's terri-"tories; that I will implicitly obey all the orders of my "commanders, and in everything behave myself as becomes "a good soldier and faithful servant of the Company; and "failing in any part of my duty as such, I will submit to "the penalties described in the Articles of War which have "been read to me."

10. How long has the form been in use in the Bengal army?

10. It was established by Government regulation, dated 8th of August 1796.

11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruits for the native infantry of the Bengal army?

11. I would propose that the following oath should be adopted henceforward. It is taken from the oath for European recruits for Her Majesty's service, and is modified to suit the native recruit:—"I ———— do make oath "that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her "Majesty, Her heirs and successors; that I will, as in duty "bound, observe and obey all orders of the generals and "officers set over me; and that I will willingly proceed "by land or sea wherever my services may be required."

12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bengal presidency of seafaring habits, and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?

12. I think not; that is, with any prospect of advantage to the service.

13. Has the Bengal presidency any marine corps, and if so, of what strength and whence recruited?

13. No; unless it be the old 20th regiment, of two battalions, now numbered 25th and 40th, of which the latter still bears the old designation of "murriam-ka-pultun," *i.e.* marine regiment. But these regiments are not the only ones of their kind now. There are besides them the 47th, 65th, 67th, 68th, all liable to be sent beyond sea.

14. Should each infantry corps be raised, each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

14. I do not see how this could well be done, unless we restricted ourselves to having very few regiments; nor do I see any advantage in it. Practically, recruiting parties do, to a great extent, go to the same districts continually to obtain recruits, and in this way regiments come to have a large proportion of men from such districts, but they are not exclusively so composed by any means. But to restrict particular regiments to particular districts has this objection, that it would prevent their being employed at any great distance from those districts, and it would deprive them of the power of recruiting where they might be serving, or in any contiguous district, however eligible might be the recruits there obtainable.

The Goorkha regiments are, however, an exception. These can only be recruited from the hill districts, and I would keep them distinct in every way; but they cannot serve in the plains.

15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?—

15. I think the area for recruiting for each and every regiment should be unlimited, in order to guard against combinations of men of particular localities, and to enlarge as much as possible the field of selection, with exception of the Goorkha regiments and corps, such as the Assam and Sylhet and Arracan battalions.

16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste?

16. I think not. If men of one tribe or cast are likely to combine for evil purposes, the tendency to such combination would be greatly increased, and facilities towards it would be furnished by homogeneous organization of regiments. I would not have any regiment recruited exclusively from any particular district, even though all the races or castes in such district were freely admitted into it. But the objection to homogeneity of castes in regiments is much stronger than that which applies to recruiting exclusively from particular districts; inasmuch as such an organization would hold up to observation the distinctions of caste and perpetuate those distinctions, whereas, on the contrary, the blending of castes should be a principal object in the organization of our native army. While I am strongly opposed to the admixture of such heterogeneous elements as men of high and men of low castes, I would equally strongly deprecate any measure which would directly encourage the separation between one caste and another, among those which we know by experience to admit of fusing together into the ranks of our native regiments.

17. If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste? Or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?

17. I think the tribes and castes should be indiscriminately intermingled in the several companies. The pitting of one company against another would not tend to the improvement of discipline, and that blending in one common interest would be lost, which it is so desirable to establish in a regiment. Were different castes or tribes to be placed in distinct companies, the antagonism of castes and tribes would be perpetuated. Besides which there are regimental appointments, such as the commissioned officers, the non-commissioned officers, the drill havildar, and drill instructors, and under certain circumstances pay havildars of companies, for which the whole regiment competes; but the selection would be exceedingly difficult if the tribes and castes were placed in distinct companies.

18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?

18. I would entertain few brahmins, and would restrict mussulmans, rajpoots, and sikhs to one third of any regiment in which they were entertained. I mean that there should not be in any corps more than one third of its complement consisting of mussulmans, nor rajpoots, nor sikhs; but these tribes together might unobjectionably form half of any regiment, or more than half.

9. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts?

19. I perceive no reason for restricting recruiting, whether of military or police corps, to particular districts.

20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?

20. No; I think not. There is this objection, that such men would come into the army corps with higher expectations as to position and rank than would be palatable to the corps into which they entered. The prizes in a regiment should be kept for its own best men, to the exclusion of outsiders.

21. What agency should be employed for recruiting in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?

21. I would, as heretofore, employ the agency of recruiting parties sent from regiments.

22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps or a distinct agency?

22. I am so strongly of an opinion adverse to police corps as armed and trained military bodies, that I cannot contemplate the recruiting for them.

23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connection with recruits for the army of the Bengal presidency?

23. The precautions already taken, as stated above, should most carefully be continued. But copies of all registers of recruits, made by the civil authorities, should be transmitted to the Adjutant-General's office, and copies of all regimental registers of recruits, and of all kindred rolls, should also be deposited in the Adjutant-General's office. In the late mutinies the non-existence of these rolls, and the destruction of those with regiments, has proved very inconvenient.

24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connection with recruits for police corps in the Bengal presidency?

25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country, and, if so, should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies, or otherwise?

25. I am not disposed to recommend introducing recruits from other countries. They would be very expensive, very troublesome, probably, and would disappoint us in the end. I think India itself furnishes sufficient men, and men sufficiently good, if well selected, without going abroad for recruits.

26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?

27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?

28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?

28. No, I think not. I would keep European and native regiments entirely distinct, and they will work together in cantonments and on service all the better for it. The prestige of the dominant class, the Europeans, would be much lowered and seriously injured if they were formed into regiments with the natives. Moreover, they could not be armed alike; and I am strongly of opinion that the jails, the treasures, the guns, and arsenals should be guarded by Europeans to the exclusion of natives. Now it would never do to make this distinction of duties and trusts if the races were attached to one and the same regiment. Another reason for not mixing them up is, that their clothing should be different, of which the effect on parade would be extremely uncouth.

29. If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief?

30. Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops?

31. Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

31. No.

32. How should such companies be armed? with similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated?

32. It is not expedient to arm natives with the Enfield rifle. It is necessary to arm the Europeans with them. This is one capital reason for not mixing them together in regiments.

33. How should the native infantry of the Bengal presidency be armed?

33. With the percussion musket.

34. How should police corps in the Bengal presidency be armed?

35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?

35. I have always thought it a great mistake to dress native soldiers like Europeans.

36. How should the native infantry of the Bengal army be dressed, with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?

36. In ungahs or tunics covering the hip, with trowsers tied, and turbans; and this is a strong reason for not mixing natives up with Europeans, who must be differently dressed, of course.

37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?

37. I think it highly desirable that each European regiment should have a native irregular regiment attached to it; but I would not officer the native regiment from the European. I would not exclude any particularly well qualified officer of the one from being attached to the other; but I would select officers for the attached irregular regiment from the whole line. It is essential, I think, that a native irregular regiment should have its own commandant to look up to; and this would be defeated if, as I take the question to imply, it were merely officered from the European corps, the commanding officer of the latter being also commanding officer of the irregular corps. I would place the latter under the commanding officer of the European corps as a sort of brigadier (without increasing his command allowance), but it should be really commanded by its own commandant.

38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers presents any analogy with such an arrangement and any encouragement to adopt it?

38. No; the gun lascars and native drivers are quite on another sort of footing.

39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?—

39. I would adopt the arrangement that heretofore has been adopted. I do not think it at all desirable that the native irregular corps should be brought into any closer contact in cantonments with the European corps than has heretofore been the case; and when marching out into camp, the relative place of the two corps in the lines they are having can make no difference.

40. Would such a system be favourable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength?

40. The nearer the association, such as is involved in the proposed system, the greater the detriment, in my opinion, to the prestige of the European soldiery.

41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?

41. In peace there might not be much difference in the intercourse between the European and the native corps.

In war it may certainly be looked for that the service would be benefited by the mutual attachment between the two corps, and the emulation by the native of the excellencies of the European corps, as exemplified at Candahar, where the 40th foot and the 2nd grenadiers served closely together, and at Jellalabad, where the 13th foot and the 35th native infantry learned to attach themselves the one to the other.

42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?

42. The native troops should be taught to rely on the European troops. I think their association to the extent I have described would foster that sentiment; but if more intimately brought into union, I fear the sentiment fostered would be prejudicial to the reliance of the native troops on the European.

II. Military Code and Rules of Discipline.

1. Can you suggest improvement in the Articles of War in use in the Bengal native army?

1. At the outset of the consideration of this question, and throughout the entire discussion of it, it should be borne in mind that there is but one code for the native armies of the three presidencies, those enacted by the Act No. XIX. of 1847; that these Articles of War apply indiscriminately to all officers and soldiers, whether regular or irregular, in the service of the East India Company; and that if alterations are made in them to suit the case of the native army in Bengal, either such alterations must be declared to be specially and exclusively applicable to the Bengal army, or they will be applicable to the native armies of Madras and Bombay also.

Further, it has to be remembered that the sixth section of the Articles of War, relating to the mode of dealing with offences not military, is not now in question. That section brings criminal offences within the jurisdiction of courts-martial in places where there may be no civil judicature appointed by Her Majesty or the East India Company. The object of the present inquiry I understand to be, to suggest improvement in the Articles of War which relate to the trial and punishment of military offences.

Great pains were taken in the arrangement of the Articles of War to classify offences and the punishments awardable for them. The index to the contents, with which the Articles are prefaced, shows at a glance the simplicity of the arrangement; and it was hoped that that index, in addition to the headings of the several groups of crimes, and the clear specification of punishments awardable, with which each group of crimes terminates, would have been sufficient to keep courts-martial in the right way. Assuredly, with the commonest attention, this result would have been obtained. The Articles of War for Her Majesty's troops have similar divisions of offences into groups or classes, and precisely similar terminating clauses to each group; and so long as this arrangement continues to be adopted and to work well in Her Majesty's forces, I do not see why these Articles of War for the native troops should be formed or arranged on any other plan.

Section I. relates to enlisting and discharges, and consists of four Articles, none of which appear to me to require alteration.

Section II. relates to crimes of all descriptions, thrown into distinct classes, and to the punishments awardable for them in each class by courts-martial. It embraces the Articles from 5 to 69 inclusive.

It was a great object with the late Lord Hardinge, under whose instructions, as Governor-General, I framed the Articles of War, to restrict the actual infliction of corporal punishment to offences of a strictly military nature, the delinquent remaining in the service; to punish disgraceful offences ordinarily, and those not involving breach of military duty, so to speak, with imprisonment with hard labour, the offender being necessarily dismissed the service; and to assign only minor punishments to offences of the lighter kind. At the same time it was of course arranged that for disgraceful offences corporal punishment should be awardable; and that for all offences for which corporal punishment or imprisonment with hard labour might be adjudged, the minor punishments should also be applicable where there might be extenuating circumstances. The restriction of corporal punishment was made in a resolution by Government, dated the 30th August 1845, in the following terms:—

"Fort William, August 30, 1845.

"Resolution:—

"The Governor-General in Council has resolved, on the "occasion of publishing the Act for providing Articles of "War for the native army, that, until further orders, cor- "poral punishment may be applied to the following offences, "viz.:—

"1. For mutiny, insubordination, violence, or using or "offering violence to superior officers.

"2. Drunkenness on duty. Under ordinary circum- "stances, and in cantonments, corporal punishment will "not be inflicted for disgraceful conduct under the six "Articles from 38 to 43 inclusive (now 40 to 46 of 1847).

"If the discipline of the army should at any time require "that the restriction imposed by this resolution should be "taken off, it will be rescinded.

"On the line of march, on board any ship or other ves- "sels, and on service in the field, the full power of the Act "will be exercised according to the absolute necessity of "the case. On these occasions the resolution is not appli- "cable; but the officers in command of troops will clearly "understand that the object of this resolution is to inflict "corporal punishment as seldom as possible, commuting it "for other punishment in all cases when it can be done "with safety to the discipline of the army."

I consider this system of punishments to be the best that could be devised; and it would be no improvement, I think, to make any change in the classification of offences or the sentences awardable for each class, or to remove the restrictions on corporal punishment. It has been proposed in some quarters to make disgraceful offences punishable ordinarily with flogging; but with Lord Hardinge it was a principal consideration not to connect corporal punishment with crimes involving moral turpitude, which rendered the dismissal of the offender desirable; but men flogged and retained in the service should be considered disgraced. To a certain extent such men will, as it is, be looked upon by their comrades as disgraced by being flogged; but it appears to me to be a wise arrangement not authoritatively to attach, when it can be avoided, the stigma of disgrace to corporal punishment. I would, therefore, not make any alteration here.

It has been lately proposed to ask the legislative council for an Act by which imprisonment with hard labour might become awardable for all offences for which simple imprisonment is awardable under the Articles of War. Considering the nature of the offences for which the articles provide simple imprisonment, to the exclusion of imprisonment with hard labour, I doubt the expediency of this change; and as, so long as we have no military prisons in which to confine soldiers, so as to keep them separate from civil criminals, the infliction of imprisonment with hard labour necessarily carries with it the dismissal of the offender, this seems to furnish an objection to the change proposed.

Section III. relates to the administration of justice.

In the 76th and 79th Articles in this section no provision is made for mitigating a sentence of dismissal in the case of a sepoy; simple imprisonment might be substituted for such sentence. This has been proposed, but the proposal has not been carried into effect by Government as yet.

Article 101 in this section relates to trials by European officers. It gives offenders about to be tried the option of claiming to be tried by European officers. The second clause of this Article declares that "it shall be competent to "the Governor-General of India in Council, by a general "order, to authorize the native troops of any of the presi- "dencies to claim to be tried in like manner by European "courts-martial."

This clause does not contemplate an authoritative order of Government that offenders shall be tried by European officers, whether they choose to claim to be so tried or not; and at present there exists no power to issue such an order. The circumstances of the native army in Bengal appear to require that Government should have such power, and that it should be exercised; and as it may be desirable to include the other presidencies in any such authoritative declaration, I would propose to leave the first clause of this article as it is, and to alter the second clause in the following manner:—

"And it shall be competent to the Governor-General of "India in Council, or to the Governor in Council, at any "presidency, by a general order, to authorize the native "troops of any of the presidencies, or in the military service "of Her Majesty, to claim to be tried in like manner, or to "direct that such troops shall be tried by European courts- "martial."

Section IV., relating to the effects of the dead, does not seem to require any alteration.

Section V.—Miscellaneous.

Article 110 may, I think, be conveniently and unobjectionably altered so as to give power to officers commanding regiments to reduce non-commissioned officers. I would alter it thus:—"Non-commissioned officers may be reduced "to the ranks by the sentence of a court-martial, or by "order of the Commander-in-Chief, or by order of the "officer commanding the regiment to which such non- "commissioned officers may belong."

Article 112.—I would propose further to strengthen the hands of commanding officers by adding to this article as follows:—"In cases of light offences, *or in the maintenance* "*of discipline*, a commanding officer may, without the in-

" tervention of a court-martial, *cause corporal punishment* " *with a rattan, to the extent of three dozen strokes, to be* " *inflicted summarily on any sepoy*, or may award," &c. &c. The words in italics are new.

Such are the few alterations which appear to me to be necessary to the improvement of the Articles of War. The total abolition of the Articles, which has been suggested in some quarters, seems to me to be a measure from which no good could be derived. It would not tend to civilize or ameliorate our native troops, and it would place a degree of power in the hands of commanding officers not known in any other army, for which the necessity is not apparent, and which would not in any way really strengthen their hold on the obedience or the affection of their men. Commanding officers, like all other persons, require to be themselves subjected to certain wholesome restrictions. The Commander-in-Chief, and even the Government in its executive capacity, are not at liberty to exercise an arbitrary authority independent of law; and there appears to be no good reason for investing commanding officers with authority independent of Articles of War.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

2. They must needs be retained, in my opinion.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bengal army?

3. Not so satisfactorily as it might, if officers would inform themselves of the provisions of the Articles of War. But great improvement may be looked for in this respect by European officers being substituted for native officers in courts-martial in the native army.

The revision to which proceedings of regimental courts-martial are subjected at the hands of general officers commanding divisions is felt as a grievance; but it would not be so if regimental courts-martial were conducted with proper care, or if commanding officers would inform themselves of their own powers, and act in strict accordance therewith. But some remarks on this subject will find a place in the answer to a subsequent question.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the native troops of the Bengal army with the military code under which they live and are governed?

4. The Articles of War are read to the native troops, in companies, and at parades of regiments, once a quarter, as directed in the 188th Article of War.

5. What proportion of the native troops can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the Articles of War?

5. I am not able to reply to this question; but sepoys are debarred from promotion who have not a competent knowledge of reading and writing in at least one character. In very special cases, however, for distinguished conduct in the field and the like, men who cannot read may be promoted, but such cases must be reported to the Commander-in-Chief for approval.

6. Under what military or civil code are police corps in the Bengal presidency?

6. None that I am aware of; further than that I believe they are under the magistrates.

7. How is discipline maintained, and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the Bengal presidency?

7. I believe commanding officers of police corps have magisterial powers as well as the ordinary military powers of commanding officers.

8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps and the authority of their European and native officers is sufficient and the working satisfactory?

8. I have no means of judging.

III. ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the native regiments of the Bengal native infantry, what is the system of promotion? is it based on merit alone, or seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

1. The Regulations (sect. LIV.) direct that "in all recommendations for promotion the fullest consideration and " attention is invariably to be given to the claim of " seniority in every grade, where no such disqualifications " as want of respectability of character, or other equally " proper and just cause of objection to the advancement " of the seniors shall exist; and to enable general officers " and brigadiers to enforce the strictest observance of the " regulations on this subject, commanding officers of corps, " in promulgating promotions made by them in regimental " orders, are required at the same time to publish the " names of those passed over and the causes of their super- " session. Seniority or length of service do not, however, " in any case constitute a claim to promotion; inspection " of past conduct and general qualification, and although " they are always to be taken into account when proceeding " to selection, yet they are never to be allowed to operate " against proved disqualification in other respects." Further, "notwithstanding that commissioned and non- " commissioned officers may be passed over on proper " grounds, they are to be made to understand that it is still " open to them by an improved course of conduct to " establish a claim to promotion, and that all such claims, " supported by the commanding officer, will be duly " attended to."

Such are the safeguards with which the claims of respectable seniority are hedged round.

The practice, however, much more decidedly recognizes the paramount claim of distinguished merit and superior qualification than these regulations appear to encourage. I speak more especially of the higher grades.

2. Are the native officers of the native infantry of the Bengal army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

2. As a class they are extremely inefficient and very useless; but I have met with very remarkable exceptions.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen?

3. No; and in many instances they are not to be compared with the men.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

4. No.

5. Does the intervention of the native officers between the European officers and their men weaken the influence of the European officers?

5. This depends very much, I think, on the European officers themselves. Where these take great interest in their men and show it in their conduct towards them, the influence of the native officers will be all in the same current if they are good native officers, and will be overborne if they are bad. When the European officers take little interest in their corps, the clever native officers will greatly influence the men for good or evil. But there is a large proportion of native officers who are mere cyphers.

6. Does a full complement of the European militate against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officers?

6. I do not think a full complement of European officers necessarily or unavoidably militates against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officers. It will not affect the case of good native officers; and in the case of the bad, it will, and just for opposite reasons, not affect them, for there is nothing in such men.

7. Has it been found in the native infantry of the Bengal army that, on the occurrence of mutinies, the native officers have given timely information, or been of any use in aiding the European officers to check mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

7. In very few cases have the native officers given information or been of use to the European officers in checking mutiny. There is a large proportion of them who have sided with the mutineers, but my belief is that the majority have done so on compulsion. There are numerous instances of their siding with the European officers.

8. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the native infantry of the Bengal army?

8. I think they should be discontinued, with special exceptions, in the cases of some few who may be reported to have superior qualifications, who are now in our native regiments. The rest I would pension or discharge with a gratuity.

9. Is the substitution of an European sergeant and corporal to each company of a native regiment in lieu of its native officers advisable?

9. I think this highly desirable; but it is indispensable that these non-commissioned officers should speak

the Hindostanee fluently; and the occurrence of drunkenness amongst them should be invariably punished by removal. I would rather say two *sergeants* than one sergeant and one corporal, because the havildars have the grade of sergeants, and it would be anomalous that, in the absence of the sergeant, a corporal should command havildars. It is indispensable that all natives in a company should be commanded by any European attached to it.

10. If the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument thus closed to the native soldier, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of services, be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

10. Yes, I think it would; for the proportion of men who rise eventually to the grade of commissioned officer is but small, whereas the scale of good-service pay would be to a great extent accessible among them, I would not hold out retiring pensions except in rare cases of merit, and for men wounded on service in the field. I think the native non-commissioned officer or soldier might very advantageously be encouraged and rewarded by occasional transfer to civil employment on the staff of the police, such as thanadars, darogahs, &c.; and if the military police is kept up, they might be transferred in good places to that body as a reward.

11. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?

11. I have no doubt that retiring pensions do strongly attach the native troops to the British service. It has been said that the late mutineers show how ineffectual they are as a hold on the attachment of the troops; but then it is to be remembered that the general belief in the country was that the British supremacy was coming to an end; and with the British rule of course the pensions would be swept away.

I do not think that the mutinies furnish any criterion of the effect of the retiring pensions on the minds of men one way or other. At the same time I am convinced that with those who remained loyal, the retiring pensions had their full effect, together with the other advantages of the British rule, in keeping them loyal.

12. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

12. If the commissioned grades are retained, I think promotion for merit ane efficiency should be the great object, but not the only one. Seniority can never justly be disregarded in toto. *Dashing* service is very often fully counterbalanced by *well adapted energy*, coupled with *experience*. Seniority unsupported by other claims should be disregarded without hesitation.

13. Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

13. The present pension system must needs be religiously kept up in favour of those who are now in the native army. It could not be at once swept away without a breach of fai h. But in the cases of all men newly enlisting, I would abolish pensions, except for rewarding rare cases of merit, and for providing maintenance for men wounded in action and for their heirs. The emoluments of the Order of Merit should be carried out of the service; but the Order of Merit and the Order of British India should be brought within due bounds at as early a date as possible. During the mutinies both these orders have been made use of in a manner very different from what their respective rules warrant.

The "Order of Merit" was intended to reward conspicuous bravery in action exclusively, and the claims of individuals are required to be investigated by a court of inquiry conducted by a judge advocate. The order has been largely conferred on men for loyalty, and for persevering brave resistance to the enemy, as in the instance of the Lucknow garrison, but without reference to conspicuous acts of bravery.

The Order of British India was intended for long and meritorious service of commissioned officers. It has been largely bestowed on native officers without the qualification of length of service. The Order is also limited in number, but no regard has been paid to the limitation.

14. What is the charge to the State of military pensions to native officers and men of the Bengal native infantry?

14. I am not in a position to answer this question, being only in camp, as it were, with the Governor-General.

15. Are the native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in courts-martial?

15. No; the great majority are quite unfit to do so. But then this is certainly owing in part to their not comprehending our military jurisprudence. On the whole, however, and taking into consideration the weighing of cases on their merits, rather than any peculiarities of our system, I think the native officers, with few exceptions, quite unfit to sit at a court-martial. I say this after having had an experience of eleven years as a practising judge advocate, and having met on court-martial duty the native officers of certainly the larger half of the regiments in the service. But I have met with occasional splendid exceptions, men of very superior intelligence.

16. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European sergeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

16. No, certainly not; speaking of the generality. There are some fully equal to them.

17. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organization for the military corps? 1. Should they be fully officered with native commissioned grades as well as with European officers; or, 2. Fully officered with European, but have no native commissioned grades; or, 3. Be officered like irregular corps, viz., have the full complement of native commissioned officers, with but a few European officers?

17. Military police corps appear to me to be just so many irregular regiments, and I can suggest no better organization than that of irregular corps for them. With regard to purely military corps, I think they should be of two kinds, regular and irregular; the former fully officered with the European commissioned grades, but on a reduced scale, such as I have elsewhere suggested, and entirely without native commissioned officers; the latter officered as irregular corps usually are.

18. How should the police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades?

18. From the unattached commissioned officers as much as possible, but the obstacle is that these worthy men frequently know but little Hindostanee; and by uncovenanted persons of the respectable classes. Native commissioned officers should be appointed as in irregular corps.

19. If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned officers, but only good-service-pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits?

19. Yes, I think so; but if this be doubtful, then does it furnish another reason for not keeping up military police corps.

20. In police corps is there, on first admission, any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing? or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades, or on promotion to commissioned grades?

20. Not that I am aware of. I know of no tests.

21. Has the distinct organization and the difference of system, regulations, and component races in the three native armies proved favourable to our power in India?

21. I do not think there is any such difference of system, regulations, and component races respectively in the three native armies as to admit of any reply being given to this question. The prestige of the British soldiery has preserved our power in India, and not the native army in any considerable degree.

22. Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate Governments, to time and to local circumstances, be allowed, or should endeavours be made to assimilate or even to amalgamate the three armies?

22. The three armies could never be amalgamated in my opinion. The Madras sepoy is not to be compared, and would not work, I think, with the sepoy of Bengal. Nor

would the Bombay sepoy. Neither would it be practicable to send native regiments to serve for any length of time in other presidencies; distance, family consideration, and perhaps climate, all militate against such a measure.*

I would keep the three armies quite distinct, as they are already in great measure by difference of language, the Hindostanee being found in all, but comparatively little known or used out of Bengal.

Their system, organization, and composition should be left, in my opinion, to the discretion of the separate Governments, to time, and to local circumstances. The entire separation of the three native armies has been of the most important use to us during the late mutinies. We have had the native troops of Madras and Bombay in antagonism with the mutineers and rebels in Bengal, which but for the separation of three armies might not have been.

Amalgamation, as regards the European officers, would work very inconveniently, I think. The officers of the three armies now on the list could not be amalgamated without great confusion and injustice to many in each presidency. If amalgamation is to take place at all, it should be with reference to the future only,—to officers admitted after a certain date; but I can anticipate no advantage from the measure. It requires time to accustom officers to the native soldiery; but experience gained in one presidency, and the acquirement of its peculiar language, would be in great degree thrown away in another. Changes in the officers to whom the men have become accustomed would operate very unfavourably on the men; and if it be impracticable, as local considerations appear to me to prove, to employ regiments of one presidency in another, except for the temporary purposes of warfare, the employment of the European officers interchangeably in the several presidencies would just involve that change and separation of officers from their men which is so undesirable.

IV. European Officers.

1. Within your experience have the powers of commanding officers of native corps been increased or diminished in the Bengal army, and state the orders, or measures, or changes in the practice of the service to which you attribute such effect?

1. This subject is a very comprehensive one. It embraces the punitive powers of commanding officers independently of courts-martial, and their powers in confirming the sentences of courts-martial, and further their power to reward men.

And first, as to the punitive powers of commanding officers independent of courts-martial.

Before there were regulations compiled for the guidance of officers, commanding officers often exercised powers, such as that of dismissing native soldiers, and of reducing non-commissioned officers, of chastising with a rattan, of awarding extra drill and duty, of refusing furloughs, for offences committed by their men; but such powers were not authoritatively conferred upon commanding officers. I speak of the period from 1821 to 1828 inclusive, which formed the early part of my experience in the service.

Dismissal.—On the 1st of September 1828 the standing orders for the Bengal native infantry were compiled by order of Lord Combermere, then Commander-in-Chief. Those orders limited the power to discharge sepoys to the cases of men who, from bodily defects, sickness, or accident, might become incapable of performing the duties of a soldier, and who were not entitled to the benefit of the invalid establishment. Recruits who, from awkwardness at the drill, were obviously unlikely to become smart soldiers were also liable to dismissal by commanding officers. But in all other cases of unfitness for the service, or when commanding officers were desirous to have sepoys discharged, they were required to obtain the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief.

In other words, commanding officers were declared to have no power to dismiss men as a punishment for offences committed.

The first Articles of War made for the native armies of the three presidencies were enacted in 1845 (Act XX. of 1845 of the Government of India). Before that time there were Articles of War established in each presidency by its own Government; those for Bengal were established in 1796, and they continued in force till 1845. Of the Articles of 1845, Article 2. provides that "no non-commissioned "officer or soldier shall be discharged as a punishment "except by the sentence of a court-martial, or by order of "the Commander-in-Chief at the presidency to which he "may belong."

This Article merely enacted by law that which was before well established by the regulations for the army,—that commanding officers had no power to dismiss men for offences committed; and now for thirty years this has been the rule, and for even a longer period.

A revised code of regulations for the army was published in 1855. They take away from commanding officers the power to discharge men physically unfit for the service, which the regulations of 1828 had granted. All such cases are now to be referred to the Commander-in-Chief for orders.

Reduction of non-commissioned officers.—There has never been any recognized authority on the part of commanding officers to inflict this punishment. The old Articles of War did not touch the point. The Articles now in force, Act XIX. of 1847, enact that "no non-commissioned officer "shall be reduced to the ranks but by the sentence of a "court-martial, or by order of the Commander-in-Chief "of the presidency to which the offender shall belong." (Article 110).

Minor punishments.—Under the old Articles of 1796 it was provided (Article III. section XI.) thus:—"Every non-"commissioned officer and soldier shall retire to his "quarters or tent at the beating of the retreat, in default "of which he shall be punished, according to the nature of "his offence, by the commanding officer." This is the only Article which alluded to the power of a commanding officer without the intervention of a court-martial.

In the regulations of 1828 minor punishments are not mentioned. In those of 1855 "the punishment of soldiers "with a rattan at the pleasure of individuals entrusted with "the instruction of recruits, *or on any other occasion what-*"*ever*, is strictly prohibited." The Government general order, dated 25th February 1835, had already prohibited the use of the rattan. The words in italics are those now in point; the allusion is to an old practice, now perhaps obsolete, but which I have myself witnessed five and thirty years ago, of sepoys being caned, not at drill only, but for stupidity or obstinacy on parade at regimental exercise.

The Articles of War now in force thus provide for minor punishments, Art. 112. "In cases of light offences a "commanding officer may, without the intervention of a "court-martial, award extra drill, with or without pack, for "a period not exceeding fifteen days; restriction to barrack "limits, not exceeding fifteen days; confinement in the "quarter guard or defaulter-room, not exceeding seven "days; solitary confinement, not exceeding seven days; "removal from staff situations or acting appointments; or "may order soldiers to be employed in piling and unpiling "shot, and in cleaning accoutrements of men in hospital." The regulations of 1855 follow up this Article of War by prohibiting extra duty being awarded as a punishment to a native soldier, and by declaring that no punishment not specified in the Article is legal. But intermediately, on the 16th of October 1854, a general order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief which greatly interfered with the power of commanding officers. It directed that men to whom drill exceeding six days might be awarded by their commanding officer, or confinement to barrack limits for six days (afterwards fixed at drill for 15 days or imprisonment in the quarter guard or defaulter-room, or restriction to barrack limits for six days, G.O., C.C., 23d January 1855), should have an entry of such punishment recorded in the defaulter-book, and that two such entries existing together should render the man ineligible for good-conduct pay for two years. But it also provided that any man who might be ordered such punishment, but denied the commission of the offence, should have the right to demand trial by court-martial; and that an intimation of this privilege should be invariably made to the soldier who might assert his innocence of the offence charged against him.

Secondly, as to the powers of commanding officers in confirming the sentences of courts-martial.

The Articles of War of 1796 directed that no sentence of a regimental court-martial should be executed till the commanding officer (not being a member of the court-martial) or the governor of the garrison should have confirmed the same. There was no restriction then on the power to confirm sentences.

Matters continued thus till the 6th of November 1818, when, for the first time, regulations were made for the supervision of the proceedings of inferior courts-martial by general officers commanding divisions, and for their registry in the offices of deputy judge advocates general.

* In the Madras army there are but few sepoys, comparatively, from the Bengal presidency. These periodically visit their homes, but they are doubtfully received there by their own people, who look upon them as expatriated by joining the Madras army; and as many of them form connexions in that presidency, the estrangement is thereby strengthened.

By these regulations the forms of procedure were rendered more exact and uniform than they had previously been, and the laxity and irregularity by which trials by regimental court-martial had been distinguished were considerably remedied; but as general officers commanding divisions were authorized to set aside for illegality the sentences of courts-martial confirmed by commanding officers, the operation of the new rules could not but weaken the powers of those officers. Reversal of sentence was never directed without the most cogent reasons, but no doubt the practice was one which worked ill for the discipline of regiments.

In November 1832 the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Edward Barnes, conferred full power on commanding officers to carry into effect all sentences, or to mitigate or remit them, and abolished the practice of referring certain sentences to the general commanding the division previous to execution. The same order gave a commanding officer power to confirm or not a sentence of corporal punishment, and to discharge a sepoy sentenced to flogging instead of inflicting that punishment.

In February 1835 the Governor General in Council prohibited the punishment of flogging either with the cat or the rattan, and substituted dismissal as a sentence for any offence for which up till that time corporal punishment might have been awarded; but the carrying into effect such sentence of dismissal was not left to commanding officers, it required the sanction of the general officer commanding the division. This order took away the powers conferred by the order of 1832.

The Act XXIII. of 1839 empowered courts-martial to sentence native soldiers to imprisonment with hard labour, and provided that all men so sentenced for any period, or sentenced to ordinary imprisonment exceeding six months, should be dismissed the service. But all such sentences were to receive the sanction of the general officer commanding the division. Commanding officers of regiments were now not allowed to carry into effect any sentence of imprisonment exceeding six months, nor to discharge men so sentenced.

In 1845 the Articles of War, made for the first time for the native armies of the three presidencies, gave some enlarged powers to officers commanding regiments, both of confirmation and of commutation of sentences, this last power being quite new. I beg to be permitted to say that I framed them, as judge advocate general, expressly with that object, under the sanction of the late Lord Hardinge, Governor General. The second edition of the articles made in 1847, and now in force, gave me in the same capacity the opportunity of still further enlarging the powers of commanding officers, and it was readily embraced. The Articles of 1847 give power to commanding officers, whenever the good of the service requires its exercise, to try offenders by regimental courts-martial for offences ordinarily cognizable by district courts-martial. Only offences restricted to the cognizance of general courts-martial were not within the discretion of commanding officers, such as violence to superiors, desertion, &c. They are empowered also to carry all sentences into effect without exception; and to instruct courts-martial not to award in particular cases either solitary imprisonment or corporal punishment.

There was, however, a resolution of Government, dated the 30th of August 1845, framed in connection with the Articles as made in that year, which laid down rules for corporal punishment, then restored by Lord Hardinge after having been abolished for ten years under the orders of Lord William Bentinck. It has been given verbatim in the reply to a previous question.

It limited the infliction of corporal punishment to the following offences:—

1. Mutiny, insubordination, violence, or using or offering violence to superiors.

2. Drunkenness on duty. It directed that under ordinary circumstances and in cantonments corporal punishment should not be inflicted for disgraceful conduct.

The resolution further declared, that if at any time the discipline of the army should require that the restrictions imposed by it should be taken off, it would be rescinded.

And lastly, that on the line of march, on board ships or boats, and on service in the field, the full powers of the Articles might be exercised according to the absolute necessity of the case, and on these occasions the resolution was not applicable. The object, however, of the resolution was stated to be to inflict corporal punishment as seldom as possible, commuting it for other punishment in all cases where it could be done with safety to the discipline of the army.

This resolution is still in force. If it interferes with the powers of commanding officers of regiments, it interferes likewise with that of superior officers; but in my opinion in a very reasonable and proper way. The supervision of proceedings of courts-martial by general officers still continues, and numerous are the cases in which, even with all the extent of power confided to commanding officers, they lose sight of the plainest directions of the Articles of War, by trying by regimental courts-martial offences of which the cognizance is restricted to general courts-martial, and by other similar neglects necessitating the setting aside of sentences illegally confirmed by them.

With regard to corporal punishment (I use this term, as it is usually understood as flogging with the cat), having said that I think the restrictions of the Government resolution of the 30th of August 1845 should not be relaxed, I beg to be permitted to quote the following passage of a circular from the Adjutant General's office, issued in 1847, in connection with the Articles of War then made and now in force. It appears to me to contain the most just views, and to meet successfully the clamorous call now made in many quarters for the free use of corporal punishment:—

"Officers and men of the native army require neither "austerity of manner nor severity of treatment, but at the "same time it is indispensable to the maintenance of discipline, that authority should be exercised with a firm "though gentle hand, and every instance of breach of "discipline visited with promptitude and decision. Though "it may not always be possible to humour their prejudices, "the men may at all times be convinced, by judicious "treatment, that their European officers are incapable of "disregarding their feelings, and their attachment will "thus be secured, even when recourse is had to reproof or "punishment in support of discipline."

The discharge of men flogged is no longer the rule, except when they are flogged for disgraceful conduct; this very circumstance of the retention in the service of men who have been flogged for military offences, furnishes, in my opinion, a very powerful argument for inflicting corporal punishment as seldom as possible, for the sufferers are certainly looked upon among their native comrades as to a certain extent disgraced.

On the whole, the occasional curtailment of the powers of commanding officers, and the want of uniformity of system throughout, as exhibited in the preceding notes, cannot but have had a tendency to weaken their authority; but matters have been on a much better footing since the enactment of of the Articles of War of 1847; and with a few additional powers, which I propose to suggest in my reply to a subsequent question, and which has already been noticed in the preceding sheets, it appears to me that the position of commanding officers will be very satisfactory, and the discipline of regiments will thereby be secured.

2. During the above period have the powers of officers of European or native corps been increased or diminished?

2. Neither increased nor diminished, I think, in any perceptible degree.

3. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps upon the discipline of corps in the native infantry of the Bengal army?

3. I conceive that the greatly extended powers granted to officers commanding regiments by the Articles of War as now in force must have had at least a beneficial tendency on the discipline of regiments, and that where such has not been the case, the fault lies with the officers themselves.

4. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of captains or officers in charge of companies?

4. I do not think there has been any perceptible alteration in the influence of officers commanding companies.

Some regiments are what are called adjutant's regiments, in which the influence of officers commanding companies is diminished, and with very bad effect, by the centralization of the power to reward by promotion, &c. But no good commanding officer could suffer this; and I look upon it as occasional only, and very far from the system of the service.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distant authority of head-quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies and of the commanding officer of the regiment?

5. Mainly on the authority and influence of officers in command of companies and of the commanding officer of the regiment.

6. Should the power of commanding officers and of officers in charge of companies be increased or diminished?

6. I think officers commanding regiments should have power to reduce non-commissioned officers as well as to appoint them. In Her Majesty's service and in the Company's European regiments commanding officers do not possess this power, and therefore it was withheld from commanding officers of native regiments when the Articles of War for the native army were made. But this power would greatly strengthen the hands of officers commanding native corps, and might, I think, be unobjectionably given. I would also give commanding officers power to inflict summary chastisement with a rattan, not exceeding three dozen strokes, on sepoys offending. The power of summary discharge I would not confer upon them; cases requiring the dismissal of the delinquent should be brought before a court-martial, and commanding officers have power already to confirm the sentences of courts-martial. I would not relax the Government resolution of the 30th of August 1845 regarding corporal punishment.

I think no man dismissed from a regiment by sentence of a court-martial, confirmed by the commanding officer, should be restored. Errors in proceedings, deficiency of evidence, and the like, should be pointed out, and if necessary, in severe terms, to the commanding officer; but his dismissal of a man so sentenced by court-martial should never be set aside. Numerous have been the cases of injustice done to men in dismissing them; but the sufferers might be employed elsewhere, or recompensed in some way, and should never be reinstated in opposition to the commanding officer's authority. It is an opinion entertained by many officers that no appeals should be received, and that the entertainment of appeals paralyzes the authority of commanding officers. I do not subscribe to this opinion. If an appeal is made on frivolous grounds, or is otherwise untenable, its rejection is certain, and the authority of commanding officers is thus upheld. But where there are just grounds of appeal, and a clear wrong has been done, it is quite too much to say that there shall be no remedy. It is the perpetration of such wrong, and not the entertainment of the appeal, that really injures the authority of a commanding officer. But though I am not in favour of rejecting appeals from men who consider themselves injured, I would not adopt any measure in consequence of any proof of such injustice which could at all wound the authority of the commanding officer.

I would propose to cancel the G.O., C.C., dated 16th October 1854 (mentioned in my reply to question 1 of this section), and to allow commanding officers full power to decide on the punishment to be awarded to a native soldier, though it may affect the man's right to good-conduct pay; and I would not give the latter the option of demanding a court-martial, which is very unsuitable in the case of natives.

The power to promote men to the non-commissioned ranks for eminent gallantry or conspicuous loyalty to the state, conferred on commanding officers by Government general orders of the 19th May 1857, should not, I think, be continued beyond the period of disturbance for which it was specially granted.

As respects officers commanding companies, I think their recommendations of sepoys for promotion and of naicks for advancement to hávildar should be strictly attended to, provided they have had charge of the company for a sufficient time to enable them to pronounce on their men. Officers commanding regiments should never grant leave of absence to non-commissioned officers or sepoys, without first ascertaining that officers commanding the companies to which they belong concur in the grant of leave.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

7. The subject is too full of minutiæ to be embodied in an answer to this question. But in general terms I would suggest that it be impressed upon European officers punctually and exactly to fulfil their own duties, with detachments especially, as an example to their men. And they should go more often into the lines and among the men than is generally done.

But the main point towards securing the improvement of discipline in regiments is that the *commanding officers* should be selected with reference to qualification for command, and that proved inefficiency for command should inevitably lead to removal.

Adjutants of regiments should be most carefully selected.

I think majors should be made eligible to do duty with other than their own regiments, for the purpose of commanding such other regiments, when the lieutenant-colonel attached to any such corps, or the major belonging to it, or the senior officer present, is unfit to command.

And also that it should be in the power of the Commander-in-Chief to send officers of all ranks, from one regiment to another, to do duty when occasion requires.

8. Is the influence of the European officers among native troops greatest in time of peace or in time of war?

8. Influence acquired in time of peace will carry with it influence in time of war. But it is in time of war, I think, that the native troops look most to their European officers.

9. What conclusions do you draw as to the course to be pursued with native troops in times of peace with regard to the strength at which regiments should be maintained, the occupation to be found for them, and the like?

9. I do not see how our native regiments are to be employed in times of peace, othewise than in the performance of their own duties, any more than our European regiments. The strength I would propose for regiments is noted elsewhere.

10. Has the strength of the native infantry of the Bengal army ever been so great in times of peace, that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere military duties?

10. The strength of the native infantry has for a long time past been scarcely adequate to the duties required of it.

11. Would it have been practicable to employ the troops upon public works?

11. I think not.

12. In apportioning European officers to native troops, —(1) Should native corps have a full complement of European officers according to the present scale, besides a full complement of native commissioned officers; or, (2) A full complement of European officers and no native commissioned officers; or, (3) A smaller number of European officers than at present and a full complement of native officers?

12. I would not adopt either of these scales.

I have advocated the appointment of two sergeants to every company of our native infantry regiments, and the abolition of the grades of native commissioned officers.

If these measure are adopted, especially the first, I think the complement of European officers might be diminished. It would suffice to have six captains, six lieutenants, and four ensigns with each regiment of native infantry, besides the field officers.

13. If a full complement of European officers, would you attach cadets at once to native corps, or first to European corps?

13. I would send cadets to native corps that are well commanded, in preference to sending them to European corps. If the cadet is to be eventually posted to an European regiment, he will not have lost time by doing duty at first with a good native regiment. If he is to be posted at last to a native regiment, the sooner he begins to serve with one the better, that he may commence as soon as possible to know the men and to acquire their language.

14. If a smaller number of European officers is assigned to native corps, how would you train them for this special employment?

14. I see no difference, whether the number of officers be greater or less, in the means of training cadets.

15. Is the efficiency of regiments affected by the number of officers taken from corps for staff employment?

15. I think it is not; for, after all, it is a well-known fact that a regiment well commanded will be quite as efficient with but a few officers as a regiment indifferently commanded with a larger number of officers; and even more so. We have some regiments, the Kelat-i-Ghilzie, the Ferozepore, the Sirmoor battalion, for instance, with only a few officers which in efficiency are probably not far, if at all, behind the regular native infantry corps.

16. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable, in the course of mutinies, between the conduct of regiments with few and those with many European officers present?

16. I have no personal *experience* of mutinies in regiments. My *observation* has led me to the conclusion that the number of European officers with a native corps makes no difference, if the men are determined to mutiny. If

the influence of European officers has kept any regiment from mutiny, it is that of the commanding officer or the adjutant, or some highly respected and efficient officer in the corps, that has had the effect; and quite independently of the number present.

17. How can the demand for European officers for staff and detached employment be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of regiments?

17. The terms of this question seem to imply an affirmative answer to the 15th question, to which, however, I have ventured to give an answer in the negative. In reply to the present question, I beg to say that I think it by no means necessarily follows that the detaching of officers to the extent demanded for staff employment injures the efficiency of regiments. There should be a limited number, below which a regiment should not be allowed to fall in point of officers present. If two sergeants per company are given, I think it will amply suffice that the number of officers required to be invariably present with a native regular corps should be, besides the commanding officer, the adjutant and the quartermaster, three captains, and three subalterns. Leave within easy recall might still be given to officers, though, for the time, the minimum number be thereby diminished. This, with eight companies in a regiment, gives one officer to each company, including the staff, and it leaves half the officers, eight per regiment, for staff employ and occasional absence on furlough.

But I am persuaded that much might be done to relieve the pressure on regiments for the demands of the staff by largely employing uncovenanted persons and officers who have retired from the service, but who would be only too glad, in many instances, to come back to India to take employment.

18. Would it be advantageous to the efficiency of the officers of the army as regimental officers, to cut off the inducement which the hope of staff employment affords to young men to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the state?

18. I think not. But it is understood that a higher test than that now undergone will be established, which young men must pass before they can obtain commissions, and before promotion can be obtained. This will be of great service to the army.

I cannot imagine any beneficial influence being exercised on the minds of officers by cutting off the hope of staff employment. They would look upon themselves as to a certain extent kept back in the course of life.

I do not think this measure would give us such good material for our army as is now available, nor that any peculiar or increased attachment to the profession would ensue therefrom, but rather the contrary.

19. Would the standard of acquirements amongst the officers of the army at large be lowered by any measure having such a tendency?

19. I think it assuredly would.

ARTILLERY.

I. Recruiting and Composition of the Artillery.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the native gunners of the Bengal army are composed?

1. Much the same as in the native infantry; but if I am rightly informed, there are fewer brahmins.

2. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the gun lascars of the Bengal army are composed?

2. Much the same as in the infantry.

3. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the drivers of the Bengal army are composed?

3. Chiefly Mahomedans and the less dignified classes of Hindoos, I believe.

4. Should native gunners or golundazes continue to be enlisted and to form part of the artillery of the Bengal army?

4. I think not.

5. Should native drivers continue to be employed with European artillery?

5. These appear necessary. They will help to do various duties which Europeans in this climate cannot perform.

6. From what districts are the several races, tribes, or castes which enter into the golundaz drawn?

7. From what districts are the races, tribes, or castes which compose the gun lascars drawn?

8. From districts are the drivers taken?

6—8. I am not able to answer these questions.

9. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded by regulation or practice of the service from the golundaz of the Bengal army, and, if so, for what reason?

9. I believe the rule is the same as in the native infantry.

10. The same question is repeated both with respect to gun lascars and drivers.

10. As above.

11. Supposing that native artillery were continued in the Bengal army, are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits for the golundaz might with advantage be enlisted?

11. No; I think not.

12. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the golundaz of the Bengal artillery, for the gun lascars, and for the drivers?

12. I believe no particular agency is employed, but that a number of men, called omêdwars, *i.e.* candidates, are to be found generally in the lines of artillery companies, and from these the golundaz are mainly recruited. I am not aware of any particular agency for enlisting gun lascars or drivers. The former, under certain circumstances, are eligible for transfer to the golundaz.

13. On entertainment of recruits for the golundaz, the gun lascars, or the drivers of the Bengal artillery, what precautions of registry and other forms are taken before the local authorities of districts?

13. I am not aware.

14. Would you suggest any alterations in the recruiting regulations or practice if golundaz continue to be enlisted?

14. I am not sufficiently informed on the subject to suggest any change.

15. The same question is put with regard to gun lascars and drivers.

15. As above.

16. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his being admitted into the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?

16. I do not think any particular form of oath is prescribed for or used in the artillery. All native recruits, including gun lascars and drivers, are sworn in on a gun, in presence of the senior officer of the brigade or battalion, and all the native officers, and it is fully explained to all recruits and establishments that they are entertained for general service, and engage to go beyond sea when required.

17. The same question is repeated with regard to the gun lascars and drivers.

17. Answered above.

18. How long has this form of oath been in use in the Bengal artillery?

18. See reply to question 16.

9. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the golundaz, gun lascar, or driver when first enrolled? or would you substitute any form of engagement for the oath?

19. I would prescribe the same oath as for the native infantry.

20. If native artillerymen continue to be used, should the different battalions be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only, or be recruited over a wide area irrespective of districts?

20. I would do as proposed for the native infantry.

21. The same question is repeated with regard to gun lascars and drivers.

21. As above.

22. Should the battalions or companies, or troops of golundaz, be homogeneous as to race or caste, or composite, having all tribes or castes mixed up together?

23. If composite, in what proportion should the various races, tribes, or castes be entertained?

24. The two foregoing questions are repeated with reference to gun lascars and to drivers.

22—24. I beg to refer to my replies regarding the native infantry.

25. What agency should be employed for recruiting golundaz, gun lascars, and drivers?

25. I see no occasion for change.

26. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, when enlisting recruits for the golundaz, gun lascars, and drivers?

26. The same that are taken and proposed to be taken with the native infantry.

27. If native drivers be discontinued, would you replace them by Europeans raised for that duty, or by European gunners trained to the duty as part of their exercise, or by Anglo-Indians enrolled for this special duty?

27. By European gunners trained to the duty as part of their exercise. But I think, as I have said above, that native drivers should be retained. They have charge of the harness and gear of the animals, and are responsible for their being duly preserved and cleaned. They proceed with their cattle for forage, and assist in loading and unloading it. They give guards and sentries over their stables and sheds, and for other purposes when required. Two syce drivers per battery are instructed in shoeing horses.

II. Rules of Discipline and Military Code.

1. Are the same Articles of War applicable to the European gunners and to the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?

1. No; the Europeans are governed by the Mutiny Act; the golundaz by the Articles of War for the native troops.

2. Can you suggest improvements in the Articles of War now in use in the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?

2. I beg to refer to my reply to the similar question regarding the native infantry.

3. Can you suggest improvements in the Articles of War as respects the European artillery?

3. No; these follow, *mutatis mutandis*, the Articles of War for Her Majesty's service.

4. Are the gun lascars and drivers under the same Articles of War as the golundaz; and do any improvements suggested comprehend these classes.

4. Yes; to the whole question.

5. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

5. They should be retained.

6. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the native artillery of the Bengal army?

6. There is no difference, that I have observed, from the working of courts-martial in the native infantry.

7. What means are adopted to acquaint the golundaz, gun lascars, and drivers with the military code under which they serve?

7. The Articles of War are periodically read to them.

8. What proportion of the golundaz, gun lascars, and drivers can read and comprehend the Articles of War in their own vernacular?

8. I do not know.

III. Organization, Promotion, and Rewards.

1. In the Bengal artillery, what is the system of promotion in force for the gun lascars, golundazes, and drivers? Is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

1. Promotions to the commissioned grades is made by government, on recommendations sent by the commandant of artillery regiment through the adjutant general of the army. The same rules as to seniority and merit apply as in the native infantry. Promotions to the non-commissioned rank are made by officers commanding brigades and battalions, at the recommendation of officers commanding troops and companies. No native artillery soldier entertained since 1826 is promoted who cannot read and write one language at least.

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the golundaz generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

2. Much the same as in the infantry, I apprehend.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the golundaz, from among whom they have risen?

3. I do not know.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

4. I do not know.

5. Do the golundaz of all grades undergo systematic instruction in anything else than ordinary gun drill? Are they practised at laying guns and mortars, at cutting fuzees, judging distances, adapting charges to mortars, &c., or do the European officers themselves execute those details?

4. The instruction of the golundaz nearly approaches that given to the European artillerymen, I believe. Gun lascars are instructed in the foot and sword drills, also gun drill; the use of the gun, drag-ropes, and general duties connected with ordnance. They are used in magazine, park, laboratory, and ordnance commissariat duties occasionally.

6. Can the golundaz of the Bengal artillery frequently read English and write it?

6. I am not able to answer this question.

7. Is it advisable that native gunners should be conversant with laboratory work?

7. I think not, after the experience of the late mutinies. On this account I would not retain the golundaz.

8. Does the intervention of the native commissioned officer between the European officer and his men, weaken or strengthen the position and influence of the European officer?

8. This must be the same as in the native infantry.

9. Have the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of golundaz been found on occasions of mutiny to evince cordial fidelity, to give timely information, and effectively to aid their European officer in checking or quelling mutiny? Have the native officers passively or overtly sided with the mutineers, or with the Government they had sworn to serve and with the European officers?

9. They have behaved as ill, I believe, as their comrades in the native cavalry and infantry; but as in these arms, so in the native artillery, some have remained eminently faithful.

10. If native artillery be continued in the Bengal army, should the grades of native commissioned officers be maintained or abolished?

10. I would abolish the commissioned grades, if it be possible, to avoid detaching parties of artillery to out-posts, such as Arracan, &c.

11. Would the substitution of such a number of European non-commissioned officers as would give one to each gun of a battery in lieu of the native commissioned officers of golundaz be advisable?

11. I think it would; but then detachments with one European non-commissioned officer should be avoided.

12. If the abolition of the grades of golundaz commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the golundaz, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement and as efficacious as commissioned grades?

12. They might, I think, be so arranged as to ensure this result.

3. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the golundaz to the British service and the British rule?

13. As in the case of the native infantry, so with the native artillery, I do not consider the late mutinies to furnish any criterion of the effect of retiring pensions on the loyalty of the men. No doubt these are a powerful attraction to all natives to enter the service.

14. Do the drivers and gun lascars receive pensions?

14. Yes.

15. Have the drivers and gun lascars of the Bengal artillery been found faithful in times of mutiny?

15. No; with some exceptions.

16. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained or modified or prospectively abolished?

16. I would abolish pensions prospectively, except for men wounded in action, and the heirs of men killed on service, and for cases of peculiar merit.

17. Can you state the charge upon the finances of the Bengal presidency on account of military pensions to the native artillery of the Bengal army?

18. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grade of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

17, 18. I would do as proposed for the native infantry.

19. Are commissioned officers of golundaz generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

19. They are on a par with native officers of the infantry.

20. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European sergeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

20. I have not the means of judging.

21. Under the supposition that the artillery be wholly European, would it be advisable to assimilate it as far as practicable with the royal artillery?

21. Yes; *mutatis mutandis.*

22. What would this assimilation involve of change in the system of the Bengal artillery?

23. What would it involve of change in the material of the Bengal artillery?

22, 23. I am not in a position to reply to these questions, nor would my opinion, as not being an artillery officer, be of any weight.

24. What modifications would it be expedient to maintain in the organization of the Bengal artillery when assimilating it to the royal artillery, in consequence of the nature of the country, climate, and service?

25. Need the material of the Bengal artillery, if assimilated to that of the royal artillery, be at all modified in consequence of climate and service in India?

26. Do you advocate the maintenance of horse artillery at its present strength?

24—26. I think horsed light field batteries might be substituted for the horse artillery. My opinion is given with great deference; it is founded on the expressed sentiments of some distinguished officers, Sir Charles Napier and others.

IV. European Officers.

1. Within your experience have the powers of the commandants of native batteries of artillery and of officers in command of golundaz batteries of the Bengal artillery been increased or diminished?

2. What has been the result upon the discipline of the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?

3. If golundaz artillery is continued, what measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline and the confirmation of the influence and authority of the European officers?

4. Is the efficiency of the Bengal corps of artillery affected by the number of officers taken away from corps duties for staff employment?

5. How can the demand for European officers of artillery for staff and detached employments be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of the corps of Bengal artillery?

6. Would the general standard of acquirements be lowered by any measure which, by removing the hope of staff employment, cut off the inducement which young artillery officers now have to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches of knowledge useful to the state?

1—6. Regarding these six questions, I beg to refer to my answers to the same questions respecting the European officers of native infantry regiments.

(Signed). R. J. H. Birch, Major-General, Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department.

Allahabad, August 28, 1858.

Replies by Major-General R. Birch, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Questions having reference to Paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 235, of 25 November 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

1. What is the number of European troops of each arm now serving in the Bengal presidency, and what is their distribution?

Grand total of European troops		61,556
Deduct naval force	983	
„ Madras European troops	3,172	
„ Bombay European troops	7,308	
		11,463
Balance		50,093

Of the Bengal presidency only—

Royal Troops.

Horse artillery	2 troops.
Foot artillery	14 companies with 8 field batteries.
Engineers	2 companies.
Dragoons	6 regiments.
Infantry	44 regiments.

Local or Company's Troops.

Horse artillery	9 troops.
Foot artillery	24 companies with 12 field batteries.
Cavalry	4 regiments, incomplete.
Ditto raised during the mutinies	4 corps.
Infantry	3 regiments.
Ditto	3 regiments ordered, but not formed.

Grand Total.

Horse artillery	11 troops.
Foot artillery	38 companies. 20 field batteries.
Engineers	2 companies.
Dragoons	14 regiments.
Infantry	50 regiments.
Cavalry raised during the mutinies	4 small corps.

Distribution (Bengal troops)—

Royal Troops.

	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Bengal	None.	—	2
Punjaub	Foot 2, Field batts. 2	1	6
Field — Engineers, 2 companies	Horse 2, Foot 12, Field batts. 6	5	34
Pegu	—	—	1

Local or Company's Troops.

	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Bengal	Foot - ½ Field batts. ½	—	—
Punjaub	Horse - 5* Foot - 10 Field batts. 4	1	1
Field	Horse - 6 Foot - 13⅔ Field batts. 7	3	3

NOTE.—Four regiments of light cavalry are incomplete, and three regiments of infantry have been ordered but are not yet formed.

2. What is the number of European troops of each arm you deem necessary for the Bengal presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution?

	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Bengal	10 companies 8½ field batts.	None.	10
N.W.P., from Benares to the Sutlej and the Jullunder Doab and Rohilcund	6 troops 27 companies 22 field batts.	9	25
Central India, from the Jumna to the Nerbudda	troops 11 companies 10 field batts.	1	8
Punjaub	3 troops 20 companies 14½ field batts.	5	16
Oude	2 troops 7 companies 6 field batts.	16	6
Gwalior	1 troops 5 companies 4 field batts.	2	3

Grand Total.

Horse artillery	12 troops.
Foot artillery	80 companies with 65 field batteries.
Engineers	3 companies.
Dragoons	21 regiments.
Infantry	68 regiments.

(See tabular statement for the proposed distribution of these troops.)

This estimate may, perhaps, appear large; but circumstances have forced upon us the necessity of having more regiments of infantry than would have been required, had the native artillery continued faithful. It is now indispensably requisite that Europeans be substituted for native artillery, and wherever there are guns there must needs be protection provided for them by European infantry or cavalry. Heretofore we have had post guns at various small stations, manned by detachments of native artillery. Some of these guns must now be withdrawn, and those which remain must be manned by European artillerymen.

In making the preceding calculations, I have estimated the cavalry regiments, other than such royal dragoon regiments as may be kept in or sent to India, at a greatly reduced rate.

In my opinion a cavalry regiment should not exceed 350 in non-commissioned and rank and file. Regiments of this description are much more easily handled on parade and in the field, more easily found with quarters, more readily moved on service; they require fewer followers, they never need be divided, and in every point of view they are more serviceable than regiments of such strength as the four regiments of European cavalry lately introduced into the Bengal army. The effect of small bodies of European cavalry, much less numerous than the reduced regiments which I advocate, has been conspicuous in all our Indian wars; and recently the conflicts occasioned by the mutiny of the native army have, in every instance, shown that European cavalry, even in handfuls of men, have carried dread into the ranks of the rebel infantry, and have dispersed and overthrown large bodies of rebel native cavalry.

* Two of these are old native horse artillery troops manned now by Europeans.

If the proposition lately made by Government, to form ten regiments of cavalry of 384 privates, in the place of the four regiments of more than double that strength already ordered, and in lieu also of the only two remaining regiments of native light cavalry, the 5th and 8th, which it is proposed to disband, we shall have, with the six royal dragoon regiments now serving in Bengal, sixteen corps of cavalry. My estimate of our requirements amounts to five additional regiments, in all twenty-one. I would propose to leave only three of the present royal dragoon regiments in Bengal, and to substitute for the other three, three regiments on the reduced scale, having on the Indian establishment eighteen regiments of cavalry.

As regards the infantry, I am persuaded that regiments of 1,140 privates, which is the present complement of Her Majesty's regiments serving in India, are much larger than are really required. The work to be done is, in fact, done by a far less number of men. I would propose to have regiments of 800 rank and file at most; and it is on that calculation that I have estimated the number of corps of infantry required for the defence of this presidency. The old establishments of regiments of royal infantry was fifteen for Bengal, and even then, circumstances occurred in Europe which made it necessary to withdraw one regiment from this presidency (and one also from Madras), without replacing them. But it is not for Europe only that we have been called on for troops in time of war. The war in Persia took away for a time both infantry and dragoon regiments of the Royal army. After all that we have recently gone through in Bengal, from the unexpected mutiny in the native army, it would be unwise to subject the defence of this extensive presidency to the hazard of being rendered too great a task for us, by keeping up a European force composed so largely, as is that we now have, of regiments of the Royal service, liable, in a greater or less degree, to be called away to other fields of action, at a time when their places could not be supplied at all. I am very decidedly of opinion that a permanent local force is, on this account, of paramount necessity, and I think that not less than fifty regiments, out of the sixty-eight which I would propose to maintain, should belong to the Indian establishment. This will still leave us three more infantry regiments of the British army than we have had before, viz., eighteen; but in a total of sixty-eight regiments, two or three corps might be temporarily spared from India on an emergency. I would reduce the six regiments now in the Company's service to 800 rank and file, at the utmost, and would constitute forty-four other regiments for the Indian service on that scale. Fewer officers will be required for them, instead of the present plan of transferring to them the officers of two native corps to one European regiment, as will be shown in my reply to another question. I belive it will be found practicable, and not very long hence, to reduce the number of corps assigned for the present defence of this presidency; and as the railroads come to be completed, we shall be able to dispense with more of them. The standard height of the men might well be lowered, both in the infantry and in the cavalry regiments, on the Indian establishment.

Respecting the artillery, the want of additional force of this arm has long been felt. It is the most important arm of all, and only by maintaining a very powerful artillery can we hope to overawe those who oppose themselves to us.

The artillery on the Bengal establishment, before the munities, consisted of (regular artillery)—

Horse artillery	European 9 Native 4	Total 13 troops in brigades.
Foot artillery	European 24 Native 18	Total 52 companies in 9 battalions.
Field Batteries	- - - 21	

Of this number, we have lost by the mutinies, one native troop and eight companies, with five field batteries, and three companies have been disarmed. But it has been determined by authority that no part of the artillery shall henceforward consist of natives; and it is now to be considered whether the artillery in Bengal shall consist, in whole, or in part, of an Indian establishment. One precaution must and will naturally be observed, that European artillery shall never be used with only native cavalry or infantry. It is indispensable, when our gunners are Europeans, that they shall be escorted by Europeans of the other arms. But I conceive that it will be necessary to keep up native drivers on the old footing. They will be required to do work that the Europeans cannot stand in this climate, and I think they would be powerless for mischief in the presence of the European gunners.

It was understood when the royal artillery reinforcement was sent out, that it was only to be temporarily employed in India. It was not publicly so announced, but that that it was so understood I know on very good autho-

rity. The relative rank of artillery officers, from the peculiar constitution of the royal artillery, is a source of considerable inconvenience, from the supercession it involves of the officers of the Indian service, our artillery not being similarly constituted.*

It involves, too, this inconvenience, that the commands in the Royal artillery are more numerous, and, therefore, more expensive, than in ours, and that the pay of the men in the Indian artillery has to be increased, to put them on a par with the men of the royal artillery.

It has been said, and with much truth, that the example of the Royal infantry and cavalry is needed in this country, to give a tone to the European regiments in the Indian service. Great good has undoubtedly been derived from the presence of the royal troops, and whatever is of superior quality in the Indian service, is based on emulation of the excellencies which distinguish our own British army. But this sort of leading is not required in the artillery. Without venturing to offer any opinion of my own, I would refer with confidence to the repeatedly expressed opinions of able officers of the highest rank, who have declared the artillery of the Company's service to be second to none in the world, not even to that of our Royal army. It is much more important that the artillery force in India should not be liable to diminution by sudden calls for service elsewhere, than either the cavalry or the infantry.

On these considerations, and on others which might be mentioned, it appears highly desirable that the whole of the artillery should be of the Indian establishment.

The artillery of the Punjaub irregular force, and the Peshawur and Hazara mountain train batteries, might still be natives. The whole of the Punjaub irregular force consists of natives, and unless European troops should be added to them, European artillery alone could not be of any use, and would be in great peril. * * * If the power of artillery, which I have proposed to distribute throughout this presidency, be established, I do not apprehend any inconvenience from reconstituting the batteries of the smaller contingents, such as the Bhopal, the Malwah, the Kotah contingents, and the Joudpore legion, with native artillerymen. For this purpose, the few companies of foot artillery, and the two troops of horse artillery which have not joined in the mutinies, might be made use of, the latter on reduced pay. The Peshawur and Hazara mountain train batteries might also be retained.

With regard to the artillery employed in Arracan there is a difficulty. There has been a detachment there hitherto, furnished from the native battalion at Dum Dum; and it will be necessary to keep up the guns two in number. To man these guns with Europeans is not practicable. I conceive the details might be taken from the remaining portion of the Bengal native artillery which has not mutined. The increased pay given in Arracan might reconcile to permanent service in that province.

Scarcely had I written the preceding remark regarding the Punjaub batteries, when intelligence was received of a mutinous plot among some men, Malwah Sikhs, from the Cis-Sutlej states, of the 10th Punjaub infantry regiment, at Derah Ismael Khan, in which some portion also of the native battery there is said to be implicated. With this warning given to us, it appears to me to be highly necessary to do away with the Punjaub batteries, and that as soon as possible; and this measure, if carried out, necessarily involves the substitution of European regiments for some part of the Punjaub irregular infantry also; for, as has been observed, European artillery cannot be left alone with native cavalry and infantry under any circumstances.

There is one important consideration which has induced me to propose so large an amount of force, European and native, for the defence of this presidency;—the necessity for organizing moveable columns from the larger stations, which should be held in readiness to proceed at very short notice, in whatever direction circumstances may require. For these moveable columns carriage must of course be kept constantly provided. It appears to me that ponies and bullocks might be largely substituted for camels, and that the whole of the carriage for all movements of troops should be kept up by Government. We might do away with the batta given to troops marching; and while troops in the field must of course be restricted to a very small amount of baggage, troops marching for ordinary reliefs, or on escort duties of any kind, should likewise be made to move much less encumbered than has heretofore been the case.

Another reason for my proposing so large a European force is, that to the European troops only would I entrust the charge of magazines and of treasuries, and the interior defence of jails.

It appears to me an excellent suggestion that all European soldiers should be taught to ride on camels, and that a certain number of these animals should be always kept up at large stations and at important posts, so as to admit of a detachment being rapidly conveyed to any point where their services may be emergently required. I would propose that all moveable columns should invariably have the means of mounting on camels a detachment equal to the wing of a regiment of infantry.

3. What is the number of native troops of each arm now serving in the Bengal presidency, and what is their distribution?

Grand Total of Native Troops.

Regiments, regular and irregular (armed) -		75,859
Deduct Madras troops - - - -	5,010	
„ Bombay „ - - - -	6,557	
		11,567
Balance - - - -		64,292
Regiments disarmed - - - -		17,776
Temporary levies, organized police, &c., serving in the Bengal presidency - -		44,371
Grand Total - - -		126,439

NOTE.—In the deductions are included 179 men of the Hyderabad contingent, and in the balance are included the

Nagpore irregular force - - -	3,425
Mewar Bheel corps - - -	1,004
Joudpore legion - - - -	1,118
Mhair regiment - - - -	550
Mhairwarra battalion - - -	712
Muna battalion - - - -	577
	7,386

Horse artillery, 3 troops.
Foot artillery, 6 companies, with some remounts, with 2 field batteries.

Sappers and miners - -	1	at Roorkee - - 528 at Attock - - 89 at Peshawur (2 cos.) 82
Body guard - - -	1	(half armed and half disarmed).
Light cavalry - - -	2	(disarmed).
Infantry, regular * - -	7	(armed).
„ „ - - -	19	(disarmed).
„ irregular - -	16	(armed).
„ „ - - -	1	(disarmed).
Cavalry, irregular - -	16	(armed).
„ „ - - -	1	(disarmed).
Artillery, irregular - -	3	with 3 batteries (one mountain train battery).
Punjaub and Sikh infantry	29	
„ „ cavalry	10	
„ irregular artillery	8	with 4 batteries (one mountain train).

New levies, and organized police are not included in this, neither are "Towanna horse," "Mooltan horse," and such corps.

Distribution.

Native Troops, Bengal.

	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Foot artillery - - 2 Field batteries - - 2	4	3½	15

1 company of sappers.†

Native Troops, Punjaub.

Horse artillery - - 2 Foot artillery - - 8 Field batteries - - 5‡	15	5	33

3 companies of sappers and miners.

Native Troops, Field.

Horse artillery - - 1 Foot artillery - - 7 Field batteries - - 2	8	11½	21

1 company of sappers and miners.§

NOTE.—The Nagpore irregular force, Mewar Bheel corps, Joudpore legion, Mhair regiment, Mhairwarra

* This inconvenience has, to a great extent, been rectified by the orders recently received, to assimilate the artillery of the three presidencies with that of the Royal army in regard to the officers.

* Three of these regiments are in China.
† Seebundee sappers at Darjeeling.
‡ 2 mountain train batteries.
§ Also some Punjaub sappers.

battalion, Muna battalion, are not included; if they should be, the following should be added to the "Field," 1 foot artillery, 1 battery, 2 cavalry, and 7 infantry.

Of these regiments 2 troops of horse artillery, 3 companies of foot artillery, 3½ cavalry regiments, and 20 infantry are disarmed.

4. What is the number of native troops you deem necessary for the Bengal presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution?

The native troops will, I presume, consist, as heretofore, of regular and irregular regiments, but with this important difference, that we shall, henceforward, have no regular native artillery, and no regular native cavalry.

With regard to the native infantry, there remain of the old Bengal army, the following regiments:—

Regular Regiments.

Entire, armed, unaffected by the mutinies	The 12th, „ 31st, „ 66th, „ 73rd	4
Portions remaining faithful when their comrades mutinied	The 42nd. Portions of other regiments, estimated in all at about 2,000 men.	
With their arms restored and now on service in China	The 47th, „ 65th, „ 70th	3
Regiments which are likely to have their arms restored	In the Punjaub	4
	In Bengal	2
	Total	16
Irregular regiments on the same footing as the line; but officered as irregulars	Kelat-i-Ghilzie. Sirmoor. Nusseree. Kemaon. Ferozepore. Laodiannah.	

Of these corps, it appears that fourteen of the regular regiments are likely to remain embodied in the Bengal army. (In calculating the whole at sixteen, I reckoned the 2,000 men composed of remnants of corps, at two regiments, as on the old complement). It is probable now that they will be made into small irregular regiments. But the fourteen corps are all probably considerably reduced, by the operation of men on leave not having returned, by invaliding, and by discharges. I think it would be unadvisable to complete them to the old standard; and, as many irregular regiments must remain embodied, for the regular regiments of native infantry, I would propose 640 privates as a proper and sufficient complement. This was the strength of our regular regiments in 1831. I would propose also that they should be maintained in the form of regular regiments; irregular infantry corps have certainly not heretofore formed the *élite* of the native army, however otherwise the case may have been with the irregular cavalry. And it is to be remembered that the whole of the contingents have mutined, viz.:—the Oude, the Gwalior, the Bhopal, the Kotah, all consisting of corps on the irregular system. We have not one irregular regiment (I do not allude to merely local corps at all) which has stood against the mutiny, excepting those which, though with only the complement of European officers which irregular corps have, are yet in point of organization and pay, on the footing of native corps of the line, viz.:—the Kelat-i-Ghilzie, the Ferozepore, and Goorkha regiments. I would now bring into the line, the six regiments above enumerated, of which the men are now on the same footing as line regiments. This would make a total of twenty regiments of regular native infantry, already embodied; and to these I would propose to add ten more, giving on the whole thirty regiments of regular native infantry on the establishment.

For the duties of the larger stations, I think regular infantry regiments should in preference be employed, the number of European officers attached to them giving them an advantage for such localities over the irregular regiments.

I think none of the regular regiments should be kept up unless they now consent to serve beyond sea, or wherever they may be ordered. Those which have been disarmed should have this undertaking imposed upon them as a condition of the restoration of their arms; and in the case of those which have remained armed all along, their refusal to undertake general service beyond sea should lead to their not being recruited, so that they may die out, and even to their discharge with suitable gratuities. I do not anticipate much difficulty in gaining the consent of the whole to take general service, considering the power we have acquired over them by the experience of the late time of disturbance.

It is an additional argument in favour of regular regiments over irregulars, that they proceed on foreign service with their own officers; whereas the irregulars require additional officers to be posted to them for the occasion, as was done when the 4th Sikh local regiment went to Burmah in the late war; a system which can but rarely work well, as on service it is more essential than anywhere else that the men should know their officers.

With regard to re-arming regiments which have once been disarmed, I know that there is a strong opinion held by officers of ability and experience that such a measure would be highly impolitic and objectionable, for they feel convinced that men once subjected to such an indignity can never be trusted again. I have ventured to hold a different opinion, and I do so still. Some of the native regular regiments were disarmed as a precaution, and they knew this, and were thankful for the measure. This sentiment has been expressed to me by native officers, who are among the best we have in the service. The alacrity with which some of them gave up their arms, and the cheerfulness with which they have since done duty, are corroborations of the fact, as in the right wing of the 4th native infantry, for example, and in the 32nd native infantry, and others. The right wing of the 4th native infantry is a striking instance. These men have been occasionally trusted with arms, and employed in the interval since they were disarmed, and they have repeatedly returned their arms into store when such occasional employment was completed. They show no symptom whatever of consciousness of disgrace by having been required to give up their arms, but quite the contrary feeling, and in a very decided manner. I see no reason to doubt that this will prove the case also with other regiments to whom their arms may be restored. The best men in the corps (and these formed, I am convinced, the majority in every regiment), felt inexpressible relief on seeing the means of mischief taken away from the bad and violently disposed minority, the men of worst character in their corps; and I see no reason to doubt that if the regiments to be re-armed are well selected, and if they be first weeded by the discharge of any man in them of bad character, we shall have a body of men in the remainder to whom arms may be safely restored, and who will not only not feel a disposition to resent as an indignity their temporary privation of their arms, but will feel and respond to the compliment of being again entrusted with them. Besides this, these men have before them the fruits of this causeless mutiny; they see, plainly exhibited, ruin brought down upon their own heads by their comrades who have risen arms against the Government; the distress of families by the stoppage of remittances; the desolation of their homes by the march of war over the land; the loss of pensions; the fall of men in battle, who, had they died in the service of Government, instead of in rebellion, would have left some provision to their heirs. These examples will surely not be thrown away; and, for my own part, I do feel firmly convinced that there exists, spread in greater or less degree throughout every regiment that we may again entrust with their arms, the elements of such fidelity and heroism as have distinguished the already very large numbers of native commissioned, non-commissioned officers and sepoys who have earned by their loyalty extraordinary rewards at the hands of Government. I would not re-enlist an individual of those who have taken their discharge, not a man who has been borne on the rolls of any regiment; but I have no fear as to the result of restoring arms to such of the disarmed regiments as, after the process of discharging the bad characters among them, may be selected for that honour.

Of the irregular or local infantry regiments (not including contingents, of course, but the old single irregular corps), heretofore existing before the mutinies, I think not one can be dispensed with, except it be the Calcutta native militia. That corps is doing such duty as a corps disarmed can do. I would not restore arms to it, but convert it into police.

How far the several levies raised and about to be raised in the North-western Provinces may answer their object, is yet an experiment of which the result has to be ascertained in the course of time. For local duties at the larger stations where they are raised, they may possibly do very well; but I am not sanguine as to their usefulness elsewhere, should they be sent from their proper stations.

For the number and distribution of the native troops which I would propose to have, I beg to refer to the tabular statement.

5. What proportion of native troops serving in the Bengal presidency are regulars, irregulars, and police corps; of what races are they composed, and in what proportions do the races occur?

5. Regulars	Armed	-	6,947	
	Disarmed*	-	16,575	
				23,522
Irregular	Armed	-	72,260	
	Disarmed	-	1,199	
				73,459
	Grand total	-	-	96,981
Police	Horse	-	7,115	
	Foot	-	17,972	
				25,087
	Grand total of regulars, irregulars, and police		-	122,068

NOTE.—Besides the above, there are troops belonging to the Rajah of Puttealla and other native princes, numbering in all 4,412 men.

Corps are composed of Affghans, Punjaubees, Pathans of Peshawur and the Dera Jat, Goorkhas, Hindoostanees, Arracanese, Assamese, and Santhals, &c.

The castes are Mussulmans, Brahmins, Rajpoots, Sikhs, Gwallas, Kayats, Koormees, Goosains, Bhats, Gurrereas, Burraies, and numerous othes castes of Hindoos.

I am not able to state the proportions of the different races.

6. What proportion of your proposed establishment of native troops should be regulars, irregulars, and police?

6. So far as relates to regular and irregular native regiments, this question has been already answered in my reply to the 4th question. (See tabular statement.)

As to the police, I have not the means of forming any very accurate opinion. I think the placing of *fire-arms* in the hands of native police, and drilling them *as regiments*, to be matters of very questionable policy. Constituted as they must needs be, of very much the same descriptions of men of which the native army, regular and irregular, is composed, it is only multiplying trained opposition to our rule against some future day of difficulty, to establish police regiments on anything approaching the footing of the native army. To protect the territories under our power against such internal disturbances as do legitimately call for the aid of the military force, properly so designated, and for their defence against external aggression, I consider the army, European and native, which I have proposed to maintain, to be sufficient. But if it is to be an object to overawe, not the regular and irregular forces only, but an armed and drilled native police also, it will be necessary to increase *considerably* our European force. If proper measures are taken to disarm the population of our provinces, there will be little occasion, I conceive, to place fire-arms in the hands of our police, when those whom they have to keep in order are not so armed; and if to resist Dacoits and other such disturbers of the peace, and to apprehend offenders, individually or in gangs, be the true duties of the police, I see no reason why they should have fire-arms, and much less why they should be drilled to act together as soldiers. Any such opposition as would require a force to be drawn out in array to put it down, seems rather a case for calling out the military than for using the police force. There is a well-known race of policemen often entertained for their own protection, or for aggression on their neighbours' property, by native zemindars, the *Latteyals*, Burkundaz, who take their designation from the weapon (the bludgeon) which they use. Of their entire effectiveness there is no doubt.

In connexion with the subject of arming and employing the police, I would take occasion to mention that, for escorts for treasure or army stores (excepting tents), I would not employ the police, but the irregular troops; but as strings of carts laden with wines and stores, such as the commissariat has to supply to the troops, sent by merchants to their constituents, may be seen now on the road from Calcutta to the principal part of this Doab, and were constantly seen before the mutinies traversing the whole country, even to Peshawur, with no protection but a few chuprassees, so might most commissariat stores now be forwarded from station to station with an escort of Burkundaz, armed with bludgeons, or at the most with swords.

The defence of jails should be entrusted to the military chiefly; the internal guard should be European soldiers; the external might be either native irregular soldiers or police.

Every magazine should be defended by small fortifications, which should give defence to the treasuries, the commissariat supplies, and a small garrison of European soldiers, in addition to providing a place of refuge to the families of the officers and men when the bulk of the troops at the station went out on service.

7. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in the Bengal presidency; and state the ratio, both inclusive, and exclusive, of the police?

7. The proportion I have assigned in the tabular statement appears to me to be sufficient, if the police is not to be armed with fire-arms, and not regimentally drilled; but if the police is to be so armed and drilled, I think we shall require at least one-half more of European troops.

8. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in India generally; and state the ratio, as affected by the inclusion or exclusion of native police corps?

8. If the police is to be what police ordinarily is, I think the proportion of the European to the native troops should be as one to four; but if the police is to have fire-arms, and to be regimentally drilled, the proportion should, in my opinion, be as one to three.

9. Is there adequate barrack accommodation for the European troops now serving in the Bengal presidency, and state its amount?

9. Of a permanent nature there is not; but accommodation, either permanent or temporary, and of the last kind some exceedingly good, there is enough available. The comparatively few troops now in the field are of course not included in the statement. What the amount of accommodation may be will best be ascertained in the department of public works.

10. Would additional barrack accommodation have to be provided in the Bengal presidency for the strength of the European troops you deem necessary, and to what extent?

11. Additional accommodation will be necessary; but to what extent I cannot here accurately state. But wherever it may be determined to place European troops, under my scheme or any other, the provision of barrack accommodation is so purely a matter of absolute necessity that there seems to be little occasion to calculate its amount or extent beforehand. Just as at Barrackpore and at Allahabad, on its being determined to locate European troops at those stations, which had not been done before, barrack accomodation was necessarily provided for them, so, at any other place, the expediency of having European troops there located is the main consideration, and that question once determined in the affirmative, the provision of barrack accommodation follows of course.

11. What proportion of the European force should belong to Her Majesty's regular army, and what proportion should be composed of troops raised for service in India?

11. I have stated this above; but, to recapitulate, I would propose, that—

The artillery should be wholly composed of troops raised for service in India, and consist of ninety-two troops and companies; that

The cavalry should consist of three royal dragoon regiments, and of eighteen regiments on the reduced scale, composed of troops raised for service in India; and that

The infantry should consist of eighteen royal regiments of foot, and of fifty regiments on the reduced scale of troops entertained for the Indian service.

12. Under the supposition that additional corps of Europeans have to be raised for service in India, how would you officer them?

12. The ten regiments of European cavalry already proposed by Government, are to be officered from the lists of the Bengal light cavalry, with a proposed addition of three lieutenants and two cornets to each. These ten regiments, if so constituted, will more than absorb the officers of cavalry now on the establishment. And if the additional regiments be constituted they will have to be officered by new appointments of officers from England. But to supply officers of standing, down to the rank of captain, inclusive, it will be necessary to allow of transfers from Her Majesty's service; and these should be so arranged as to afford to the cavalry officers now on the Indian establishment a fair share of the higher grades in the new regiments. I am not advocating amalgamation, for it appears to me that that is surrounded with inseparable difficulties, and could not be brought into operation without great injustice, in one way or another; but what I would propose is actual *bonâ fide* transfers of officers

* In these are included 507 military prisoners.

from Her Majesty's service to the Indian establishment, with every reasonable advantage secured to them of previous service for pension, but with restriction in all necessary respects to the system prevailing in the Indian service; and once transferred, they should thenceforward take their place on the gradation list of the Indian establishment. Officers for the lower grades might be supplied by the nomination of cadets, as heretofore.

The usual system of forming new regiments of European infantry has the immediate effect of making supernumerary as many colonels as there are regiments formed.

Each body of officers of the old native infantry has its colonel; but the junction of two such corps of officers causes the loss of one officer of that rank. The promotion in the line is by this means most injuriously interfered with, and not only in Bengal, but in Madras and Bombay also, the officers of the three presidencies being included in one list, down to the captains inclusive.

Again, the tone of the Bengal army is lowered by losing its colonels. Its officers by every such step that they lose, are less and less able to compete for those commands and distinctions, which the service of India presents to the just ambition of officers. Further, the loss of the rank of colonel regimentally, cruelly deprives us of that privilege which after all falls to the lot of comparatively very few among us, of enjoying rest and a competent income in our own country in the down-hill of life, a privilege which ordinarily is not attained in less than forty years' service. Again, every diminution of the grade of regimental colonel, is a diminution of the funds of those invaluable institutions on which our widows and orphans depend for their subsistence; and for every step in that rank lost to us, the subscriptions of all the other ranks of officers must be enhanced, a process which would soon press beyond endurance on the means of officers of all grades, especially of the lowest.

Lastly, any great diminution of the number of regimental colonels would sink Bengal into a third-rate presidency; a very anomalous state of matters, considering the extent of territory embraced within it, the very large amount of force, European and native, required for its defence, and the fact of its being the seat of the supreme Government of India.

In any arrangement that may be made in reorganizing the Bengal army the maintenance of a fair proportion of regimental colonels should be an object of special care.

The system of doubling up the officers of two corps into one new regiment gives the latter more officers than are required for it; for instance, two lieutenant-colonels and two majors. One of each grade is amply sufficient. In Her Majesty's regiments serving in India, one of the two lieutenant-colonels is generally away from the regiment, either as a brigadier, or on staff employ or on leave; and it frequently happens that one of the two majors is away on staff employ or otherwise. There is actually no occasion for two officers of these grades with any regiment. I think also that the captains and subalterns might without inconvenience be less numerous. Her Majesty's infantry regiments serving in India have twelve captains, fourteen lieutenants, and ten ensigns. The local European regiments have fourteen captains, twenty-two lieutenants, and ten ensign .

It certainly cannot be necessary to have an establishment of officers more numerous than suffices for Her Majesty's regiments, which are of greater strength than our Indian corps. On this ground, two captains and eight lieutenants might at once be struck off from the complement of each of the European corps on the Indian establishment. But I am persuaded that twelve captains, twelve lieutenants, and six ensigns would be a proper and sufficient complement for each regiment of European infantry.

I have estimated the requirements of the Bengal presidency at fifty regiments of European and thirty regiments of native infantry, to form the permanent Indian establishment here. To officer these, according to the scale I have proposed for European and for native regular regiments, we shall require :—

		Total.
For the European regiments	50 colonels 50 lieut.-colonels 50 majors 600 captains 600 lieutenants 300 ensigns	80 colonels. 80 lieut.-colonels. 80 majors. 780 captains. 780 lieutenants. 420 ensigns.
For the native regiments.	30 colonels 30 lieut.-colonels 30 majors 180 captains 180 lieutenants 120 ensigns	

The present establishment of officers of all ranks in the Bengal infantry is—

78 colonels,
80 lieut.-colonels,
80 majors,
560 captains,
880 lieutenants,
400 ensigns.

Therefore, to make up the required complement of officers on the new scales, we are deficient of—

2 colonels,
220 captains,
20 ensigns,

and we have a surplus of 100 lieutenants.

Considering, then, that the first 220 lieutenants of infantry in the list are officers from fourteen to eighteen years' standing, 1843 to 1850, with very few of so late a season as 1849 and 1850, it would not be unreasonable to promote them to the rank of captain. If this be done, the measure will absorb 220 ensigns, to be promoted to lieutenants in their room.

The effect of what I have proposed will be, on the whole, the promotion of—

2 lieut.-colonels to be colonels,
2 majors to be lieut.-colonels,
2 captains to be majors,
222 lieutenants to be captains,
122 ensigns to be lieutenants;

and the same number of cadets, 122, will have to be supplied from England to complete the establishment. This would be no great drain.

I believe several projects of a different nature have occurred to others, and among them one is to consider all the officers of infantry as forming one general list, irrespective of the regiments to which they belong, and then to select from the whole such of the officers as may be considered best adapted for serving with European regiments. This plan would be highly injurious to a great many officers, without any adequate good to the service.

In the first place, to select from among a host of officers, who have never served in a European regiment, such as may be best fitted for such service, can only be a speculative and uncertain procedure. It can only be conjectured that, owing to their known or supposed possession of certain qualities, certain officers are better adapted than others for commanding European soldiers; and in many cases the selection will assuredly prove erroneous.

Again, the position of the selected officers in the corps to which they are sent will not admit of adjustment in any conceivable form which would not militate against the first principles of a seniority service such as ours. And the force of this suggestion is increased when it is remembered that the armies of Madras and Bombay are so mixed up with that of Bengal, that a radical alteration in the old system of promotion cannot affect one of the three armies without affecting the other two likewise.

But selection in order to form many European regiments is a hopeless task. What occasion there can be for doubting the efficiency of officers of the Indian service, and their capacity to command European soldiers, is not apparent. We have had European regiments for many years in all the presidencies, and though the first and oldest regiment in each presidency is now, in regard to the mode in which it was formed, beyond the memory of any one, the other six regiments, two in each presidency, have been formed within a comparatively recent period, and they were formed by the chance assemblage together of officers from the line, not selected, but posted to them according to their standing in the regiments generally. With these corps there has been no lack of able officers, and the efficiency of these regiments is unquestionable; it has been amply proved, both in peace and war. And it may be prognosticated most reasonably, that the new regiments will become as efficient as the old ones. If there be any sort of failure, it will be at first only; and every day's experience, and the constant flow of casualty and change, will speedily correct any deficiency.

There is another and very strong objection to this sort of selection for the European regiments from the general list. The claims of the European regiments are not a whit more emergent than those of the general staff; and it is assuredly a mistake to suppose that the refuse of officers will do for native regiments. We require the best officers we can get for all the various employments presented by the Indian service; and the first object should be to raise the tone of the whole army as one body, and not to let it be supposed that indifferent qualifications will answer the purpose of any branch of the service.

Having mentioned the general staff, I beg to be allowed

to say that the formation of a staff corps appears to me simply a question of expense, but of expense so enormous as to place its realization out of question. After very anxious consideration, I do not see how a staff corps is to be formed except by seconding, that is supplying the place in their regiments of all officers removed to the staff; and by allowing the rank of such officers to go on, *pari passu*, with that of those who succeed to their places in the regiments. But this does not provide for eventual circumstances, such as the occasionally proved inefficiency of officers employed on the staff, nor their vacating appointments after five years tenure of office, which is now the rule.

In the British army the unattached or half-pay list takes up officers appointed to the staff, but only their army rank goes on while they are unattached, and it is an object with the authorities to oblige as many officers as possible to return from the unattached list to the effective service, in order to lighten the public burthen. But this is not a sort of arrangement applicable to the Indian service, nor does it meet the views of those who suggest an unattached list for India. Their object is to get rid of staff absentees in regiments, and to shelve finally the inefficient officers of field rank. But as I before observed, these measures might be effected, but only at an immense increase of expense.

The real selection which should be made is that of commanding officers, and of the regimental staff. This selection should be rigid and uncompromising, and all will then work well.

13. Under the supposition that a considerable increase take place in the number of corps raised for service in India, and that they are officered from the officers of the mutinied battalions of the Bengal army, will this accession of seniority promotion corps create any greater embarrassment in juxtaposition with the purchase promotion system than what now accrues from the existence of the Royal artillery, Royal engineers, Royal marines, and the three Indian armies, in all which corps and armies seniority promotion is the system?

13. I think not, if the plan of officering the European and native infantry regiments which I have suggested be adopted, there will be no embarrassment, any more than there hitherto has been.

14. The feasibility of raising corps of foreign mercenaries, such as Tartars, Chinese, Malays, Dyaks, Africans, Madagascarenes, &c., being assumed, would you consider that the proportion of European to native and foreign mercenary troops could, with safety to our power and supremacy in India, be modified from the ratio stated in reply to Questions 7 and 8; if so, to what extent?

14. No; I do not think the proportion of one European soldier to four natives should ever be diminished.

TABULAR STATEMENT of European and Native Troops to constitute the Indian Service in Bengal, showing the proportions relatively of each, and their Distribution. (Local Corps in Assam, Sylhet, Arracan, and elsewhere, not included.)

Stations.	Horse Artillery. A.	Foot Artillery. B.	Field Batteries. C.	European Cavalry. D.	Irregular Cavalry. E.	European Infantry. F.	Native Infantry. G.	Irregular Infantry. H.	Moveable Column.
Fort William	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	
Barrackpore	—	1	1	—	—	1	3	—	
Dum Dum	—	1	1	—	—	½	—	—	
Chinsurah	—	—	—	—	—	½	—	—	
Berhampore	—	½	½	—	—	½	1	—	
Dacca	—	½	½	—	—	½	½	—	
Chittagong	—	—	—	—	—	—	½	—	
Raneegunge	—	½	½	—	—	½	—	1	
Shergotty	—	1	1	—	1	1	—	—	
Gya	—	½	½	—	1	½	—	—	
Arrah	—	½	½	—	1	½	—	—	
Patna	—	½	½	—	—	½	—	—	
Dinapore	—	1	1	—	—	1	1	—	
Hazareebaugh	—	1	1	—	1	1	—	—	
Ranchee (Chota Nagpore)	—	½	½	—	—	½	—	—	
Buxar	—	½	—	—	—	½	—	—	
Benares	—	2	1	1	1	1	2	—	
Jaunpore	—	½	½	—	—	½	—	1	
Azimgurh	—	1	1	1	1	1	—	1	B C D E F ½ ½ 1 1 ½
Bustee (Goruckpore)	—	1	1	—	1	½	—	—	
Allahabad	2	3	2	2	1	2	—	2	A B C D E F H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Futtehpore	—	½	½	—	1	½	—	—	
Cawnpore	—	1	1	—	1	1	—	—	
Futtehgurh	—	1	1	—	1	1	1	—	
Etawah	—	1	1	—	1	½	—	1	
Mynpoorie	—	½	½	—	—	½	—	—	
Banda	—	1	1	—	1	½	—	1	
Allygurh	—	1	½	—	1	½	—	—	
Agra	—	2	1	—	1	2	2	—	B C E F G 1 1 1 1 1
Muttra	1	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	
Meerut	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	—	A B C D E F G 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Delhi	—	2	1	—	—	1	—	1	
Roorkee	—	½	½	—	—	½	—	—	
Umballa	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	—	A D E F G 1 1 1 ½ 1
Kussowlie	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	
Sobathoo	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	
Dugshai	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	
Jullundur	1	1	1	1	1	1	—	1	A D E F 1 1 1 ½
Phillour	—	1	½	—	—	½	—	—	
Calpee	—	1	1	—	1	1	—	—	
Jalaon	—	1	1	—	1	½	—	—	
Jhansi	—	1	1	—	1	1	—	1	
Nowgong	—	1	1	—	1	1	—	1	
Sangor	—	2	1	—	1	1	1	—	

Tabular Statement of European and Native Troops to constitute the Indian Service in Bengal, &c.—*cont.*

Stations.	Horse Artillery. A.	Foot Artillery. B.	Field Batteries. C.	European Cavalry. D.	Irregular Cavalry. E.	European Infantry. F.	Native Infantry. G.	Irregular Infantry. H.	Moveable Column.
									B C D E F
Mhow	—	2	2	1	1	1	1	—	1 1 1 1 ½
Neemuch	—	1	1	—	1	1	—	1	
Nusseerabad	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	1	
Nagode	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	
Jubbulpore	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	
									A B D E F G
Lucknow	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	—	1 1 1 1 1 1
Fyzabad	—	1	1	—	—	1	1	—	
Sultanpore	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	1	
Other places in Oude	—	3	3	2	2	2	2	—	
									B C D E F
Bareilly	—	2	2	1	1	2	—	1	1 1 1 1 1
Shahjehanpore	—	1	1	—	1	1	—	1	
Moradabad	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	1	
Almorah	—	½	½	—	—	½	—	1	
Nynee Tal	—	½	½	—	—	½	—	—	
									A B C D E F H
Gwalior	1	3	2	2	2	2	—	2	1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Augur	—	1	1	—	1	½	—	—	
Seepree	—	1	1	—	—	½	—	1	
Ferozepore	—	1	1	1	1	1	1	—	
									A B D E F G
Lahore	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	—	1 1 1 1 1 1
Umritsir	—	1	1	—	—	⅔	—	1	
Govindghur	—	1	—	—	—	⅓	—	—	
Sealkote	—	1	1	1	1	1	1	—	
Noorpoor	—	½	—	—	—	½	½	—	
Kangra	—	½	—	—	—	½	½	—	
Mooltan	—	2	1	—	1	1	1	—	
Dera Ismail Khan	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	—	With infantry of the Punjaub irregular force.
Burnoo	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	—	
Kohat	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	—	
Jelum	—	1	1	—	1	½	—	—	
Rawul Pindee	—	1	1	—	1	2	—	1	
Attock	—	1	½	—	—	½	—	1	
Shumsabad	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	
Nowshera	—	1	1	—	1	1	—	1	
Peshawur	2	4	3	2	2	2	—	2	
Grand Total	12	80	65	21	45	68	30	27	

INDIAN ESTABLISHMENT.

Proposed Strength of Regiments (exclusive of Artillery).

European Cavalry.

1 Colonel,
1 Lieutenant-colonel,
1 Major,
6 Captains,
12 Lieutenants,
6 Cornets,
384 Privates.

European Infantry.

1 Colonel,
1 Lieutenant-colonel,
1 Major,
12 Captains,
12 Lieutenants,
6 Ensigns,
800 Privates.

Irregular Native Cavalry.

1 Commandant,
1 Second in command,
1 Adjutant,
400 Privates.

Regular Native Infantry.

1 Colonel,
1 Lieutenant-colonel,
1 Major,
6 Captains,
6 Lieutenants,
4 Ensigns,
640 Privates.

Irregular Native Infantry.

1 Commandant,
1 Second in command,
1 Adjutant,
400 Privates.

But it is not proposed to reduce below 800 privates the local regiments, such as the Assam regiments, &c., which are now above that strength.

APPENDIX No. 62.

(No. 121.)

From Major-General W. R. MANSFIELD, to Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. DURAND, C.B.

SIR, September 4, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to send you the answers to certain series of questions respecting the future organization of the Bengal army in obedience to the commands of the Right Honourable the Governor-General.

In order more fully to explain my meaning than appeared to me to be possible, by adhering solely to my answers to the questions, I have ventured to add a minute containing my views at length in the solution of the matter proposed for consideration.

I have, &c.
W. R. MANSFIELD,
Major-General.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

	Page
ANSWERS to QUESTIONS on "The Recruiting and Compositions of Corps."—No. 1, Infantry	96
" " on "European Officers."—No. 4, Infantry	96
" " on "Military Code and Rules of Discipline."—Infantry, No. 2	96
" " on "Organization, Promotion, and Rewards."—Infantry, No. 3	96
Introductory Chapter to Minute	97
CHAPTER I. The principle on which Native Armies should be formed, with Extract from "A Journey through the Kingdom of Oudh," by Major-General Sir W. H. Sleeman, K.C.B	97
" II. Caste,—as regards Constitutions of Regiments	99
" III. The Regular Army of Bengal	100
" IV. The European Forces for the Army of Bengal	101
" V. The Commands of Native Regiments	103
" VI. On the Questions having reference to Paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 235 of 25th November 1857, Military Department, Court of Directors	103
" VII. The future Distribution of the Regular Forces in the Presidency of Bengal in times of tranquillity	103
" VIII. The Army of Bengal	105
" IX. On the Financial Result to be anticipated as consequent on the Scheme submitted	105
" X. The Organization of the Artillery for Bengal	106
Copy of Memorandum No. 173, by the Chief of the Staff, on the future formation of the Bengal Light Cavalry (European)	107
Return (A.) of European Troops serving in the Bengal Presidency on 1st July 1858	108
Return (B.) of Native Troops, Regular and Irregular, serving in the Bengal Presidency on 1st July 1858	109
Disposition Return (C.) of Temporary Levies, Organized Police, Contingents, &c., in the Bengal Presidency on the 1st July 1858	110
Tabular Statement of the Total proposed Establishment of the Regular Army of Bengal	112

ANSWERS by the Chief of the Staff to QUESTIONS on "The Recruiting and Composition of Corps."—No. 1, Infantry.

ANSWERS to QUESTIONS.

3. Yes.
4. Yes.
11. An oath is of no avail.
14. Yes, if possible, excepting exceptional corps like the guides.
15. Certain corps, such as guides, &c.
16. Not as a general rule. But the constitution of corps in this respect should vary.
17. By companies.
18. Should be distributed as equally as circumstances will permit.
19. In the same districts. Perhaps there should be little or no difference in the engagement of the two sets of men. I believe that irregular infantry and police corps should be convertible terms, and both to do the same duty in war and during peace. Practically this is the case in times of war when the police have received.
20. No; but I would render all native troops liable to a police duty, if requisite, and vice versâ.
21. The commanding officer should be responsible for the enlistment of recruits.
22. Do. Do.
23. Leaving it altogether to the commanding officer under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, I would have nothing to say to any local authorities beyond calling on them for assistance in obtaining the men.
24. I recognize no difference.
25. Inexpedient. The Africans are the only people whom it would be worth while to enlist. To do so is forbidden by reasons of imperial policy.
28. No.
33. With the ordinary percussion musket.
34. Do. Do.
35. Close imitation is unnecessary.
36. With a view to the comfort and *activity* of the soldier, the dress of the French zouave might perhaps be studied to advantage with this object. But indeed one dress is as good as another, if stiff head-dresses and tightness be avoided. Tight jackets and shakos should be forgotten for ever, and a loose tunic or round long-waisted jacket and a pugree substituted. The trousers or peejamas cannot be too loose.
37. I very much approve of this suggestion.
38. Yes. As far as I know, the drivers and lascars belonging to the batteries have not mutinied.
39. In line, as in a regiment of two battalions.
40. In my opinion favourable. I do not see how the moral question of awe can be effected by it after recent occurrences; there will not be much intimacy under any circumstances.
41. This can only be told after the experiment has been tried. I do not see that any difficulty could arise. The native battalion might be detached for any length of time, but always with the certainty before it of returning to head quarters, *i.e.* the European battalion.
42. The spirit of confidence and self-reliance will be much enhanced by being constantly in association with Europeans.

This is a matter of "morale," produced by more success in arms, and not of training.

They will not fight the worse when away from their European comrades because they have acquired a feeling of self-reliance by constant success in their company.

W. R. MANSFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of the Staff.

ANSWERS by the Chief of the Staff to QUESTIONS on "European Officers."—No. 4, Infantry.

ANSWERS to QUESTIONS.

5. Officers in command of regiments and companies, and not on the head-quarters.
6. Increased. In the eye of the native there should be no apparent limit to the power of his immediate chief.
8. The influence of one man on another is always at the greatest pitch in times of excitement.

We must look on soldiers as men, and consider they are acted on like their fellows in civil life.

Consequently the influence of real leaders or commanders of men is greatest in war, while that of a mere regulation-colonel, who has not the "quality" of command in him, will be stronger in times of peace.

W. R. MANSFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of the Staff.

ANSWERS by the Chief of the Staff to QUESTIONS on "Military Code and Rules of Discipline."—Infantry, No. 2.

ANSWERS to QUESTIONS.

1. Articles of war to be dispensed with, and in their place a set of simple regulations, under which a soldier may be tried.
2. No.
3. No.
7. As in irregular corps.

W. R. MANSFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of the Staff.

ANSWERS by the Chief of the Staff to QUESTIONS on "Organization, Promotion, and Rewards."—Infantry, No. 3.

ANSWERS to QUESTIONS.

1. Seniority.
2. No.
3. No.
4. No.
6. No.
7. Must be continued if it be only out of regard for the Madras and Bombay armies.
8. No.

9. A scheme of this sort might probably be worked out, but it would never atone for the loss of promotion and power.

10. It appears not from the experience of the last year. Great faith used to be placed on the virtue of pensions.

11. By merit.

12. Abolished.

14. They are always led by the Judge Advocate-General or the superintending officer.

15. This depends on the man and not on the class.

16. The irregular system, but with one officer to each company. In war the presence of many officers is imperative.

16 (1). Yes.

16 (2). No.

17. As at present in the Punjab; but there should be more European officers, say three to each battalion.

In the Punjab there is but one, I believe.

18. I should think not. It is contrary to human nature.

20. The last year is the answer to this question.

21. Keep the three armies separate, and maintain every marked difference of system.

All local distinction and difference should be carefully fostered.

W. R. MANSFIELD,
Major-General, Chief of the Staff.

MINUTE on the Reconstruction of the Army of Bengal, by Major-General Sir W. R. Mansfield, K.C.B., Chief of the Staff in India.

Allahabad, 13th July 1858.

I venture, with considerable diffidence, to add a minute to my series of answers to the questions proposed for consideration under the orders of the Right Honourable the Governor-General.

It has appeared to me that by the adoption of this course I may be able more thoroughly to elucidate my thoughts on the great subject of these questions than by presenting them only in a form which to a certain degree interferes with their connection, and therefore with close argument.

Perhaps it may be well to say *in limine* that my views are not merely of yesterday, since the great outbreak and rebellion of last year, but that they were the results of thought many years ago, when, owing to my position of command of one of Her Majesty's regiments, I was thrown much into contact with the native army of Bengal.

These views have been greatly strengthened by late occurrences.

CHAPTER I.

The Principle on which Native Armies should be formed.

Without attempting to indicate the original causes of the mutiny of the Bengal army, we may admit that the loyalty of the corps which remained true to their colours has been an affair of circumstances.

This remark applies as much to the native corps in the armies of Madras and Bombay, as to the few and isolated faithful regiments of Bengal.

In the two former the disease of mutiny did at times make its appearance, but the favourable circumstances were too strong to permit of its spreading, and, taken as a whole, the two armies have passed through a very terrible ordeal in a manner almost incredible.

To attribute this wonderful result to one of the circumstances, viz., a better system, or discipline as compared with the system and discipline of the army of Bengal, would be indeed an error.

We are not surprised to find the officers of the Madras and Bombay armies assume that a great superiority distinguishes them in this respect.

Perhaps this may be the case owing to their smaller numbers, although it is denied by many not incompetent judges.

Admitting it to be true, we must regard the fact as only one of the circumstances which conduced towards that result, of which the officers of the two southern armies are so justly proud.

If we look a little further we shall find another circumstance, from which a most important lesson may be learnt, containing perhaps the vital principle to be followed in the reconstruction of the army of Bengal.

The armies of Bombay and Madras being quite separate and apart from that of Bengal, having different interests, different system, and different services to show, are animated by an *esprit de corps* of their own, and it may be presumed entertain much jealousy of the larger body, to which a certain pre-eminence has been awarded on account of its vastly superior numbers, and of the constant wars in which it has of late been engaged.

In this term of *esprit de corps* is included the feeling of separate nationality and race, which is always apparent in troops raised in different parts of a large empire.

If we may judge of the feelings of the soldiery by those of the officers, of which the latter make no secret from the generals down to the ensigns, we shall be hardly liable to error in ascribing a strong antipathy in the southern armies towards the great one of the north.

It is unnecessary to recapitulate what is so much known to every one, the constitution of the late Bengal army.

Suffice it to say, that that army, owing to the manner in which it was recruited, formed an immense quasi masonic brotherhood from Peshawur to Calcutta, and from the Himalaya to the Nerbudda. With that river the agency of the brotherhood stopped, and other military bodies were beyond which refused to acknowledge its signs or to obey its behests.

The unwise tendency of the Bombay Government of late years to give a preference to the Poorheas of Oudh, on account of the comeliness of such recruits, had nearly caused its army to be affiliated to the brotherhood of Bengal. Fortunately the mischief had not gone far enough to complete the process, when the outbreak of last year took place.

To this only may the safety of the Bombay army under Providence be now attributed.

We have sufficient evidence to show on what a precipice it was for some time standing on the account stated; and the cavalry of Madras, in which the same error was committed, gives testimony of a like nature respecting the army of that presidency, though in a far less degree, as the men enlisted in the northern provinces were few in number, as compared with the Poorheas in the service of Bombay.

The manner in which the warlike population of the Punjab has been employed in crushing the mutiny of the army and the general insurrection in the presidency of Bengal, is another instance differing in kind, but not in idea, of the sentiment which has so largely conduced to the safety of Southern India.

It was not because they loved us, but because they hated Hindostan and hated the Bengal army, that the Sikhs have flocked to our standards instead of seizing the opportunity to strike again for their freedom.

They wanted to revenge themselves, and to gain riches by the plunder of the Hindostanee cities. They were not attracted by mere daily pay. It was rather the prospect of wholesale plunder and of stamping on the heads of their enemies.

In short, we have turned to profit the *esprit de corps* of the old Khalsa army of Runjeet Singh in the manner which for a time would most effectually bind the Sikhs to us as long as the active service against their old enemies may last.

What then is the lesson to be learnt from the great instances which have been cited?

That we should avoid creating any grand centralised army like the one lately dissolved, and substitute in its place several local armies, which should remain distinct and separate from one another, and in each of which an *esprit de corps* peculiar to itself should be fostered by all the means incidental to distinct services, and countries differing in climate, latitude, and race.

Independent of the safety of the empire in not being again exposed to the secret plots of a mighty brotherhood, all of which obey the same impulses, we should recognize the fact, that the native army of India is not wanted for foreign war.

We have attained the natural limits of the Indian empire.

What we require is such an organization as may provide for the military defence and the maintenance of the peace in every part of the country, in the manner most agreeable to the troops and to the people, without sacrificing efficiency.

Perhaps the first severe shock given to the fidelity of the sepoy, was in the passage of the Indus, and in the early expeditions to China.

If we admit that we have passed the acquisitive phase of our Indian policy, and that we are bent for the future on consolidation of the empire only, we may arrive at the conclusion that several local armies for certain large provinces, partaking somewhat of the character of our militia at home, but liable to police duty, are more adapted to our object, on the grounds of general policy, than one large homogeneous body, which is an army for purely military, and for the most part aggressive purposes.

Our north-west trans-Indus frontier would naturally fall to the share of the army of the Punjab.

Its employment thus is suited to the warlike genius of the Sikhs.

It is necessary, on grounds of policy, that he should be constantly opposed to the Afghan, and sufficiently practised in war to meet the eruptions either of savage or civilized enemies from the west.

In other parts of the empire the native armies would really be but a better sort of police in ordinary times, and to duties of such a form would they, in fact, come to be limited, upon which they should be employed without remorse, instead of remaining in ease, idleness, and uselessness in large cantonments, as has been the case in time of peace hitherto. But they would be liable, as our militia, to service anywhere in case of danger to the empire.

Each chief commissionership is a mighty kingdom. It may be said that Imperial safety requires the characteristics of each kingdom to be preserved, and that no advantage can follow, whereas great danger might ensue on abolishing the old landmarks, or on obliterating old differences between provinces, religions, and races.

By the maintenance of a local force for each kingdom or commissionership, which should generally be moved only within the precincts of the country to which it belongs, and in which it was raised, the idea of a large confederacy of states under an Imperial Government would be maintained, instead of the dead levelling process of centralization pursued during our later years, the latter having been carried through by an army, which we fondly hoped, and perhaps almost believed, was so thoroughly mercenary as to have abjured every affection excepting that for pay and pension.

Such speculation on Indian policy may appear foreign to the subject of this minute.

In truth, however, they are not, but form the very essence of it. We cannot separate the policy of British India from the constitution of its army. The great sepoy mutiny has been but one form of general insurrection. Whether it was a cause or a consequence is now of little importance. An army of 120,000 men could not mutiny without dragging a large part of the country with it, in which it was raised, and vice versâ, if wide provinces strike for freedom, the soldiers who spring from them are sure not to forget the claims of race, religion, and brotherhood.

It appears to me, therefore, that on the largest political considerations, as well as on account of the great military question, the various provinces or chief commissionerships of this immense presidency should be treated as a confederacy of states, each having its own local force, the binding string of the fasces of states being the British army proper of the Queen and of the Honourable Company, reinforced slightly by bodies of light troops, which should be gathered from every district and corner of India, and should be closely incorporated with the British battalions.

In one of my answers I have said, that as regards the service of the state, the native troops and trained police may be taken as convertible terms.

There can be no essential difference between the two bodies, recruited as they are from the same classes, and trained as they are in the same manner.

If the idea of local forces were adopted, we should find it inexpedient to allow any difference whatever to exist between them, and there should be no distinct appellation.

It matters not that in theory the idea of a police force differs from that of a military one. In practice we find the training required for the latter is the best preparation for the former.

The trained police of Ireland is probably the most efficient body of troops in the whole world, and the so-called police battalions of Scinde and the Punjab are in no respect inferior to the native battalions of this army. In point of fact there is no difference between them. They do the same duty, carry the same arms, and have a like training.

Here then it seems we have the secret of keeping the troops constantly employed.

When not assembled for the purpose of military instruction or for military duty proper, they should be dispersed, not on furlough, as according to the old practice, but on duty, in the discharge of ordinary police functions, under their European officers, as the disciplined auxiliaries of the magistrate, a *corps d'élite* on which the latter might depend when greater firmness is required than can be expected from his ordinary attendants and chuprassies.

If this were admitted it would be for the commander of the local army to institute a certain system of relief, under which a given number of his regiments would be kept together, and proceed with their military training, while the remainder should be employed in the districts with the magistrates, each corps having its own tour at stated intervals of both duties under its European officers.

The European officer who, under the old system, had no chance of becoming acquainted with the people or the country, would thus, each in his turn, be thrown into contact with all classes of the population.

The extraordinary segregation of the British officers from the people could not but cease, and perhaps it might not be seen again that a wide-spread conspiracy should take place without the cognizance of a single white man throughout the presidency. It would come to pass that every officer employed with the native troops would have worked at some time or other during his career, and probably for a great portion of it, immediately with the civil magistrate, and would thereby be qualified to be a magistrate himself, while at the same time his efficiency as a military officer would not be impaired.

The local forces would have no artillery of their own. It being decreed, that in future all artillery shall be European, it would of necessity belong to the regular army, which is apart from the local forces, although portions of the former, including artillery, cavalry, and infantry, would be of necessity distributed throughout each state, as the general binding medium of the empire.

During the season of camps and drill the local forces might meet the regular army for exercise, but only then. At all other seasons the former should be dispersed over the various districts, some in the active performance of police work, others in cantonments as military bodies.

The wives and families should live in the cantonments with the men.

Long furloughs, so much abused formerly (vide General Sleeman's "Journey through Oudh," see page 49), would no longer be necessary, as the men would be in their own country, and would have their wives with them.

The system of long furloughs then should be altogether abolished.

They should cease to be a matter of right, and it should be left to commanding officers to determine whether they should be granted or not, according to the conduct of the applicants.

It will have been remarked, that the object of the system proposed is to obtain real work from the sepoys at all times, and not to maintain large bodies of armed men in a state of ease, and even luxury, and of the most profound idleness during peace.

Many years ago I ventured the remark, from personal observation, and it is a remark which has been in the mouths of many of our best authorities, that the only condition of safety with respect to the Bengal army was its constant employment in war. It was impossible to observe the state of ease in which they lived in time of peace, and the surly conduct of the sepoys when called on to do what did not exactly suit their fancy, without appreciating the dangers which would arise at some time or other from such pampered soldiery. Their officers steadily resisted their employment under the magistrates, and in too many instances pandered to their prejudices and idleness. Reasoning on great military principles, but forgetting, perhaps, the natures and character of the men he had to deal with, their tendency to combine for unlawful purposes, and mistaking perhaps the present wants of the empire, Sir Charles Napier earnestly recommended the concentration of great divisions of troops, thus alienating them still more from what may be called civil duty, by way of distinction, although in most parts of India it has generally borne a military character, and will always have to do so.

The old mutinies of India, and the terrible one of last year, demonstrate the inexpediency of such concentrations of native troops at immense stations, except where they may be wanted for garrisons, as at Peshawur. The necessity of advocating a principle of dispersion to preserve the peace of the country after the fashion of military police, rather than that of assembly for the purpose of imposing military display, therefore becomes obvious.

I believe the true principle to be adopted may be stated in a very few words.

As centralization is necessary to meet a foreign enemy, so dispersion is requisite for the maintenance of peace in a country which has been occupied. It sounds almost like a truism, but the repetitions of it cannot be avoided, and it must be pressed home, owing to the great and venerated authority under which an opposite view has been advocated.

One more point occurs to me in the general question of the sepoy before I pass to another part of the subject.

It appears to me, that in our anxiety to propitiate him, we have allowed him to gain an exaggerated opinion of his own value, and that we have not been at sufficient pains to cause it to be understood that admission to and retention in our service are great privileges.

The importance of this omission on our part can hardly be over-estimated. I would propose to repair the fault by abolishing the system of unlimited service, and to substitute in its place an enlistment for (10) ten years.

When the time of enlistment had expired, re-enlistment should be matter of the greatest favour, to be granted exceptionally only.

A second enlistment should not exceed five years, after the expiry of which term the soldier might be re-enlisted a third time. At every subsequent period of five years the bond should be again renewed.

As in the army of the Queen, the soldier should not be allowed to take his discharge while he might be engaged in active service.

The advantages to be gained would be as follows:—

The men would cease to look on their regimental positions as vested rights, and when once accustomed to a soldier's life would have the strongest incentive to merit the favour of re-enlistment.

The worthless and inefficient men would be got rid of without trouble.

The question of seniority promotion would be settled, as inefficient non-commissioned officers and even commissioned officers would have to abide by the law of their enlistment.

Pensions would not be paid except to the favoured few who had earned them by good service, after a series of re-enlistments.

Then would pensions really be the reward of merit and good service.

On such terms, I am of opinion that a pension list should still be allowed to exist, but only on such terms.

Such, then, are the general principles which I would advocate in the reconstitution of the native army:—

1. Local army for each commissionership or government.
2. To employ the troops actively in the performance of police duties, without sacrificing their military efficiency.
3. Enlistment for limited service; re-enlistment being held to be a great boon, and not a right.
4. Pensions a reward for good conduct and long service only.
5. A limited native auxiliary force to be attached to the British cavalry regiments and infantry battalions.

Extract from "A Journey through the Kingdom of Oudh," by Major-General Sir W. H. Sleeman, K.C.B., Resident at the Court of Lucknow.

THIS privilege which the native officers and sipahees of our native army enjoy for petitioning for redress of grievances through the resident has now been extended to all the regular, irregular, and local corps of the three presidencies; that is, to all corps paid by the British Government, and to all native officers and sipahees of contingent corps employed in and paid by native states who were drafted into them from the regular corps of our army up to a certain time; and the number cannot be less than fifty or sixty thousand. But European civil and political functionaries, in our own provinces and other native states, have almost all some men from Oudh in their offices or establishments, whose claims and complaints they send for adjustment to the resident; and it is difficult for him to satisfy them that he is not bound to take them up in the same manner as he takes up those of the native officers and sipahees of our native army, and he is often induced to yield to their importunity, and thereby to furnish grounds for further applications of the same sort. This privilege is not recognized or named in any treaty or other engagement with the sovereign of Oudh; nor does anyone know its origin, for it cannot be found in any document recorded in the resident's office.

If the resident happens to be an impatient, overbearing man, he will often frighten the durbar and its courts or local officers into a hasty decision, by which the rights of others are sacrificed for the native officers and sipahees; and if he be, at the same time, an unscrupulous man, he will sometimes direct that the sipahee shall be put in possession of what he claims, in order to relieve himself from his importunity, or that of his commanding officer, without taking the trouble to inform himself of the ground on which the claim is founded. Of all such errors there are unhappily too many instances recorded in the resident's office. This privilege is in the hands of the resident an instrument of *torture*, which it is his duty to apply every day to the Oudh durbar. He may put on a *screw more* or a *screw less*, according to his temper or his views, or the opportunity of officers commanding corps or companies, and native officers and sipahees in person, which never cease to oppress him more or less.

The most numerous class of complaints, and the most troublesome, is that against the government of Oudh, or its officers and landholders, for enhanced demands of rents; and whenever these officers or landholders are made to reduce these demands in favour of the privileged sipahees, they invariably distribute the burthen in an increased ratio upon their neighbours.

Officers who have to pass through Oudh in their travels or sporting excursions, have of late years generally complained that they receive less civility from villages in which our invalid or furlough sipahees are located than from any others, and that if they are anywhere treated with actual disrespect, such sipahees are generally found to be either the perpetrators or instigators. This complaint is not, I fear, altogether unfounded, and may arise from the diminished attachment felt by the sipahees for their European officers in our army, and partly from the privilege of urging their claims through the resident, enjoyed by native officers and sipahees, now ceasing on their being transferred to the invalid establishment.

But the privilege itself is calculated to create feelings of dissatisfaction with their European officers, among the honest and hardworking part of our native army. Such petition only when they have just cause, and not one in five of them can obtain what they demand, and believe to be their just right, under an administration like that of Oudh, whatever efforts the resident may make to obtain it for them; and, where one is satisfied, four become discontented; while the dishonest and idle portion of their brother soldiers, who have no real wrongs to complain of, and feign them only to get leave of absence, throw all the burden of their duties upon them. Others again, by fraud and collusion with those whose influence they require to urge their claims, often obtain more than they have any right to, and their unmerited success tends to increase the dissatisfaction felt by the honest and more scrupulous portion of the native officers and sipahees who have failed to obtain anything.

Government will not do away with the privilege without first ascertaining the views and wishes of the military authorities. They are not favourable to the abolition; for, though the honest and hardworking sipahees may say that it is of no use to them, the idle and unscrupulous, who consider it as a lottery in which they may sometimes draw a prize, or a means of getting leave of absence when they are not entitled to it, will tell them that the *fidelity* of the whole native army depends upon its being maintained and extended. I am of opinion, after much consideration and a good deal of experience in the political working of the system, that the abolition of the privilege would be of great advantage to the native army, and it would certainly relieve the European officers from much importunity and annoyance which they now suffer from its enforcement. It is not uncommon for a sipahee of a regiment in Bombay to obtain leave of absence for several times over for ten months at a time, on the pretence of having a case pending in Oudh. When his leave is about to expire, he presents a petition to the resident, who obtains for him, from the Court, an order for the local authorities to settle his claim. This order is sent to the officer commanding his regiment. The man then makes up a piteous story of his having spent the whole ten months in prosecuting his claim in vain, when, in reality, he has been enjoying himself at home, and had no claim whatever to settle. The next year, or the year after, he gets another ten months' leave for the same purpose, and when it is about to expire, he presents himself to the resident, and declares that the local authorities have been changed, and the new officers pay no regard to the King's orders. New orders are then got for the new officers, and sent to his regiment, and the same game is played over again.

CHAPTER II.

Caste,—as regards Constitution of Regiments.

With regard to the Hindoo castes it may be expedient to adopt into the army we can hardly be too liberal.

The old spirit of exclusiveness in favour of the high and cleanly castes, which operated on the officers to the full as much as it did on the sepoys themselves, created the *imperium in imperio* which is ever the certain forerunner of mutiny in all armies.

The sepoys, believing we could not do without them, an opinion they were at no pains to disguise, naturally thought that whenever it might suit them to declare our rule at an end our ruin would be in fact accomplished.

The subserviency of the officers generally to the feeling of high caste, which gave them handsome and intelligent men, was, I believe, appreciated in all its strength by the sepoys, who actually played with the fears of their Braminized colonels, and insisted, in many instances, on the observance of certain customs, even in the presence of an enemy, to which we know they are perfectly indifferent under really intelligent and energetic command.

Thus was the germ of resistance to authority and discipline fostered, and it but too often happened that commanding officers openly admitted the presence of a power superior to their own discipline, succumbed to it themselves, and induced superior authority to give countenance to it also. The jealousy on the part of the sepoys of interference with what they held to be a vested right to fill the Bengal ranks was manifested, almost with violence, when the direction was given to admit a certain proportion of Sikhs to the corps in the Punjab shortly after the annexation of that country.

Exclusiveness in the choice of recruits must, therefore, be cut away root and branch, and, while we admit low caste, we must not shut out high caste.

Let all castes and let the Mussulman share and share alike in the regiments of the local armies.

There may be low caste corps, high caste corps, and Mussulman corps.

Other regiments may be formed of companies of different castes, and in all there should probably be a company or two of Mussulmans.

Uniformity in these respects is neither desirable nor advisable.

The more diversity that can be introduced into the constitution of the different corps the better, so that in case of any future attempt at combination the heterogeneous character of the various regiments may present an effective bar to it, and be the means of information to the commanding officers.

One test, however, should be applied to all.*

It should be a *sine quâ non* that all the individual sepoys forming a company should mess together. Any man objecting to conform to this regulation should be immediately discharged. In war it is necessary to efficiency, and in peace it is required as a test of discipline in the face of caste and Hindooism.

I am strongly of opinion that Mussulmans should not be in the same company or troop with Hindoos or Sikhs, and that the two latter should not be mingled together. I would maintain even in the same regiment all differences of faith with the greatest care. There might be rivalry or even hate between two companies or troops.

The discipline of a native regiment instead of being impaired would gain by it, as regards the great question of the obedience of the whole to the commanding officer. The motto of the regimental commander, and therefore of the Commander-in-Chief, must be for the future "Divide et impera."

Chapter III.

The Regular Army of Bengal.

While the idea of local native armies for a confederacy of states has been entertained, it will not have escaped recollection that the binding medium of the whole, to ensure general allegiance throughout the empire, and the fidelity of the native soldiery, must be a large European force, to which should be permanently attached special native corps.

The presence of native troops with the British corps is necessary both in the field and in quarters. The idea of the local or police armies being admitted, it becomes, therefore, indispensable to render the British corps quite independent of the former, which, except in extraordinary circumstances, are not intended to move beyond the precincts of their own provinces.

Many reasons combine to show how imperatively the authorities of India are bound to limit the demands on England for regiments and recruits. The former affects the war department and the foreign policy of England, the latter touches the questions of British industry, population, and rates of wages very nearly.

We cannot, therefore, do without a regular native army, which shall act like the European force as a counterpoise of the local forces, while, from circumstances, association, and paucity of numbers, it will be thoroughly identified with the British regiments proper, and be considered both by itself and the British regiments as the mere auxiliary of the latter.

The British corps proper should be numerically stronger than the native ones; but if such a plan be too expensive, it is necessary that the latter should on no account exceed the former in number.

I would prefer the following proportions:—

A native battalion, 600 strong, to be attached to every battalion of British infantry, whether the latter belong to the Queen's or Company's service:

In the cavalry, the native squadrons might be equal in strength to the British:

The officers of the native battalions should be taken from among the British regiments to which they are attached, the battalions and squadrons being respectively under the supreme command of the commanding officer of the British corps, there being a commandant of the native battalion or cavalry squadrons, according to the practice of the irregular system:

If possible he should be one of the majors of the European regiments, but if circumstances did not admit of such an arrangement, he should be chosen for his fitness from among the captains, or from another corps.

This arrangement is not meant to interfere with the detached employment of the native, whether cavalry or infantry, or to diminish the power of the commandant of the native battalion or regiment.

The latter would be to the British battalions as a second regiment in a brigade, to be commanded for general purposes; its own internal economy and regimental command being unimpaired, and maintained in all its integrity according to the well-known practice of our service.

The relief of a Queen's corps serving in India need not form any bar to such an arrangement.

If the foregoing designs were entertained it would become necessary to add largely to the establishment of officers in each regiment. The officers so employed could, at their option, be transferred to a relieving corps coming from England, under the orders of the General Commanding-in-Chief, according to the practice which has always obtained at the Horse Guards in disposing of the supernumerary officers reduced to half pay from the relieved regiments.

A regiment of two battalions, one British and one native, would thus be formed, and they should never be separated from one another, except for temporary and detached purposes. In the regiments of the Company's service the bond would last for ever, and as regards those of Her Majesty, it would endure till their departure for England. There would be no difficulty, however, when one of Her Majesty's regiments should, in its turn, be ordered home. The native battalion attached to it would await in some convenient station the arrival of the relieving corps, with which it should be connected without delay.

It seems to be generally admitted that the presidency of Bengal will not be able to subsist in future with an European garrison of less than (50,000) fifty thousand men,* and this exclusive of the force necessary for Gwalior and Rajpootana. I am myself of opinion that in the course of time, when the rebellion of this last year shall have become matter of history, and cease to be a means of excitement with the popular mind, when the province of Oudh shall have been thoroughly reduced, and order again properly established in Central India and Bundlecund, that a less number may be found to suffice, and that we shall not be required to maintain an European force of above (35,000) thirty-five thousand men,† for this presidency. But for the present, and for some years to come, probably ten at least, the larger number, viz. (50,000) fifty thousand, must be maintained.

Assuming that number to be indispensable, an assumption few would be found to deny, I would at once take measures to associate with them (30,000) thirty thousand natives, to be distributed rateably between the cavalry and infantry.

The head-quarters of each European regiment should be made the scene of a new levy.

It should be distinctly understood, that in such new levies the future regular army was to be, and that to them it was to be restricted, with some exceptions to be stated hereafter.

All corps and levies made under the orders of the Government, the Commander-in-Chief, the various chief commissioners, &c. &c., should be the local armies or police forces of their respective provinces, to be augmented or decreased accordingly as may be demanded by the general

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* To a certain extent this has been carried out in the Punjab regiments.

The experiment has been tried in certain Hindoo low caste corps which have been raised during 1858, but without success.

On the urgent representation of the officers commanding some of these corps the Commander-in-Chief has deemed it advisable not to persevere in it.

His Excellency, among other things, was told that just now there was so much fear in the native mind about tampering with their faith and religious observances, that danger of serious nature might arise, which in ordinary times would not be the case.

* This will require an establishment of about 64,000.

† Requiring an establishment of 44,000.

policy of the empire, of that of each province under existing circumstances, and with regard to present emergencies.

Thus for the present we are compelled by a bitter necessity to admit an immense Punjabee and Sikh force, and to employ of them probably 60,000 men of all arms, to the exclusion of the other races and sects of Hindustan.

While the excitement of war, plunder, and success over their natural enemies lasts, we may believe this Sikh army may not give us trouble. But we can hardly doubt that, when the excitement has passed away, we shall have to exhibit great prudence and judgment in dissolving the large Punjabee force we have scattered broad-cast over the empire, and that we must provide in time a native as well as an European counterpoise.

Therefore, I repeat, no time should be lost in initiating the scheme which alone contains, in my belief, the principle of safety with regard to the regular army of India, and that each battalion and formed regiment of cavalry in the presidency of Bengal not quartered in the Punjab, should be permitted to raise a native corps for general service.

This duty should not be extended for the present to the British corps stationed in the Punjab.

When a few of the second or native battalions have been roughly formed, they should march with the British regiment to which they belong to the Punjab, and relieve the corps there stationed.

For some time to come we must resolutely abstain from enlisting more Sikhs or Punjabees, excepting to fill vacancies in corps we may wish to continue; namely, until the equilibrium has been restored in our ranks between these races and the others of Hindustan.

When that shall have been compassed, there will be no greater objection to Sikh companies in the regular army than to any other men in India, on the contrary, we know them to be most admirable soldiers, and, were it admissible on political considerations, would desire no other recruits.

Chapter IV.

The European Forces for the Army of Bengal.

The question has been put,—"What proportion of the "European force should belong to Her Majesty's regular "army, and what proportion shall be composed of troops "raised for service in India?"

In answering this question, we are obliged to consider that the days of the Company's service, properly so called, are numbered, and that the distinction as at present existing between the army of Her Majesty and of that of the Honourable Company cannot but soon come to an end. But it would appear, that although that distinction is about to cease, another one will spring to life, *i. e.* that there will be a local Queen's army for India, as distinguished from the regular moveable army of the Crown.

Although there are no official data on which to ground this assumption, it seems there can be little doubt about it, in consequence of the late permission given to the Company to raise many additional regiments of cavalry and infantry. I therefore take liberty to assume the above question to be settled.

I am the more strengthened in this course, owing to the absolute and palpably evident necessity of having a body of English gentlemen trained to the knowledge of India, which shall not be estranged from its service, excepting under certain conditions.

Much may be said on the moral question of relieving regiments from time to time, but if the Crown takes possession of all the armies of India, that must in great measure be laid aside, and the source must be maintained in all its integrity from which the numerous functionaries proceed for the administration of the Indian empire.

Assuming, then, that a local European army will be entertained for the presidency of Bengal under the Crown, I would submit, that this body should consist of an artillery regiment having about the same strength as the present one, English companies being substituted for the old native companies. Of ten regiments of cavalry consisting of (400) four hundred sabres each;* and of (30) thirty battalions of infantry consisting of (12) twelve companies each. Of the twelve companies forming a battalion, two should remain in England as a depôt, in accordance with the system now adopted for Her Majesty's army under the late orders of Government. Each battalion should possess in India the same strength as that now allowed to Her Majesty's regiments, viz.:—

12	10 Companies abroad.
	2 ditto at depôt.
1	Colonel-Commandant.
2	Lieutenant-Colonels.
2	Majors.
12	Captains.
14	Lieutenants.
10	Ensigns.
1	Paymaster.
1	Adjutant.
1	Quartermaster.
1	Surgeon.
3	Assistant Surgeons.
1	Sergeant Major.
1	Quartermaster Sergeant.
1	Paymaster Serjeant.
1	Armourer Sergeant.
	Schoolmaster appointed by the Secretary of State for War.
1	Hospital Sergeant.
1	Orderly Room Clerk.
12	Colour Sergeants.
48	Sergeants.
1	Drum Major.
24	Drummers and Fifers.
60	Corporals.
1140	Privates.
1339*	Total numbers.

Whilst, however, this large local force should be called into being for service in India, or without relief, it is absolutely necessary for the great purposes of example, discipline, and salutary emulation, that a certain number of the moveable regiments of the Crown should periodically come to India, and be relieved in due course, according to the practice which has obtained heretofore.

I have the most entire and absolute conviction, that this practice is required for the discipline of the local regiments. It cannot have escaped the most careless observer, that although regiments which have been long in India fight as well as highly disciplined corps just arrived from England, and that although the men of the former are for a time more efficient than the latter, as understanding the climate better, and being more able to take care of themselves, nevertheless there is by no means the same healthy tone of discipline running through the body in the one as in the other. It is by no means uncommon to see extraordinary sloth and debauchery in such old regiments, and that the officers have become so enervated by climate or other causes, that they are unable to check the one and to do away with the other. But again it is observed, that the quartering of such a corps in the neighbourhood of the well disciplined one excites a new emulation, when the importation of another commanding officer will go far to reassert discipline, effect the necessary reform, and finally restore absolute efficiency. I wish to draw no invidious comparisons between the two services, but will simply record that what has been here asserted has come under my observation in both.

I would therefore propose that the establishment coming from the moveable army of the Crown should be on about the same footing as that preserved in the time antecedent to the great mutiny, but I would add some artillery to it, and some royal engineers. The establishment would therefore stand thus:—

†12 Troops and Field Batteries of Artillery.
4 Companies Royal Engineers.
2 Regiments of Dragoons.
15 Battalions of Infantry.

Much has been said in England respecting the great difficulty of obtaining recruits to meet the new and permanent demands of the army occasioned by the late military revolution in India.

In order to meet this difficulty I would submit, that as the British soldier in India is never required to carry a greater weight than his arms, ammunition, and great coat, it is unnecessary to seek for large and bulky men in the ranks for India. Consequently there should be one invariable standard of infantry and cavalry recruiting for India, whatever might be the regulation of the authorities at home for regiments serving elsewhere. The Indian standard should be 5 ft. 3 in. for grown men, and 5 ft. 2½ in. for growing lads. For the artillery no man under 5 ft. 6 in. in height

* See latest recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief in in this respect, as shown in Memo. by the Chief of the Staff, No. 173, which is appended, page 107.

* This number includes the depôt companies which it is proposed to retain in England.

† Vide Tabular Statement attached for explanation.

should be admitted, excepting the drivers, who would be men of 5 ft. 3 in. As a rule no man should be enlisted who has not completed his twentieth year.

It would soon come to be understood, amidst the classes from which the recruits are drawn, that the rivalry between the recruiting sergeants as now existing between those belonging to Her Majesty's service and those of the Honourable Company had ceased. The short men would go at once to the service disposed to admit them without question.

Such, broadly stated, is the system I would adopt as regards the component parts of the future army of Bengal, and I do not see that there need be any difficulty in developing it in practice.

The cavalry and artillery already exist, as also, it may be said, six battalions of infantry. It remains then to form twenty-four battalions in addition. The system hitherto adopted, and which seems to be agreeable to the Bengal army, is to take two battalions of the old native infantry and to fuse them into one of the new European regiments.

This system is understood by the officers of the army, and although fraught with some inconvenience in respect of producing rapid efficiency in a new battalion, perhaps militates less than any other which could be devised against the rights which every officer possesses according to the commission he holds under the Honourable Company.

Let us now, therefore, examine how the plan proposed would work with regard to the officers.

Including the three European infantry regiments lately ordered, 54 regiments of the old Bengal establishment will be absorbed in completing the European local infantry to 30 battalions. There would then be left the officers of 20 regiments, who should be distributed according to their seniority in the 30 European corps. The establishment of each corps being thus permanently increased as the only means of meeting the constant draughts on regiments made by the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief to fill the numerous offices of the civil and military administration of India, including the commandants and other officers for the native forces, regular and local.

It will be found eventually that the establishments of the European regiments, even with the addition proposed, will not be sufficient for the proper discharge of the service unless another great alteration be introduced, and that is, the institution of an unattached list, on which the names of all officers should be placed holding situations of certain position either in the civil government or on the staff of the army.

I would instance, as such situations, assistant commissioners of first and second class, and all officers in civil employ of position superior to that rank.

2ndly. Officers connected with the secretariat of Government.

3rdly. Officers commanding police corps.

On the staff of the army officers having the rank of deputy-assistant adjutant-general and all superior grades.

Officers having the command of irregular corps, or corps of the local forces proposed in the first chapter.

In order to atone for the want of regimental promotion thus entailed upon an officer accepting staff employment, he should receive a step in effective rank for every five years passed in staff employ, according to the custom obtaining in Her Majesty's service with regard to majors so situated. Thus the appointment of an officer to permanent staff employ would give a step of regimental promotion.

If such a system of unattached commissions be not introduced into the army of Bengal, it will be quite impossible to officer the European regiments in a manner sufficient for discipline, and at the same time to meet the calls of Government and the Commander-in-Chief.

An English regiment requires many experienced officers, and it also requires tolerably permanent command. If an English regiment be left to chance, if it be divested of all its best officers, if elderly gentlemen should be sent to command it, who are ignorant of regimental duty, as was formerly so often the case with the native infantry regiments of Bengal, the new local army will be a disgrace in quarters, and in all probability will misbehave in the field.

The government of India, however constituted at home and in the country itself, must now take the greatest precautions in this respect. They cannot succeed without in some measure separating the civil and military staff from the regiments, and incurring a larger expense in the matter of officers than that to which they have hitherto been accustomed.

It must also be borne in mind that the officers for the native portion o fthe regular army, whether the latter be attached to the European corps, as proposed by me, or not, must be drawn from the bodies of officers of which the Europeans corps are composed. It will not do hereafter to have one set of men belonging to the European local corps and another to the native corps. They must originally belong all to the European corps, be trained there, and nominated by appointment to serve with the native corps according to the present irregular system.

Every man for the future, nominated to do duty with a native corps, must be a selected man, and his position should be enhanced by the receipt of larger allowances than those falling to the lot of his comrades who remain in the ordinary performance of duty in the European regiment.

In short, every appointment to a native regiment should be held to be a staff appointment, as is now the case with the irregular corps.

We now approach the question of the local army of India and that of the moveable army of England. It has been assumed that the local army will be a royal army.

We must recollect the great prestige and honour belonging to the army of the Honourable Company, and we must take care that those great and first-rate qualities of an army are not lost sight of. The local army of India must be placed on a footing of absolute equality with that of the moveable army of England.

This can only be obtained in one manner; viz., by allowing exchanges between the officers of the two armies.

The precedent for such an arrangement is found in all the local corps raised for special service in the various colonies. An officer serving in a West India regiment may go to the guards, or an officer in the Ceylon rifles to the blues.

This principle, then, on every account of justice to the officers of the local army and of harmony between the two services of the Crown, should be admitted under certain limitations.

Such limitations are necessary. The welfare of the state will not admit of wholesale exchanges, or of the too frequent departure of officers who have already acquired knowledge and experience of the country of their original choice.

I would venture to advocate, therefore, that no exchange should be permitted till an officer had completed ten years' service in India; that tolerable parity of years, without too much strictness in that respect, should be exacted from two men demanding to exchange; and that no officer should be able to transfer his staff appointment to the individual with whom he proposed to make an arrangement. Such exchanges would depend upon the fiat of the Commander-in-Chief, subject to the confirmation of the Crown, after the consent of the local government of India should have been obtained. Previous misconduct in either party should be an absolute bar, and no man who had blemished his character in the one, from whatever cause, should be allowed to transfer himself to the other.

Officers in the unattached list of all ranks, from that of general downwards, should be available for service anywhere under the orders of the Crown.

We should never again listen to a distinction between two services of Englishmen being a bar to the employment of a large class of experienced and intelligent officers.

The local British army of India, including officers and men, should be subject to the same Mutiny Act and Articles of War as the other forces of the Crown.

For the officers of the local army the same rules of furlough should remain as those now existing, excepting that no furlough should exceed two years in duration.

The old furlough of three years was originally calculated with regard to the twelvemonth sacrificed in the home and outward passages round the Cape.

I am not aware that any essential points have been omitted, in which the interests of the state or of the relations of the officers towards it are concerned. But there is one immediately affecting the officers in their private capacity, which may cause much difficulty whenever the attempt is made to amalgamate the service of the Crown and the Company. I allude to the funds to which all the officers of the latter have subscribed and are subscribing.

Under the regulations, and, therefore, the action of these funds, the officers of the Company's army form a joint stock association.

It will be for the actuary to determine hereafter how an individual officer may be compensated who might determine or wish to exchange to the regular army of the Crown, if such exchange be admitted to be, as it undoubtedly is, a necessity of state on account of reasons which have been already alluded to.

In any case the solution of the question will be most delicate and difficult; to determine which, without the consent of the individual affected, any government would be most averse. The advantage to be gained in dissoluing an association which establishes an interest in a body of officers apart from their military profession, and not possessing a military character, cannot escape us.

Chapter V.

The Command of Native Regiments.

The Honourable Court has directed that the power of commanding officers of native infantry regiments shall be increased, and it has also been ruled that the claims of seniority shall be so far set aside, that incompetent lieutenant-colonels may be shelved under the orders of the Government.

These concessions to the opinions of those who are conversant with the native character are well considered and right, though it may be doubted whether they go far enough.

In the so-called irregular system, every commandant of a native regiment is a selected man. This should be the rule throughout the service, and for the future no man should be allowed to command a native regiment who has not been specially chosen for it. It is difficult to guard against jobbery and personal predilection, but on the whole on so important a matter it is better to risk the inconveniences which may spring from such causes than again to trust to the blind chances of a seniority system as regards the command of native soldiery.

It is bad enough in the case of a British regiment, fenced, as the latter is, by all the compensating circumstances of a Mutiny Act, the free spirit of the men, the prevalent sense of duty and the individual knowledge of what is due to them as soldiers, in short the perception of legality and freedom common to all British born men, which annihilates much of the personal influence of a commander, and causes the commander to look far more to the laws they live under than to the man who executes them.

But with Asiatics the presence of an incompetent commander is absolutely fatal. With them the immediate commander should be a second Providence, and stand instead of Articles of War and everything else. From him there should be no apparent appeal. He should rule them, not only as one of our regulation commanders, but as a king. But then he must be a king according to the old meaning of the term. The officers who, in former years, and in our own time, have had the most success in dealing with the native soldiery, are exactly those who from circumstances, or owing to their own strength of character, have escaped interference from higher authority.

The commandants of native corps must, therefore, be chosen men, and, when appointed, much confidence must be reposed in them.

Certain simple rules should be laid down for the guidance of the commandant, which should stand in lieu of Articles of War. The power of dismissal from the service, of inflicting corporal punishment, should be vested in him, records of his proceedings being carefully preserved for submission to the Commander-in-Chief.

It has been shown very fully, in the last year of war; that for service in the field the present irregular system does not give sufficient officers either to the cavalry or the infantry.

While in the field every regiment should have at least one European officer per troop or company. Whether that be useful, possible, or not, in time of peace, it should always be looked to and enforced when a regiment is engaged in war.

If the plan proposed in a previous chapter be adopted, this may be ensured without loading a regiment uselessly with officers when it is not actively employed. I say uselessly, as the ordinary business of interior economy cannot but be performed by native officers, as in the irregular regiments of the present day.

In the local or police armies I would have a commandant assisted by a second in command and adjutant. I consider the Punjab police arrangement, which only allow sone officer to a corps, faulty in this respect, and that there should never be less than three English officers to any corps, however constituted, or whatever may be its denomination.

Chapter VI.

On the Questions having reference to Paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 235, of 25th November 1857.—Military Department, Court of Directors.

Many of the questions proposed in the paper, having reference to paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 235, have been answered in the foregoing chapters of this Minute, and others will obtain their replies from the Departments of the Adjutant-General and the Secretariat.

* Return marked

A. in answer to No. 1,
B. „ „ No. 3,

are annexed.

Questions 2 and 4 have been treated in the foregoing chapters of this Minute.

With respect to those questions in which it is required to state certain ratios, I would submit the impossibility of making even a proximate calculation until the plans of government shall have been decided on, respecting organization and European establishments. I therefore refrain from committing myself to any arbitrary assertion on these matters beyond what has been generally stated in this paper.

It appears from these Returns that the present proportion, including military police and levies of every kind, is about three to one of natives to Europeans.

It is probable, as time wears on and the country subsides into a state of peace, that we shall be able to manage with a proportion of four to one.

In former times, in the presidency of Bengal, it was, I believe, as much as fifteen to one.

With respect to Question 13, I would say in reply,—I do not think, when we are legislating on the future organization of the Indian army, that the question of purchase or non purchase should be entertained.

As explained in the fourth chapter of this Minute, I would admit the privilege of exchange between the officers of the regular army and those of the local army, under certain conditions.

Purchase, though winked at by authorities in India, has never been legalized or regulated in the Indian armies, as it has unfortunately been in that of Her Majesty. Although it may be difficult, perhaps impossible, utterly to abolish purchase in the latter, no step should be taken to authorize it in the local army.

Let there be no interference with the officers of the local army, but as at present let those who like to pay discharge themselves of their superfluous money, and let there be no illegality nor shame in receiving it on the part of the officers leaving the service.

This will not materially affect exchanges, or the status of either service; and I do not see that any embarrassment can occur.

The men who pay largely for promotion in Her Majesty's army are content, with rare exceptions, to enjoy life in England, and do not seek to improve their position by service in India, except in exciting times. This is well known to all regimental officers.

Chapter VII.

The future Distribution of the regular Forces in the Presidency of Bengal in times of tranquillity.

The proposed British establishment for the ensuing ten years is estimated at,—

44 Troops and Batteries of Artillery,
30 Reserve Companies „
12 Regiments of Cavalry,
4 Companies of Engineers,
45 Battalions of Infantry.

Until peace is thoroughly established, we cannot do well without at least (50) fifty battalions of infantry. The question before us, however, is, the distribution of the forces for the maintenance of peace after it shall have been restored.

* Note.—Return marked C. to complete answer of Question No. 5, part of which is found in Return marked B.

I would propose for that purpose the following Distribution, as per annexed Return :—

	Reserve Companies' Artillery.	Artillery Troops or Companies.	Cavalry Regiments.	Infantry Battalions.	
Presidency Division	3	2	—	2	Besides the battalions, there will be recruit depôts at Dum Dum and Chinsurah for Her Majesty's regiments, and at Barrackpore, and eventually at Berhampore, for those of the Honourable Company. At Dum Dum are the head quarters of the Royal Artillery.
Dinapore	1	1	—	2	At Hazeerabagh will be stationed a depôt of Honourable Company's recruits.
Benares and Gazeepore Buxur Azingbur	1	2	1	3	
Gorruckpore	—	1	—	1	It is asserted that Gorruckpore is very unhealthy in the autumn. Owing to necessity, a regiment is quartered there for this year. Hereafter it may turn out advisable to bring it to the right bank of the Gogra.
Allahabad	2	1	1	2	The force stated here is the minimum, owing to the great importance of the fort as a magazine, and the establishments, civil and military, which are growing daily.
Banda	—	1	—	1	
Saugor	1	1	1	2	The dependencies of Saugor include Shahghur, Damoh, Jubbulpore, and the intervening tract of country, which is prone to rebellion.
Jhansee	—	1	—	1	The force stated here will only suffice for quiet times, it being necessary at present to occupy from Jhanzee Chunderie on one side, Mote and Kooneh on the other, while there is a garrison at Culpee. When the country is thoroughly tranquil it will be sufficient to have one battalion at Jhansie, which shall detach two companies to Culpee.
Cawnpore	1	2	1	2	Supports Oudh on the one side, and Bundlecund on the other.
Futtehghur and Mynpooree	—	1	—	1	
Oudh (Lucknow, Fyzabad, Bureaeh, Seetapore)	4	6	2	8	When the country shall have been disarmed, it will be possible to deduct two regiments from Oude, but not before.
Gwalior and Dependencies	1	3	1	2	This is a minimum, and may require reinforcement at any time.
Meerut	1	2	1	1	
Delhie	1	1	—	2	One reserve company of artillery and one infantry regiment may be deducted from the strength of this garrison when the arsenal is removed and the fortifications destroyed.
Agra	2	2	—	1	The strength of artillery here stated as required, on account of the arsenal and its proximity to Gwalior.
Muttra	—	—	1	—	
Bareilly	1	1	—	1	
Moradabad	—	1	—	½	
Shahjehanpore	1	1	—	½	
Kamaon	1	—	—	—	
Umballah	—	2	1	1	With regard to the feeling in the Company's Sutledge states, it might be advisable to quarter two infantry regiments at this station.
Ferozepore	1	1	—	1	
Jullundur, Phillour	1	1	—	1	Phillour has a magazine.
Umritzur	1	—	—	1	
Lahore	2	2	1	2	This is a minimum.
Mooltan	1	1	—	1	The presence of an infantry battalion should never be dispensed with at Mooltan.
Sealcote	—	1	—	1	It is possible that the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab might prefer to send the regiment quartered at Sealcote to Jhelum.
Rawulpindee Attock Nowshera Peshawur	3	6	1	4	The troops at Rawul Pindee and other stations mentioned here are the outposts of the empire.
TOTAL	30	44	12	45	

The head quarters Royal Engineers should be at Roorkee, and the companies distributed according to the wants of the country.

W. R. MANSFIELD,
Major General,
Chief of the Staff.

NOTE.—The stations of the artillery as stated in this Return would be considerably affected if my scheme for the organization of artillery were to be adopted.

It will be observed that the above distribution makes no allusion to Burmah or Rajhpootana.

This has been done advisedly, on the assumption that, according to the practice which has prevailed for some years, the former, Burmah, will continue to be held by the army of Madras, and the latter, Rajhpootana, by that of Bombay. In the same manner, I would propose that Goonah and Mhow may be provided for by a detachment from the Rajhpootana force, and so be comprehended within that command.

If every corps comprised in the above Distribution Return were at its full strength we should find a total of about 62,000 rank and file, without taking into account the officers and non-commissioned officers.

In practice, it is discovered that when the establishment of a battalion in India stands at 1,000 rank and file, we never in fact find in the ranks more than 750. This is accounted for by the averages of the sick and the convalescent lists, the death vacancies, to fill up which is the process of a twelvemonth, as well as the other numerous vacancies caused by invaliding, discharges, &c., &c.

This number of 62,000 must therefore by no means be accepted as being absolute. On the contrary, it must be taken as the paper or establishment number, as distinguished from the number ready for active purposes, and we should make a reduction of fully one fourth from it, or of (250) two hundred and fifty men per thousand, even if the regiments be kept complete on paper by the yearly drafts. Thus the 62,000 will be reduced to 46,500, the latter number forming the European garrison of the Bengal Presidency ready for effective duty, although the larger one would figure in the Government returns.

Chapter VIII.

The Army of Bengal.

The calculation on which the Distribution Return is based depends altogether on the association of a limited native army, whether in camp or quarters, with the European regiments of cavalry and infantry.

If the British line proper be not so extended by a body of native soldiery attached to and dependent on it, the said native organization being apart from all others in the country, the necessity of adding largely to the numbers of the European corps will quickly make itself visible.

In former times the European force was the auxiliary of the Sepoy army. Now the conditions must be exactly reversed, and the Sepoy must be admitted only as the auxiliary of the European. The latter cannot do altogether without the former on his own personal account, and, as said before, England has not men to furnish an English army of (100,000) one hundred thousand men for the Presidency of Bengal. Consequently, wherever an European corps is quartered, it must have for a neighbour a weak Sepoy battalion, the latter being either on a separate establishment as formerly, or attached to the European corps, as I have ventured to recommend.

I conceive it to be very important that there should be no mistake in this matter. In it is involved the great considerations of economizing our demands on England, and of providing the counterpoise for the local or police armies.

There are, besides, certain native corps which I would preserve in their integrity, without interference with their present organization, consisting of Goorkas; viz.:—

Nusseree,
Kumaun,
Sirmoor,
66th Native Infantry;
73d „ „

These battalions being kept quite apart should, as heretofore, be cantoned generally in the hills, and come down for any service for which might be required. The cantonment of each regiment might be a Goorka colony.

A few regiments, and remnants of regiments, have remained faithful. It might be well to retain and recruit them as a separate brigade, their officers being named by special appointment, as has been the case with the Kelat-e-Ghilzee regiment.

These regiments are, the

31st Native Infantry,
Kelat-e-Ghilzee Regiment, and
Lucknow Regiment.

Three regiments to be formed out of faithful remnants of mutinous corps.

Total, six.

Thus, besides the native force to be attached to the European corps, we should have an addition of (11) eleven battalions, which would swell what may be called the moving native army, as distinguished from the local or police armies, to rather more than (40,000) forty thousand men, to be constituted as follows:—

4,800	Cavalry, 12 regiments, at 400 men each.
27,000	Infantry, 45 battalions, at 600 „
4,000	Goorkas, 5 regiments, at 800 „
4,800	six other N. I. regiments, at 800 „
40,600	
	To this add proposed European establishment of all arms,—
62,000	excluding officers and serjeants.
102,000	Total.

This total, therefore, represents the army by which the Presidency of Bengal might, in my opinion, be held, if at the same time each large Government be provided with a local or police army, including irregular cavalry and infantry, which may be available either for military or civil purposes.

Let us recollect that the latter bodies have either been called into existence, or are in the course of being so, in all parts of this Presidency, under the pressure of circumstances.

In point of fact, it is only required to develope and complete what has been roughly shaped out.

Chapter IX.

On the Financial Results to be anticipated as consequent on the Scheme submitted.

On the 1st of January, 1857, the number of native soldiers in the army of Bengal, including irregulars of all descriptions, drivers and gun lascars, amounted to 170,000 men.

At that time the European force consisted of		15,750
It has been ruled that, in point of expense, one European soldier equals two sepoys.		
Deduct from the proposed European establishment	62,000	
The old ditto	15,750	
	46,250	
Multiply by 2, to give the equivalent of sepoys	2	
	92,500	
Add the proposed sepoy establishment for the moveable army	40,600	
Total	133,100	

If this sum be deducted from the native establishment, on the 1st January, 1857, viz.	170,000
We shall find the difference of cost between the proposed moveable army and the old regular Anglo-Indian army of Bengal, irrespective of the pension list	133,100
Difference	36,900

It has been proposed, in the foregoing scheme, to abolish the pension list, excepting in certain cases.

What the saving under that head may be I cannot say, there being no published data of the receipts of Government in this respect. It is presumed, however, that it would be very large.

In such case, it would seem that if we allow the local or police armies to swell to (80,000) eighty thousand men, the cost to the State on account of military expenditure would not exceed what it was in the commencement of 1857, while we might expect a not inconsiderable diminution in the outlay of the civil magistrate on account of burkendaz, or non-military police.

It is not assumed that the latter can be dispensed with altogether, but I think we may fairly look to a considerable economy in this respect, when the military police has been fairly organized over the whole country. On this point, however, I am not competent to give an opinion.

Chapter X.

The Organization of the Artillery for Bengal.

I have refrained from answering the series of questions respecting artillery in India. The officers connected with that corps in this country have doubtless been called on for their opinion on the matters submitted, and I could but reiterate the information which I might be able to obtain from them at second hand.

But there are two or three points of general organization to which I would very respectfully venture to call attention.

An important problem demands solution, viz., how best to ensure economy with a large development of European artillery, without interference with real practical efficiency which depends on the sufficient manning of the guns.

Establishment of a Troop of Bengal European Horse Artillery.

	1 Captain.
	3 Lieutenants.
	1 Staff Serjeant.
	6 Serjeants.
	6 Corporals.
	10 Bombardiers.
	2 Trumpeters.
	2 Farriers.
	2 Rough Riders.
	80 Gunners.
Total -	113 Europeans,
	27 Gun Lascars,
Total -	140

Establishment of a Bengal European Horse Battery.

	1 Captain.
	3 Lieutenants.
	1 Staff-serjeant.
	1 Rough riding serjeant.
	1 Farrier serjt.
	6 Serjeants.
	6 Corporals.
	6 Bombardiers.
	2 Buglers.
	60 Gunners.
Total -	87 Europeans.
	66 Native drivers.
	27 Gun Lascars.
	1 Native farrier.
Total -	181

Establishment of a Bengal Reserve Company of Artillery.

	1 Captain.
	2 Subalterns.
	1 Staff-serjeant.
	6 Serjeants.
	6 Corporals.
	6 Bombardiers.
	2 Buglers.
	60 Gunners.
Total -	84 Europeans.
	36 Gun Lascars.
Total -	120

Under the old rules a troop of Horse Artillery, including all ranks from the Captain to the Lascars, numbers 140 men, and a field battery 181. *Vide* margin.

It cannot be too strongly impressed, that, for the purpose of active service, a troop, manned as above stated, is inefficient. We invariably observe, that after the first severe action in which a troop is engaged, it actually has not men enough to work the guns. After the second, leave is requested by the Commander of the troop, and obtained, to send one, two, or even three guns into park.

During the latter part of the siege of Delhi, the troops of Horse Artillery were partly driven and worked by men belonging to Her Majesty's 9th Lancers.

When the two Bengal troops came down to Delhi to the relief of Lucknow, there were but five guns in each troop, and these guns were imperfectly manned. They were afterwards helped by men taken from the Royal Artillery.

In the campaign of Lucknow and Rohilcund, Colonel Tombs' troop, which came down from Meerut with a complete establishment, became so crippled for want of men, that it could not work more than (4) four guns.

The field batteries are little better when the native drivers are subtracted.

Under these circumstances, I believe it to be an imperative necessity to add largely to the strength of every troop and field battery.

Establishment of a Troop of Royal Horse Artillery.

	2 Captains.
	3 Lieutenants.
	1 Asst. surgeon
	1 Vet. surgeon.
	2 Staff-serjeants.
	10 Serjeants.
	10 Corporals and Bombardiers.
	160 Gunners and drivers.
	1 Trumpeter.
	1 Farrier.
	12 Artificers.
Total -	196 men and 200 horses.

Establishment of a Light Field Battery Royal Artillery.

	2 Captains.
	3 Lieutenants.
	1 Asst. surgeon.
	12 Serjeants.
	10 Corporals and Bombardiers.
	150 Gunners and Drivers.
	2 Trumpeters.
	1 Farrier.
	11 Artificers.
Total -	186 men and 130 horses.

Establishment of a reserve Company of Royal Artillery.

	2 Captains.
	3 Lieutenants.
	7 Serjeants.
	10 Corporals and Bombardiers.
	92 Gunners and Drivers.
	1 Trumpeter.
Total -	110 men.

The proposal has been made, and submitted to Government, to assimilate all establishments to the scale of the Royal Artillery. These establishments, *vide* margin, are very large, and, as compared with those of Bengal, may appear indeed extravagant.

I believe the proposal to be wise, but I can hardly expect the Government to entertain such a large proportion of men to the number of guns worked as that which finds favour at home, on account of the great expense of the European soldier in India.

Perhaps, however, a mean may be taken, by which a larger number of guns would be insured, and an organization introduced, not so inefficient on account of paucity of gunners, as is now the case, but not so extravagant as that presented according to the royal scales.

I would suggest, then, for consideration, that it might be expedient to adopt the English strength of men for troops and batteries, but to economize on the number of these bodies by adding two pieces, viz., one field gun and one howitzer to each troop and field battery, making the number of guns for every such body (8) eight instead of (6) six.

I have in my Distribution Return proposed the number of (44) forty-four troops and field batteries, and (30) thirty reserve companies for the establishment of Bengal with a general strength of (12,787) twelve thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven of all ranks.

In the Royal Artillery this would give a result of 264 light field guns. By the plan proposed the number would be swelled to 352.

The troops and field batteries would admit of convenient division, as a half troop or field battery would then consist of three guns and a howitzer, a sufficient force of moveable artillery for the minor stations or a small column.

It may be observed, that in the continental armies of Europe a field battery does consist of (8) eight pieces instead of (6) six as with us.

The late change of rank among the officers of the Bengal Artillery, causing the introduction of a second captain to each company, would seem to facilitate this arrangement, and the more frequent division of field batteries than has hitherto obtained with the original establishment.

Were such a design entertained, we should not require a larger establishment of captains than (148) one hundred and forty-eight, whereas it would be expedient to add one subaltern to each company on account of the more frequent divisions of batteries and the increased number of guns.

The arm being thus organized and manned, I cannot but think we should have an ample sufficiency of artillery to meet every purpose, and never again to trust a gun to a native; whereas every gun, putting the matter of race aside would be more efficient than has been the case hitherto.

It may be remarked in addition, that according to this plan it would be unnecessary to add to the number of battalions already existing, the only augmentation of officers required being that of one subaltern to each company or troop.

Let us assume that there are (24) twenty-four stations requiring the presence of one or more batteries of (8) eight guns, this being a larger allowance than is required in reality. We should then, according to the plan proposed, have (20) twenty batteries liable to division for minor stations and detached duties; *i.e.*,

24 to be kept entire at large stations,
20=40 half batteries, each of four guns, for minor stations.

I find that, according to the old rules, the total establishment of field guns maintained in a state of activity stood as follows:—

Troops or Field Batteries.	*Guns.*
9 European troops	54
4 Native do. Regular	24
21 Light field batteries, regular	126
3 Punjab field batteries	18
2 Ditto, mountain train	12
4 Gwalior	24
3 Oudh	18
4 Hydrabad	24
1 Mehedpore	6
1 Assam	6
1 Ramghur Battalions	4
1 Kotah Contingent	4
1 Bhopal Contingent	6
1 Jondpore ditto	4
1 Nagpore ditto	6
1 Malwa ditto	6
1 Sylet Battalion	2
59 Totals.	344

Thus it will be seen that there is but a difference of (8) eight field guns in the establishment proposed from that which was in existence before the mutinies, but with the great distinction, that, in former times, the European troops and batteries were less numerous than those worked altogether by natives, whereas now they will be altogether worked and driven by British gunners and drivers.

It is submitted that a half battery of four guns manned by Englishmen is more than a match for a native battery of (6) six guns.

I would observe that a certain number of Lascars cannot be dispensed with. The opinion of the Bengal Artillery would seem to run counter to the employment of *Gun* Lascars in future, but all the officers of that arm with whom I have conversed on the subject are in favour of servants whom they call *Store* Lascars by way of distinction.

Of these, one Tindal and (10) ten Lascars might be attached to each troop or field battery.

In conclusion I would remark, that one portion of the Royal Artillery system should very certainly not be imported into India.

In the Royal Artillery the drivers, though enlisted as gunners and drivers, are not even taught how to work a gun.

It is imperatively necessary in India that every Englishman attached to a gun should know how to work it on occasion, and be able to do so if required.

Consequently as heretofore all the men enlisted for the Bengal Artillery should be drilled as *gunners* and *drivers*.

The establishment proposed stands, therefore, as follows, for a troop of horse artillery:—

6 6 lb. guns		
2 12 lb. howitzers.		
2 Captains.	Native Artificers -	12
4 Lieutenants.	Store Lascars -	11
2 Staff Serjeants.		
10 Serjeants.	Total	23
4 Corporals.		
6 Bombardiers.		
171 Gunners and Drivers.	202 European establishment.	
2 Trumpeters.	23 Native ditto.	
1 Farrier.	240 Horses.	
202 Total.		

In a Royal troop there are (160) one hundred and sixty gunners and drivers and (12) twelve artificers. In my establishment I add (11) eleven gunners and drivers and one trumpeter, as all artificers shall be natives.

Proposed establishment for a field battery:—

6 9 lb. guns.		
2 24 lb. howitzers.		
2 Captains.	Native artificers -	12
4 Lieutenants.	Lascars - -	11
12 Serjeants.		
10 Corporals and Bombardiers.	Total	23
161 Gunners and Drivers.		
2 Trumpeters.	192 European establishment.	
1 Farrier.	23 Native ditto.	
192 Total.	170 Horses.	

As in the troop the European artificers admitted in the Royal Artillery are added to the strength of effective gunners and drivers, their places being taken by native workmen.

Establishment of a reserve company to consist of:—

2 Captains.
4 Lieutenants.
7 Serjeants.
5 Corporals.
5 Bombardiers.
92 Gunners and Drivers.
1 Trumpeter.

116 Total.

Grand Establishment:—

12 Troops Horse Artillery.
32 Horse Field Batteries.
30 Reserve Companies.

To be formed in three brigades horse artillery and nine battalions of foot artillery.

If it be intended to maintain a certain proportion of the Royal Artillery regiment in the army of Bengal, it might be well to have three troops and (9) nine field batteries belonging to that regiment, subtracting a like number from the brigades and battalions of the Bengal regiment.

I cannot but think, for the efficiency of both, that much advantage would result in such a permanent arrangement.

I believe that at present both gain alike, and that on imperial grounds the practical experience won in Indian campaigns is as advantageous to the Royal Artillery and Her Majesty's service as the importation of new practice and new ideas is to that of Bengal. Both are called on to defend their own services and professional habits before the salutary rivalry of each other. We have a right to expect the very best consequences as an absolute certainty.

W. R. MANSFIELD,
Major General.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

No. 173.

MEMORANDUM by the Chief of the Staff on the future Formation of the Bengal Light Cavalry, European.

Head Quarters, Allahabad,
2d July 1858.

1. The Governor-General has determined that the 5th and 8th regiments of Native Light Cavalry are not more worthy of lenient treatment than the other corps of the same arm, and, consequently, that they shall incur a like fate.

2. A question therefore is submitted, as to whether a fifth regiment of European cavalry should be formed on the basis of the four regiments recently ordered, and now in course of organization, or, if any modification should be proposed, so as to constitute regiments of European cavalry of less strength than those already authorized, and how many in that case it may be thought desirable to organize, and with what complement of officers and men.

3. Considering the manner in which it will be necessary hereafter to disseminate the European cavalry throughout India, it appears to the Commander-in-Chief that it will be expedient to have small regiments instead of five strong ones.

It is of great consequence, for the sake of discipline and efficiency, that corps should not be broken up, but should move and work as a whole whenever circumstances permit.

4. Excepting when a large army is formed, there are few cavalry columns organized in which it would be necessary to have more than 350 British dragoons, as with them would be associated native cavalry to make the column up to (1,000) one thousand sabres in ordinary times.

5. Under these circumstances, His Excellency would recommend that there should be ten cavalry corps consisting of (3) three squadrons or (6) six troops.

1.
1 Lt.-Colonel.
1 Major.
6 Captains.
12 Lieutenants,
6 Cornets.
1 Adjutant.
1 Quartermaster.
1 Surgeon.
1 Assistant Surgeon.
1 Veterinary Surgeon.

2.
1 Reg. Serj. Major.
6 Troop Serj. Major.
1 Quartermaster Serj.
1 Armourer Serj.
1 Saddler Serj.
1 Farrier Serj.
1 Schoolmaster Serj.
1 Orderly Room Serj.
18 Serjeants.
1 Trumpet Major.
6 Trumpeters.
18 Corporals.
6 Farriers.
384 Privates.
450 Horses,

To be officered as per margin, 1.

The strength of the regiment to be as per margin, 2.

6. The appointment of paymaster is not recognized in the East India Company's service, but it is probable that ere long, considering the great increase in the number of regiments belonging to the Honourable Company, it will be found necessary to adopt the practice of Her Majesty's service in this respect.

If this should come to pass it will be necessary to add one Paymaster and one Paymaster-serjeant to the above establishment.

7. Before closing this paper, it may be well to advert to a point of organization which has not escaped the attention of the Rt. Hon. the Governor General,—the possible mingling of native squadrons hereafter with the European squadrons.

If such a projection should ever be entertained—and of its feasibility and practical utility there can be little doubt—it will be found that the strength of the European regiment, as above stated, will be more convenient than a large one, both as a moveable body in the field and for ordinary purposes to which Government would apply such corps.

8. If we suppose (3) three native squadrons of British dragoons, of the strength above stated, we shall have a body of (6) six squadrons, consisting, when the regiment is completely effective, of (700) seven hundred sabres, after allowing a considerable margin for sickness.

9. No cavalry regiment should exceed this in strength, both on account of discipline in general and real efficiency as a moveable body under one commanding officer.

Sir Sydney Cotton reports most favourably of the experiment he has made in the Peshawur Light Horse.

In that corps there is one squadron of natives to two of Europeans. General Cotton passes the highest encomium on all alike.

By order,
(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD, Major-General,
Chief of the Staff.

A.

RETURN of EUROPEAN TROOPS serving in the BENGAL PRESIDENCY on 31st July 1858.

CORPS.	European Officers.	European Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	TOTAL.
QUEEN'S.			
ROYAL ARTILLERY.			
E Troop Horse Artillery	7	181	188
F " "	6	184	190
8th Company 2d Battalion Foot Artillery	6	102	108
5th " 3d " "	5	177	182
1st " 6th " "	7	186	193
6th " 7th " "	6	178	184
3d " 8th " "	7	176	183
3d " 9th " "	7	181	188
6th " 11th " "	5	96	101
5th " 12th " "	6	162	168
5th " 13th " "	4	201	205
6th " 13th " "	7	191	198
3d " 14th " "	6	202	208
4th " 14th " "	7	168	175
7th " 14th " "	6	209	215
TOTAL	92	2,594	2,686
ROYAL ENGINEERS.			
4th Company	6	110	116
23d "	4	80	84
TOTAL	10	190	200
CAVALRY.			
Her Majesty's 2nd Dragoon Guards	19	518	537
" 6th " (Carabin.)	23	614	637
" 7th "	32	495	527
" 7th Light Dragoons	27	439	466
" 9th Lancers	16	541	557
" 2d Battalion Military Train	10	228	238
TOTAL	127	2,835	2,962
INFANTRY.			
Her Majesty's 5th Fusileers	24	713	737
" 6th Foot (1st Battalion)	16	639	655
" 7th Fusileers "	41	1,225	1,266
" 8th Foot "	19	799	818
" 10th "	22	776	798
" 13th Lt. Infantry "	30	859	889
" 19th Foot	33	1,042	1,075
" 20th "	31	796	897
" 23d "	34	926	960
" 24th "	26	942	968
" 27th "	26	986	1,012
" 29th "	25	907	932
" 32d Light Infantry	15	463	478
" 34th Foot	28	728	756
" 35th "	35	858	893
" 37th "	37	669	706
" 38th "	38	951	989
" 42d "	31	828	859
" 52d Light Infantry	25	978	1,003
" 53d Foot	21	902	923
" 54th "	33	797	830
" 60th Rifles (1st Battalion)	20	710	730
" " (2d ")	16	392	408
" 61st Foot	15	770	785
" 64th "	27	801	828
" 70th "	17	979	996
" 73d "	24	792	816
" 75th "	20	780	800
" 77th "	32	574	606
" 78th Highlanders	23	748	771
" 79th "	32	896	928
" 80th Foot	21	720	741
" 81st "	29	1,041	1,070
" 82d "	39	929	968
" 84th "	22	755	777
" 87th Fusileers	23	1,006	1,029
" 88th Foot	40	877	917
" 90th Light Infantry	32	803	835
" 93d Highlanders	32	891	923
" 94th Foot	41	854	895
" 97th "	36	848	884
" 98th "	37	769	806
" 2d Battalion Rifle Brigade	28	930	958
" " " "	32	951	983
TOTAL	1,228	36,600	37,828

CORPS.	European Officers.	European Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	TOTAL.
HONOURABLE COMPANY'S			
ARTILLERY.			
Staff 1st Bridgade Horse Artillery	No returns.		
1st Troop 1st " "			
2d " 1st " "			
3d " 1st " "			
Staff 2d " "	7	8	15
1st Troop 2d " "	5	96	101
2d " 2d " "	6	99	105
3d " 2d " "	6	98	104
Staff 3d " "	7	9	16
1st Troop 3d " "	5	104	109
2d " 3d " "	5	105	110
3d " 3d " "	4	118	122
4th " 3d " "	.	62	62
Staff 1st Battalion Foot Artillery	1	4	5
1st Comp. 1st " "	4	83	87
2d " 1st " "	.	70	70
3d " 1st " "	4	57	61
4th " 1st " "	1	43	44
Staff 2d " "	5	6	11
1st Comp. 2d " "	6	84	90
2d " 2d " "	3	68	71
3d " 2d " "	4	33	37
4th " 2d Battalion Foot Artillery with European drivers attached	6	140	146
Staff 3d Battalion Foot Artillery	4	6	10
1st Comp. 3d " "	1	64	65
2d " 3d " "	7	85	92
3d " 3d " "	4	79	83
4th " 3d " "	4	60	64
Staff 4th " "	5	6	11
1st Comp. 4th " "	5	59	64
2d " 4th " "	5	58	63
3d " 4th " "	3	71	74
4th " 4th " "	4	72	76
Staff 5th " "	2	5	7
1st Comp. 5th " "	.	43	43
2d " 5th " "	2	33	35
3d " 5th " "	1	40	41
4th " 5th " "	.	21	21
Staff 6th " "	4	6	10
1st Comp. 6th " "	3	8	11
2d " 6th " "	4	89	93
3d " 6th " "	3	95	98
4th " 6th " "	5	65	70
TOTAL	145	2,252	2,397
CAVALRY.			
1st European Regiment Light Cavalry	16	245	261
2d " " "	13	256	269
3d " " "	18	235	253
4th " " "	No return.		
TOTAL	47	736	783
INFANTRY.			
1st European Bengal Fusileers	49	853	902
2d " "	47	780	827
3d European Regiment	47	876	923
TOTAL	143	2,509	2,652
Bengal Yeomanry Cavalry	26	222	248
Lahore Light Horse	7	134	141
Peshawur Light Horse	7	179	186
TOTAL	40	535	575
European Invalid Battalion	74	176	250
European Veteran Company	.	28	28
TOTAL	74	204	278
GRAND TOTAL	1,961	49,411	51,372

Adjutant-General's Office,
Head Quarters, Allahabad,
4th August 1858.

B.

RETURN of NATIVE TROOPS, REGULAR and IRREGULAR, serving in the BENGAL PRESIDENCY.

CORPS.	European Officers.	European Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.	TOTAL. European.	TOTAL. Native.
ARTILLERY.					
4th Troop 2d Brigade H.A. and Gun Lascars 1st, 2d, and 3d Troops	6	3	189	9	189
Gun Lascars 3d Brigade H.A.	—	—	92	—	92
Gun Lascars and Gun Drivers 2d Battalion Foot Artillery	—	—	188	—	188
Gun Lascars and Gun Drivers 3d Battalion Foot Artillery	—	—	214	—	214
Gun Lascars 4th Batt. Foot Artillery	—	—	113	—	115
7th Battalion Foot Artillery	No return.				
Staff 8th Battalion Foot Artillery	4	2	3	6	3
1st Company 8th Batt. Foot Artillery	Mutinied.				
2d " " "	3	—	100	3	100
3d " " "	Disbanded.				
4th " " "	5	—	39	5	39
5th " " "	3	—	120	3	120
6th " " "	Mutinied.				
9th Battalion Foot Artillery	No return.				
TOTAL	21	5	1,058	26	1,058
CAVALRY.					
4th Regiment Light Cavalry	No return.				
5th " "	7	—	442	7	442
6th " "	8	—	17	8	17
8th " "	8	—	354	8	354
9th " "	7	—	169	7	169
10th " "	—	—	129	—	129
TOTAL	30	—	1,111	30	1,111
SAPPERS AND MINERS	No return.				
INFANTRY.					
2d Regiment Native Infantry	5	1	660	6	660
3d " " "	8	2	103	10	103
4th " " "	14	2	528	16	528
13th " " "	7	1	876	8	876
16th " " "	7	—	779	7	779
21st " " "	11	2	902	13	902
24th " " "	8	—	819	8	819
25th " " "	11	—	776	11	776
26th " " "	2	2	143	2	143
27th " " "	7	—	725	7	725
31st " " "	No return.				
32d " " "	No return.				
33d " " "	4	2	848	6	848
35th " " "	6	1	755	7	755
36th " " "	4	1	122	5	122
37th " " "	6	1	131	7	131
39th " " "	7	—	753	7	753
40th " " "	2	—	103		103
49d " " "	No returns.				
49d " " "					
47th " " "	6	1	657	7	657
49th " " "	8	1	395	9	395
50th " " "	10	—	775	10	775
58th " " "	7	1	795	8	795
59th " " "	8	1	124	9	124
61st " " "	6	—	578	6	578
62d " " "	No return.				
63d " " "	6	2	860	8	860
64th " " "	12	2	880	14	880
65th " " "	16	1	1,089	17	1,089
66th " " "	11	1	803	12	803
69th " " "	No return.				
70th " " "	7	—	1,211	7	1,211
73d " " "	—	2	138	2	138
Lucknow Regiment	5	4	292	9	292
Poorbeeah "					
TOTAL	211	29	17,620	240	17,620
LOCAL CORPS.					
Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment	5	2	1,107	7	1,107
Regiment of Ferozepoor	3	2	771	5	771
Regiment of Loodianah	3	—	415	3	415
Sikh Volunteers	No return.				
Kemaoon Battalion	5	1	692	6	692
Sirmoor "	No return.				
Nusseree "	7	1	829	8	829
1st Extra Goorkah Regiment	5	1	475	6	475
Landour Hill Rangers	6	1	518	7	518
1st Assam Light Infantry Battalion	4	2	1,025	6	1,025
2d " "	3	1	1,133	4	1,133
Mhairwara Battalion	4	2	738	6	738
Mhair Regiment	3	2	622	5	622
Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion	6	2	962	8	962
Arracan Battalion	6	2	723	8	723
Shekhawattee Battalion	3	—	743	3	743
Pegu Light Infantry Battalion	No return.				
Munneepore Regiment	2	2	503	4	503
Kamroop Regiment	4	2	915	6	915
Mynpoorie Infantry and Cavalry	—	—	590	—	590
Futtehgurh " "	—	—	539	—	539
Cawnpore " "	5	—	825	5	825
Allahabad " "	4	—	613	4	613
Allygurh " "	2	1	307	3	307

CORPS.	European Officers.	European Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.	TOTAL. European.	TOTAL. Native.
LOCAL CORPS—*continued.*					
Bareilly "	—	—	322	—	322
Sebundy Sappers and Miners	1	2	211	3	211
Resident's Escort	No returns.				
Local Company of Artillery					
Nimar Police Corps					
Malwah Bheel Corps					
Meywar "	4	2	1,030	6	1,030
Meena Battalion	4	—	579	4	579
Calcutta Native Militia	3	1	963	4	963
Hill Rangers	3	2	616	5	616
Jodhpore Legion	4	2	703	6	703
1st Sikh Infantry	4	—	986	4	986
2d "	4	1	948	5	948
3d "	3	—	960	3	960
4th "	6	—	259	6	259
TOTAL	116	34	22,622	150	22,622
IRREGULAR CAVALRY.					
1st Irregular Cavalry	2	—	536	2	536
2d "	4	—	405	4	405
4th "	2	—	238	2	238
5th "	1	—	64	1	64
6th "	4	—	581	4	581
7th "	4	—	575	4	575
8th "	4	—	472	4	472
11th "	No return.				
16th "	2	—	416	2	416
17th "	6	—	482	6	482
18th "	4	—	589	4	589
Ramgurh "	1	—	190	1	190
Benares Horse	2	—	164	2	164
Beatson's "	No return.				
Meade's "	6	1	453	7	453
Behar "	No return.				
Rohilcund "					
Peshawar Light Horse	—	—	148	—	148
1st Sikh Irregular Cavalry	No return.				
2d " "	6	—	617	6	617
3d " "	4	—	766	4	766
4th " "	4	—	524	4	524
1st Punjaub "	5	—	568	5	568
2d " "	8	—	713	8	713
3d " "	6	—	536	6	536
4th " "	6	—	546	6	546
5th " "	5	—	582	5	582
Jodhpore Sikh Horse	1	—	453	1	453
Mooltanee Cavalry	No return.				
Towanna Horse					
TOTAL	87	1	10,618	88	10,618
PUNJAUB IRREGULAR FORCE.					
1st Punjaub Light Field Battery	1	2	143	3	143
2d " "	2	—	141	2	141
3d " "	1	1	141	2	141
No. 4 Garrison Company of Artillery	2	—	151	2	151
Hazara Mountain Train Battery	1	—	80	1	80
Corps of Guides	4	—	1,137	4	1,137
TOTAL	11	3	1,793	14	1,793
INFANTRY.					
1st Punjaub Irregular Infantry	4	—	924	4	924
2d " "	5	—	900	5	900
3d " "	3	1	954	4	954
4th " "	10	—	845	10	845
5th " "	6	—	1,022	6	1,022
6th " "	3	—	917	3	917
7th " "	7	—	820	7	820
8th " "	4	—	918	4	918
9th " "	4	—	919	4	919
10th " "	4	—	925	4	925
11th " "	4	—	958	4	958
12th " "	4	—	941	4	941
13th " "	6	2	948	8	948
14th " "	5	—	955	5	955
15th " "	4	—	959	4	959
16th " "	6	1	922	7	922
17th " "	3	2	1,007	5	1,007
18th " "	3	—	959	3	959
19th " "	3	—	913	3	913
20th " "	4	—	961	4	961
21st " "	7	—	930	7	930
22d " "	4	—	1,002	4	1,002
23d " "	4	2	896	6	896
24th " "	6	20	846	26	846
Hazara Goorkah Battalion	3	—	793	3	793
TOTAL	116	28	23,134	144	23,134
GRAND TOTAL	592	100	77,956	692	77,956

C.

Disposition Return of Temporary Levies, Organized Police, Contingents, &c. in the Bengal Presidency, on the 1st July 1858.

Division.	Station.	Corps.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.	Guns.	Remarks.
Presidency.	Ranegunge	Sonthal Police	231	–	
	Cachar	Kaskie Levy	214	–	
	Purneeah	Purneeah Military Police Battalion	634	–	
	Dorundah	Call and Sonthal Levy	488	–	150 of these at Chyebassa.
	Dnoodnugger	Bengal Police Battalion	363	–	
	Patna and Dinapore	Ditto	35	–	
	Bastee	Ditto	55	–	
	Chupra	Ditto	41	–	
	Arrah	Ditto	161	–	
	Dehree	Ditto	39	–	
	Rohtas	Ditto	296	4	
Dinapore	Sasseram	Sebundy Levy	242	–	35 of these are Cavalry.
	Behar District	Behar Irregular Cavalry	176	–	
		Behar Station Guards	757	–	
		Behar Mounted Police	25	–	Europeans.
		Sewan Levy	231	–	
	Ghazeepore	Police Levies	131	–	
	Benares	Ditto	710	–	62 mounted, includes 337 of Calonias Levy, of which station is not given.
	Jonnpore	Ditto	288	–	89 mounted. *Note.*—Of these Police Levies the Horse *are partially armed.*
	Mirzapore	Ditto	207	–	
	Azimghur	Ditto	200	–	50 mounted. Infantry entirely unarmed.
	Allahabad	Sikh Police Corps	1,114	–	
		Allahabad Levy	525	–	
Saugor.	Bandah	Bundlecund Auxiliary Levies	978	2	
	Calpee Road	Towana Horse	398	–	Since moved to Bilhour, between Cawnpore and Meerunka Sarai.
	Bunnee	Kurpoortala Raja's Contingent Artillery	83	–	
		Ditto Cavalry	146	–	
		Ditto Infantry	1,110	–	
		Ditto Ditto	186	–	
Oudh.	Oonao	Pathan Horse	110	–	
	Lucknow	2 Regiments Oudh Police Cavalry	811	–	
		4 Ditto Infantry	2,218	–	
		Sekh Levies from Umballah	711	–	
		Allahabad Mounted Police	322	–	Detachments at Chinthut, Mullahabad, and Futtehghur.
	Mullahabad	1st Regiment Oudh Police Infantry	879	–	
		Remains of Oudh Irregular Cavalry Corps	125	–	
Cawnpore.	Cawnpore	Cawnpore Levy	798	–	3 Companies detached to Meerunka Sarai.
	Etawah	Auxiliary Levy Artillery	50	5	
		Ditto Cavalry	213	–	
		Ditto Infantry	375	–	
	Mynpoorie	Mynpoorie Irregular Cavalry	414	–	
		Ditto Police Levy	303	–	200 Men detached to Etawah.
	Futtehghur	Futtehghur Levy	578	–	
		Furruckabad Police Infantry	240	–	
		Ditto Cavalry	136	–	
Rohilcund.	Shahjehanpore	Mooltanee Horse	638	–	
	Powaeen, near Shahjehanpore	Rohilcund Auxiliary Police Cavalry	321	–	
		Ditto ditto Infantry	220	–	
	Bareilly	Kemaon Hill Levy	737	–	200 Men detached to Pillibheet.
	Moradabad	Mooltanee Horse	356	–	
		Pathan Horse	101	–	
		Cavalry attached to 1st Punjaub Infantry	70	–	
		Gowan's Infantry	539	–	
	Bijnour	District Police Cavalry	219	–	
	Allyghur	Police Cavalry	102	–	
		Police Infantry	210	–	
		Allyghur Levy	277	–	
	Agra	Police Battalion	895	–	
	Muttra	Police Infantry	186	–	
	Camp Muttra	Artillery, General Van Cortland's Levy	51	4	Have returned to Goorgaon.
		Towana Horse	149	–	
		Goorgaon Mounted Police	192	–	
	Boolundshuhur	Pathan Horse (Stokes)	226	–	En route to Allahabad.
		Police Cavalry	540	–	
		„ Infantry	455	–	
	Moozuffernugger	Police Cavalry	107	–	
		„ Infantry	222	–	
Meerut.	Meerut	Police Cavalry	405	–	
		„ Infantry	822	–	
	Delhie	8th and 9th Punjaub Police Battalions	1,500	–	And in the Division. Approximate; no return.
		Mounted Police	300	–	Ditto ditto.
	Jhujjhur	Jhujjhur Mounted Police	210	–	
		Esakhel Cavalry	107	–	
		Futteesla Raja's Artillery	66	–	
		Ditto Cavalry	387	–	
		Ditto Infantry	1,167	–	
	Rhotuck	Towana Horse	320	–	Now at Goorgaon.
		Police Cavalry	222	–	
		„ Infantry	91	–	
		Raja of Jheend's Troops; Cavalry	59	–	
		Ditto ditto Infantry	164	–	
	Seharunpore	Police Cavalry	105	–	
		„ Infantry	480	–	
	Dehra Dhoon	Police	174	–	26 of these are mounted.

Disposition Return of Temporary Levies, Organized Police, &c. in the Bengal Presidency, on 1st July 1858—*continued.*

Division.	Station.	Corps.	Non-commissioned Officers and Men.	Guns.	Remarks.
Sirhind.	Umballa	Police, Mounted	145	–	
		4th Punjab Police Battalion	575	–	
	Hooshairpore	Horse Levy	74	–	
		Foot	349	–	
	Loodianah	Putteeala Raja's Contingent	39	–	
		Nabha Ditto	247	–	
		Sooruj Mookhhee Police Battalion	76	–	
		Mooltanee Infantry	26	–	
		General Service Levy	172	–	
	Hissar	Raja Jowhir Sing's Contingent	696	–	
		Mounted Police	332	–	
		Detachment, Lieutenant Walcott's Battery	39	4	
	Sirsa	Artillery	16	4	3 4-Pounders, 1 3½-Pounder.
		Police Cavalry	238	–	
		,, Infantry	304	–	
		Putteeala Raja's Infantry	62	–	
	Lahore	Lahore Mounted Police	103	–	
		Punjab Ditto	843	–	And in the Division.
		1st ,, Police Battalion	893	–	
	Mooltan	Mooltan Mounted Police	350	–	And in the Division. Approximate; no Return.
		3d Punjab Police Battalion	476	–	
	Googaira	Googaira Horse Levy	108	–	
		Ditto Foot	200	–	Approximate: no Return received.
		Detachment 3d Punjaub Police Battalion	103	–	
Lahore.	Sealkote	Sealkote Foot Levy	306	–	
	Umritsur	Mooltanee Horse	104	–	
		,, Infantry	44	–	
		7th Punjab Police Battalion	—	–	No Return.
	Goordaspore	3rd Troop Punjab Mounted Police	36	–	
		Goordaspore Foot Levy	183	–	
	Noorpore	Detachment 2nd Punjab Police Battalion	168	–	
	Kangra	Ditto ditto	368	–	
Punjab.	Bunnoo	Irregular Mounted Levy	306	–	
		Irregular Foot Levy	364	–	
		6th Punjab Police Battalion, Detachment	39	–	
	Dera Ismail Khan	Irregular Mounted Levy	385	–	
		Irregular Foot Levy	571	–	
		6th Punjab Police Battalion	722	–	
	Goojerat	Irregular Mounted Levy	31	–	From Return of 1st June.
	Goojranwalla	Irregular Foot Levy	341	–	
	Liera	Detachment 6th Punjab Police Battalion	93	–	
	Mithunkote	Irregular Mounted Levy	103	–	
		Irregular Foot Levy	110	–	
	Tak	Detachment 6th Punjab Police Battalion	43	–	
	Jhelum	Jhelum Levy	271	–	
Peshawur.	Rawul Pindee	Mounted Police	350	–	And in the Division. Approximate; no Return.
		5th Punjab Police Battalion	380	–	
	Campbellpore	Khuttuck Levy	162	–	
	Attock	Mooltanee Horse Levy	49	–	
		,, Foot Levy	76	–	
	Nowshera	Mooltanee Horse	105	–	
	Peshawur	Mounted Police	500	–	Approximate: no Return.
		Grand Total	44,371	23	

This Statement is necessarily, in many instances, imperfect, in consequence of Returns not having been duly furnished.

Quartermaster General's Office, Head Quarters,
Allahabad, 29th July 1858.

(Signed) W. MACPHERSON, Lieutenant Colonel,
Officiating Quartermaster General of the Army.

(A true Copy.)

H. H. CREALOCK,
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General to Chief of the Staff.

Note.—This number is constantly swelling, as the Magistrates under the orders of Government succeed in adding to the ranks of the Military Police.

(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD, Major General,
Chief of the Staff.

TABULAR STATEMENT of the TOTAL PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT of the REGULAR ARMY of BENGAL.

THE EUROPEAN MOVEABLE ARMY OF THE CROWN.

	Number of Regiments.		Numbers of Troops, Batteries, and Companies.					Detail of Officers.										Detail of Non-commissioned Staff.									Detail of Troop and Company Non-commissioned Officers and Men.									Grand Total Strength of all Arms.
	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Troops, Artillery.	Batteries, Artillery.	Cavalry Troops.	Engineers.	Infantry.	Colonels.	Major.	Captain.	Subaltern.	Paymaster.	Quartermaster.	Adjutant.	Surgeon.	Assistant Surgeon.	Veterinary Surgeon.	Regimental Sergeant Major.	Quartermaster Sergeant.	Paymaster Sergeant.	Hospital Sergeant.	Armourer Sergeant.	Farrier Sergeant.	Trumpet Major.	Saddler Sergeant.	Orderly-room Clerk.	Schoolmaster Sergeant.	Troop Sergeants Major.	Sergeants.	Corporals and Bombardiers.	Trumpeters and Drummers.	Farriers.	Privates, &c.	Horses.	Strength of each Regiment.	Total Strength of each Arm.	
	–	–	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	3	–	–	–	1	1		2*	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	10	10	1	12	160	200	203	609	
	–	–	–	9	–	–	–	–	–	2	3	–	–	–	1	–		2*	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	10	10	2	11	150	130	192	1,725	
	2	–	–	–	9	–	–	2	2	9	18	1	1	1	2	1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		9	32	32	9	10	606	703	746	1,492	
	–	–	–	–	–	4	–	–	–	2	3	–	–	–	–	–		–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		–	6	18	2	–	92	–	123	492	
	–	15	–	–	–	–	10	2	2	10	20	1	1	1	1	3	–	1	1	1	1	1	–	1	–	1	1	10	40	50	20	–	950	–	1,119	16,785	
Establishment –	2	15	3	9	9	4	10	4	4	25	47	2	2	2	2	7	2	6	2	2	2	2	3	2	1	2	2	19	98	120	34	33	1,958	1,033	2,383	21,106	21,166

* Staff Sergeants.

THE EUROPEAN LOCAL ARMY OF THE CROWN.

	Number of Regiments.		Number of Troops, Batteries, and Companies.					Detail of Officers.										Detail of Non-commissioned Staff.									Detail of Troop and Company Non-commissioned Officers and Men.									Grand Total Strength of all Arms.
	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Troops, Artillery.	Batteries, Artillery.	Troops, Cavalry.	Engineers.	Infantry.	Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Paymaster.	Quarter-master.	Adjutant	Surgeon.	Assistant Surgeon.	Veterinary Surgeon.	Regimental Sergeant Major.	Quartermaster Sergeant.	Paymaster Sergeant.	Hospital Sergeant.	Armourer Sergeant.	Farrier Sergeant.	Trumpet Major.	Saddler Sergeant.	Orderly Room Clerk.	Schoolmaster Sergeant.	Troop Majors.	Sergeants.	Corporals and Bombardiers.	Trumpeters and Drummers.	Farriers.	Natives.	Privates, &c.	Horses.	Strength of each Regiment.	Total Strength of each Arm.	
	–	–	9	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	4	–	–	–	–	–		2*	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	10	10	2	1	23	171	240	225	2,025	
	–	–	–	23	–	–	–	–	–	2	4	–	–	–	–	–		2*	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	10	10	2	1	23	161	170	215	4,945	
	–	–	–	30†	–	–	–	–	–	2	4	–	–	–	–	–		–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	7	10	1	–	–	92	–	110	3,480	
	10	–	–	–	6	–	–	1	1	6	18	–	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	–	–	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	18	18	6	6	–	334	450	477	4,770	
	–	–	–	–	–	‡	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	—	
	–	30	–	–	–	–	10	2	2	10	24	1	1	1	1	3	–	1	1	1	1	1	–	1	–	1	1	10	40	50	20	–	–	950	–	1,123	33,690	
Establishment –	10	30	9	53	6	–	10	3	3	22	54	1	2	2	2	4	1	6	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	16	85	68	61	8	46	1,758	860	2,156	48,910	48,910

* Staff Serjeants. † Reserve Companies. ‡ The Bengal Engineers, a Corps of Officers whose number varies.

THE NATIVE MOVEABLE ARMY, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM LOCAL FORCES IN PARTICULAR PROVINCES.

	Number of Regiments.		Number of Troops and Companies.			Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates.	Horses.	Strength of each Regiment.	Total Strength of each Arm.	
	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Troops, Cavalry.	Infantry.						
	12	– –	6	– –	– – – – – – – – –	400	– –	400	4,800	
	– –	45	– – –	6	– – – – – – – – –	600	– –	600	27,000	
	– –	5	– –	8	Goorkas – – – – – – – –	800	– –	800	4,000	
	– –	6	– –	8	Faithful Remnants of Native Infantry Corps – – –	800	– –	800	4,800	
Establishment –	12	56	6	22	– – – – – – – – –	2,600	– –	2,600	40,600	40,600

GRAND TOTAL STRENGTH OF ALL ARMS – – – – – – { EUROPEANS – 70,016 / NATIVES – 40,600 } 110,616

(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD, Major General.

REMARKS.

Abstract of the European Force.

Officers – – – – –	2,818
Non-commissioned Officers, Trumpeters, and Artificers – – – –	5,890
Rank and File – – – –	61,308
TOTAL –	70,016

Note.—No statement of officers on account of the Native regiments has been given, as they will be deducted from the establishments of other regiments on the so-called Irregular system: *vide* text of Minute. The establishment stated in the Return for the local European regiments has merely been copied from the present royal establishments, which will probably require large augmentations to compensate for the extraordinary demands of the Government and the Commander-in-Chief for civil and military administration, and to admit all the officers of the present army. It must ever be remembered that, one season of the year being taken with another, the *effective* strength of the European forces in India is reckoned on the whole as less by one fourth than the regulated establishments. The figures in this return represent the proposed regulated establishment.

Note 2.—The 70,016 as European establishment includes 736 artificers, natives on the strength of the artillery, troops, and battalions.

APPENDIX No. 63.

MILITARY LETTER from the GOVERNOR-GENERAL, dated Allahabad, July 8, 1858.

1. In your Honourable Court's Despatch, No. 219, dated 4th November 1857, which announced your intention to form four regiments of European Cavalry in the service of the East India Company, and communicated your desire that these regiments should be substituted for eight regiments of Native Light Cavalry, your Honourable Court left it to the discretion of the Government of India to fix upon the eight regiments which were to be dispensed with, retaining the other two corps: to which two regiments such native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and troopers as might have been faithful to the Government, were to be attached.

2. In pursuance of these instructions, it was arranged that the 5th and 8th regiments of Native Light Cavalry which had been disarmed, but had not mutinied, should be retained in the service, and that for the other eight regiments the four new European corps should be substituted.

3. The retention of the two regiments in the service involved the restoration to them of their arms; but previous to adopting that measure, and to enable me to judge whether the two regiments deserved to be treated with so much honour and confidence, I caused inquiry to be made through the Chief Commissioner in the Punjaub regarding the conduct of the 5th and 8th regiments since they were disarmed. The accompanying papers will apprize your Honourable Court of the result of this inquiry, and will show you that neither of these regiments are worthy of having their arms restored to them, or of being any longer retained in the service.

4. It having now, therefore, become necessary to acquaint your Honourable Court that the retention of any portion of the Bengal Light Cavalry is impracticable, excepting such remnants of the ten regiments as may have continued faithful or may prove worthy of consideration when the disarmed corps are finally disposed of; before offering to you my own views on the best mode of supplying the place of the 5th and 8th regiments of Light Cavalry, I determined to obtain an expression of the opinion of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief on the proper organization of European cavalry regiments for the Indian service. I informed his Excellency that it was my intention to solicit your Honourable Court to supply the place of the 5th and 8th regiments with European cavalry, and I now beg earnestly to invite your early attention to the subject.

5. The establishment of the four European cavalry regiments which your Honourable Court directed has been adopted, as shown in the accompanying General Order. But I am satisfied that regiments on that scale are too large, on various considerations; and while I would most strongly advocate the substitution of European corps for the 5th and 8th regiments of Light Cavalry, I beg to propose that this may be done, not by adding a fifth bulky regiment to the four already ordered, but by revising the establishment of these, and organizing ten regiments on a reduced scale in lieu of the ten regiments of Native Light Cavalry.

G.O.P.C. No. 736. May 11, 1858.

6. The scale suggested by his Excellency the Commander-in-chief is noted in the margin. The only question which occurs to me in regard to it is, whether it would not be better to retain the number of captains at seven, as at present, instead of reducing it to six, as proposed by his Excellency. Provision would then be made for absentees, an object of some importance, seeing that there is no chance of its being possible by any immediate arrangement to relieve the new European cavalry any more than other branches of the army from contributing officers to staff and detached employ; and the additional expense of keeping the seventh captain would be more than met by making the adjutant and the quartermaster non-effective instead of effective.

1 Colonel.
1 Lieut.-colonel.
1 Major.
6 Captains.
12 Lieutenants.
6 Cornets.
1 Adjutant.
1 Quartermaster and interpreter.
1 Surgeon.
1 Assistant-surgeon.
1 Veterinary surgeon.
1 Riding master.
1 Regimental sergeant major.
6 Troop sergeant majors.
1 Quartermaster-sergeant.
1 Armourer sergeant.
1 Saddler sergeant.
1 Farrier sergeant.
1 Schoolmaster sergeant.
1 Orderly-room clerk.
18 Sergeants.
1 Trumpet-major.
6 Trumpeters.
18 Corporals.
384 Privates.
450 Horses.
6 Troops.

7. Your Honourable Court will determine whether, upon this point, any modification of his Excellency's proposed scale is desirable.

8. A regiment constituted as is now proposed, in point of non-commissioned officers and rank and file, will amount to 446 in all, and will form a very serviceable corps for purposes of discipline and for movement in the field. It will secure the advantages described by the Commander-in-Chief, and the scheme of organizing ten regiments of the proposed scale presents this favourable result, that while five regiments, on the scale of the four already established by your Honourable Court, amounting in non-commissioned and rank and file to 818 men in each, give a total of 4,090 men required to complete them. Ten regiments with a total of 440 men require only 310 additional men to make up the complement of the whole.

9. It will be observed by your Honourable Court that the Commander-in-Chief has made allusion to "the possible "mingling of native squadrons hereafter with the European "squadrons."

10. A project has been under my consideration for attaching to each regiment of European cavalry in the Indian service a corps of Native irregular cavalry, formed after the model of ordinary irregular cavalry regiments, with a commandant, a second in command, and an adjutant.

11. I strongly incline to think that such an addition to the European cavalry regiments would be of essential advantage in many points of view. But the question is one upon which there is a difference of opinion amongst officers of much experience, and as a decision upon it is not at all necessary to the immediate organization of the European cavalry regiments, I beg permission to defer bringing it before your Honourable Court until it shall have been further considered.

No. 736 of 1858.

General Orders by the Honourable the President of the Council of Indian Council.

Fort William, May 11, 1858.

Under instructions from the Honourable the Court of Directors, the Honourable the President in Council is pleased to direct the formation of four regiments of European Light Cavalry, on the Bengal establishment, in substitution of eight regiments of Bengal Native Light Cavalry.

Each regiment will consist of,—
1 colonel.
2 lieutenant-colonels.
2 majors.
14 captains.
18 lieutenants.
8 cornets.
1 adjutant.
1 interpreter and quartermaster, non-effective.
surgeon.
2 assistant-surgeons.
1 veterinary surgeon.
1 riding-master.
1 regimental sergeant-major.
10 troop sergeant-majors.
1 quartermaster sergeant.
1 armourer sergeant.
1 saddler sergeant.
1 farrier sergeant.
1 hospital sergeant.
1 orderly-room clerk.
40 sergeants.
1 trumpet-major.
10 trumpeters.
40 corporals.
10 farriers.
700 privates.

To be formed into ten troops.

School establishment as authorized by the Regulations:—
1 drill-sergeant.
1 drill-corporal.
10 pay-sergeants.
1 librarian.
1 provost-sergeant.
1 savings bank clerk.
} non-effective.

Syces, grass-cutters, quartermasters, and other native establishments, in the proportion authorized for Her Majesty's Dragoon regiments.

The pay of the several grades will be the same as that of corresponding ranks in Her Majesty's Dragoon regiments.

The troop contract allowances will be issued at the rates heretofore authorized in Native cavalry regiments.

The regiments will be officered each with the officers of two of the regiments of Native cavalry, whose junction in one regiment will be effected by the same gradual process as that which was adopted when the 1st and 2nd European regiments of infantry were formed into one regiment.

G.G.O., No. 224 of 1829.
G.O.G.G. { 29 June 1838. 7 Oct. 1840.

The officers of the Native cavalry are accordingly transferred with effect from the 1st May 1858.

Those of the 1st and 3rd to the 1st Bengal European Light Cavalry.

Those of the 2nd and 7th to the 2nd Bengal European Light Cavalry.

Those of the 4th and 6th to the 3rd Bengal European Light Cavalry.

Those of the 9th and 10th to the 4th Bengal European Light Cavalry.

The colonels, who will be extra to the establishment, consequent on the formation of four regiments instead of eight, will remain as supernumeraries until further orders.

Officers hereafter appointed will be posted to the new regiments, and not to either of the wings; and officers so posted can succeed to vacancies in the higher grades only, after the officers who belonged to the wings at the time of their junctions shall have been promoted.

The uniform and equipments of the Bengal European Light Cavalry will be prescribed hereafter, and such further orders as may be necessary respecting the formation of the new regiments will be issued by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

The 5th and 8th regiments of Native Cavalry will retain their numbers and present organization until further orders.

(Signed) F. D. ATKINSON, Major,
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India,
Military Department.

No. 469 A.

From the Adjutant General of the Army to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Military Department,
With the Governor-General.

SIR,

IN reply to your letter of the 19th ultimo, No. 384, communicating for the information of the Commander-in-Chief the decision of the Right Honourable the Governor-General to supply the place of the 5th and 8th regiments of Native Light Cavalry, and requesting his Excellency to state his views as to the expediency of forming corps of less strength than those already authorized, and as to the number it would be desirable to raise; I am directed to request you will submit to his lordship the following observations:—

2. Considering the manner in which it will be necessary hereafter to disseminate the European cavalry throughout India, it appears to the Commander-in-Chief that it would be better to have ten small regiments rather than five strong corps; for it is of great consequence that corps should not be broken up but should move and work as a whole whenever circumstances permit.

3. Excepting when a large army is formed there are few cavalry columns required in which it would be necessary to have more than 350 British dragoons; as with them would ordinarily be associated native cavalry sufficient to make up the column to a thousand sabres.

4. In this view his Excellency would recommend that there should be ten cavalry corps consisting of three squadrons, or six troops each, and officered and constituted as per margin.

1 Colonel.
1 Lieut.-Colonel.
1 Major.
6 Captains.
12 Lieutenants.
6 Cornets.
1 Adjutant.
1 Quartermaster.
1 Surgeon.
1 Assistant-surgeon.
1 Veterinary surgeon.
1 Riding-master.
1 Regimental sergeant-major.
6 Troop sergeant-majors.
1 Quartermaster-sergeant.
1 Armourer sergeant.
1 Saddler sergeant.
1 Farrier sergeant.
1 Schoolmaster sergeant.
1 Orderly-room clerk.
18 Sergeants.
1 Trumpet-major.
6 Trumpeters.
18 Corporals.
6 Farriers.
384 Privates.
450 Horses.

5. The appointment of regimental paymaster is not recognized in the Bengal army; but the Commander-in-Chief thinks it probable that ere long, considering the great increase in the number of European regiments of the Honourable Company, it may be found necessary to adopt the practice of Her Majesty's service in this respect. If this should come to pass, it will be necessary to add a paymaster sergeant to the establishment now suggested.

6. Before concluding I am directed to advert to a point of re-organization which has not escaped his Lordship's notice, viz., the possible mingling of native squadrons hereafter with the European squadrons.

If such a project should ever be entertained, and of its feasibility and practical utility his Excellency has little doubt, it will be found that the strength of the European regiments as above stated will be more convenient than a large corps, as regards a moveable body in the field, and for the ordinary purposes to which Government would apply such regiments.

7. If three native squadrons of irregular cavalry were added to three squadrons of British dragoons of the strength suggested, there will be a body of six squadrons numbeirng. after allowing a margin for sickness, above seven hundred sabres, a strength which Sir Colin Campbell considers should never be exceeded, both on account of discipline and the real efficiency of a moveable body under one commanding officer.

8. Sir Sydney Cotton has reported most favourably of the experiment he has made in the Peshawur Light Horse, where a troop of Natives is associated with two of Europeans. The Major-General passes high encomiums on all alike.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. MAYHEW, Lieut-Col.,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

Head-Quarters, Allahabad,
July 3, 1858.

P.S. The enclosures of your letter are herewith returned, as requested.

NOTE.

The following is a comparison of the establishment of the Four European local corps already sanctioned, with that for the Ten regiments now proposed:

	Establishment of Four European Corps per G. O., May 11, 1858. Ten Troops each.	Establishment now proposed for Ten European Corps. Six Troops each.	Increase of Establishment by the Proposed Arrangement.
Colonel	1	1	5
Lieut.-Colonel	2	1	0
Major	2	1	0
Captains	14	*7	0
Lieutenants	18	12	30
Cornets	8	6	20
Adjutant	1	1	5
Interpreter and Quartermaster, non-effective	1	1	5
Surgeon	1	1	5
Assistant Surgeon	2	1	0
Veterinary Surgeon	1	1	5
Riding Master	1	1	5
Non-commissioned and Troopers	818	440	0
Increase of Officers by the proposed arrangement			80

Five regiments of 818 men each give a total of 4,090 men; 10 regiments of 440 each will require 4,400 men, or an addition of only 310 men to make up the complement of the whole.

If a comparison be taken of the number of effectives likely to be present at head-quarters with an establishment of 4,400 non-commissioned officers and privates, with the result as shown with respect to the Queen's Dragoons in India, the result would be that with an established strength of 4,400, there would only be present at head-quarters 2,783 non-commissioned and troopers.

Establishment of Queen's Dragoons in India	7,720
Present effective	4,897
This result applied to an establishment of 4,400 would produce	2,783

Indian Army Commission, December 1858.

(Signed) R. B. WOOD,
Colonel and Secretary.

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* The Commander-in-Chief proposed six captains only, but the Governor-General prefers seven, which would make provision for absentees for staff employ.

APPENDIX No. 64.

Lord HARRIS's ANSWERS, &c.

Government House, Madras,
July 2, 1858.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter, in which you enclose a list of queries having reference to paragraph 5 of the Honourable Court's Despatch, No. 235, dated November 25, 1857.

In accordance with your Lordship's request, I now furnish replies to those questions.

I have endeavoured to make my answers as concise as possible, without entering upon the grounds on which my conclusions have been formed, but I am quite prepared to give my reasons for them, if required.

I have, &c.
HARRIS.

ANSWER to QUESTION 1.

EUROPEAN TROOPS of all Arms, Madras Presidency, according to established Strength.

	Sergeants, Corporals, and Privates.
Dragoon and Lancers	1,416
Artillery:—Royal	933
Company's	1,845
Veterans	125
Infantry:—Her Majesty's	8,629
Company's	2,841
Veterans	115
European Sappers	75
Total established Strength	15,979

DISTRIBUTION of EUROPEAN TROOPS, Madras Presidency, according to Effective Strength.

		Regiments.	Troop or Companies.	Sergeants, Corporals, and Privates.
Nagpore Force	Kamptee Artillery	-	Head Quarters and 1 Comp.	227
Hyderabad Subsidiary Force	Secunderabad Lancers	Head Quarters, H. M. 12th Lancers	-	397
	Infantry	Her Majesty's 1st Royals	-	1,110
	Artillery	-	Head Quarters and 1 Comp.	223
Northern Division	Vizagapatam Infantry	Her Majesty's 69th Regiment	3 Companies	197
	Infant. Vet. Comp.	-	1 Company	110
	Masulipatam Artillery	-	Detail	17
Ceded Districts	Bellary Infantry	Her Majesty's 74th Highlanders	-	484
	Artillery	-	1 Company	79
	Shorapoor Infantry	Her Majesty's 74th Highlanders	1 Company	95
	Dharwar Infantry	Do.	3 Company	283
	Ramandroog Infantry	Do.	1 Company	101
Fort St. George	Fort St. George Artillery	-	Detail	91
	Infantry	Her Majesty's 44th Foot	-	921
Centre Division	Mount Artillery	Head Quarters, Madras and Royal Artillery	-	698
	Vellore Artillery Veterans	-	Detail	21
	Palaveram Artillery Veterans	-	1 Company	71
Mysore Division	Bangalore Dragoons	Her Majesty's 1st Dragoons	-	520
	Infantry	Her Majesty's 60th Rifles	-	998
	Artillery	-	Head Quarters and 1 Troop Horse, and 1 Comp. Foot	295
	Mysore Infantry	Her Majesty's 60th Rifles	1 Company	98
	Hurryhur Infantry	Do.	1 Company	100
Malabar and Canara	Cannanore Infantry	Head Quarters, H. M. 66th Regt.	-	463
	Mangalore Infantry	Her Majesty's 66th Regiment	1 Company	106
	Malliapooram Infantry	Do.	½ Company	134
	Calicut Infantry	Do.	1 Company	105
	Sircy Infantry	Do.	1 Company	106
Southern Division	Trichinopoly Infantry	Head Quarters, 2nd European Light Infantry	-	719
	Artillery	-	1 Company	72
	Tanjore Infantry	2nd European Light Infantry	⅔ Company	58
Pegu Division	Moulmein Artillery	-	1 Company	59
	Rangoon Infantry	Head Quarters, H. M. 68th Foot	-	813
	Artillery	-	Head Quarters, and ⅓ Comp.	116
	Tonghoon Infantry	Head Quarters, H. M. 69th Foot	-	496
	Artillery	-	1½ Company	117
	Bassein Artillery	-	⅓ Company	25
	Shuay Gheen Artillery	-	½ Company	36
	Thayetmys Artillery	-	1 Company	66
Straits	Penang and Malacca Artillery	-	1 Company	61
Gen. Whitlock's, or Saugor Field Division	Saugor Lancers	12th Lancers	-	237
	Bandah Artillery	-	1 Troop and 4 Companies	415
	Saugor Infantry	3rd Madras European Regiment	-	198
	Bandah Infantry	Head Quarters, 3rd Europ. Regt.	-	474
	Hinnotah Infantry	Head Quarters, H. M. 43rd Foot	-	1,035
	Dummah Infantry	3rd Madras European Regiment	2 Companies	185
	Jubbulpore Infantry	Do.	Detail	49
Bengal Field Force	Lucknow Infantry	1st Madras Fusileers	-	561
	Benares Artillery	-	1 Company	108
		Total Real Strength	-	13,950

(Signed) F. S. GABB, Major,
Deputy Adjutant-General of the Army.

Answers to Question 2.

European Troops of each Arm deemed necessary for the Madras Presidency.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Companies of Artillery.		
			Horse.	Foot.	Reserve Companies.
Kamptee } These two stations to supply Saugor	1	1	1	2	1
Jaulnah } and Mhow with detachments.	1	1	1	1	–
Secundrabad	2	1	1	2	1
Northern Division	1	—	–	1	–
Bellary	1	—	–	1	1
Bangalore	1	1	1	2	1
Mercara (to provide Malabar)	1	—	–	1	–
Jackatalla } to provide Trichinopoly	1	—	–	–	–
Trichinopoly }	—	—	1	1	–
Fort St. George	1	—	–	–	1
St. Thomas' Mount	—	—	1	2	2
Penang	—	—	–	1	1
Singapore*	1	—	–	1	1
Thayatmayoo	1	—	–	1	1
Toughoo	½	—	–	1	1
Rangoon	1	—	–	1	–
Moulmein	½	—	–	1	–

* The question of a station for European Infantry being formed at the Straits is left for the decision of the Government of India, but is here thrown out as a suggestion.

Answer to Question 3.

Native Troops of all Arms, Madras Presidency, according to established Strength.

	Havildars, Naigues, and Privates.	
Cavalry	2,754	
Artillery	849	
Sappers and Miners	1,505	
Infantry, including 3rd Extra Regt. and Madras Sapper Militia	62,722	
		67,830
Veterans—	2,324	Variable, will increase in proportion to increase of army.
Hyderabad Contingent:—		
Cavalry	2,192	
Artillery	388	
Infantry	5,280	
		7,860
Irregulars:—		
Kurnool Horse	332	
Mysore Horse	2,809	
Nair Brigade (Travancore)	1,563	
Ganjam Sibundies	423	
Malabar Police	174	
Nagpore Force, Cavalry	400	
Artillery	138	
Infantry	2,688	
		8,527
Total of all classes		85,117

Distribution of Native Troops of all Arms, Madras Presidency, according to Effective Strength.

Divisions, &c.	Stations.	Regiments.	Troops or Companies.	Havildars, Naigues, and Privates.	Total.
Nagpore Force	Kamptee	1 Cavalry	–	258	
		3 Infantry	–	1,930	
	Seonie	–	1 Detachment	78	
	Hoosingabad	1 Infantry and	3 Companies	621	
	Seetabuldee	–	4 Companies	408	
	Narasingapore	–	5 Companies	351	
					3,646
Hyderabad Force	Secunderabad	1½ Cavalry	–	512	
	"	5 Infantry	–	3,895	
	"	–	Detachment Sappers and Miners.	46	
	"	–	Detachment Artillery	44	
					4,497
			Carried forward	–	8,143

ANSWER to QUESTION No. 3.—*continued.*

Divisions, &c.	Stations.	Regiments.	Troops or Companies.	Havildars, Naigues, and Privates.	Total.
			Brought forward		8,143
Northern Division	Cuttack	1 Infantry		550	
	"		Detachment Artillery	41	
	Sumbulpore		Detachment Artillery	28	
	"		Detachment Infantry	697	
	Vezianagram		Detachment Artillery	38	
	"	2 Infantry		1,322	
	"		Detail	31	
	Masulipatam		Detachment Artillery	14	
	"	1 Infantry		884	
	Vizagapatam	1 Infantry		1,053	
	Berhampore		Detachment	248	
	Russulcoudah	1 Infantry		545	
	Samulcottah	1 Infantry		912	
	Dowlaishweram	Sappers and Miners		358	
	"		8 Minor Outposts	608	
					7,329
Ceded Districts	Bellary	1 Cavalry		390	
	"	2 Infantry		1,720	
	Cuddapah	1 Infantry		931	
	Cumbum		1 Company Infantry	82	
	Kurnool	1 Infantry		794	
					3,917
Fort St. George	Madras	Body Guard		113	
	"	2 Infantry		1,523	
	"	1 Sapper Militia		877	
	"	1 Native Veteran Battalion		951	
					3,464
Centre Division	Saint Thomas' Mount	Head-Quarters, 5th Battalion Artillery.		93	
	Vellore	1 Infantry		788	
	"	2 Native Veteran Battalion		209	
	"		8 Minor Outposts	1,461	
					2,551
Mysore Division	Bangalore	1 Cavalry		383	
	"	1 Infantry		755	
	Huryhur	1 Infantry		477	
	North Canara		3 Companies Infantry	396	
	Mercara	1 Infantry		483	
	"		4 Minor Out Posts	441	
					2,935
Malabar and Canara	Cannanore		Detachment Artillery	48	
	"	2 Infantry		1,346	
	Mangalore		Detachment Artillery	25	
	"	1 Infantry		568	
	"		7 Minor Outposts	698	
					2,615
Southern Division	Trichinopoly	1 Cavalry		378	
	"	3 Infantry		1,730	
	Quilon	1 Infantry		639	
	Palamcottah	1 Infantry		720	
	"		14 Minor Outposts		4,760
Pegu Division	Rangoon	5 Infantry		2,883	
	"		1 Company Sappers & Miners	99	
	Thayetmyo	4 Infantry		2,614	
	"		1 Company Sappers & Miners	88	
	Tonghoo	1½ Infantry		1,212	
	"		1 Company Sappers & Miners	92	
	Shuaygheen	½ Infantry		461	
	Moulmein	2 Infantry		1,054	
	"		9 Minor Outposts	1,348	
					9,851
Straits	Singapore		Detachment Artillery	77	
	"	1 Infantry		651	
	Penang		Detachment Artillery	32	
	"	1 Infantry		720	
	"		5 Minor Outposts	375	
					1,855
China	Hong-Kong		Detachment Infantry	229	
					229
Service	Saugor Field Force	3 Infantry	1 Company Infantry	1,996	
	" "		1 Troop Horse Artillery	90	
					2,086
Service	Bengal	2 Cavalry		663	
	"		Detachment Sappers and Miners	112	
	"	3 Infantry		2,225	
	"		Detachment Artillery	44	
	"		1 Company Artillery	30	
					3,124
					52,859

ANSWER to QUESTION 4.

When the police of the Madras presidency is reorganized this force will relieve the troops of some of the duties on which they are employed, and I consider that the army will be sufficiently numerous at its present full strength, provided the six local corps for Pegu are raised. It might, however, be advisable to diminish the number of native cavalry regiments, and replace them by Europeans. This, however, is a subject requiring serious consideration, and upon which I should require further information before giving a deliberate

opinion. It has already been determined to do away with the native artillery.

I should be disposed to retain the present distribution of the forces, at all events until it is proved to be defective.

ANSWER to QUESTION 5.

NATIVE TROOPS, Madras Presidency, as consisting of Regulars, Irregulars, and Police, and of what Races composed.

	Havildars, Naigues, Privates.	Castes.						
		Christians.	Mussulmans.	Telingas. or Gentoos.	Tamul.	Other Castes.	Indo-Britons.	Hindoostanee (Oudh, &c.)
Regulars.								
Madras Army	52,859*	2,137	19,783	17,238	5,426	2,769	282	2,972
Hyderabad Contingent	7,860	- -	- -	- -	- -	Chiefly of the same classes as the Bengal Army.		
Irregular.								
Kurnool Horse	332	- -	- -	- -	- -	Mussulmans.		
Mysore Horse	2,809	- -	- -	- -	- -	Mussulmans and Hindoos.		
Nair Brigade	1,563	- -	- -	- -	- -	Hindoos.		
Ganjam Sebundies	423	- -	- -	- -	- -	Hindoos.		
Nagpore Force	3,226	- -	- -	- -	- -	Mussulmans and Hindoos, chiefly of the same classes as the Bengal Army.		
Police.								
Malabar Police	174	- -	- -	- -	- -	Nairs, Moplas, and Mussulmans.		

* The castes in the 3rd Extra Regiment N. I., and of the recruits recently transferred from recruiting depôts to corps. are not given in the returns.

Adjutant-General's Office, Fort St. George,
June 22, 1858.

(Signed) F. S. GABB, Major,
Deputy Adjutant General of the Army.

ANSWER to QUESTION 6.

It is difficult to give a very definite answer to this question.

Return No. 3 gives the numbers and distribution of the regular army of Madras, and of the few local corps strictly under the orders of this Government, but it will be observed it also includes as part of the forces within the military area of the presidency the irregulars belonging to Nagpore, the Nizam, and Travancore; and as these two first-named large and important territories are in no way under the supervision of the Madras Government, I cannot pretend to give any opinion concerning them. I, however, suppose them to be efficient and loyal, and that the number of our regular troops usually stationed amongst them has been generally found sufficient. I have stated above that the police of this presidency is about to be reorganised. At present, with the exception of a few Sebundy corps and the Kurnool horse, it is not a disciplined force, and it is even difficult to ascertain its numbers. When reorganized the police will include the small irregular corps above-mentioned, and should amount to about 22,000 men. There would then be no irregulars strictly within the presidency.

The regular army would amount to about 60,000.

ANSWER to QUESTIONS 7 and 8.

I have already given a return of the number and description of European troops I consider necessary for the military area of this presidency.

The object I have in view in recommending this force and its location is to insure the moral effect produced by the presence of Europeans, and to secure the speedy formation of small forces capable of acting within certain areas with rapidity and effect.

If this course be adopted, and if at the same time the native corps be formed with discretion in the selection of materials, as regards race, caste, &c., and disciplined with vigour, I am inclined to think that proportions of mere numbers are of little importance, and cannot very well be taken as any significant test for ensuring safety and predominance.

ANSWER to QUESTION 9.

There is not adequate barrack accommodation.

The barracks in Fort St. George require to be enlarged.

Those at Trichinopoly and Masulipatam should be improved.

A barrack for a wing of a regiment should be built at Waltan.

The barracks in Pegu, I believe, require improvement.

STATEMENT of BARRACK ACCOMMODATION now available for European Troops of all Arms, Madras Presidency, including Pegu and the Straits.

		Number of Men who can be accommodated.			
		Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Hospital.
Nagpore Force	Seetabuldee	—	133	—	12
	Kamptee	—	260	1,000	—
Hyderabad Subsidiary Force	Secunderabad	—	147	621	187
	Tremulgherry	—	—	1,000	—
Ceded Districts	Bellary	—	70	2,260	—
Northern Division	Vizagapatam	—	—	40	20
Fort St. George	- -	—	400	1,245	Genl. Hospital.
Centre Division	Vellore	—	—	190	100
	Arcot	—	—	640	160
	Saint Thomas' Mount	—	1,208	—	—
	Poonamullee	—	—	600	—
Mysore Division	Bangalore	700	173	1,000	—
	Mercara	—	26	—	50
Malabar and Canara	Cannanore	—	—	1,000	112
	Malliapooram	—	—	150	12
Southern Division	Trichinopoly	—	147	413	140
	Jackatalla	—	—	1,000	—
Pegu Division	Rangoon	No Returns received.			
	Moulmein				
	Thyatmew				
	Tonghoo				
Straits	Singapoor				
	Penang				
	Labuan				

N.B. New Cavalry Barracks at Bangalore, to accommodate 700 men, not yet completed, are not included.

Quartermaster-General's Office,
Fort St. George, June 19, 1858.

(Signed) ARTHUR DRURY,
Acting Assistant Quartermaster-General of the Army.

ANSWER to QUESTION 10.

Additional barrack accommodation would be required for—

1 regiment of cavalry at Secunderabad.
1 „ „ Nagpore.*
1 „ „ Jaulnah.*
1 wing at Mercara.

* Or possibly for wings at these places, and also at Mhow and Saugor.

There would also probably be additional accommodation for artillery required at some stations.

ANSWER to QUESTION 11.

I should be disposed to have three-fourths of the infantry and cavalry belonging to Her Majesty's regular army. I would recommend that the regiments should be relieved within a shorter period than at present.

The artillery might be chiefly raised for India.

ANSWER to QUESTION 12.

They must I suppose through the regular course of the Honourable Company's service. This would be apparently the simplest course, though other plans might be suggested.

ANSWER to QUESTION 13.

I must confess I do not fully comprehend this question.

ANSWER to QUESTION 14.

I consider the proportion could not be altered.

Lord HARRIS's ANSWERS to QUESTIONS on the RE-ORGANISATION of the INDIAN ARMY.

INFANTRY.

MY LORD, Botacamund, August 14, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 16th June 1858, forwarding questions connected with the reorganization of the infantry branch of the service.

I beg to send herewith my replies to the same, and regret that recent indisposition has been the cause of delay in transmitting them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HARRIS.

The Right Hon. Viscount Canning.

No. 1. THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. The Madras army is composed of:—
Mahomedans,
Brahmins and Rajpoots,
Mahrattas,
Telingas or Geutoos,
Tamulians,
Pariahs, &c.

2. Mahomedans are drawn from all parts. Telingas chiefly from the Northern Circars; Tamulians, &c. from Central and Southern Carnatic, Mysore, Ceded districts, Madma, and Tinnevelly.

3. No race, tribe, or caste has been excluded from enlistment by regulation. It has been an object to maintain a due proportion, so that no one caste should preponderate over another.

4. With the sanction of Government, an order was published in December last, fixing the caste proportion as follows:—
One-fourth Tamulians of various castes from the Carnatic and Ceded districts.
One-fourth Telingas and other Hindoo castes from the Northern Circars.
One-fourth Mahomedans from various parts.
One-fourth natives of lower castes, or without recognized caste.

5. Recruiting parties under European and native officers, chiefly the latter, when it is inconvenient to detach parties. Recruiting for particular corps is carried on by officers commanding stations, under orders from army head quarters. There are also recruiting depôts.

6. A descriptive register is taken by the recruiting and the examining medical officer, showing the recruit's name, age, height, country, village, caste, colour, &c., and is forwarded monthly to the regiment.

If the party is under a native officer, the candidate is taken for approval to the nearest commanding or staff officer. The party is generally composed of natives of the district in which the recruiting takes place, and they bring in relatives, acquaintances, &c.

7. No special precautions, beyond inquiry as to character and fitness.

8. I would not recommend any at present.

9. The words of the oath are, "I ———, private, do "solemnly affirm in the presence of Almighty God, that I "will serve the Government with truth and loyalty, and "that I will faithfully obey the orders of all officers set "over me. I do also further affirm that I will never "abandon these colours, and that I will defend them with "my life."

10. It has been substantially the same for the last 50 years.

11. It is not probable that any alteration would render the oath more binding.

12. There are a few on the western coast, and also on the eastern, of sea-faring habits; but it is very doubtful whether marine corps could be formed of them. Some enrol themselves as lascars on board steamers, &c., but many of these come from other countries.

13. No.
14. I think not.
15. Yes.
16. Certainly not.
17. No.
18. Answered in question 4.

19. In my opinion the distinction between police and military corps should as a general rule be so complete in regard to the description of men, of which each should be composed, that recruiting for both might be allowed in the same districts.

20. I consider that the police corps require a superior description of men to that suitable for the army corps; they could not, therefore, serve as nurseries for troops.

21. No other agency than that mentioned in reply to question 5 can be employed with advantage.

22. A distinct agency.

23. No change in this respect appears desirable; beyond, perhaps, when practicable, an inquiry of the village authorities, as to the candidates really being what he states himself to be.

24. The system for forming the police corps for the Madras Presidency is now under consideration. I have no doubt it will vary from that employed for the army in some respects.

25. I should doubt the expediency; but if determined on, I would prefer separate regiments.

26. I have no experience, except of Africans. They would probably answer.

27. Agencies could be established at the British settlements.

28.
29.
30. } I am entirely opposed to the arrangements suggested.
31.
32.

33. As at present with the percussion musket, which is superior to anything in use with other native troops. Notwithstanding the fidelity of the Madras army, a judicious policy seems to require that the European alone should be armed with the Enfield or rifle musket.

34. With a constable's staff for ordinary duty; with a carbine and short sword for special service.

35 & 36. I have no doubt that the native soldiers prefer being dressed like the Europeans. The great desideratum is to originate a suitable costume for the latter.

37. I would keep the European and native regiments entirely distinct.

38. No.
39. I would attempt nothing of the sort.
40. In my opinion, unfavourable.
41. In a very unsatisfactory manner.

42. We cannot preserve, even if we attempt, different systems for the military and for the general population. There can be no question that our policy tends to improve the nature of the natives morally, intellectually, and physically.

No. 2.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1.
2. } Having had the advantage of seeing the answers to these questions by H. E. Sir Patrick Grant, I beg leave to express my general concurrence with his views.
3.
4.
5.

6. } There is only one police corps strictly so called in
7. } this Presidency, but there are in addition and under
8. } similar rules three Sebundy corps formed, and two being raised. These corps, though entirely under the direction of the civil authorities, are disciplined at present under military regulations; they will, however, eventually be amalgamated with the general police of the country.

No. 3.—Organization, Promotion, and Rewards.

I may make the same statement of general concurrence respecting the questions in this list.

No. 4.—European Officers.

I have received no copy of No. 4.

APPENDIX No. 65.

Sir Patrick Grant's Answers.

Sir, Oatacamund, June 16, 1858.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 15, of the 21st of May, received here on the 10th instant, and to make the following replies to the series of "Questions" therein enclosed.

Answer to Questions 1 and 2.

My letter to Major-General Sir William Mansfield, chief of the staff, dated 1st January 1858, with Enclosures, contains full information on the points adverted to. Copy accompanies.—A.

Answer to Question 3.

The number of native troops of each arm now on the establishment of the Madras presidency is as follows:—

Two troops of horse artillery, 168 gunners.

One battalion of Golandauze, of eight companies, including two supplemental companies. The strength of the battalion is 552 privates, with the usual proportion of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

One corps of sappers and miners, consisting of 12 subadars, 12 jemadars, 50 havildars, 100 naicks, and 1,350 privates, formed into 12 companies.

Seven regiments of light cavalry (the eighth has been broken up); each regiment consists of 367 sabres of all grades, being a total of 2,569 light cavalry sabres.

Fifty-two regiments of native infantry of the line, and three "extra" regiments; total, 55 regiments of native infantry, amounting in all to 61,600 bayonets.

Two veteran battalions, numbering together 2,320 bayonets.

The distribution of these native troops is shown in Enclosure B.

Answer to Question 4.

I conceive the existing number of native troops to be quite necessary for the Madras presidency at present, and until our European force is increased to the extent proposed, till a local force for Pegu is organized, and an efficient police is formed. When these arrangements shall have been carried out, all native artillery may be, and ought to be dispensed with. The light cavalry may be reduced from eight to four regiments, of six hundred privates each, formed into light troops. I would hope that a considerable reduction may be likewise effected in the strength of the native infantry, but to what precise extent I cannot now say.

When a police is organized and in working order, the distribution I would propose to make of the native troops (infantry) is as follows:—

	Reg.		Reg.
Madras	3	Kurnool	1
Vellore	1	Secunderabad	5
Trichinopoly	3	Nagpore Territory	6
Palamcottah	1	Jaulnah	2
Quilon	1	Masulipatam	1
Cannanore	3	Vizianagram	3
Mercara	1	Russilcondah	1
Mysore	1	Cuttack	1
Mangalore	2	Rangoon	3
Bangalore	3	Thyatmyo	2
Huraghur	1	Tongkoo	2
Cuddapah	1	Moulmein	2
Bellary	3	Straits	2
Total regiments of native infantry	55		

Answer to Question 5.

The proportion of regulars is given in the replies to Question 3.

The irregulars and police corps, viz. the Hydrabad contingent, the Nagpore irregular force, the Nair brigade, the Kurnoal irregular horse, the Mysore Silladar horse, the Orissa Paik companies, the Ganjam Sebundies, the Malabar police corps, are not under military authority, and I am unable to give any information with respect to their composition; but the enclosed Return (C.) shows the distribution and numbers of these forces.

The proportions of the different races now ordered to be observed in the composition of the regulars are specified in the enclosed General Order, dated the 3rd December 1857, No. 74. (C. 1.)

Answer to Question 6.

As regards regulars, this question is answered in the reply to Question 4.

With respect to the proportion of irregulars and police, I am not able at present to form an opinion except as regards Pegu, for which, in my report dated 2nd February 1857, forwarded to the Government of India by the Madras Government on the 9th idem, I recommended the following local force:

Two companies of artillery,
Two companies of sappers,
One regiment of cavalry,
Four regiments of infantry,

inclusive of the present Pegu light infantry.

Answer to Questions 7 and 8.

In the Madras presidency, and in India generally, I consider that the European force never should be below the proportion of one-third of the native troops of the line. I would not allow police corps to affect the calculation either way.

Answer to Question 9.

The barrack accommodation for the European troops now borne on the establishment of the Madras presidency is shown in Enclosure D. It will be observed that it is inadequate.

Answer to Question 10.

The extent of additional barrack accommodation required for the European force, I deem to be necessary for the Madras presidency, is specified in Enclosure D.[1].

Answer to Question 11.

On this point I recorded my opinion, and it is still the same, in my memorandum placed in the hands of the Governor-General on the 29th June 1857. Extract enclosed, E.

Answer to Question 12.

I would officer additional corps of Europeans raised for India in the mode specified in my memorandum submitted to the Governor-General on the 11th August 1857, and for the reasons therein given. Copy Enclosure F.

Answer to Question 13.

An increase to the number of corps raised for service in India, and officered from the officers of the mutinied battalions of the Bengal army ought not, I think, to cause any additional embarrassment on account of the two different systems of promotion by purchase and promotion by seniority.

Answer to Question 14.

I consider that foreign mercenaries, of the races specified in this question, are almost as little to be trusted in the long run as are the native troops of India.

I am of opinion that there is in the heart of every black man an inherent dislike of the white man, which will always lead him to sympathize with those of his own colour, however they may differ in race, creed, or country.

To provide effectually for the safety of our Indian empire, never let us have less than the proportion of our own countrymen indicated in my replies to Questions 7 and 8.

As instructed in paragraph six of your letter under acknowledgment, I have, on the present occasion, confined my replies to the points specified in the series of "Questions."

I, however, take leave to add, that I have already, in various minutes, memoranda, and letters, submitted to the higher authorities, recorded my sentiments on almost every point adverted to in the letter from the Honourable the Court of Directors, No. 235, of the 25th November 1857,

and in the Despatch from the Secret Committee, No, 1930, dated the 9th March 1858.

I have, &c.

(Signed) PAT GRANT,
Lieutenant-General, Commander-in-Chief.

NOTE.—In my reply to Questions 7 and 8, I have stated that the European force in India never should be below the proportion of one-third of the native troops of the line; and the strength respectively of Europeans and natives which I have specified as being required for the Madras presidency is, as nearly as possible, in that ratio—thus:—

EUROPEANS.		NATIVES.	
43 Companies of Artillery, each averaging 121 of all ranks	5,203	4 Regiments of cavalry, each 703 sabres	2,812
3 Regiments of Dragoons, each 703 sabres	2,109	55 Regiments of Infantry, and two Battalions of Veterans, amounting in all to bayonets	63,920
13 Regiments of Infantry, each 1,152 bayonets	14,976		
Total Europeans	22,288	Total natives	66,732

PAT. GRANT.

A.

SIR, Madras, January 1, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 12th ultimo, communicating to me the desire of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief in India, to be furnished with a statement of all the European corps belonging to both services now stationed in or expected at the Presidency of Madras, together with the stations held by the respective corps.

On these points I hope that the enclosed * return will be found to afford full and explicit information to his Excellency.

The Commander-in-chief in India also requires to be made acquainted with my opinion on the strength of the European forces which I may consider necessary as the permanent British garrison of the various British provinces, including Burmah, over which my command extends.

On this most important question, I have already, some months since, communicated my views to the Right Honourable the Governor-general of India, as well as to the Right Honourable the Governor of Madras, and I now proceed to submit my opinions, in like manner, to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief in India.

I consider that for the thorough protection and military occupation of the Madras Presidency within its present defined limits, and including Burmah, we require a British force of—

Artillery.

156 field guns, requiring to be manned by troops or companies - - - - - - - - 26
Reserve companies - - - - - - - 17

Total troops or companies - - 43

Cavalry.

Regiments - - - - - - - - 3

Infantry.

Regiments - - - - - - - - 13

And of this force, I would propose the following "disposition."

Southern Division.—Head-quarters at Trichinopoly.

12 guns, one reserve company of artillery and two regiments of infantry.†

Centre Division.—Head-quarters at Madras.

12 field guns, (3) three reserve companies of artillery, one of which should always be quartered in Fort Saint George, and one regiment of infantry.

Mysore Division.—Head-quarters at Bangalore.

18 Field guns, one reserve company of artillery, one regiment of dragoons, and one regiment of infantry.

Malabar and Canara District.—District head-quarters at Cannanar.

Six field guns, one reserve company of artillery, and one regiment of infantry.

Ceded Districts.—Head-quarters at Bellary.

12 Field guns, one reserve company of artillery, and one regiment of infantry.

Northern Division.—Head-quarters at Vizianagram.

12 Field guns, two reserve companies of artillery, and one regiment of infantry.

Secunderabad Field Force.—Head-quarters at Hydrabad.

24 field guns, one reserve company of artillery, one regiment of dragoons and two regiments of infantry, one of which and six field guns to be placed at Jaulnah.

Nagpore Field Force.—Head-quarters at Ramptee.

18 field guns, two reserve companies of artillery (one always to be in the fort of Seetabuldee, in which is situated the arsenal of the entire force), one regiment of dragoons, and one regiment of infantry.

Burmah.—Head-quarters, Rangoon.

42 field guns,* three reserve companies of artillery,† and three regiments of infantry.‡

Straits.—Head-quarters, Singapore.

Two reserve companies of artillery, one for Singapore, the other for Penang,

RECAPITULATION.	ARTILLERY. Number of Field Guns.	Troops and Companies for Field Guns.	Reserve Companies.	Regiments of Dragoons.	Regiments of Infantry.
Southern Division	12	2	1	–	2
Centre Division	12	2	3	–	1
Mysore Division	18	3	1	1	1
Malabar and Canara	6	1	1	–	1
Ceded Districts	12	2	1	–	1
Northern Division	12	2	2	–	1
Secunderabad and Jaulnah field force	24	4	1	1	2
Nagpore field force	18	3	2	1	1
Burmah	42	7	3	–	3
Straits	–	–	2	–	–
Total Field Guns and European Force of all arms	156	26	17	3	13
		43			

To meet these requirements we have available and in prospect,—

Field guns - - - - - - - 150
Troops and companies to man these guns and for reserve companies, 1 troop, 2 companies royal artillery, 4 troops and 16 companies Madras artillery. Total troops and companies - - - 23
Regiments of dragoons - - - - - §2
Regiments of European infantry - - - ‖11

Thus our means in hand and in prospect fall short of our necessities to the extent of six field guns, twenty companies of artillery, one regiment of dragoons, and two regiments of infantry; and if, as seems to be contemplated, the Saugor Territory north of the Nerbudda is again transferred to the Madras presidency, I consider that we shall require a further accession of European force of not less than eighteen field guns, manned by three companies of artillery; two reserve companies of artillery, one regiment of dragoons, and one regiment of infantry. The establishment of troops of horse artillery and companies of foot artillery in this presidency are, in my judgment, much below the strength which a due regard to efficiency in this all-important arm of the service demands.¶

* Dated 31st ultimo, prepared by the quartermaster-general of the army.

† One at Trichinopoly and one at Jackatalla (Neilgherry Hills),

* Rangoon - - - - - 12
Theyatmyo - - - - - 12
Tonghoo - - - - - 12
Moulmein - - - - - 6
42

† Rangoon - - - - - 1
Theyatmyo and Meaday - - - 1
Tonghoo - - - - - 1
3

‡ Rangoon - - - - - 1
Theyatmyo - - - - - 1
Tonghoo - - - - - 1
3

§ 1st King's Dragooon Guards, 12th Royal Lancers.

‖ H.M. 1st, 43rd, 44th, 3rd Battalion 60th Rifles, 66th, 68th, 69th, and 74th. East India Company's 1st Fusiliers, 2nd Light Infantry, and 3rd Regiment.

¶ Present establishment of a Troop of Madras Horse Artillery :—
6 Serjeants.
6 Corporals.
12 Bombardiers.
84 Gunners.

Of a Company of Foot Artillery.
6 Serjeants.
6 Corporals.
6 Bombardiers.
60 Gunners.

Of a Regiment of European Infantry.
50 Serjeants.
50 Corporals.
800 Privates.

I consider that a troop of horse artillery should consist of at least 100 gunners, with a corresponding number of serjeants, corporals, and bombardiers; and I am of opinion that companies of foot artillery should be augmented to a strength of 80 gunners each, with additional non-commissioned officers in proportion.

I also think that the establishment of regiments of European infantry of the Company's service should be fixed at one thousand privates each, with a proportionate number of non-commissioned officers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) PATRICK GRANT,
Lieut.-General, Commander-in-Chief, Madras.

To Major-General Mansfield, Chief of the Staff,
Head-quarters Camp, Cawnpore.

A. 1.

STATEMENT of all European Corps belonging to Her Majesty's and the Honourable Company's Services, and the Stations at which they are now serving or immediately about to be quartered at, in the Madras Presidency (including Burmah).

Troops.	Company.	Regiments.	Strength in India according to last Return. Rank and File.	Where serving.	Remarks.
H.	–	Royal Horse Artillery	214	Saint Thomas' Mount.	
A.	–	Horse Artillery	510	General Whitlock's force.	
B.	–	Ditto		Secunderabad.	
C.	–	Ditto		Bangalore.	
D.	–	Ditto		Kamptee.	
		1st Royal Dragoon Guards	505	Bangalore.	
		12th Royal Lancers	648	Wing at Secunderabad. Wing with General Whitlock's force.	
Horse Battery	1	Royal Artillery	159	Ordered to Bellary from Bangalore.	
	1	Ditto	153	General Whitlock's force.	
	1	Ditto	214	Ordered to Tonghoo.	
	1	Ditto	126	Secunderabad.	
	A.	1st Battalion Artillery	384	Straits	Reserve Company.
	B.	Ditto		Burmah	Reserve Company.
Horse Battery	C.	Ditto		Bellary.	
Ditto	D.	Ditto		Burmah	Horses withdrawn to Bengal.
Ditto	A.	2nd Battalion Artillery	395	Trichinopoly.	
Ditto	B.	Ditto		Burmah	Reserve Company.
Ditto	C.	Ditto		Saint Thomas' Mount	Reserve Company.
	D.	Ditto		Kamptee	Reserve Company.
Ditto	A.	3rd Battalion Artillery	373	Bengal.	
Ditto	B.	Ditto		Burmah.	
Ditto	C.	Ditto		Burmah.	
Ditto	D.	Ditto		General Whitlock's force.	
Ditto	A.	4th Battalion Artillery	395	Ditto.	
	B.	Ditto		Ditto	Reserve Comp. for Siege Train.
Ditto	C.	Ditto		Secunderabad.	
	D.	Ditto		Burmah	Reserve Company.
		H.M.'s 1st Royals (1st bat.)	1,041	Secunderabad.	
		„ 43rd Light Infantry	958	General Whitlock's force.	
		„ 44th regiment	760	Fort Saint George.	
		„ 60th Rifles	1,040	Bangalore.	
		„ 66th Regiment	844	Cannanore	2½ Companies on detachment at Calicut and Malliaporram.
		„ 68th Regiment	761	Burmah.	
		„ 69th Regiment	718	Burmah	3 Companies on detachment (temporarily) at Vozagapatam.
		„ 74th Highlanders	890	Bellary.	
		1st Madras Fusileers	850	Bengal	Intended to be quartered on the Neilgherry Hills on return to this Presidency.
		2nd European Lt. Infantry	850	Trichinopoly.	
		3rd Madras European Regiment.	850	General Whitlock's force.	To be eventually quartered at Kamptee.

ABSTRACT.

1 Troop Royal Horse Artillery	214
4 Troops H.C.'s Horse Artillery	510
2 Regiments H.M.'s Dragoons	1,148
4 Companies Royal Artillery	652
16 Companies H.C.'s Artillery	1,550
8 Regiments H.M.'s Infantry	7,012
3 Regiments H.C.'s Infantry	2,550

Total Strength of each Arm, Rank and File.

Artillery, Royal and H. Company's	2,926
H.M.'s Dragoons	1,148
H.M.'s and H.C.'s Infantry	9,562
Total of all arms	13,636

Head Quarters, Ooty,
24th June 1858.

F. N. NEILL,
Quartermaster General.

(Original.)

B.

DISTRIBUTION RETURN of the NATIVE TROOPS of each Arm now on the Establishment of the Madras Presidency.

Description of Troops.	Regiment.	Head-quarters of Corps.
Horse Artillery -	E. Troop -	½ F. S. in Bengal. ½ Secunderabad.
Ditto -	F. „ -	F. S. General Whitlock.
Light Cavalry -	1st Regiment	Trichinopoly.
Ditto -	2nd „ -	Sholapore.
Ditto -	3rd „ -	Bangalore.
Ditto -	4th „ -	F. S. Bengal.
Ditto -	5th „ -	Bellary.
Ditto -	6th „ -	F. S. Bengal.
Ditto -	7th „ -	Kamptee.
Golundauze -	5th Battalion -	Saint Thomas' Mount.
Ditto -	2 Companies	Straits.
Ditto -	1 Company -	F. S. in Bengal.
Ditto -	1 „ -	Cannanore.
Ditto -	1 „ -	Sumbulpore.
Ditto -	1 „ -	Burmah.
Ditto -	Supplemental Company.	Mount.
Ditto -	„	Vizianagram.
	8	
Sappers & Miners	Head-quarters	Dowlaishweram.
Ditto -	4 Companies -	Dowlaishweram.
Ditto -	1 Company -	F. S. Sir H. Rose's force.
Ditto -	1 „ -	F. S. General Whitlock.
Ditto -	1 „ -	F. S. Bengal.
Ditto -	1 „ -	Secunderabad.
Ditto -	4 Companies -	Burmah.
	12	
Native Infantry -	1st Regiment	F. S. General Whitlock.
Ditto -	2nd „ -	Quilon.
Ditto -	3rd „ -	Cannanore.
Ditto -	4th „ -	Burmah, Meaday.
Ditto -	5th „ -	Berhampore and Sumbulpore.
Ditto -	6th „ -	Burmah, Rangoon.
Ditto -	7th „ -	Secunderabad.
Ditto -	8th „ -	Burmah, Tonghoo.
Ditto -	9th „ -	Secunderabad.
Ditto -	10th „ -	Secunderabad.
Ditto -	11th „ -	Cannanore.
Ditto -	12th* „ -	Burmah, Rangoon.
Ditto -	13th „ -	Burmah, Moulmein.
Ditto -	14th „ -	Straits, Singapore.
Ditto -	15th „ -	Burmah, Thayetmew.
Ditto -	16th „ -	Mangalore.
Ditto -	17th „ -	F. S. in Bengal.
Ditto -	18th „ -	Vellore.
Ditto -	19th „ -	F. S. General Whitlock.
Ditto -	20th „ -	Bangalore.
Ditto -	21st „ -	Trichinopoly.
Ditto -	22nd „ -	Straits, Penang.
Ditto -	23rd „ -	Burmah, Rangoon.
Ditto -	24th „ -	Burmah, Henzadah.
Ditto -	25th „ -	Madras.
Ditto -	26th „ -	Kamptee.
Ditto -	27th „ -	F. S. in Bengal.
Ditto -	28th „ -	Hooshungabad.
Ditto -	29th „ -	Maenlipatam.
Ditto -	30th „ -	Bellary.
Ditto -	31st „ -	Vizianagram.
Ditto -	32nd „ -	Kamptee.
Ditto -	33rd „ -	Kamptee.
Ditto -	34th „ -	Trichinopoly.
Ditto -	35th „ -	Hurryhur.
Ditto -	36th „ -	Kurnool.
Ditto -	37th „ -	Burmah, Shuay Gheen.
Ditto -	38th „ -	Vizagapatam.
Ditto -	39th „ -	Burmah, Thaytemew.
Ditto -	40th „ -	Cuttack.
Ditto -	41st „ -	Burmah, Rangoon.
Ditto -	42nd „ -	Secunderabad.
Ditto -	43rd „ -	Russellcondah.
Ditto -	44th „ -	Burmah, Thayetmew.
Ditto -	45th „ -	Madras.
Ditto -	46th „ -	Vizianagram.
Ditto -	47th „ -	Bellary.
Ditto -	48th „ -	Burmah, Moulmein.
Ditto -	49th „ -	Secunderabad.
Ditto -	50th „ -	F. S. General Whitlock.
Ditto -	51st „ -	Palamcottah.
Ditto -	52nd „ -	Mercara.

* Four companies in China.

Distribution Return of Native Troops—*cont.*

Description of Troops.	Regiment.	Head-quarters of Corps.
Madras Rifles -	8 Companies †	F. S. Bengal.
Native Infantry -	1st Extra -	Samulcottah.
Ditto -	2nd - -	Trichinopoly.
Ditto -	3rd „ -	Cuddapah.

Quartermaster General's Office,
Head Quarters, Ootacamund.

N. F. NEILL,
Quartermaster General.

Besides the above there are—

2 Native Veteran Battalions, Head quarters at Madras and Arcot respectively.

1 Madras Sapper Militia, at Madras.

Strength of Madras Army :—

2	Troops Native Horse Artillery at 90	180	rank and file.
1	Regiment Golundauze - -	600	„
1	„ Sappers and Miners -	1,450	„
7	„ Light Cavalry, at 324 -	2,268	„
52	„ Native Infantry, at 1,060,	55,120	„
3	Extra Regiments, at 1,060 -	3,180	„
	Total - -	62,798	

Strength of Veterans and Sapper Militia :—

2	Veteran Corps, at 1,110 -	2,220	rank and file.
1	Madras Sapper Militia -	1,024	
	Total - -	3,244	

F. N. NEILL,
Quartermaster General.

C.

ABSTRACT of Local and Irregular Forces serving in the Madras Presidency.

Description of Territories.	Horse Battery.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.	TOTAL.
Mysore Territory -	- -	2,784	-	- -	2,784
Travancore Country	- -	- -	29	1,608	1,637
Malabar Police -	- -	- -	- -	177	177
Kurnool Country -	- -	337	- -	- -	337
Nizam's Dominions	- -	2,231	742	5,283	8,256
Nagpore Territory	1 4	495	- -	2,657	3,266
Ganjam Country -	—	- -	- -	472	472
TOTAL - -	114	5,847	771	10,197	16,929

C 1.

EXTRACT from General Orders by his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, dated Head-quarters, Choultry Plain, 3rd December 1857. No. 74.

7. The following caste proportions are to be maintained in recruiting under this order :—

¼ Tamulians of various castes, inhabitants of the Carnatic and Ceded Districts.

¼ Telingas and other Hindoo castes from Northern Circars.

¼ Mussulmans from various parts.

¼ Natives of lower castes, or without recognized caste.

8. Until further orders, the foregoing paragraphs will als apply to the recruiting of the army generally.

(True extract.)

W. O. AMES,
Lieut.-Colonel, Adjutant-General of the Army.

† Rifle companies of 1st, 5th, 16th, 36th, and 49th N. I., and two companies of the 34th N.I.

D.

DETAIL of Barrack Accommodation for European Troops in the Madras Presidency.

Divisions.	Stations,	Nature of Barrack.	Capable of containing Rank and File.	Total accommodation for			Remarks.
				Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	
Presidency	Fort Saint George	Infantry Barracks -	1,245	- -	- -	1 Regt.	Has been condemned as a barrack for Europeans, and will not contain more than 700.
	Ditto -	Artillery „ - -	400	- -	- -	- -	The Artillery Barrack will only contain 100.
	St. Thomas' Mount	Horse Artillery Barrack -	104	1 Tp. Horse	—	—	
	Ditto -	Ditto „ -	104	Ditto -	—	—	
	Ditto -	Foot Artillery „ -	400	4 Cos. or 1 Battalion	- -	- -	Good Barracks, but will not contain more than 300 each.
	Ditto -	Ditto „ -	400	Ditto -	- -	- -	
	Poonamallee -	Infantry „ -	600	- -	- -	- -	Depôt H.M.'s Troops. Occupied, but of the worst description.
Centre Division -	Arcot - -	Ditto „ -	640	- -	- -	- -	Infantry Depôt, Company's Europeans.
Nagpore Force -	Seetabuldee -	Artillery „ -	133	1 Company	—	—	
	Kamptee -	Ditto „ -	100	Ditto -	—	—	
	Ditto -	Ditto „ -	100	Ditto -	—	—	
	Ditto -	Horse Artillery „ -	100	1 Tp. Horse	—	—	
	Ditto -	Infantry „ -	1,000	- -	- -	1 Regt.	
Ceded Districts -	Bellary - -	Artillery „ -	70	1 Company	- -	- -	Old Infantry Barrack at Bellary long since condemned and out of use.
	Ditto -	Infantry „ -	1,260	-	- -	1 Regt.	New Barracks. Artillery Barrack condemned.
Mysore Division -	Bangalore -	Infantry „ -	1,000	- -	- -	1 Regt.	Infantry Barracks long since condemned, holds not more than 800.
	Ditto -	Horse Artillery „ -	116	1 Tp. Horse	—	—	
	Ditto -	Cavalry „ -	700	- -	1 Regt.	—	
	Ditto -	Artillery „ -	80	—	—	—	
	Mercara -	Ditto „ -	26	- -	- -	- -	Not in use.
	Malliapooram -	Infantary „ -	150	- -	—	2 Comps.	
	Cannanore -	Ditto „ -	1,000	- -	—	1 Regt.	
Hy Subv Force -	Secunderabad -	Infantry „ -	700	- -	- -	1 Regt.	Condemned, but still in use,
	Ditto -	Artillery „ -	170	2 Companies	—	—	
	Jalnah - -	Horse Artillery „ -	100	1 Troop -	- -	- -	Not in use.
	Trimulgherry -	Infantry „ -	1,000	- -	- -	1 Regt.	New Barrack.
Southern Division -	Trichinopoly -	Infantry „ -	413	- -	- -	A Wing	Condemned, and temporary Barracks sufficient for the accommodation of the corps.
	Ditto -	Artillery „ -	103	1 Company	—	—	
	Jackatalla -	Infantry „ -	1,000	- -	- -	1 Regt.	New Barrack.

N.B. New Cavalry Barracks at Bangalore to accommodate 700 men not yet completed, and not included. Most of these barracks are quite incapable of holding now the number they were originally intended for, on the improved system of quartering, certainly not more than two-thirds of the number originally mentioned can be quartered in any of them.

F. N. NEILL,
Quartermaster-General.

Head-quarters, Ootey, June 24, 1858.

D. 1.

The exact extent of quartering for European troops in Burmah is not known, the public buildings not being under this presidency. There are, however, quarters for a regiment of European infantry at each of the stations of Rangoon, Moulmein, Sheyatmeyo, and Tonghoo; and for detachments at Mecaday, Bassein, and Shuaygheen; quarters for artillery at Rangoon, Moulmein, Sheyatmeyo, Tonghoo, and for smaller parties at Shuaygheen and Bassein. These quarters were, however, of a very inferior description in January 1857, as fully reported in his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's minute of the 2nd February of that year.

Nothing is correctly known of the means of quartering in the straits, but the following is the extent of additional barrack accommodation deemed necessary for the European forces in the Madras Presidency:—

Fort St. George -	- One regiment of infantry.
Presidency - -	- Two European infantry depôts.
Vellore - -	- Half company of artillery and two companies of infantry.
Mysore division -	- Two companies of artillery.
Malabar and Canara	- Two companies of artillery.
Ceded Districts -	- Three companies of artillery.
Northern Division -	- One regiment of infantry and four companies of artilllery.
Secunderabad -	- One regiment of infantry and two companies of artillery.
Jaulnah - -	- One regiment of infantry.
Kamptee - -	- One company of artillery.

F. N. NEILL,
Quartermaster-General.

E.

EXTRACT from a Memorandum, dated Calcutta, June 29, 1857.

I think that the officers appointed to these European corps should be sent home to raise and organize their regiments, and until they are formed and fit for duty it is obviously necessary that India should be occupied by Her Majesty's troops, a portion of which should always be in this country. There are no better troops in the world than the European regiments of the Company's service, but associating them with troops of the Royal army creates a generous emulation and rivalry, is a powerful stimulus to exertion, and beneficial in very many respects. The system of interior economy of regiments of Her Majesty's service is, I believe, superior to that of any army in the world, and it should be strictly followed in all European regiments of the Company's service. The troops should be cantoned in considerable bodies, in the most eligible position, and in the proportion of one European to three native soldiers.

(Signed) PATRICK GRANT,
Lieut.-General, Commander-in-Chief, Bengal.

F.

MEMORANDUM.

Calcutta, August 11, 1857.

IN continuation of my memorandum of the 29th of June, I beg to recommend, if additional European regiments for the Company's service are sanctioned, that the following mode of officering them may be adopted. I propose that the existing establishment of officers of native regiments of each branch, artillery, cavalry, and infantry, should be maintained as now existing, and promotions go on as at present, regimentally; that the officers to serve with the European corps shall be selected by the Commander-in-Chief from the whole army, and in the porportions obtaining in Her Majesty's service.

That only those in excess of such numbers, and after providing for the staff duties of the army, shall be retained for the performance of duty with native corps.

When from any cause an officer proves unfit for the thoroughly efficient discharge of the duties of an European regiment, it shall be competent to the Commander-in-Chief to remand him to the native corps to which he belongs, and to supply his place by selection, as before.

I anticipate the most favourable results from this mode of officering additional European corps.

It will secure the presence with each corps of the number of officers necessary to maintain discipline and perfect efficiency.

The principal of selection will admit of none but efficient officers being attached to European regiments, a point of the highest importance, the value of which cannot be overestimated, and belonging to different regiments, and having distinct and separate interests, the officers attached to European corps will have little or no inducement to purchase the retirement from the service of their brother officers with whom they are for the time serving; and thus jealousies and bad feeling and frequent changes will be in a great measure obviated.

I need scarcely draw attention to the evils of the present system under which officers are appointed to regiments, solely with reference to their standing on the gradation list, and the command of corps falls into incompetent hands, merely because rank and seniority are considered to have claims which cannot be set aside save in cases of notorious and proved unfitness and incapacity, such as hardly ever occur or can be established.

I think the home establishment of officers of Her Majesty's service would quite suffice for Company's European regiments in India, viz.—

Cavalry.

1 lieutenant-colonel.
1 major.
1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 cornet, per troop.
1 lieutenant or cornet for adjutant, interpreter, and quarter-master.

Infantry.

1 lieutenant-colonel.
2 majors.
1 captain, 1 lieutenant or ensign per company; and 2 additional subalterns for adjutant and quarter-master, and interpreter.

Artillery.

1 captain and 3 subalterns per troop or company with battery attached.
1 captain and 1 subaltern will suffice for a reserve company.

The establishment of a regiment of light cavalry in Bengal is—

1 lieutenant-colonel,
1 major,
7 captains,
9 lieutenants,
4 cornets.

And thus two regiments of light cavalry could supply the complement of officers I have indicated for a regiment of European dragoons, and leave available for employment with native troops, staff, or other duty,

1 lieutenant-colonel,
1 major,
6 captains,
9 lieutenants,

making a total of 17 officers, from which deduct 3 for each native corps (which I consider quite a sufficient number as I should now wish to see native regiments constituted, whether of cavalry or infantry), and 11 officers for every two regiments of light cavalry are left surplus.

In like manner every two regiments of native infantry can supply the regulated establishment of officers for one regiment of European infantry, and there would still remain 11 officers of those two regiments available for detached employment, &c. &c.; and from the 24 regiments of native infantry composing the Bengal army, the officers would stand thus, supposing twenty European infantry regiments were to be found. The total number of European officers of all ranks below regimental colonels borne on the establishment of 74 regiments of native infantry amount to - - - - - - - - - - - - 1850

Deduct establishment proposed for 20 regiments of European infantry. - - -	700	
34 regiments of natives - - - - -	102	
		802
	Leaves	1048

European officers of infantry available for any purpose, after fully providing, as I think, for maintaining a full complement with regiments.

I have said in my memorandum of the 29th June, that guns ought never again to be manned by natives. I will now add, that neither ought natives to be employed as syce drivers. A corps of European artillery drivers should be formed.

Nearly the whole native army is now either in open revolt or disarmed on well-founded suspicion of unfaithfulness; there can therefore be no breach of faith in reorganizing regiments, and making any change the Government may consider expedient in the constitution and terms of enlistment of the native portion of the Bengal army. If when the present disturbances shall have ceased, there should be any regiments who have throughout conspicuously maintained their loyalty, an exception in their favour can be easily made.

(Signed) PAT. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General, Acting Commander-in-chief.

SIR PATRICK GRANT'S REPLIES.

INFANTRY.

I. THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Bengal army is composed?

1. Mahommedans, Brahmins, Chuttrees, Rajpoots, Sikhs, Gwallahs, and Ahuns are the races, tribes, and castes of which the Bengal army was composed.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?

2. Chiefly from Oude, a few from the Punjaub, and the rest from Bhajepoor and the Doab.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Bengal army?

3. Men of the inferior castes habitually employed in menial occupations were not eligible for enlistment in the Bengal army, either by regulation or practice.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Bengal army?

4. Yes; I consider, and I speak from experience, having made the experiment, that recruits might with great advantage be drawn from amongst the following races and tribes hitherto neglected and excluded, viz., Mewatees, Runghurs, Guajurs, and Jats. They make excellent soldiers under strict discipline and judicious management.

. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?

5. Native officers and men proceeding on furlough, generally brought back with them recruits in sufficient numbers to supply deficiencies; if this source failed, the agency of recruiting parties under native commissioned or non-commissioned officers was resorted to.

6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

6. The officer or non-commissioned officers commanding the recruiting party was required to ascertain from the local authorities of districts that the recruits were really what they represented themselves to be.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of Sepoys, or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?

7. The soldier who presented a man for enlistment was held answerable for the correctness of all particulars connected with the candidate for service.

Note.—Having no records or official documents to refer to relative to the Bengal army, I have answered the foregoing seven questions entirely from memory.

8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes, [with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops in the Bengal army.]

8. Every man physically fit should be eligible for enlistment, without distinction of race, tribe, caste, or district; and I think it would be well sometimes to employ European instead of exclusively native agency in recruiting.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bengal army?

9. I do not recollect the words of the oath with sufficent precision to enable me to answer this question.

10. How long has this form been in use in the Bengal army?

10. I think the form of oath was modified when the new articles of war for the native troops were introduced in 1845-6, but I am not certain.

11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruits for the native infantry of the Bengal army?

11. From my recollection of the wording and matter of the oath, I think it was as full and binding as it was possible to make it.

12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bengal presidency of seafaring habits; and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?

12. Yes, in the south-east portion of the province of Bengal Proper, in the districts of Chittagong, Dacca, &c., races and tribes of seafaring habits were to be found in considerable numbers, and the old "marine regiment," the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 20th native infantry, was composed exclusively of these classes.

13. Has the Bengal presidency any marine corps; and if so, of what strength, and whence recruited?

13. There is no marine corps at present in the Bengal presidency.

14. Should each infantry corps be raised, each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only?

14. I am opposed to district corps being formed for a regular army, and much prefer general enlistments.

15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?

15. Answered in the reply to the preceding question.

16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste?

16. Composite not homogeneous corps are the most desirable, in my opinion.

17. If a corps is not homogeneous will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste? Or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?

17. Neither would I have companies homogeneous, but mix up tribes and castes in each company, and as much as possible in equal proportions.

18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?

18. As much as possible in equal proportions.

19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts?

19. In my opinion recruiting for corps, either for military or police purposes, should be general throughout the country, and not restricted to separate or particular districts. The more the different classes and races are mixed so that no one tribe shall unduly predominate, the less chance there will be of combination against authority.

20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?

20. Most decidedly not.

21. What agency should be employed for recruiting in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?

21. See reply to 8.

22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps or a distinct agency?

22. Police corps should be, I think, recruited exclusively by police agency.

23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connection with recruits for the army of the Bengal presidency.

23. See reply to 6.

24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connection with recruits for police corps in the Bengal presidency?

24. Similar precautions are desirable.

25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country, and if so should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies or otherwise?

25. I am strongly opposed to the expedient of enlisting the inhabitants of the tropical climates for service in India, for I am convinced that as a general rule the black man will always fraternize with the black man against the white man. And if the natives of other tropical climates are, as I believe them to be, composed of better stuff for soldiers than are the natives of this country, it is to my mind an additional argument against enlisting them for service in India.

26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?

26. Africans *who are not Mahommedans* are to be preferred if recourse is had to recruiting in other tropical climates.

27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?

27. I have no information or experience that enables me to say what is likely to prove the best agency to employ for such recruiting.

28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?

28. On no account should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments. Always and under all circumstances keep your Europeans in distinct and separate regiments.

29. If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief?

29. Answered in 28.

30. Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops?

30. Answered in 28.

31. Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

31. Answered in 28.

32. How should such companies be armed? with similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated?

32. Answered in 28, and I will now add that I cannot express in sufficiently strong terms my condemnation of the admixture of Europeans with natives referred to in 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32.

33. How should the native infantry of the Bengal presidency be armed?

33. Native infantry never should be armed with a firelock superior to the ordinary percussion musket. Never put into the hands of a native soldier an Enfield rifle or weapon of a similar superior description.

34. How should police corps in the Bengal presidency be armed?

34. I would arm police corps also with percussion muskets. Natives cannot manufacture caps, and therefore it is only while the caps last (and it is easy to regulate the supply) that the percussion musket can be turned against us.

35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?

35. Formerly before the Bengal army destroyed and disgraced itself, and having regard to what I know was the feeling of the men, I should have urged that the dress of the native soldiers ought always to be assimilated to a certain extent to that of the European soldier.

36. How should the native infantry of the Bengal army be dressed with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?

36. Now that the Bengal native infantry have forfeited all claim to have their wishes or feelings on the point considered, and as it does not affect their efficiency, I would no longer seek to assimilate them with the European soldiers in either dress or equipments. I propose that henceforward the dress of the Bengal sepoy shall be a dark blue cotton merzai quilted with cotton for the cold season; blue jungheeas and a pugau of any colour wound round the head in a uniform regimental pattern; a blanket great coat or cloak; shoes as formerly worn; and black or brown leather instead of buff accoutrements for the hot season, and white cotton merzai and jhungeeas, all else as in the cold season.

37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment, a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?

37. My opinion is strongly adverse to the *permanent* association in quarters of natives with Europeans proposed in this question. Mixing Europeans and natives in just proportions on field service is very advisable and advantageous to both; but I think it most undesirable that the native soldier should have the opportunities which close and permanent association would give to him of seeing the European soldier in the degrading position and state in which, unhappily, the latter too often exhibits himself in quarters.

38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers presents any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?

38. I do not consider that the association of Europeans with gun lascars and native artillery drivers presents any analogy with the arrangement proposed in the immediately preceding question (37), nor any encouragement to adopt it.

39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?

40. Would such a system be favourable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength?

41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?

41. Do not seem to me to call for any reply with reference to my answers to 37 and 38.

42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?

42. It is most desirable that native troops should not be trained to feel that they are entirely dependent upon European troops for support. But I do not hesitate to assert (in opposition to the oft-expressed opinions of Sir John Malcolm and other distinguished and experienced officers) that (most providentially, as I think,) it is alone through the instrumentality of their European officers that native troops are ever imbued with a spirit of confidence and self-reliance on service, and the native troops in our service so officered will always be immeasurably superior to any Asiatic enemy to whom they may be opposed.

Efficiently commanded and well led by British officers, native troops will always, my experience tells me, acquit themselves with credit, independently of European support. But they have no confidence whatever in the very best native officers, and deprived of their European officers (as I think it will be admitted late events have abundantly made manifest) except behind walls or other protection native troops are a mere armed rabble.

PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-General,
Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army.

Ootacamund,
16th July 1858.

SIR PATRICK GRANT'S REPLIES to the FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, and FOURTH SERIES of QUESTIONS on the REORGANIZATION of the INDIAN ARMY.

INFANTRY.

I. THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. A General Order of the 3d December 1857 prescribed that the Madras native army shall be composed of the following races, tribes, and castes, in the proportions of each specified, viz.:—

One fourth Tamulians of various castes, from the Carnatic and ceded districts.
One fourth Telingas and other Hindoo castes, from northern circars.
One fourth Mussulmans, from various parts.
One fourth natives of lower castes, or without recognized caste.

2. This question is partly answered in reply No. 1. The following is a list of the countries, &c. of the different castes of which the Madras army is composed, as taken from the inspection return for infantry:—

COUNTY OR DISTRICT.

Northern Circars.
Central Carnatic (Madras, Vellore, &c.)
Southern Carnatic (Trichinopoly).
Baramahal.
Ceded districts.
Mysore.
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly.

3. All men physically fit for soldiers, and of the prescribed age, without distinction of race, tribe, or caste, are eligible for enlistment in the Madras army. There is no exclusion either by regulations or practice.

4. Reply to 3. answers this.

5. The only agency employed in the Madras army for the enlistment of recruits consists of selected recruiting parties under European or native officers, chiefly the latter, detached from the headquarters of regiments, or from recruiting depôts, of which latter there are four formed within the last few months. The officer in charge of a recruiting party, on arrival in the district selected, generally breaks his detachment into smaller parties, or sends out intelligent men singly into the different villages.

Occasionally the officer commanding a particular station is, however, directed to recruit a certain number of men for particular regiments, which he does by enlisting men who present themselves on the spot.

6. Candidates presenting themselves for enlistment to a recruiting party when at a station where there is a medical officer or subordinate, are examined by him, and if passed he enters their names in a roll, showing the recruit's age, height, chest measurement, caste, colour, particular appearance, marks, scars, &c., native country and village. Men pronounced fit are considered enlisted from date of examination, and these rolls are forwarded monthly to the regiment by the recruiting officer. If candidates are taken

where there is no medical officer, they are examined at the first station where one is to be found. Should the party not be under a European officer, then the recruits are taken to the nearest commanding or staff officer for approval, and are considered as enlisted from the date they were provisionally entertained.

7. No particular precautions are taken in the case of men enlisted at regimental headquarters beyond ascertaining their physical fitness for the service. These men are generally brought forward by some one in the regiment, and after inquiry as to character, &c. are submitted for the commanding officer's approval.

All recruits enlisted into a regiment are carefully examined by the medical officer, and reported on by the inspecting general annually in his confidential report.

8. No alterations appear to be called for in the existing recruiting regulations. Until December last Mahommedans and Hindoos were enlisted in equal proportions. The proportions are now as indicated in the reply to Question 1; and the composition of the army is not, I think, susceptible of further improvement.

9. The words of the oath or solemn affirmation administered to each recruit under the colours of the regiment when he has completed his drill, and is fit to join the ranks, are:—

"I, , private, do solemnly affirm, in the "presence of Almighty God, that I will serve the "Government with truth and loyalty, and that I "will faithfully obey the orders of all officers set "over me. I do also further affirm, that I will "never abandon these colours, and that I will "defend them with my life."

10. The above form of oath has been in use in the Madras army for the last thirty years and upwards.

11. It does not occur to me to suggest any change in the wording or matter of the oath.

12. There may be a few on the western coast, as there are some at Madras; but they are not, I believe, in sufficient numbers to admit of marine corps being formed. A few enrol themselves as Lascars on board steamers and sailing vessels.

13. There is no marine corps in the Madras Presidency.

14. I am opposed to district corps being formed for a regular army, and much prefer general enlistments.

15. Answered in the reply to the preceding question.

16. Composite not homogenous corps are the most desirable, in my opinion.

17. Neither would I make the companies homogenous, but, as at present, mix up the tribes and castes in each company.

18. The proportions in which the races, tribes, and castes should be entertained are specified in reply to 1.

19. In my opinion, recruiting for corps for military purposes should be general throughout the country wherever suitable recruits can be had, and not restricted to separate or particular districts. For police corps, however, it is advisable to recruit in particular districts, because in some parts, Malabar and Canara, Rajahmundry, the Goomsoor country, and Sumbulpore for example, all, save the inhabitants of such localities, are sure to be prostrated by disease when employed in those quarters.

20. Most decidedly not.

21. It does not seem to me that any better agency than the present can be employed to recruit for the army.

22. Police corps should, I think, be recruited by police agency exclusively.

23. I do not think it necessary that any precautions should be taken before the local authorities in connection with recruits for the army. On the contrary, imposing forms and restrictions would add to the difficulties of procuring recruits, which already are much felt in this presidency.

24. In recruiting for police corps, reference to the local and civil authorities is advisable, with a view to ascertaining the previous character of candidates for enlistment, and that they really are what they represent themselves to be.

25. I am strongly opposed to the expedient of enlisting natives of other tropical counties for service in India, for I am convinced that, as a general rule, the black man will always fraternize with the black man against the white man. And if the natives of other tropical climates are, as I believe them to be, composed of better stuff for soldiers than the natives of this country, it is to my mind an additional reason against enlisting them for service in India.

26. Africans who are not Mahommedans are to be preferred, if recourse is had to recruiting in other tropical climates.

27. I have no information or experience to enable me to say what would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting.

28. On no account should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments. Always, and under all circumstances, keep your Europeans in distinct and separate regiments.

29. Answered in 28.

30. Answered in 28.

31. Answered in 28.

32. Answered in 28.

I cannot express in sufficiently strong terms my condemnation of the admixture of Europeans with natives referred to in 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32.

33. Native infantry never should be armed with a firelock superior to the ordinary percussion musket. Never place a long-sighted rifle or weapon of that superior description in the hands of a native soldier.

34. I would arm police corps also with percussion muskets. Natives cannot manufacture caps, and therefore it is only while the caps last (and it is easy to regulate the supply) that the percussion musket can be turned against us.

35. The dress of the native soldier ought always to be assimilated, to a certain extent, to that of the European soldier.

36. Scarlet tunics and Oxford mixture trowsers, as worn by Europeans, is the dress prescribed for the Madras army, and I do not think that these articles of equipment are susceptible of improvement. They conduce to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier, and he likes the dress and is proud of it.

The head dress and sandals of the Madras army are unsightly, and in many respects objectionable; but I have satisfied myself, by personally communicating with the native soldiers of all ranks, that they entertain a rooted dislike both to shoes and to any head dress less native in form and material than the present. I have, therefore, uniformly declined to countenance any such changes, for I cannot perceive the wisdom of making an army dissatisfied, to gain a point which, after all is of no real or substantial importance.

37. My opinion is strongly adverse to the *permanent* association in quarters of natives with Europeans proposed in this question. Mixing Europeans and natives together in just proportions *on field service* is very advisable and advantageous to both; but, I think, it most undesirable that the native soldier should by close and permanent association, have opportunities of seeing his European comrade in the degrading position in which, unhappily, the latter too frequently exhibits himself in quarters.

38. Native artillery drivers have, I hope, been for ever abolished, and I do not consider that the association of Europeans with gun lascars presents any analogy with the arrangement proposed in the immediaaely preceding question, 37, nor any encouragement to adopt it.

39, 40, and 41, are answered by my replies to 37 and 38.

42. It is most desirable that the native troops should not be entirely dependent upon European troops for support. But I do not hesitate to assert (in opposition to the oft-expressed opinions of Sir John Malcolm, and many other experienced and distinguished officers) that (most providentially, as I think,) it is alone through the instrumentality of their European officers that native troops are ever inclined with a spirit of confidence and self-reliance on service, and that native troops in our service so officered will always be immeasurably superior to any Asiatic enemy to whom they may be opposed.

Efficiently commanded, and well led by European officers, native troops will always acquit themselves with credit, independently of European support. But they have no confidence whatever in the very best native officer, and deprived of their European officers, as late events have abundantly shewn, except behind walls or other protection, they are a mere armed rabble.

PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-General,
Commander-in-Chief.

Ootacamund,
6th July, 1858.

II. MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

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1. It will be beneficial to remove the restrictions upon corporal punishment *in garrison* for disgraceful conduct.

The offence of habitual drunkenness ought to be constituted in this army, where it is by no means of rare occurrence.

And corporal punishment should be sanctioned for in-

subordinate and mischevious writing—such as placards, anonymous letters, and the like.

2. In my opinion the special rules regulating punishment in the native army should be retained; framed, as these rules have been, with reference to local circumstances and to native prejudices, feeling and religion, with which it is as impolitic to interfere as it is unjust, and a positive breach of faith.

3. I do not, myself, think that native courts-martial do work altogether satisfactorily; but, nevertheless, I am very averse to take from native commissioned officers the privilege of sitting upon courts-martial. It is optional with the native soldiers of the Madras army whether they will be tried by a European or a native court, and it seems to me that this is sufficient, without degrading native commissioned officers by ruling positively that they are not eligible for this duty.

4. The prescribed sections of the articles of war are explained to every recruit prior to being enrolled; and translations of the articles, in Hindoostanee, Feloogoo, and Tamil, are read to the men on parade once in three months. The monthly returns of regiments, dated 1st January, 1st April, 1st July, and 1st October of each year, are required to specify that this has been done.

5. This point cannot be ascertained without calling for returns from regiments.

6, 7, and 8. I am unable to answer these questions. Police corps in this presidency are not in any respect under military authority, nor have I any information with regard to them in any particular.

PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-General,
Commander-in-Chief.

Ootacamund,
16th July 1858.

III. ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

1. On merit and seniority combined, but by positive merit rather than by mere seniority or length of service.

2. The native officers of the native infantry of the Madras army are generally as intelligent, useful, and efficient as native officers are capable of being made.

3. Merit being the principle on which they are selected for promotion, it may be fairly assumed that the acquirements of the commissioned grades are to a certain extent superior to those of their comrades in the ranks.

4. There are preliminary examinations to promotions in the superior grades tending to qualify for the commissioned ranks, and every havildar on promotion to jemadar attends adjutant's drill till reported fully acquainted with the duties of his new grade.

There is no test for promotion from one commissioned grade to another:

5. The intervention of the native officers between the European officers and their men cannot weaken the influence of the European officers if the European officers do their duty; if they take that interest in their men, which a conscientious sense of duty and a determination to maintain his legitimate authority will always dictate to an officer in command of a company, and if they know the names and characters and capacity of their men;—if these points are attended to, and in May 1857 I directed that they should be specially reported upon by inspecting officers,—the influence of the European officers never will be weakened by the intervention of the native officers.

I do not think that a full complement of the European makes either against or in favour of the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officer. I hold that as a general rule it is wholly impossible to make the native commissioned officers professionally efficient, and well it is that such is the case. For my part I do not desire to see native officers capable of efficiently exercising even the command of a company, much less that of a regiment or brigade or division.

6. The native officers of the Madras army have, in some instances, but very rarely, given timely information and aided their European officers in checking mutiny and disaffection.* They invariably side, ostensibly, with the European officers; but they are known, in some instances, to have secretly encouraged disaffection.

7. I think it was a great mistake, when originally forming a native army, to institute the native commissioned grades; but I should consider it a positive breach of good faith and in the highest degree impolitic and unjust, to discontinue the grade of native commissioned officer in the Madras native infantry, who have throughout the late crisis in Bengal maintained an unshaken loyalty to the Government.

8 and 9, require no answer, referring to my reply to 7.

10. Unquestionably retiring and family pensions have had a great effect in attaching the native troops to the British *service*. The natives of India do not love us it is true, but they are keenly alive to their own interests, next to their religion, the strongest feeling of their nature—and they well know that under no other rulers will they enjoy the liberal advantages they receive in the British service. But this, and every other consideration, will be cast aside without a moment's hesitation if (and their fears and suspicions are easily aroused) the idea once takes possession of their minds that there is any intention to subvert or interfere with their religion, their religious prejudices or feelings.

11. Merit, combined with seniority, but primarily merit governs promotions in the grades of native commissioned officers in the Madras army.

12. The sytem of pensions as now in force in the Madras army should be maintained inviolate.

13. I have ascertained from the Military Auditor General that the aggregate per annum of military pensions to native officers and men of the entire native army of the Madras Presidency amounts to 13 lacs and rupees 23,399 10.

14. I do not think native commissioned officers generally are fit to take part in courts-martial, but nevertheless I deprecate their being deprived of the privilege of sitting upon courts-martial. As I before observed, it is optional with a native soldier whether he will be tried by a European or a native court; and any change is, in my opinion, unadvisable.

15. In point of *professional* intelligence and efficiency the general run of European serjeants and corporals are, in my opinion, immeasurably superior to the general run of native commissioned officers.

16. The existing organization of military corps of native infantry works well, and should, I think, be maintained as regards the native grades of the Madras army. A just proportion of European officers who will look upon their regiment as their home, and be content to remain with them, is quite indispensable to the efficiency of a native regiment.

If selected solely for superior merit and qualifications, the proportion of European officers usually attached to irregular corps will be found sufficient; but if the command and officering of a native regiment is to be dependent on seniority and mere chance, as at present, a full complement of European officers is absolutely necessary.

17. Three European officers will suffice for a police corps. And in police corps I would have no native commissioned officers. Police corps are almost entirely new to the Madras presidency, and there is no breach of faith in organizing them on whatever may be thought the best system.

18. Were the different organizations indicated in this question adopted, I should expect that regular corps would not be by any means so popular a service, nor draw such good recruits as irregular and police corps.

19. I cannot answer this question; there is but one police corps in this Presidency (the Malabar,) and it is exclusively under civil authority.

20. The distinct organization, and difference of system, and component races in the three native armies has, I consider, saved India in the crisis through which we are now passing.

21. To assimilate or amalgamate the three *native* armies would be, in my opinion, a most suicidal measure.

So long as each native army is under a distinct and separate system and composition, a general combination is little likely to occur; but amalgamate the three armies, and in time they will feel that the cause of one is the cause of all, and they may, and most probably would, unite against us in event of revolt or mutiny taking place on a question in which all were interested—religion or pay for instance.

PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-General,
Commander-in-Chief.

Ootacamund,
17th July 1858.

MEMORANDUM for his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

1. By General Order G. 6th February 1821, Subidar Shekh Ismail, of the 1st Battalion, 20th regiment, was granted a palankeen, with an allowance of 70 rupees per mensem, for discovering a plot at Nagpore in 1819.

2. A subidar named Kisson Doss, pensioned from the 4th cavalry with a palankeen, &c., for previous faithful services, gave information to the Adjutant-General in 1832-35, of the conspiracy at Bangalore.

* See annexed Memorandum from the Adjutant General of the Army.

3. General Order G. 28th September 1832, Subidar Major Syed Guffoor and Subidar Syed Abdool Rymon, both of the 8th light cavalry, were rewarded for frustrating the designs of evil-disposed persons, who caused the pollution of a mosque at Arcot. But it was considered a necessary precaution to transfer Syed Guffoor from his regiment to the pension establishment, lest any implicated should revenge themselves upon him.

4. In 1837 the subidar of my troop gave me the only information that was received in the 6th regiment light cavalry of the intentions of the men to resist the order just issued discontinuing the full batta, and of their making the order, although the regiment had not come under its operation, a subject of formal complaint to the inspecting general.

5. By General Order G. 28th April 1842, Subidar Major Shaik Davood, 10th regiment, and Subidar Major Jinam Rhan, of the 48th regiment, with two previously distinguished subidars,* all of whom had honourably exerted themselves during the batta affair at Secunderabad, received special marks of the approbation of Government. The two named gave information as well as assistance to the authorities. On the same occasion five native officers,† of horse and foot artillery, received special rewards; and one of them, a jemidar, greatly distinguished himself by his fidelity and in giving early intimation of the designs of the disaffected. At the time these events occurred I was in the Adjutant-General's department, and personally acquainted with the latter individual.

6. In the recent 8th light cavalry case, Colonel Anderson of the 3d light cavalry was informed by a native officer of the latter corps, that the 8th regiment had resolved on not embarking for Calcutta except on the old rates of pay and pension, &c.

7. A trooper of the 8th light cavalry, on the advice of his father-in-law, a pensioned subidar of that regiment, also gave intimation to the adjutant of the designs of the men; and for fear of the consequences, declined having his fidelity publicly rewarded.

The above are the only instances I can at present call to mind, but I doubt not, had I access to the records in my office at the Presidency, I could adduce further instances of fidelity to Government on the part of individual native officers of this army.

PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-Colonel,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

Adjutant-General's Office,
Headquarters, Ootacamund,
17th July, 1858.

INFANTRY.

IV. EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. During my experience of two years as Commander-in-chief of the Madras army it has been my constant aim to strengthen the hands of commanding officers of native corps,

i. By insisting that all applications for appointments to the staff shall be transmitted through commanding officers, who are required to give their opinion on the qualifications of the applicants, and especially to state whether they have received from them all due support and assistance.

ii. By confirming, in the case of native promotions, the recommendations of commanding officers as far as possible.

iii. By requiring that officers commanding companies shall have, in all cases, a potential voice in promotions in their respective companies.

iv. By directing inspecting officers personally to ascertain and report whether officers in command of companies are thoroughly acquainted with the names, characters, and history of their men; insufficient information on these points being, in my opinion, fatal to the influence over their men of European officers serving with native corps.

2. The powers of officers of corps have been increased as above specified.

3. I persuade myself that a favourable result has been obtained by the increase of the powers and influence of officers of corps, as above described.

4. The reply to 3, answers this question.

5. The discipline of all corps upon service mainly depends upon the influence and judicious exercise of authority of the commanding officer and the officers in command of companies, but more especially upon the commanding officer.

6. If we could always arrange to have none but sensible, judicious, and thoroughly competent officers in command of regiments, it would certainly be desirably to increase their powers and to give them every latitude.

But constituted as the service is, and that an officer not notoriously incompetent must obtain command of a regiment when he attains a certain rank and standing, the restrictions imposed on the powers of commanding officers have been salutary I conceive.

As respects the powers and influence of officers of companies, I refer to my reply to 1.

7. The other measures I would suggest for the improvement of discipline are these,—

i. I would (experimentally) concede to commanding officer of native regiments power to confirm and execute the sentences of all regimental courts-martial, including sentences of forfeiture of good-conduct pay, without referring to any superior authority.

ii. I would allow commanding officers of native regiments at their own discretion to punish native non-commissioned officers without the intervention of a court-martial or superior authority, by

Extra drill,
Pack drill, and
Placing their names lower on the list of naik and havildar.

iii. I would restore to commanding officers of native regiments a power exercised by them (and with great advantage to discipline) up to 1827, when the practice was peremptorily prohibited, as well as corporal punishment, by Lord William Bentinck, that of caning men in the ranks and recruits at drill, at the discretion of the commanding officer and the adjutant.

If an officer is so wanting in judgment, temper, and discretion as to be incapable of fitly exercising these increased powers, he is unfit for command, and it should be competent to the Commander-in-chief to remove him from the position of commanding officer of a regiment.

8. The influence of the European officers among native troops is greatest in time of war when officers and men are much more thrown together, and learn to know and to appreciate one another's good qualities.

9. The discharge of the duties imposed upon them as soldiers, has found the native troops in more than a just amount of occupation during the 38 years I have been in the service. When adjutant general in Bengal, I placed before the Commander-in-chief (Sir Charles Napier) a return shewing that one third of the entire native army was permanently on duty, day and night, from year's end to year's end. And since I have been in command of the Madras army, I have made repeated representations that that army also is similarly overworked, and the energies and exertions of the troops most unduly and injuriously overtasked in like manner.

10 and 11. Reply to question 9 answers these. But I have to add, that the Madras native troops are habitually liable to be employed on public works of a military character when not fully occupied on ordinary military duties. And I desire to state here, that I have never known the Bengal sepoy refuse to engage in such works on field service.

12. My replies to questions 7, 16, and 17, head, "Infantry. III. Organization, Promotions and Rewards," answers this question, clauses 1, 2, 3, included.

13. I would attach all cadets to European corps until they should be thoroughly drilled and fitted to assume command of a company on parade. I think it most objectionable that this indispensible professional instruction should be imparted to European officers by any native, or in conjunction with native recruits by a European instructor. A European officer should join a native corps so well up in his drill as to be capable of teaching others, and not be dependent on those under his command for instruction in his military duties.

14. If a smaller number of European officers is assigned to native corps, I would select for such special employment those distinguished for superior energy and vigour of mind and body, temper, judgment, unbending resolution, and a good colloquial knowledge of the language of their men.

15. The efficiency of regiments, in my opinion, is most injuriously affected by the number of officers taken from corps for staff employment. Either regiments are drained of their best and most deserving officers, or patronage is not dispensed with justice to individuals, and solely with reference to superior merit. On this head, in a minute

* Pensioned Subidar Shaik Dowell; and pensioned Subidar Futteh Homed Sirdar Bahadoor.
† One Subidar and four Jemidars.

dated the 21st May 1857 (duly forwarded to the Supreme Government and to the home authorities), I wrote as follows, and I adhere now to the opinions I then expressed, viz. :—"I repeat, that in the Madras army the principal "causes of complaint are the unceasing demands upon the "energies of the men, their poverty, and, more than all, "the great paucity of European officers of standing and "experience present with regiments. Officers and men "must be brought more together, and the European "officers must be taught to look upon their regiments as "their home, and not to fix their whole thoughts, as they "now do, on devising means of getting away to staff or "other detached employment. Anything rather than regi-"mental duty is the universal feeling. The consequences "of this craving are, utter indifference, not to say positive "dislike, towards their men, and the engendering of a "restless, discontented disposition, which is, I doubt not "communicated to the soldier." See also my memorandum of the 29th June 1857, placed in the hands of the Governor General on that date.

16. The conduct of native regiments in quarters, either in the course of mutinies or at other times, is not influenced so much by the number of European officers present as it is by securing the presence with corps of a really competent commanding officer and a proportion of experienced and contented officers of companies, who take an interest in their men, and know how to deal with them, and to secure attachment.

On field service, the presence with native troops of a full compliment of European officers is very important; the youngest and most inexperienced will inspire the native soldier with far more confidence than the very best native officer ever does.

17. In answer to this question I quote again from my Minute of the 21st May 1857 :—"Either form a staff corps, "or completely change the system by which local and "irregular forces are at present officered from the line; the "effect of which is to deprive the regular army of its most "valuable officers, thus making the main army of minor "importance to those local and irregular excresences and "make-shifts."

"Take the officers who are to serve with these local "forces from the line; but let them understand that they "will be struck off the strength of their own regiments, "and have no further claim to promotion therein, or to "any of the staff appointments of the regular army."

* * * * *

"Local and irregular forces should be available for "employment on field service, so as to occasionally open "to all ranks a field for distinction; but once an officer "makes his election, and enters the local and irregular "levies, all connexion between him and the line should "be for ever severed, and his place in the regular army at "once filled up."

* * * and let this "principle be made applicable to the department of public "works also."

Note.—As regards officering the Bengal army, see also my Memorandum of the 11th August 1857, submitted on that date to the Governor General. Copy (F.) accompanied my letter to Lieut.-Colonel Durand, dated 16th June.—*See* page 125.

18. The system I have suggested for providing for staff and detached employment, would not, I conceive, cut off from the officers of the army inducements to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the state, while it is calculated, I think, most essentially to promote the efficiency of regiments of the line and of regimental officers.

19. My reply to question 18 answers this question also.

Note.—This same series of questions in reference to the Bengal army has been sent to me; but I am not aware that I have here stated anything with respect to the Madras army that is not equally applicable to the Bengal native troops. To reply separately would, therefore, be a mere repetition of what I have already written on the several points adverted to under this particular head.

PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-General,
Commander-in-Chief.

Ootacamund,
July 17, 1858.

ENGINEER SOLDIERS, SAPPERS AND MINERS.

I.—RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION.

1. The corps of Sappers and Miners consists of 12 companies.

EUROPEAN.

1 Serjeant-major, 1 Quartermaster-serjeant, 24 Serjeants.
24 1st Corporals, 24 2d Corporals.

EAST INDIAN.

1 Assistant apothecary.
2 Buglers.

NATIVE.

12 Subadars.
12 Jemadars.
1 Havildar major.
50 Havildars.
100 Naignes.
1350 Privates.
24 Recruit } Boys.
24 Pension }
12 Puckallies.
53 Artificers.
1 2d Dresser.

2. CASTES.

Christians	35
Moosulmans	79
Brahmins and Rajpoots	8
Mahrattas	4
Telingas (Gentoo)	191
Tamil	246
Other inferior castes	496
Indo-Britons	15

3. COUNTRY.

Hindoostan.
Northern Circars.
Central Carnatic (Madras, Vellore, &c.)
Southern Carnatic (Trichinopoly).
Baramahal.
Ceded Districts.
Mysore.
Tanjore, Madura, and Tinnevelly.

4. None.

5. I think not.

6. As in the native infantry.

7. As in the native infantry.

8. As in the native infantry.

9. None; the existing system answers perfectly.

10. As in the native infantry.

11. As in the native infantry.

12. As in the native infantry.

13. Composite; the present proportions are good, and should be left undisturbed.

14. The present system answers all purposes.

15. None which do not at present exist.

16. Efforts are systematically made to obtain recruits acquainted with useful trades.

17. It is not considered expedient that natives of other tropical climates should be enlisted as sappers. If, however, it is determined that such shall be enlisted, they should be formed into separate companies, and not mixed up with the natives of India.

18 and 19. See replies to these questions in reference to infantry.

20. The existing establishment of the corps is sufficiently strong for the absolute requirements of the service, but the sappers are found so useful a body of men, that the number of companies might with advantage be increased.

21. The native infantry soldier's time is sufficiently occupied in the performance of duties proper to him. He has always willingly laboured upon military works when his services have been required; but to make sapper training, even in a modified shape, part of his regular duty would be exceedingly unpalatable to him.

22. Yes; when occasion has required; and the work has been done willingly.

23. On the fair engineer wants of the service.

—	Serjeants.	1st Corporals.	2d Corporals.
Present for duty -	3	17	14
Not joined - -	—	1	4
In Civil Employ -	22	6	11
TOTAL -	25	23	29

24. Certainly not; for this reason, that the majority of the European sappers, vide margin, are at present employed away from their regiment, under civil engineers of divisions, &c.

25. The existing establishment of 2 serjeants, 2 corporals, and 2 2d corporals is ample; provided these men are allowed to remain with their corps.

Jacket, trowsers, and boots supplied by Government biennally G.G.O., 12th May 1854, No. 114.

26. I am not aware of any advantage from making the dress of the native sappers resemble that of the European infantry. The Europeans attached to the sappers have an established working or fatigue dress.

27. Native officers, Staff serjeants, Havildars and Buglers } with swords.
The privates,—with sapper carbines with sword-bayonet.

28. Dress and arms. The present dress and arms appear to me to be quite suitable.

29. Unknown.

30. Unknown, but it is believed that a great many of them know a little English.

31. There is a school of instruction in carpentry, brick and tile making, stone cutting, and other artificers' work, for natives.

32. Their qualifications are scarcely sufficiently high to authorize their being classed as skilled engineer soldiers.

33. It appears to me highly desirable that the Public Work department should be altogether separate from that of the military corps of sappers. But I do not advocate establishing a *corps* of European sappers for actual *work* in this climate. A sufficient number of qualified European sappers, to act as overseers and superintendents, would quite suffice.

34. Certainly not, unless a large augmentation to the corps of engineers takes place, or the existing establishment is restored to military duty. Under the present system there are never more than two Engineer officers attached to the corps of sappers, viz., the commandant and the adjutant, and scarcely an engineer officer in purely military employ of any sort; the department of Public Works, and various civil duties, absorb nearly the entire body of engineer officers.

II.—Rules of Discipline and Military Code.

1. As in the infantry.
2. As in the infantry.
3. As in the infantry.
4. As in the infantry.

III.—Organization Promotion and Rewards.

1. As in the infantry.
2. The native officers are efficient and intelligent; but none of this grade can take the place of a European officer.
3. As in the infantry.
4. I think not; they are promoted for military efficiency, rather than on account of professional acquirements, as in the infantry.
5. As in the infantry.
6. I am not aware that there has been anything approaching mutiny in this corps; nor do I think that portions of it have been at stations at which other troops have been insubordinate. From their earliest formation the Madras sappers have been eminently conspicuous for their admirable conduct in every situation. On every occasion of service throughout India—in Afghanistan, in Scinde, and in Persia—they have been employed, and always acquitted themselves with marked distinction.
7. As in the infantry.
8. By the practice in this army, the native officer's commission holds good over the European warrant or non-commissioned officer.
9 and 10. As in the infantry.
11. As in the infantry.
12. As was recommended for the infantry.
13. As in the infantry.
14. As in the infantry.
15. I think not. The European sapper is educated expressly for engineer work, and is taught a variety of sapper duties that the native never learns.
16. Infantry officers are appointed to the sappers as a substitute for engineer officers, and the system answers sufficiently well. But the infantry sapper officer's standard of efficiency is very much lower than that for the officer of engineers.

The instruction the infantry officer receives at sapper headquarters, before he can be detached in command of a company, is no doubt advantageous to him; and when qualified for such detached duty he is competent to superintend all the work that can be required of native sappers; and, perhaps, the infantry sapper officer is better suited to the native sapper work than the more highly-educated engineer officer.

At the same time, I think the corps should be separately officered; as the demands for it take officers from their own regiments, and they are often strangers to their men.

17. Now doubt it has. See reply to this question in reference to infantry.
18. As in the infantry. Attempts at amalgamation, assimilation, or centralization of the three native armies must, in my opinion, prove most injurious to our power in India.

IV.—European Officers.

1. The power of the commandant of sappers has been increased, as described in the answer to this question in reference to the infantry; but the constant changes of commandant and assistant, in view to their obtaining the the superior allowances in the department of Public Works, to which their standing gives them a claim, is very injurious to the corps.
2. There has been also an increase in the power of the officers of companies.
3. There has been little or no change as regards the native portion of the sappers. The conduct of the few European sappers has decidedly improved.
4. On the authority and influence of officers commanding companies, and the officer commanding the force under whose immediate orders the sappers are serving.
5 and 6. As in the infantry.

PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-General,
Commander-in-Chief.

Ootacamund,
August 31, 1858.

CAVALRY.

I.—The Recruiting and Composition of Corps.

1. The Madras cavalry, with the exception of its trumpeters, farriers, and bandsmen, who are chiefly East Indians, is composed exclusively of Mahommedans, Rajpoots, and Mahrattahs, and, by the latest return, in the following proportions:—

Mahommedans - - -	2,341
Rajpoots - - - -	98
Mahrattahs - - -	324

2. Twenty-three from Hindoostan.
Forty-nine from Northern Circars.
About two hundred from Mysore.
About two thousand thirty-six, Arcot District, Vellore, Madras, &c.
About three hundred, Trichinopoly and Tanjore, and the rest from the Baramahl and ceded districts.

3. No races, tribes, or castes have been excluded by regulation from the Madras cavalry, which, in regard to composition, is much the same now as when the two senior regiments were transferred to the East India Company in 1784 by the Nawaub of Arcot. The regular cavalry has for many years been considered the birth right of the Mahommedans of the Arcot district; and, with the exception of a few Mahrattahs, commanding officers have made little effort to recruit elsewhere. The paucity of Hindoos in the ranks I find attracted attention fifteen years ago, and endeavours were made, with but partial success, to obtain Rajpoots and

Mahrattahs. From all I have been able to gather it is clear to me that there was no doubt a strong feeling on the part of commanding officers in favour of the Mahommedan; and this, with other causes, has tended to exclude Hindoos from the Madras regular cavalry.

4. Possibly Hindoos from Mysore might be induced to enter the native regular cavalry, as they readily enlist into the Mysore horse; the Mysore horse, however, as a matter of policy, has been purposely retained in a state of comparative indiscipline, and for that reason is, in all probability, much more popular than the native regular cavalry. Moreover, there is, I learn from Lieutenant-General, Sir Mark Cubbon, the strongest disinclination on the part of the people of Mysore to quit the province for any lengthened period.

5. The same agency as for native infantry when requisite; but the present establishment of light cavalry regiments (300 privates) is on so reduced a scale, that of late years vacancies, as they have occurred, have been easily filled up by the transfer of recruit boys or by enlistments at regimental head-quarters.

6. The same as for native infantry.

7. The same precautions as for native infantry.

8. Not of necessity, but as a simple measure of precaution the existing preponderance of Mohammedans should be gradually reduced until Hindoos and Mahommedans are in equal proportions, if it can be managed.

9. The same oath as for native infantry.

10. See native infantry.

11. See native infantry.

12. I much prefer general enlistments to recruiting in any particular districts; but as stated in the reply to question 2, it is only in ceriain districts that men suitable for the mounted branch of the service have been obtained.

13. Without reference to districts, if practicable.

14. Composite, not homogeneous, corps are most to be desired in my opinion.

15. The tribes and castes should be as much as possible mixed up in the whole corps.

16. Mahommedans and Hindoos in equal proportions would be the best composition, but Hindoos of the inferior tribes and castes dislike the cavalry service, neither are they well fitted for it; and Rajpoots and Mahrattahs in sufficient numbers are difficult to be obtained; indeed, I am led to believe that they are not procurable in this presidency in any number.

17. The present agency is quite suitable if the existing system is to be followed; but if my recommendation to enlist half Mahommedans and half Hindoos is adopted, it may be necessary to employ extra means for providing a sufficient number of the latter class, such as a recruting depôt, and a distinct agency similar to that recently created for the infantry.

18. See reply to question 23, "infantry," on this point.

19. See reply to question 28, "infantry," on this point.

20. Answered as above.

21. Answered as above.

22. Answered as above.

23. Answered as above.

24. With the old dragoon sabre adapted to the strength of the man's arm. The present sword is much too heavy for a native trooper, and I may say for any but the most powerful men in even a regiment of European dragoons. Swords of several different weights, adapted to the varied strength and size of the men, should be given to regiments of cavalry, and the scabbards should either be of wood or lined with wood; the present steel scabbards have wood in them, but it is not in the proper place; it is placed at the sides of the blade, and not where it ought to be, before the edge. The perpetual drawing and returning swords should be prohibited. The swords should be drawn and inspected by the officers periodically; the edge carefully examined and reset if it has sustained injury, because they give confidence, not for any other reason. I would give each native cavalry soldier a brace of *percussion* pistols; and for sentry or vidette duty, I would arm one-fifth of the men with *percussion* carbines; but as I have often heard said by the late Colonel Charles Cureton, than whom there was no better cavalry officer, nor one of more varied experience, "the dragoon's true weapon is his horse."

25. There is advantage in assimilating to some extent the dress and equipments of the regular native cavalry to those of the European dragoon; but I think that generally assimilation is carried too far. As regards the dress and equipments, &c. of native cavalry, I would recommend that reference be made to a report on those points which was drawn up by me under the instructions of the late Sir James Lumley (then adjutant-general of the Bengal army) in 1841–42.

Information was sought for and obtained from the best and most experienced officers of both Her Majesty's and the Company's service in India, and submitted to the government of India (Secretary, Military Department,) with a full expression of Sir James Lumley's own opinions, and there the matter ended.

26. The dress I would recommend for the light cavalry of the Madras army is a loose scarlet or dark blue tunic "nimcha" or "mirzai" pattern, double-breasted, and with a stand-up collar, without lace, embroidery, or frippery of any sort; pantaloons, blue cloth, "peg-top" pattern; jack boots reaching four inches above the knee cap to draw over the pantaloons; hunting spurs to buckle over the boots; a twisted turban of uniform pattern. A head dress more European and less native in form and material than the present cumbrous, inconvenient, and unsightly "turban" would be strongly objected to by the Madras light cavalry. A cloth cloak as at present.

The stable dress, if one is required in a native corps, should consist of a pair of blue cotton or serge pantaloons made like the others; a blue or red cotton or serge "merzai;" skull cap, and shoes or sandals as at present.

The officers' dress should as closely as possible resemble the men's. I would, however, defer *for a time*, making any change, in regard to dress, in the Madras light cavalry.

II.—Rules of Discipline and Military Code.

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1 to 5 inclusive. See my replies to these same questions with respect to "Infantry." They are equally applicable to cavalry.

III.—Organization, Promotion, and Rewards.

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1 to 16 inclusive. See my replies to the foregoing questions with respect to "Infantry." They are equally applicable to native cavalry.

20. The substitution of irregular for regular native cavalry in the Madras army would not detract from efficiency, and would be far less costly. But a measure so sweeping is calculated to startle the minds of the existing regular cavalry, and to fill them with all kinds of fears and suspicions; and this is the invariable effect produced on natives by any changes in their condition, even such as are to us manifestly and unmistakeably for their advantage.

With the sole exception of the 8th regiment, the whole regular cavalry of the Madras army have acquitted themselves both in the field and in quarters loyally and creditably during the disturbances in Bengal, and I strongly recommend that so entire a change as converting them into irregular horse may not be attempted.

21. To mount irregular cavalry either in part or in whole on government horses would entirely upset the present constitution of this branch, and, in my opinion, destroy their usefulness, their economy, and their instant readiness for immediate service without assistance from commissariat or any other department.

22. Rupees five hundred and fifty (rupees 550) each.

23. Arabia, Persia, the Cape, Australia, and some few are bred by the Silladars in the Mysore district, but they are of a very inferior description.

26. The requirements during the past twelve months have been unusually heavy, and they have been marvellously well met.

27. Australian and Cape horses equal to the requirements of the European cavalry and artillery of the Madras presidency should be obtained from those colonies. The other breeds of horses are deficient in the weight and substance indispensable to thorough efficiency for those arms of the service.

28. On this point I recommend that reference should be had to a correspondence which passed, I think, in 1846–47, on the subject of procuring horses for the public service from the colonies. The correspondence will be found in the office of the adjutant-general of the Bengal army. The measure was strongly advocated by the military authorities of the day. Considerable expense was incurred in sending selected officers of experience to Australia to institute inquiry into the matter. If my memory does not deceive me their report was highly favourable in every respect; but nothing came of it.

IV.—European Officers.

16. See my replies to the sixteen foregoing questions, head "Infantry, 4 European Officers." They are quite as applicable to cavalry.

17. Presuming that the strength of regiments of dragoons of the royal army has been fixed with reference to considerations of thorough efficiency, experience, and mature deliberation, it appears to me that corps of European dragoons raised for service in India ought to be composed of the same number of sabres. At the same time I will state, though with diffidence, that my individual opinion is that a regiment of 500 privates, with the regulated proportion of non-commissioned officers, and consisting of eight troops, is the best and most handy organization.

18. The existing establishment of officers for a regiment of native light cavalry will suffice for a regiment of European dragoons of the strength indicated in my reply to the preceding question, if none are withdrawn for staff or other detached employment. But if the present system is persevered in of denuding corps of the line of their best officers, and creating a craving to get away in those who remain, I hold that it will be impracticable to maintain regiments in a state of thorough efficiency.

19. A single rank admits of showing a more extended front; every sword comes into play also, and these are obvious advantages; but a single rank looks weak and loose, and I think is so in reality as well as in appearance.

The double rank, on the other hand, has weight, solidity, and compactness, and I think that order of formation adds materially to the confidence of the soldier likewise. On these grounds I base my opinion in favour of the double rank system of formation. At any time a single rank can be formed if occasion requires, but let the double rank be the rule.

20. Trusting that the single rank system never will be introduced, it is unnecessary for me to reply to this question.

21. Of course it would be practicable, but in my opinion most unadvisable, and in every way objectionable, to attach a body of native troops permanently to any European corps.

22. Requires no answer referring to my reply to the preceding question. I consider my replies on these points with respect to infantry equally applicable to cavalry.

Pat. Grant, Lieut.-General,
Commander-in-Chief.

Ootacamund,
August 19, 1858.

CAVALRY, BENGAL.

I.—The Recruiting and Composition of Corps.

1. Hindoostanee Mahommedans, Sheikhs, Synds, Moghuts, and Pathans, and Hindoos, Brahmins, Rajpoots, Jats, and some also of the inferior castes. There are also Ranghurs in considerable numbers (*i.e.* Hindoos converted to Mahommedanism), and some few Sikhs and Afghans.

2. Principally I think from the Delhi and Rohilcund districts It must depend a good deal upon where the corps was raised.

3. I do not believe there are any regulations on this head for the irregular cavalry. The practice I think has been much the same as that of the regular army, viz., to exclude men of the inferior castes habitually employed in menial occupations.

4. I do not think so; the ranks are open to all classes, except the sort of men particularized above.

5. Recruiting is generally carried on amongst the native officers, non-commissioned officers, and sowars of the regiment. In most corps an "omedwar" list was kept. Any man of the regiment who wished a relation or friend to be enlisted brought him to the adjutant, and had his name put down in this list. Upon a vacancy occurring in the ranks, the commanding officer selected a recruit from amongst the body of omedwars present with the corps. Upon being entered on the list, of course they were at liberty either to remain with the regiment with their friends and wait their turn, or meanwhile to seek service elsewhere; if they obtained it, their names were simply erased.

6. I do not think recruiting parties were ever sent out into districts. With recruits brought up by men in the regiment those who presented them for enlistment stood surety.

7. Answered above. Their friends are responsible.

8. No alterations seem to me to be called for.

9. I do not remember the exact words. They swear to serve the company faithfully, to obey their officers, and never to desert or forsake their standards. Mahommedans are sworn upon the Koran, and Hindoos upon the "Gunga Jul."

10. I believe the form of oath is just the same as that employed in the regular army. I suppose it has been in use since the irregular service was formed and regularly organized and placed under the authority of the commander-in-chief, *i.e.* in 1846–47.

11. It does not occur to me to suggest any change, and I do not believe that any form of oath to serve a christian is considered really binding by either Hindoo or Mahommedan.

12 and 13. I much prefer recruiting over the widest possible area without reference to districts.

14. Composite, not homogeneous, corps are the best in my opinion.

15. Neither would I have the Ressalahs homogeneous, but mix up tribes and castes in each and as much as possible in equal proportions.

16. If composite, the chief object should be to keep an equal balance between the two religious classes of Mahommedan and Hindoo.

17. I think just as at present.

18. The man enlisting him being held responsible for a recruit, seems to be as much precaution as can be necessary.

19, 20, 21, 22, and 23. See my replies to questions 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32. "Bengal infantry," head "Recruiting and composition of corps." The answers apply equally to irregular cavalry.

24. Native Tulwar and Victoria percussion carbine.

25 and 26. See my replies to these same questions in reference to the native regular light cavalry of the Madras army.

II.—Rules of Discipline and Military Code.

1. I think they might be much simplified, and the catalogue of offences which commanding officers are empowered to deal with without reference to superior authority much increased.

2. Retained; they were made especially for the native army, and with regard to the prejudices, &c. &c. &c. of natives, at the same time the present would be a good opportunity to make any alterations which the times call for, as indicated in the reply to the immediately foregoing question.

3. I think that the principle of trial by courts-martial is good, but I much doubt that the present system does work satisfactorily, and I think it very desirable that it should be more simplified at all events in irregular corps, where, as much as possible, the commanding officer should be supreme.

4. The Articles of War can be read to them periodically upon parade as in regular regiments.

5. I cannot tell, but in most corps I fancy a very small number.

III.—Organization, Promotion, and Rewards.

1. Merit and seniority combined; seniority though greatly preponderating in the scale.

2. No, I do not think they are conspicuously so, nor by any means so much more so than those of the regular army, as is generally supposed. There is a like mixture of dull and bright in both.

3. Not so in my opinion.

4. The only test *ordered*, I believe, but rarely attended to, is, that a man should be able to read and write, *i.e.* before he can be promoted from the ranks to be a non-commissioned officer. The examination on these points is easily slurred over if a man is naturally sharp and intelligent, and the commanding officer considers him likely to make a good non-commissioned officer. For further promotions there is no test.

6. Most rarely, I believe, has any information been obtained from, or any warning been given by, native officers on these occasions. On the occurrence of an outbreak the generality, I think, do ostensibly range themselves on

the side of their officers, but their influence either in preventing or quelling a revolt appears to be nil.

10. See my reply to this same question in reference to the native infantry of the Madras army.

11. I think there ought to be pensions for long and faithful service, and that it would not be wise to abolish them. The present system as to rates, &c., appears to satisfy the recipients; any alterations, however, might be made that recent occurrences suggest with respect to the Bengal native army.

12. I cannot say.

13. I think promotion by merit and efficiency should be *the rule*; commanding officers generally have a just regard to the claims of old soldiers.

14. They are always proved to be swayed by party and private interests. They do not see offences in the same light as we do, and from this it is often very hard to get them to award an adequate punishment for what we consider, and what our Articles of War lay down, as serious offences.

17. A native regiment should either be fully officered, *i.e.*, to admit of the management of troops and companies being entirely in the hands of European officers, or if not, the present number of three officers is ample for an irregular corps,—the second in command, in time of peace, and present with the head-quarters of his regiment, has nothing to do, and the adjutant little more; the commanding officer is all in all. The permanent addition, therefore, of merely one or two more officers is unnecessary. But, on service, additional officers ought to be appointed to do duty.

18. I think when the service was first started the irregular cavalry was the most generally popular. It was something new; it opened a further large field for employment; there was a much greater laxity of drill and discipline, and the pay was so good,—at all events, in the non-commissioned and higher ranks. Even as regards the privates, I think, in a pecuniary point of view, a native would far prefer receiving 20 rupees to keep himself and his horse, than seven rupees a month and have a horse provided for him. There is sufficient proof of this in the anxiety of bargheers in irregular cavalry regiments to be made "khoduspahs," *i.e.*, owners of horses of their own. Still, there is never any difficulty in obtaining recruits for the regulars amongst the families of the men belonging to them, in the same way as the irregulars get plenty of recruits from their families; and the regular sepoy generally considers himself superior to the irregular.

19 and 20. Erased.

21. See my reply to this same question in reference to the Madras cavalry.

22. Rupees 800 each, I think, but I speak entirely from memory.

23. The horses come from the various government studs. They are the produce of English and Arab sires out of country and stud-bred mares. Australian, Cape, and country horses have been purchased at odd times on emergencies. In 1843, and also in 1845, a number of Arabs came up from Madras and Bombay.

24. Wherever it can, horses generally are to be purchased, as required, in the district in which the corps is stationed. Some commandants also send men annually to purchase at the Hurdwar or other great fairs.

25. I should think from 160 to 180 rupees.

26. The irregular cavalry may be quite well left to themselves. I think that much greater care and attention than used to be observed might be given to the system of breeding horses in the government studs.

27. I think that government ought to be able to breed first-rate horses at their own studs, and at much reduced prices.

28. See my reply to this same question in reference to the Madras cavalry.

29. Twenty rupees a month in our own old provinces, beyond the Indus 30.

30. If not put to constant needless expense for showy and costly uniforms and various other things that commanding officers often oblige their men to get, which are not in reality required, ordinarily 20 rupees a month is sufficient. But on actual service during a campaign, when the cost of every article of food for man and horse is enhanced, and there is so much extra wear and tear of all kinds, the pay of a sowar should be increased to 25 rupees a month, I think.

30 *b*. Generally they are, I have always understood, more or less in debt. A Mahomedan, of which class they are mostly composed, is, I suspect, seldom free from it; he generally spends all he receives. But twenty rupees a month, as I have before said, is sufficient on ordinary occasions to keep a sowar and his horse well; and an addition of five rupees a month when in the field would meet all extra expenses.

31. Answered in replies to 30 and 30*b*.

32. I think the present system of allowing a certain defined number of assamees to native commissioned and non-commissioned officers is good. It imparts some respectability and standing to these men, and forms an inducement to them both themselves to enter and to bring bargheers to the service. I think the number apportioned to the native officers should certainly be defined and limited to admit of a certain proportion of the sowars being "khoduspahs;" but if one native officer can afford to purchase an assameeship, while another cannot, I should allow him to do so. The average value of an assameeship I should suppose to be about 300 rupees. They must have increased in value, as the mounting, dress, and equipment of the men has become more expensive. I do not think they have any effect upon the efficiency of the corps in horses and equipments or conduct of duty one way or the other.

IV.—European Officers.

1. Since the irregular cavalry have been brought under direct military authority and subjected to the general regulation of the service, the powers of commanding officers have certainly been much diminished, and of late years the tendency has been to diminish them more and more.

2. If by "discipline" is meant the perfect subordination of the men to their commanding officer, I think that taking out of his hands the almost absolute authority he formerly exercised has been very injurious.

5. Certainly upon the authority, influence, and example of the officers who serve with and belong to them, more especially the commanding officer.

6. The powers of commanding officers should be increased; as I have before said, they should be almost absolute. The powers of officers of troops in corps of irregular cavalry where there are no European troop officers should be regulated entirely at the discretion of the commandant of the regiment.

7. Abstain from over drilling, and the efforts to convert corps of irregular cavalry into regiments of regular cavalry, and return to the old custom of encouraging them to practice their native exercises and feats of horsemanship and arms.

13. See my replies to questions 13 and 14, head "Infantry. IV. European Officers."

15. See my reply to question 16, head "Infantry. IV. European Officers."

21 and 22. These questions have already been answered in reference to regular cavalry and infantry, and the same replies are, I consider, equally applicable here.

Pat. Grant, Lieut.-General,
Ootacamund, Commander-in-Chief.
August 14, 1858.

ARTILLERY.

I.—Recruiting and Composition of the Artillery.

1. The same as the Madras native infantry.
2. As above.
3. As above.

4. I would never again have a native artilleryman in India. The conduct of the Madras native artillery has been admirable hitherto, and the portions employed in Bengal during the disturbances have acquitted themselves most creditably. I would therefore maintain the existing native artillery of this presidency, and let them gradually die off, enlisting no more native recruits however, and manning all field batteries by Europeans, the golundauz, while they are kept up, being formed into reserve companies. I may

add, that these measures, which I suggested more than a year ago, are now being given effect to as opportunity offers under instructions from the Court of Directors.

5. Certainly not; all artillery drivers should be Europeans, or (if the experiment now under trial answers) East Indians, should it be found that men of that class in sufficient numbers are procurable, which from present appearances is very doubtful.

6. Same as infantry.
7. As above.
8. As above.
9. See reply to this question as regards native infantry.
10. As above.
11. See reply to this question as regards native infantry.
12. As above.
13. See reply to this question as regards native infantry.
14. As above.
15. As above.
16. As above.
17. See reply to this question as regards native infantry.
18. As above.
19. As above.
20. As above.
21. As in question 20.
22. See reply to this question as regards native infantry; it is equally applicable to artillery.
23. As above.
24. As above.
25. See reply to this question as regards native infantry.
26. As above.
27. See reply to question 5.

The stature of a gunner should not be under five feet six or seven inches; a well-knit man of five feet three or four inches is quite tall enough for a driver, but they should, nevertheless, be bound by the terms of their enlistment to perform both duties if required.

II.—Rules of Discipline and Military Code.

1. The Articles of War for native troops are alone applicable to native military classes of every description.
2. See reply to this question as regards native infantry; it is equally applicable to artillery.
3. In my opinion the Articles of War for all European troops in India should correspond in every particular with the Articles of War for Her Majesty's British army.
4. See replies to questions 1 and 2.
5. See reply to this question as regards native infantry; it is equally applicable to native artillery.
6. As above.
7. As above.
8. As above.

III.—Organization, Promotion, and Rewards.

1. See reply to this question as regards native infantry; it is equally applicable to gun lascars, golundauzes, and native drivers.
2. As above.
3. As above.
4. See reply to this question as regards native infantry.
5. The golundauz have been systematically instructed and practised in all these points; but I am told that, with exception of the ordinary gun drill, they have evinced little aptitude either to receive or retain the instruction imparted to them.
6. I am informed that many of the golundauz can both read and write English, but that they are often indisposed to allow it to be known that they possess these acquirements.
7. Certainly not.
8. See reply to this question as regards native infantry; it is equally applicable to native artillery.
9. As above.
10. As above; but I earnestly hope that it has been authoritatively and finally decided to abolish native artillery not only in the armies of India, but as well in the forces of all native independent (so called) states and chiefs.
11. See reply as regards native infantry on this point; it is equally applicable to native artillery.
12. As above.
13. As above.
14. Yes, after 20 years' service, if unfit for further duty.
15. Neither more nor less so than any other native military retainers. The drivers and gun lascars are drawn from precisely the same classes and districts as the golundauz and native infantry, and I conclude are imbued with precisely the same feeling and disposition.
16. See reply to this question as regards native infantry.
17. As above.
18. See reply to this question as regards native infantry.
19. As above.
20. As above.
21. On this point of assimilation I beg to refer to a minute I recorded at Madras on the 21st November 1856, and of which I now forward a copy.* Assimilation to the extent therein contended for is much to be desired; any closer assimilation is, I think, not called for. The perfect efficiency of the artillery of the armies of India never has been doubted, and I imagine it is infinitely more economical than the royal artillery. I observe that the Chairman of the Court of Directors announced at the last Addiscombe examination, that the officers of the artilleries of India are to be placed on the same organization as the officers of the royal artillery, thus abolishing the ranks of regimental major and 1st lieutenant, and substituting for them the superior grades of lieutenant-colonel and 2nd captain, and doubtless this is a boon which cannot fail to be gratefully appreciated by the artillery of the Indian armies.
22. The "system" of the Madras artillery corresponds with that of the royal artillery, both horse artilleries being formed on the "detachment system;" and the system of drill and instruction throughout is also, I think, the same in both.
23. A royal artillery 24-pounder howitzer and 9-pounder gun are each 3 cwt. heavier than the pieces of the same description in use in India; and here and in Bengal the pole is in use instead of shafts, as used in the royal artillery and in the Bombay presidency. The royal artillery gun carriages are also much heavier than those of the Madras pattern. On these and other points see also the Minute of the 21st November 1856.
24. The present organization of the Madras artillery would be all that need be desired if an increase were made to the strength of troops and companies, if European were substituted for native drivers, and if the lamentable paucity of European officers were rectified; and in every case let us have horses instead of bullocks with field artillery. In my opinion a troop of horse artillery and a battery company of foot artillery should consist of, the former 100 and the latter 80 gunners, with the prescribed proportion of bombardiers, corporals, and serjeants; and let the establishment of officers be on a scale *to ensure the presence at all times with each troop and battery* of at least one captain and three subalterns. Artillery insufficiently officered never can be thoroughly efficient.
25. I think the present matériel of the Madras artillery most suitable to the climate and service in India; and I am of opinion that it would be a mistake, with our light horses, to assimilate it more exactly to that of the royal artillery.
26. There are at present two troops of native horse artillery in this presidency. They should be gradually reduced, and two light field batteries, manned by Europeans, substituted for them.

IV.—European Officers.

1. See reply to this question as regards native infantry it is equally applicable to artillery.
2. As above.
3. As above.
4. See reply on this head as regards native infantry. The paucity of officers, as I have repeatedly represented, is utterly destructive of thorough efficiency in the corps of artillery.
5. See reply on this head as regards infantry; it is equally applicable to artillery.
6. As above.

Pat. Grant, Lieut.-General,
Commander-in-Chief.

Ooctacamund,
August 21, 1858.

* *See* page 138.

APPENDIX No. 66.

MINUTES of Lieut.-General Sir PATRICK GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, Madras.

GENERAL STAFF OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

In the short minute on civil salaries recorded a few days ago, I remarked on the evil effects likely to arise from remunerating two officers, identic in labour, responsibllity, and importance, at different rates. I observed that, as regards many of the appointments on the General Staff of the Madras army, this system prevailed; and I intimated my intention of offering the subject to the consideration of Government.

I think it will be admitted that the stimulus of progressive advancement is desirable to secure zeal, perseverance, and diligence; that the same rate of remuneration should be allowed for the discharge of duties in all respects of the same description, and involving precisely the same amount of labor and application; and that it is only just that the emoluments of an office should be in correspondence with its importance, responsibility, and labours. I now proceed to show that in these respects the present system in this Presidency is, in my judgment, defective; and how it may be best amended.

I commence with the Department of the Adjutant General of the Army — second to none in importance and responsibility — and far exceeding all others in downright labour and incessant application to duty.

The Adjutant General's Department comprises the following appointments; in the order in which, in my opinion, they ought to stand as respects position, responsibility, and labour, and in emolument, in reference to these considerations—*viz.*

Adjutant General of the Army.
Deputy Adjutant General of the Army.
Assistant Adjutant General of the Army.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General of the Army.
Assistant Adjutant General of Divisions.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General of Divisions.
Major of Brigade.

The Deputy Adjutant General of the Madras Army draws a staff and horse allowance of Rs. 600 per mensem each; I think it too little, bearing in mind that he is the deputy of the Principal Staff Officer of the Army, and adverting to the onerous and important duties he has to perform. The Deputy Adjutant General in Bengal draws 800 rs. a month, and I am clearly of opinion that the Deputy Adjutant General of Madras should be raised to 700.

Including 60 rupees allowance for two horses; entitled to the regimental pay and allowances of his rank, and the Presidency scale of house rent.

The Assistant and Deputy Assistant Adjutant General of the Army have precisely the same amount and description of duties, and I think that, as in Bengal, their designations and emoluments should be identical. They should be designated 1st and 2nd Assistant Adjutant General of the Army, and their Staff allowances ought to be raised, I submit, to a near approximation to the Bengal rate—I would say 450 rupees a month—the Bengal rate being 500; and the Assistant Adjutant General of Artillery should be placed on the same footing.

Includes rs. 30 for one horse; entitled to the regimental pay and allowances, and the Presidency scale of house rent of their rank.

Assistant and Deputy Assistant Adjutant General of Division, as regards duty, labor, and responsibility, are exactly on a par, and in Bengal (except with an army in the field, when the Assistant draws superior office allowance to the Deputy Assistant) all are paid precisely alike. In Madras there is a wide difference; the Assistant Adjutant General of Division draws, in all, extra allowances amounting to Rupees 528 per mensem; while the Deputy Assistant Adjutant General of Division receives only Rupees 304. I think it will be admitted that the Bengal rule is the most just — and I propose that it should be adopted in this Presidency, giving to an Assistant or Deputy Assistant Adjutant General of Division (when not on field service) the same rate of remuneration— rupees 400 per mensem each. All Brigade Majors have exactly the same duties and responsibilities, and in Bengal all receive precisely the same remuneration, while in Madras several different rates prevail, and, as far as I have been able to ascertain, without the slightest reason. In Bengal all Brigade Majors receive rupees 354 per month, and I suggest that this rule should be adopted in the Madras Presidency.

Includes rs. 170 staff pay, 60 for 2 horses, 30 for office tent, and 140 office allowances; entitled to the regimental pay and allowances of their rank.

Includes rs. 124 staff pay, 60 for 2 horses, 30 for office tent, and 140 office allowances; entitled to the pay and allowances of their regimental rank.

In Bengal, a Brigade Major is allowed—and properly so—for every Brigade Command. In Madras we have ten Brigade Commands and only six Brigade Majors. Four more should be added to the present establishment, in assimilation with the Bengal practice. In Bengal there are three Fort Adjutants, but no such staff appointment as Cantonment Adjutant, and Station Staff Officer. In Madras there are six Fort Adjutants, three Cantonment Adjutants, and five Station Staff Officers.

With the one exception of Fort Saint George, I think all three Fort Adjutancies, the three Cantonment Adjutancies, and the five Station Staff Officers' appointments should be abolished. At the Head Quarters of a Brigade the duties now conducted by Cantonment Adjutants, Fort Adjutants, or Station Staff Officers, should be performed by the Brigade Major; at Stations not being the Head Quarters of a Brigade, and for which a Brigade Major is not given, the Staff duties should be conducted by one of the Regimental Staff Officers; the interpreter and Quartermaster has least to do, and can therefore most conveniently take the duty.

This is the practice in Bengal, and I recommend that it should be followed in this Presidency. At some few stations in Bengal the "Station Staff" is * allowed 25 or 30 rupees a month for an extra writer, and the same rate should obtain here.

* Who is also a Regimental Adjutant or Quartermaster, as I have already observed.

The designation of Station Staff Officer at Poonamallee and Palaveram should be changed, I think, to "Commandant of the Depôt"—the emoluments remaining the same as now existing; and for Saint Thomas' Mount I suggest that a Brigade Major should be given, in lieu of the present "Station Staff."

In course of my service I have held the whole of these appointments, from Regimental Adjutant to Adjutant General of the Army, and may therefore be allowed to speak authoritatively with *respect* to them.

DEPARTMENT OF THE QUARTERMASTER GENERAL OF THE ARMY.

Though not so laborious, in importance and responsibility this Department is considered to be on a par with the Department of the Adjutant General; and in respect of allowance it ought to be placed on the same footing.

In Bengal all the Officers of this Department are considered to belong to the Department of the Quartermaster General "*of the Army*"—which is the designation of each and every grade—and they are employed wherever the Commander-in-Chief thinks they can be of most use. Generally an Officer of the Department is attached to each Division of the Army, but not necessarily so, as appears the rule at Madras; and when not absolutely required with the troops, they should be detached to parts of the country not previously well known, required to report on their general features and resources, the lines of road which traverse them, the state of the roads, the names and description of the different villages, the extent of the population, where supplies for troops marching, and carriage, and water, can be most conveniently provided and found, &c. &c. Very important information may be gained this way, and on points on which it is the particular duty of the Quartermaster General's Department to afford accurate and reliable intelligence.

All general duties in the Quartermaster General's Department at Stations or with Division or Detachments of the Army, for which no provision is made by express appointment, should be performed by Regimental Quartermaster.

IN THE MADRAS PRESIDENCY WE HAVE

1 Quartermaster General of the Army.
1 Dy. Qr.-Mr. General of the Army.
1 Asst. Qr.-Mr. General of the Army.
1 Dy. Asst. Qr.-Mr. General of the Army.
3 Assts. Qr.-Mr. General of Division and Forces.
6 Dy. Assts. Qr.-Mr. General of Divisions.

IN BENGAL PRESIDENCY THERE ARE

1 Quartermaster General.
1 Dy. Qr.-Mr. General.
2 Assts. Qr.-Mr. General.
2 First Class Dy. Assts. Qr.-Mr. General.
2 Second Class Dy. Assts. Qr.-Mr. General.
2 Offig. Dy. Assts. Qr.-Mr. General.

} all "of the Army."

Thus, in Bengal, ten officers, two of them officiating and extra to the fixed establishment, discharge duties on which thirteen officers are permanently employed in the Madras Presidency, though the extent of the former and the numerical strength of its army, vastly exceeds the extent and numbers of the Madras Presidency and Army.

	Allowances as in Bengal, viz.
1	Same as Adjutant General of the Army.
2	„ Dy. Adjutant General of the Army.
3	„ Asst. Adjutant Genl. of the Army.
4	Rs. 400 per month } Includes allow-
5	Rs. 300 per month } ance for horse
	30 Rs. entitled to the pay, batta, gratuity and tentage of their regimental rank.

Note.—Officiating Deputy Assistants draw rs. 250 per mensem, with the pay and allowances of their regimental rank.

I think the following reduced establishment would be found quite sufficient for this Presidency, viz.

1	Quartermaster Genl. 1
1	Dy. Quartermaster General - - 2
2	Assistants Quartermaster General - - 3
3	Dy. Assts. Qr.-Mr. General, 1st class - 4
3	Dy. Assts. Qr.-Mr. General, 2nd class - 5

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

The present establishment is, I consider, quite suitable, being in the proportion of a Deputy Judge Advocate General for each Division, and Field force, and the emoluments are in exact correspondence with those of the Deputy Judge Advocates General of the Army in the Bengal Presidency; the designations likewise correspond.

These three are the Departments of the Army under the immediate orders of the Commander-in-Chief, and to them I shall therefore confine myself.

If the views I have enunciated are concurred in by the Right Honourable the President and my colleagues, I would suggest that the financial portion of the subject be referred for report to the Military Auditor General, in order that the entire question in all its bearings, may be fully before the Government.

(Signed) PAT. GRANT.

November 18, 1856.

ARTILLERY.—21 November 1856.

The authorities at Home and in India have, for upwards of thirty years, entertained an anxious desire to assimilate the Artillery of the three Presidencies; so as to admit of their affording mutual assistance, and of changing materiel, stores, and equipments, on occasions of their being associated on duty or of exchanging stations.

For these thirty years this most important subject has been keenly discussed by Artillery Officers of the three Presidencies, successive Commanders-in-Chief in India have recorded their opinions on it, voluminous reports have been made, experiments tried, recommendations and suggestions innumerable have been offered, but as yet without any satisfactory result, and to shew that the real object is as far from being accomplished as ever, I need only point to the fact that the Bengal and Madras Artillery have been unable to exchange armaments and equipments, when directed within the last few weeks to relieve one another in Burmah and the Saugor Division: and consequently the Madras guns, and carriages, and horse equipments, have to be conveyed from Mhow to Burmah, and the Bengal materiel must be taken from Burmah to Mhow.

Why this most serious inconvenience has not long since been corrected, and the necessary assimilation effected, is I think clearly explained by the Honourable the Court of Directors as follows:—"Each Government recommends its "own fancied superiority in Ord-

Letter dated 11th July 1834. "nance improvements, and advo-"cates the suggestion of its own "Artillery officers, little or no attention is paid to what may "already be in useful operation at the sister Presidencies, "and comparisons which might be beneficial and lead to "uniformity, are seldom made."

It is quite hopeless to expect unanimity on this subject amongst the Artillery officers of the three Presidencies, and if assimilation so highly important and desirable is to be attained, paramount authority can alone decide in what manner and to what extent it is to be carried out. I think, therefore, that the Honourable Court alone can effectually deal with the question, and it will be in the highest degree gratifying to me if the observations I beg to make, prove of any assistance towards arriving at a final judgment on the several points in dispute.

It is in no spirit of presumption, but, on the contrary, with very great diffidence, that I approach a subject which has for so lengthened a period engaged the serious attention of so many able and experienced officers of the highest rank; nor should I venture upon the task were it not that the whole correspondence having repeatedly passed through my hands while I was Adjutant General of the Army in Bengal, and having seen and minutely examined in every particular the Artillery of the three Presidencies, I have had opportunities of comparing each with the others not enjoyed by those who have preceded me when they recorded their sentiments.

I propose to consider the subject under each of the following heads:

Organization. Equipments.
Armament. Light Field Gun Carriages.

Organization.—The Madras and Bombay Horse Artillery is formed on the "Detachment system," as in the Royal Artillery, and only the near horses in draught are ridden.

In Bengal there is no Detachment, and every horse in draught carries a rider. The system has proved thoroughly efficient in Bengal, where the horses are of much superior weight and substance, and it is far less expensive than the "Detachment system," which requires more men and more horses. But the Bengal organization would not be suitable to the other Presidencies, where the horses are much smaller and lighter than the Bengal Government Stud horse. Moreover, the differences in organization do not materially affect the real question of the one Presidency being able to assist the other when necessary: and I would therefore make no change in this respect, but allow each Presidency to retain its present organization, and Bombay its shafts, instead of the pole, as used in Bengal and Madras.

The organization of the Light Field Batteries is the same in all the three Presidencies.

Armament.—The Bengal Armament of a Troop of Horse Artillery is five 6-pounders and one 12-pounder howitzer, and of a light field battery five 9-pounders and one 24-pounder howitzer. In Madras and Bombay the proportions per troop and battery are four guns to two howitzers—which I consider greatly preferable, and for this reason—every two pieces are supposed to be superintended by a Subaltern, and it is highly desirable that the pieces should be of the same description: but if only a single howitzer is present, this is impracticable, and hence, with a gun and a howitzer (provided with different ammunition and varying in so many particulars otherwise) superintended by the same officer, much confusion and serious mistakes may, and I am aware do, sometimes arise in the heat and hurry of action. Further, the 24-pounder howitzer is the perfection of a light field piece, and if two are attached to every battery with a force in the field, a howitzer battery can be readily formed at any moment.

In Madras and Bombay all light field batteries, manned by Native companies, are armed with 6-pounders and 12-pounders howitzer, because Natives are thought physically unfit to work Ordnance of any heavy calibre; but, judging from the appearance of the Native artillerymen here and in the Bombay Army, I am disposed to think that the prevailing opinion with respect to their physical powers is groundless. Doubtless they are not nearly such large powerful men as their Bengal comrades, but quite equal, nevertheless, to the service of a 9-pounder battery; and I strongly recommend that the present comparatively useless 6-pounder field batteries in Madras and Bombay should be at once armed with the immeasurably superior 9-pounder gun and 24-pounder howitzer. In Bengal one troop of horse artillery was armed with the heavier Ordnance as an experiment and it answered admirably. It was a superb troop (Fordyce's), and in the rapid advance and long marches to Peshawur, under Sir Walter Gilbert, as well as in the foray to Kohat with Sir Charles Napier, this troop always maintained a forward position without the least distress to either the men (Europeans) or horses. I do not, however, advocate arming horse artillery generally with 9-pounders; but I think 6-pounders most objectionable for light field batteries, and I hope that they may be peremptorily forbidden in the Madras and Bombay armies.

Equipments.—In Bengal all harness and saddlery is issued, in the first instance, from the Government stores, and afterwards maintained complete in all respects from the contract allowance, issued monthly to officers in command of troops and batteries—who are responsible to superior authority that everything is in perfect order.

When an officer is appointed to a troop or battery to supply a vacancy, he is required to purchase, at a valuation, such of the stock ordered to be kept up as may remain in store, the property of his predecessor; and whenever an officer is removed from a troop or battery, the horse furniture and stores are surveyed by a committee, and he is called upon, previous to his departure, to make good all deficiencies, according to an adjustment to be determined by the regimental commanding officer; and precisely the same course might be followed, if the mode of supply and keeping up were assimilated—if the public convenience rendered it desirable (as is now the case in Burmah) that the troops of batteries of different presidencies should exchange equipments. In Madras, and Bombay also, I believe, the duties of providing, repairing, and maintaining in a state of efficiency, the saddles, bridles, harness, and horse appointments of horse artillery, horse field batteries, and

native cavalry, including the body guard, devolve on the military board; and it is intended, I believe, to transfer them to the Commissariat Departments on the Board being abolished. Under this system, the regulated allowance for each horse, granted by Government, is formed into a general fund (on the principle of the old off-reckoning fund for the provision of army clothing) for the benefit, not of the troop officers who have the direct and immediate charge of the equipment, but of commanding officers of *regiments*, and the profits are divided annually amongst the officers so entitled, giving two shares to the officer commanding the horse *brigade*, one share to each officer commanding a regiment of cavalry, and one-fourth of a share to each officer commanding a horse battery.

In my opinion the Bengal plan is the best, it creates a generous rivalry amongst the troop and battery officers as to who turns out in the most efficient state and best equipped; while the regimental commanding officer is responsible that no deviation from established patterns takes place. It insures the instant supply and correction of deficiencies or omissions, however arising, which must be impracticable when the arrangements are, as at Madras, under the control of a distant governing body, like the military board or the Commissariat, and thus delay and tardy references take the place of promptitude and immediate action.

Light Field Gun Carriages.—From the outset this point has been the great bone of contention between the artillery officers of the different presidencies, and it is, before all others, the one on which assimilation to a certain extent is most urgently called for.

In Madras and Bombay, and also in the Bengal artillery, the gun carriage is constructed on much the same principle, and it can be used in Bengal without the least difficulty: but the Bengal carriage cannot be adopted in the other presidencies without ruining the horses, from its great additional weight in draught, arising from the weight being placed in front of instead of behind the limber axle. In Bengal this is not felt as an inconvenience, because of the superior size and strength of the horses; but with the light smaller horse in use here, the increased weight the Bengal carriage throws on the neck of the animal is destructive of efficiency.

I have had the different carriages submitted for my inspection and compared one with the other with the greatest care and attention, and I have no hesitation whatever in pronouncing in favour of the Madras carriage; but for all practical purposes the assimilation will be sufficient if the Madras construction of the pintle and position of the pintle hook, the Madras wheel, the Madras diminished length of axle-tree body and diminished length of axle-tree arm, as compared with the excessive length of the Bengal axle, are adopted as the pattern for all India.

It is not a matter of importance, even if a Madras battery were brigaded with a Bengal battery, that one should have a swivel loop, the other a fixed one—but it is very important that one should be able to borrow a wheel from the other, which at present is impossible, for the nave of the Bengal wheel is too long for a Madras axle arm, and the arm of the Bengal axle too thick for the Madras nave; in these respects, therefore, assimilation is highly necessary. The Madras short pole in rear of the limber to fix the pintle to is, I think, a great improvement, and materially facilitates limbering up, without in any degree diminishing the strength of the carriage, but I would not force its introduction upon the other presidencies if they are opposed to it, for overstrained assimilation is neither desirable nor necessary.

I have served in the field with every troop and battery of the Bengal Artillery—I have the highest admiration for the regiment, and all the officers of any standing are my personal and valued friends, and as these facts are well known, it may perhaps be imputed to me that I have a strong leaning towards the system and practice of that corps—but I can honestly declare that the opinions I have now expressed are free from all such predilections or prejudices. I have deliberately and impartially weighed and considered, and compared one with the other, every point which I thought ought to be carefully investigated, and with the single view of endeavouring to ascertain and show what changes are advisable for the general good of the three presidencies, so intimately involved, as I think, in procuring the desired extent of assimilation. And I have assuredly not written under present local influences or promptings, for I have neither consulted any one here, nor has any officer of the Madras Artillery been even made aware of my intention to draw up this report.

Minute by the Right Honourable the President, Madras, December 4, 1856.

The subject of the Minute of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief appears to me very important—and requiring early attention.

The diversities which exist between the armies of the three presidencies in various points must be very objectionable—more especially in case of their having to act together.

It would probably be impolitic to endeavour to assimilate them at once, but they might gradually be diminished.

At present, I imagine, many of them are scarcely known of, and are only discovered when the troops come together, or happen to replace each other.

The best method, it strikes me, for bringing them to light and for reducing them to comparison, would be for an Inspector for each Department to be appointed for the whole of India—whose duties would be to report periodically on all the points worthy of notice in their respective arms of the service.

The Minute of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief should be brought to the notice of the Government of India for their favourable consideration, and with a recommendation that it should be forwarded by them to the Honourable Court.

From the Secretary to Government, Military Department, December 23, 1856, No. 3370; to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I am directed to forward for submission to the Government of India the annexed copy of a Minute by the Commander-in-Chief having reference to the assimilation of the materiel of the Artillery of the three Presidencies.

2. The subject appears to the Governor in Council to be one of great importance, and requiring early attention; the diversities of pattern which at present exist frequently proving a serious hindrance to the public service.

3. It might not be prudent or perhaps practicable, immediately to effect a complete assimilation; but it appears highly desirable that measures should at once be adopted for its gradual accomplishment.

4. Many of the points of difference probably are at present scarcely known, and only come under notice as the Artillery of different Presidencies are required to serve together or to relieve each other.

5. It would seem necessary, therefore, in the first instance that a complete comparison should be instituted in every item of Ordnance equipment of the three Presidencies, preparatory to the establishment, as far as may be found practicable, of similar patterns for the whole.

6. In regard to the system under which saddlery and harness are supplied in this Presidency, the Governor in Council would observe that it was established with the sanction of the Court of Directors, as well as of the Government of India, and that the experience of more than twenty years has proved it to be in every point of view free from objection and perfectly efficient.

Memorandum by Lieut.-General Sir Patrick Grant, June 1857.

European troops now in Bengal:—9 troops of horse Artillery, being 54 guns; 24 companies of foot artillery, 12 of which man twelve of the twenty light field batteries or 72 guns; thus, 126 field guns in all are manned by Europeans, and the remaining (72) seventy-two by natives; 2 regiments, Her Majesty's dragoons; 15 regiments, Her Majesty's, 3 companies, in all 18 regiments of infantry.

Under present circumstances, and they are likely to be of long duration, this force of Europeans is altogether inadequate. The present disposition of Europeans is very good as far as it goes, but some stations require to be strengthened, and some new ones must be formed, I conceive.

I consider that we should have at and in the immediate neighbourhood of the presidency, *in addition to existing numbers*,—

2 batteries (12 guns) and (1) one regiment of infantry.
At Berhampore, a battery (16 guns) and (1) one regiment of infantry.
At Dinapore, another battery (six guns).
At Benares, another battery and a regiment of infantry.
At Allahabad, a battery and a regiment of infantry, and two reserve companies of artillery.
At Cawnpore, 18 field guns, 1 regiment of dragoons, and two regiments of infantry.
At Lucknow, 12 field guns and a regiment of infantry.
At Agra, 12 field guns, another reserve company of artillery, and a regiment of infantry.
At Umballah, 6 field guns and a regiment of infantry.
At Jullundar, 6 field guns.
At Ferozepore, 6 field guns.
At Rewalpindee, 6 field guns.

Thus the additional European force required would consist of—

20 companies of artillery.
1 regiment of dragoons.
9 regiments of infantry for permanent stations.

So far as I can see at present, to preserve perfect tranquillity throughout the Bengal presidency, we shall require to have in excess of the force at fixed stations above specified, five moveable columns, viz.:—one at Hazarabaugh, one at Allahabad, one at Agra, one at Umballa, one at Jhelundar.

Each of these columns should consist of, at the lowest calculation, six guns and two regiments of European infantry, and the Jhelum column should have a regiment of dragoons also. The total amount of European force in excess of that now in the country would therefore consist of,—

25 companies of artillery.
2 regiments of dragoons.
19 regiments of infantry.

(Signed) P. GRANT.

June 18, 1857.

Memorandum to the Governor-General, Calcutta, June 29, 1857.

In my memorandum dated the 18th of June, and which I did myself the honour to place in the hands of the Right Honourable the Governor-General on that day, I specified the amount of European force which I consider absolutely necessary for the perfect security of this presidency, *in excess of that now borne on the Bengal establishment, viz.*:—

25 companies of artillery.
2 regiments of dragoons.
19 regiments of infantry.

The "disposition" I proposed to make of these troops was also indicated. But India cannot be held by European troops alone. We must have a native force to take the numerous duties involving exposure to the sun at every season, and the question for consideration is, how is this native force to be formed, and how composed.

Faith must be kept, I conceive, with all the native troops, as at present existing, who maintain an unshaken loyalty to the State to the close of the present disturbances.

There seems little room to doubt that five regiments of light cavalry * and thirty-six regiments of native infantry † have already mutinied, and will fall to be disbanded, leaving, if no more corps commit themselves, which is extremely doubtful, five regiments of light cavalry and thirty-eight regiments of native infantry; and I hold that this will be a sufficient force of native troops for the Bengal presidency, if the increase to the European troops which I have suggested is made, and the following arrangements are carried out:—

* Lt. Cy. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 7th Regiments.

† Native Infantry, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 15th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 24th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 34th, 37th, 38th, 41st, 45th, 48th, 51st, 53rd, 54th, 55th, 56th, 57th, 68th, 71st, 72nd, and 74th, in all thirty-six Regiments.

	Regts. N.I.
Eastern Frontier:— Jelpegarree . . . } Dacca . . . . . }	1
Saugor District:— Saugor, Dumoh, Jubbulpore, Mhow, and Nagode . . . . }	5
Nowgong and Jhansi	1
Total N. I. Rgts. to Madras	7
" " " Neemuch	1
" Nusserrabad, Jeypore, Agmeer . . . . . }	2
Total Regts. to Bombay .	3
Grand total taken from Bengal	10

1st. Transfer the stations and posts marginally noted to the Madras and Bombay presidencies, and, as the most appropriate and politic reward for the unshaken loyalty they have manifested throughout the present crisis, increase those armies to an extent equal to the increase of duty thus imposed upon them.

2nd. Organize a thoroughly efficient police, mounted and dismounted, at each of the three presidencies, taking the Punjab police as a model. I am told it is admirable. A police of this description could efficiently discharge many heavy duties which now fall upon the regular troops, and with this relief and re-transferring the stations I have specified to Madras and Bombay, I am of opinion that thirty-eight regiments of Native Infantry of the present strength would amply suffice for the Bengal presidency. If more are found to be absolutely necessary, irregular corps should alone be raised, composed of Seiks, Goorkhas, and other classes not hitherto generally enlisted.

To replace the revolted corps of cavalry and infantry, the East India Company should raise three regiments of British dragoons and nineteen regiments of European infantry, appointing to each regiment an establishment of officers equal to that now allowed for two native corps. In this way, very little, if any, additional expense will be incurred, and the permanent stability of our Indian empire will be fully secured.

I think that the officers appointed to these European corps should be sent home to raise and organize the regiments; and until they are formed and fit for duty, it is obviously necessary that India should be occupied by Her Majesty's troops, a portion of which should always be in this country. There are no better troops in the world than the European regiments of the Company's service; but associating them with troops of the royal army creates a generous emulation and rivalry, is a powerful stimulus to exertion, and beneficial in very many respects. The system of interior economy of regiments of Her Majesty's service is, I believe, superior to that of any army in the world, and it should be strictly followed in all European regiments of the Company's service. The troops should be cantoned in considerable bodies in the most eligible position, and in the proportion of one European to three native soldiers.

There should be no single regiment stations. All large treasuries, arsenals, magazines, and jails, should be invariably placed within easy reach of military protection. Every cantonment should be provided with a redoubt, or other defensive works in a commanding position, and armed with a couple of heavy guns, on traverses, and three or four light pieces.

All artillery should be manned exclusively by Europeans —natives should never again be trusted with guns, nor should the Enfield or Minié rifle ever be placed in the hands of native troops.

Dissatisfaction and distrust have been gradually growing up in this army; and while the minds of the soldiers were imbued with such feelings, designing men could have little difficulty in communicating to the troops impressions suitable to their own ends. I feel convinced that the wide extension of all kinds of educational projects, the change in the terms of enlistment, rendering it compulsory on the Bengal sepoy to proceed on foreign service beyond sea—the enactment legalizing and encouraging the re-marriage of Hindoo widows, have all been industriously made use of to alarm the native troops into believing that their religion and caste were in danger. I now proceed to consider how dissatisfaction and distrust have arisen, and I think the feeling may be traced to have originated from the following causes.

FIRST.—Want of confidence in the Government on the part of the sepoy.

SECOND.—An idea that the sepoy could dictate to Government.

THIRD.—Want of officers in whom the sepoy could confide.

FOURTH.—Officers not having sufficient control over their men, and consequently not looked up to and respected as they should be.

I assign the want of confidence in Government, 1st, to the attempt made in 1841 and 1843 to withhold the extra service batta from the troops at Peshawur and Scinde respectively.

2nd. The withdrawing of forges from the irregular cavalry of the line—and the refusing to restore them when they were sanctioned for the Punjab, Nagpore, and I believe Oude local irregular cavalry.

3rd. Suddenly reducing the establishment of regiments of the line and irregular cavalry from 1,000 and 800 respectively to 800 and 600, instead of allowing the excess to die off, or transferring the old men of the irregular cavalry to the newly raised regiments, which I myself strongly recommended at the time.

4th. The forcing native commissioned and non-commissioned officers to give up their bhargeers, though they had entered the service under a written agreement that they should be permitted to keep on in perpetuity the number of bhargeers they brought into the regiment.

5th. The attempt to send new volunteer corps on foreign service against their will, and the indirect punishing of the men for refusing to go, by sending them to an unhealthy station, where they were decimated by disease, whereas the commanding officer who misled Government was in reality the culprit. I allude to the case of the 38th N. I.

6th. The efforts made to change the interior economy of the regiments of irregular cavalry, I refer to proposed changes in the horse funds, &c. In short the rage for changes of any or every sort which has prevailed latterly in this army, and which are always viewed with suspicion by natives, and have tended to unsettle the minds of the men and make them distrustful. The golden rule, "let well alone," seems to have been lost sight of.

As regards my second head: "The idea that the sepoy "could dictate to Government." I adduce the fact of extra batta ordered to be no longer paid to some corps in 1841 and 1843 being subsequently disbursed, on dissatis-

faction being manifested. 2nd. Granting to the Goorkhas (Sirmoor Battalion) the pay of the line when moved from their stations, after they had mutinied because it was withheld; and the order directing that if officers overdrew pay for the sepoy they should liquidate the surplus themselves, not deduct it from the man, as happened in the case of the 43rd N. I. I write from memory, and may make mistakes as to dates and corps, but I cannot be in error as to the facts.

In support of the third cause:—"The want of officers in "whom the sepoy could confide," it is sufficient to refer to the last army list. Taking the first twelve regiments, I find present with their regiments 10 field officers, 34 captains, 61 lieutenants, 28 ensigns, total, 133 officers, or 11½ officers per regiment. Deduct commanding officer, adjutant and quartermaster, and all ensigns under two years' service; and there remains 5¾ officers per regiment for company duty. Further, these officers are discontented, only looking forward to leave their regiments for some more pleasant employment, so that they perform, and unwillingly, the bare outline of their duty; and never, as a general rule, mix or converse with their men; but, on the contrary, too often refuse to listen to their complaints, at the best telling them to go to the adjutant, and not unfrequently, "Go to hell—don't bother me."

With regard to my fourth head, "that officers have not sufficient control over their men, and consequently are not respected by them." 1st. I would refer to the circulars and orders directing seniority to be the rule for promotion, contrary to former standing orders, thus depriving officers commanding companies, as well as regiments, of all power of rewarding good or punishing bad men. The seniority system is also vicious, in that it leaves the acute, active-minded man to brood over his bad luck in the ranks, while confers promotion on the "good" imbecile at the top of the list, who, easily led by his smart intelligent junior, is wholly incapable of guiding or controlling him. I entertained totally different opinions on this head formerly, but I now recant, and these are my present deliberate convictions. 2nd. The order preventing officers from punishing non-commissioned officers except by sentence of a court martial, which is tantamount to saying that an officer shall not interfere with a non-commissioned officer at all; for it is impossible to try a man for the thousand and one trifling faults which make up the sum of a bad non-commissioned officer, for which one or two days drill is a sufficient punishment. 3rd. The inability to reduce a bad and careless non-commissioned officer except by sentence of a court martial for some very gross fault, and the consequent laxity of discipline of the army. 4th. Difficulty experienced in punishing even bad men by a court martial, as any legal flaw, however trifling, is sufficient to invalidate the proceedings; so that commanding officers prefer shutting their eyes to faults to demonstrating their own powerlessness to their men. 5th. Encouraging petitions against officers who have either to prove their case or submit to reproof, while the presenter of a false petition escapes scot free; and thus officers have all to lose and naught to gain, while the petitioner has all to gain and naught to lose. Petitions must of course be received, and thoroughly inquired into; but when they are proved to be without foundation and vexatious, the petitioner should be punished, and in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, petitions are quite unfounded.

The following examples of the way in which the authority of commanding officers is lowered and contemned have been related to me by one of the most intelligent field officers in this army, as coming within his own knowledge. A non-commissioned officer plundered the property he was appointed to guard, perjured himself to conceal his misconduct, took his discharge to avoid a court-martial, and some months afterwards petitioned the then Commander-in-Chief to be restored. His Excellency ordered him to be reinstated, and to be tried by a court-martial, when he was found guilty of theft and perjury; but nevertheless the culprit was retained in the service, and thrust back upon his regiment. A native officer obtained a month's leave when he ought to have been some distance on the route to join, he sent in a petition to his commanding officer asking for an extension of a month, which he well knew his commanding officer had no power to give, pleading urgent business in the civil courts as his excuse. His commanding officer wrote, desiring him to rejoin immediately, but in spite of several orders to this effect, the native officer stayed away until the end of the second month. On rejoining he was placed in arrest, and pleaded illness as his reason for absenting himself. The commanding officer applied to the general commanding the division for a court-martial on the man for disobedience of orders and for falsehood, for he had not been ill. The answer received was, that the general commanding the division conceived that a man in the position of a native officer had a right to expect that his application would be attended to, and the man was released with a reprimand. A few days afterwards a very excellent native officer requested two months leave, and the same commanding officer applied to the same general of division recommending that it should be granted. The reply was, the Government were so liberal in their leave to soldiers, that the general could not think of granting the application. The only comment I will make on these circumstances is, that the system which allows a commanding officer of a regiment to be so lowered in the eyes of his men, calls loudly for amendment.

Having thus traced the causes of dissatisfaction and distrust, I proceed to suggest measures to avert their recurrence. As remedies for the first and second causes of discontent, I would propose that one rate of pay should be received by the soldier under all circumstances, and compensation given when provisions or carriage rise above a certain fixed rate; or should this be considered inexpedient, a peace and war and beyond frontier scale of pay might be adopted, as is the case with the irregular cavalry: this would effectually stop all discontent on the score of pay, as no misapprehension could arise, and the Government would not be placed in the invidious position of either persevering in wrong, or granting, when disaffection had shown itself, what ought never to have been deducted from the soldier; above all, the soldier would not have the opportunity of believing that he had coerced the Government. Under the present system, no officer or soldier knows what the different rates of pay are under different circumstances, nay, even the Audit Office itself is sometimes at fault.

The want of efficient officers with regiments may, I conceive, be remedied by the adoption of the measures proposed in the following minute, which I recorded at Madras on the 21st May 1857,* and I think that no officer of this army should be appointed to the staff until he shall have qualified under the rules recently introduced into the Queen's service, and which should be made applicable to the Indian armies also.

* See page 142.

In order to remedy the 4th evil, "officers not having "control over their men, and consequently not being re-"spected by them," officers commanding and in charge of troops and companies should have a potential voice in all promotions in their respective troops and companies, and the greatest attention should be paid to their recommendations by the regimental commanding officer, unless he sees good and sufficient reason for overruling them.

If courts-martial were simplified and less law governed their proceedings, I think we should have more real substantial justice and much improved discipline.

(Signed) PATRICK GRANT.

MADRAS ARTILLERY.

Calcutta, August 19, 1857.

Secretary to Government Letter No. 644, of February 26, 1857, with voluminous accompaniments.

The proportion of artillery attached to the Madras army is much too limited, and I think a perusal of this correspondence will amply satisfy whoever reads it that a large increase to that most important arm of the service is essentially necessary.

I think an addition of three battalions is required, and they should be exclusively Europeans. I would never again have a native artilleryman in India.

At present we have in the Madras army two troops of native horse artillery, and a battalion of Golundauze, consisting of eight companies, including two supplemental companies. Hitherto these native artillerymen have been faithful, and I am disposed to maintain them on their present footing, and to let them gradually die off; but I would not entertain any more native recruits for the artillery, and I am strongly of opinion that all the field batteries should be manned by Europeans alone. The Golundauze, while they are kept up, being formed into reserve companies exclusively.

Field artillery, with odious bullock draught, is shorn of half its efficiency. I cannot too strongly urge the absolute necessity of horsing all the batteries, and for ever abolishing bullock draught.

Note. This has now been sanctioned.

The strength of companies of European artillery should be raised from 60 to 75 or 80 gunners each, with a corresponding increase of non-commissioned officers.

All artillery drivers should be Europeans; or the experiment might be advantageously tried, of organizing a corps

of drivers of East Indians; they make good trumpeters, drummers, and buglers, and we can at least feel confidence in their loyalty: they would also stand exposure to the climate better than our own countrymen.

Officers, in the proportion of one captain to command each troop and battery, and one subaltern for every two guns, should be at all times *present* with troops of horse artillery and light field batteries.

Each reserved company of European artillery should have two officers attached to it, one of whom should be either a captain or an old and experienced lieutenant.

One European officer of some standing will suffice for a native reserve company.

In addition to these numbers, at least one third spare of each rank should be available to provide for casualties and contingencies. My time is limited, and I am unable to enter more minutely into this most important question.

(Signed) PAT. GRANT.

STAFF CORPS.

May 21, 1857.

The sentiments which have been recorded by the Right Honourable the President in his Lordship's Minute of this date have my entire and hearty concurrence in every particular.

I believe it to be impossible to exaggerate the amount of the mischief which has been produced by the press, European and native, in India. It calls loudly for remedy, and I trust that measures may be adopted, and speedily, to check and restrain an evil of such magnitude.

I have already, in my minute dated the 16th of March, stated at some length my impressions with respect to the feeling of the Native Army of this Presidency, of the perfect accuracy of which I am now more than ever convinced.

The deplorable events which have taken place in Bengal must, to some extent, have the effect of unsettling the minds of the men of the native armies throughout India, and I hold it to be absolutely necessary, to secure the safety of our Indian Empire, that a very large increase to the European force should be made at once. At the very least calculation this Presidency will require the number of European regiments indicated by the President. His Lordship has shown how little prepared we are just now to deal with any serious outbreak, and I trust that no time may be lost in placing matters on a satisfactory footing.

The discipline and morale of the Bengal army have received a shock which will require years of the most judicious management and thorough knowledge of the native character to repair: if, indeed, the old, loyal, faithful feeling of attachment to the Government and their officers can now be ever revived.

Let it be our earnest endeavour to avert from the Madras army the distressing fate which has involved the disgrace and ruin of one of the noblest armies in the world.

I repeat that, in the Madras army, the principal causes of complaint are the increasing demands on the energies of the men, their poverty, and, more than all, the great paucity of European officers of experience and standing present with the regiments. Officers and men must be brought more together, and the European officers must be taught to look upon their regiments as their home, and not to fix their whole thoughts, as they now do, on devising means of getting away to staff, or other detached employ; anything rather than regimental duty is the universal feeling.

The consequences of this craving are, utter indifference, not to say positive dislike, towards their men, and the engendering of a restless, discontented disposition, which is, I doubt not, communicated to the soldier.

Either form a Staff corps, or completely change the system by which local and irregular forces are at present officered from the line, the effect of which is to deprive the regular army of its most valuable officers (otherwise patronage is not dispensed with purity and justice), leaving only those of inferior merit and capacity for duty with their regiments, and thus making the real and main army of minor importance to those local and irregular excrescences and make-shifts. Make all irregular and local corps into separate local bodies, each for the protection of, and the discharge of the duties of the district to which it may be attached, such as Hyderabad contingent, &c., in the Nizam's dominions, Oude corps in Oude, Gwalior corps in the Gwalior country, Punjab corps in the Punjab, and so on. Take officers who are to serve with these local forces from the line, but let them understand that they are struck off the strength of their regiments, and have no further claim to promotion therein, or to any of the staff appointments of the regular army. If officers take to the irregular forces, they should be made to stick to that line, rising from adjutant to the command of a corps, and holding the command (once obtained) in perpetuity. Local and irregular forces should be available for employment on field service whenever necessary, so as to occasionally open to all ranks a field for distinction: but once an officer makes his election, and enters the local and irregular levies, all connexion between him and the line should be for ever severed, and his place in the regular army at once filled up. Each district brigade to be commanded by a brigadier from the *regular* army, with the usual staff drawn from the *local* force. These Brigade commands should, however, be open to officers of proved and acknowledged ability, and distinguished merit, belonging to the local forces, and this should be the highest post to which they could aspire; further promotion or advancement being compensated for by present advantages of pay, &c. &c.

The sole and entire patronage of the local and irregular forces to be in the hands of Government, applications being, however, made to the Commander-in-Chief for the services of officers of the line, required to fill vacancies. But in no other way should the Commander-in-Chief have any power to interfere with these forces. His real business is with the regular army, to that, to its well-being and its improvement and interests, let the Commander-in-Chief devote his every energy; and, let me ask, may not the Department of Public Works have this principle applied to it with advantage?

(Signed) PATRICK GRANT.

APPENDIX No. 67.

Lord ELPHINSTONE'S REPLY to the FIRST SERIES of QUESTIONS.

SIR, Bombay, September 22, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to forward my reply to the first series of questions on the subject of the numbers and organization of the military and police force to be maintained in the Bombay presidency.

I have, &c.

Colonel Durand, C.B. ELPHINSTONE.

1. *What is the number of European troops of each arm now serving in the Bombay presidency, and what is their distribution?*

Return marked A. shows the number of European troops of each arm now serving in the Bombay presidency, and their distribution.

2. *What is the number of European troops of each arm you deem necessary for the Bombay presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution?*

Return marked B. shows the number of European troops of each arm deemed necessary for the Bombay presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution.

In replying to this question I have taken into consideration the present limits only of this presidency. Bombay troops, however, now occupy garrisons in Rajpootana and Central India, at the stations of Neemuch, Nusseerabad, Mhow, Seepree, Jhansi, Gwalior, and in the Nizam's territories at Jaulna.

The agents to the Governor-General in Rajpootana and Central India, and the resident at Hydrabad, will, I conclude, be called upon to consider what garrisons will be required for these stations.

3. *What is the number of native troops of each arm now serving in the Bombay presidency, and what is their distribution?*

Return marked A. shows the number of native troops now serving in the Bombay presidency and their distribution.

4. *What is the number of native troops you deem necessary for the Bombay presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution?*

Return marked B. shows the number of native troops deemed necessary for the Bombay presidency, and what should be the ordinary distribution.

5. *What proportion of native troops now serving in the Bombay presidency are regulars, irregulars, and police corps? Of what races are they composed, and in what proportions do the races occur?*

The proportion of native troops now serving within th limits of the Bombay presidency are:—

Regulars	*26,668*
Irregulars	*8,588*
Police, disciplined and armed (exclusive of the police of Bombay and of Sind), *viz.*	*9,871*
Bombay town police	1,162
Sind police	*5,075*

In the accompanying Return marked C., the races of which the regular troops are composed are shown, with the proportions per cent. The total number of regulars in this return varies from that above given, as the return includes the whole of the regular Bombay army, the troops serving without as well as within the presidency.

The irregulars number 8,588, the proportion per cent. of races to the whole being :—

Deccanees	37·9	Guzerattees	8·8
Hindoostanees	24·4	Kutchees	3·9
Madrasees	0·58	Bheels	0·9
Concannees	10·0		

The proportion per cent. of races in the Bombay police to the whole is as follows :—

Mahomedans	18·6	Mahrattas	25·7
Kolees	8·2	Bheels	13·0
Poorbheas	3·1	Christians	0·3
Rajpoots	3·05	Hindoo castes	27·4

The proportion per cent. of races in the Sind police to the whole, is as follows :—

Mahrattas	4·3	Punjabees	5·0
Purdasees	13·8	Beloochees	6·5
Mussulmans	44·5	Sindees	24·0

6. *What proportion of your proposed establishment of native troops should be regulars, irregulars, and police?*

To meet the requirements of the Bombay presidency only, I should propose that the regular force should consist of 25 regiments of infantry.

The irregular force of 9 regiments of cavalry and 13 regiments of infantry, including the marine battalion.

I would have no regular cavalry, except the European regiments.

The police force should consist, as at present, of about 18,000 men; 700 of these mounted for the Bombay provinces (not including Sind), and 1,500 mounted for Sind.

7. *What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in the Bombay presidency? and state the ratios, both inclusive and exclusive of police corps?*

I have proposed that the European force for the Bombay presidency should consist of 2 regiments of cavalry, 4 troops of horse artillery, 20 companies of foot artillery, 1 company of sappers, and 9 regiments of infantry.

According to present established strength, these would give in numbers :—

Cavalry	1,492
Horse Artillery	764
Foot Artillery	3,600
Sappers	120
Infantry	9,630
	15,606

The native troops deemed necessary are—

3 companies African artillery;
5 companies of sappers;
25 regiments of regular infantry;
9 regiments of irregular cavalry; and
13 regiments of irregular infantry, including marine battalion.

These would give in numbers according to present established strength :—

African artillery	300
Sappers	620
Regular infantry	28,600
Irregular cavalry	6,930
Irregular infantry	11,000
	47,450

The proportion therefore of Europeans to the regular and irregular troops would be a third of the whole, and inclusive of police, would be about one-fourth.

8. *What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in India generally? and state the ratios as effected by the inclusion or exclusion of native police corps?*

I have no means of judging what proportion the regular and irregular native troops and police should bear to each other in Bengal and in the Punjab. My impression is that the proportion of Europeans to natives of every description should not be less than 20 per cent., and for the next few years 25 per cent.

9. *Is there adequate barrack accommodation for the European troops now serving in the Bombay presidency, and state its amount?*

Return marked D. shows the amount of present barrack accommodation for European troops in the Bombay presidency.

10. *Would additional barrack accommodation have to be provided in the Bombay presidency for the strength of European troops you deem necessary, and to what extent?*

Returns marked E. and F. show the additional barrack accommodation required in the Bombay presidency, for the strength of European troops deemed necessary for it.

11. *What proportion of the European force should belong to Her Majesty's regular army, and what proportion should be composed of troops raised for service in India?*

I think the whole of the European force should belong to Her Majesty's regular army.

When the East India Company had an army of its own, distinct from that of the Crown, I can conceive a difference of opinion existing upon this subject, but now that the whole army of India is to be a royal army, there seems to be no good reason for maintaining a distinction between one part of the European force and the remainder.

It is no valid argument to say, that the regiments of Her Majesty's regular army are liable to be withdrawn from India in the event of an European war; for unless the whole of the European troops in India were raised for local service only, that portion of them which belonged to the Queen's regular army would always be liable to be thus withdrawn, and even if the whole were raised as local troops, means would be found, in the event of any great emergency to make them available for general service, neither do I consider that it is a sound reason for raising European regiments for Indian service only, to say that such regiments will be more entirely at the disposal of the Government of India.

If there is one thing which must be laid down as a principle not to be departed from in our military arrangements in India, it is the entire subordination of the army both European and native to the Government of India. The troops of the Queen's regular army while serving in India, must be wholly subject to the authority of the Queen's Government in India. Regimental promotion, indeed, may be left entirely to the Horse Guards, but the patronage of every staff appointment in India should be vested, as, with very few exceptions, it now is entirely in the hands of the supreme and local governments, and of the supreme and local commanders-in-chief.

Having gone into the arguments commonly used in favour of the measure of raising European regiments for Indian service only, I will briefly add those which seem to me to tell conclusively against it.

1st. It will perpetuate the distinction which has hitherto existed between the Queen's and the Company's service, a distinction which has occasioned much jealousy and heart-burning, and which ought now I think to be done away with for ever.

2nd. It is impossible that any local troops can be *really* equal to the British line; they must always be conscious of a species of inferiority. They do not fight the battles of England on the battle-fields of Europe. Even if the enemy whom they may have to encounter upon the plains of India were of a different stamp, the fact that he is not a European enemy would take away half the glory of defeating him. But the fact is, that henceforward our European force will have no regular armies in India to conquer, for I presume that the organization of the native army will in future be such that no general revolt will be possible. I need hardly say that this is no reason for being satisfied with any but the best description of European force in India. English troops cannot be supplied in great numbers, and even if England could furnish them, India could not afford to pay for them; we must pay the best price for those that we have, and we ought to have the best article.

But a European force raised for India, and constantly stationed there, will be physically as well as morally inferior to the Queen's regular army. Instead of keeping men in this climate until their health is ruined, I am convinced that true policy demands that we should have more frequent reliefs of our European regiments. No regiment ought under any circumstances to remain in India more than ten years, and, except under a great exigency, no man should be allowed to come out who is not willing to enlist for the whole of this period, and whose health and constitution do not at least permit the hope that he will live to return. One great cause of expense is the sending out men who are wholly unsuited for the climate. Not only the poor fellow who dies or is invalided, but the man who is sickly, and passes half his time in hospital, is a direct loss to the State.

I would add the Company's European artillery and the nine regiments of European infantry to the Queen's regular army; the best way of doing so would be to incorporate the artillery of the three presidencies with the royal artillery, retaining them as separate battalions, and allowing every

officer and man the option of remaining in India and of drawing his full Indian pay and allowances, or of serving in other parts of the world upon the same pay and allowances as are now drawn by the royal artillery. In any case, both officers and men should retain their right to retire from the service on the Indian rates of pension. Probably the Company's infantry regiments might be at once transferred to the royal army as second battalions to the nine oldest regiments in the line which have not second battalions already, by doing this both the officers and men who are accustomed to India and wish to remain here, might always have the opportunity of remaining. One battalion of each of the nine regiments might be kept in India as long as there are any officers or men belonging to the Company's regiments remaining. Officers and men not wishing to return to Europe might always be kept in this battalion; and all would be entitled to the Indian rates of pension on their retirement or discharge.

12. *Under the supposition that additional corps of Europeans have to be raised for service in India, how would you officer them?*

The answer which I give to this question may be inferred from my reply to the last.

I believe that it would be a great mistake to raise any additional corps of Europeans *for service in India* only. I think that the whole European force should form a part of the Queen's regular army, consequently the officers must belong to Her Majesty's regular army.

It may be objected to this that the members of the Council of India, like the Court of Directors, are to be partly remunerated by the patronage of the Indian armies; and that if all the officers of the European force in India are to belong to Her Majesty's regular army they will lose a portion of their patronage, and if the native corps are in future officered in the way which I am going to suggest, they will be deprived of the whole of it. But I do not see why this should be the case; the privilege of recommending officers for their first commissions is already exercised by the colonels of the household regiments, and virtually by the Commander-in-chief, the Board of Admiralty (for the Marines), and (formerly at least) by the Master-general of Ordnance (for the artillery and engineers); if, in lieu of their present patronage, the members of the Council of India were allowed to recommend to Her Majesty a certain number of qualified young gentlemen for commissions in the army, this objection might be got over, at any rate it ought not to stand in the way of a measure which would place all the Queen's officers upon an equal footing, and thereby remove a source of jealousy and heartburning, which will otherwise continue to exist as heretofore.

Another objection of a different kind is, that if all the Queen's officers in India are appointed by the Crown, the patronage of the Crown (or of the Horse Guards) will be too much increased, but this may be met either by allowing the members of the Council of India to exercise a portion of that patronage in the way I have suggested, or what would be much better, by allowing them to nominate a certain number of cadets to the Royal Military College, of which all who qualified themselves for the army should receive commissions from the Queen.

I may here remark that one of the most effectual means of promoting a good feeling and military spirit among all the officers of the army and of uprooting every remnant of jealousy and separation between the different services would be to educate all young gentlemen destined for the army at the same military college. I am convinced that nothing would have a better effect upon the *morale* of the army than the amalgamation of the so-called college at Sandhurst with the academies of Woolwich and Addiscombe.

It is hardly necessary to point out that the efficiency of the professorial staff would be trebled, while greater scope and opportunity of improvement would be afforded to the talents of every cadet.

13. *Under the supposition that a considerable increase takes place in the number of corps raised for service in India, and that they are officered from the officers of the mutinied battalions of the Bengal army, will this accession of seniority promotion corps create any greater embarrassment in juxta-position with the purchase promotion system than what now accrues from the existence of the royal artillery, royal engineers, royal marines, and the three Indian armies, in all which corps and armies seniority promotion is the system?*

From what I have already written it will be seen that I do not recommend that any European corps should be raised for service in India only.

With regard to the officers of the Bengal army whose regiments have mutinied, I think that they might be provided for in the following manner:—

1st. All officers at present employed on the staff or in command of irregular or police corps, or on other detached duty to be placed on a general staff or detached list, such arrangements being made for the promotion of officers upon this list, as may give them as nearly as possible the same average prospect of promotion which they would have enjoyed regimentally.

I would make the appointment of officers to all native regiments by selection from the general staff list upon the same principle, and in the same proportion that officers are now selected from the line for the irregular corps.

Of the regimental officers now unemployed, a limited number (say 10 or 15 per cent.) in excess of the number at present on the staff or on detached employment, or required for native regiments under the system proposed in the preceding paragraph, might be allowed the option of being included in the general staff list, with a view to filling vacancies.

The supernumeraries while unemployed might receive the net pay of their rank, and an unattached allowance which would make up their income to that which they would have drawn as regimental officers at a half batta station.

No officer to be eligible for the staff list who is not qualified for staff employment, according to the present standard.

When the officers now placed upon the staff list retire or die out, I would provide for the performance of their duties by officers taken from the Queen's regiments who have passed the required test, which will of course include an examination in the native languages.

When officers are placed on the general staff list, their places in their regiments to be filled up; thus the inconvenience of taking officers from their regiments, and of again remanding them when these are ordered on service, often to the neglect and injury of the important duties for which they were selected, would be obviated.

A further limited number of officers belonging to the mutinied regiments of the Bengal army might be allowed the option of entering Her Majesty's service. It has been found that the practice of attaching a Company's officer to each Queen's regiment as interpreter has been very useful. I believe that if one captain and two subalterns were to be attached to each as supernumeraries, to be absorbed as vacancies occur, that the same object would be gained, and many useful officers might find employment. Officers thus transferred to European regiments might further have the option of remaining in India until they had served their time, or of going home with the regiment in which they were serving; and in the event of their remaining in India, they should be entitled to pension according to length of service and upon the Indian scale, as at present.

My impression is, that after establishing the general staff or detached list which I have proposed, and after allowing for the absorption of three officers into each European regiment in India, there would remain but few officers unprovided for. But to all officers not included in the general staff and detached list, and not absorbed into European regiments in India, I would pay a fair equivalent for their loss of service, either in the shape of a pension, chargeable upon the Indian revenue, or of purchase money for their commissions. These officers, if pensioned, to be relieved from all liability to serve; if purchased out, they would of course be free from any liability of the kind.

The question refers to the officers of the mutinied battalions of the Bengal army only, but it will be perceived that my answer is of a wider application, and embraces the whole of the Company's officers. I would recommend the establishment of a separate general staff list in each presidency.

14. *The feasibility of raising corps of foreign mercenaries, such as Tartars, Chinese, Malays, Dyaks, Africans, Madagascarenes, &c., being assumed, would you consider that the proportion of European to native and foreign mercenary troops could, with safety to our power and supremacy in India, be modified from the ratio stated in reply to questions 7 and 8; if so, to what extent?*

In calculating in reply to questions 7 and 8 the proportion of European to native troops of all sorts, I have assumed that the native army will be so constituted as to render the danger of general mutiny as small as possible. It appears to me, that if proper precautions are used (I shall have another opportunity of explaining those which I advocate, and in the meantime I beg to refer to my minutes of the 14th and 22nd May last), I am persuaded there would be as little to apprehend from native troops as from foreign mercenaries, and I do not think that the employment of the latter would enable us to reduce the number of European troops.

There are, however, two exceptional cases in which foreign troops might be advantageously employed; one of

these is in the artillery. I agree with those who think that it is not judicious to train any natives of India to the use of guns. They make excellent artillerymen, and they attach great value and importance to guns; but these very circumstances make it dangerous to place them in their hands. There are some stations, however, such as Shikarpore and Aden, in this presidency, in which European troops suffer severely, and where it is, nevertheless, necessary to have artillery. I would suggest that a few companies of African artillerymen might be formed for those hot stations.

Another exceptional case is, when a whole province is disaffected or hostile to us, like Oude or the Delhi division. In such a case it would be dangerous to raise troops on the spot, and it is not desirable to keep a body of native troops from a different part of the country in such a province. They would be liable to be tampered with, perhaps they might carry the spirit of disaffection to their homes. In this case it would be safer to depend wholly upon European and foreign troops. I do not see why we might not at once secure the services of the Gold Coast artillery corps, of the three West Indian regiments, and of the Ceylon rifle corps (Malays), their places being taken by native (Indian) artillery and by sepoy regiments; the difference of pay ought not to prevent this measure from being carried out. The Indian Government would pay the difference between the colonial allowances and Indian allowances, and it would gain six companies of African artillery and four excellent regiments, while six companies of Golundaz and four or five of the sepoy regiments now disarmed and utterly useless, or worse than useless, would be not only got rid of, but turned to good account.

September 21, 1858. ELPHINSTONE.

MINUTE.

The Secret Committee's despatch to the Government of India of the 9th of March (No. 1930) has been sent to us only that we may obtain and submit the opinion of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief as to the future probable demand for troops, and their distribution within this presidency. Upon these points a military opinion is of course indispensable; but it seems to me that the subject of the despatch includes the composition as well as the distribution and strength of the native army; and holding, as I do, that this was the radical error to which the greatest disasters which we have experienced were chiefly to be attributed, I hope that I shall not be considered officious if I take this opportunity of bringing my views upon this matter under the notice of the Government of India and the Secret Committee. They are not new to my colleagues, for I have already entered fully into them upon more than one occasion.

I cannot explain the system of recruitment which I advocate better than by transcribing a part of my minute of the 21st September last. "I have a very strong opinion upon "this subject. I believe that for a long time past we have "too much lost sight of our true policy with respect to the "native army; and when I find that the views which I "have long entertained, and which were formed from "reading the minutes of Sir Thomas Munro, and from "conversing with General Cubbon, the late Sir John "Doveton, and other officers of great experience in the "Madras army, are so nearly the same as those which are "now expressed by Brigadier-General Jacob, I am strongly "impressed with the conviction that they are sound.

"I beg to append to this minute copy of one by Sir "Thomas Munro, dated December 29th, 1820. It will, "I am sure, be read with interest at the present moment.

"'Our native troops,' says Sir Thomas Munro, 'unite "'the character of a standing army with that of a militia.' "It is to be observed that this is, or at least *was*, the case "with all the best native armies that have ever existed. "The Mahrattas, the Khalsa of Lahore, and, to this day, "Goorkhas of Nepaul, are exactly described by these words "of Sir Thomas Munro. The effect of losing sight of this "normal condition of the native army is, to use Sir "Thomas Munro's words, 'to convert it into a body of "'mere mercenaries, finding homes and families wherever "'they may go, and ready to join in any disturbance "'dangerous to the State.'"

But it may be said that there is equal or even greater danger in forming our regiments exclusively from men belonging to the same part of the country, and that our safety consists in forming our regiments of the most discordant materials. I know that this is the prevailing opinion at the present moment, an opinion, however, which is founded upon a state of things totally different from that which I advocate. I hope, therefore, that I may be allowed to show in what this difference consists.

"As I have before remarked, the system advocated by Sir "Thomas Munro is the nearest approach to that of the "best constituted armies under native governments. It "may be regarded in fact as the *natural* system of an in- "digenous army. According to it the troops, though liable "to serve in foreign countries and in distant parts of India, "are essentially local troops. The regiments are raised in "the same districts in which they are habitually quartered. "The men, though belonging to the same part of the "country, are not necessarily of the same caste. It is, "however, probable that a large proportion of them are, "and that there are, as Sir Thomas Munro expresses it, "'many families related to each other serving in the same "'corps.'"

"That experienced officer and farsighted statesman did "not, however, anticipate danger from this cause. He knew "that the two things that possess the greatest influence for "good over the mind of the native are his family and his "village, and he sought to enlist this influence with the "sepoy, into the service of Government. He considered "that the more a regiment was localised, the more this "influence would be felt, the more the thoughts and aspir- "ations of the sepoy would be concentrated in his regiment, "and the less community of feeling would exist between "him and the sepoy of a different regiment, raised in a "different district, and seldom brought into contact with "him, except when on actual service.

"The Bengal army was the very opposite of this; though "100,000 men were raised from the same province, and "exclusively from the highest castes, and though they "refused to serve beyond sea, they certainly could not be "considered a local force in the same sense of the term in "which it was used by Sir Thomas Munro, but a very small "proportion of that great army was ever quartered in the "district from which it was almost exclusively raised.

"The regiment was never considered by the sepoy as his "home; in the regiment the influence of the family and "the village was wholly wanting, indeed this influence "instead of leading him to concentrate all his thoughts in "his own regiment, as it would have done under the system "recommended by Sir Thomas Munro, had a directly "opposite tendency, for the Bengal sepoy had his relations "and his correspondents in half the regiments in the army, "any attack real or fancied upon the susceptibilities of one "regiment was thus felt by the whole, and when one "mutinied, the rest followed, as if impelled by some unseen, "but irresistible impulse, as if an electric shock had been "felt by them all.

"General Jacob's plan differs in some important particu- "lars from Sir Thomas Munro's. He localises the head "quarters of the regiment even more completely than Sir "Thomas Munro, who merely contemplated the periodical "and frequent return of each corps to the station which it "regarded as its home, the place whence it was chiefly "raised, but General Jacob does not advocate the location "of his regimental home in the district where the regiment "is principally recruited, the tie which he seeks to create is "a purely regimental one. In this respect his plan seems "to me inferior to Sir Thomas Munro's. It has this further "disadvantage, that it has no tendency to isolate the regi- "ments from each other, an object which, I think, we "should seek to promote by every means in our power."

If the plan which I advocate be adopted, each regiment will have its own special recruiting district, from which no other corps will be permitted to enlist recruits, the complete isolation of regiments will be effected, for it will be difficult, if not impossible, to keep up that close correspondence, and to create that community and identity of feeling in regiments thus composed, which existed in the late Bengal army; on the other hand the home associations, the only healthy moral influence which we can bring to bear upon the native mind will be encouraged, and it is not too much to say will be arrayed on the side of Government.

It is not necessary in order to carry out this plan, that regiments shall be raised in every district, or even in every province. I am quite aware that there are parts of the country in which it would be impossible to raise a regiment, there are other parts where at present, at all events, it would be highly inexpedient to do so. The area of recruiting districts must be in proportion to their capacity to furnish recruits; this does not depend so much upon the density of the population, as upon the character of the people; but as a general rule, I would endeavour to raise regiments in every part of the country, excepting only those provinces where the spirit of disaffection prevails. Even in the lower provinces of Bengal which are probably the most unwarlike in India some races will be found like the Santhals who may probably be turned into good soldiers.

This radical change in the system of recruiting should be the basis of our future policy with regard to the native army. It may be useful also to divide the army into different classes, such as troops of the line, irregular levies, and police corps, and to separate these classes as much as pos-

sible by artificial means, each class having its own terms of enlistment, rates of pay, arms, and uniform.

It seems to me that it is worthy of the consideration of the Government of India whether the army of the Punjab shall not be entirely separated from the army of Bengal; for many years we have been endeavouring to assimilate, to centralize, to do away as much as possible with the differences and peculiarities which used to distinguish the armies of the different presidencies. I think that it must now be admitted that it is just as well that we had not altogether succeeded in effecting this object. If we had thoroughly amalgamated the three armies, and had incorporated Sikhs and Ghoorkahs into the mass, where should we have been now?

But it may be urged that if we had done this the mutiny of last year would not have taken place, that it was in its origin a caste movement, and that the intermixture of other castes and races would have prevented it. I am not prepared to admit this; but even admitting it, for the sake of argument, I cannot allow that mutinies can only be caused by caste questions. I believe that more mutinies have arisen from questions of pay and allowances than from any other cause.

But suppose the whole native troops to be formed into one grand army, the component parts of each regiment being as heterogeneous as possible, and suppose some cause of discontent to arise which affects all castes alike, the danger would be undoubtedly far greater than that which overtook us last year. I have long considered this subject, and I am convinced that the exact converse of this policy of assimilation is our only safe military policy in India. *Divide et impera* was the old Roman motto, and it should be ours. The safety of the great iron steamers, which are adding so much to our military power, and which are probably destined to add still more to our commercial superiority, is greatly increased by building them in compartments. I would ensure the security of our Indian empire by constructing our native army upon the same principle; for this purpose I would avail myself of those diversities of race and language which we find ready to our hands. I might, perhaps, hesitate to express my conviction so decidedly, if I were not able to show that my views upon this subject are entirely in accordance with those of the Duke of Wellington. The following extract from a letter of his Grace to Mr. Wynne, the President of the India Board, dated Strathfieldsaye, August 7th, 1826, is so much to the point that I cannot forbear to copy it:—

"Since I wrote to you yesterday I have read that part of "Malcolm's book which relates to the military establish- "ments in the East Indies, and I see that he recommends "the amalgamation of the armies, the equalization of their "pay, and indeed the formation of the whole into one. He "attacks the opinion which I entertain of the security "which is derived from the division of the establishments.

"But Malcolm passes over unnoticed two or three little "events not much to the credit of Indian armies as armies, "but which ought to have a great influence in the decision "of these questions. First, the mutiny of the European "officers of the Bengal army in 1795-96.

"2ndly. The mutiny of the sepoys of the army of Fort "St. George; and thirdly, the mutiny of the officers of the "army of Fort St. George. Some others might be quoted, "such as the arrest of Lord Pigot, &c., but I refer only to "those of modern times as bearing more immediately upon "the question.

"It is true that this country can always rely upon the "King's troops in India, that is to say, if the native army "is kept in the hands of the Company; but I declare I "believe that if, upon any one of those occasions the armies "had been amalgamated, and had formed but one, the "dependency upon this country would have been lost.

"With these events before us, and seeing what armies "have done in different countries of Europe and are capable "of attempting, I cannot but think it fortunate that they "are three separate and distinct armies, and not an army "consisting of 250,000 men.

"But there is one point peculiarly Indian which Malcolm "has not brought forward in discussing this question, how- "ever much it deserves consideration, and notwithstanding "that it has not escaped him in considering other parts of "this subject, and that is the different classes and nations "of people of whom these armies (proposed to be made "one army) are composed. He says very truly, in another "part of his book, that the natives of the countries about "Cape Comorin are as unlike those of Hindostan or of the "provinces of Bengal, as a native of Spain or of Italy is to "a native of Sweden, or of the north of Germany or of "Russia, and their languages differ as much as their appear- "ance. The exclusive merit of these officers of the Com- "pany's army is their understanding the language, manners, "and customs of the natives of India placed under their "command. But how is a man belonging to a corps raised "and stationed on the coast of Coromandel or Malabar, or "in the ceded districts or the Deccan, to go and command "a battalion raised and stationed in Hindostan? He knows "no more of them than (not so much probably as) the "commanding officer of one of the King's regiments who "may have done duty in Hindostan. The fact is that all "these armies differ in their discipline, appearance, mode "of doing duty, &c., not only because they are separate "armies and paid at different rates, but because they are "composed of people of different nations; this can never "be altered, let us leave the rest as it is.

"If you have not read it, pray read the account of the "mutiny of the officers of the army of Fort St. George, which "was in fact fomented by the commander-in-chief, General "MacDowall. Pray likewise read the account of the late "conspiracies in the Russian armies, which are not unworthy "of attention in considering the question of forming the "Indian armies into one."

These extracts show that the Duke of Wellington considered the separation of the native armies of the three presidencies as our greatest safeguard against the danger of mutiny. I need not point out the striking corroboration which the events of the last year have afforded to his opinion; my object is simply to suggest the adoption of the principle of separation and isolation which he advocated to the fullest extent which may be found compatible with perfect efficiency and convenience.

May 14. (Signed) ELPHINSTONE.

MINUTE.

Having read my honorable colleague's minutes, I hope that I may be permitted to add a very few words on the subject of the enlistment and composition of the native army.

I am aware that this is a subject upon which a difference of opinion is almost sure to exist. In fact it is impossible to propose any plan which is not open to some objection. I admit at once that there may be danger in drawing the native troops exclusively from the population of the country in which they are to be generally and habitually quartered, but I believe this danger to be infinitively less than that which arises from the opposite system. I would point out that under a system either of promiscuous or of partially *foreign** enlistment, the complete isolation of regiments, and even of armies, becomes impossible; correspondence will be kept up between men in different regiments, and in different armies; the community of feeling and interest between the different regiments and the different armies, and the consciousness of strength which this inspires, will not be destroyed. But if the principle of isolation be adopted, if the native army be completely and thoroughly localized, this great and constant source of danger would cease to exist.

There might still be disaffection, and there might still be mutiny, but it would be local, not general.

In this presidency the police, which are purely local, have never shown any sympathy for local insurgents or rebels, and I need not say that I entirely concur with both my honourable colleagues that the existing system in this presidency should not be disturbed; at this moment we have two Bheel battalions in Candish acting against their own clansmen and chiefs. In Ireland, the constabulary and the military force, almost equally recruited from the Irish population, have never hesitated to act against their own countrymen, whether ribbonmen or orangemen. Even supposing that a regiment or the troops at one station were gained over, that they refused to act, or even joined the disaffected, their disaffection would not immediately spread into other regiments or stations, and the whole European force in the division, and probably a portion at least of the native troops where different races and languages exist in the same division (they would be found in every Indian army), would be available to suppress it.

There are two other points in my honourable colleague's minutes, on which I wish to explain myself more clearly than I appear to have done. Mr. Mallet observes that this presidency is divided into four great military districts, and that only two of them would furnish sufficient recruits for their military occupation. But though I would *localise* each regiment, and give it a home or permanent head quarters, I do not recommend that regiments should never be moved from this home. If Guzerat or the Southern Mahratta country will give us no recruits, they must be garrisoned by regiments raised in other parts of the presidency, those regiments being however frequently relieved,

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* *i.e.* from other parts of India.

and never kept for more than three or four years away from their permanent head quarters. I believe, however, that recruits would be much more readily found in those parts of the country which do not now furnish any, if the local system of enlistment were adopted; I can easily understand a man whose language is Guzrattee or Canarese, disliking to enter a regiment of Mahrattas and Hindostanees, who are to him almost foreigners. A hundred years ago, not many highlanders would have enlisted in an English regiment.

The other point is one upon which Mr. Reeves lays much stress, and which I readily admit deserves the greatest consideration. My honourable colleague thinks that regiments should be composed of different castes and classes, and that great care should be taken that neither Brahmins nor Mussulmans, nor indeed any class of natives, should be allowed an undue numerical superiority; but attention to this precaution is not, it appears to me, incompatible with the principle of isolation; indeed, I have great doubts whether any Brahmins should be enlisted; they appear to exercise an influence over the men of other castes which is inconsistent with discipline. I have heard of a low caste officer falling at the feet of a Brahmin private and beseeching his blessing. This seems utterly subversive of all correct military feeling and discipline, and if there is any truth in such stories, the only remedy would appear to be the exclusion of men possessing such influence from the ranks. With reference to other castes and classes, I agree with my honourable colleague, that it is desirable that men of different castes should be encouraged to enlist, and that if possible no one caste should predominate. (I except, of course, regiments composed of a particular tribe or race, like Bheels or Kolies.) Knowing, however, that mutinies and disaffection proceed from other causes besides caste, I think that all precautions upon this point will be ineffectual to prevent them, if our native regiments are still linked together by a system of enlistment which fosters those feelings of common interest and mutual reliance upon each other, and that consciousness of power, without which no mutiny of an army *en masse* could ever be brought about.

May 22. (Signed) ELPHINSTONE.

A.

RETURN showing the Troops, European and Native, of all Arms serving within the limits of the Bombay Presidency and their Distribution.

	Commissioned Officers.		Non-Commissioned and Rank and File.	
	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.
Her Majesty's Troops.				
1 Troop Horse Artillery	5	–	212	73
2 Light Field Batteries	10	–	331	29
1¾ Regiments Cavalry	63	–	1,076	–
6½ Regiments Infantry	245	–	5,377	–
Total	323	–	6,996	102
Hon. Company's European Troops.				
1 Troop Horse Artillery	5	–	118	25
5 Companies Foot Artillery, with Light Field Batteries.	12	4	398	260
1 Company without Battery	4	1	79	30
3 Companies Reserve Artillery, with Light Field Batteries.	7	2	293	138
1 Regiment Infantry	32	–	982	–
Total	60	7	1,870	453
Hon. Company's Native Troops.				
4 Companies Foot Artillery, with Light Field Batteries.	3	19	5	470
5 Companies, without Batteries	11	21	2	441
Head Quarters and 2½ Companies Sappers and Miners.	4	5	17	319
1 Regiment Light Cavalry	15	14	2	441
5 Regiments Irregular Cavalry	20	125	–	3,686
21 Regiments of Infantry	279	495	14	21,357
1 Marine Battalion	4	24	–	1,130
1 Native Veteran Battalion	14	16	–	822
Enrolled Pensioners	5	55	2	1,661
Total	355	774	42	30,281
Grand Total	738	781	8,908	30,836

DISTRIBUTION of the above.

Her Majesty's Troops.	Stations.
Artillery.	
D Troop, Horse Artillery	Poona.
1st Batt. 8th Comp. Light Field Battery	Baroda.
14th Batt. 8th Comp. Light Field Battery	Kulladghee, Dharwar, and Nurgoond.
Cavalry.	
3rd Dragoon Guards (Head Quarters Wing)	Kirkee.
Detachment	Sattara.
Detachment	Under orders to proceed to Nuggur.
Depôt, 14th Light Dragoons	Kirkee.
17th Light Dragoons (Lancers)	Kirkee.
1 Squadron	Sholapore.
Infantry.	
4th King's Own (Wing)	Ahmedabad, temporarily transferred from Mauritius.
18th Royal Irish (Head Quarters)	Poona.
2 Companies	Under orders to proceed to Nuggur.
1 Company	Asseerghur.
33rd Regiment (Head Quarters)	Poona.
2 Companies	Sattara.
1 Company	Sholupore.
1 Company	Ahmednuggur.
51st Light Infantry	Kurrachee.
1 Company	Ahmedabad.
2 Companies	Hydrabad.
1 Company	Shikarpore.
56th Regiment (Head Quarters)	Belgaum.
1 Company	Sawunt Waree.
57th Regiment (Head Quarters)	Bombay.
Wing	Aden.
Depôt, 64th Regiment	Belgaum.
74th Detach. from Bellary, temporarily	Dharwar Fort.
Depôt, 78th Regiment	Poona.
Depôt, 83rd Regiment	Deesa.
Depôt, 86th Regiment	Poona.
89th Regiment	Deesa.
92nd Highlanders, 1 Company	Bombay.
1 Company	Nussick.
1 Company	Mullegaum.
Depôt, 95th Regiment	Deesa.
Details of Recruits of Her Majesty's Regiments.	Baroda and Broach.

Honourable Company's Native Troops.	Stations.
Artillery.—Horse Brigade.	
Head Quarters	Poona.
4th Troop	Poona.
1st Battalion.	
Head Quarters	Ahmednuggur.
1st Company, with Light Field Battery	Ahmedabad.
2nd Company, without Battery	Aden.
3rd Company, with Light Field Battery	Belgaum.
4th Company " "	Hydrabad.
2nd Battalion.	
Head Quarters	Bombay.
2nd Company, with Light Field Battery	Sattara.
3rd Company " "	Sholopore.
Reserve.	
No. 1 Company	Shikurpore.
No. 3 Company	Kolapore.
No. 4 Company	Kurrachee.
Infantry.	
Depôt, 1st Regiment Fusiliers	Kurrachee.
2nd Regiment Light Infantry	Belgaum.
Detachment	Kolapore.
Detachment	Kulladghee.
Detachment	Rutnagherry.
Depôt, 3rd Regiment	Ahmednuggur.
Honourable Company's Native Troops—Artillery.	
1st Comp. 3rd Batt. Artillery	Detachments, Rajcole and Surat.
2nd Comp. " with I.t. Field Battery	Ahmedabad.
3rd Comp. " " "	Deesa.
5th Comp. "	Ahmednuggur.
6th Comp. "	Aden.
1st Comp. 4th Batt. with I.t. Field Battery	Head Quarters, Ahmednuggur.
2nd Comp. " " "	Ahmednuggur.
4th Comp. "	"
6th Comp. "	"
Sappers.	
1½ Company Sappers and Miners	Poona, Detachment, S. Mahratta Country.
1 Company	Aden.
Cavalry.	
1st Lancers (Detachment)	Bombay.
2nd Light Cavalry (Detachment)	Deesa and Bombay.
2nd Madras Light Cavalry	Sholopore.
Poona Irregular Horse (Head Quarters)	Seroor,
Detachments	Khandesh, Poona, Nuggur, and Shullghat.
1st Sind Horse, Irregular	Jacobabad.
Detachments	Hoosenkagherry, Tungwanee, Khundkote, and Koomree.
2nd Sind Irregular Horse	Jacobabad.
Detachment	Rojun.
3rd Sind Irregular Horse	Jacobabad.

Honourable Company's Native Troops.	Stations.
Cavalry—cont.	
Southern Mahratta Horse	Head Quarters, Kulladghee.
Detachments	Belgaum, Dharwar, Sattara, and Kolapore.
Infantry.	
1st Grenadier Regiment, Native Infantry	Bombay.
2nd Grenadier " "	Rupoolpoor.
Depôt	Ahmedabad.
3rd Regiment, N. I.	Sholapore.
Detachment	Beegapoor.
5th Regiment, N. I. I.	Ahmednuggur.
Detachment	Field Service in the Districts.
6th Regiment, N. I.	Poona.
7th Regiment, N. I.	Bombay.
8th Regiment, N. I.	Baroda.
Detachments	Jumboseer and Dohud.
11th Regiment, N. I.	Ahmedabad.
Detachment	Gogo.
Depôt, 13th Regiment, N. I.	Hydrabad.
14th Regiment, N. I.	Kurrachee.
Detachment	Ahmedabad.
15th Regiment, N. I.	Kolapore.
Detachments	Rutnagherry Vingorla, and Kulladghee.
16th Regiment, N. I.	Surat.
Detachment	Broach.
17th Regiment, N. I.	Deesa, under orders for Rajcote.
Wing	Rajcote.
18th Regiment, N. I.	Belgaum.
Detachment	North Canara Frontier.
20th Regiment, N. I.	Belgaum.
Detachments	Ramghat and Betsee.

Honourable Company's Native Troops.	Stations.
Infantry—cont.	
22nd Regiment, N. I.	Sattara.
Left Wing	Tasaum.
Detachments	Asta, Beegapoor, and Punderpoor.
23rd Regiment, N. I. I.	Malligaum.
Detachment	Asserghur.
Depôt, 25th Regiment, N. I.	Poona.
26th Regiment, N. I.	Dhoolia.
Detachments	Nuggur Districts.
28th Regiment, N. I.	Dharwar.
Detachments	Field Service, Southern Districts.
29th Regiment, N. I.	Aden.
30th Regiment, N. I.	Malligaum.
Detachment	Kurrachee.
31st Regiment, N. I.	Deesa
Irregular Infantry.	
Marine Battalion	Bombay.
Detachments	Sind, Bushire, &c. &c.
Native Veteran Battalion	Dapoolee.
Detachments	Bhewudy and other parts of the Koukan.
Enrolled Pensioners	Tauna, Poona, Ahmednuggur, Dapoolee, Malwan, and Ahmedabad.

N.B.—No Returns of the 3rd Belooch Battalion and the two Sind Rifle Regiments have been received; they are not, consequently, included in the above.

(Signed) R. PHAYRE, Lieut.-Col., Quartermaster-General.

Quartermaster-General's Office,
Poona, July 1, 1858.

B.

PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION of TROOPS in the Bombay Presidency.

	Cavalry.		Artillery.			Sappers and Miners.		European Infantry.		Native Irregular Cavalry.		Native Infantry.				Barrack Accommodation required.
			European.		Afr.	Eur.	Nat.					Regular.		Irregular.		
	Regiments.	Troops.	Troops.	Companies.	Companies.	Companies.	Companies.	Regiments.	Companies.	Regiments.	Troops	Regiments.	Companies.	Regiments.	Companies.	
Poona Division																
Poona	1	—	2	2	1	1	2	1	—	1	—	2	—	—	—	
Sattara	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	5	1	—	1	—	1	—	
Ahmednuggur	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	1	—	—	—	
Malligaum	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	
Nassick	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Asseerghur	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	
Dhoolia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	1	—	
Dhurrumpoor	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	
Total	1	—	2	6	1	1	2	2	—	2	—	6	—	—	—	
Guzerat Division.																
Surat	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	
Broach	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	
Baroda	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	5	—	—	
Ahmedabad	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	1	—	1	—	2	—	1	—	
Deesa	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	
Rajcote	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	
Dohud	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	
Total	—	—	1	5	—	—	1	2	—	3	—	7	—	2	—	
Southern Division.																
Belgaum	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	
Dharwar	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	
Kulladghee	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	
Sawuut Warree	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	
Kolapore	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	1	—	1	—	
Sholapore	1	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	1	—	—	—	
Total	1	—	1	4	—	—	—	2	—	1	—	6	—	2	—	
Sind Division.																
Kurrachee	—	—	—	2	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	2	—	1	—	
Hydrabad	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	½	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	
Shikarpore	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	
Jacobabad	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	2	—	
Total	—	—	—	3	1	—	1	1½	—	3	—	3	—	5	—	
Aden	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	½	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	
Bombay	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	1	—	
Grand Total	2	—	4	20	3	1	5	9	—	9	1	25	—	13	—	

C.

RETURN of RACES in the Bombay Army, January 1, 1858.

——	Hindoostanees.	Coucan.	Deccan.	Goozerat.	Madras.	Malabar.	Punjab.	Sind.	
Artillery	909	195	152	9	8	2	—	—	1,276
Engineers	226	115	225	—	8	—	—	—	574
Cavalry	1,001	175	127	41	41	—	—	—	1,385
Infantry	11,011	15,684	2,723	256	534	279	153	74	30,174
Total	13,147	16,169	3,227	306	591	281	153	74	33,949

Proportion per Cent. of each Race to the whole Army :—

	Per Cent.		Per Cent.
Hindoostanees	38·75	Madras	1·71
Concanees	47·6	Malabar	·82
Deccanees	9·5	Punjab	·45
Guzerat	·90	Sind	·01

This Return does not include Beeloch Battalions or Irregular Cavalry.

D.

RETURN of Existing and Sanctioned BARRACK ACCOMMODATION for European Troops in the Bombay Presidency, including Aden. Calculated at 1,200 Cubic Feet per man.

STATIONS.	Permanent existing.	Temporary existing.		Temporary Sanctioned.				Permanent Sanctioned.		REMARKS.
	Number of Men.	Wing.	Companies.	Regiment.	Wing.	Troop.	Companies.	Wing.	Companies.	
Artillery.										
Bombay	For 264 Men	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	In Fort George Barracks.
Poona	For 164 Men	—	—	For Two Troops				—	—	For 1 Company Artillery recommended.
Sattara	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	For One Company		
Nuggur	For 381 Men	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Poona Division.
Malligaum	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	For One Company		
Asseerghur	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	For One Half Comp.		
Belgaum	For 60 Men	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Dharwar	—	—	—	For One Company				—	—	
Kulladghee	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	For One Company		Southern Division.
Kolapore	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	For One Company		
Sholapore	For 88 Men	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	These Barracks condemned.
Ahmedabad	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	For One Company		
Baroda	Old Pendals	—	—	—	—	—	—	For One Company		
Surat	Space in the Castle for about 100 Men.	—	—	—	—	—	—	For One Company		Northern Division.
Deesa	For 116 Men	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Kurrachee	For 162 Men	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Shikarpore	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	For One Company.		Sind Division.
Aden	—	For One Company		For One Company.				—	—	
Total Artillery	1,235	—	1	—	—	2	2	—	8½	
Cavalry.										
Sholapore	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	For One Wing.		
Kirkee	For 453 Men	For a Wing.		—	—	—	—			
Sattara	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	For One Wing.		
Total Cavalry	453	1	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	
Infantry.										
Bombay	For 778 Men	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	640 in Town Barracks, and 318 at Colaba.
Poona	For 831 Men	For One Wing		For One Regiment				—	—	In the Gorporee Barracks. New Wananee Barracks in course of completion. Poona Division.
Sattara	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	For Two Companies.		
Asseerghur	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Belgaum	For 645 Men	—	—	—	—	—	—	For One Wing.		
Dharwar	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	For Two Companies		
Kulladghee	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	For One Company		Southern Division.
Kolapore	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	For Three Companies		
Sholapore	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	For One Company		
Ahmedabad	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	For One Wing		
Baroda	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	For Two Companies		
Ahoo	—	For 200 Men		—	—	—	—	For 100 Men additional.		Northern Division.
Deesa	For 683 Men	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Kurrachee	For 1,618 Men	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Sind Division.
Hyderabad	For 1,392 Men	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	At Kurrachee there are, in addition Pendals of an old temporary construction for about 1,600 men.
Aden	—	For One Wing		For One Wing.				—	—	
Total Infantry	5,947	2	—	1	1	—	—	2	11	

E.

ADDITIONAL ACCOMMODATION required for European Troops deemed necessary for the Bombay Presidency, taking into account present permanent accommodation only.

	Cavalry.			Artillery.			Sappers and Miners.		Infantry.		
	Regiments.	Troops.	Number of Men.	Troops.	Companies.	Number of Men.	Companies.	Number of Men.	Regiments.	Companies.	Number of Men.
Poona Division.											
Poona	—	—	—	—	1	118	1	120	—	—	—
Sattara	—	—	—	—	1	118	—	—	—	5	500
Ahmednuggur	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2½	250
Malligaum	—	—	—	—	1	118	—	—	—	—	—
Asserghur	—	—	—	—	1	118	—	—	—	—	—
Total	—	—	—	—	4	472	1	120	—	7½	750
Northern Division.											
Surat	—	—	—	—	—	50	—	—	—	—	—
Baroda	—	—	—	—	1	118	—	—	—	—	—
Ahmedabad	—	—	—	—	1	118	—	—	1	—	1,070
Deesa	—	—	—	1	—	191	—	—	—	3½	350
Rajcote	—	—	—	—	1	118	—	—	—	—	—
Total	—	—	—	1	3	595	—	—	1	3½	1,420
Southern Division.											
Belgaum	—	—	—	—	½	89	—	—	—	3½	350
Dharwar	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	200
Kolapore	—	—	—	—	1	118	—	—	—	5	500
Sholapore	1	—	746	1	1	191 118	—	—	—	3	300
Total	1	—	746	1	2½	516	—	—	—	13½	1,350
Sind Division.											
Kurrachee	—	—	—	—	⅔	74	—	—	—	—	—
Grand Total	1	—	746	2	10⅔	1,657	1	120	1	24½	3,520*

* That is for one Regiment of Cavalry, 2 Troops of Horse Artillery, 10⅔ Companies of Artillery, 1 Company of Sappers and Mines, 3½ Regiments of Infantry.

The number of Men for each Regiment, Troop, and Company is taken from the present established strength for the different branches of the Army.

F.

ADDITIONAL BARRACK ACCOMMODATION required for European Troops deemed necessary for the Bombay Presidency, taking into account present accommodation, both permanent and temporary.

	Cavalry.			Artillery.			Sappers and Miners.		Infantry.		
	Regiment.	Wing.	Number of Men.	Troops.	Companies.	Number of Men.	Companies.	Number of Men.	Regiment.	Companies.	Number of Men.
Poona Division.											
Poona	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	120	—	—	—
Ahmednuggur	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	300
Malligaum	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Asseerghur	—	—	—	—	½	59	—	—	—	—	—
Total	—	—	—	—	½	59	1	129	—	8	300
Guzerat Division.											
Surat	—	—	—	—	½	59	—	—	—	—	—
Ahmedabad	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	500
Deesa	—	—	—	1	—	191	—	—	—	3	300
Rajcote	—	—	—	—	1	118	—	—	—	—	—
Total	—	—	—	1	1½	368	—	—	—	8	800
Southern Division.											
Belgaum	—	—	—	—	½	89	—	—	—	—	—
Kalapore	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	200
Shalapore	—	1	373	1	1	309	—	—	—	2	200
Total	—	1	373	1	1½	398	—	—	—	4	400
Sind Division.											
Kurrachee	—	—	—	—	1	118	—	—	—	—	—
Grand Total	—	1	373	2	4½	943	1	120	—	15	1,500*

* Equal to 1½ Regiments of Infantry, 1 Wing of Cavalry, 1 Company of Sappers and Miners, 2 Troops of Horse Artillery, 4½ Companies of Artillery.

APPENDIX No. 68.

Lord ELPHINSTONE's replies to FIRST SECTION of INFANTRY SERIES of QUESTIONS.

INFANTRY.

I. RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Bombay army is composed?

The races are chiefly Concanees, Deccanees, and Hindostanees in the regular army. We have three battalions of Beloochees, and are raising two more; two battalions of Bheels, and are raising a third; and one corps of Kolees. All castes are professedly admitted, but most Commanding Officers have hitherto given the preference to the higher castes.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?

The Concanees, chiefly from the Southern Concan; the Deccanees, from all parts of the Deccan; the Hindoostanees, from Oude and the neighbourhood of Cawnpore and Delhi; the Beloochees, from Sind and Beloochistan; the Bheels, from Khandesh, and the new corps from the hills of Guzerat; the Kolies, from the Nassick district.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Bombay army?

None are excluded by the regulations. In practice hardly any recruits have been hitherto obtained from Guzerat, and few from the Southern Mahratta country. The Bheels, Kolies, Beeruds, and other aboriginal tribes, are virtually excluded from the ranks of the regular army.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn from for the native infantry of the Bombay army?

I have no doubt that if the system of local enlistment were adopted and insisted upon recruits might be obtained from those parts of the presidency which at present furnish none. For example, I see no reason why the Hindoos and Mussulmans of Guzerat should not be much more largely enlisted in the Bombay army. The Kolies too of Guzerat are a very fine race, and might, I believe, be induced to enlist for general service. This government has just ordered the Beloochees to be enlisted for general service; hitherto they have only been engaged for service in Sinde; but one battalion volunteered for the Persian war, and another went to Delhi. It is doubtful whether the Bheels will engage for general service. They are a very shy race, and under any conditions enlistment goes on very slowly with them.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts from which the Bombay army is recruited?

I believe that recruits are brought in by their comrades when they return from furlough, but recruiting parties are also sent from regiments.

6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

See Jameson's Code, Third Appendix, Page 182., Section 46., Article 214.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoys or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?

I am not aware of the details upon this subject.

8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes (with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops) in the Bombay army?

I advocate the system of local and separate enlistment for each regiment, in preference to the general and indiscriminate enlistment of men for the whole army in the same districts. Upon this point I beg to refer to my minutes of 14th and 22d May, appended to my former paper of replies.

I doubt if any Brahmins should be enlisted; the religious influence they possess over the inferior castes seems to be inconsistent with military discipline and even with safety.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bombay army?

I, A.B., private in the regiment, do swear, that I will not abandon these colours, but always defend them to the utmost of my power, and that I will implicitly obey all the orders of my commanders, and in every thing behave myself as becomes a good soldier, and faithful servant of the Company; and failing in any part of my duty as such, I will submit to the penalties described in the articles of war which have been read to me.

10. How long has this form been in use in the Bombay army?

Since the 11th April 1807.

11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the sepoy of the Bombay army?

If any oath is to be retained, the sepoy should be required to swear allegiance to the Queen.

12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bombay presidency of seafaring habits; and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?

The present marine corps is chiefly composed of Mussulmans and low-caste Hindoos. The so called native Portuguese, chiefly Roman Catholic fishermen, of whom there are a large number in Salsette and the Concan, would, in my opinion, form as good a native marine corps as could be raised. But I doubt their willingness to enlist in a corps chiefly composed of Hindoos and Mussulmans.

13. Has the Bombay Presidency any marine corps; and if so, what strength, and whence recruited?

This has been answered in the reply to the previous question. The marine corps is of the same strength as that of a regiment of the line.

14. Should each infantry corps be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only?

I have already given my opinion upon this point. I attach the utmost importance to it. I believe that upon this more than upon all the other conditions together depends our future security in India.

15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area, in fact without reference to districts?

Answered in the foregoing reply.

16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste?

Where races and tribes are so entirely distinct as the Bheels, Kolies, Beloochees, &c., I think that they should be formed into distinct corps. In districts where the population is mixed, and people of different tribes and castes are found in the same village, it would be desirable to enlist all indiscriminately.

17. If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste? Or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?

My answer to this question may be inferred from the foregoing. There can be no inconvenience in mixing up people enlisted from the same district and speaking the same language.

18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, and castes be entertained?

It may be as well to prevent any caste having the preponderance; but if each corps is enlisted in a separate district, and if there are no Brahmins, this is a matter of comparative indifference.

19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area, without reference to district?

I would enlist them from the same districts. As the police

receive less pay than the army, and have constant hard work, the better sort of recruits would enter the army.

20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?

Most certainly not. It is of the utmost importance to keep them as distinct as possible. Besides, I would have a lower standard for the police, and would have men of a different stamp altogether.

21. What agency should be employed for recruiting in the districts of the Bombay presidency or of its dependencies, or in districts of other presidencies?

Under the system which I have explained in my minutes of 14th and 22d May, probably no special agency would be required. Each regiment would return periodically to the district in which it was recruited, or to its neighbourhood, and the regimental head quarters would be the recruiting depôt.

22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency?

I am not aware that any particular agency is required; there appears to be always abundance of recruits for police corps.

23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the army of the Bombay presidency?

I am not aware that any precautions are necessary in this presidency. I presume that the precautions here alluded to are intended to prevent the enlistment of mutineers or disaffected men.

24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connection with recruits for police corps in the Bombay presidency?

Answer as above.

25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country, and if so, should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies, or otherwise?

With the exception of a few African artillerymen for stations where Europeans cannot exist without great risk of life and health, I would have no foreign mercenaries. I would prefer relying upon the natives of the country. But it may be advisable for a time to entertain some regiments of Africans and Malays for service in notoriously disaffected districts, where it would be neither expedient to raise troops or to quarter regiments raised in other parts of the country which might become infected with the disaffection of the inhabitants.

26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?

I have no knowledge of the natives of other tropical countries; but the Africans in the West India regiments and the Malays in the Ceylon rifle regiments are said to be excellent soldiers.

27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?

I have no knowledge which would enable me to answer this question.

28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of a native regiment?

I cannot possibly conceive an arrangement more calculated than this to exhibit in the strongest light our distrust of the natives and our own weakness.

29. If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for the special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief?

I leave this question to be answered by those who advocate the measure.

30. Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops?

31. Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

32. How should such companies be armed? With similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated?

I leave these questions to be answered by those who advocate the measure.

33. How should the native infantry of the Bombay presidency be armed?

If there is any choice, I would of course give the best arms to the Europeans, but I would not, even on this point show any distrust of the natives.

34. How should police corps in the Bombay presidency be armed?

I would arm them with a light fusil or musket and a short sword or knife, which would be useful both as a bayonet and as a separate weapon.

35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native sepoy a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?

I should say not. It appears to me that it would be preferable to dress them in a uniform better suited to native habits.

36. How should the native infantry of the Bombay presidency be dressed with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?

I cannot answer this in detail, but I think a looser and more native style of dress than the present would be better.

37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment a native irregular regiment officered from that European regiment alone should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?

Believing that local European regiments would be the greatest of all possible mistakes, I do not enter into this question.

38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers present any anology with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?

It is sufficient to recall to Colonel Durand's recollection the conduct of the drivers of the Bengal battery at Mhow last year.

39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?

Needs no reply.

40. Would such a system be favourable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops, which is an element of strength?

Nothing in my opinion would be more calculated to impair both.

41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?

I leave this question to be answered by those who advocate the measure.

42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?

We must have native troops, and it is better that they should be competent and self-reliant than good for nothing, which would be the case if they are taught to depend upon European support. Our policy should be to create an army which we can rely upon, and then to make it as good as we can.

Oct. 4, 1858. ELPHINSTONE.

APPENDIX No. 69.

Lieut.-General Sir H. Somerset's Answers.

Head Quarters, Poona,
July 22, 1858.

Sir,

I have the honour to communicate to you, for the information of the Right Hon. the Governor-General, my views regarding paragraph 5 of the Honourable Court's despatch, No. 235, as well as replies to the questions which accompanied your circular letter, No. 14, of 21st May.

2. Should it be resolved to enlist natives of other tropical countries for service in India, I would certainly recommend their being formed into separate regiments; but, after due consideration, I am led to doubt the expediency of such enlistments at all.

3. I think that, in the long run, regiments so composed would cost the State nearly as much as Europeans do, without possessing their general efficiency.

4. But it is chiefly on political grounds that I deprecate such enlistments, and I will therefore submit for his Lordship's consideration, a few of the reasons that strike me as militating against them.

5. The history of India for the past century has shewn, I think, that our rule has rested more upon moral influence and the natural ascendency of our race over the Asiatic, than on the numerical strength of the British troops maintained in the country; and it seems to me that though it is our plain duty to augment the latter, yet that we must still look to moral influence as the distinguishing characteristic of our rule; and here I will not stop to analyse on what this influence is based, its chief outward cause is, undoubtedly, the European element, civil and military, in the country; but besides that, there are other points of no small importance, such as the superior vigour, moral, physical, and intellectual, of the Anglo-Saxon. Not the least of the collaterals I refer to is the salutary impression on the native mind of our unbounded resources. Hyder Ali is not the only native who has felt what he undoubtedly expressed, that, "in regard to our power, he was not afraid so much of "what he saw as of what he did not see."

6. I gather, from the results of a year's severe test, that the truth of this principle has been fully established, for though in the course of many years the undue reduction of our European forces, too indulgent a rule, and many other powerful causes, had so weakened its effect in a portion of our Empire, as to pave the way for mutiny and rebellion, still the main body of the people of India remained passive under its influence, and thus allowed time for the full restoration of its supremacy by means of an accession of European force, and the successive victories that followed.

7. If a section of our subjects, carried away by a mixture of ignorance, arrogance, and fanaticism, were recently led to overrate their own strength and underrate ours, to forget that the substantial privileges which they enjoy depend solely on their connection with us, and *not* on the soundness of their own constitution, moral or social, we may conclude that, having now had ocular demonstration that the European force in this country can be trebled, and having learnt such severe lessons through its instrumentality, they will, as a body, abandon such fallacies, and readily believe that our ascendency, even under the most adverse circumstances, is a practical as well as a moral truth.

8. If I am right, then, in supposing that the ascendency of our prestige and moral power constitute the main spring of our rule, I think that before introducing any foreign elements into our system, we should satisfy ourselves that they will strengthen, or at all events not weaken it.

9. I must confess that I am far from thinking that the enlistment of foreign native mercenaries into our ranks will have a beneficial effect; they would not, in the first place, command the respect that Europeans do, nor could they for reasons of policy, as well as duty, be introduced in sufficiently large numbers to render us independent of the sepoys, who, numerically speaking, must always preponderate; nor do I consider that, should a moral epidemic recur, like that from which we are now emerging, they would be one whit more trustworthy than the natives of this country themselves are.

10. Finally, they might occasion jealousy and distrust between us and the whole native army, and their presence be, very probably, attributed to inability on our part to maintain an adequate European force in the country; and, if such were the case, the consequences might be more serious and embarrassing than we can now trace.

11. After viewing the subject, therefore, in every possible light, I think that if we maintain a fixed European force *en evidence* in the country, and steadily persevere in our attempts to free its people from the moral thraldom in which they are held by their Brahminical heads, we should be independent of native foreign mercenaries, and always command the respect as well as the support of a large section of our subjects: indeed, even now it is not so much the people in this presidency as the Brahmins who are disaffected, and it is clear that our influence must either transcend theirs or in time yield to it.

12. I shall now have the honour to reply to the questions which accompanied your letter under reply.

Answers to Questions Nos. 1 and 3.

13. The number of European and native troops now serving in the Bombay Presidency, and their distribution, is given in the annexed Return, marked A.

14. The Rajpootana field force, though at present under the orders of the Government of India, properly belongs to the Bombay Presidency, and has been included as serving therein.

15. *Mhow*, at present held by Bombay troops, has also been included.

16. Returns showing these details also accompany the sketch.

Answer to Questions Nos. 2 and 4.

17. I beg to submit a return, marked B, showing the number of European and Native troops I propose for this Presidency as at present defined, and their distribution.

Answer to Question No. 5.

18. In the accompanying return marked C, I give as near a computation as possible of the strength of the regulars, irregulars, and police, to which this Presidency will soon be completed. For the information regarding the races of the men, I must refer you to other sources.

19. There are two extra battalions of infantry, upwards of 1,100 strong each, that are now being formed by drafts from regular regiments; these battalions are really regulars, but at present officered as irregulars, and for reasons which I will explain in treating the next question, No. 6. I deprecate the proportion of irregulars being augmented beyond what it now is, namely, about 10,000 men.

20. There is one other point which I desire especially to urge upon his lordship's notice, which is, that whatever irregular troops we have, may be kept free from serving as police under civil officers, as at present practised. I shall hope, further on, to show how utterly impossible it is for any body of troops to be efficient as police and soldiers too; but, independently of this, it often happens that the sudden withdrawal of irregulars from police duties for field service hazards the tranquillity of the districts affected by it, there being generally no force available to replace them. I would suggest that if it is indispensably necessary that irregulars should be so employed, more than half the regiment may not be on detached duty at once, the other half being at head-quarters for instruction in drill, &c., &c.

Answer to Question No. 6.

21. The question as to what proportion of our native establishment should be regulars, irregulars, and police, involves, I think, some of the most important considerations of the present day, because there are ideas abroad whose practical adoption would lead, I fear, to great evils and fresh complications.

22. I allude, in the first place, to the hypothesis that the native army should from henceforth be required to perform the combined duties of police and soldiers; and secondly, that, for financial reasons, its present establishment of twenty-five* European officers per regiment should be reduced to four (inclusive of the surgeon), according to the model of irregular corps.

23. I cannot but regard the first of these projects as simply impracticable, chiefly because the population of this part of India is subdivided into a variety of races, many of them aboriginal and predatory; whose employment by Government is not only a matter of policy but of duty, and who, though ready and willing to enter police corps, are resolutely averse to leaving their own districts, and to the course of discipline necessary for a soldier.

24. But besides this there is the natural diverseness between the duties required of policemen and soldiers, which

* This excludes one colonel and two medical officers but includes regimental staff.

renders their unfettered performance on a large scale, by one and the same body, impossible.

25. For instance, in a policeman, a *local* knowledge of the country and people is the principal qualification, whereas in a soldier a perfect freedom from *all local ties*, sympathies, or encumbrances, a readiness to move anywhere on any duty, at a moment's warning, and a strict discipline are required.

26. If, therefore, the raw material as well as the mode of its preparation for the two branches are so radically different, I cannot see how the combination contemplated by such a theory could be even attempted with any hopes of success.

27. With regard to the reconstruction of the native army on the irregular model, I quite agree that the reduction of the native commissioned, non-commissioned rank and file of the former in each regiment so as to correspond with the latter more closely than at present, is a measure that would be productive of economy and good order, but I cannot agree that the number of European officers to non-commissioned rank and file should be reduced below its present proportion.

28. The present established strength of a native regiment is as follows:—

European Commissioned Officers.

	Pay in Garrison. Rupees.	As.	P.
1 Colonel	1,295	5	0
1 Lieut.-Colonel	827	14	0
1 Major	640	14	6
7 Captains	2,618	7	0
11 Lieutenants	2,483	4	0
5 Ensigns	910	9	7
1 Surgeon	674	1	0
1 Assistant-surgeon	255	12	0
28	9,706	3	1

European Non-commissioned Officers.

	Rupees.	As.	P.
1 Sergeant-major	50	13	2
1 Quartermaster-sergeant	44	13	2
2	95	10	4

Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned Rank and File.

	Average Garrison Pay as per Classes. Rupees.	As.	P.
12 Subadars	624	0	0
12 Jemadars	294	0	0
12 Color Havildars	192	0	0
48 Havildars	672	0	0
60 Naiques	720	0	0
24 Drummers and Fifers	192	0	0
12 Bhistees	90	0	0
1000 Privates	8,000	0	0
1,180	10,784	0	0

29. Thus, the twenty-nine native infantry regiments of this presidency are established to contain 34,220 native commissioned, non-commissioned rank and file, and their garrison pay monthly, inclusive of European officers, amounts to about 600,000 rupees.

30. This strength having been found totally inadapted to the positive duties which had to be performed, Government sanctioned, as a temporary measure, the enrolment of about 2,000 pensioners, and two extra battalions 1,180 strong each, so that over and above the 34,220 men specified, we have about 4,360 to meet present emergencies,* but of this extra number the 2,000 enrolled pensioners being an expensive body, and too old and infirm to perform other than light camp duties, must be discharged as soon as their relief can be arranged for.

31. I have just shown that we already have upwards of 4,000 regular native infantry over and above our established strength, but it is unorganised and unofficered at present, and therefore of very little use. Though the army is so hard worked, that unless augmented or reorganised it cannot continue to perform its present rate of duty for long without great loss, yet I am led, after the most careful consideration, to believe that instead of increasing its rank and file, the most efficient and politic mode of relieving it and strengthening our system will be by a reorganization calculated alike to increase our moral hold upon it and render it fitter for detailed and detached work than it is at present.

32. About 39,000 native commissioned, non-commissioned rank and file would, I think, meet all our requirements, if organised on either of the following plans.

33. The first, which is the one that I would most strongly recommend, involves the abolishment of the rank of native commissioned officers altogether, and the increase of the European officers so as to make up for that reduction.

34. I have found that we have at present too many companies and too many non-commissioned rank and file* for the purposes of general economy; and I would, therefore, propose that each regiment should consist of 10 companies and the following ranks.

Europeans.	Natives.
1 colonel.	30 colour havildars.
1 lieutenant-colonel.	40 havildars.
1 major or second lieutenant-colonel.	50 naiques.
10 captains.	20 drummers and fifers.
12 lieutenants (including 1 adjutant, 1 quarter-master).	10 bhistees.
10 ensigns.	850 privates.
1 surgeon.	
1 assistant surgeon.	
37 officers.	980

1 serjeant-major (European)
1 quartermaster-serjeant (ditto).

35. But if the plan of excluding the native officers be objected to on political grounds I trust that, at least, the present number of European officers per regiment may be continued, and that the following may be the strength of native commissioned,† non-commissioned rank and file per 10 companies, viz.:—

	Garrison Pay. Rupees.
10 subadars	520
10 jemadars	245
10 colour havildars	160
40 havildars	560
50 naiques	600
20 drummers and fifers	160
10 bhistees	75
850 privates	6,800
1,000 total.	Rupees 9,120

36. I would propose that our army, which now consists of 29 regiments of native infantry, should be reconstructed into 39 of 1000 each, which, at the comparatively trifling cost of about a lac and a half per mensem in excess of our present expenditure on this head, would give us a force more in hand, better disciplined, and better adapted to both military and political purposes than the present army is.

Abstract Cost.

	Rupees.
28 officers	9,706
1 serjeant-major and quartermaster-serjeant	95
1000 native commissioned, non-commissioned rank and file	9,120
	18,921
	39
	170,289
	56,763
Total rupees	737,919

37. In estimating the number of officers for a native infantry regiment the number, on an average, required from each for military and civil staff appointments must never be lost sight of. In the present day it has amounted to about three per regiment for military and five for civil.

38. While I quite agree that three European officers are sufficient for each police corps, I cannot believe that that degree of discipline, which is the life and soul of the regular army, can ever be either established or maintained by that number of European officers per regiment in a native Indian army.

39. Whatever soldierlike qualities the sepoy may hitherto have shown, he owes their development solely to his European officers, under whose directing influence his natural

* These make in all 38,580 regular native infantry.

* 12 companies—1,180 native commissioned, non-commissioned and rank and file.

† 10 companies—1000 native commissioned and non-commissioned rank and file.

prejudices and apathy have been overcome to an extent that can be best estimated by comparing the present state of the native army of this presidency with what it was 30 years ago.

40. A well-officered native cavalry or native infantry regiment is not only as a rule a better disciplined and more efficient body in the field than an irregular one; but it has greater weight in the country in time of peace. Its European officers often exercise a beneficial influence beyond the limits of their regiment, and I have observed that political officers and magistrates, in certain circumstances, estimate the native regulars at a very different standard from other native troops.

41. That the reduction of European officers in the native army would involve a loss of its discipline and general efficiency there can be no doubt; but there is a still more serious evil inseparable from it, and that is *the undue power that it would throw into the hands of the native officers*, for officers there must be of one kind or the other.

42. Now, if there is one lesson which the history of the past year has taught us more prominently than another, it is, I think, the imperative necessity of so arranging the constituent elements of our system, civil and military, as to place the reins of all branches of importance in European hands.

43. We have learned that our supremacy in this country depends chiefly upon the European element; but more, I think, upon its judicious fusion amongst the mass to be governed by it than upon its bare physical strength; and I firmly believe that no addition of European strength that we are able to make to this presidency would ever compensate for the moral and physical paralysis which an undue reduction of European officers would occasion to the native army, and through it to the State.

44. No native will progress towards the European standard of improvement except by constant and well-regulated association with Europeans, and I cannot but regard any measure that tends to lessen that association in the army as clearing the way for a host of villains who by dint of superstition and fanaticism would endeavour to mould that army to their purpose. An example of this occurred last year in the case of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, half of which was composed of Hindoostanees, but whose lines, in the midst of mutiny and rebellion in Malwa, were comparatively inaccessible to seditious agents, not only on account of the vigilance of the European and native commissioned and non-commissioned officers but the good feeling and mutual regard that existed between them and their men.

45. It may be relied upon that the effect of isolating the native army, either externally from their comrades, the European soldiers, or depriving them internally of their European officers, would sooner or later be productive of an inflated spirit of pride that would ultimately lead to their entire alienation from us.

46. Some of our most distinguished and *practical* generals (Lord Hardinge and Sir Charles Napier amongst the number) have earnestly represented to Government the *want* of more European officers* with native regiments, but no officers of experience in the field has yet come forward to declare that we have got *too many*. When I reflect that out of the three officers proposed for each regiment, dashing and vigorous leaders for every difficult occasion have to be supplied, casualties filled, the errors of indiscipline rectified by holding together the wavering or rallying the broken mass, I feel utterly at a loss to account for so suicidal a project as that under notice, involving, as I before remarked, undue power being thrown into the hands of the native officers, and even placing them in command of regiments on field service.

47. The real calibre of the native of India must always be borne in mind when judging of matters so important as these are. Sepoys led by an European officer are different men from those not so, *more especially against a foreign enemy in a strange country*.

48. I would mention here, as bearing closely on the point under discussion, that out of the three native cavalry regiments serving with Sir James Outram in Persia, the 3rd light cavalry (a regular corps) was held in highest esteem in the army as always ready, always efficient; and certainly, if we recall to mind their dashing conduct at Khooshab, the prominent position they held was well earned and well deserved.

49. I will not dwell further on the subject than to observe that if an European regiment requires some sixty officers to maintain its discipline and lead it in the field, much more a native one some five and twenty; in no point of view therefore can I see the reasonableness of the theory that would reduce that five and twenty to three.

50. My own impression is, after the most careful consideration, that the police must be a perfectly distinct force, and that (including local corps) it should not exceed about half the numerical amount* of the regulars and irregulars put together. Although its existing proportion is a little in excess of that, yet, as there are pensioners and veterans, and some city police included in the total, it may be taken as equivalent to half, and is, I conclude, that considered sufficient by the Government to meet the wants of this presidency, according to its present limits.

51. I think also that the irregulars should never exceed a proportion of one fourth the regulars. These proportions are also existing ones (or very nearly so), the result of practical trial, and I would strongly and respectfully urge on his lordship's notice that they have of late years, and especially during the one that is past, stood a test that affords the best guarantee we could desire for their general adaptation to foreign and home service.

ANSWER to QUESTIONS Nos. 7 and 8.

52. The proportion of European troops to the whole native force of the Bombay presidency, police, regulars, and irregulars, should never, I think, be less than one fourth,† and excluding the police, they should bear a proportion of about half the regulars and irregulars put together.

53. It will be difficult to maintain a greater proportion of European to native troops than one fourth, but it is politic to maintain that, if possible.

ANSWER to QUESTIONS Nos. 9 and 10.

54. The barrack accommodation for troops in the Bombay Presidency, as well as that required for the strength I consider necessary, are stated in the accompanying return marked D.

ANSWER to QUESTION No. 11.

55. The proportion of European force to be drawn from Her Majesty's army must depend upon what could be permanently spared from that army in the time of war. I am strongly of opinion that it will never answer in the event of an European war to denude India to the extent already done. I submit this view as accordant with past experience, and I think that two thirds of the European force required for the permanent occupation of India should be composed of troops raised exclusively for that service.

ANSWER to QUESTION No. 12.

56. I would officer those troops as at present, on the seniority promotion system, and if requisite absorb the unemployed officers of the Bengal army in their organization, and the reconstruction of the native army.

ANSWER to QUESTION No. 13.

57. With regard to the embarrassment that will accrue from the juxta-position of the seniority and purchase promotion systems, it would, I think, be very great, unless some remedy similar to what has been applied to the Royal and Company's engineers and artillery, be granted to the Company's cavalry and infantry also, the officers of which will now be superseded on all sides, as the abolition of the rank of major in the artillery and engineers gives the officers of those arms a decided advantage over those that are still under the seniority promotion system. I am not quite clear as to the actual course that would afford the desired relief, but would suggest for consideration that each native cavalry and infantry regiment should have a second lieutenant-colonel, who would only receive the pay of a major until he attained a certain position on the general list of lieutenant-colonels, after which he would be entitled to the pay of that rank. Whilst thus expressing myself, however, I must say that I do not speak at all confidently on this subjects.

ANSWER to QUESTION No. 13.

58. I do not think it would be safe to reduce our established European strength below one-fourth of the whole of the troops in India, be the remaining three-fourths com-

* It must always be borne in mind how large a proportion of the European officers of native regiments are withdrawn for staff duties.

* Present established strength—

Regulars	42,614
Irregulars	10,135
Police	28,738
Total	81,487

† This proportion would admit of ⅓ being temporarily sent on service

posed of whatever countries they may; indeed, if foreign mercenaries were introduced I should be rather inclined to increase than diminish the proportion, as I think the effect they would have on the country generally would be of an exciting character; if any measure would admit of our reducing the European force below this, it would be the augmentation of the European officers of the native army, not their reduction, as I have heard advocated.

I have, &c.
H. SOMERSET,
Lieutenant-General, Commander-in-Chief,
Bombay Army.

A.

LIST of Her Majesty's European and the Honourable Company's European and Native Troops of each Arm, now borne on the Rolls of the Bombay Presidency, showing their present Strength and Distribution.

Those in *italics* are beyond the limits of the Presidency, and their strength is given as per the last returns received since their date, however many casualties have occurred.

Head Quarters, Poona, July 22, 1858.

Her Majesty's Troops.		Commissioned Officers.		Non-commissioned, Rank and File.	
		Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.
Serving in the Presidency.	1st troop horse artillery	5	—	212	73
	3 companies siege train artillery	15	—	277	12
	2 light field batteries	10	—	331	29
	1 company of engineers	4	—	112	—
	2½ regiments cavalry	81	—	1,436	—
	9½ regiments infantry	360	—	8,618	—
	Total	475	—	10,986	114
Serving beyond the Presidency.	*1 light field battery*	*5*	—	*185*	*29*
	1 company engineers	*4*	—	*117*	—
	1½ regiments cavalry	*49*	—	*903*	—
	5 regiments and 2 companies infantry	*145*	—	*4,094*	—
	Total	*203*	—	*5,299*	*29*
	Grand Total	678	—	16,285	143

DISTRIBUTION of the above.

Her Majesty's Troops.	Stations.
Artillery.	
D troop horse artillery	Poona.
8th company, 1st battalion, light field battery	Baroda.
6th company, 14th batt. light field battery	*Central India, F.F.*
8th company, 14th battalion, light field battery	Kulladgher, Dharwar, and Nurgoond.
3rd company, 4th battalion, siege train	Neemuch.
2nd company, 11th batt., siege train	Surat.
7th company, 11th batt., siege train	Mhow.
Engineers.	
11th company	Neemuch.
21st company	*Central India, F.F.*
Cavalry.	
3rd dragoon guards	Kirkee.
1 squadron	Ahmednuggur.
1 squadron	Sattara.
8th hussars (head-quarter wing)	*Central India, F.F.*
Left wing	Nusseerabad.
14th light dragoons	*Central India, F.F.*
Depôt	Kirkee.
17th lancers	Kirkee.
1 squadron	Sholapoor.
1 squadron	Mhow.
Infantry.	
4th King's own (wing)	Ahmedabad, temporarily.
18th Royal Irish (head quarters and 5 companies)	Poona.
2 companies	Ahmednuggur.
1 company	Asseerghur.
2 companies	*Jaulna.*

Her Majesty's Troops.	Stations.
Infantry—cont.	
33rd regiment (head quarters)	Poona.
2 companies	Sattara.
1 company	Sholapoor.
1 company	Ahmednuggur.
51st light infantry (head quarters)	Kurrachee.
1 company	Barada.
2 companies	Hydrabad.
1 company	Shikarpoor.
56th regiment	Belgaum.
1 company	Sawuut Warree.
57th regiment (hd. qrs. and wing)	Bombay.
Wing	Aden.
64 regiment	*Bengal Presidency.*
Depôt	Belgaum.
71st Highlanders	*Central India, F.F.*
72nd Highlanders	Neemuch.
74th Highlanders (detachment from Bellary, temporarily)	Dharwar Fort.
78th Highlanders	*Bengal Presidency.*
Depôt	Poona.
83rd regiment	Nusserabad.
Depôt	Deesa.
86th regiment	*Central India, F.F.*
Depôt	Poona.
Detachment	Mhow.
89th regiment	Deesa.
1 company	Ahmedabad.
1 company	Mount Aboo.
92nd Highlanders	Mhow.
1 company	Bombay.
1 company	Nassick.
1 company	Malligaum.
95th regiment	*Central India, F. F.*
Depôt	Deesa.
Details of recruits of H.M. regiments	Baroda and Broach.

Honourable Company's European Troops.	Commissioned Officers.		Non-commissioned, Rank and File.	
	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.
Serving in the Presidency. — 2 troops horse artillery	10	—	253	49
6 companies foot artillery, with light field batteries	14	5	474	325
1 company without battery	4	1	79	30
3 companies reserve artillery, with light field batteries	7	2	293	138
1 regiment infantry	32	—	982	—
Total	67	8	2,101	542
Serving beyond the Presidency. — *2 troops horse artillery*	*11*	—	*292*	*49*
1 company foot artillery, with light field battery	*2*	*1*	*97*	*73*
1 company reserve artillery, with light field battery	*1*	—	*52*	*46*
2 regiments infantry	*52*	—	*1,801*	—
Total	*66*	*1*	*2,242*	*168*
Grand Total	133	9	4,343	710

DISTRIBUTION of the above.

Hon. Company's European Troops.	Stations.
Artillery.	
Horse Brigade.	
Head quarters	Poona.
1st troop	*Central India, F.F.*
2nd troop	Nusserabad.
3rd troop	*Central India, F.F.*
4th troop	Poona.
1st Battalion.	
Head quarters	Ahmednuggur.
1st company with light foot battery	Ahmedabad.
2nd company, without battery	Aden.
3rd company, with light foot battery	Belgaum.
4th company, with do. do.	Hydrabad (Sinde).
2nd Battalion.	
Head quarters	Bombay.
1st company, with light field battery	Neemuch.
2nd company, with do. do.	Sattara.

Hon. Company's European Troops.	Stations.
2nd Battalion—cont.	
3rd company, with light field battery	Shalapoor.
4th company, with do. do.	*Central India, F.F.*
Reserve.	
1st company	Shikarpoor.
2nd company	*Central India, F.F.*
Detachment	*Jaulna.*
3rd company	Kalapoor.
4th company	Kurrachee.
Infantry.	
1st regiment fusileers	*Bengal Presidency.*
Depôt	Kurrachee.
2nd regiment light infantry	Belgaum.
Detachment	Kalapoor.
Ditto	Kulladghee.
itt	Rutnagherry.
3rd regiment	*Central India, F.F.*
Depôt	Admednuggur.

Honourable Company's Native Troops.	Commissioned Officers.		Non-commissioned, Rank and File.	
	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.
Serving in the Presidency. — 5 companies foot artillery, with light field batteries	5	21	6	671
5 companies without batteries	11	22	2	487
Head quarters and 3½ companies sappers and miners	6	7	20	427
2 regiments light cavalry	33	33	3	959
5 regiments irregular cavalry	20	125	—	3,686
26 regiments native infantry	339	614	17	26,469
1 marine battalion	4	24	—	1,130
1 native veteran battalion	14	16	—	822
Enrolled pensioners	5	55	2	1,661
Total	437	917	50	36,312
Serving beyond the Presidency. — *1½ companies sappers and miners*	*5*	*3*	*13*	*130*
2 regiments light cavalry	*31*	*31*	*2*	*846*
Detachment of irregular cavalry	—	*1*	—	*26*
3 regiments native infantry	*39*	*69*	*1*	*2,630*
2 Belooch battalions	*15*	*4*	—	*2,041*
Total	*90*	*108*	*16*	*673*
Grand Total	527	1,025	66	41,985

DISTRIBUTION of the above.

Honourable Company's Native Troops.	Stations.
Artillery.	
1st company, 3rd battalion artillery	Detachments Rajkote and Godra.
2nd company, 3rd batt. with light field battery	Godra.
3rd company, 3rd batt. with do.	Deesa.
4th company, 3rd batt. with do.	Nusseerabad.
5th company, 3rd battalion	Ahmednuggur.
6th company, 3rd battalion	Aden.
1st company, 4th batt. with light field battery	Head quarters, Ahmednuggur.
Detachment	Neemuch.
2nd company, 4th batt. with light field battery	Ahmednuggur.
3rd company, 4th battalion,*	——
4th company, 4th battalion	Ahmednuggur.
5th company, 4th battalion,*	——
6th company, 4th battalion	Ahmednuggur.
Sappers and Miners.	
Sappers and Miners (head quarters and 1½ company)	Poona detach. Southern Mahratta country.
1 company	Aden.
1 company	Neemuch.
1½ *companies*	*Central India F.F.*
Cavalry.	
1st lancers (head quarters)	*Central India F.F.*
Detachments	Nusseerabad and Bombay.
2nd native light cavalry (head qrs.)	Neemuch.
Detachment	Deesa.
3rd native light cavalry	*Central India F.F.*
2nd Madras light cavalry	Sholapoor.
Detachment	*Secunderabad.*
Poona irregular horse	Seroor.
Detachments	Khandeish, Poona, Ahmednuggur, and Thulghaut.
1st Scinde irregular horse	Jacobabad.
Detachments	Hoosenkegheny, Tungwanee, Khundkote, and Koomree.
2nd Scinde irregular horse	Jacobabad.
Detachment	Rojun.
3rd Scinde irregular horse	Jacobabad.
Detachment	*Gundava.*
Southern Mahratta irregular horse	Head quarters, Kulladghee.
Detachments	Belgaum, Dharwar, Sattara, and Kolapoor.
Infantry.	
1st grenadier regt. native infantry	Bombay.
2nd grenadier regt. native infantry	Ahmednuggur (Guzerat.)
Depôt	Ahmedabad.
3rd regt. native infantry	Sholapoor.
Detachment	Beejapoor.
4th regt. native infantry, rifles	Mhow.
5th regiment native light infantry	Ahmednuggur.
Detachments	Field service in the district.

Honourable Company's Native Troops.	Stations.
Infantry—cont.	
6th regt. native infantry	Poona,
7th regt. native infantry	Bombay.
8th regt. native infantry	Baroda.
Detachments	Jambooseer and Dohud.
9th regt. native infantry	Mhow.
10th regt. native infantry	*Central India F.F.*
11th regt. native infantry	Ahmedabad.
Detachment	Gogo.
12th regt. native infantry	Nusseerabad.
Detachment	Neemuch.
13th regt. native infantry	Neemuch.
Detachment	Nusseerabad.
Depôt	Hydrabad.
14th regt. native infantry	Kurrachee.
Detachment	Ahmedabad.
15th regt. native infantry	Kolapoor.
Detachments	Rutnagherry, Vingorla, and Kulladghee.
16th regt. native infantry	Surat.
Detachment	Broach.
17th regt. native infantry	Rajkote.
Wing	Deesa.
18th regt. native infantry	Belgaum.
Detachment	North Canara frontier.
19th regt. native infantry	Mhow.
20th regt. native infantry	Belgaum.
Detachments	Ramghaut and Baltsee.
22nd regt. native infantry	Sattara.
Left wing	Tasgaum.
Detachments	Ashta, Beejapoor, and Punderpoor.
23rd regt. native light infantry	Khandeish.
Detachment	Asseerghur.
24th regt. native infantry	*Central India F.F.*
Depôt	Mhow.
25th regt. native infantry	*Central India F.F.*
Depôt	Poona.
26th regt. native infantry	Dhoolia.
Detachments	Nuggur districts.
28th regt. native infantry	Dharwar.
Detachments	Field service southern districts.
29th regt. native infantry	Aden.
30th regt. native infantry	Malligaum.
Detachment	Kurrachee.
31st regt. native infantry	En route to Deesa.
Irregular Infantry.	
Marine battalion	Bombay.
Detachments	Scinde, Bushire, &c.
Native veteran battalion	Dapoolie.
Detachments	Bhewudy and other parts of Koukan.
Enrolled Pensioners	Tanna, Poona, Ahmednuggur, Dapoolie, Malwan, and Ahmedabad.
1st Belooch battalion	*Bengal Presidency.*
2nd Belooch battalion	*Deeragazee Khan.*
Detachments	*Mungrota Meetunkote.*

* These companies do not at present exist, the men who composed them having been distributed among the other companies of the battalion.

N.B. No returns of the 3d Belooch Battalion and the two Sinde Rifle Regiments, (being civil,) have been received; they are not consequently included in the above.

H. SOMERSET,
Lieutenant-General, Commander-in-Chief.

B.

PROPOSED PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT of Regular Troops for the Bombay Presidency, and their Distribution.

Head Quarters, Poona, July 22, 1858.

Stations.	EUROPEANS.							NATIVES.		REMARKS.
	Sappers and Miners.	Horse Artillery.	Reserve Companies of Artillery without Lt. Field Battery for Garrison Duty.	Companies of Artillery with Light Field Battery.	Cavalry.	Military Train.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	
Bombay garrison.	—	—	1	—	—	—	1 reg.	—	2 regs.	Exclusive of the marine battalion.
Surat -	—	—	1	—	—	—	Detach. 1 co.	—	½ reg. hd. qr. wing.	The detachment of European infantry to be furnished from the Presidency or Ahmedabad, as found convenient, and the whole of the European troops to be quartered in the Castle.
Northern division:										
Broach -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	½ reg.	
Baroda -	—	—	—	1	—	—	Detach. 1 co.	—	1 reg.	If European troops not required at Baroda for political reasons, the whole of this force might be concentrated at divisional head qrs. Ahmedabad.
Ahmedabad	1 co. -	—	—	1	—	Detach.	1 reg.	—	2 regs.	
Rajkote -	—	—	—	1	—	—	Detach.	—	1 reg.	
Deesa -	1 co. -	1 troop	—	1	—	Detach.	1 reg.	Wing -	2 regs.	
Mhow -	„	—	—	1	1 squad.	Detach.	„	1 reg.	4 „	
Rajpootana field force:										
Nusseerabad	—	—	1	1	„	„	„	Hd. qr. wing.	3 „	It has been proposed to dismantle Agimere, and establish our arsenal, &c. in a field fortification at Nusseerabad.
Neemuch -	1 co. -	1 troop	1	—	Hd qrs. and 2 squads.	Detach.	„	1 reg.	2 „	Should be the head quarters of Rajpootana field force. A field fortification is in contemplation.
Scinde division:										
Kurrachee -	2 cos.	—	—	2	—	Detach.	2 regs.	—	3 „	
Hydrabad	—	—	—	2	—	„	Wing -	—	1 reg.	When the frontier brigade sanctioned for Jacobabad is properly organized, the European artillery and infantry now at Shirkarpoor would be brought to Hydrabad. In addition to the regular native infantry at Kurrachee, Hydrabad, and Shikarpoor, there is a Belooch battalion for each station.
Shikarpoor	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Aden -	1 co. -	—	1	—	—	—	Wing -	—	1 reg.	
Southern division:										
Belgaum -	„	—	—	1	—	Hd. qrs. of a div.	1½ regs.	—	3 regs.	One company of siege artillery for fort.
Dharwar -	—	—	—	1	—	—	Detach. 2 cos.	—	1 „	The Europeans inside the fort.
Kuliadghee	—	—	—	1	—	Detach.	Detach. 3 cos.	—	1 „	At present the head quarters of the Southern Mahratta horse.
Kolapoor -	—	—	—	1	—	„	Wing -	—	1 „	
Sholapoor -	—	1 troop	—	—	Wing -	„	„	—	2 regs.	The 2d regiment of Mahratta horse should be at Sholapoor.

Proposed Permanent Establishment, &c.—*cont.*

Stations.	European.							Natives.		Remarks.
	Sappers and Miners.	Horse Artillery.	Reserve Companies of Artillery without Lt. Field Battery for Garrison Duty.	Companies of Artillery with Light Field Battery.	Cavalry.	Military Train.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	
Poona and Kirkee.	Hd. qrs. and 2 cos.	2 troops	—	1	1 reg:	Hd. qrs. of the corps.	2 regs.	—	3 regs.	
Sattara -	—	—	—	1	Hd. qr. wing.	—	Detach.	—	1 reg.	
Ahmednuggur.	—	—	3	1	—	Detach.	Wing -	—	1 „	
Malligaum -	—	—	—	1	—	„	„	—	2 regs.	
Dhoolia -	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 reg.	
Asseerghur	—	—	Detachment from Nuggur.	—	—	—	Detach.	—	Detach.	
Total	1 reg. A.	6 troops	9 companies B	18 light field bats.	3 regts.	A corps of 4 divs. C	15 regs.	3 regs.	39 regs.	

A. If a corps of sappers and miners composed entirely of Europeans be objected to on the score of expense, that arm of the service ought at least to be composed of half Europeans and half natives. Our present strength of native sappers is five companies, far below the requisite proportion for this army. Were an European battalion of five companies added to this, I consider we should have enough. It is certainly questionable whether we should be entirely dependent upon natives as sappers and miners any more than as artillery-men. Were a foreign enemy to appear in India and be joined by our native sappers, we should, without Europeans of that arm, be in an awkward predicament.

B. Siege artillery required as a reserve and for garrison purposes in forts, &c. At present we cripple our light field batteries to man siege trains, and too often detach the latter inefficiently equipped.

C. Every one has felt the imperative necessity of bringing the carriage of armies under military control and organization, of keeping up in time of peace a certain proportion of animals and equipments, drivers, &c., with each division of the army. Such proportion not to be less than one-third; the quantity of carriage required to move the force at the station. Thus we should have a nucleus on which to base an augmentation in time of war, with some hope of rendering the mass in some degree manageable through the medium of the trained officers, non-commissioned officers, and drivers accustomed to the work. If this corps cannot, for reasons of economy, be entirely European, it should at all events be partly so, for the same reasons that we would put our artillery in sure hands, for without its baggage and commissariat an army soon becomes a rabble. If an enemy, strong in cavalry, knew how to use it, he might in most instances destroy all the baggage of an Indian division, simply owing to its unmanageable character, being composed of a heterogeneous mass of men, cattle, and vehicles, chiefly pressed into the service for the occasion. The delay in starting troops for want of carriage, the check to agriculture and trade caused by its seizure from the people of the country, the enormous outlay with which the present system is attended, the infinite sources of fraud that it contains, and other evils too numerous to detail, are reasons that will be found to counterbalance any arguments, resting on financial grounds, that can be brought against it, but even on those grounds I am satisfied that it will be found a saving in the long run.

Detail.	Established strength.				
	Commissioned Officers.		Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.		
	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.	
2 battalions of sappers and miners.	30	10	500	570	The Europeans should be all artificers.
6 troops of horse artillery -	30	—	900	150	Two more troops of horse artillery are urgently required.
9 companies reserve artillery	45	—	945	288	
18 light field batteries - -	90	—	*2,682	576	* Including drivers.
3 regiments of European cavalry.	129	—	2,244	—	
Military train - -	26	—	800	—	
15 European regiments -	750	—	16,155	—	
3 regiments native light cavalry.	78	48	6	1,950	
39 regiments native infantry -	1,092	780	78	38,220	
Total -	2,270	838	24,310	41,754	

The proposed establishment of regular native troops will be 42,592, including native officers.

H. Somerset,
Lieut.-General, Commander-in-Chief.

C.

RETURN of the whole of the Native Troops, Regulars, Irregulars, and Police borne on the Returns of the Bombay Presidency, including some under organization.

Head Quarters, Poona, July 22, 1858.

Honourable Company's Native Troops.	Established Strength.				Remarks.
	Commissioned Officers.		Non-commissioned Rank and File.		
	European.	Native.	European.	Native.	
Regular Troops.					
5 companies of foot artillery, with light field batteries.	20	15	5	720	4 European officers to each company, the native artillery to be gradually absorbed.
5 companies without batteries - -	20	15	–	500	
5 companies of sappers and miners -	10	10	32	570	2 European officers to each company.
3 regiments of light cavalry - -	78	48	6	1,950	26 European officers to each regiment.
29 regiments of native infantry - -	812	696	58	33,176	28 „ „
2 extra battalions of infantry - -	8	48	4	2,288	Ordered to be raised with an establishment of 4 officers including the surgeon. They are composed of sepoys transferred from regular regiments, and should be fully officered as regulars.
Enrolled pensioners - - -	5	67	2	1,933	
Total -	953	899	107	41,137	
Irregular Troops.					
Scinde frontier brigade, including 3 regiments of horse and 2 of foot.	22	129	—	3,873	Under organization.
3 Belooch battalions - - -	12	60	—	3,363	One under organization.
Poona horse - - - -	4	30	—	922	
2 regiments of Southern Mahratta horse	8	58	—	1,750	A 2nd regiment is now being raised.
Total -	46	277	—	9,908	
Police and Local Corps serving as Police.					
Marine battalion - - -	4	24	—	1,144	Head quarters, Bombay.
Main body of police of the presidency under the commissioners of police.	—	—	—	16,000	This will be about the strength shortly.
Horse and foot Scinde police - -	4	88	—	4,251	Civil.
Police of the Island of Bombay - -	—	—	—	1,093	
Kalapoor infantry local corps - -	2	20	—	900	Civil.
Sawunt Warree „ - -	4	12	—	988	Civil.
Kutch legion „ - -	2	10	—	700	Computed civil.
Sattara „ - -	1	8	—	595	
Kattiwar horse, local - - -	1	1	—	900	Civil.
Guzerat horse, local - - -	4	33	—	1,059	Civil.
1 native veteran battalion - -	27	16	—	896	
Troops kept up by a few native states are not included.					
Total -	49	212	2	28,526	
Grand Total - -	1,048	1,388	109	79,571	

Total native commissioned, non-commissioned, rank and file, regulars, - -		42,036	As at present established.
Ditto,	irregulars, - -	10,185	
Ditto,	police and local corps	28,738	
	Grand Total	80,959	

These numbers are substantially correct, and show what, according to the present intention of Government, will shortly be the strength of their branches.

The following proposed establishment of regular native troops was given in Return B.

1 battalion sappers, natives, 580.
3 regiments light cavalry.
39 native infantry.

H. SOMERSET,
Lieutenant-General, Commander-in-Chief.

D.

STATEMENT showing the existing BARRACK ACCOMMODATION for European Troops in the Bombay Presidency, as well as that required for the Strength considered necessary.

Station.	Troops.	Existing Barrack Accomodation.		Permanent Barrack Accommodation required.	Remarks.
		Permanent.	Temporary.		
Bombay	1 company of reserve artillery.	For a battalion in Fort George.	—	—	
	1 regiment of infantry	For 286 men in the Town Barracks, and for a wing at Colaba.	—	*1 regiment of infantry*	The present infantry barracks are condemned. New ones are required.
Surat	1 company of reserve artillery.	—	1 company of artillery	*1 company of reserve artillery.*	The detachments of artillery and infantry occupy buildings in the Castle.
	1 company of infantry	—	1 company of infantry	*1 company of infantry*	
Baroda	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	1 company of artillery, with battery.	*1 company of artillery, with battery.*	
	1 company of infantry	—	2 companies of infantry	*1 company of infantry*	
Ahmedabad	1 company of sappers and miners.	—	—	*1 company of sappers and miners.*	
	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	1 company of artillery, with battery.	*1 company of artillery, with battery.*	
	Detachment mil. train	—	—	*Detachment mil. train*	
	1 regiment of infantry	—	Wing of infantry -	*1 regiment of infantry*	
Rajkote	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	—	*1 company of artillery, with battery.*	
	2 companies of infantry	—	—	*2 companies of infantry*	
Deesa	1 company of sappers and miners.	—	—	*1 company of sappers and miners.*	
	1 troop of horse artil.	1 troop of horse artil.	—	—	
	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	—	*1 company of artillery, with battery.*	
	Detachment mil. train	—	—	*Detachment mil. train*	
	1 regiment of infantry	1 regiment of infantry	—	—	
Mhow	1 company of sappers and miners.	—	The European troops at present are sheltered in the artillery barracks, hospitals, and other public buildings.	*1 company of sappers and miners.*	
	1 company of artillery, with battery.	2 companies of artillery, with battery.		—	The company of sappers or detachment military train can be accommodated in one of the artillery barracks.
	1 squadron of cavalry	—		*1 squadron of cavalry*	
	Detachment mil. train	—		*Detachment mil. train*	
	1 regiment of infantry	—		*1 regiment of infantry*	
Nusseerabad	1 company of reserve artillery.	—	Major-General Roberts, commanding Rajpootana field force, was invested with full authority to take whatever measures he deemed proper to insure shelter for the troops at Nusseerabad and Neemuch, for the hot season and rains.	*1 company of reserve artillery.*	
	1 company of artillery, with battery	1 company of artillery, with battery.		—	
	1 squadron of cavalry	—		*1 squadron of cavalry*	
	Detachment mil. train	—		*Detachment mil. train*	
	1 regiment of infantry	—		*1 regiment of infantry*	
Neemuch	1 company of sappers and miners.	—		*1 company of sappers and miners.*	
	1 troop of horse artil.	—		*1 troop horse artillery*	
	1 company of reserve artillery.	—		*1 company of reserve artillery.*	
	Head quarters and 2 squadrons of cavalry.	—		*Head quarters and 2 squadrons of cavalry*	
	Detachment mil. train	—		*Detachment mil. train*	
	1 regiment of infantry	—		*1 regiment of infantry*	
Kurrachee	2 companies of sappers and miners.	—	—	*2 companies of sappers and miners.*	
	1 troop of horse artil.	1 troop of horse artil.	—	—	
	2 companies of artillery, with batteries.	—	1 company of artillery	*2 companies of artillery, with batteries.*	For one company already sanctioned.
	Detachment mil. train.	—	—	*Detachment mil. train*	
Hyderabad	2 regiments of infantry	1 regiment of infantry	1 regiment of infantry	*1 regiment of infantry*	
	2 companies of artillery, with batteries.	—	—	*As only a wing of infantry is proposed to be stationed at Hyderabad, accommodation for the company of artillery and detachment military train can be provided for in the infantry barracks, with some addition and alteration.*	
	Detachment mil. train	—	—		
	Wing of infantry -	1 regiment of infantry	—		
Aden	1 company of sappers and miners.	—	—	*1 company of sappers and miners.*	
	1 company of reserve artillery.	1 company of artillery	—	—	
	Wing of infantry -	Wing of infantry -	—	—	

STATEMENT—*cont.*

Station.	Troops.	Existing Barrack Accommodation.		Permanent Barrack Accommodation required.	Remarks.
		Permanent.	Temporary.		
Belgaum	1 company of sappers and miners.	—	—	*1 company of sappers and miners.*	
	1 company of reserve artillery.	—	—	—	The present artillery barracks in the fort for the reserve company.
	1 company of artillery, with battery.	1 company of artillery	—	*1 company of artillery, with battery.*	
	Head quarters of a division of mil. train.	—	—	*Head quarters of a division of mil. train.*	
	1½ regts. of infantry	1 regiment of infantry	Wing of infantry -	*½ regiment of infantry*	
Dharwar	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	1 company of artillery, with battery.	*1 company of artillery, with battery.*	
	2 companies of infantry	—	2 companies of infantry	*2 companies of infantry*	
Kulladghee	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	1 company of artillery, with battery.	*1 company of artillery, with battery.*	
	Detachment mil. train	—	—	*Detachment mil. train*	
	3 companies of infantry	—	1 company of infantry	*3 companies of infantry*	
Kolapoor	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	1 company of artillery, with battery.	*1 company of artillery with battery.*	
	Detachment mil. train	—	—	*Detachment mil. train*	
	Wing of infantry -	—	3 companies of infantry	*Wing of infantry.*	
Sholapoor	1 troop of horse artil.	1 company of artillery, *condemned.*	—	*1 troop horse artillery*	
	Wing of cavalry -	—	Wing of cavalry -	*Wing of cavalry*	
	Detachment mil. train	—	—	*Detachment mil. train*	
	Wing of infantry -	—	1 company of infantry	*Wing of infantry*	
Poona	Head quarters and 2 companies of sappers and miners.	—	—	*Head quarters and 2 companies of sappers.*	
	2 troops of horse artil.	2 troops of horse artil., *condemned.*	—	—	Plans and estimates for 2 troops of horse artillery and 1 company of artillery, with battery, under preperation.
	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	—	—	
	Head quarters of the military train	—	—	*Head quarters of military train.*	
	2 regiments of infantry	2 regiments of infantry	—	—	
Kerkee	1 regiment of cavalry	1 regiment of cavalry, *condemned.*	—	—	Plans and estimates for new barracks before Government.
Sattara	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	1 company of artillery, with battery.	*1 company of artillery, with battery.*	
	Head quarter wing of cavalry.	—	Wing of cavalry -	*Head quarter wing of cavalry.*	
	2 companies of infantry	—	2 companies of infantry	*2 companies of infantry*	
Ahmednuggur	3 companies of reserve artillery.	For a battalion of artillery.	—	—	
	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	—	—	
	Detachment mil. train	—	—	*Detachment mil. train*	
	Wing of infantry -	—	1 company of infantry	*Wing of infantry*	
Malligaum	1 company of artillery, with battery.	—	1 company of artillery	*1 company of artillery, with battery.*	
	Detachment mil. train	—	—	*Detachment mil. train*	
	Wing of infantry -	—	—	*Wing of infantry.*	
Asseerghur	Detachment of reserve artillery.	—	—	*Detachment of reserve artillery.*	
	1 company of infantry	—	1 company of infantry	*1 company of infantry*	

ABSTRACT.

	Existing Accommodation for	Required for
1 regiment of sappers and miners - -	— - -	10 companies.
6 troops of horse artillery - - -	4 - - -	2 troops.
9 companies of reserve artillery - -	6 - - -	3 companies reserve artillery.
18 companies of artillery, with batteries -	5 - - -	13 companies, with batteries.
3 regiments of cavalry - - - -	1 - - -	2 regiments of cavalry.
1 corps of military train - - - -	— - - -	1 corps of military train.
15 regiments of infantry - - - -	7 - - -	8 regiments of infantry.

(Signed) H. SOMERSET,
Lieut.-General, Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army.

Head Quarters, Poona, July 22, 1858.

Lieut.-General Sir Henry Somerset's Replies to he Series of Infantry Questions on Army Re organization.

INFANTRY.

I.—The Recruiting and Composition of Corps.

1. Christians, Mussulmans, Hindoos, Jews, Seiks, men drawn from every part of India, without reference to race, tribe, or caste, and fit to bear arms.

2. The Dekkan, Konkan, Hindoostan (Northern Provinces) for the most part, the Punjaub, Malabar, furnishing a small quota, Guzerat, and Kutch, but few in number.

3. No.

4. Coolies and Bheels have perhaps been neglected. It remains, however, to be tested whether they will, as is the custom under the Bombay presidency, proceed wherever called upon to serve; but none have been excluded.

5. Of parties composed of a native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and men of the regiment requiring to be recruited. Lately, with great success, a European officer from each regiment has been detached, and succeeded well, or the reverse, according to the activity and intelligence of the officer.

6. The Government General Order by the Bombay Government, of the 5th May 1855, No. 539., contains the regulations on this head.

7. No precautions are taken if the enlistment take place in the cantonment where the regiment happens to be located, but if at another station the man is examined by a committee of officers, andi f found fit, registers are forwarded, one to the officer commanding his regiment, the other to the adjutant-general of the army. The same precaution is taken with respect to the sepoys' families.

8. Alterations are not required. It is requisite only to make officers commanding regiments individually responsible that none but eligible recruits are entertained, without reference to race, tribe, or caste.

9. "I, A.B., private in the battalion, regiment, do swear, That I will not abandon these colours, but always defend them to the utmost of my power; and that I will implicitly obey all the orders of my commanders, and in everything behave myself as becomes a soldier and faithful servant of the company; and failing in any part of my duty as uch, I will submit to the penalties described in the Articles of War which have been read to me."

10. Since April 1857.

11. The oath appears clear in its wording, and to contain all that is required.

13.

14. No, I think not; the measure would not be politic. The Bombay army, under existing regulations, can enlist only within its own limits, and but few recruits can be had from Candeish, Guzerat, Cutch, and other districts. Restricted to the Deccan, Northern and Southern Concan, including the Sawunt Warree, the Bombay army is in my opinion likely to become a Mahratta clique.

15. Recruits should be taken from all parts of the country, excepting, perhaps, Oude, until we ascertain the cause of the mutiny, without reference to race, tribe, or caste. Brahmins should be excluded the service, both civil and military.

16. No; it should be a promiscuous mass of all races, tribes, and castes.

17. No. The companies should not be homogeneous, but, like the regiment, composed of all castes.

18. This must wholly depend upon the facility given to enlistment. If commanding officers are permitted to enlist where they please, care should be taken that the companies are composite, not homogeneous.

19. Military corps from all districts, if possible. The police from the particular pergunna in which it is serving.

20. I think not. Commanding officers should be held wholly responsible for the recruitment of their respective corps.

21. The agency should be left entirely to commanding officers.

22. Distinct.

23. If thoroughly acted up to, nothing more is required than existing regulations, which are clear and distinct.

24. The recruiting for the police should be local.

25. I am quite averse to enlisting natives of any other tropical climate for service in India. I am convinced it would be impolitic.

26. I am not acquainted with any, except the natives of South Africa, none of whom would enlist or enrol themselves for permanent service in India.

27. I conceive it could only be done through the government of the colony.

28. I conceive this measure objectionable and unadvisable.

29. I am averse to mixing Europeans with natives in any way.

30. Answered above.

31. Do. do.

32. Do. do.

33. With the percussion arms at present in use.

34. Wholly dependent on political consideration; but when the mutiny shall have been put down, the country people disarmed, and complete police arrangements organized, this body should be armed with a sword and truncheon only.

35. The disadvantages have been removed by the abolition of the shako, stock, and knapsack. Tunic, loose trowsers, and kilmarnock, form an excellent dress. Imitation has the advantage of uniformity only.

36. If you do not adopt the native dress entirely, dress them as they now are.

37. I am very doubtful about the expediency of this. The native regiments may be brigaded together at one station, but I do not suggest or approve of any amalgamation.

38. Gun lascars are advisable and necessary, but I would have no native drivers.

39. The European barracks should be entirely separate from the other lines.

40. I do not approve of association, beyond occupying the same cantonment.

41. Not at all.

42. The native troops have confidence in themselves, but I would brigade them together in all operations. I am of opinion that associating the native troops with Europeans would have a bad effect, and is not advisable further than brigading them together in the field.

II.—Military Code and Rules of Discipline.

1. There ought in my opinion to be but one Mutiny Act and one Code of Articles of War for the army in India, so modified as to be be applicable to the Queen's and Company's troops, European and Native.

2. I conceive this is answered by the above.

3. I think not; courts-martial composed of European officers only would work better.

4. By translation into the vernacular, and by reading and explaining to the troops the Articles of War.

5. About one-third.

6. Under the civil code.

7. Entirely under the commissioner of police.

8. This is a question upon which, as no reports are made to the commander-in-chief, I am unable to give you an opinion.

III.—Organization, Promotion, and Rewards.

1. On merit and seniority combined.

2. I think them generally intelligent for their position, but I doubt their utility. I am opposed to having native officers in the regular army.

3. Native officers acquire intelligence and experience from having been previously havildars and naiques, but there are many privates equally intelligent.

4. There is an examination for the grade of havildar, but having attained that rank all non-commissioned officers are considered eligible for promotion.

5. In some measure I think it does. Certainly not; there cannot be too many European officers.

6. There has been only a very partial mutiny in the regiments of the Bombay army. I do not think that the native officers did give timely information, and in one regiment they were many of them deeply implicated.

Had there been no native officers, the mutiny could not have been concealed as it was.

7. If the practice of taking away the European officers for civil staff employ was discontinued (which it ought to be), and the full complement of officers retained with the regiment, there would be no necessity for native commissioned officers, and I think it would be desirable that it should be gradually discontinued.

8. If respectable European non-commissioned officers could be obtained, men thoroughly conversant with the colloquial language, *one* per company might be more advantageous to discipline than an unsteady European in the position of a non-commissioned officer. I am not inclined to recommend this system to be adopted. The sepoy makes an excellent soldier, is active and intelligent, many of them capable of performing any duties up to that of serjeant or havildar major; beyond that he should not be promoted.

9. A gradual scale of good service and retiring pensions would be highly appreciated, and would be efficacious, and a compensating encouragement to the deserving native non-commissioned officer.

10. Most undoubtedly it is what they all look forward to and appreciate.

11. This does not apply to the Bombay army. The promotions are all by selection and merit.

12. The system of pensions should be maintained.
13.
14. I think not; they are greatly influenced by the superintending officer in their opinions.
15. They have great professional intelligence, but they have not the efficiency of European non-commissioned officers.
16. As they now are, and full corps of European officers, and no native officers; 2, fully officered by Europeans. I would do away with native officers; 3. I would only have native officers in the irregular corps; but the line regiments should be fully officered by European officers; but until the practice of taking officers for the civil staff is discontinued (a system fraught with mischief, and destructive of discipline), this can never be the case.
17. By active educated gentlemen of the civil service, or by a separate corps of officers for the police service.
18. I think so. The men serving generally in the irregular corps are a different class of persons.
19. I am not aware that there is.
20. Most favourable. I consider it to have been the saving of India.
21. On no account to assimilate or amalgamate the three armies.

IV.—European Officers.

1. Yes; by authority to discharge at discretion any soldier who may apply for his discharge, or whose removal from the service might be desirable, under present circumstances, a report being made to army head quarters of the cause of the measure.
2. They have neither been increased nor diminished.
3. As the increased power referred to in No. 1 answer was given to commanding officers in August 1857, there has hardly been time to ascertain the result of the measure.
4. There has been no increase or diminution of the influence of captains or officers in charge of companies.
5. Upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the officer in command of the regiment.
6. Increased.
7. Magisterial power to the commanding officer answers admirably in the irregular regiments, which might with advantage be introduced generally. Flogging should be ordered for theft, insubordination, and any disgraceful conduct, to which should be added imprisonment, and as a consequence expulsion.
8. It is at all times great, and would be greater if officers were not so frequently taken from the regiments for civil staff duties; a system most injurious to the service.
9. The duties of the native troops in garrison are at all times severe. They have their own amusements, in which they are encouraged and indulged by their European officers.
10. Never.
11. On military field works, for which they should receive a small addition of pay.
12. The want of a full complement has been greatly felt, caused by the circumstances before alluded to.
12. Para. 2. A full complement of European officers, and no native officers whatever.
12. Para. 3. No native officers.
13. If a full complement of European officers was maintained, I see no reason why cadets should be at first posted to European regiments. They should be posted to native regiments, and be made to study the native languages, time and opportunity being given for that, with only a very little drill, until the first object was attained.
14. I have already suggested that the complement must be complete.
15. Most materially and injuriously.
16. I cannot say. All the regiments have been equally inefficient in officers.
17. For certain staff appointments I would have a staff corps; but it is the demands of the civil staff that destroy the efficiency of regiments.
18. I would not cut off the inducement (except for the civil employ). Officers cannot be too highly educated, even for regimental service.
19. I do not conceive it would; but on this point I write a separate minute.

V.—European Officers.

1. I feel it impossible to speak too strongly upon the injurious effects to the army, to regiments, and to discipline, by the system that exists of taking so many officers from their regiments for staff and civil employ.
2. This point has been brought, I believe, under the notice of government, by many commanders-in-chief and general officers, more particularly by the late Sir Charles Napier; but their remarks and observations have had little or no effect.
3. With the example that we have so recently had before us in Bengal, where the whole of the native officers have mutinied with their men, it cannot be necessary to dilate on the utter uselessness of native commissioned officers. I will therefore only remark on the necessity of having a full complement of European officers, and endeavour to show the injurious effects to discipline by the system of depriving regiments of their officers, and the encouragement held out to them to obtain staff employment, civil or military.
4. The discipline of a regiment can only be carried out by every member of it minutely attending to the duties assigned to him; the subaltern to his squad of men, the captain to his company, and the commanding officer to the whole.
5. Every officer on joining a regiment should go through the regular drill, and should be taught the mode of looking after his men, learning the system of accounts and the system of discipline as laid down by the Articles of War and the regulations of the service, and for his efficiency on these points he ought to look up to his commanding officer for encouragement, approbation, and protection.
6. By the practice of government a totally different system is encouraged and prevails. It is perfectly well known that a cadet from his first joining is told by his friends to look out for a good staff appointment. He comes out armed with letters from influential friends and members of the Court of Directors, to governors and secretaries, &c.; but is careless of any introduction to his commanding officer.
7. These recommendations, particularly if coming from persons of influence and power, are carefully recorded, to be acted upon as occasions may offer.
8. The young man joins his regiment, learns a little of his drill, but very shortly finds himself selected for military or political employ on the staff, and this without any reference to his qualificatious, and invariably without any reference to his commanding officer.
9. The Court of Directors have laid down a rule that no more than a certain number of officers can be taken from a regiment, but this is frequently broken through, either as an emergent case or for special reasons; the consequence is, that regiments are left almost entirely without officers, which renders it impossible to carry out any system of responsibility throughout the various ranks, and thus discipline falls to the ground; and this system is carried through all ranks, from the lieutenant-colonel to the ensign, to the injury of every regiment in the service, and to the army generally.
10. Thus officers taken from their regiments for staff employ rejoin on promotion after some years absence, totally ignorant of their regimental duties, and of discipline, &c., and many of them positively not knowing how to put on their uniform.
11. During my experience in command in India I have known officers, after 14 and 18 years absence on civil employ, rejoin on promotion to take up the command of a regiment. How can such a man know anything of his duty? And how can any discipline be carried on in any army where such a system exists.
12. Many of the regiments of the Bombay army are commanded by captains; others have but one captain for duty; and one regiment now in the field (should the present commander, a captain, have to come away sick,) will be commanded by a junior lieutenant. Another point is the great injury to discipline and military esprit by such a system. An officer gets appointed to civil employ; the commissariat, revenue, survey, police, or deputy collector of a district, or other non-military employment; he immediately throws off his uniform, swaggers about in all kinds of costumes, grumbles at having to pay the slightest subscription towards the expenses of messing or entertainments given by his regiment (while more worthy men are doing double regimental duty), sets for a time his commanding officer at defiance, thinks it the greatest possible bore to have anything to do with his regiment, and when he does rejoin he returns to it more ignorant than the recruit of yesterday.
13. Experience has shown us that when the day of trial comes, native officers are useless nay worse than useless, and yet there are not, for the reasons I have stated, sufficient European officers left to look after the companies or to carry on the current duties of the regiment.
14. In several regiments subalterns are in command of three and four companies; how then is the interior economy of those companies or their organization and discipline to be attended to?
15. I believe the natives to be greatly attached to their officers, and they would be more so if the regiments were kept complete, and by doing away with the native officers bring the European officers more frequently and necessarily in contact with their non-commissioned officers and men. I can speak from more experience than most men, having been many years in the Cape Mounted Riflemen, and having commanded the regiment for upwards of 28 years, a regiment 1,000 strong, with a full compliment of 45 officers, more than three officers never having been permitted to be absent at one time. The whole regiment looked up to their

officers as their fathers and protectors, and followed them to their death.

To have the native army efficient, it should have its full complement of officers, who should from their first joining be made to learn to conduct their duties on the system established by the regulations; and no officers should be taken for any other staff employ but these:—adjutant-general, brigade major, military secretary, or A.D.C., and those only under the distinct sanction of the commanding officer. The quartermaster general's department, being a scientific branch of the service, should be taken from a staff corps. The commissariat should also be a totally and entirely distinct branch of the service, as also the police.

16. More officers should be appointed to native regiments, and a better system of promotion established, and officers encouraged to learn their duty as officers, and to remain with their regiments, and above all to be taught to look up to their commanding officer for recommendation as to their qualifications. By the present system the commanding officer is totally and entirely set aside; he is never asked the question as to an officer's fitness or qualification, neither is the general officer or indeed the commander-in-chief, except to ask if there are more than the usual complement of officers away from their regiment.

17. I have known adjutants and quartermasters of regiments (the most important and responsible officers of a regiment) taken away, and appointed to staff and police appointments, without a question being asked; and thus the whole efficiency of a regiment becomes completely and entirely upset.

18. Until this system is discontinued, and a rule laid down that no officer shall be selected and taken from a regiment without the consent of the commanding officer of the regiment, obtained through the commander-in-chief, it is utterly hopeless to carry on discipline in a manner to ensure regiments being efficient, or the comfort and well-being of the soldiers of the native army attended to and secured.

19. I enclose a return of the number of officers on staff and civil employ in the Bombay army, exclusive of those from the artillery and Native cavalry.

H. SOMERSET,
Lieut.-General, Commander-in-Chief, Bombay.

Poona, July 24, 1858.

The established strength in European commissioned officers, exclusive of the colonels, of the 29 regiments of native infantry of the Bombay army, is as follows	725
From which must be deducted the vacancies of ensigns requiring to be filled up	78
	647
Out of which number the absentees on staff employ amount to	218
	429
From which deduct the number absent on furlough beyond presidency limits	67
TOTAL	362

APPENDIX No. 70.

PROPORTION of EUROPEAN to NATIVE TROOPS.

Circular

From Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. DURAND, C.B., to
Allahabad, May 21, 1858.

1. Under instructions from the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India, I have the honour to forward a printed copy of Letter No. 235,* dated 25th November 1857, from the Honourable the Court of Directors.

2. Circumstances having rendered it hitherto impracticable, notwithstanding the successes which have attended our troops in the field, and the important advance which has been made towards the re-establishment of the authority of Government in the disturbed districts, to constitute such a commission as the Honourable Court desired to see appointed, the Governor-General has determined to adopt the alternative of obtaining in writing from eminent and experienced public servants, civil and military, their opinions on the several heads of the inquiry, the conduct of which would otherwise have been entrusted to the commission.

3. In respect to the order in which these heads shall be taken up, his Lordship is of opinion that the main features of the revolt of the native army in Bengal, and the general and financial considerations which the issue of this unparalleled mutiny entail, are of themselves sufficient to prescribe the point to which, practically, the attention of the Home Government must first be directed; that point being the strength and the composition of the European army, which must be permanently maintained in India, as the broad and fixed basis of our power and security.

4. This being so, the 5th paragraph of the Honourable Court's despatch becomes the one of primary importance. And indeed a decision on the point above noticed, as well as on the question raised in that paragraph, viz., the proportion which the European should bear to the native portion of the army in India generally, and at each presidency separately, will go far to simplify inquiry into other parts of the whole subject, the financial aspect of which will then be brought clearly into view.

5. Impressed with the necessity for a speedy, though a well-considered settlement of these fundamental data, the Governor-General has directed me to forward for your attentive consideration the appended series of questions, and to request that replies may be returned with as little delay as the weighty nature of the points referred for your opinion may render practicable.

6. This series of questions will be followed by other series upon the various heads to which the Court's despatch calls attention; therefore, in replying to those which I am now directed to place before you, there will be no necessity for touching upon the many important particulars to which the letter of the Honourable Court adverts, but which are foreign to the main question raised in the fifth paragraph.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. M. DURAND.

From Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. DURAND, C.B., on special duty with the Governor-General, to the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

MY LORD, Allahabad, August 16, 1858.

On the 21st May last, under your Lordship's instructions, a circular letter, enclosing the first series of questions upon the subject of army reorganization, was despatched to the various public servants, civil and military, whose opinions it was deemed advisable to obtain.

2. In the circular letter in question it was stated that in your Lordship's opinion, the main features of the revolt of the native army in Bengal, and the general and financial considerations which the issue of this unparalleled mutiny entailed, were of themselves sufficient to prescribe the point to which, practically, the attention of the Home Government must first be directed; that point being the strength and the composition of the European army which must be permanently maintained in India as the broad and fixed basis of our power and security. That consequently the 5th* para. of the Honourable Court's despatch, No. 235, dated 25th November 1857, became the one of primary importance, and that a decision upon the strength and composition of the European army, and the proportion it should bear to the native army at each presidency separately, and in India generally, would go far to simplify inquiry into other parts of the whole subject, the financial aspect of which would then be brought clearly into view.

3. I have now the honour to lay before your Lordship a précis of the replies which have been received upon the first series of questions.

4. I beg likewise to represent that a précis of the replies upon the subsequent series of questions is in course of preparation; but with reference to the views expressed in the 5th para. of the circular letter of the 21st May 1858, it seemed advisable to submit without delay the accompanying paper for your Lordship's consideration and orders.

5. Upon the political question raised by the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab respecting Peshawur, the précis avoids remark; the subject, however, being one which, though of political character, has an incidental bearing on the amount and disposition of force necessary for the Punjab, it will not fail to meet with the attention which the importance of the question demands.

6. I have endeavoured to conform to the instructions conveyed to me in the Military Secretary's letter, No. 238, of the 16th May 1858,† and have therefore abstained from offering any opinions upon the various subjects contained in the précis.

7. A correct return of the barrack accommodation of the Bengal presidency is in course of preparation by the Secretary of the Government of India in the department of Public Works. It did not seem advisable to delay the papers for this return, which can be separately submitted when received.

* Appendix No. 54, p. 51.

* To aid your Government in forming an opinion as to the proportion which the European should bear to the native portion of the army in India generally, and at each presidency separately, we would recommend that your Government should call upon the Commission to give their opinions on this very important question; and we can entertain no doubt that the enlarged knowledge and experience of the members of the Commission will enable them to furnish you with valuable information on this head.

† Appendix No. 54, p. 52.

PRÉCIS of REPLIES to the QUESTIONS having reference to paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 235, of 25th November 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

QUESTIONS 1, 2, 3, and 4.

1. *What is the number of European troops of each arm now serving in , and what is their distribution?*
2. *What is the number of European troops of each arm you deem necessary for , and what should be their ordinary distribution?*
3. *What is the number of native troops of each arm now serving in , and what is their distribution?*
4. *What is the number of native troops you deem necessary for , and what should be their ordinary distribution?*

1. The Adjutant-General of the Bengal Army, Colonel Mayhew, in his letter, No. 1473A, of the 6th July 1858, after stating that considerable delay had taken place in submitting his replies, in consequence of the difficulty he had experienced in collecting material for the returns called for by questions 1, 3, and 5, proceeds to answer questions 1 and 3 by enclosing the Distribution Return of the troops, European and native, serving in the Bengal establishment on the 1st May 1858. He notes, however, with regret, that the returns are somewhat imperfect, which is attributable partly to his having no information as to the various police corps lately raised, and partly to having received no returns from six of Her Majesty's corps of infantry, a battalion of Company's European artillery, and two battalions of Company's native artillery, besides having no returns from the Sirmoor battalion, and from the levies of horse raised since the mutiny.

2. From the Distribution Return of the 1st May 1858, it appears, omitting the corps of infantry and the artillery, from which no returns had been received, that the strength of European troops of all arms was—

Officers	1,665
Rank and file	42,947

In order to include the omitted corps, if an average be struck upon those whose strength is shown by the return, then the total of the European troops would be about—

Officers	1,864
Non-commissioned and rank and file	48,433

3. From the same source the strength of the native troops, omitting those corps of which Colonel Mayhew had no returns, was, on the 1st May 1858, as follows:—

European officers	713
„ non-commissioned officers	115
Native commissioned, non-commissioned, and rank and file	77,550

Allowing for the Sirmoor battalion and for the cavalry levies, the strength of the native troops may be taken at—

European officers	750
„ non-commissioned	150
Native commissioned, non-commissioned, and rank and file	80,000

4. Colonel Mayhew expresses the opinion that for many years to come a European force of not less than 60,000 men of all arms will be required; and, without taking into account the sappers and miners, the European force should be composed of 10,000 artillery, 8,000 cavalry, and 40,000 infantry. The distribution of this force Colonel Mayhew would leave very much as it is at present, making Calcutta, Dinapore, Allahabad, Lucknow, Agra, Delhi, Lahore, and Jhelum large entrepôts for European troops, on which all their outposts might be assembled, whether for offensive or defensive operations, and where large stores of every kind should be always in a state of preparation for service.

5. Colonel Mayhew is of opinion that the native troops might be retained numerically in equal proportions with Europeans for cavalry, infantry, and sappers, and be distributed in like manner, and always associated as much as possible. He considers, however, that the native troops of the line have one and all forfeited every claim to consideration, and should be disbanded at once; that every man should be given distinctly to understand that all claim had ceased under old regulations, but to such portion as had shown *active* loyalty to the State, enhanced benefits might be granted as a reward.

6. This recommendation would involve the disbanding, at once, of about 20,000 men, and would thus reduce the 80,000 native troops to about 60,000 men—the equal proportion which the Adjutant-General proposes.

7. Sir J. Lawrence, Brigadier-General N. Chamberlain, and Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes, have given full and valuable replies to the series of questions, both as restricted to the Punjab and as applied generally to the Bengal presidency. They have further added general remarks, replete with important observations.

8. It appears that there are now serving in the territories under the administration of Sir J. Lawrence the following European force:—

Artillery	1,691
Cavalry	707
Infantry	11,157
Total	13,555

The European force deemed necessary is as follows:—

Arm.	Regiments.	Troops or Companies.	Number of Men.
Sappers		2	200
Artillery		29	2,900
Cavalry	5		2,500
Infantry	17		17,000
Total			22,600

9. The strength of native troops, exclusive of those unarmed, is,—

Native regulars	1,000
„ irregulars	7,710
Punjab „	20,860
Police	13,050
Depôts	2,750
Levies	7,076
Total	52,446

The strength recommended varies but little in amount from the foregoing, and is given as follows:—

Arm.	Regiments.	Troops or Companies.	Number of Men.
Pioneers		2	200
Artillery		8½	840
Irregular cavalry	15		7,400
Police horse		54	5,400
Infantry	31		27,624
Police battalions	12		10,900
Total			52,364

10. With regard to the number of European troops necessary for the Bengal presidency, Sir J. Lawrence and the officers associated with him observe, that to speak confidently on this point would require a more detailed knowledge of many parts of the presidency than they possess; but that to the best of their judgments 54,600 men should be the strength of European troops for the Bengal presidency. This number they distribute as follows:—

Bengal, including Arracan and Pegu	10,000
North-west Provinces	17,000
Central India	5,000
Punjab, including Peshawur	22,600
Total	54,600

11. They do not enter into a detail of the different arms, as that seems a mere question of proportion, but in distributing European troops Sir J. Lawrence and his committee are decidedly of opinion that these should not be frittered away in detachments, but centralized; firstly, with reference to political requirements; and, secondly, to the healthiest places within those political circles.

12. Having no correct data available as to the present strength and distribution of the native troops, a statement is subjoined, showing the troops serving in the Bengal presidency in January 1857, before the mutiny:—

Europeans	19,670
Natives	176,834
Total	196,504

Laying down the principle that native soldiers should be as five to two Europeans, that is three native infantry, and two police to two European soldiers, Sir J. Lawrence and his committee would distribute them as follows:—

——	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.
Bengal	10,000	25,000	35,000
North-west Provinces	17,000	42,500	59,500
Central India	5,000	12,500	17,500
Punjab	22,600	56,500	79,100
Bengal Presidency	54,600	136,500	191,100

13. Mr. C. B. Thornhill gives a tabular statement, which in one view supplies an answer to questions 1 to 4, and exhibits the strength and disposition of the European and native army in the North-west provinces before the mutiny, and the arrangement he would suggest for the future. The value of the tabular statement is increased by Mr. Thornhill entering clearly, though concisely, in his letter upon the grounds on which his replies are based, and also by the information which the letter contains regarding the police battalions now forming for the North-west provinces.

14. In framing his estimate of the force required for the North-west provinces, Mr. Thornhill adheres to the civil division of the country into the seven circles of commissioners' jurisdictions, because this has formed the basis of the organization of the new police battalions, which force he anticipates will in a great measure supply the place of the old native army as mere local guards. It will be observed that the seventh circle comprehends the Central India agency.

15. According to the tabular statement, the strength of Europeans requisite for the North-west provinces may be taken at 16½ batteries or companies of artillery, 5 regiments of European cavalry, 18½ regiments of European infantry, besides a corps of veterans, and some invalids. In paragraph 21 of the letter which accompanies the tabular statement, the suggested strength of Europeans would be five regiments of cavalry, and about 17 of infantry, besides artillery.

16. The native troops required are,—six regiments of irregular cavalry, eight regiments of native infantry, and 32 district police battalions. In paragraph 20 of Mr. Thornhill's letter, it is laid down that each divisional battalion will consist of an average of about 3,000 foot and 500 horse, and that in round numbers the organized police for the six divisions of the North-west provinces may be taken at 20,000 foot and 3,500 horse. If a regiment of native infantry be assumed as 1,000 bayonets, and a regiment of irregular cavalry at 584 sabres, then the total of native troops for the North-west provinces would amount to 28,000 infantry, and 7,000 cavalry, or 35,000 men.

Mr. Muir proposes, for all India, sixteen brigade stations of the following force:—

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Total.
For moveable columns	25,000	5,200	2,500	32,700
To garrison 16 brigade stations -	16,000	–	1,600	17,600
Total - - -	41,000	5,200	4,100	50,300

The brigade stations proposed are:—

North-west Provinces -	Meerut.	Punjab	3 similar Stations.
	Allahabad.	Bengal	Calcutta.
	Lucknow.		Dinapore.
Rajpootana and Central India	Gwalior.		Nagpore.
	Nusserabad.	Madras	2 Brigade Stations.
	Mhow.	Bombay	2 Brigade Stations.

Besides these, however, Mr. Muir considers that the divisional stations, treasuries, &c. require the presence of European troops, and for the following places he estimates that a force of

8 Infantry regiments,
3 or 4 Cavalry,
6 or 7 Batteries of Artillery,
3 or 4 Reserve Companies of Artillery,

would suffice:—

1. Bareilly.
2. Agra.
3. Benarés.
4. Goruckpore.
5. Saugor.
6. Jubbulpoor.
7. Jhansi.

The 29 or 30 stations which are the head quarters of district civil administration, and chiefly within the divisional circles above specified, he would provide with forts where they have them not already, and considers that each should have a small garrison of Europeans trained to artillery practice. To meet this requisition, he would have a garrison corps formed of invalids and pensioners 1,500 strong, besides 300 to 400 artillerymen. To the 50, 300 European troops of the 16 brigades must therefore be added, 12,100 men for the divisional and district stations of the North-west provinces.

The police force of the North-west provinces is to be composed of 18,800 infantry and 5,100 cavalry.

For the North-western provinces Mr. Muir estimates the force necessary as European troops:—

11 Regiments of infantry.
3 „ cavalry.
10½ Troops or battalions of artillery.
9⅔ Companies of artillery.

In all 14,700 men, to which he adds native troops:—

17 Regiments native infantry.
5 „ cavalry.
1 Company Christian artillery.

In all, 19,600 men, or in the proportion of 1⅓ native regular soldiers to one European soldier; police included,) one European to 2⅓ native soldiers.

The total of regular troops for the North-west provinces would therefore be 34,300 men, or, police included, 58,200 men.

As Mr. Muir makes no estimate of the strength of force required for the divisional and district stations in Bengal Proper, in the Punjab, and in the Madras and Bombay presidencies, it is difficult to approximate to the real amount of troops European and native he deems necessary for the Bengal presidency, or for the Madras and Bombay presidencies.

17. Major-General Sir Sydney Cotton proposes to combine the regular native horse and foot altogether with the European corps, in the proportion of two Europeans to one native. To the 40,000 European infantry, which he would fix as the least amount of force required for the Bengal presidency, Sir S. Cotton would attach 20,000 natives, trained, armed, and disciplined precisely in the same manner, and incorporated with the Europeans. Consentaneously with the Adjutant-General, Colonel Mayhew, Sir S. Cotton advocates, as a preliminary step to reorganization, that the whole of the regular cavalry and infantry of the Bengal army remaining embodied, whether armed or disarmed, whether apparently loyal or otherwise, be *in limine* discharged from the service of the British Government. The new levies Sir S. Cotton would graft and amalgamate with the European troops; and if it were deemed expedient to re-enlist any part of the old native army, it should be on similar terms, and with a like object, as in the case of the new levies. The artillery should, in the opinion of Sir S. Cotton, be entirely European; and as he objects to native drivers, it follows that to the 40,000 European infantry must be added an artillery of such strength as would be able to furnish drivers as well as gunners.

18. The police force of the country, not armed and trained as soldiers, as heretofore, Sir S. Cotton would increase, so as to do away with the necessity of employing the troops in detached duties; but in addition to the 20,000 natives, armed and trained like, and amalgamated with the 40,000 European infantry, Sir S. Cotton proposes about 40,000 irregular infantry, armed with firelocks and two-grooved rifles, but not trusted with the Enfield rifle. The proposed strength of irregular cavalry is not given.

19. If it be assumed that Sir S. Cotton's requirements as to artillery demand 10,000 Europeans, then the total of European troops for the Bengal presidency will be 50,000 men, exclusive of cavalry, which does not enter into Sir S. Cotton's estimate. The total of native infantry, regular and irregular, amounts to 60,000 men.

20. In the opinion of Brigadier-General J. Jacob, the strength of European troops, exclusive of artillery and sappers, sufficient for the Bengal presidency, would be 20,000 men. Of these 10,000 for Bengal, and 10,000 to be placed at Simlah; but he would have 10,000 men at Kurrachee as a reserve force, generally applicable to service, whether on the Indus frontier or elsewhere.

21. If the foregoing opinions are compared, the disparities will be found considerable; chiefly so, however, with respect to the native portion of the force to be maintained. Comparison in detail cannot be instituted, because where two appear to concur, as in the instance of Sir J. Lawrence's committee and Mr. Thornhill, in their calculation of the European troops required for the North-west provinces, it will be observed that the comparison would be fallacious to a certain extent, inasmuch as Sir J. Lawrence probably includes Oude, and excludes specifically Central India from the North-west provinces; whereas Mr. Thornhill excludes Oude, and includes Central India, or a good part of it. Sir J. Lawrence's committee and Brigadier-General J. Jacob concur as to the amount of European force advisable to maintain in Bengal, viz., 10,000 men; but they differ widely as to what is necessary for the Punjab, for which Sir J. Lawrence requires 22,600 men; whereas Brigadier-General J. Jacob considers 10,000 men at Simlah sufficient for the North-west provinces and the Punjab, but would have 10,000 men at Kurrachee, which he considers to be the best and most convenient position in all India for European troops, and especially useful as a reserve force for the Punjab and the North-west frontier. Sir S. Cotton, except in casually mentioning what he considers advisable for the Trans-Jhelum frontier, does not enter into details as to the position of the corps d'armées into which he would divide the troops of the Bengal presidency.

Sir W. Mansfield remarks that it seems to be generally admitted that the presidency of Bengal will not be able to subsist in future with a European garrison of less than

(50,000) fifty thousand men, and that exclusive of the force necessary for Gwalior and Rajpootana. He is of opinion "that in the course of time, when the rebellion of the last "year shall have become matter of history and cease to be a "means of excitement with the popular mind, when the "province of Oudh shall have been thoroughly reduced, "and order again properly established in Central India and "Bundelcund, that a less number may be found to suffice, "and that we shall not be required to maintain an Euro-"pean force of above* (35,000) thirty-five thousand men "for this presidency. But for the present and for some "years to come, probably ten at least, the larger number "say (50,000) fifty thousand must be maintained."

Major-General Birch considers that the Bengal presidency will require—

Horse artillery - - -	12 troops.
Fort artillery - - -	80 companies, with 65 field batteries.
Engineers - - - -	3 companies.
Dragoons - - - -	21 regiments.
Infantry - - - -	68 regiments.

He remarks that this estimate may appear large, but that the defection of the native artillery, and the necessity of substituting European artillery in its place, entails the necessity that guns be supported by European infantry or cavalry wherever they may be placed. Major-General Birch, however, proposes that the cavalry corps do not exceed a strength of 350 non-commissioned rank and file, and that they be 18 in number on the Indian establishment, and that the dragoon regiments of the line be 3 in number, so as to raise the total to 21 corps of cavalry.

As regards the infantry, he proposes that the regiments do not exceed 800 rank and file, and that the local force be composed of 50 such regiments, the remaining 18 being from the lines so as to raise the total to 68 regiments. This amount of force, when railroads are completed, it may hereafter, and not very long hence, he supposes, be found practicable to reduce.

For reasons assigned, Major-General Birch would have none but local artillery, amounting to 77 batteries of horse and foot artillery, besides a few native batteries for the smaller contingents, from the existence of which he would apprehend no inconvenience in the face of such a heavy preponderance of European artillery.

22. The general results as respects the strength of Europeans approximate more nearly, and are as follows:—

——	Europeans.	Natives.
Major-Gen. Birch - -	71,000	19,200
Major-Gen. Sir W. Mansfield	50,000	30,000
To be reduced hereafter to	44,000	30,000
Colonel Mayhew - -	60,000	60,000
Sir J. Lawrence - - Brigadier-Gen. Chamberlain Lieutenant-Col. Edwardes -	54,600	136,500
Major-Gen. Sir S. Cotton -	40,000 Inf.	60,000 Inf.
Brigadier-Gen. J. Jacob -	20,000 Inf. and Cavalry.	

As artillery and cavalry must be added to Sir S. Cotton's proposed strength of European infantry, his estimate would probably be raised to a total strength of European force about a mean between Colonel Mayhew's and Sir J. Lawrence's, or probably nearer that of the former than of the latter. Sir W. Mansfield, assuming 50,000 European troops to be indispensable, would at once take measures to associate with them (30,000) thirty thousand natives, to be distributed rateably between the cavalry and infantry. He would make the head quarters of each European regiment the scene of a new levy, and would restrict, with some exceptions, the future regular army to such new levies. All corps and levies raised to be the local armies or police forces of their respective provinces, and to be augmented or decreased according as the general policy of the empire or that of each province may render necessary. He observes upon the "bitter necessity" which at present compels the employment of such a preponderance of Punjabee and Sikh force, whom he estimates at 60,000 men; and remarks, that while the excitement of war, plunder, and success over their natural enemies lasts, we may believe this Sikh army may not give us trouble, but that it can hardly be doubted that when the excitement has passed away great prudence and judgment will have to be exhibited in dissolving the large Punjabee force scattered broadcast over the empire; and that we must provide in time a native as well as an European counterpoise. He would therefore lose no time in initiating the scheme, and in causing each battalion and formed regiment of cavalry in the presidency of Bengal not quartered in the Punjaub to raise a native auxiliary corps for general service. When a few such corps had been roughly formed, Sir W. Mansfield would move them with the British regiment to which they belonged to the Punjaub, and relieve the corps there stationed. Except for particular corps, the recruiting of Punjabees and Sikhs should cease until the equilibrium between those races and the Hindustanees had been restored in our ranks.

With regard to the native troops necessary for the Bengal presidency, Major-General Birch gives an analysis of the existing state (at the time of writing) of the remains of the Bengal native army, and proposes bringing the six irregular corps, viz., the Kelat-i-Ghilzee, the Ferozepore, and the Goorkha regiments into the line, which would make a total of 20 regiments of regular native infantry already embodied, to which he proposes to add 10 more, so as to have altogether 30 regiments of regular native infantry on the establishment. Major-general Birch considers 640 privates as sufficient strength for these corps.

The reasons which lead Major-General Birch to advocate the re-arming of some of the disarmed native corps are stated at length, as also the bearing which an armed police, militarily trained and organized, has upon the strength of European troops necessary for the military occupation of the country.

The placing arms in the hands of native police, and the drilling them as regiments, he considers matter of very questionable policy, and as multiplying trained opposition to our rule against some future day of difficulty. He thinks that if proper measures are taken to disarm the population of our provinces, there will be little occasion to place fire-arms in the hands of the police; that if the police is to be what police ordinarily is, the proportion of the European to the native troops should be as one to four; but if the police is to have fire-arms, and to be regimentally drilled, the proportion should be as one to three.

General E. J. Jacob regards the Punjab as being well within the sphere of influence and action of his proposed reserve force of 10,000 men at Kurrachee, he would not of course bring into comparison, in disconnexion from his reserve, the 20,000 men he assigns to the Bengal presidency; making allowance for this, the widest disparity is between the proposal of Brigadier-General J. Jacob and those of the other recorded opinions.

23. The closest apparent agreement is between Sir S. Cotton and Colonel Mayhew, for their proposals would seem to concur in the force of natives as well as of Europeans. It has been seen that both suggest that the remnants of the old Bengal army, whether armed or disarmed, be at once disbanded; but neither enter into particulars to show how this can be safely carried into effect, that is, without adding to the number of rebels still in arms, and to the general insecurity of the North-west provinces. The strength of native troops proposed by Sir J. Lawrence is more than double that recommended by Sir S. Cotton and Colonel Mayhew; but Sir S. Cotton calculates upon an increase of the police, which, though not armed or trained as soldiers, is to relieve the army of detached or escort duty in every possible case. Colonel Mayhew likewise excludes police, a point he leaves untouched; Sir J. Lawrence includes police; and Mr. Thornhill in his estimate of 35,000 native troops for the North-west provinces includes as many as 23,500 police, of horse and foot, armed, trained, and having a thoroughly military organization, under the command and supervision of about 120 European officers.

QUESTIONS 5, 6, 7, and 8.

5. *What proportion of native troops now serving in are regulars, irregulars, and police corps? Of what races are they composed, and in what proportions do the races occur?*
6. *What proportion of your proposed establishment of native troops should be regulars, irregulars, and police?*
7. *What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in ; and state the ratios, both inclusive and exclusive, of police?*
8. *What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in India generally; and state the ratios as affected by the inclusion or exclusion of native police corps?*

24. The proportion of races in the native troops serving under Sir J. Lawrence in the Punjab is—

Mussulmans - -	30,188
Sikhs - - -	14,692
Hindoos of mixed castes -	7,566
Total - - -	52,446

The Sikh element, usually thought to predominate in the forces under Sir J. Lawrence's orders, is in the ratio of about one Sikh to two Mussulmans; and when the mixed Hindoo castes are added, the ratio is one Sikh to two and a half

* Requiring an establishment of 44,000.

Mussulmans and Hindoos. The pure Sikh element has therefore a counterpoise in the greater armed numerical strength of Mussulmans and Hindoos.

25. In the territories under the administration of Sir J. Lawrence the ratio of European troops, inclusive of police, is as three to seven; exclusive of police, as five to eight. The Committee lay down as a rule that the minimum of Europeans should be one to three natives, and the maximum one to two; and they point out that, assuming this principle to be expedient, to 22,600 Europeans they might have 67,800 natives. The actual proposition, 52,364 natives, is a mean between the two ratios. They justly remark that the country can neither be held nor worked by Europeans alone; and although, as a mere question of security, a large European force is essential, a still larger number of natives is indispensable for the administration of the country. They add that if at first sight the ratio of natives in their proposal be deemed too great for safety, it must be borne in mind that on the side of the Europeans are ranged 102 field pieces of artillery against 22 on the side of the natives. Or if it be thought that less natives would suffice for the administration, they answer that at every point the natives have been reduced to the lowest practicable numbers. The increase and decrease of the several arms are shown as follows:—

Arm.	Former Strength.	Proposed Strength.	Increase.	Decrease.
Europeans -	12,050	22,600	9,550	—
Natives, regular and irregular	58,717	36,064	- -	22,653
Police - -	9,000	16,300	7,300	—
Totals -	79,767	74,964	16,850	22,653
Result, actual decrease - - -				5,803

26. As a general rule, Sir J. Lawrence and his associated officers lay down the principle that native soldiers should be as five to two Europeans; and that they would keep as nearly as practicable to the following proportions:—

European soldiers - - -	2
Native infantry - - - -	3
Police - - - - -	2
Total - - -	7

This is merely laid down as a general rule, for they correctly observe that some of the races of India are much more warlike and robust than others, and that the European check ought to vary with the native power. Thus, they state it as their opinion that in the Punjab and Upper India less than one European to two Sikhs, or Pathans, or Goorkhas would not be safe; whereas with the Hindoostanees it might be one to three; and with the southern races one to four. They show that before the mutiny European soldiers were only one to nine. For India generally, they maintain that the proportion laid down for Bengal should pervade the whole of India, and that they know of no element of security which would render it safe to increase the proportion of natives, except that of Christianity.

27. Mr. Thornhill considers that the European arm should not be less than one-third of the total strength of armed and disciplined natives of all kinds, and that recourse should be had chiefly to a system of organized police, for the performance of all guard, escort, and interior detachment duties which formerly were discharged by the native army. This, as will be seen by his letter and tabular statement, is in course of being rapidly carried into effect, in so far as the raising, arming, and training of a militarily organized police is concerned. Taking the average strength of European corps of cavalry and infantry, the proportion of Europeans to natives, armed and trained, would be in the North-west provinces, according to Mr. Thornhill's proposed distribution, about two Europeans to three and a half natives.

28. Colonel Mayhew would have the European and the native troops in equal proportions in the Bengal presidency, and as one to three for India generally, exclusive of police. Sir S. Cotton would have them in the ratio of two Europeans to three natives, exclusive of police, in which ratio of two to three he is in accordance with Sir J. Lawrence and his colleagues. As Sir J. Lawrence writes from Peshawur, it may be said that the replies from the Punjab are unanimous upon the proportion which the European should bear to the regular native troops, viz., two to three, exclusive of police.

29. Upon this point it may be here observed that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief at Madras, Sir P. Grant, formerly the Adjutant-General of the Bengal army, and an officer of much experience in the field, states as his opinion, that in the Madras presidency, and in India generally, he considers that the European force never should be below the proportion of one-third of the native troops of the line, and that he would not allow police corps to affect the calculation either way.

30. Upon this subject his Excellency, Lieutenant-General Sir H. Somerset, the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, observes, that the proportion of European troops to the whole native force of the Bengal presidency, police, regulars and irregulars, should never be less than one-fourth, a proportion which admits of one-third being temporarily sent on service. Excluding the police, Sir H. Somerset would have the Europeans bear a proportion of about half the regulars and irregulars put together. He considers that it would be difficult to maintain a greater proportion of European to native troops than one-fourth, but that it is politic to maintain that, if possible.

31. The object of the first series of questions having been, as before remarked, to ascertain the strength and composition of the European army which must be permanently maintained in India generally, as well as in each presidency separately, it is now advisable to give a résumé of the requirements of the Madras and of the Bombay presidencies; and in doing so the Madras presidency will be first taken.

32. Sir P. Grant refers to a letter, copy of which he appends, dated the 1st January 1858, addressed to Major-General Sir William Mansfield, as containing full information as to the European troops of all arms, belonging to both services, stationed in or expected at the presidency of Madras; and also as to the European forces which Sir P. Grant considers necessary for the various British provinces, including Burmah, under his Excellency's command.

33. Sir P. Grant is of opinion that until the European force is increased to the extent proposed, and until a local force is organized for Pegu, and an efficient police is formed for that province, the existing number of native troops in the Madras army is quite necessary for that presidency. When those arrangements shall have been carried out, he considers that all native artillery may, and ought, to be dispensed with; that the light cavalry may be reduced from eight to four regiments; and he hopes that a considerable reduction may be effected in the strength of the native infantry, though he cannot say to what precise extent.

34. It has already been shown that in his replies to questions 7 and 8, Sir P. Grant was of opinion that the European force in India should never be below the proportion of one-third of the native troops of the line; that ratio is nearly kept in Sir P. Grant's estimate of the strength of European and native troops required for the Madras presidency, which is as follows:—

Europeans.		Natives.	
43 companies of artillery, each averaging 121 of all ranks -	5,203	4 regiments of cavalry, each 703 sabres -	2,812
3 regiments of dragoons, each 703 sabres	2,109	55 regiments of infantry, and 12 battalions of veterans, amounting in all to	
13 regiments of infantry, each 1,152 bayonets -	14,976	bayonets - -	63,920
Total Europeans -	22,288	Total Natives -	66,732

The present strength of the Madras Army is as follows:—

Europeans.		Natives.	
1 troop Royal horse artillery - -	214	2 troops Company's horse artillery -	180
4 troops Company's horse artillery -	510	1 regiment of Golundaze - - -	600
2 regiments of Her Majesty's dragoons -	1,148	1 regiment of sappers and miners - -	1,450
4 companies of Royal artillery - -	652	7 regiments of light cavalry - -	2,268
16 companies of Company's artillery -	1,550	52 regiments of native infantry - -	55,120
8 regiments of Her Majesty's infantry - -	7,012	3 regiments extra -	3,180
3 regiments of Company's infantry -	2,550	2 regiments of veterans	2,220
		1 regiment of Madras sapper militia -	1,024
Total Europeans -	13,636	Total Natives -	66,042

The proposed future strength of force for the Madras presidency and its dependencies is therefore much the same as to native troops, but shows an increase of 8,652 European troops, of whom 2,277 are artillery-men. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief includes no European regiment for the Straits, in this estimate of required strength.

With respect to the proportion of irregulars and police, Sir P. Grant is unable at present to form an opinion, except as regards Pegu, for which province his Excellency has recommended a local force in his report to the Government of India, dated 2nd February 1857.

The Right Honourable the Governor of Madras, Lord Harris, considers that when the police of the Madras presi-

dency is reorganized, that force will relieve the troops of some of the duties on which they are employed. The police when reorganized is to amount to about 22,000 men, and when in operation his Lordship is of opinion that the native army will be sufficiently numerous at its present full strength, provided the six local corps for Pegu are raised; that it might, however, be advisable to diminish the number of native cavalry regiments, and replace them by Europeans; but that the subject requires serious consideration and further information before giving a deliberate opinion.

The established strength of the European and native troops of the Madras army are as follows:—

Natives.		Europeans.	
Cavalry	2,754	Dragoons and lancers	1,416
Artillery	849	Royal artillery	933
Sappers and miners	1,505	Company's ditto	1,845
Infantry, including 3 extra regiments and Madras sapper militia	62,722	Veterans ditto	125
		Her Majesty's infantry	8,629
		Company's ditto	2,341
Veterans	2,324	Veterans	115
		European sappers	75
Total	70,154	Total	15,979
Real strength	52,859	Real strength	13,950

Lord Harris' proposal, as to the amount of European infantry required for the Madras presidency, agrees with that of Sir P. Grant, viz., 13 regiments; but the Governor of Madras suggests, for the decision of the Government of India, the question of making the Straits a station for a European corps, which would raise the estimated strength of Europeans to fourteen. As the Governor of Madras states that it has been already determined to do away with the native artillery, the 35 troops, batteries, and reserve companies, which Lord Harris deems sufficient, would be European; but there are eight less than in Sir P. Grant's proposed force, and one dragoon regiment more. The two distributions may be seen in the following table:—

LORD HARRIS.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery. Horse.	Foot.	Reserve Company.
Kamptee } to supply Saugor and } Jaulnah } Mhow	1	1	1	2	1
	1	1	1	1	–
Secunderabad	2	1	1	2	1
Northern division	1	–	–	1	–
Bellary	1	–	–	1	1
Bangalore	1	1	1	2	1
Mercara, to provide Malabar	1	–	–	1	–
Jackatalla } to provide Trichi- } Trichinopoly } nopoly	1	–	–	–	–
	–	–	1	1	–
Fort St. George	1	–	–	–	1
St. Thomas' Mount	–	–	1	2	2
Penang	–	–	–	1	–
Singapore	1	–	–	1	1
Thyatmyoo	1	–	–	1	1
Tonghoo	½	–	–	1	1
Rangoon	1	–	–	1	–
Moulmein	½	–	–	1	–
Total	14	4	6	19	10
			35		

SIR P. GRANT.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery. Horse.	Foot.	Reserve Company.
Kamptee	1	1	Troops are not distinguished from batteries.	3	2
Secunderabad and Jaulnah	2	1		4	1
Northern division	1	–		2	2
Bellary	1	–		2	1
Bangalore	1	1		3	1
Cannanore	1	–		1	1
Jackatalla	1	–		–	–
Trichinopoly	1	–		2	1
Fort St. George	1	–		2	1
St. Thomas' Mount	–	–		2	2
Penang	–	–		–	1
Singapore	–	–		–	1
Thyatmyoo	1	–		2	1
Tonghoo	1	–		2	1
Rangoon	1	–		2	1
Moulmein	–	–		1	–
Total	13	3	–	26	17
				43	

The requirements of the Madras presidency, according to Sir P. Grant, are 156 field guns, 13 regiments of European infantry, 3 regiments of dragoons, 43 troops, batteries, and companies of reserve. To meet these requirements there are available and in prospect 150 field guns, 23 troops and companies of Royal and Company's artillery, two regiments of dragoons, and 11 regiments of European infantry. Thus the means in hand and in prospect fall short of what Sir P. Grant considers the necessities of the Madras presidency to the extent of six field guns and 20 companies of artillery, one regiment of dragoons, and two of infantry. His Excellency adds that if, as seems to be contemplated, the Saugor territory north of the Nerbudda is again transferred to the Madras presidency, that a further accession of 18 field guns and five companies of artillery, one regiment of dragoons, and one regiment of infantry will be necessary. This would raise the total of cavalry and infantry to a par with Lord Harris', and the companies of European artillery to 48, or 13 more than the Governor of Madras proposes.

Lord Harris observes that the object he has in view in recommending this force and its distribution is to ensure the moral effect produced by the presence of Europeans, and to secure the speedy formation of small forces capable of acting within certain areas with rapidity and effect. He considers that if this course be adopted, and if at the same time the native corps be formed with discretion in the selection of materials, and disciplined with vigour, the proportions of mere numbers are of little importance, and cannot very well be taken as any significant test for ensuring safety and predominance.

When the Madras presidency police is organized, and is of the complement of 22,000 men, the whole body of armed natives would be about 88,000 men, exclusive of the Pegu local force and the Hyderabad and Nagpore contingents. If the two latter bodies be included, then in round numbers the Madras European force will be associated with 100,000 armed natives, exclusive of the Pegu local force. The ratio of European troops to native may be taken as being at present one to six, and the proposals raise the ratio of European to native troops to one to three and a half; or, if the police be included, and Pegu local force, to about one European to five native armed men.

Pegu and the Nizam's territory being occupied by Madras troops, and therefore included in the replies from the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras presidency, the remarks of the Commissioners of the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal, and of the Resident at Hyderabad may here be noticed in subordination to the more general review of the requirements of the Madras presidency.

Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson, the Resident at Hyderabad, proposes to raise two African corps in place of two of the present infantry regiments of sepoys of the Hyderabad contingent. If troops of this description are not entertained, he advocates the location of an additional European regiment in the Nizam's territory, somewhere near Longsoogoor or Moodgul, whichever is found the more favourable in point of climate; and would have another European regiment at Ellichpoor, with a sanitary station near the latter cantonment at Chickuldah. He observes that this would be a more expensive arrangement than the enrolment of African corps, and, considered with reference to tropical service, probably not so efficient.

Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson remarks that if the strict letter of treaties be adhered to, we might not be able to place any European infantry in the subsidiary force, excepting a few artillerymen, vide Article 3 of Treaties of 1798 and 1800 respectively; but he considers that according to the treaty of 1853, the Hyderabad contingent might be all Europeans, only the numbers, not the description of troops, being therein specified. No objection has, however, ever been made by the Nizam to the introduction of European troops, and the practice seems to have been to regard the specification of sepoy battalions in the treaties as having reference to the expense, and in keeping up the subsidiary force one European soldier has been considered numerically as two natives. Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson would substitute European artillerymen for the Golundaze of the Hyderabad contingent, and he does not think that the augmentation of European infantry he proposes would cause the Nizam any uneasiness.

The troops which Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson proposes for the occupation of the Nizam's territories are as follows:—

Europeans.		Natives.	
1 regiment cavalry	700	Subsidiary Force.	
3 regiments infantry	3,000	1 regiment cavalry	350
2 troops horse artillery	200	5 regiments infantry	4,000
6 horse batteries	600	Hyderabad Contingent.	
		4 regiments irregular cavalry	2,336
		6 regiments native infantry	5,412
		Police.	
		District	1,744
		Hill rangers, &c.	441
		Total native troops	12,093
		Total police	2,185
Total	4,500	Total natives	14,283

The European force ordinarily consisted of one regiment of European infantry and two companies of artillery; it was lately increased by a regiment of cavalry and a battery of royal artillery, so that it amounts to 1,894 of all arms. The proposed increase amounts therefore to about 2,600 Europeans. As the Nizam has at present in service 18,000 Arabs, and about 5,000 Affghans, or altogether 23,000 men, the armed natives may be taken at 37,000 men of regular and irregular troops, British and Nizam's. Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson's proposal therefore gives the proportion of European to native troops—

Exclusive of police and Arabs, &c.,
1 European to 2·68 natives.
Inclusive of police, exclusive of Arabs, &c.,
1 European to 3·17 natives.
Inclusive of Arabs and Affghan soldiery,
1 European to 8·2 natives.

The Commissioner of Pegu, Major A. P. Phayre, has, in his replies, included the Tenasserim provinces; and states the present strength of the European and native troops serving in Burmah as follows:—

Europeans.		Natives.	
3 regiments infantry	2,168	4 companies Madras sappers	361
5 companies of artillery	351	13 regiments of Madras native infantry	7,550
		1 regiment Pegu light infantry	800
		3 regiments police	1,600
		1 company native artillery	53
Moulmein.		Moulmein.	
Artillery	76	2 regiments of infantry	1,408
Infantry	110		
Total Europeans	2,705	Total Natives	11,772

Major Phayre remarks that another class of troops differing from those entered in his return is now being raised in the Madras presidency as "Pegu police corps." They are to be composed of the same races generally as the Madras regiments of the line. The Commissioner observes, that knowing neither the language, the manners, the people, or the country, they will scarcely be useful as police in the strict sense of the term; but that as jail and treasury guards, and in taking ordinary station duties at large stations, they may facilitate a permanent reduction of the number of regular troops in Pegu. They would also, if half the force were composed of these police corps, diminish the frequency with which the turn for service in Burmah will fall upon the regular native infantry of the Madras army.

Major Phayre recommends that a European regiment be added to the present strength, and be placed at Moulmein; where he considers it would be of great service with reference to the display of force towards the Burmese territory; would be readily available, if required, at Calcutta or Madras; and have the advantage of the healthiness of Moulmein. With this exception, the present number and distribution of European troops in Pegu appears to Major Phayre all that can be desired. He would, however, reduce the native regiments from thirteen to nine, and make minor changes in their distribution. Of the nine regiments, four might be the "Pegu police corps" now raising in Madras. The whole proposed force would then be as follows:—

European infantry and artillery	5,400
Native regular infantry	5,000
Native Indian police	4,000
Pegu light infantry	1,600
Native sappers	575
Total	16,575

The native regiments are here assumed at their full strength, and the augmentation is almost entirely in the European part of the force, and amounts to 2,700 men.

Major-General J. Bell, who commands the Pegu division, does not include the Tenasserim provinces in his replies. He proposes no increase to the European force now in Pegu, but would have the battery of European artillery which was withdrawn restored to Pegu, so as to allow of one being at Thyatmyoo. He suggests no alteration in the distribution at present existing.

With respect to the native troops, the Major-General remarks that there are now serving in Burmah eleven regiments, of an average strength of 600 privates each. When each corps is augmented to its full complement of 1,000 privates, he considers that two regiments might be safely withdrawn, one from Rangoon, and one from Thyatmyoo; and that if a Pegu police corps of 1,000 strong be given, then two more corps of regulars might be withdrawn, one from Henzada, and one from Thyatmyoo. He would postpone the consideration of police corps until the one promised is obtained and experience shows how it works.

The proportions involved in the Major-General's proposals are,—

European soldiers to regular native infantry,
Three to seven.
European soldiers to native infantry and police,
Three to eight.

Captain Hopkinson, the officiating Commissioner in the Tenasserim and Martaban provinces, proposes no increase to the force of European and native troops on that coast, except that the companies of artillery and infantry should be at their full strength. But both Colonel Stevenson, the officer commanding, and Captain Hopkinson, though not deeming such an increase absolutely necessary, consider that the presence of two or three hundred Europeans at Moulmein would make assurance doubly sure, and prove highly satisfactory to the mercantile community. Both officers, however, assume the invariable presence of a vessel of war on the coast. Upon this subject a letter from Captain F. B. Seymour, of Her Majesty's ship "Pilorus," is appended.

Major-General Sir M. Cubbon, Commissioner of Mysore, considers that the European force for the territories under his administration should not be fewer than one complete European regiment of infantry, at least 1,000 strong, or still better 1,200; one complete regiment of European dragoons, at least 700 strong, and 300 European artillery, horse and foot; the whole to be stationed at Bangalore.

With respect to native troops, Sir M. Cubbon considers one entire regiment necessary at Mercara in Coorg, together with one brigade of European artillery for special reasons; one regiment at Hurryhur, on the northern boundary of Mysore, and one native regiment at the French Rocks, or at a new station proposed by the Commander-in-Chief between Seringapatam and Mysore; at Bangalore, two regiments of native infantry, but no native light cavalry.

Of irregular troops, there are four battalions of Mysore irregular infantry, consisting of about 2,200 men, and seven regiments of Mysore irregular horse, numbering about 2,500 privates. Both are distributed throughout the country as revenue and judicial guards, as escort for treasure, and generally for police purposes. 1,000 of the jelladars are now serving under the orders of the Madras Government beyond the frontier of Mysore.

The number of European troops proposed is in the ratio of two to five of the regular native troops, and two to between nine and ten of the regular and irregular troops.

Sir M. Cubbon's proposal as to European troops agrees with that of the Commander-in-Chief for Mysore, but differs in distribution of native troops, as the Commissioner would dispense with the regiment of light cavalry, and has only two instead of three native infantry regiments at Bangalore. He also would place a brigade of European artillery at Mercara, but of what strength the brigade should be is not stated.

From the replies of his Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir H. Somerset, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army, it appears that, according to the information and returns received at head-quarters up the 22nd July 1858, the following was the strength of the European troops borne on the rolls of the Bombay army:—

Her Majesty's Troops.	Officers.	Non-commissioned and Rank and File.
Serving within the limits of the Presidency	475	10,986
Serving beyond the limits of the Presidency	203	5,299
Total of Her Majesty's troops	678	16,285

Honourable Company's Troops.	Officers.	Non-commissioned and Rank and File.
Serving within the limits of the Presidency	67	2,101
Serving beyond the limits of the Presidency	66	2,242
Total Company's European troops	133	4,343
Grand Total of European troops	811	20,628

The same returns and distribution list show the strength of native troops as follows:—

—	European Officers.		Natives.
Serving in the limits of the Presidency - -	437		
Non-commissioned officers		50	37,229
Serving beyond the limits of the Presidency -	90		
Non-commissioned officers		16	5,781
Total European Officers -	527		41,985
Non-commissioned Officers -		66	Natives.

The proposed strength of European and native troops is as follows:—

—	Established Strength.			
	Commissioned Officers.		Non-commissioned Officers.	
	Europeans.	Natives.	Europeans.	Natives.
2 battalions of sappers and miners - - - -	30	10	500	570
6 troops of horse artillery -	30	—	900	150
9 companies reserve artillery -	45	—	945	288
18 light field batteries - -	90	—	2,682*	576
3 regiments of European cavalry	129	—	2,244	—
Military train - - -	26	—	800	—
15 European regiments -	750	—	16,155	—
3 regiments of native light cavalry - - - - -	78	48	6	1,950
39 regiments of native infantry	1,092	780	78	38,220
Total - -	2,270	838	24,310	41,754

* Includes drivers.

Including officers,	European troops - -	26,580
Ditto ditto,	Native troops - -	42,592

An examination of the details of the proposed strength of European and native troops will show that the increase of Europeans, amounting to 4,548 of all ranks, is due to the substitution of Europeans for Golundaze and drivers; to the battalion of European sappers and miners; and to the military train. The same number of batteries now on the rolls of the presidency is recommended; viz., twenty-four; but instead of—

European officers - - - -	100
,, non-commissioned and rank and file -	2,573
Native officers - - - - -	52
,, non-commissioned and rank and file -	2,013

Sir H. Somerset proposes for the artillery, 24 batteries, manned by,—

European officers - - - -	165
European non-commissioned officers and rank and file - - - - -	4,527
Native non-commissioned and rank and file -	1,014

Hence, the increase of Europeans for the artillery is 65 officers and 1,954 non-commissioned officers and rank and file.

There are now on the rolls of the presidency four regiments of Her Majesty's cavalry, which have 130 officers and 2,339 non-commissioned and rank and file. Sir H. Somerset proposes three regiments of European cavalry of full strength, viz., 129 officers and 2,244 rank and file; in other words, nearly the same strength of men and officers.

Of Her Majesty's infantry, there are now borne on the rolls of the presidency 14¾ regiments, giving 505 officers and 12,712 non-commissioned officers and privates. To these must be added three regiments of Company's European infantry, giving 84 officers and 2,783 non-commissioned officers and rank and file; or a total of 17¾ regiments, having 589 officers and 15,495 non-commissioned officers and privates. Sir H. Somerset proposes 15 European regiments of full strength, giving 750 officers and 16,155 non-commissioned officers and privates. Here, again, the increase is due to the assumption that the 15 regiments are at their full complement, for there is a reduction of 2¾ regiments of European infantry.

As compared with the strength of European troops at the time of the mutiny at Meerut, the proposed augmentation amounts to 17,000 of all ranks, and is, therefore, considerable; but close on 8,000 Europeans of all ranks borne on the rolls of the Bombay presidency are serving beyond its limits in Malwa, Rajpootana, and Gwalior.

Sir H. Somerset proposes that the native infantry of the Bombay army, which now consists of 29 regiments, of 12 companies, and 1,180 native commissioned and rank and file, should be re-constructed into 39 regiments of 10 companies, and 1,000 native commissioned, non-commissioned, and rank and file. He calculates that an extra expenditure of a lac and a half of rupees would be about the cost of this re-organization. The present strength of 34,220 men has been found so totally inadequate that 2,000 pensioners and two extra battalions of 1,180 strong, each had to be enrolled; of these, the pensioners, an expensive body, being too old and infirm, must be discharged as soon as their relief can be arranged. Thus, over and above the 34,220 men of regular native infantry, 4,360 were enrolled to meet present emergencies; thus making in all 38,850 regular native infantry, or about 420 men less than the strength proposed by Sir H. Somerset.

The three branches of the regulars, irregulars, and police and local corps will shortly be of the following strength:—

Native regular troops - - -	42,036
,, irregulars - - - -	10,185
,, police and local - - -	28,738
Grand Total -	80,959

Sir H. Somerset is of opinion that the question, what proportion of our establishment should be regulars, irregulars, and police, involves some of the most important considerations of the present day, because there are ideas abroad, the practical adoption of which would lead, his Excellency fears, to great evils and fresh complications. He considers the duties of the soldier and the policeman so diverse as to render their unfettered performance by one and the same body impossible; that the qualifications of a policeman are a local knowledge of the country and people, whilst those of the soldier are perfect freedom from all local sympathies or encumbrances, a readiness to move anywhere on any duty at a moment's warning, and submission to a strict discipline. To maintain such a state of discipline his Excellency considers that the European element must be increased, not diminished; that though police corps may be sufficiently officered by having three European officers, such a number is quite inadequate for the corps of the line; and he would do away with the native commissioned officers in order to find means, with no additional charge to the state, to augment the number of European officers above the existing establishment. He argues that the contrary course cannot fail to lower the discipline of the troops, and throw undue power into the hands of the native officers. He thinks that the past year shows the imperative necessity of keeping the reins, both of our civil and of our military administration, in the hands of Europeans; that our supremacy in this country depends chiefly upon the European element, but more upon its judicious fusion among the mass to be governed, than upon its bare physical strength; and he believes that no addition of European strength in our power to make would compensate for the moral and physical paralysis which an undue reduction of European officers would occasion to the native army, and through it to the state. He regards any measure which tends to lessen that association in the army of the European with the native as clearing the way for the dominance of superstition and fanaticism, and he quotes the conduct of the 25th Bombay native infantry at Mhow, in the midst of mutiny and rebellion in Malwa, as an instance of the effect of the vigilance of the European and native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and the good feeling which existed between them and their men. After adverting to the opinions of such distinguished and practical generals as Lord Hardinge and Sir Charles Napier, Sir H. Somerset says, "When I reflect that out of the three officers proposed "for each regiment, dashing and vigorous leaders for every "difficult occasion have to be supplied, casualties filled, "the errors of indiscipline rectified by holding together the "wavering or rallying the broken mass, I feel utterly at a "loss to account for so suicidal a project as that under "notice, involving, as I before remarked, undue power being "thrown into the hands of the native officers, and even "placing them in command of regiments on field service."

Sir H. Somerset is of opinion that the police must be a perfectly distinct force, and that, including local corps, it should not exceed about a half of the regulars and irregulars put together, and that the irregulars should never exceed a proportion of one-fourth the regulars. These proportions are the existing ones, or very nearly so; and his Excellency urges upon the notice of the Governor-General, "that they have of late years, and especially during the one "that is past, stood a test that affords the best guarantee

" we could desire from their general adaptation to foreign " and home service."

The proportion of European troops to the whole native force of the Bombay presidency, police, regulars, and irregulars, should never, in his Excellency's opinion, be less than one-fourth; a proportion which would admit of one-third being temporarily sent on service. Excluding the police, the European troops should bear a proportion of about half the regulars and irregulars put together.

The Right Honourable the Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, appends to his replies a return marked A. which shows the number of European troops of each arm serving in the Bombay presidency, and their distribution, according to the information received at head quarters up to the 1st July 1858. It differs therefore slightly from a similar return appended to Lieut.-General Sir H. Somerset's paper.

In the return marked B. which shows the number of European and native troops of each arm which his Lordship deems necessary for the Bombay presidency, he observes that he has taken into consideration the present limits only of the presidency, and omits Rajpootana and Central India.

Lord Elphinstone proposes that the European force for the Bombay presidency should consist of—

2 regiments of cavalry;
4 troops of horse artillery;
0 companies of foot artillery;
1 company of sappers; and
9 regiments of infantry.

It is calculated that according to present established strength these would give—

Cavalry - - - -	1,492
Horse artillery - - -	764
Sappers - - - -	120
Infantry - - - -	9,630
Total - - -	15,606

The native troops deemed necessary are,—

3 companies, African artillery.
5 do. sappers.
25 regiments of regular infantry.
9 do. of irregular cavalry.
13 do. of irregular infantry, including the marine battalion.

It is calculated that these would give—

African artillery - - -	300
Sappers - - - -	620
Regular infantry - - -	28,600
Irregular cavalry - - -	6,930
Irregular infantry - - -	11,000
Total - - -	47,450

The proportion therefore of Europeans to the regular and irregular troops would be a third of the whole, and inclusive of police would be about one fourth. The police force should consist as at present of about 18,000 men; 700 of these mounted for Bombay, and 1,500 mounted for Sind.

Lord Elphinstone is of opinion that the proportion of Europeans to natives of every description should not be less than 20 per cent., and for the next four years 25 per cent.

His Lordship is of opinion that the whole of the European force should belong to Her Majesty's regular army. He denies the validity of the argument in favour of a proportion of the European troops being raised for local service in India, based on the withdrawal, in times of pressure from European war, of Her Majesty's line corps; and he meets the argument that European troops raised for local service in India would be more entirely at the disposal of the Government of India, by stating, that " If there is one thing " which must be laid down as a principle not to be departed " from in our military arrangements in India, it is the " entire subordination of the army, both European and " native, to the Government of India. The troops of the " Queen's regular army while serving in India, must be " wholly subject to the authority of the Queen's Government " in India. Regimental promotion indeed, may be left " entirely to the Horse Guards, but the patronage of every " staff appointment in India should be vested, as with very " few exceptions it now is, entirely in the hands of the " supreme and local governments, and of the supreme and " local Commanders-in-chief."

He objects to a local European army, as—1st, perpetuating the distinction between the Queen's and the company's service;

2ndly entailing upon India a European force physically as well as morally inferior to the Queen's regular army; morally inferior, because conscious that they do not fight the battles of England on the battle-field of Europe; physically inferior because instead of keeping men in India until their health is ruined, Lord Elphinstone considers that true policy demands the more frequent reliefs of European regiments.

His Lordship would add the Company's European artillery, and the nine regiments of European infantry, to the Queen's regular army. "The best way of doing so " would be to incorporate the artillery of the three presi- " dencies with the royal artillery, retaining them as separate " battalions, and allowing every officer and man the option " of remaining in India, and of drawing his full Indian " pay and allowances, or of serving in other parts of the " world upon the same pay and allowances as are now " drawn by the royal artillery. In any case both officers " and men should retain their right to retire from the " service on the Indian rates of pension. Probably the " Company's infantry regiments might be at once trans- " ferred to the Royal army, as second battalions to the nine " oldest regiments in the line which have not second bat- " talions already. By doing this, both the officers and men " who are accustomed to India, and wish to remain here, " might always have the opportunity of remaining. One " battalion of each of the nine regiments might be kept in " India as long as there are any officers or men belonging " to the Company's regiments remaining. Officers and " men not wishing to return to Europe, might always be " kept in this battalion; and all would be entitled to the " Indian rates of pension on their retirement or discharge."

In reply to question 13, Lord Elphinstone proposes that the officers of the Bengal army whose regiments have mutinied, be provided for as follows:—

" 1. All officers at present employed on the staff, or in " command of irregular or police carps, or on other de- " tached duty, to be placed on a general staff or detached " list; such arrangement being made for the promotion of " officers upon this list, as may give them, as nearly as " possible, the same average prospect of promotion which " they would have enjoyed regimentally."

" I would make this appointment of officers to all native " regiments by selection from the general staff list, upon " the same principle, and in the same proportion, that " officers are now selected from the line for irregular corps.

" Of the regimental officers now unemployed, a limited " number (say 10 or 15 per cent. in excess of the number " at present on the staff, or on detached employment, or " required for native regiments, under the system proposed " in the preceding paragraph, might be allowed the option " of being included in the general staff list, with a view to " filling vacancies.

" These supernumeries while unemployed might receive " the net pay of their rank and unattached allowance, " which would make up their income to that which they " would have drawn as regimental officers, at a half batta " station.

" No officer to be eligible for the staff list who is not " qualified for staff employment, according to the present " standard.

" Officers now placed upon the staff list retire or die out. " I would provide for the performance of their duties by " officers taken from the Queen's regiments who have " passed the required test, which will, of course, include " an examination in the native languages. When officers " are placed on the general staff list their places in their " regiments to be filled up; thus the inconvenience of " taking officers from the regiments, and of again remanding " them when these are ordered on service, often to the " neglect and injury of the important duties for which they " were selected, would be obviated."

" 8. A further limited number of officers belonging to the " mutinied regiments of the Bengal army might be allowed " the option of entering Her Majesty's service. It has been " found that the practice of attaching a Company's officer " to each Queen's regiment as interpreter has been very " useful. I believe that if one captain and two subalterns " were to be attached to each as supernumeraries, to be " absorbed as vacancies occur, the same object would be " gained, and many useful officers might find employment. " Officers thus transferred to European regiments might, " further, have the option of remaining in India until they " served their time, or of going home with the regiment in " which they were serving; and, in the event of their " remaining in India, they should be entitled to pension " according to length of service, and upon the Indian scale, " as at present.

" My impression is, that after establishing the general " staff or detached list which I have proposed, and after " allowing for the absorption of three officers into each of " Her Majesty's regiments in India, there would remain " but few officers unprovided for; but to all officers not " included in the general staff and detached list, and not " absorbed into Her Majesty's European regiments in India,

" I would pay a fair equivalent for their loss of service, " either in the shape of a pension, chargeable upon the " Indian revenues, or of purchase money for their commis- " sions.

" These officers, if pensioned, to be relieved from all " liability to serve; if purchased out, they would, of course, " be free from any liability of the kind.

" The question refers to the officers of the mutinied " battalions of the Bengal army only; but it will be per- " ceived that my answer is of a wider application, and " embraces the whole of the Company's officers. I would " recommend the establishment of a separate general list " in each presidency."

From the foregoing abstracts of the various opinions of the requirements of the different presidencies, it would appear that when brought together the following is the strength of European force proposed:—

Bengal, from - -	54,000 to 60,000
Madras, from - -	22,288 to 23,140
Bombay, from - -	15,606 to 24,226

In other words, for all India, from 100,000 to 107,000 non-commissioned officers and rank and file are considered necessary. Of these, upwards of 18,000 men are required for the artillery force; upwards of 72,000 for the infantry; and the remainder for engineer soldiers, cavalry, and military train.

From the return, laid before the House of Commons, in compliance with the order of the 4th December 1857, entitled " A Return of the actual Military Force that was " in India at the time of the outbreak of the Mutiny at " Meerut, &c., &c.," it seems that at the time of that occurrence the strength of European officers, non-commissioned officers, and rank and file, was as follows:—

Bengal - - -	22,688	Europeans.
Madras - - -	10,194	„
Bombay - -	9,589	„
Total - -	42,471	„

Of native troops, there were,—

Bengal - - -	118,663	
Madras - - -	49,737	
Bombay - -	30,940	
Total - -	199,340	Natives.

There were on the 1st May 1858, borne on the rolls of the several presidencies, as follows:—

EUROPEAN TROOPS.

Bengal - - -	51,197	
Madras - - -	13,636	
Bombay - -	22,032	
Total - -	86,865	European troops.

NATIVE TROOPS.

Bengal - - -	80,000	
Madras - - -	66,042	
Bombay - - -	41,985	
Total - -	188,027	Native troops.

It is to be regretted that the absence of any replies from Bengal Proper prevents a correct approximation to the existing strength of the armed police, either actually organized or in course of organization. From the replies received it is, however, known that the following is the strength of the various bodies of armed police having a military organization:—

Bombay - - - -	28,738
Madras - - - -	22,000
North-west provinces - -	23,500
Punjab police, levies, and depôts -	22,876
Total - - -	97,114

But this omits the military police forming in and for Oude, and for Bengal Proper, as also for Pegu.

Added to the 188,000 native troops, there will result a total of 285,000 natives armed and under military organization. Considering that Bengal Proper, Oude, and Pegu are omitted, it may be safely said that there are or shortly will be upwards of 300,000 natives armed and militarily organized in the pay of the British Government.

Upon the very serious consideration of the available cover for European troops it appears from the abstract furnished by Captain H. Yule, the secretary to the Government of India, in the department of public works, that the amount of cover may be approximately stated, as follows:—

——	Lower Provinces.	North-west Provinces Nagpoor, Oude, Saugor Territory.	Total.
	For Men.	For Men.	
New barracks, entirely built, a few permanent, and others of various degrees of durability.	8,400	18,800	27,200
Barracks restored, and miscellaneous buildings restored and adapted for cover.	3,350	28,800	32,150
Existing permanent barracks -	4,850	5,900	10,750
	16,600	46,500	70,000

" This estimate is exclusive of the hospital accommo- " dation and cover for officers, which has also been pro- " vided.

" The new barracks entirely built vary exceedingly in " character and substance, from shelter of the most hasty " and temporary character to that of the kind usually " understood as permanent. Out of the whole amount, " cover for about 2,200 men may lay claim to the latter " character, including the works at Fort William, which " have been some years in progress. Cover for about 8,000 " or 9,000 men is of a very temporary kind, and the greater " part of this has been entirely undertaken since the latter " part of May, the remainder is of a medium kind, of " which the better examples may last for 12 or 15 years " with ordinary repairs.

" A copy of an abstract of accommodation in the Punjab is " also added. This was received in the early part of the " year, but requires little modification. It shows accommo- " dation in barracks, omitting resort to other buildings, or " to extraordinary crowding, for 16,840 men.

" Hence we have a total of accommodation for 86,940 " men, entirely excluding the Madras and Bombay presi- " dencies, Sind, Pegu, &c."

From the replies of the Punjab Committee, it seems that in the Punjab the total accommodation is more than sufficient for the 13,655 soldiers actually present; and that there is accommodation, permanent or temporary, for 20,000 men; that no difficulty has been experienced this year in sheltering the European troops; but that additional accommodation for 12,131 men would be required to meet the wants of the force of European troops recommended by Sir J. Lawrence's Committee. This results from some of the present barracks being temporary, and others not in the places where they are wanted. In no place, however, would really good barracks be thrown away by the proposed arrangements, except at Peshawur, where it is necessary to save life.

For the Madras presidency there will, according to the return which accompanies Sir P. Grant's replies, be required additional barrack accommodation for four regiments, and two companies of European infantry, two European infantry depôts, and fourteen and a half companies of artillery, according to his Excellency's proposed arrangements.

For the Bombay presidency Sir H. Somerset calculates that, according to the proposed strength and distribution of troops, there will be required of additional barrack accommodation cover for,—

8 regiments of infantry.
2 regiments of cavalry.
18 troops and companies of artillery.
10 companies of sappers and miners.
1 corps of military train.

Lord Elphinstone's estimate is less, and amounts to cover for,—

1 regiment of cavalry.
3½ regiments of infantry.
2 troops of horse artillery.
10½ companies of artillery.
1 company of sappers and miners.

In round numbers it may be estimated that the augmentations proposed for Madras, Bombay, and the Punjab involve the construction of barracks to accommodate from about 25,000 men to 30,000, according as the higher or lower estimates are taken. If some of the temporary cover lately raised in Bengal has to be replaced by more permanent accommodation, the foregoing will be proportionally increased.

QUESTION 11.

11. *What proportion of the European force should belong to Her Majesty's regular army, and what proportion should be composed of troops raised for service in India?*

Upon the question what proportion of the European force should belong to Her Majesty's regular army, and what

portion should be composed of troops raised for service in India, Colonel Mayhew is of opinion that the majority of the European army of India should be raised for exclusive service in the country, and should be in the proportion of three local to one of Her Majesty's regular troops.

Sir J. Lawrence and his colleagues recommended—

	Line.	Local.
Artillery - - -	¼ -	¾
Cavalry - - -	¼ -	¾
Infantry - - -	½ -	½
Sappers and miners -	none -	all.

Both Sir J. Lawrence and the Adjutant-General concur in the desirableness of keeping up emulation and improvement by having fresh regiments from home periodically; both note the attendant evils of expense of transport, non-acclimation, and ignorance of the country and people. Sir J. Lawrence considers the artillery as the great strength of the army; that it should be chiefly local, and as little liable as possible to calls from England for general service. The cavalry for India Sir J. Lawrence would have of a totally different kind from that in vogue for the British line; what are called light dragoons being too heavy for Indian horses, climate, and warfare. He would have every ounce of steel and brass got rid of, and accoutrements brought down as nearly as possible to the standard of a cross-country sportsman; and as so plain and simple a cavalry would not probably be admitted into the line, he would have this branch of the Indian army chiefly local. The engineer branch of the Indian army he would have wholly local, as they would be of little use if not thoroughly acquainted with the country.

Sir S. Cotton is strongly in favour of the amalgamation of the Indian armies, and of their being blended and becoming part of the regular army of the Crown. The European troops would, therefore, according to this proposition, all belong to the line, and none but the native portion to local troops.

Lord Harris would be disposed to have three-fourths of the infantry and cavalry belonging to Her Majesty's regular army; but would recommend that the regiments should be relieved within a shorter period than at present. The artillery might be chiefly raised for India.

Sir P. Grant is of opinion that there are no better troops in the world than the European regiments in the Company's service; but that associating them with troops of the Royal army creates a generous emulation and rivalry, is a powerful stimulus to exertion, and beneficial in very many respects. He believes that the system of interior economy of regiments of Her Majesty's service is superior to that of any army in the world, and that it should be strictly followed in all European regiments of the Company's service. His Excellency does not state the proportion of European troops which should belong to the line, or be local; but he states that a part of the European force for India should always belong to Her Majesty's line.

Sir H. Somerset considers that the proportion of European force to be drawn from Her Majesty's army must depend upon what could be permanently spared from that army in the time of war. His Excellency is strongly of opinion that it will never answer, in the event of an European war, to denude India to the extent already done; a view he deems accordant with past experience, and he thinks that two-thirds of the European force required for the permanent occupation of India should be composed of troops raised exclusively for that service.

Colonel P. Melville conceives it to be immaterial what proportion of the European troops belongs to Her Majesty's line, or are local; and that it may be allowed to fluctuate according to circumstances.

Sir W. Mansfield assumes, in consequence of the late permission given to the Company to raise many additional regiments of cavalry and infantry, that there is to be a local Queen's army for service in India; and he considers himself strengthened in the assumption that this question is settled from the absolute and probably evident necessity of having a body of English gentlemen trained to the knowledge of India, and not liable to be estranged from its service except under cetain conditions. He observes that much may be said on the moral question of relieving regiments from time to time, but that if the Crown take possession of all the armies of India, that must in great measure be laid aside, and the service from which the numerous functionaries proceed for the administration of the Indian empire must be maintained in all its integrity.

Under these views Sir W. Mansfield would have the local Queen's army for the Bengal presidency to consist of an artillery regiment having about the same strength as the present one, English companies being substituted for the old native companies of 10 regiments of cavalry, consisting of (400) four hundred sabres each, and of 30 battalions of infantry, consisting of 12 companies each. Of the 12 companies forming a battalion, two to remain in England as a depôt, in accordance with the system now adopted for Her Majesty's army under the late orders of Government. Each regiment to be of the same strength as that now allowed to Her Majesty's battalion, viz., 1,339, total number of commissioned, non-commissioned, and rank and file.

Sir W. Mansfield proposes that the strength of the line troops should be about the same as antecedently to the great mutiny, but he would add some artillery and some royal engineers. He proposes, therefore,—

12 troops and field batteries of artillery,
4 companies of royal engineers,
2 regiments of dragoons,
15 battalions of infantry,

in addition to the local Queen's troops.

As Lord Elphinstone advocates the amalgamation of the Indian armies and that of the Crown, he would have the whole of the European force in India part of the regular British army.

Question 12.

12. *Under the supposition that additional corps of Europeans have to be raised for service in India, how would you officer them?*

Upon the question of the best mode of officering the local European corps, the Adjutant-General, Colonel Mayhew, is of opinion that the permanent European corps cannot be more readily commanded than by the British officers of the mutinied battalions of the native army, forming the complement for one European regiment out of two native ones, as is being done at present with the new cavalry and infantry corps.

Sir P. Grant proposes that the existing establishment of officers of native regiments of each branch, artillery, cavalry, and infantry, should be maintained as now existing, and promotions go on, as at present, regimentally. That the officers to serve with the European corps shall be selected by the Commander-in-Chief from the whole army, and in the proportions obtaining in Her Majesty's service. That only those in excess of such numbers, and after providing for the staff duties of the army, shall be retained for the performance of duty with the native corps. Officers who proved unfit for duty with a European regiment Sir P. Grant would have remanded to the native corps, supplying their places by selection, as before; and he anticipates most favourable results from this mode of officering additional European corps, as it would secure with each corps the number of officers necessary to maintain discipline and perfect efficiency, and would operate as a check to the system of purchasing out juniors, as the officers attached to European corps would belong to distinct native corps, and thus would have no interest in purchasing out those with whom they were for the time serving. Sir P. Grant considers that frequent changes would thus in a great measure be obviated. An important feature in his Excellency's proposal is, that the officers appointed to these European corps should be sent home to raise and organize their regiments, for until these are formed and fit for duty it is obviously necessary that India should be occupied by Her Majesty's troops.

On the other hand, Sir J. Lawrence's Committee advocate a different system from either of the preceding, though they concur as to the source from whence the officers are to be drawn. Their proposal, and the grounds upon which it is made, are given as follows:—

"The new regiments of Europeans should, we think, be "officered from the officers of the old native army. The "temporary disadvantages inseparable from their inexpe- "rience of European soldiers would be compensated by "their knowledge of the country and language. The State "too must find employment for these officers, whose devoted "services as a body, during the late crisis, have esta- "blished claims which cannot be overlooked, and there "seems no other opening for them. The circumstances of the "late crisis have, however, been so exceptional, and caused "in the Bengal presidency such great derangement of pro- "motion, that justice to the officers as well as the service "seems to demand that the whole of the officers of the "cavalry and infantry of that presidency should be thrown "into two general lists for the two branches, and be placed "according to seniority from their status on the 10th May "1857. As it is, the surviving officers of the worst corps "have benefited by the mutiny, and have superseded not "only their contemporaries of the best native regiments, "but also those of the European regiments who have been "putting down the mutineers. A very general dissatisfac- "tion prevails upon this head, and it is very easy to remedy "it now before beginning a new system. Having thrown "all the officers into a general cavalry and general infantry "list, the Adjutant-General's department of the army, and "the generals of divisions should be called on to report

" those officers whose inefficiency for the public service is " notorious, and such officers should be struck off the rolls " of the army, and allowed to retire on the pension of their " rank, or on a bonus commensurate with their services; or, " in some cases, both. The really efficient officers should " then be posted to the new army according to seniority."

Sir S. Cotton's proposal is again wholly different, inasmuch as he would first amalgamate the Indian armies with that of the Crown, abolishing all distinctions between the officers and soldiers of these hitherto distinct armies. He regards India as the only field for the training of officers to command, and that it is of imperial importance to England as a great European power that all European officers serving in the same army should be placed on the same footing, and rendered available in common for all duties.

After having described how he would organize and officer the irregular infantry and cavalry of the native portion of the army, he proceeds to advocate that the European officers serving on the staff and other detached duties, and in irregular corps in India, be placed on one general list, as in the artillery; and Sir S. Cotton is of opinion that it would be far better to have them so than on regimental lists, because from those general lists, selection being made for the regimental and staff duties, the officers best suited for the various occupations would find their way into their proper places. In the first instance the officers would be appointed in the *regular service*, and rise accordingly, that is, regimentally; being only placed upon the general list, or staff list, when attached to the staff or to irregular native corps.

It will at once be observed that Sir S. Cotton's proposed scheme is radically different, from that of Sir J. Lawrence, and from Sir P. Grant's, and all three are distinct from that advocated by the Adjutant-General, Colonel Mayhew; which last has been already partially instituted by the orders of Government and the Court of Directors.

Colonel P. Melvill, the Military Secretary to the Government of Bombay, would have the additional corps officered from the present establishment of the Indian army, on the same principle as when augmentations were made in former times.

Sir H. Somerset would officer the additional European corps as at present, on the seniority-promotion system, and if requisite would absorb the unemployed officers of the Bengal army in their organization, and the reconstruction of the native army. Lord Harris would also officer the additional corps through the regular course of the Honourable Company's service, as the simplest course; though other plans might be suggested.

Sir W. Mansfield considers that the system of officering local European corps by fusing the cadres of officers of two native infantry battalions into one is understood by the officers of the army, and militates less than any other which could be devised against the rights which every officer possesses according to the commission he holds under the Honorable Company. He calculates that including the three European infantry regiments lately ordered, 54 regiments of the old Bengal establishment will be absorbed in completing the European local infantry to 30 battalions. " There would then be left the officers of 20 regiments, who " should be distributed according to their seniority in the " 30 European corps; the establishment of each corps " being thus permanently increased, as the only means of " meeting the constant draughts on regiments made by the " Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief to fill the " numerous offices of the civil and military administration " of India, including the commandants and other offices " for the native forces, regular and local." Sir W. Mansfield, however, is of opinion that in addition to the fusion of the 20 cadres of battalion officers, with the 54 cadres, an unattached list, on which the names of all officers holding civil or military staff appointments should be placed, will be necessary. In order to atone for the want of regimental promotion, which would be entailed upon officers accepting staff employment, Sir W. Mansfield proposes that for every five years passed in staff employ a step in effective rank should be given, according to the custom obtaining in Her Majesty's service, with regard to majors so situated. He also advocates the introduction of the principle of exchanges under certain limitations between officers of the line and of the local service, and that officers on the unattached list of all ranks, from that of general downwards, should be available for service anywhere under the orders of the Crown.

It will have been seen by the quotations from the replies of Lord Elphinstone, that he advocates the transfer of the local European regiments to the line as second battalions; the formation of a general staff and detached list; and the thorough amalgamation of the Indian armies with those of the Crown

In reply to question 12, the Military Secretary to the Government of India, Major-General Birch observes, that the 10 regiments of European cavalry already proposed be Government are to be officered from the lists of the Bengal light cavalry, with a proposed addition of three lieutenants and two cornets to each. In order to officer the additional regiments he proposes, Major General Birch suggests that, " To supply officers of standing, down to the rank of " captain inclusive, it will be necessary to allow of transfers " from Her Majesty's service; and these should be so " arranged as to afford to the cavalry officers now on the " Indian establishment a fair share of the higher grades " in the new regiments." He points out that he is not advocating *amalgamation*, which he considers surrounded with insuperable difficulties, and not to be brought into operation without great injustice one way or another; but that his proposal is for *bonâ fide* transfers from Her Majesty's service to the Indian establishment, with every reasonable advantage secured to them of previous service for pension; but with restriction in all necessary respects to the system prevailing in the Indian service. Once transferred, they should take their place on the gradation list of the Indian establishment; whilst officers for the lower grades might be supplied by the nomination of cadets, as heretofore.

Major-General Birch then passes to the subject of officering the regiments of European infantry, and remarks that the usual system of forming new regiments has the immediate effect of making supernumerary as many colonels as there are regiments formed, and that promotion in the line is thus most injuriously interfered with, not only in Bengal, but in Madras and Bombay also. He notes that the status of the Bengal army is lowered by losing its colonels, as the army becomes less able to compete for commands and distinctions, and is cruelly deprived of the privilege, which, after all falls to the lot of comparatively very few of its members, and then only after 40 years' service, of enjoying rest and a competent income in their own country in old age; also, that every diminution of the number of colonels is a diminution of the funds of those invaluable institutions on which the widows and orphans of the officers of the Indian armies depend for their subsistence, and that the loss of colonels involves, as a consequence, a forced subscription from other ranks of officers of all grades, a process which would soon press beyond endurance on the means of the lower grades; lastly, that a great diminution of the number of regimental colonels, would sink Bengal into a third-rate presidency. He holds, therefore, that in any arrangements for the reorganization of the Bengal army, the maintenance of a fair proportion of regimental colonels should be an object of special care.

Major-General Birch points out that the system of doubling up the officers of two corps into one new regiment, gives the latter more officers than are required; more than are attached to Her Majesty's European regiments, which are of greater strength than the Indian European corps; he considers that 12 captains, 12 lieutenants, and 6 ensigns would be a proper and sufficient complement for each regiment of European infantry. For the 50 European and 30 native regiments, Major-General Birch's proposal is therefore as follows, viz.:—

	Total.
European regiments:	
50 Colonels.	80 Colonels.
50 Lieut-Colonels.	80 Lieut.-Colonels.
50 Majors.	80 Majors.
600 Captains.	780 Captains.
600 Lieutenants.	780 Lieutenants.
300 Ensigns.	420 Ensigns.
Native regiments:	
30 Colonels.	
30 Lieut-Colonels.	
30 Majors.	
180 Captains.	
180 Lieutenants.	
120 Ensigns.	

The effect of the proposal would be the promotion of—

2 Lieut.-Colonels to be Colonels,
2 Majors to be Lieut-Colonels,
2 Captains to be Majors,
222 Lieutenants to be Captains,
122 Ensigns to be Lieutenants,

and the same number of cadets, 122, would have to be supplied from England, to complete the establishment.

Major-Gen. Birch objects to a general list of the kind proposed by Brig. J. Jacob and the Punjab Committee, as being highly injurious to a great many officers without any adequate good to the service. He considers that selection would be speculative and uncertain, and in many cases erroneous; that the position of the selected officers in the corps to which they are sent would not admit of adjustment in any conceivable form which would not militate against the first principles of a seniority service; and that as the

armies of Madras and Bombay are mixed up with that of Bengal, a radical alteration in the old system of promotion cannot affect one of the three armies without affecting the other two likewise, that selection to form European regiments is a hopeless task, and that there is no occasion for doubting the efficiency of the officers of the Indian armies, the European regiments of which have proved of unquestionable efficiency, and have had no lack of able officers. Major-Gen. Birch also objects, to the scheme of selection from a general list, that the claims of the general staff and of native regiments are as emergent as those of European corps; and that the object should be to raise the tone of the whole army as one body, and not to let it be supposed that indifferent qualifications will answer the purpose of any branch of the service.

Major-Gen. Birch regards the formation of a staff corps as simply a question of expense, but of expense so enormous as to place its realization out of question; and he recommends "seconding," that is, supplying the place in their regiments of all officers removed to the staff; allowing the rank of such officers to go on *pari passu*, within that of those who succeed to their places in the regiments. He points out the character of the unattached or half-pay list of the British army, and its inapplicability to the Indian armies, or the objects sought to be attained for the improvement of those armies, and concludes by observing that the real selection which should be made is that of commanding officers, and of the regimental staff; a selection which should be rigid and uncompromising; and that all will then work well.

QUESTION 13.

13. *Under the supposition that a considerable increase takes place in the number of corps raised for service in India, and that they are officered from the officers of the mutinied battalions of the Bengal army, will this accession of seniority-promotion corps create any greater embarrassment in juxtaposition with the purchase-promotion system, than what now accrues from the existence of the Royal artillery, Royal engineers, Royal marines, and the three Indian armies, in all which corps and armies seniority-promotion is the system?*

In reply to this question, the Adjutant-General of the Bengal army apprehends that a considerable accession of seniority-promotion corps would not be productive of greater embarrassment than now exists. Sir J. Lawrence's committee are of a similar opinion; but they add, that should it create additional embarrassment, they have no hesitation in recommending that the present purchase-promotion system be no further extended, considering it based on vicious principles, and depriving the State of the military ability which would otherwise be available. They remark that the system which attains in the Indian armies, of purchasing out seniors, and benefiting by the promotion according to seniority, is a very legitimate and very useful way of giving money its influence in quickening promotion, and one on which public opinion keeps a wholesome check.

Sir P. Grant is also of opinion that an increase to the number of corps raised for service in India, and officered from the officers of the mutinied battalions of the Bengal army, ought not to cause any additional embarrassment on account of the two different systems of promotion by purchase and promotion by seniority.

Colonel P. Melvill is of opinion that the purchase-promotion system of Her Majesty's army produces no embarrassment in juxtaposition with the seniority-promotion system of the Indian army, and that no augmentation in the number of corps on the one side or the other can cause any embarrassment so long as the two systems stand divided from each other; but, that any attempt to amalgamate them would produce the utmost confusion.

Sir H. Somerset remarks upon this question, that the embarrassment that will accrue from the juxtaposition of the seniority and purchase-promotion systems would be very great unless some remedy, similar to what has been applied to the Royal and Company's engineers and artillery, be granted to the Company's cavalry and infantry also, the officers of which will now be superseded on all sides, as the abolition of the rank of major in the artillery and engineers gives the officers of those arms a decided advantage over those that are still under the seniority-promotion system. Upon this point his Excellency suggests for consideration the addition of a second lieutenant-colonel to each native cavalry and infantry regiment, to receive the pay of major until he attained a certain position on the general list of lieutenant-colonels; after which he would be entitled to the pay of that rank.

Sir S. Cotton does not touch upon this point; according to his proposal, all officers would enter the regular service, and that being one in which, with the exception of the ordnance and marine corps, purchase is the rule, all officers except those of the artillery and engineers would necessarily come under its operation.

QUESTION 14.

14. *The feasibility of raising corps of foreign mercenaries, such as Tartars, Chinese, Malays, Dyaks, Africans, Madagascarenes, &c., being assumed, would you consider that the proportion of European to native and foreign mercenary troops could, with safety to our power and supremacy in India, be modified from the ratio stated in reply to questions 7 and 8; if so, to what extent?*

Upon this question the reply of Sir J. Lawrence and his Committee merits special attention, and will be found to concur with the views of distinct and distant authorities belonging to other presidencies. In the event of foreign mercenaries (coloured races) being raised for service in India, Sir J. Lawrence's Committee does not think that the proportion of European troops could be modified to any sensible degree. The Committee strongly object to such a system, and upon grounds thus stated:—"Military service "is one of the most powerful means of conciliation which "the British Indian Government has at its disposal; but "after we have given all the service that is available, it is "still one of the popular complaints that we give so little. "It is a necessity of our position that we must spend a "large proportion of the revenues of the country on "European soldiers; but no such necessity exists for "bringing in Muhomedan, Hindoo, and Buddhist foreigners "from other tropical countries. Such a policy would be "felt to be oppressive, and would be departing from the "benevolent desire we have ever had to rule India for the "benefit of the Indians. Moreover, with the memories of "1857 still fresh, we doubt much whether the natives of "India are not the most docile of coloured military races. "Again, every foreign coloured soldier that you bring into "India, displaces an Indian soldier,—a soldier by caste and "profession, who will take to no other livelihood. What "would the advocates of foreign mercenaries propose to do "with these displaced military classes? No statesman can "ignore them. The wise policy is to feed, use, and control "them."

Upon this question the Adjutant-General of the Bengal army contents himself with the observation, that in the event of another rise against British dominion in India, no troops are safely to be trusted but European ones; he thus, by inference, discountenances the idea of the enlistment of foreign coloured mercenaries.

Sir S. Cotton is averse to the employment of foreign coloured mercenaries in the Indian service, and apprehends that they would become a very great burden to the State when worn out, and perhaps very troublesome; and in support of his opinion upon this point, he instances the Arabs in the Deccan in the service of the Nizam, and the Ceylon corps, composed of Malays, Caffres, and Sepoys, which were not found to answer.

The Resident at Hyderabad of the Deccan, Lieutenant-Colonel C. Davidson, takes a different view, and proposes to enlist in the Hyderabad contingent, in place of two of the present infantry regiments of sepoys, two African corps taken indiscriminately from the races inhabiting that great continent. He would apply this principle throughout the armies of India, and out of every eight regiments embodied, he proposes that two should be foreigners capable of serving in a tropical climate. After questioning the policy of entertaining low-caste men, and pointing out that low-caste men are equally disinclined to go on board a ship or to proceed on foreign service, and to the full as great adepts at secret combinations to resist authority as high-caste men, Lieut.-Colonel Davidson observes, that "The Native Go- "vernments have long since given us a practical lesson as "to their opinion of the loyalty and fidelity of the sepoy "soldiery of India. It will be found that their most "trusted troops were always foreign mercenaries. The "Nizam has at this present moment in his employ 18,000 "Arabs, and about 5,000 Rohillas (Affghans), and many "more of the latter tribe are in his territory seeking em- "ployment. Not a petty rajah in Guzerat but has, or "endeavoured to have, his Arab or foreign guard, however "small it may be numerically, for the protection of his "person and treasury; alleging, they find the foreign mer- "cenaries faithful, while their own immediate subjects "cannot be trusted. So far as the difference of circum- "stances admits, we might do well to imitate the Roman "policy, which jealously excluded the employment in their "conquered provinces of troops native to the place, and "substituted for them men having no local sympathies of "country and kindred."

It will be observed that Sir H. Somerset enters upon the question under consideration at some length, and opens his

replies by treating this subject with a care and completeness which is the more valuable from the experience which his Excellency has had in the British possessions of Southern Africa; a quarter from whence many have proposed to draw a supply of foreign coloured mercenaries. Sir H. Somerset is of opinion that, in the long run, regiments so composed would cost the State nearly as much as Europeans, without possessing their general efficiency. He however deprecates the enlistment of foreign coloured mercenaries chiefly on political grounds, thus stated:—"If a section of our subjects, "carried away by a mixture of ignorance, arrogance, and "fanaticism, were recently led to overrate their own strength "and underrate ours, to forget that the substantial privi- "leges which they enjoy depend solely on their connexion "with us, and *not* on the soundness of their own consti- "tution, moral or social, we may conclude that, having now "had occular demonstration that the European force in "this country can be trebled, and having learnt such severe "lessons through its instrumentality, they will as a body "abandon such fallacies and readily believe that our ascen- "dancy, even under the most adverse circumstances, is a "practical as well as a moral truth." Having thus arrived at the conclusion that the events of 1857 and of 1858 have resulted in the affirmation of our ascendancy, Sir H. Somerset is of opinion that foreign coloured mercenaries would fail to command the respect that European troops do; that they could not be introduced in sufficient numbers to render us independent of the sepoys, who, numerically speaking, must always preponderate; and that, should a moral epidemic recur like that from which we are now emerging, the foreign mercenaries would not be one whit more trustworthy than are the natives of India. Further, that foreign mercenaries might occasion jealousy and mistrust between ourselves and the whole native army, and lead to the dangerous conclusion of our inability to maintain in India an adequate European force. Sir H. Somerset objects, therefore, to the enlistment of foreign coloured mercenaries, and advocates the maintenance of a fixed European force, *in evidence*, in the country, and the steady perseverance in the attempt to free the people of India from the moral thraldom to Brahminical influence, which his Excellency asserts to be the disaffected element in the Bombay presidency, and the influence with which we are practically in conflict, and to which either our influence must become superior, or in time yield.

Colonel P. Melvill is of opinion that the presence of foreign coloured mercenaries would not enable the Government to dispense with any portion of the English troops in India.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Madras army is as much opposed to the entertainment of foreign coloured mercenaries as the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army. Sir P. Grant's words are, "I am strongly opposed to the expedient "of enlisting natives of other tropical countries for service "in India, for I am convinced that, as a general rule, the "black man will always fraternize with the black man "against the white man; and if the natives of other tropical "countries are, as I believe them to be, composed of better "stuff for soldiers than the natives of this country, it is to "my mind, an additional reason against enlisting them "for service in India."

The Commissioner of Mysore, Sir M. Cubbon, says positively that the introduction of foreign coloured mercenaries would be received with great distaste, not only by the existing Madras army, but by the population in general. Lord Harris considers that the presence of foreign mercenaries from other tropical countries would not admit of the proportion of the European troops necessary for the permanent occupation of India being altered.

Lord Elphinstone expresses the opinion that there are two exceptional cases in which foreign coloured mercenaries might be advantageously employed. He suggests that a few companies of African artillerymen might be formed for service at such stations as Shikarpoor and Aden, in which European troops suffer severely.

The other exceptional case is, when a whole province is disaffected or hostile to us, like Oude or the Delhi division. "In such a case it would be dangerous to raise troops on "the spot, and it is not desirable to keep a body of native "troops from a different part of the country in such a pro- "vince. They would be liable to be tampered with; per- "haps they might carry the spirit of disaffection to their "homes. In this case it would be safer to depend wholly "upon European and foreign troops. I do not see why "we might not at once secure the services of the Gold "Coast artillery corps, of the three West India regiments, "and of the Ceylon rifle corps (Malays), their places being "taken by native (Indian) artillery and by sepoy regiments. "The difference of pay ought not to prevent this measure "from being carried out. The Indian Government would "pay the difference between the colonial allowances and "Indian allowances, and it would gain six companies of "African artillery and four excellent regiments; while six "companies of Golandauze, and four or five of the sepoy "regiments, now disarmed and utterly useless, or worse "than useless, would be not only got rid of, but turned to "good account."

H. M. DURAND, Col. Engineers,
Special Commissioner from the
Governor-General.

APPENDIX No. 71.

(No. 173.)

From Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. DURAND, C.B., on special duty with the Governor-General, to the Right Hon. the Governor-General of India.

MY LORD, Allahabad, September 4, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to submit a précis of the replies to the series of questions having reference to the reorganization of the native infantry of the Bengal army.

2. From the importance of the subject, and its pressing nature, it did not seem desirable to delay the submission of the précis until those for the infantry branches of the other presidencies should be complete.

3. I beg to call your Lordship's attention to the postscript appended to the replies of the Punjab committee. Sir J. Lawrence, Brigadier-General Chamberlain, and Colonel Edwardes therein state their conviction that unless the European soldier be placed on a footing more consonant with the advancing civilization of the English people, difficulty will be felt in maintaining a largely increased force of British troops in India. The measures they recommend are, the removal, as far as practicable, of the restrictions upon the number of married soldiers in a regiment; changes with respect to spirit rations, spirits sold at the canteens, and the substitution of beer and porter; the necessity of aiming to provide the army with well educated and thoughtful commanders of regiments; the present position of chaplains in India, and the crying necessity for its amelioration; an increase in the ecclesiastical establishment proportionate to the large number of British troops, and to the extension of the limits of the presidency; finally, the imperative necessity for a careful and conscientious selection of chaplains. As the précis upon the reorganization of the native infantry of the Bengal army afforded no opportunity of adverting to these suggestions of the Punjab committee, and as they are all of manifest importance, I venture in this form specially to call your Lordship's attention to the earnest representation of Sir J. Lawrence and his associated colleagues.

I have, &c.
H. M. DURAND, Lieut.-Col., Eng.,
On special duty with the Governor-General.

REORGANIZATION of the ARMIES of INDIA.

PRÉCIS of REPLIES to the QUESTIONS having reference to the Native Infantry of the Bengal Army.

The Punjab having furnished a large part of the native army now existing, and which fills the gap of the revolted Bengal army, it was important to obtain particular information with respect to the Punjab troops. Sir J. Lawrence, Brigadier-General Chamberlain, and Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes, having sent full replies upon the subject specially referred to them, and that subject being one, under present circumstances, of great interest, it seems advisable to forward this digest of replies with the observations of the above-named officers, to whom, for the sake of brevity, the designation of the Punjab committee will henceforward be applied. As the committee has also furnished answers upon the general questions in their relation to the reorganization of the Bengal army, without restriction to the Punjab forces, though with frequent reference to the paper devoted to the latter, the digest will, when touching upon the opinions of the Punjab committee, bring their special and their general views together.

Similarly, the independent opinions of other authorities consulted will, where concurrence admits of such a course being pursued, be grouped together, and the names of the officers will be given in the margin, so as to facilitate reference to their original manuscripts.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND THE COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

QUESTIONS 1 and 2.

1. *What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Punjab irregular force is composed?*
2. *What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?*

The Punjab committee reply:—"Firstly, the Mu- "homedans of independent countries beyond our frontier

" such as Cabul, Candahar, the Afreedee Hills, Swât, " Boury, &c.

" Secondly, Trans-Indus Muhomedan British subjects, " from the Peshawur valley, Kohat, &c.

" Thirdly, Cis-Indus Muhomedans. (These are the " broad distinctions which should be carefully observed.)

" Fourthly, Seikhs.

" Fifthly, Hindoo hill races, which come under two " classes, viz., those of the Jummoo independent hills, " known as the Dogra Rajpoots, and the Rajpoots who are " British subjects residing in the hills between the Ravee " and Sutlej.

" Sixthly, a sprinkling of Hindoostanees, 1,295 in the " eleven regiments, of whom 288 were Muhomedans and " 1,007 Hindoos.

" Seventhly, 470 Goorhkas."

Questions 3 and 4.

3. *Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment either by the regulations or by the practice of the Punjab irregular force?*
4. *Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from which recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Punjab irregular force?*

" By the practice of the force, sweepers, muzzubbees (or " sweeper Sikhs), mosullees (or Muhomedan sweepers), and " the lowest Muhomedan and Hindoo classes generally, " such as those laid down in the standing military regula- " tions, sec. xxxi. part 2, para. 6, were excluded. There " were also no Christians in the force. Originally there " were some few Eurasian Christians (fifers and buglers) " transferred from the native infantry regiments of the line; " but being very few in number, and having no respectable " associates, they fell into bad habits and disrepute, and " were for this reason remanded to their original corps, " since which there have been none.

" No class should be excluded from the native army. " But though we ourselves may and ought to rise above " caste, we cannot practically ignore it, so long as the " natives themselves socially maintain it. If low caste " men, sweepers, &c. be promiscuously enlisted in the " ranks, our great political object which we have in view " (viz., the counterpoise of races) will not be attained; for " assuredly the low caste men, true to their traditions, will " submit in everything to the higher caste in the regiment; " and if their good conduct and smartness raise them to " rank, it will only bring them superior pay, and not give " them that influence over their military subordinates which " discipline requires. At least we think that a great change " must previously come over the native army on the ques- " tion, before the lowest castes can be usefully associated " with the highest castes in one corps. Moreover we be- " lieve that the native soldiers already in the ranks would " be disgusted, if recruits whom they considered unfit " associates were suddenly to be forced upon them in " large numbers. We are aware that the armies of Bombay " and Madras show all classes mixed together. We do not " know how this works practically. It would be possible " for the European officers, following the bent of their own " wishes and feelings, to imagine that sweeper soobadars " (for instance) were really the commanders of their men; " and yet for that command to extend no further than the " parade ground or the orderly room, and to cease alto- " gether in the lines and interior economy of the regiment. " But assuming that all caste prejudice has really been " broken down in these armies, we would observe, firstly, " that in them the majority of the community, or in other " words public opinion, is indifferent to caste, while here " the community is bigoted in its favour; and secondly, " that the mixed system has in them happily grown up from " the beginning, so that high caste men who now enlist in " those armies, do it with their eyes open, and of their own " accord, led either by the difficulty of getting service " elsewhere, or by some peculiar circumstances; whereas the " caste system has unhappily grown up and been indige- " nous in the Bengal armies from the beginning, and has " in them the same strength as the mixed system in the " sister presidencies. However strongly, then, we may feel " the tyranny of caste, and however resolved we may be to " do all in our power to overthrow it, yet sound wisdom " requires that we should not conceal the practical dif- " ficulties, but set them candidly forth, and then endeavour " to meet them, and this especially because the low castes " themselves are not prepared to help us, and seize the " freedom we wish to give them. 'We have heard of a " small guard of the Bombay army on detached duty making " their own jemadar, a man of low caste, carry on his head " the bundle of their clothes, &c., to which the jemadar, " away from his European friends, submitted as a matter of " course; and whether that anecdote be true or not, we " have seen during the last year that when a regiment of " native soldiers in the Bengal army mutinied, the whole of " the low caste camp followers, tent pitchers, grooms, grass- " cutters, sweepers, &c., went off with them like a flock of " sheep, and thereby lost their service, unable to resist the " habitual slavery of race. For these reasons our advice " would be that we introduce the new system gradually, " by having separate regiments for the low castes,* into " which any native physically fit should be admitted; that " a certain number of higher caste men be admitted into these " low caste regiments, if, for want of service, they apply for " it, as the best means of bringing about voluntary close " association; and that similarly a certain number of the " *lowest* caste men be admissible into high caste regiments, " where the commanding officer sees that it can be done " without offence; but we should at this stage deprecate " the forcing of any fixed proportion or number of lowest " caste men into the existing regiments of the force, lest in " doing justice to one class we be felt (wrongly or rightly) " to be doing injustice to another. Before leaving this " question it seems necessary to explain, firstly, that though " for the sake of contradistinction we have spoken of the " Punjab regiments as 'high caste regiments,' yet in point " of fact they would not be so considered by natives, as " the Hindoo soldiers in them are generally Soodras; and, " secondly, that in native estimation there is the widest dif- " ference between low caste and lowest caste men, which " ought not to be overlooked. The Soodra is a low caste " man in the eyes of the Brahmin and Rajpoot; but the two " latter have no objection to serve with the former, whereas " a sweeper is by all three considered to be an outcast.'

The Punjab committee in its answers to the four first questions applied to the whole Bengal army state that of that army, " Three-fourths perhaps are Brahmins and Raj- " poots of Oude and Buxar, and the rest Gwâlâs, and " Aheers of different districts, Muhomedans of Oude and " Behar, a few Hindoos from Rohilcund, a few Sikhs, and " a fewer Goorkhas. That part 2, sec. 31. of the military " regulations details those superior castes of natives which " are eligible for the ranks. They exclude all inferior " castes, and make no mention of Eurasians or Christians, " neither of whom were in practice admitted to the ranks, " though Eurasians were employed in the bands, and as " drummers and fifers."

After referring to the observations already quoted upon the enlistment of excluded castes in the Punjab forces, the Punjab committee proceeds as follows:—" To which we " would add our strong conviction of the duty and wisdom " of bringing as many Christian natives into the service as " possible. The Karens of Pegu are a Christian race, and " should be freely enlisted, and next to them we would " desire to see aboriginal races like the Sonthals, Bheels, " &c., and segregated tribes, such as the Boondelas and " Gouds, made available as counterpoises. Probably few " of these secluded people would like to go far from their " homes at first; but the provincial system which we have " proposed entirely meets their present case, and in time, " as the service became appreciated, they would probably " go to any part of India. Again, the Eurasians, who have " so long been a reproach to us, should now be elevated by " enlistment and proper care. We would advocate the " collection of all Christian natives and Eurasians together, " in separate corps, and not dispersing them in the Hindoo " and Muhomedan ranks, where in peace they would have " no influence and be exposed to petty annoyances, and " in rebellion would fall victims and be lost to the State. " To each Christian native corps there should be an or- " dained Christian teacher and pastor, either European or " native."

From the replies of the officers noted in the margin, it appears that the native infantry of the Bengal army was composed of Muhomedans,

Commander-in-Chief.
Major-Gen. Birch.
Lt.-Gen. Sir P. Grant.
Major-Gen. Sir J. B. Hearsey.
Brig. Coke.
Brig. Troup.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Steel.
Col. Mayhew.
Col. Burn.
Col. Shuldham.
Maj.-Gen. Sir S. Cotton.
Major-Gen. Sir J. Hope Grant.

Brahmins, of all denominations,
Chuttryas,
Rajpoots,
Gwallahs,
Kaits,
Aheers,
Jats,

and that some few low caste men, such as Mallees, Kachees, Gurrereeahs, *i. e.*, shepherds, had crept into corps. After the conquest of the Punjab, the enlistment of Sikhs and Punjabee Muhomedans and Hindoos was allowed to the

* In the newly-raised Punjab regiments there are two entirely composed of muzzubees, *i. e.*, sweepers, of the Sikh religion. They are pioneers, and are doing well.

amount of 200 to a regiment, as the military regulations under the head of enlistment, part 2nd, para. 5 and para. 6, run as follows:—

5. "Hindoos, Muhomedans, and Seikhs are eligible for re-
"cruits. 6. Especial care, however, must be taken to
"reject all men of inferior castes, such as Bunurrahs,
"Kyeths, Naces, Thumolees, Gurrereeahs, Lodhs, Bhojeeas,
"Kahars, Mooraees, Kaudoos, Malas, Kachees, and any
"others habitually employed in menial occupations."

The only castes left were Brahmins, Chuttreeas or Rajpoots, Gwallahs, and Aheers.

The districts from whence the infantry was drawn were, many of the men from Oude, from North and South Behar, especially the latter; principally from Shahabad and Bhojepore; from the Dooab of the Ganges and Jumna; from Rohilcund; a few from Bundlecund; and since the conquest and annexation of the Punjab, a proportion from that province.

The Adjutant-General, Colonel Mayhew, gives in the accompanying return the races and castes of which the native army was composed on the 1st April 1858. Although it does not enter into the detail of the inferior castes of the Hindoos now in the ranks, the return is useful as showing the broader feature of the composition of the army a year after the commencement of the great revolt of 1857. It will be observed that in the classification Colonel Mayhew's return has recourse in part to a geographical grouping, and that it anticipates some of the recommendations as to recruiting tracts.

RETURN showing the RACES and CASTES of which the NATIVE ARMY was composed on April 1, 1858.

CORPS.	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-commissioned Officers.	Native Commissioned and Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.	NUMBER of each RACE and CASTE.																	Total.
				Christians.	Mussulmans.	Brahmins.	Rajpoots.	Hindoos of inferior descriptions.	Seikhs.	Punjabees.	Hindoostanees.	Cis-Sutledge.	Trans-Sutledge.	Hill Stations of Nepaul.	Huzara Tribes.	Affghans.	Goorkhas.	Hill Men.	Mhairs.	Mhairats.	Bheels.	Mooreeahs, Grasseeans and other predatory tribes.	
Artillery	6	4	2,241	-	552	77	88	445	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,162
Light Cavalry	26	8	1,259	25	624	344	231	35	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,259
Infantry (Regular)	248	47	21,928	486	3,590	6,205	6,404	4,326	135	192	-	-	-	-	-	-	590	-	-	-	-	-	21,928
Infantry (Irregular)	240	29	42,715	20	1,853	1,532	2,911	3,821	3,504	15,286	396	2,270	2,867	358	23	32	271	3,677	566	915	803	223	41,328
Cavalry (Irregular)	94	-	10,703	41	3,831	360	549	181	833	2,401	1,219	167	467	19	-	105	29	2	-	-	-	-	10,194
Artillery (Irregular)	10	6	998	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	495	38	15	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	553
Sebundy Sappers and Miners	1	2	209	-	2	18	179	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	209
Total	625	91	80,053	572	10,452	8,526	10,362	8,818	4,472	18,374	2,153	2,452	3,339	377	23	137	890	3,679	566	915	803	223	77,133
N.B.—Aggregate of Corps the Races of which are not shown in this Return																							2,920
Grand Total																							80,053

Adjutant-General's Office, Head Quarters,
Allahabad, August 13, 1858.

(Signed) W. MAYHEW, Lieut.-Col.,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

Besides the lowest and menial castes of Hindoos excluded from the ranks of the Bengal army by regulation, there was a practical exclusion of the races occupying large tracts of country, such as Rewah or Bughailcund, Rajpootana, and Central India, besides races scattered over many different parts of India, such as Goojurs, Mewattees, Jats, Ranghurs, Affghans of border tribes, Belooch, and others. Sir J. Hope Grant notes that the sepoys who fought for Clive were chiefly of low caste; and he expresses the opinion that the Bengal army did not at first become Brahminized by any order of Government, but simply by recruiting officers over a series of years, confining their choice to the largest, handsomest, and cleanest looking men, who are undoubtedly the high castes. That these gradually came to preponderate, and then they exercised their powerful influence to keep away all low caste people; and finally, that the custom became the rule, and the low castes were altogether excluded.

The races hitherto excluded or neglected, and among whom enlistment might with advantage be extended, are stated as follows:—

Rajpoots of Rewah Territory.
Rajpoots of Rajesthan.
Rajpoots of Rajpootana.
Rajpoots of Central India.
Goojurs, Koormees, Pasees, Rajbhurs.
Jats of Hanse, Hissar, and Bhurtpoor country.
Rangurs.
Mahrattas.
Mahomedans of agricultural class.
Mewattees.
Shekawattees.
Mahomedans of the Punjab.
Affghans of border tribes.
Hill tribes of Cachar.
Munurpoorees.
Burmese, Karens, Sonthalls.

Although there is no difference of opinion as to extending enlistment over such comparatively little worked fields as the foregoing, there is a wide discrepancy upon the subject, treated at length, and considered with care by the Punjab committee, viz., the enrolment of the lowest castes, and their introduction into the ranks of the army.

Brigadier Coke is of opinion that the lower classes of Hindoos, such as Bunurrahs, Chumars, Sweepers, &c. should be excluded, as they will not fight, and throw a slur on the whole native army. He thinks that sweepers might fight, but does not hold it desirable to entertain them; and he remarks that the Muzzubbee Seikhs, originally of the sweeper caste, have been raised from their position by being admitted to take the Pakul, and by being employed as soldiers by the great Maharajah of the Punjab, Runjeet Sing.

Colonel Burn would also continue to exclude the lowest castes from our ranks, though he thinks a regiment or two of Mehturs (sweepers) might be tried as pioneers. Colonel Burn considers that they are not to be trusted, either as soldiers or policemen, and that their enlistment, to the exclusion of the better classes, will give very general disgust to the whole nation. He is of opinion that caste cannot be put down by merely elevating the lower orders: that the latter are as much wedded to the destructive privileges of their class as the Brahmins or Chuttrees; and, are so completely under the dominion of the upper classes, that no discipline would induce them to break the bonds of caste, and release themselves from its influence. That if the higher and better orders of the Hindoo races are not, in future, to be trusted, he does not see how the smallest reliance can be placed on the lower and less educated classes: that these last, in their present degraded condition, will, Colonel Burn fears, prove themselves utterly unworthy of trust.

Colonel Mayhew notes the fact that Lord William Bentinck, when Commander-in-Chief, attempted to introduce the inferior castes into the army, but did not meet with support, and that subsequently the measure was dropped. (Vide General Orders by the Governor-General, 31st December 1834.) Colonel Mayhew is of opinion that, practically, commanding officers have carried the custom of excluding low caste men too far; but that the lowest tribes will, he apprehends, be found totally wanting in the spirit necessary to make good soldiers, and never will be fit for promotion to the smallest command, in consequence of the servility almost inherent in their social position.

Sir J. B. Hearsey.
Sir S. Cotton.
Sir P. Grant.
Brig. Troup.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Farquharson.
Col. Shuldham.
Lt.-Col. Macpherson.

The officers noted in the margin abstain from making any positive remarks upon this subject; but when enumerating the neglected races and castes from whence recruits might advantageously be drawn, they omit the names of the lowest castes.

Taking a contrary view, Sir J. Hope Grant observes, that we have the very high authority of Colonel Skinner (who warned us forty years ago) for employing many other castes; that the men who defended Bhurtpoor against Lord

Lake were unknown in our army ranks; that the Papees of Oude, always employed by high caste talookdars when anything desperate had to be done, were quite shut out from our ranks; that the Kunjars (Gipseys), Nutts, and Sweepers, all fine material, and highly recommended by Colonel Skinner, would not even have been *touched* formerly by our *high caste* European officers; that besides these are many other classes that might with great advantage be employed, among others, that the Mallah, or boatmen race, make excellent soldiers.

The officers who concur in this opinion, that none, not even the lowest classes, should be excluded, are entered in the margin.

Col. K. Young.
Major Williams.

The Commander-in-Chief remarks that the field from which recruits were obtained was too limited; and that he thinks men should be taken of every caste, or of no caste (if there are such people), and from every district, and that there cannot be too great a diversity.

QUESTIONS 5 and 6.

5. *What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?*
6. *On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?*

The chief agency seems to have been that of native officers and men, who, when they went on leave to their villages, were instructed to bring back with them young men fit for recruits. It appears that formerly recruits offered themselves in such numbers at the head quarters of regiments, even when stationed at a distance from the recruiting districts that no special agency was employed it being seldom necessary to send out parties for the purpose. It is remarked that regiments thus become family cliques; and that native officers took bribes to stand security, and that thus inferior looking men got into the service.

Commander-in-Chief.
Major-Gen. Birch.
Col. Burn.
Brig. Troup.
Col. Mayhew.

Col. Mayhew.
Sir J. Hearsey.

With respect to the precautions taken when recruits were enlisted, it would seem that most officers were aware of none, except such security as the ipse dixit of a sepoy of the regiment or a native officer vouched in behalf of the recruit. Some officers quote the regulations containing the form originally introduced in the Punjab, but afterwards prescribed for the whole army; but this was only acted upon in the Punjab, and was impracticable in Oude, and other independent States; so that it was a dead letter, or nearly so, in the Bengal army. The Punjab committee observe that in future the form of attestation by the local civil authorities prescribed by the regulations for British subjects should be rigidly enforced, having become a more valuable check than ever.

Sir P. Grant.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Coke.
Col. Burn.
Col. Shuldham.

Sir S. Cotton.
Col. Shuldham.
Brig. Farquharson.
Sir P. Grant.
Major-Gen. Birch.
Commander-in-Chief.

The foregoing answers apply to Question 7, with respect to which it is therefore unnecessary to recapitulate what has already been stated; though at the same time the further remarks of Sir J. Hearsey, corroborated as they are by those of Brigadier Troup, deserve attention. The former notes that the custom of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers standing security that the men presented were good and proper recruits for the service, led to a corrupt system, which he thus describes:—"This opened a *trade* or *profit* to "the *native officers*. They sold their interest, *their recommendation*, or *good word*, and made *not the least hesitation* "*in telling falsehoods* so as to get the candidate enlisted! "The native officers sold their interest, making the recruit "(if he could not give sufficient money) bind himself "down by oath to serve these native officers as *menials* for "a certain term of years. All this was kept secret from "their European officers. Every imaginary precaution was "taken as laid down, under the head of 'enlistment' in the "military regulations; but no European, no officer can "overcome the tergiversation of a native." Brigadier Troup, after saying that he does not know what was the practice generally throughout the army, adds that though convinced that had the orders for registry of recruits been rigidly carried out, instead of being in most instances slurred over by the local authorities, the results would have been most beneficial, yet, that he had so little faith in this precaution that in the regiments he commanded he superadded another. This was a committee of native officers, aided by the regimental pundit and moulvie, to examine all recruits enlisted in the regiment. He adds with regret that notwithstanding all these precautions he found that he had been imposed upon in many instances as regarded the recruit's caste and place of residence.

QUESTION 8.

What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops in the Bengal army?

The Punjab committee can suggest no improvement for the Punjab force, but for the Bengal army they suggest that "a relative proportion of the respective castes should be "fixed and adhered to; and the prescribed attestation of "magistrates should be invariably obtained. But these "precautions will be of little use unless a proportionate "share of promotions be given systematically in each race "in the corps. Some races are more astute and obsequious "than others, and if allowed become masters of the regiment."

Sir J. Hearsey and Colonel Mayhew advocate the total exclusion of Brahmins; the former officer recommends that no Muhomedans of Hindoostan Proper be entertained; Colonel Mayhew, that town-bred Muhomedans be excluded. Sir J. Hearsey is of opinion that in the regular infantry of the Bengal army all recruits should come from districts and countries *new* to the old provinces from whence recruits have hitherto usually been drawn. Colonel Shuldham, would greatly restrict the number of Brahmins and Muhomedans, and would have greater care taken in ascertaining the connections, castes, and villages of the recruits, and in all possible cases would require of recruits that respectable natives stood their securities.

Colonel Burn does not see that the material at our disposal affords much room for improvement. He considers that the future native army of Bengal, in order to work well, must be composed of an entirely new set of men; and that none of the old leaven should be left to impregnate the new mass; that every man who has been suspected, and had his arms taken from him should be dismissed, for that such men can never again serve with credit, as they will not be trusted by their officers, and will feel shamed and degraded. For the new army he would enlist all fighting classes, whether Muhomedans, Hindoos, or Seikhs, in due proportions, being careful only as regards their physical fitness for the service; and he apprehends no danger in this arrangement, if the paramount race, the Europeans, are maintained in proper proportion to the native auxiliaries. Brigadier Coke likewise would enlist from all tribes and castes that will fight; so also Colonel Farquharson, giving preference to the agricultural and pastoral races.

Sir P. Grant is of opinion, that every man physically fit should be eligible for enlistment without distinction of race, tribe, caste, or district; and that it would be well sometimes to employ European, instead of exclusively native agency in recruiting.

Sir S. Cotton thinks it very possible that recruiting depôts under well selected European officers might be established with great benefit for the purpose of recruiting from the various tribes and castes throughout the country; a view which is also taken by Brigadier Troup, who proposes three permanent depôts, with an experienced commandant, a surgeon, and two European serjeants to each; one at Buxar, to provide all corps at and below Benares; one at Lucknow, to supply all corps at and above Allahabad as far as Umballa; and another in the Punjab, to supply all corps stationed there and at Ferozepore. He points out how by this simple arrangement the army would at a trifling expense be kept complete with efficient men, and the state avoid the expense of paying for more men than are actually necessary to complete the army. He thinks that the service should be thrown open to all tribes and castes without distinction, with the exception of Christians, whom he would like to see a separate corps, feeling certain that a corps of native Christians would answer very well.

Major Williams would have carefully selected European officers sent into the districts to recruit and select from the population rather than from the more corrupt inhabitants of towns, and the officers charged with this duty should not trust too much to their subordinates.

Sir J. Hope Grant would not recognize caste, but take all races and castes; he however proceeds a step further than those who advocate the same absence of distinction as to castes, for he would make all recruits mess together.

The Commander-in-Chief would do away with all allusion to caste in any general recruiting regulations, and would have physical fitness the main point looked to. He would admit all castes to the service, but thinks it would perhaps be a wise plan to have regiments of separate castes, as well as regiments of mixed castes; and the latter to be composed of every religion and creed.

Major-General Birch sees no occasion for much alteration, and is adverse to the admission of low caste men into the native army; because, 1st, discipline cannot be maintained

where a low caste commissioned or non-commissioned officer crouches with his forehead to the ground before a Brahmin sepoy; 2ndly, to ally ourselves with the lowest castes is to separate ourselves more thoroughly than at present from the chiefs and respectable classes of the country, and to exasperate, not to diminish caste prejudices; 3rdly, he doubts whether the advocates of lowest castes would like to serve with a regiment of *Domes* or *Hullah Khores;* 4thly, that to enlist largely lowest castes is to proscribe Brahmins and other high castes, and respectable Mahomedans, the best soldiers; 5thly, the experiment of trusting the military defence of the country to men deficient in self-reliance from the depressing influence of caste, would be extremely hazardous; 6thly, that our disregard of the prejudice of caste will not induce the natives to do so; 7thly, the argument drawn from the Madras and Bombay armies is not applicable, the social state and feeling of caste being different in Bengal from the other presidencies; 8thly, the mutinies were not occasioned by caste influence, but from mistaken fears for their religion, all religions combining against us, which refutes the notion that any one caste stirred up the rebellion more than another; 9thly, the turbulence of Brahmins may be controlled by not enlisting too many of them, but sees no wisdom in adopting measures with the avowed object of annihilating caste, which is utterly unattainable by any measure we could adopt. Major-General Birch coincides with the General Orders of 31st December 1834, and sees no occasion for future concession. "The "Governor-General of India in Council is pleased to direct "that all objections to men belonging to the respectable "classes of the native community, or preferences amongst "such classes, on account of caste or religion, shall cease "to operate in respect to their admission into the ranks of "the Bengal army."

QUESTIONS 9, 10, and 11.

9. *What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bengal army?*
10. *How long has this form been in use in the Bengal army?*
11. *Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruits of the native infantry?*

The Judge Advocate-General of the Army, Colonel Keith Young, gives the oaths sanctioned by authority. The first oath, that administered to the sepoys of the late Bengal army, came into operation when the articles of war of 1796 were published. The second, that administered to the Seikh recruits, was first published to the army in General Orders of the 7th October 1853. Colonel Young observes, that in practice the words "I will go wherever I am ordered, whether "by sea or land," have been introduced into the first form of oath, when administered to recruits in general service regiments.

The first form of oath runs as follows:—

"I, A.B., inhabitant of , village ,
"pergunnah , subah , son of
" , do swear that I will never forsake or
"abandon my colours; that I will march wherever I am
"directed, whether within or beyond the Company's terri-
"tories; that I will implicitly obey all the orders of my
"commanders, and in everything behave myself as becomes
"a good soldier and faithful servant of the Company; and
"failing in any part of my duty as such, I will submit to
"the penalties described in the articles of war, which
"have been read to me."

The second oath, for Seikh recruits, runs as follows:—

"I, inhabitant of
"son of , swear by the Gooroo Grunth
"Sahibjee, and if I tell a falsehood may the Gooroo Grunth
"Sahib cause misfortune to descend upon me, that I will
"never forsake or abandon my colours; that I will march
"wherever I am directed, whether within or beyond the
"Company's territories; that I will implicitly obey all the
"orders of my commanders, and in everything behave
"myself as becomes a good soldier and faithful servant of
"the Company; and failing in any part of my duty as
"such, I will submit to the penalties described in the
"articles of war, which have been read to me."

With respect to the utility of these oaths, the Judge Advocate-General thus expresses his opinions:—"I am "doubtful as to any advantage that is likely to accrue "from swearing in recruits. The results of the last year "have clearly shown how entirely powerless any form of "oath has been to secure the fidelity of the sepoy. All have "alike gone; those who it may be presumed, from educa-"tion or from superior intelligence, know well the impor-"tance to be attached to an oath, as well as the more "ignorant, who regards it probably as a mere form, to be "forgotten as soon as it was made. I can scarcely believe "that the oath has kept one sepoy true to his allegiance; "no disgrace attaches, in their minds, to breaking it. The "disgrace rests only in the punishment, and there is no "advantage in the administration of an oath that might "not, I believe, be equally gained by simply declaring to a "sepoy at the time of his enlistment that he was expected "to obey implicitly his superiors, and to go wherever he "was ordered, whether by sea or land; and that no objec-"tion made by him hereafter would be received as an ex-"cuse for disobedience. If, however, it is considered "desirable that the formality of swearing in recruits should "be observed, I think it will be well to introduce the form "in use in general service corps, and to lay down clear and "defined rules for the manner in which the oath is to be "administered, and the period after enlistment when it is "to be taken."

The Punjab committee are of a similar opinion with the Judge Advocate-General, for they fear that in practice no oath will bind, that the unconscientious will boldly disregard it, and the conscientious find such loopholes, as that fidelity to their colours and their oath was kept by taking the colours with them when they mutinied; or, that the water they were sworn on came out of a well in the lines, and not from the Ganges; and so it was no oath at all! or, that no oath taken to an infidel is binding!

The Punjab committee would, however, still have recruits sworn in, because it is necessary to have some solemn engagement to which to appeal; but in the spirit of Act V. of 1840 they would substitute for all heathen or Muhomedan oaths an oath before Almighty God. They would simplify the oath to the fewest possible words, with the utmost possible scope, thus:—

"I, inhabitant of
"village, pergunnah, district,
" province, do swear before Almighty God
"that I will be a faithful soldier and servant of the British
"Government; that I will march wherever I am directed,
"and will obey all the orders of my European officers."

The Adjutant-General, Colonel Mayhew, and the officiating Quartermaster-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson, would add to the existing form of oath the words "by sea or land;" but Colonel Mayhew would have the oath very distinctly explained to each recruit before he is sworn in, "which should never be till he has become accus-"tomed for several months to the service, and at drill."

Brigadiers Steel and Farquharson likewise suggest the addition of the words "by sea or land;" but Brigadier Steel would further introduce a specific engagement, "to "work at or from entrenchments in the presence of an "enemy when required." Whilst Brigadier Farquharson would not restrict this part of the engagement so narrowly, but would have the recruits swear "to do anything, such "as dig trenches, make roads, cut jungle, build lines, &c., "during peace or war; menial work, as a right, to be ex-"cluded, which is against the religion of the Asiatic."

Colonel Shuldham suggests that every recruit be called on to swear that he is not a "bhugut," and that he never will become a bhugut while on the effective branch of the service. Colonel Shuldham states that the sepoys who are "bhuguts" remain in hospital for weeks after they are cured, because they will not take sufficiently nourishing food to recover their strength.

Sir J. Hearsey considers that as many tribes are likely for the future to be enlisted for the Bengal army, investigation should be made of the kind of oath which each tribe holds to be most binding, and would have such oath administered. In this opinion Sir J. Hope Grant concurs, for he remarks, that "the only hold, as far as conscience goes "(and this of the very slightest), you can have on the re-"cruit is to swear him according to his religion, and not by "one form of oath, or one made up according to our ideas."

Major Williams observes upon this subject that neither solemn affirmation nor oath would in general prove binding on the men if disposed to mutiny. He suggests, however, a written agreement, signed, and sworn to in as solemn and binding a form as possible, and according to the respective creeds of the enlisting parties. He considers that mere solemn affirmation has little or no hold on a native; and that a statement required to be made on oath bears a very different aspect to them from one made on solemn affirmation alone, but that a written agreement has almost a greater hold on a native than a simple oath, as he is more careful to comprehend what he signs and swears to.

Brigadier Coke considers that it is high time that all oaths were done away with, as a bad soldier will never be bound by an oath, and a good one does not require one. He states that the 1st Punjab infantry has been raised nine years, and that no man in it was ever sworn in, or ever heard of the articles of war; that they obey their commanding officer, go where they are ordered, and have shown, like the rest of the Punjab corps, how they can fight wherever they have

been employed; that if they disobey orders they are flogged; and that till something of the Bengal line folly crept into the Punjab force, which, had it been carried out by commanding officers, would have ruined the force, non-commissioned officers and men were summarily dismissed when they were found from vice or temper to be unfit for the service. Brigadier Coke deems the commanding officer the only fit judge of these matters, and says, "Let native soldiers "have only one master, their commanding officer, and they "will be good and obedient soldiers; let them find that "the brigadier is one master, the general a second, and the "commander-in-chief a third, they will obey no master. "To all officers who have thought on this subject, "or who have experience of the native character, this "truth is so self-apparent that I can only imagine one "reason why it has not been acted on, and that is, that the "Madras mutiny has not been forgotten, and that Govern-"ment doubt the loyalty of their European officers."

Sir P. Grant and Sir S. Cotton consider the existing form of oath as good and binding as it is possible to make it. Colonel Burn proposes the adoption of the second or Seikh form of oath, with alterations to suit all classes.

Major-General Birch proposes a form of oath, taken from that for European recruits for Her Majesty's service, modified to suit the native recruit: —

"I do make oath, that I will be faithful "and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty, Her heirs and "successors; that I will, as in duty bound, observe and "obey all orders of the generals and officers set over me, "and that I will willingly proceed by land or sea wherever "my services may be required."

The Commander-in-Chief observes that we seem to be the only people in the country who think the oath of consequence, that the sepoys evidently do not; and that any improvement in the wording of the oath appears to be a matter of much indifference.

Questions 12 and 13.

12. *Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bengal presidency of sea-faring habits, and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?*
13. *Has the Bengal presidency any marine corps, and if so, of what strength, and whence recruited?*

With reference to the first of these questions, the answers chiefly point to the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal as a possible recruiting ground for marine corps. Mughs, Chittagong Muhomedans, Karens, Burmans, natives of the Malay peninsula and of the Eastern Archipelago, are accordingly enumerated; the Dacca and other boatmen, and the Sonthals are also adverted to, but Colonel Shuldham remarks that the men of Chittagong were thought deficient in courage.

Sir P. Grant.
Sir J. H. Grant.
Brig. Steele.
Brig. Farquharson.
Col. Shuldham.
Lt.-Col. Macpherson.
Col. Burn.
Major Williams.

Sir J. Hearsey, with reference to the second of these two questions, No. 13, states, that "Two regiments in the "Bengal infantry were formerly called marine corps. The "men were expressly enlisted for service beyond sea. This "innovation was introduced at the earnest solicitation of "my father, Colonel Andrew Wilson Hearsey, during the "Governor-Generalship of Sir John Shore, afterwards Lord "Teignmouth, or in the period of the first Governor-"Generalship of Lord Cornwallis. Infantry regiments had "been formed by volunteers to proceed by sea to Madras. "Unfortunately, the transport, on which was half a regi-"ment of sepoys, foundered in a typhoon, and was never "heard of again. This caused a great dread of sea voyages, "and innumerable objections were raised regarding *caste "prejudices*, and these said caste *prejudices* have been ever "since thrown in our teeth, when the sepoys of the Bengal "army were inclined to disobey any order, or act in any "country they disliked to go into."

Beyond noting the two battalions formerly considered as marine corps, though both the appellation and their specific duties have fallen into desuetude, the answers throw little light upon the subject, but the Punjab committee advocate the formation of marine corps raised from the races of sea-faring habits.

Both the Commander-in-Chief and Major-General Birch doubt whether marine corps would be of use to the service.

Questions 14 and 15.

14. *Should each infantry corps be raised in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?*
15. *Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area; in fact, without reference to districts?*

The opinions of the Punjab committee are as follows:—

"This is a very important question, but after mature "consideration, and with reference to the events of the past "year, we come decidedly to the conclusion that regiments "of native infantry should be provincial in their composi-"tion and ordinary sphere of service. As we cannot do "without a large native army in India, our main object is to "make that army safe; and next to the grand counterpoise "of a sufficient European force, comes the counterpoise of "natives against natives. At first sight it might be thought "that the best way to secure this would be to mix up all the "available military races of India in each and every regi-"ment, and to make them all general service corps. But "excellent as this theory seems, it does not bear the test of "practice. It is found that different races mixed together "do not long preserve their distinctiveness; their corners "and angles, and feeling and prejudice get rubbed off, till "at last they assimilate, and the object of their association "to a considerable extent is lost. To preserve that dis-"tinctiveness which is so valuable, and which while it lasts "makes the Muhomedan of one country despise, fear, or "dislike the Muhomedan of another, corps should in future "be provincial, and adhere to the geographical limits "within which differences and rivalries are strongly "marked. Let all races, Hindoo or Muhomedan, of one "province be enlisted in one regiment, and no others, and "having thus created distinctive regiments, let us keep "them so against the hour of need, by confining the circle "of their ordinary service to the limits of their own "province, and only marching them on emergency into "other parts of the empire, with which they will then be "found to have little sympathy. By the system thus "indicated, two great evils are avoided; firstly, that "community of feeling throughout the native army, and "that mischievous political activity and intrigue which "results from association with other races, and travel in "other Indian provinces, and, secondly, that thorough "discontent and alienation from the service which has "undoubtedly sprung up since extended conquest has "carried our Hindoostanee soldiers so far from their homes "in India Proper. There can be no question that a "contented servant is better than a discontented one. "Unfortunately, we have tried too much hitherto to "purchase the contentment of our native armies by "increased pay, batta, &c.; this has not answered its "purpose, and has produced many evils. It has enriched "the sepoys, but not satisfied them. Nothing can reconcile "natives to long absence from their homes, where they "leave their wives and lands. The sepoys felt they were "being coaxed into foreign* service, and got both angry "and insolent with a sense of power. We believe that "what is called 'general service' has been prominent "among the causes which undermined our once faithful "native army. If, then, in future we keep our regiments "moving ordinarily in a circle about their homes, we shall "add greatly to their real happiness, and consequently "their loyalty, and be able to get rid of all mischievous "increases of pay. Fewer men will also suffice, for the "furloughs will be shorter, and, in fact, we believe that the "service will thus be rendered more safe, more economical, "and more popular."

The Punjab committee, having thus laid down the general principle of provincial regiments, proceed to explain that, not to deprive the State of the advantage and precaution of having a few foreign regiments in every province, they would always have about a fourth of the regiments of each province stationed in the next adjoining province, and relieved every two or three years by another fourth. In the Punjab the committee would allow one third, because the Punjab frontier Trans-Indus requires regiments peculiarly equipped and organized; and it is desirable that they should not be moved. Again, it is desirable that the Goorkha regiments at Jutog and in Huzara, and the guides in Yusufzye should be locals. This leaves only the sixteen regiments in the interior of the province from which to detach corps for service in the North-west provinces or Oudh. As fifteen out of thirty-one Punjab regiments will on this plan never leave that province, it is thought that a third of the sixteen interior corps may well take a tour of more distant duty for three years at a time, which would give each of them six years uninterruptedly in their own province.

Brigadiers Coke and Farquharson are also for provincial recruiting for separate corps. The former officer (vide general remarks introductory to replies) is of opinion that corps should be raised of separate classes and tribes; thus, Seikh corps to be composed of Seikhs, and no admixture of any class with them; Brahmins and Rajpoots in other corps; Gwallas and other low caste Hindoos in other corps, but no Sweepers or Chumars to be enlisted; Hindoostanee Mussulmen in separate regiments, Goojurs separate, Mewattees separate, Pathans, Cis and Trans Indus with Punjabee Mussulmen separate, Dograhs in separate corps, as the Goorkahs are at present. His scheme, therefore, is

* *i.e.* anywhere very distant from their own homes.

that of provincial recruiting for corps of homogeneous composition as to races and tribes. Colonel Farquharson's appears to be exactly the same.

Brigadier Steel and Colonel Burn also consider that it would be advantageous to restrict the recruiting of each infantry corps to a prescribed district or province, and Colonel Burn instances the jealousy between the Oudh and Behar men taken advantage of at Lahore, where the Behar men were separate from those from Oudh.

Major Williams would have each corps raised in a prescribed district, but if so, should serve as little as possible in that district; and he quotes rule 7 of the police manual for the North-west provinces, in which it is laid down as a general rule, that "it is better not to have too many of any "one district serving therein, as local ties would prevent "them acting so efficiently against their own countrymen."

Sir S. Cotton, referring to his plan for the reorganization of the native army, in which corps of the irregular portion of the army are of the strength of 400, states, that if such were the case, "there would be no objection to their being "raised and recruited in districts; not to remain there, but "for general service." But if corps were stronger than 400 men, Sir S. Cotton thinks a counterpoise should be preserved by enlistment from separate parts of the country.

Sir J. Hearsey would have corps of distinct tribes, but provided the distinctiveness of tribes were kept, deems it immaterial from what districts the recruits come; the more distant from each other the better.

Sir P. Grant is opposed to restricted recruiting in prescribed districts, and much prefers general enlistment. Colonel Mayhew considers that a mixture of tribes of the same *faith* is very desirable, and that corps should be raised for general service by recruiting all over the country without restriction to districts. Brigadier Troup, Lieut.-Colonel Macpherson, Colonel Shuldham are in favour of recruiting over a wide area, and Sir J. Hope Grant advocates the same course as necessary to the exclusion of caste.

The Commander-in-Chief would have no fixed rule, and thinks that corps should differ as much as possible; one be of all castes, one be of some particular caste, one from a particular district, another from every district and of every caste. Uniformity in such matters his excellency deems dangerous, and it is added that when corps consist of various castes, these might often with advantage be formed in separate companies.

Major-General Birch objects to the restriction of corps to a particular district on the ground that it would prevent their being employed at any great distance from those districts, and would deprive them of the power of recruiting where they might be serving, or in any contiguous district. He advocates recruiting over a wide and unlimited area, to enlarge the field of selection, and guard against combination.

Question 16.

Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste?

The Punjab committee are of opinion that some corps should be homogeneous, but that most corps should be mixed, of the races prevailing in the respective provinces; and they refer to the condition of the Punjab force, in which there are already three homogeneous corps, viz., one regiment of Goorkhas and two corps of Muzzubbee pioneers, this is exclusive of Nussuree Goorkhah battalion, which does not belong to the Punjab force. The committee state that if more regiments of Goorkhas could be obtained they would be glad, but that it appears impracticable, and that more Muzzubbee corps are not required. Hence they do not recommend any more homogeneous regiments for the Punjab, but that all the other provincial corps should be mixed, some being in the proportion observed in the new Punjab corps, viz.:—

Muhomedan companies - - -	4
Seikh do. - - -	4
Hill Rajpoot do. - - -	2
	10
Others having a predominant element thus,—	
Seikhs company - - -	5
Muhomedans do. - - -	3
Hill Rajpoots - - - -	1
Hindoostanees - - - -	1
	10
Or,—	
Muhumedan company - - -	5
Seikhs do. - - -	3
Hill men do. - - -	1
Hindoostanees do. - - -	1
	10

Again, in one corps the whole of the Muhomedans might be Pathans of the Trans-Indus, though this should be quite exceptional. In another regiment they might be all Punjabee Muhomedans from the Cis-Indus, and so on. The views of Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson coincide with those of the Punjab committee.

The Adjutant-General, Colonel Mayhew, is of opinion that so far as Hindoos, Muhomedans, Seikhs, and Goorkhas are concerned, regiments should decidedly be homogeneous. He asserts, that the admission of the three latter only partially in the old infantry corps of the Bengal army quite neutralized their influence as counterpoises to Hindoo predominance of feeling throughout the infantry, whilst in the cavalry and artillery the Muhomedan ascendancy prevailed from the same cause.

Brigadier Coke would have each corps of one tribe or caste; and his reasons are:—"That in a rising of the Mus- "sulmen, you would always have Seikhs, Dogras, Goor- "khas, and Hindoo corps to depend on, and *vice versâ*. By "mixing the castes in one corps they become amalgamated, "and make common cause, which they never do if kept in "separate corps. Hindoos and Mussulmen are natural "enemies, the same with Seikhs; yet the result of mixing "them in one corps has been to make them all join against "government, and not only the soldiers, but through them "the Hindoo and Mussulman zemeendars were incited to "make common cause, which they never would have done "had the races been kept in distinct corps. Our en- "deavour should be to uphold in full force the (for us for- "tunate) separation which exists between the different "religions and races, not to endeavour to amalgamate "them. *Divide et impera* should be the principle of Indian "government."

Brigadier Steel advocates the homogeneity of corps upon similar grounds, viz., that association creates a fellow feeling in corps, a fact which has been proved in the quarrels between corps; in such squabbles and fights the *esprit de corps* sets aside the considerations of tribe or caste. Colonel Steel, therefore, to prevent community of interest, would keep each corps and department as separate and unconnected as possible. Brigadier Troup likewise pronounces in favour of homogeneous corps.

Colonel Burn would not separate the Muhomedans and Hindoos of Hindoostan, but he would have distinct regiments of Seikhs; and with the latter, he would not amalgamate the Manjah and Cis-Sutlej Seikhs, but keep them separate. He observes, that when Seikhs were first admitted into our army he advocated their being kept in distinct regiments, and that the late mutiny has confirmed him in the correctness of that opinion. He notes, that the Seikhs belonging to the mutinous corps in Delhi went with them, and that nothing would induce them to break this unnatural alliance and join their countrymen, who were fighting in our ranks. They remained with the rebels throughout the siege. Colonel Burn advances the conduct of the Goorkhas, who have always been kept distinct, as a contrast to that of the Seikhs during the mutiny, and as proving with what advantage this distinction of races may be worked upon for the maintenance of our authority.

With the exception of Goorkhas and Pathans, Brigadier Farquharson would not have corps homogeneous; and Colonel Shuldham is of the same opinion, except that for service in the Straits he considers that a Mussulman corps would be most efficient.

Both Sir P. Grant and Sir J. Hope Grant are strongly opposed to homogeneous corps, and in favour of their being composite. So also Major-General Birch, who regards homogeneity as favourable to combination for evil purposes, and as calculated to perpetuate distinctions. Whereas, though strongly opposed to the admixture of high castes with very low castes, he equally deprecates the separation between one caste and another among those which we know by experience to admit of fusion together into the ranks of our native regiments.

Question 17.

If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous; each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste? Or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?

The Punjab committee would have both homogeneous and composite companies, as both systems have their advantages. The men are happier in homogeneous companies; but the committee consider it a greater question whether mixed companies are not the better check. The committee deem that there is safety in a variety of systems, and that the army should be no more homogeneous in system than in race.

Sir J. Hearsey would have each company homogeneous. No caste *prejudices* to be allowed, and the name, the very word caste, to be abolished in the army; but he observes that, if tribes are mixed they will act together, and that many of the Seikhs joined the Poorbees in the late mutinies, because the Poorbees were more numerous; but that as soon as they were separated, and not overawed by the Brahmins and Mahomedans, they proved true and faithful to their salt and to the Government.

On similar grounds Sir S. Cotton advocates homogeneous companies; Brigadier Farquharson and Major Williams concur in this point. Brigadier Coke is of opinion that the next best thing to having the whole corps of one caste, is to have each company of one caste; and that tribes and castes should not be mixed in the companies. Brigadier Troup is also of opinion that tribes and castes should not be mixed up; but he remarks that, unless the whole regiment be homogeneous, it would be utterly impossible to preserve the companies of men of one tribe and caste, as removals from various causes would require frequently to be made from one company to another, on account of promotion and various other circumstances. Brigadier Steel, who dwells equally upon the impolicy of mixing races and castes, also adverts to the necessary intermingling of companies in the performance of duty.

On the other hand, Colonel Burn is of opinion that, if distinctions are made in regiments, by dividing the men into classes or tribes, quarrels will be incessant; and if corps are severally recruited from particular districts, he advocates that all the fighting classes of that district be admitted without distinction, and mixed up in the companies, as has been the practice hitherto.

Neither Sir P. Grant nor Colonel Mayhew are in favour of homogeneous companies, but prefer them composite. Sir J. Hope Grant and Colonel Berkeley, who concur in the non-recognition of caste, are also opposed to homogeneous companies, and in favour of composite ones, as not involving the necessity of purposely recruiting to keep up one class of men in a company. Major-General Birch is also opposed to homogeneous companies, as not tending to the improvement of discipline and a common interest, and as calculated to perpetuate the antagonism of castes and tribes, and as rendering more difficult the regimental appointments, such as commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers, drill instructors, pay havildars, &c.

Question 18.

If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?

Colonel Keith Young makes one answer to Questions 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, and would like to see all plans fairly tried. He thinks that it would be very desirable to have some corps recruited entirely from certain castes or certain districts. For instance, corps exclusively composed of Seikhs, Rajpoots, Gwallahs, Belochees, Goorkhas, Punjabees, Oude men, and Bhujpoorees; and again, he would have other regiments in which the companies were similarly composed, the regiments thus containing men of all castes and from all districts, but the companies being men entirely of one caste or one district. He considers that the latter organization would be found preferable for the mass of the native army, as corps exclusively composed of one caste, or recruited in one district, would have too much of nationality about them; and he conceives that it would be neither politic nor prudent to encourage national regiments, except to a very limited extent. Some regiments Colonel Keith Young would have composite throughout, as in the present Bombay, and in the late Bengal, army. Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson expresses opinions very similar to those of Colonel K. Young, but is careful to state that he would exclude the lowest castes from his composite corps.

Brigadier Coke objects to composite corps; and Brigadiers Steel and Troup, who also prefer homogeneous corps, answer Question 18, by the one (Colonel Steel) adverting to the proportions laid down by the regulations, whilst the other (Colonel Troup) recommends three equal proportions. Major Williams is also for equal proportions; and Sir S. Cotton likewise advocates one-third Seikhs, one-third Puthans, and one-third Hindoos. Sir P. Grant is also in favour of maintaining, as far as possible, equal proportions.

Major-General Birch says:—"I would entertain few "Brahmins, and would restrict Mussulmen, Rajpoots, and "Seikhs to one-third of any regiment in which they were "entertained. I mean that there should not be in any "corps more than one-third of its complement, consisting "of Mussulmans, nor Rajpoots, nor Seikhs; but these "tribes together might unobjectionably form half of any "regiment, or more than half."

Question 19.

If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area, without reference to districts?

Sir J. Hearsey, Brigadier Steel, and Colonel K. Young are of opinion that police corps should not be raised in the district in which they are to serve. Brigadier Steel and Major Williams would have the machinery for recruiting military and police corps kept perfectly distinct. Major Williams, Brigadier Farquharson, and Colonel Shuldham would allow the recruiting for both to be carried on in the same districts; so also would Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson.

Sir P. Grant. Brigadier Troup. Major-Gen. Birch. — The officers noted in the margin are strongly in favour of general enlistment over the widest area, both for military and police corps.

Colonel Burn, in connexion with a proposed organization for the infantry of the Bengal army, would have police corps that are not for local police duties recruited or filled up by drafts from the corps of the line. By which system the active service corps would be rarely efficient regiments, and the police corps would be composed of well-disciplined and steady old soldiers, in every way suited for the duties of a military police.

Sir S. Cotton, under the impression that police corps should never be armed, trained, or disciplined like corps of the army, considers that they might advantageously be raised in the districts in which their employment lies.

Question 20.

Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?

In reply to this question, the general opinion is in favour of their being kept perfectly distinct and that police corps should not be regarded as nurseries for the corps of the line. The exceptions are Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson, who, if necessary or expedient, would draw men from the police corps; and Colonel Shuldham, who would also occasionally, when there was an emergent call for men, have recourse to the police corps. Brigadier Farquharson, who objects to the measure as a general rule, would, in time of war, sanction volunteering.

Commander-in-Chief. Major-General Birch. Sir P. Grant. Sir J. Hearsey. Sir S. Cotton. Brigadier Troup. Brigadier Farquharson. Brigadier Coke. Brigadier Steel. Major Williams. Colonel Mayhew. Punjab Committee.

Colonel Burn, instead of making the police corps nurseries for the corps of the line, would make the line corps nurseries for the police.

Question 21.

What agency should be employed in recruiting in the districts of the Bengal presidency, or its dependencies?

Lt.-Col. Macpherson. Colonel Shuldham. Colonel Burn. Punjab Committee. Commander-in-Chief. Major-General Birch. — The officers noted in the margin regard the present system as meeting all requirements, and as open to little serious objection.

Sir P. Grant, instead of exclusively employing native agency, would sometimes employ European agency in recruiting.

Sir S. Cotton. Brigadier Steel. Colonel Mayhew. — The officers who advocate depôts under selected officers are given in the margin; and their reasons are, that the system will supersede the "Bhaeebundee" tendency heretofore so baneful to the service, and which still obstructs the introduction of new feelings into the native army; that the army would, at a very trifling expense, be be always kept complete with efficient men, and the State avoid the expense of paying for more men than are actually necessary; that a depôt in the heart of its own recruiting province would admit of the men leaving their friends there, and that when a regiment had suffered in the field, or on foreign service, it would be an indulgence to the men if it were sent to its own district and depôt to recruit. Brigadier Steel would form the depôts at

Brigadier Troup. Col. Farquharson.

Buxar,	for	Bhojepooreahs,
Allyghur,	„	Jats,
Beelundshur,	„	Goojurs,
Meerut,	„	Mewattees,
Mynpooree	„	Rajpoots, who could also be raised at preceding stations,
Umritsur,	„	Seikhs,
Goozerat,	„	Punjabees,
Rawul Pindee,	„	Eusofzaes,
Joinpore,	„	Rajcoomars,

and at any other places where there are distinct races of military character and taste. Brigadier Steel restricts his proposal to three depôts, viz., Buxar, Lucknow, and one in the Punjab.

Sir J. Hearsey would depute European officers, selected as good linguists, and for a knowledge of the native character, in charge of recruiting parties, otherwise there will be deceit and roguery. He would have very little, if any, recruiting in Hindoostan Proper, or in our old districts, or in Oude; for he apprehends that the men in these being the relatives and connexions of mutineers and pensioners who have been executed, transported, or had their villages burnt and estates escheated, *will always be ready to turn traitors through revenge.*

Major Williams also advocates the deputation of selected officers upon the duty o frecruiting.

Brigadier Coke would entrust the recruiting to commanding officers of corps. Sir J. Hope Grant would likewise hold the commanding officer responsible.

Question 22.

Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency?

The general opinion is in favour of a distinct agency, and of leaving the recruiting for police corps to the discretion and supervision of their own commanding officers. Brigadier Troup alone is of opinion that the same agency might be used; whilst Colonel Burn's proposal of line corps being the nurseries of the police corps puts aside this question.

The Commander-in-Chief would have the recruiting carried on separately.

Major-General Birch is so strongly of an opinion adverse to police corps, as armed and trained military bodies, that he cannot contemplate the recruiting for them.

Question 23.

What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the army of the Bengal presidency?

The general opinion, though variously stated, concurs in the view expressed by the Punjab committee, that the existing rules only require to be enforced. Those who advocate the institution of recruit depots would hold the officers commanding responsible for the correctness of the descriptive rolls sent with recruits to corps, and for ascertaining, by frequent visits to his districts, that the local civil authorities pay proper attention to the correct attestation of recruits, and to the accuracy of the returns as to their caste, employment, and residence; a duty represented to be slurred over.

The Commander-in-Chief deems it to be a matter of little moment.

Major-General Birch would have the precautions above stated carefully observed, and copies of all registers of recruits made by the civil authorities transmitted to the Adjutant-General's office, as also copies of regimental registers of recruits and of kindred rolls. He remarks, that in the late mutinies the non-existence of these rolls, and the destruction of those with regiments, proved very inconvenient.

Question 24.

Should similar or different precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for police corps in the Bengal presidency?

Here, again, opinion is practically unanimous that the same precautions should be taken with recruits for police corps as are adopted with recruits for the line, or, rather, should be adopted for the latter.

Major Williams quotes the instructions issued to the officers of the military organized police of the North-west provinces.—(Vide rules 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.) From which it appears that strong, able-bodied, men, irrespective of castes, high or low, if recommended by the civil authorities, and approved by the civil surgeons, may be taken from the ages of 18 to 35 years for the police; that no one caste or tribe is to predominate; that native Christians are to be readily taken, if of good character; that the enlistment is for service in any part of India, and that, with the view of gaining good men, parties of influence and good character bringing 100 good men are to have the rank of jemadar, with liberty to recommend two havildars and two naicks.

The Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that it is a matter of little moment.

Questions 25 and 26.

25. *Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India, with the natives of the country; and, if so, should they be formed in separate regiments or in companies, or otherwise?*
26. *If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?*

In the précis of the answers to the first series of questions this subject has been very fully treated, and the opinions of the Punjab committee, to which they refer, have been quoted *in extenso.* It is unnecessary here to recapitulate their objections to the introduction of foreign coloured mercenaries, a measure to which they are entirely opposed as in contravention of our policy of administering India, as far as practicable, for the profit and advantage of its inhabitants, and as increasing the difficulty of finding employment for the races, traditionally and habitually military in character and occupation, without aiding to solve the problem how these races are to be disposed of.

The officers noted in the margin are likewise very strongly opposed to a measure which they consider as probably equally costly with, and far less efficient than, the employment of European troops; that the recruiting would be very difficult, and supply of men limited; whereas India furnishes sufficient and fit men, if well selected, and as affording no security, such foreign coloured mercenaries being proverbially treacherous, and from the prejudice and sympathy of colour certain to make common cause against the European race.

Commander-in-Chief.
Major-General Birch.
Sir P. Grant.
Colonel Mayhew.
Brigadier Troup.

The officers noted in the margin advocate the measure as expedient, and would have such foreign mercenaries formed into separate corps, and to consist of Malays, Chinese, Tartars, Africans, Burmese, and men of the Eastern Archipelago. Sir J. Hearsey limits his concurrence in the utility of the measure, to the enrolment of all tropical or very hot countries, including Malta, Sicily, Naples, the Ionian islands, Madeira, and the Brazils.

Sir J. Hope Grant.
Colonel Berkeley.
Colonel Burn.
Major Williams.
Lt.-Col. Macpherson.
Brigadier Steel.
Brigadier Coke.
Brigadier Farquharson.
Colonel Shuldham.
Sir S. Cotton.

Colonel K. Young would enlist such foreign coloured mercenaries, and would have them in corps, organized in all three modes; viz., the regiment homogeneous, the companies of a composite regiment homogeneous, and the regiment composite throughout.

Question 27.

What should be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?

Those who advocate the measure look to the assistance of governors, consuls, and European residents to aid the officers selected for the duty of raising corps of foreign mercenaries. Brigadier Steel observes that the Dutch raised corps in one colony for the service of another; that they had Malay corps in Java, and Amboynese corps for Java, a Javanese corps for Ceylon, and so on.

Questions 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32.

28. *Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?*
29. *If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief?*
30. *Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops?*
31. *Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?*
32. *How should such companies be armed? With similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated?*

The objectors to this proposal are numerous, and very decided in their opinions. The Punjab committee consider it would be a misapplication of European power. Colonel Burn is of opinion that any such compulsory amalgamation is bad. Voluntary friendships between the two classes he would encourage, but would not attempt any unnatural combination of men of such totally distinct habits, and deems that it would certainly be looked upon by the native soldier in its true light, as a coercive measure. Sir P. Grant says, "On no account should a company or companies of Europeans forms a component part of native regiments. Always, and under all circumstances, keep your Europeans in distinct and separate regiments." Colonel Mayhew considers that the close admixture of the

European with the native soldier will lower the former in the eyes of the latter, and that as the idiosyncracies of the the two races are incompatible, they should be kept as distinct as possible. Sir J. Hope Grant, Colonel Berkeley, Colonel K. Young, Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson, Brigadiers Steel, Farquharson, Coke, Troup, and Major Williams are all clearly and strongly opposed to such an organization of native regiments; and Sir S. Cotton, himself an advocate for attaching native troops as auxiliaries to European corps, objects to so small a body of Europeans as one, or even two, companies forming part of a native regiment, and holds that the efficiency of the Europeans would in this manner be utterly sacrificed; and that they would speedily deteriorate, both in character and discipline.

The advocates for such an organization are Sir J. Hearsey and Colonel Shuldham. The former would have the flank companies Europeans, and two serjeants to each battalion company. Colonel Shuldham only approves of the adoption of this organization in the event of that in Question 27 not being carried into execution. In that case he would have the flank companies Europeans armed with rifles, and would further have a serjeant to each company of the battalion.

Sir J. Hearsey would have the barracks of such European companies on the flanks of the lines of the native companies, so also would Sir S. Cotton and Brigadier Troup if the organization they object to were adopted; but Colonel Shuldham would have the barracks of the two companies together, and in rear of the centre.

Sir J. Hearsey and Colonel Shuldham are of opinion that such detachments would not seriously complicate commissariat arrangements; Sir S. Cotton thinks they need not do so, but Brigadiers Farquharson and Troup and Colonel Berkeley are of the contrary opinion.

The advocates of this organization would arm the European companies with Enfield rifles.

Sir P. Grant remarks upon Question 32, that he cannot too strongly condemn such admixture. The Commander-in-Chief is also of opinion that they had better be kept separate; and Major-General Birch, who advocates their being kept entirely distinct, urges that the prestige of the Europeans would be much lowered and injured by close association; that they could not be armed alike; that, in his opinion, jails, treasuries, guns, and arsenals should be guarded by Europeans, to the exclusion of natives, and that if the two were associated in the same regiment it would not do to make such a distinction of duties and trusts. Moreover, that their clothing would be different. and the effect on parade extremely uncouth.

Question 33.

How should the native infantry of the Bengal presidency be armed?

The Punjab committee would arm the native infantry with a light musket and bayonet. On frontiers, when hill tribes are to be kept in order, they might have two-grooved rifles; but never the Enfield, or any weapon equal to that in the hands of the European troops. Brigadier Coke concurs in opinion with the Punjab committee.

Sir S. Cotton would arm the native auxiliaries of his scheme of organization like the Europeans, with the Enfield rifle; but the irregular infantry which he proposes he would arm with the two-grooved rifle or common musket.

The officers noted in the margin would arm the native infantry with the common percussion musket and bayonet. Colonel Shuldham, with this weapon, or with fusils, as muskets are heavy. On the other hand, Brigadier Troup would arm them with the Enfield rifle.

Commander-in-Chief.
Major-General Birch.
Sir P. Grant.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Farquharson.
Colonel K. Young.
Lt.-Col. Macpherson.
Colonel Burn.
Major Williams.
Sir J. H. Grant.
Colonel Berkeley.

Question 34.

How should police corps in the Bengal presidency be armed?

The Punjab committee would arm the police with a percussion carbine and sword, and the officers whose names are in the margin propose the same.

Sir J. Hearsey.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Coke.
Commander-in-Chief.

Others advocate the police being armed with a common percussion musket, the supply of caps being regulated. Major Williams and Colonel K. Young limit this to the military police, the former officer proposing to arm the cantonment and city police with clubs, and burkundaz with swords; whilst Colonel K. Young would give swords and spears to those not belonging to the military police.

Sir P. Grant.
Colonel K. Young.
Major Williams.
Brigadier Troup.
Colonel Shuldham.

Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson proposes the fusil; with which weapon Sir S. Cotton would also arm the police when the population was armed, though when these were disarmed he would only allow swords to be carried by the police.

Colonel Steel would give the police a musketoon, or cut-down musket; spear and bamboos to those who are for ordinary watch and ward, and a sword to detectives.

Question 35.

Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?

Upon this question the Punjab committee observe, that "there can be no advantage in a leather stock, tight coat, "and trowsers which fetter the free use of the legs. In "the late native army, in a really well-dressed regiment, a "sepoy could neither stoop to the ground nor take rest in "his accoutrements. Some improvements have recently "been effected in the European soldiers' "dress; but much remains to be done "before they get the full use of their "limbs, and the greatest possible ease "in a hot climate." The officers whose opinions tally with that of the Punjab committee, in considering that no advantage arises from the close imitation of the dress of the European soldier, are marginally given.

Sir J. Hope Grant.
Sir J. Hearsey.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Coke.
Colonel K. Young.
Colonel Shuldham.
Lt.-Col. Macpherson.
Col. Mayhew.
Major-Gen. Birch.
Commander-in-Chief.

Sir P. Grant however states his opinion as follows:—"Formerly, before the Bengal army destroyed and disgraced "itself, and having regard to what I know was the "feeling of the men, I should have urged that the dress "of the native soldier ought always to be assimilated "to a certain extent to that of the European soldier." Colonel Burn considers that the advantage of dressing the native like the European soldier is to prevent concentration of fire upon the European troops when in action, but that a looser and easier dress would be preferred by the natives, and also by the Europeans in this very hot climate. Brigadier Troup, too, is of opinion that the advantages of similarity of dress counterbalance the disadvantages.

Question 36.

How should the native infantry of the Bengal army be dressed, with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?

The reply of the Punjab committee is, "In a loose "tunic, with open throat, no stock, a "good thick turband that will ward off "sun, or cold, or blows, and loose "pantaloons without a single button, "fastening round the waist by a "string." This is the dress of the Punjab corps, and is referred to by the officers marginally noted.

Commander-in-Chief.
Major-General Birch.
Sir S. Cotton.
Brigadier Coke.
Sir J. H. Grant.
Colonel K. Young.
Lt.-Col. Macpherson.
Brig. Farquharson.
Colonel Shuldham.
Major Williams.

Others are in favour of the Zouave dress.

Colonel Berkeley.
Colonel Mayhew.
Colonel Burn.
Brigadier Steel.

Brigadier Troup is of opinion that the native soldier of the regular army should, both in dress and everything else, as far as the system can be made applicable to natives, closely imitate the European soldier in everything.

Sir P. Grant says:—"Now that the Bengal native in-"fantry have forfeited all claim to have their wishes or "feelings on the point considered, and as it does not affect "its efficiency, I would no longer seek to assimilate them "with the European soldier in either dress or equipments. "I propose that henceforward the dress of the Bengal "sepoy shall be a dark blue cotton mirzai, quilted with "cotton for the cold season, blue jungheers, and a pugree "of any colour wound round the head in a uniform regi-"mental pattern; a blanket, great coat or cloak; shoes as "formerly worn, and black or brown leather instead of "buff accoutrements. For the hot season white cotton "mirzai and jungheers; all else as in the cold season."

Question 37.

It has been proposed that to every European local regiment a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry, in close and permanent association?

The reply of the Punjab committee shall be given in their own words:—"To this we are all opposed, though not on "the same grounds. Sir John Lawrence and Brigadier-

" General Chamberlain think that the wider the European " and native regiments can be kept apart the better, and " that any improvement in smartness and drill which the " native regiments might acquire from association would " be more than counterbalanced by familiarity with the " vices and defects of too many of the European soldiery, " which still leave so much to regret, even after the ame- " liorations and improvements of late years. Colonel " Edwardes would not apprehend the above evil conse- " quences, but he joins the other members in thinking " the proposed combination impracticable on the following " grounds:—In the first place, the management of a Euro- " pean regiment is totally different from that of a native " regiment, and we can foresee nothing but inconvenience " from the colonel of a European regiment (who must " necessarily be the senior officer) controlling the system " of the commandant of the native corps; secondly, it " would be embarrassing to have two regiments thus in- " separably tied together, and would greatly complicate the " reliefs; thirdly, it would nullify all the proposals for " provincial battalions. A certain number of native troops " are, however, necessary with European troops, to relieve " them from exposure to the sun, and leave as many " Europeans available as possible. Brigadier-General Cham- " berlain and Colonel Edwardes think, therefore, that in- " stead of as heretofore drawing the sepoys haphazard " from the line, it would be better permanently to attach " one or two companies of sepoys* to each regiment of " European infantry, care being taken that high caste " natives should not be enlisted for this duty, but those " races who would most readily fraternise with the Euro- " pean. Sir John Lawrence, however, does not think that " anything would be gained by such an arrangement, and " would rather adhere to the ordinary practice."

The proposal made by Brigadier-General Chamberlain and Colonel Edwardes is in accordance with the opinion and suggestion of Colonel Keith Young, who replies to this question by deprecating having any large body of natives intimately associated with European troops, and by proposing to have a native company raised from the class which supplies the cook-boys attached to each European regiment of cavalry and infantry in the service. To each company he would attach two European officers, selected for their knowledge of the language; and would have the companies to consist of 100 privates, and such complement of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers as may be decided upon for the native corps of the line. He considers that such companies would save Europeans from much exposure, and take numerous duties which otherwise necessarily employ European soldiers; and that the class, distinct from other natives, and accustomed to imitate contact with European troops, would continue, as they have done during the late disturbances, to regard themselves as part and parcel of the corps to which they belonged.

Sir P. Grant is strongly adverse to the permanent association proposed in Question 37, deeming it " most unadvisa- " ble that the native soldier should have the opportunity, " which close and permanent association would give him, " of seeing the European soldier in the degrading position " and state in which, unhappily, the latter too often ex- " hibits himself in quarters." Brigadier Troup carries his objection even further than this, for he expresses the opinion that such permanent association with the native would, in the course of a short time, so demoralize the European that he would only be so in name; and the maintenance of discipline, or anything like it, would be impossible.

The officers marginally noted are averse to the scheme; and Colonel Mayhew remarks that recent experience shows that admixture has not worked well generally; that the practice is to be discontinued in the artillery; and that it should not be introduced into other branches.

Sir J. Hope Grant. Brig. Steel. Brig. Coke. Lt.-Col. Macpherson. Col. Mayhew. Major Williams.

Colonel Burn considers the proposal better than that of flank companies of Europeans, but doubts if it would work well. Sir J. Hearsey, on the contrary, gives preference to the scheme of having European flank companies, and observes that Europeans kept separate cause natives to stand in greater awe of them.

The officers who approve of auxiliary native corps in close and permanent association with European regiments are marginally noted. Both Colonel Berkeley and Colonel Shuldham propose, however, to raise the auxiliaries to two corps, so as to form a complete brigade; but Colonel Shuldham adds a light field battery of European artillery. Sir S. Cotton, who considers that the arrangement proposed would prove eminently successful, instances the good feeling which sprung up between the European and native corps brigaded together for a long period in Affghanistan, and adverts to his scheme of army organization, in which he recommends the proportion of two Europeans to one native, incorporating the two races.

Sir S. Cotton. Col. Berkeley. Col. Shuldham.

Major-General Birch deems it " highly desirable that " each European regiment should have a native irregular " regiment attached to it. But I would not officer the " native regiment from the European. I would not exclude " any particularly well qualified officer of the one from " being attached to the other; but I would select officers " for the attached irregular regiment from the whole line. " It is essential, I think, that a native irregular regiment " should have its own commandant to look up to; and " this would be defeated if, as I take the question to imply, " it were merely officered from the European corps, the " commanding officer of the latter being also commanding " officer of the irregular corps. I would place the latter " under the commanding officer of the European corps, as " a sort of brigadier, (without increasing his command " allowance,) but it should be really commanded by its own " commandant."

The Commander-in-Chief thinks it might be tried as an experiment; but that there does not seem to be any advantage promised from it. His excellency apprehends that the auxiliary native corps might perhaps consider itself entitled not to be employed except with its European corps, which would be a great disadvantage.

Question 38.

Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers presents any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?

The reply of the Punjab committee is, that there is both a certain analogy and encouragement, and also certain difference in the two cases; that the gun lascars and native drivers economise European power, and have been found not only most convenient and useful in ordinary wars, but singularly faithful in the late exceptional crisis, when their loyalty was put to the severest imaginable test; but that the gun lascars and native drivers are not highly disciplined, drilled, and armed with offensive weapons, as the native auxiliary regiments or companies with a European regiment would be, and that so far the latter would be a new experiment.

Generally, the opinions are that there is no analogy, and no encouragement to be drawn in favour of auxiliary native corps from the association of gun lascars and native drivers with European artillerymen; that during the late mutiny, neither drivers nor lascars could be trusted, and that where they proved less rebellious than other native troops, it was probably owing to fear and being armed with swords quite useless; and that the artillery should have no native drivers, but be European exclusively. Brigadier Troup considers that there is no analogy whatever, the two cases being in no way parallel, as the duties of the gun lascar and driver are perfectly distinct from those of the artillerymen, and they never come in collision with each other, which is quite different to being mixed up on an equality upon duty. Sir S. Cotton also deems the two cases not analogous, but instances the Peshawar light horse as being in point. The corps consists of three troops, two of which are European, and the third native, the latter being composed of men of the Punjab and of the Peshawur and Hazara districts, trained in every way as dragoons. Sir S. Cotton confidently says that this corps is as fully efficient as one wholly European, and that the most cordial feeling exists between the two races.

Sir P. Grant. Brigadier Steele. Major Williams Lt.-Col. Macpherson.

Brigadier Coke.

Sir J. Hearsey. Colonel K. Young. Sir J. Hope Grant.

The Commander-in-Chief likewise considers that there is no analogy, an opinion also expressed by Major-General Birch.

Question 39.

How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?

There is not much variety of opinion on this point. Brigadier Farquharson, under the supposition of two European regiments being quartered together, would have their barracks in the centre, with the artillery between them. Sir S. Cotton would have the European barracks in the centre, and natives on the flanks.

Colonel Burn would have the barracks apart from the lines, the social habits of the two races being so contrary; and Colonel Shuldham would have them sufficiently near to check an emeute, but sufficiently separate to prevent all intimacy.

* To be commanded by subalterns of the European regiment.

The Punjab committee consider the matter unimportant with so small a body, and would place a barrack for the two companies wherever most convenient.

QUESTION 40.

Would such a system be favourable, or the reverse, to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength?

The Punjab committee have partly answered the question in reply to 39, but they add that they all think that if an auxiliary native corps were attached to a European one, it would end in the delegation of most important duties to the sepoys, such as magazine guards, &c., which ought always in future to be confined to Europeans.

Brigadier Steel considers that the European character is not sufficiently careful or suspicious, and that the system would be unfavourable to vigilance, and diminish the awe entertained for Europeans. Brigadier Troup and Major Williams and Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson also deem the system unfavourable, and calculated to lessen the awe which is an element of strength.

Sir J. Hearsey is of opinion that the awe maintained would be the same if his proposal were adopted.

Sir S. Cotton, Colonel Berkeley, and Brigadier Farquharson regard the system as favourable, as also does Colonel Shuldham, with the proviso that all intimacy must be prevented.

Colonel Burn takes a distinct view of this question which in his opinion hinges much upon the facility of intercommunication between the native and the European. His answer is, that "a closer association of the two races, if "founded on friendship, would be favourable to that "vigilance which has become essential. A friendly warning "of what was going on at Meerut on the 10th of May "1857 would have prepared the European troops for "immediate action. At present, the European and native "troops are unable to communicate from a want of "knowledge of each other's language. I would encourage "in every way the acquisition of English in our native "army. It would soothe the inhuman cruelty that is "inherent in the native mind. So sensible were the "Romans of the influence of language over manners, that "it was their most serious care to extend, with the progress "of their arms, the use of the Latin tongue. Britain "should follow this example, and teach the English "language throughout her Indian empire. The main-"tenance of that awe of European troops which is an "element of strength, can only be upheld hereafter by "having everywhere a sufficient European force ready and "armed with authority, to put down at once any rising "either of the native army or of the native popula-"tion."

The Commander-in-Chief does not think that the adoption of the system would have much effect one way or the other, but his excellency sees no particular advantage from it.

Major-General Birch is of opinion that the nearer such association as is involved in the proposed system, the greater the detriment to the prestige of the European soldier.

QUESTION 41.

How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?

The Punjab committee consider that auxiliary corps would be at all times embarrassing and inconvenient. Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson deems the objections to the arrangement so great as to outweigh partial advantages, and Brigadier Troup, though he thinks that it would work better in time of war than in peace, considers that it would never answer. Colonel Burn considers that the existing system of brigading native and European troops together is better than the forced alliance of the proposed arrangement under contemplation. Brigadier Steel holds that in camp it would work unfavourably.

On the other hand, Sir S. Cotton and Colonel Berkeley think the arrangement would answer equally well in peace and war. Colonel Shuldham apprehends no difficulties, and Brigadier Farquharson, who is of opinion that the two battalions need not be always kept together, deems the arrangement applicable to the requirements of the service.

The Commander-in-Chief observes that it might be made to dovetail, but that sometimes inconvenience would arise from the European regiment being always attended by its auxiliary native corps.

Major-General Birch considers that in peace there would not be much difference, but that in war the service would certainly be benefited by the mutual attachment of the two corps, and by the emulation of the native corps; and he exemplifies it by the feeling which existed between the 40th foot and 2nd grenadiers and the 13th foot and 35th native infantry.

QUESTION 42.

Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?

The Punjab committee observe in reply, that "Under "the former system, in which the native army so greatly "overbalanced the European one, it was not desirable to "develope the native military talent, and self-reliance. It "was politic under such circumstances, for instance, to pro-"mote sepoys by seniority, and not by merit, and to keep "the command of companies in the hands of European "officers. But if the re-adjustments and reforms in the "Indian army which we have advocated, be carried out, "we need not any longer be under the lamentable neces-"sity of debilitating our native troops. We can then "strive to make them vigorous and effective; contenting "ourselves with the reservation of the artillery and latest "improvements in the rifle for the European troops, and "the certainty that whenever a native regiment, however "efficient, mutinously separates itself from its European "officers, it will find that it has lost its most vital prin-"ciple."

Sir P. Grant considers that "it is most desirable that "native troops should not be trained to feel that they "are entirely dependent upon European troops for sup-"port. But I do not hesitate to assert (in opposition "to the oft-expressed opinions of Sir John Malcom "and other distinguished officers), that (most provi-"dentially, as I think,) it is alone through the instrument-"ality of their European officers that native troops are "ever imbued with a spirit of confidence and self-reliance "on service, and the native troops in our service so "officered will always be immeasurably superior to "any Asiatic enemy to whom they may be opposed. "Efficiently commanded and well led, by British officers, "native troops will always, my experience tells me, acquit "themselves with credit independently of the European "support. But they have no confidence whatever, in the "very best native officers, and deprived of their European "officers (as I think it will be admitted late events have "abundantly made manifest), except behind walls or other "protection, native troops are a mere armed rabble."

In favour of fostering a spirit of confidence and self-reliance among the native troops are the officers marginally noted. The Quartermaster-General, would have the native army small, but well-trained. Brigadier Troup is of opinion, that the system of auxiliary battalions must be unfavourable to the acquisition of confidence and self-reliance by the native troops. Brigadier Coke's answer contains matter of grave import. He says:—

Lieut.-Col. Macpherson.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Troup.
Brig. Coke.
Colonel Burn.
Sir J. Hope Grant.

"I am of opinion, that native or any other troops who "have no self-reliance would be worse than useless in the "hour of trial. I would do everything in my power to "give self-reliance to native troops. I do not mean "by self-reliance a mutinous and insubordinate spirit. "Nothing can be more mutinous and insubordinate than "an English mob, but this does not make them self-reliant; "witness the way in which a policeman walks into the "midst of a violent chartist mob, and carries off his man. "A mutinous and insubordinate army can only exist with "a timid and weak government. No arrangement of "troops, no amount of want of self-confidence will save "an army under these circumstances, for they will soon "find that their own want of self-confidence does not equal "that of their rulers. I hope I shall always see native "troops rely on Europeans for aid and support in the hour "of danger, believing them to be their superiors in bodily "strength, physical and moral courage; but I do not think "we have in many cases since the late rebellion increased "this feeling, and if it is not strenuously exerted, our "northern soldiers will not long continue to believe in the "name alone."

Colonel Berkeley and Major Williams would have native troops trained to have confidence in their European officers.

Sir S. Cotton thinks the development of confidence and self-reliance in native troops fraught with danger to the State, and would check their growth by his proposed system of organization. Those who are of the opinion that the encouragement of such qualities in native troops is impolitic are marginally noted.

Sir J. Hearsey.
Col. K. Young.
Col. Shuldham.

Colonel Shuldham supports this view by the remark, that when the tug of war comes, native troops always look up to the European troops, and that at other times it signifies little whether they have self-reliance or not.

Colonel Mayhew considers the question from a wholly different point of view, and expresses his conviction that the permanent association in the same corps of European and native soldiers would have the effect of making the expensive and needy Englishman dependent on the rich and usurious Hindoo, to whom he would find himself constantly bound by debt; and thus a spirit dangerous to discipline would be fostered in spite of the utmost care of the ruling powers.

This might, Colonel Mayhew adds, certainly be obviated, in a measure, by the frequent change of the native portion of a corps from its European base; but the amalgamation would thereby be weakened, and retain none but its worst features.

Major-General Birch says, that the native troops should be taught to rely on the European troops. He thinks their association to the extent he proposes would foster the sentiment. But that a more intimate union would be prejudicial to the reliance of the native troops on the European.

The Commander-in-Chief observes that they must be trained to act occasionally with no Europeans, save their own officers; that there is no fear of their looking down upon European troops, but that we should never again rely upon their *feelings* of dependence on Europeans, or on any other of their supposed *feelings*, but place it altogether out of their power to do serious mischief, which his excellency believes to be by no means incompatible with good service out of them.

II.—Military Code and Rules of Discipline.

Question 1.

Can you suggest improvement in the Articles of War in use in the Bengal army?

The Judge Advocate-General of the army, Colonel Keith Young, is of opinion that until something is definitely settled regarding the organization of the native army, it will be premature to take the question of Articles of War into consideration. It appears that amended articles, approved by the Commander-in-Chief, General the Honourable G. Anson, were forwarded to Government, and are now before it; but Colonel K. Young thinks that whatever the constitution of the army may be, many more changes in the Articles of War than those recommended will be necessary. He is also of opinion that whatever the military code by which the army is to be governed, it should be left to the Commander-in-Chief to determine, with the sanction of Government, what the provisions of that code are to be; and he objects to this duty being devolved upon the Legislative Council; a body, mostly non-military, not possessed of a sufficient knowledge of the requirements of the army, and for whose laws, having reference to the army, the Commander-in-Chief is practically responsible. As a further reason for pronouncing it inexpedient to continue in the Legislative Council the power of framing Articles of War, Colonel K. Young advances the long delays in making necessary amendments, or in introducing any fresh article the Commander-in-Chief may deem essential to discipline.

Colonel K. Young suggests that the Legislative Council should pass an Act, abolishing the present native Articles of War, and vesting authority in the Commander-in-Chief, with the sanction of the Governor-General in Council, to frame such articles, rules, or regulations, as he may consider expedient from time to time for the preservation of discipline in the Bengal army. If the intervention of Parliament were required, the Home Government should be addressed on the subject. A similar provision might be made for the armies of the other presidencies; or if they thought proper the mode of dealing with the more serious offences might be left to be declared by the Supreme Government.

Colonel K. Young states:—"In elucidation of the evils resulting from framing Articles of War under a legislative enactment, I may mention that by the greater portion of the present native army, consisting of Seikhs and levies of all kinds, the Articles of War are understood to be ignored altogether, commanding officers proceeding for the trial and punishment of offenders under magisterial authority. I have no official knowledge that such is the case, but it is a matter of general notoriety, so that although it is declared by the articles that all native soldiers are to be subject to them, they are entirely set aside, and treated with a disregard but ill-calculated to ensure respect for legislative enactments; and there is besides, for after consideration, the illegality of all trials held otherwise than under the authority of the Articles of War. Were the power of making them vested in the Commander-in-Chief matters might have been properly provided for at once, all illegal proceedings avoided."

The Punjab committee observe that it is the general feeling of the army that the Articles of War for the native troops are so technical, and so stringently construed, that justice is often sacrificed to form; and that it is difficult for a court-martial to observe their niceties and refinements; that prisoners admitted by all the authorities of the regiment, division and judge advocate's department to be guilty, frequently escape punishment, and return triumphantly to their regiments, to the great injury of discipline. That even judge advocates disagree about the requirements of the articles; whereas, to influence the native soldiery, which is their most valuable function, they should be so simple that any sepoy could understand them; though so comprehensive that no real offender could escape.

The Punjab committee quote instances of the defeat of justice by errors of procedure, or in sentences, being allowed to quash proceedings; and they point out other faults of system and practice which violate the plain laws of simple justice.

They are of opinion that native regimental courts-martial are a solemn farce, which might with great advantage to discipline be abolished, and their functions merged in the commanding officer. They add, that "it is not to be doubted that the gradual weakening of commanding officers has hastened the gradual dissolution of the discipline of the native army. We are a free people, rejoicing in constitutional liberty, and we have loved to treat our native subjects in the same way, forgetting that they are not yet fitted for it, and are certain to abuse it. What they respect is power in their immediate superior; not power a thousand miles off, in some jealous constitutional check. We must revert somewhat to first principles, and while guarding strictly against individual abuse of power, make every native soldier look up to his commandant." They then proceed to state the powers they wish to see vested in commanding officers; viz.,—

Proposed powers of Commanding Officers.

1. To dismiss any soldier whose term of service had not exceeded five years.

2. To recommend the dismissal of a soldier of more than five years' service to the brigadier, whose decision to be final, and not liable to appeal.

3. To reduce any non-commissioned officer one step, placing him at the head of the roll of lower rank.

4. To imprison a soldier or non-commissioned officer for a term of two months, half of which may be solitary confinement, and to recommend imprisonment up to six months, requiring the confirmation of the brigadier.

5. All imprisonment to involve loss of pay (except subsistence allowance), as it involves loss of the prisoner's services to Government.

6. Any man sentenced to more than four months imprisonment to be struck off the rolls of the regiment.

7. The commanding officer (and he alone) to sentence any sepoy to be flogged for insubordination or theft, to the extent of thirty lashes; no sepoy to be flogged twice in one month. Any sepoy flogged three times to be dismissed the service.

8. The commanding officer may fine any sepoy, non-commissioned officer, or native officer, within the limit of one month's pay in one year.

9. Every sentence of punishment to be entered in regimental orders.

Under the above rules petty civil crimes, in which both parties were soldiers or camp followers, would be tried by the commanding officer, serious crimes by the civil courts, and military crimes (as distinguished from military misdemeanors), requiring more than six months' imprisonment, by a district court-martial. The general of the division to have the power of confirming sentences up to fourteen years' imprisonment; beyond which sentences to require the confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief.

District court-martials to be the only court-martial for native officers and soldiers; and not to require more than five members, of whom two should be native commissioned officers, and three European officers. Only one European officer, and no native commissioned officer being of the prisoner's regiment. Commissioned native officers, as a rule, to be tried by district courts-martial; but when exceptional cases required, might be dismissed without trial by the chief military authority of the province.

The Oude committee would abolish the Articles of War.

Sir J. Hope Grant. Sir S. Cotton. Brig. Coke. Brig. Farquharson. Sir J. Hearsey. Major Williams.

So, likewise, would the officers marginally noted, among, whom Sir S. Cotton considers the Articles of War in their present form as wholly useless, and not understood by the native troops; with which view Major Williams coincides, styling the Articles of War incomprehensible to natives. Brigadier Coke would have no Articles of War, magisterial powers vested in the commanding officer, and capital cases made over to the sessions.

Brigadier Farquharson would also invest the commanding officer with magisterial powers, and substitute a simple code for his guidance. So also Sir J. Hearsey would have the articles few and plain, with much left to the discretion of the commanding officer. Brigadier Steel also, though he adverts to the fallibility of commanding officers, would have them given more authority.

The Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that the powers of commanding officers should be greatly increased, and his excellency remarks, that it is doubtful whether there should be such a tribunal as a native regimental court-martial, and whether it might not without inconvenience be abolished, if the powers of commanding officers are adequately increased.

Major-General Birch observes, that there is but one code for the native armies of the three presidencies, that enacted by Act No. XIX. of 1847; that the Articles of War apply to all officers or soldiers, regular or irregular, and that alterations to suit the case of the native army of Bengal will, unless declared exclusively applicable to this army, be applicable to those of Madras and Bombay also.

After noticing the great pains taken in the arrangement of the Articles of War, the classification of offences, and the indexing the contents, precisely in a similar manner to those for Her Majesty's forces, Major-General Birch observes, that he does not see why the arrangement which is found to work well in Her Majesty's army should require a different plan for the native troops. He then proceeds to make some observations upon the objects kept in view in framing the resolution of the 30th of August 1835, regarding corporal punishment, and the restrictions put upon its infliction; and considering the system of punishments the best that could be devised, he deems that it would be no improvement to change the classification of offences, the sentences awarded, or to remove the restrictions on corporal punishment.

Major-General Birch proposes an important addition to Article 101, so that it may be in the power of the government of the three presidencies to order, when desirable, that offenders shall be tried by European officers.

In Article 110, he would give power to officers commanding regiments to reduce non-commissioned officers; and in Article 112, he proposes still further to strengthen the hands of commanding officers by investing them with the power in cases of light offences, or *in the maintenance of discipline*, to inflict summarily, without the intervention of a court-martial, *corporal punishment with a rattan to the extent of three dozen strokes.*

Major-General Birch says:—"The total abolition of the "articles, which has been suggested in some quarters, "seems to me to be a measure from which no good could "be derived. It would not tend to civilize or ameliorate "our native troops, and it would place a degree of power "in the hands of commanding officers not known in any "other army, for which the necessity is not apparent, and "which would not in any way really strengthen their hold "on the obedience or the affection of their men. Com-"manding officers, like all other persons, require to be "themselves subjected to certain wholesome restrictions. "The Commander-in-Chief, and even the Government in "its executive capacity, are not at liberty to exercise an "arbitrary authority independent of law; and there "appears to be no good reason for investing commanding "officers with authority independent of Articles of War."

Question 2.

Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

The Punjab and Oude committees would retain neither. Sir J. Hope Grant considers either objectionable. Brigadier Coke would have no special rules for regulating punishments of any kind in the native army. He would leave the matter to the commanding officer, who should keep a register of the men tried, the crimes for which they were tried, and the punishments awarded. The trials to be conducted in the presence of the native officers, in the vernacular. He considers the nature of Europeans and of Asiatics to be so utterly different, that it is manifestly as impossible to frame rules to suit both races, as it is to render them of the same colour.

Sir S. Cotton considers that the present rules for the punishment of offences not requiring trial by court-martial are too lenient, and useless in upholding discipline. He is of opinion that corporal punishment, and solitary confinement in cells, should be inflicted at the discretion of commanding officers, whose powers should in every respect be much increased, and all, excepting capital crimes, be punished under the orders of commanding officers. He recommends the following:—

Crimes.	Punishments.
Mutiny, desertion, and all capital crimes.	Death, transportation, by sentence of a European court-martial, sentence being carried out under orders of officer commanding division.
Disobedience, neglect of duty, and all other crimes not capital.	To be punishable with or without hard labour, solitary confinement to the extent of fourteen days, and corporal punishment not exceeding fifty lashes, these punishments being awardable by commanding officers of regiments.

Brigadier Farquharson would have a specific code laying down general rules; but leaving punishments, in a great degree, to the discretion of commanding officers.

Brigadier Steel considers the habits of the native so different from those of the European soldier that any assimilation for regulating punishment is not necessary.

The reply of the Commander-in-Chief to this question is, "No, decidedly not. It is impossible to assimilate them, "and therefore unwise to attempt it."

In the opinion of Major-General Birch the special rules regarding punishments in the native army must needs be retained.

Question 3.

Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bengal army?

The Punjab and the Oude committees are of opinion that the system of native courts-martial does not work satisfactorily, and in this opinion the officers noted in the margin concur. Sir S. Cotton considers, that the system has utterly failed in its object; that the native officers have no sense of justice, are totally ignorant of the Articles of War, and of their duties at a court-martial; and that the proceedings as at present conducted are farcical. Brigadier Coke gives the following picture of the working of this institution:—"Native officers sitting on a court will always "endeavour to let off the offender for many reasons. There "is always some clique who, either from being related to "the offender or of the same tribe or village, will make it "their business to get up a party amongst the native officers "to screen the offender. If these native officers will not "agree to this, it makes a feud, which shows itself in a "thousand underhand tricks which tend to defeat justice "and injure discipline. Native officers are also bad judges "of punishment; certain crimes are great offences in our "eyes, and considered of little moment by natives. This "particularly applies to matters of discipline. Consult "native officers fully in every matter regarding the proof "of the crime,—let the trial be open, before all the native "officers or men who are interested to attend: we lose "much of the respect that we should otherwise obtain for "our justice by closed courts,—but let the sentence rest "with the commanding officer alone. All crimes committed "at head quarters where he is present should be tried by "him alone. Nothing gives a greater insight into the state "of his corps. Evidence given before him, when the matter "is first investigated, and what is afterwards given before "a court-martial is as different as light from darkness. An "investigation taken on the spot and at the time the offence "is committed has a chance of eliciting the truth; the "investigation before a court-martial never; as the evidence "has been all tampered with and everything settled and "agreed on beforehand in the lines. When any investigation "is required affecting the state of the corps, let the court be "comprised of European and native officers mixed. The "acumen of the European officer, and the insight into "native character and local knowledge of the native officer "will be more likely to elicit the truth than any other kind "of court; but it should only be used for the investigation "of large matters."

Commander-in-Chief.
Sir G. Hearsey.
Sir J. Hope Grant.
Sir S. Cotton.
Brig. Coke.
Brig. Farquharson.
Major Williams.

Sir J. Hearsey would have all the courts-martial in native regiments composed entirely of European officers.

Upon this question the Judge Advocate-General has the following remarks:—

"I think that under the present system of trials by native "courts-martial substantial justice is administered; and "what is more, I believe the sepoys think so too; but I am "at the same time of opinion that equally satisfactory results "might be arrived at by less complex machinery; and the "majority of cases now tried by native courts-martial might "be disposed of with advantage by commanding officers of "regiments, provided that these officers are selected officers "not merely succeeding by seniority, and that their pro-"ceedings are open to proper supervision. This arrangement

" would be one entirely consonant with native habits and " feelings, who love despotic power whether as the governor " or the governed; and for the future it seems unquestionable " that the hands of commanding officers must be strengthened if a severe discipline is to be maintained."

Dissentient from the general opinions expressed is that of Brigadier Steel, who remarks that the conduct of the native army had been so satisfactory up to the period of the assembly of the rifle depôts, and that occasions for the assembly of courts-martial had been so rare, that he is not aware of any grounds of dissatisfaction with the institution of native courts-martial.

Major-General Birch attributes native courts-martial not working so satisfactorily as they might to the failure on the part of officers to inform themselves of the provisions of the Articles of War; he anticipates great improvement by the substitution of European for native officers in courts-martial in the native army; and observes that if courts-martial were conducted with care, if commanding officers would inform themselves of their own powers, and act accordingly, the revision of regimental courts-martial by generals of division would cease to be felt as a grievance.

The Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that the system of native courts-martial does not work satisfactorily, that commanding officers have been too much hampered by them; and that offenders have often escaped through some trivial error in the proceedings, a thing most undesirable with natives.

Question 4.

What means are adopted to acquaint the Bengal army with the military code under which they live, and are governed?

Sir J. Hope Grant. Sir S. Cotton. Brig. Farquharson. Brig. Steel. Col. K. Young. Major Williams.

The Punjab committee, like the officers marginally noted, mention periodical parades at which the Articles of War were read; but they add that the sepoys gained little knowledge in this way, and that their ideas were gathered from the precedents furnished by the management of their own and other corps, and the punishments awarded by courts-martial. The Oude committee state that European officers seldom understand the Articles of War, and less frequently are able to communicate. Major Williams remarks that at these periodical parades few heard, and scarce ten per cent. of the native troops who heard understood, what was read. Sir S. Cotton makes a similar observation, that the Articles of War were not understood when read out.

The Commander-in-Chief and Major-General Birch also reply that the Articles of War are directed to be periodically read out to the men (158 Art.)

Question 5.

What proportion of the native troops can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the Articles of War?

The Punjab committee reply that perhaps ten per cent. can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the Articles of War. The Oude committee say one in a hundred, and that one in a thousand understand what they read. Brigadier Coke states that in Pathan and Seikh regiments not above one or two can read and write. Sir S. Cotton, not one in a hundred; Sir J. Hope Grant, very few indeed; Sir J. Hearsey, very few, not five per cent.; Brigadier Steel and Major Williams, very few, a very small proportion. Brigadier Farquharson takes the most favourable view, and says about a half.

Major-General Birch remarks that sepoys, unable to read and write in one character, are debarred promotion except in special cases to be reported to the Commander-in-Chief.

The Commander-in-Chief finds it quite impossible to say what proportion of the sepoys can read; but that of those who could, very few, he is told, probably ever perused the Articles of War.

Question 6.

Under what military or civil code are police corps in the Bengal presidency?

Punjab Committee. Oude Committee. Major Williams. Brig. Steel. Sir J. Hope Grant.

In the Punjab, in Oude, and in the North-west provinces, the European commanding officers have magisterial powers, and deal with petty offences; and the civil courts take cognizance of serious crimes.

The Commander-in-Chief has not the least idea under what military or civil code the police corps are placed.

Major-General Birch replies, "None, that I am aware of; " further than that I believe they are under the magistrate."

Question 7.

How is discipline maintained, and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the Bengal presidency?

Punjab Committee. Oude Committee. Sir J. H. Grant. Brig. Coke. Brig. Steel. Brig. Farquharson. Major Williams.

In the Punjab police force the commanding officers in military cases punish according to their own discretion, subject to appeal to the chief commissioner. In the Oude police force the European commandant can summarily dismiss a private, and exercises the powers of a joint magistrate, punishing up to three years' imprisonment, without reference. He can reduce or fine non-commissioned officers, and can flog any private for a military offence; he can fine all native commissioned officers save commandants and adjutants of cavalry and infantry; he can promote to the various non-commissioned grades. The chief of the police has higher powers, and can summarily dismiss all ranks save that of native commandant, for which the sanction of the chief commissioner is required; he can sentence to imprisonment and to transportation for long periods; but transportation for life and capital punishment are subject to confirmation by the chief commissioner.

In the military police of the North-west provinces police officers can sentence to 100 lashes, and three years' imprisonment, with hard labour. Heinous crimes are committed to the sessions.

The Commander-in-Chief knows nothing of the police corps.

Major-General Birch believes commanding officers of police corps to have magisterial powers as well as the ordinary military powers of commanding officers.

Question 8.

Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of the police corps, and the authority of their European and native officers, sufficient, and the working satisfactory?

The reply of the Punjab committee is, that hitherto the body of military police in the Punjab has been small, and the selection of officers easy; and the system has been found to work well. The body will now be larger, and there would be no objection to a simple code.

Major Williams considers that ten months' experience the few and trivial complaints brought against the police of the North-western provinces, and the testimony of magistrates and commissioners, is highly in favour of the military police, and shows that the system is working satisfactorily.

Sir J. Hope Grant and Brigadier Farquharson also express favourable opinions.

Brigadier Steel, who was superintendent of the police corps disbanded in 1847, is of opinion that a higher rate of pay was accorded for the same material than was necessary, which may lead to the necessity for raising the pay of other establishments; and that experience only can show if the working is satisfactory.

The Commander-in-Chief knows nothing of police corps, and Major-General Birch has no means of judging of the working and discipline of the police corps.

III.—Organization, Promotions, and Rewards.

Question 1.

In the native regiments of the Bengal native infantry, what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, or seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

The Punjab committee reply that the system of promotion is based nominally on seniority and merit, but really on seniority, as the senior was never passed over unless he was imbecile. In the Punjab irregular force the rule is to give the promotion to the best man, preference being always shown to the senior if possible.

Sir J. Hearsey. Sir S. Cotton. Sir J. Hope Grant. Oude Committee. Brig. Farquharson. Brig. Coke. Brig. Troup. Col. Burn. Col. K. Young. Major Williams.

It appears, from the concurrent testimony of the officers marginally noted, that the general rule in the native infantry of the Bengal army was promotion by seniority; that the exceptions were rare, merit operating to a very limited extent, and provided the character were good seniority being seldom departed from; hence, says Major Williams, the noted inefficiency of superior grades of native officers. Colonel Burn remarks, that "it had become so much the practice to regulate pro- " motion by seniority that it was looked upon as the right " of the senior, and any deviation from this practice was " regarded by the whole corps as an infringement of what " they considered as established law of the service. Some

" commanding officers took advantage of the invaliding " season, when a great many vacancies occurred, to promote " smart and deserving men. They were generally selected " from amongst the drill instructors. Others stoutly upheld " the seniority system as the only safeguard against mis- " conduct in the field and in cantonments." Brigadier Coke, after stating that seniority was the chief consideration, adds, " but many energetic officers laboured to get rid of " their old and inefficient men, and to replace them with " more efficient officers, both as regards age and qualifica- " tions; but what with the parsimony of the Government " in keeping officers and men on the rolls of the regiments " who were only fit for the invalids, to which they would " neither send them nor discharge them; and what with " the obstacles which were thrown in the way of command- " ing officers by head quarters to the promotion of junior " and efficient men, the whole promotions for the last twenty " years have been almost entirely by seniority."

Brigadier Steel is of opinion that promotion was regulated by merit and seniority combined, but observes that promotion by favour has sometimes caused discontent.

The Commander-in-Chief replies, " I am informed, and " can also state from my own knowledge, that promotions " went much by seniority; but sometimes men were pro- " moted out of their turn for smartness, gallantry, &c. In " some corps commanding officers promoted out of turn " more than in others. A good deal had been done at head " quarters of late years to encourage promotion by seniority, " save in cases where the men were disreputable or very " incompetent. There was an old order that men should " not be promoted who could not read and write. This in- " most cases used to be a dead letter, but was very gene- " rally enforced after the publication of the new military " regulations in 1855, and occasioned much dissatisfaction " amongst men who had expected promotion and were thus " suddenly superseded owing to the revival of the rule."

Major-General Birch quotes the regulations, section 54, *in extenso;* and adverting to its contents, says, that " such " are the safeguards with which the claims of respectable " seniority are hedged round," but that practice more de- cidedly recognized the paramount claim of distinguished merit and superior qualifications than these regulations encouraged.

Questions 2, 3, and 4.

2. *Are the native officers of the native infantry of the Bengal army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?*
3. *Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen?*
4. *Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?*

The Punjab committee reply that the native officers of the Bengal army were proverbially dull and inefficient, and they ask how it could be otherwise when the position of the native officers was considered a reward of long service, and not a link in the discipline of the corps, extreme age aggravating all their natural defects; whereas, the native officers of the Punjab irregular force are represented to be particularly intelligent, useful, and efficient, in all positions affording the greatest assistance to their officers.

The general sentiment is that the native officers of the Bengal army were not intelligent, useful, or efficient. Brigadier Coke states, that from two to three native officers might in a regiment be fit for their position. Colonel Burn depicts them as in general very old and perfectly useless; and he observes that one great blunder made by the mutineers was the selection of these old and worn-out men to command them; and that " it was the saving of our small army before Delhi, " that such men as Subadar Bukht Khan, and others " equally infirm, were the leaders of the rebels." Sir S. Cotton represents them as dull, inefficient, and wholly useless in supporting discipline; and drawing a similar conclusion with the foregoing, quoted from Colonel Burn's, adds, " Were they otherwise, the mutiny has clearly shown " us that they would be very dangerous and mischievous." Brigadier Troup regards them as the most stupid, useless, worn-out race that ever existed, and not to be trusted. Brigadier Steel considers that the native officers were useful in minor details, and that their position was an inducement to all ranks to behave well. The Oude committee remark, with respect to them, that of intelligent and efficient men there was the usual proportion under a seniority system.

Commander-in-Chief.
Major-Gen. Birch.
Sir J. Hearsey.
Sir J. Hope Grant.
Sir S. Cotton.
Oude Committee.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Coke.
Brig. Troup.
Col. K. Young.
Col. Burn.
Major Williams.

There is a general concurrence of opinion with respect to the native officers of the Bengal army, that their acquirements were usually not of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they rose. On the contrary, that age, indolence, and disease having usually impaired their energy and intelligence, they were, though originally on a par with the sepoys, actually of a lower grade, and frequently leant on a smart non-commissioned officer or private, especially if a Brahmin. Brigadier Troup remarks that " they (the native officers) are " from age and long service, so infirm and apathetic, " that they are generally commanded by, instead of com- " manding those under them. Added to this, it is quite " a mistake to suppose that the mere fact of giving a man " a commission made him at once a native gentleman " of influence; so far the contrary, it must be well known " to all those who are at once conversant with the native " character, that however much appearances may be kept " up before the European officers, that when away from " their control the youngest sepoy in the company, if of a " higher caste, was considered a better man than the " subadar; and this was productive of the most pernicious " consequences, as regards discipline and duty, but more " especially the manner in which it influenced the minds of " native officers when sitting as president and members of " courts-martial."

Major-Gen. Birch.
Punjab Committee.
Oude Committee.
Sir J. Hope Grant.
Sir J. Hearsay.
Sir S. Cotton.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Coke.
Brig. Troup.
Brig. Steel.
Col. Burn.
Col. K. Young.
Major Williams.
Sir J. Hearsey.

The Punjab committee, except the native officers of the Punjab irregular force, whom they state to be selected men, and consequently far above the average.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief remarks that from having been non-commissioned officers for several years before obtaining commissions, the native officers have usually learned more of their duties than they knew when sepoys, and that from his own observation his excellency can state that many of them can drill a company very well.

On the question of test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or from one commissioned grade to another, there is much unanimity. Sir J. Hearsey introduced tests in the cavalry regiments he commanded, but except (as remarked by Brigadier Farquharson) longevity, there would seem by concurrent testimony to have been none. In the Punjab irregular force there is no other than that of general qualification for command.

Commander-in-Chief.
Major-Gen. Birch.
Punjab Committee.
Oude Committee.
Sir J. Hope Grant.
Sir J. Hearsey.
Sir S. Cotton.
Brig. Coke.
Brig. Troup.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Farquharson.
Col. Burn.
Col. K. Young.
Major Williams.

Question 5.

Does the intervention of the native officers between the European officers and their men weaken the influence of the European officers? Does a full complement of the European militate against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officer?

The Punjab committee observe that the result of the intervention of the native officers must depend on the disposition and energy of both the European and the native officers; but that on the whole they believe that as far as their influence went, the native officers strengthened their European commanders. This is said with reference to the Bengal army; with regard to the Punjab force, they are of opinion that when the command is in the hands of a competent officer the intervention of the native officers does not weaken the influence of the European officers.

The Commander-in-Chief answers, " Not necessarily," to both questions; and Major-General Birch considers that the result of the intervention of the native officers depended very much upon the European officers themselves, vaying according to their conduct and the interest they took in their men. That when European officers took little interest, clever native officers would greatly influence the men for good or evil, but that many of them were mere cyphers.

Upon this point the authorities who deem that the intervention does not weaken the European officers are given in the margin: Brigadier Coke remarks, however, that sympathy between the native and the European officer decreased latterly, partly because the officer, finding himself powerless to reward or punish, ceased to take interest in his men, and partly because every officer who had interest or abilities only thought of getting on the staff, and of escaping the tedious routine of regimental duty; and Brigadier Steel observes that both classes of officers had too little power for either good or evil.

Sir J. Hope Grant.
Brig. Coke.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Farquharson.
Col. K. Young.
Oude Committee.

Others, however (vide margin), consider that the intervention of the native officers was unfavourable to the influence with the men of the European officers; that the latter should be all in all, and that the native officers were a hindrance; that if the latter were not in existence the European officers would act more directly upon their men; whereas, from the position which the native one holds, the European officer is compelled to repose a trust in him which he is very seldom worthy of.

Sir J. Hearsey. Major Williams. Sir S. Cotton.

Brig. Troup.

Colonel Burn is of opinion that the intervention of the native officer between the European officer and his men might be made very beneficial; but that to effect this the native officers must be men of education and of a better class of society than the privates. He is of opinion that had we had men of this stamp in the army in 1857, to explain to the sepoys the utter groundlessness of their fears of being made Christians, there would have been no mutiny.

Upon the second section of this question, the Punjab committee is of opinion that a full complement of European officers certainly interferes with the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officers, but that in the Punjab irregular force the complement of European officers is only four. Sir S. Cotton considers that a full complement of European officers would make ciphers of the native officers, an opinion with which Brigadier Coke concurs, inasmuch as such an organization must cause the native officer to take little or no interest in his duties.

On the other hand, Sir J. Hope Grant, Brigadier Troup, and the Oude committee, hold the contrary opinion, namely, that a full complement of European officers does not militate against the professional efficiency of the native officer. Sir J. Hope Grant does not put it quite so absolutely, but says that it "ought not." Major-General Birch is also of opinion that a full complement of European officers does not necessarily militate against the efficiency of the native officers.

Question 6.

Has it been found in the native infantry of the Bengal army that, on the occurrence of mutinies, the native officers have given timely information, or been of any use in aiding the European officers to check mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

The Punjab committee are of opinion, that during the late mutiny the native officers of the Bengal army on few occasions gave any information of, or aid in checking, what was impending or taking place. But in former years, when there was dissatisfaction or mutinous feeling in particular corps, the committee state that the native officers, as a body, did tell their European officers what was going on; and that, even in the mutiny of 1857, the native officers went away with, rather than led the mutineers; and in any body that remained loyal there was generally a large proportion of native officers.

Colonel K. Young believes, "it may be stated without "contradiction that the instances in which native commissioned officers have given timely information of intended "risings are very exceptional, but when mutiny has once "broken out they have very often sided with their European "officers. During the late mutiny, however, their leaning "has rather been towards the mutineers, on the ground, I "believe, that they were deserting a hopeless cause; that "they were abandoning, in fact, a sinking ship."

Sir J. Hope Grant's reply conveys the opinion that in some cases the native officers have given information, but that they were so old and useless that they were quite unable to check any mutiny or irregularity. The opinion of Major-General Birch is somewhat similar. He states, that "in few cases have the native officers given information or "been of use to the European officers in checking mutiny. "There is a large proportion of them who have sided with "the mutineers, but my belief is that the majority have done "so on compulsion. There are numerous instances of their "siding with the European officers."

The foregoing are the more favourable opinions; those that follow are less so.

Brigadier Steel considers that the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, as a body, have always professed ignorance of any cause of discontent, and have pretended not to be parties to it.

Colonel Burn remarks, that "the native officers, being of "the same class in society, and generally closely allied to "a portion of the men under them, have in all mutinies "aided and abetted the mutineers. They are all equally "affected by the same cause, and being equally ignorant, "any common ground of offence is as much a grievance "to the commissioned officer as it is to the private soldier."

Sir J. Hearsey observes that native officers usually encourage mutiny if they think it may benefit them. That he has known them discourage trustworthy men from giving evidence or reporting mutinous acts or language; and that a native officer not siding (covertly) with the men would, indeed, be an exception to the general rule.

Brigadier Troup says, in reply to Question 6:—"I am "not aware of their ever having done so; but on the contrary (they) have always practised the grossest deceptions, "and played a double part throughout. I am not aware, "excepting during the recent crisis, that they ever sided "openly with the mutineers, although I am fully aware they "always did so secretly; and although they have openly "made the show of siding with the European officers, on "occasions when the men did break out into open mutiny, "selfish motives alone induced them to adopt the measure, "for there was not one amongst them that did not know "and tacitly aid in the coming storm without ever warning "their European officers of what was about to take place; "and had native officers of regiments under such circumstances been summarily dismissed the service, and their "promotions filled up from other corps, I feel quite certain "that mutiny would have been less frequent in the Bengal "native infantry."

The remaining opinions concur in regarding the native officers as rarely of any use and very frequently themselves mutineers; and the Commander-in-Chief replies distinctly, "No; from all information I have obtained, the native officers have gone with the men."

Sir S. Cotton. Brig. Coke. Brig. Farquharson. Major Williams. Oude Committee.

Question 7.

Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the native infantry of the Bengal army?

The Punjab committee advocate the continuance of native commissioned officers, but on a better system. They urge that, unless human nature can be altered, there must either be prizes for ambition or discontent; and that they regard the native officer as an indispensable link in the management of a native regiment. The Commander-in-Chief thinks that they must be continued, unless the number of European officers present with the native corps is to be immensely increased, which seems neither possible nor desirable.

Colonel K. Young would not only maintain but increase the number of grades, so that no soldier should be left during his whole service without seeing before him the chance of continued prospective advancement.

Brigadier Farquharson would likewise continue the grades of native commissioned officers, but demand higher intelligence and efficiency. Brigadier Coke would also continue them, but make them responsible for their companies. So too Colonel Burn, who regards native officers as necessary in the native army as a medium of communication between the sepoy and his European officer, and as more likely to listen with patience to the childlike complaints of the sepoy, and to send him away in good humour to his lines, than the European officer. Colonel Burn, however, would appoint native officers from the educated and wealthier classes in the district where the corps is enlisted; and he would make a knowledge of English an indispensable requisite for admission into the service.

The Oude committee and Sir J. Hope Grant are also advocates for maintaining the grades of native commissioned officers.

On the other hand, Sir J. Hearsey would discontinue the grades of native commissioned officers, being, in his opinion, worse than useless; and Sir S. Cotton, Major-General Birch, Brigadier Troup, and Major Williams are also in favour of abolishing them; the latter officer making it dependent, however, on the army not being broken up into small detachments, and stating, that provided men were selected for the grade, the rank of jemadar might be retained. Major-General Birch would make special exceptions in favour of men of superior qualifications now in our service; the rest he would pension or discharge with a gratuity.

Question 8.

Is the substitution of a European serjeant and corporal to each company of a native regiment in lieu of its native officers advisable?

The reply of the Punjab committee to this question is, "Decidedly not. European serjeants and corporals could "not in the climate of India perform the multifarious duties "of native officers. Nor would they have due influence "with the men, or know anything wrong that was going

" on in the regiment. Instead of being an element of " strength, we fear they would prove one of weakness and " dissatisfaction. This was found to be the case in the " Punjab regiments, and they were in consequence removed."

The Commander-in-Chief deems it inexpedient, and those who oppose such an organization on the ground that the class is not calculated to have supervision over sepoys; that it would be a waste of European soldiers, and of no use, are marginally noted.

Oude Committee.
Sir J. Hope Grant.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Coke.
Brig. Steel.
Col. Young.
Col. Burn.

On the contrary, Brigadier Troup thinks the substitution most advisable, but would not draw the European non-commissioned officers from the European troops in India, but from a superior class especially raised for this peculiar service. Sir S. Cotton and Sir J. Hearsey both advocate the substitution, as also Major Williams.

Major-General Birch deems the substitution highly desirable; but that it is indispensable that the non-commissioned officers should speak Hindoostanee fluently, and that drunkenness should be invariably punished by removal. He would prefer two serjeants to one serjeant and a corporal, because havildars have the rank of serjeants, and it would be anomalous that a corporal should command a havildar, yet that it is indispensable that all natives in a company should be commanded by any European attached to it.

Question 9.

If the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument thus closed to the native soldier, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

The Commander-in-Chief deems the abolition of the grade of native officer inadvisable; and a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pension, claimable after specified periods, injudicious; as men when past work would cling on to obtain higher pensions, and experience shows that commanding officers will not always prevent this.

The Punjab committee likewise object, and are of opinion that there must be a graduation of ranks, and a machinery for managing the men, which no pecuniary privileges without rank can give; and that such a system as the one stated in the question would neither be efficient nor popular.

The Oude committee would have the graduated scale, in addition to native officers.

The advocates for maintaining native officers consider that no substitute would supply their place; and that the rates of pay, and the increase given after specified periods of service, are high enough to insure excellent recruits, being better than they could earn in any of the ordinary walks of life.

Col. K. Young.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Coke.
Col. Burn.

On the other hand; Brigadier Troup takes quite a different view of this most important subject; he says, " This is a subject that I have closely studied for the last " twenty years, and have during that period, at various " times, got the opinions of men of almost every native " regiment in the service; I can therefore speak with the " utmost confidence upon it. No man on entering the " service ever thinks of looking forward to the higher " grades, so much so, that by far the greater majority of " them would, had they the option, take their pension " after serving fifteen years. I could, had I space here, " give ample proof of this. The fact of the old native " commissioned and non-commissioned officers clinging " so pertinaciously to the service as they generally do, " has, I know, decided many, who have not given the " matter that study which it is worthy of, into the belief " that they remain on in the service in the hope of gaining " distinction, and a higher rate of pension. But in reality " this is not the true cause, as I have it from the men " themselves; the fact is, that many of them remain on in " the service so long that they have outlived their families, " and have no home to go to; others again say, ' I have " ' remained in the service until I am so old that I would be " ' useless at home, therefore the best thing I can do for my " ' family is to continue in it as long as I can, and save all " ' the money I can for their benefit; but had I been allowed " ' I should have been very glad to have taken my pension " ' after having served twenty-one years.' My opinion is, " that the pay of the regular native soldier should be fixed " at eight rupees per month in all situations, that the non-" commissioned officers should be paid exactly as at pre-" sent, and that there should be no such thing as marching " batta. Carriage at a certain rate per man when marching, " and levies when in cantonments should be furnished by " the state; this, with a graduated scale of good-service " pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified " periods of service, regulated on the same system as that " in Her Majesty's army, would, in my opinion, make the " native soldier more contented and efficient than he has " ever been, and more than compensate for the loss of the " commissioned grades."

Major-General Birch considers that the scheme sketched in the question would be efficacious, as the proportion of men who rise eventually to the grade of commissioned officer is but small; whereas the scale of good-service pay would be to a great extent accessible among them. He would reserve retiring pensions for exceptional cases of merit, and for men wounded on service in the field; and he thinks that the native non-commissioned officer and soldier might very advantageously be encouraged and rewarded by occasional transfers to civil employment on the staff of the police, such as thanadars, darogahs, &c., and also to the military police, if kept up. Sir S. Cotton takes a similar view as to the means open to Government for reconciling the native mind to what he regards a very necessary measure, and suggests the promotion of deserving men in police corps, or by civil employment, in addition to retiring pensions and to good-service pay, which latter boon he would have granted under the orders of the commanding officer.

Major Williams thinks there would be no difficulty in obtaining recruits for a limited native army on the encouragements held out by the plan suggested in Question 9; but pensions he would reserve for special cases of distinguished conduct in the field, or a long period of good conduct. Sir J. Hearsey would have no pensioners, no invalids, but a graduated and liberal scale of good-service pay, increasing after terms of five or six years unbroken good conduct. It appears that he contemplates a bonus in money to be occasionally given in lieu of pension.

Question 10.

Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?

The Punjab committee state, that the pensions have always been very highly valued, and that one source of discontent was the difficulty of getting invalided; still, that the institution, though a man could hardly get pensioned off while life was left in his body, was much valued; and that if it did not prevent the recent mutiny, it was because other questions of more vital moment were concerned. They consider the mutiny to have been very much among the younger sepoys. They advert to the practice of the invaliding committees in the Bombay army as much more liberal than in that of Bengal, and deem this one reason of the greater efficiency of the Bombay native commissioned and non-commissioned grades.

Brigadier Steel regards the invalid establishment to have been the mainstay and support of the regular native army, and always to have been looked upon with the greatest veneration.

Others, again, consider that although the late mutiny proved that retiring pensions were ineffectual in attaching native troops to the service, yet that the " monster deluge " of revolt which swept through the land, and the consequent destruction of confidence in the stability of government, an impression which caused many men to join in the revolutionary movement, ought not to lead to the abolishment of the pension establishment. The late revolt they regard as wholly exceptional, and that under ordinary circumstances pensions, either in receipt or expectancy, work a salutary effect. Brigadier Coke, however, makes similar observations with the Punjab committee, and considers our system of allowing men to serve on for the pension who are unfit for the service to be ludicrous, and that every man unfit for the service up to fifteen or twenty years should be paid up and discharged, provided his incapacity does not arise from wounds; and he adds, that if all soldiers who were unfit for the service up to fifteen years were weeded out of the corps, it would save much malingering, and reduce the pension establishment to a great extent.

Brig. Coke.
Col. K. Young.
Col. Burn.
Sir S. Cotton.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Troup.
Major-Gen. Birch.

The reply of the Commander-in-Chief to this question is, " No, not at all. The idea always previously enter-" tained that the pensions ensured the loyalty of the army, " has proved to be utterly fallacious. Men who had first " obtained pensions at the time of the mutiny, and could " in no way be affected by the ' greased cartridge ' question,

" at once joined the rebel ranks. The number of pen-
" sioners that have come forward to support us is believed
" to be very small."

The Oude committee, Sir J. Hearsey, Sir. J. Hope Grant, and Major Williams, also consider that retiring pensions have failed to attach native troops to the British service.

Question 11.

Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

In reply to this question the Punjab committee say, " Certainly; but we wish here earnestly to urge upon " Government that to select native officers for merit, and " keep them meritorious, the European officers themselves " must be selected and efficient. A bad European officer " cannot work a system of merit. He would soon spoil " the best native officer in the world, and the more these " questions of army reform are thought over, the more " clearly will it be seen that the educating of the European " officer lies at the root of the matter."

Those who advocate the discontinuance of the grades of native commissioned officers state that if retained, merit and efficiency should rule promotion.

Sir J. Hearsey. Brig. Troup. Major Williams.

Of those who are in favour of maintaining native commissioned officers Brigadier Coke and Colonel K. Young are for merit, efficiency, and gallantry in the field ruling promotion; both officers would make the commanding officer the sole judge, considering him the most deeply interested in having efficient officers, and that if himself qualified for his position no one else is so fit to decide, and that if not fit for his position he should be removed summarily. Brigadier Coke remarks that he would not be too greedy to promote to the non-commissioned grade from juniors, if the seniors are able-bodied men and of good courage. It tends with the northern soldiers, who are jealous of their name and character, to disgust them with the service, and by this means many valuable soldiers are lost to the State.

Colonel Burn's opinion is analogous to Brigadier Coke's, for he states, that " if promotion to the native commissioned " grade is to continue as hitherto, by advancement from the " ranks, it ought to be by selection from the non-commis-" sioned grades. Once a commissioned officer, the pro-" motions ought to be made by seniority, except for some " very sufficient cause it be found necessary to pass a man " over in promotion, or to promote a junior for some good " or gallant act."

Brigadier Steel would have a test adopted, and failure in any such test, as indicating a want of sufficient qualification, to exclude from promotion; but for any particular good conduct he would always grant promotion.

Brigadier Farquharson would make merit and efficiency the rule, but in the promotion of native commissioned officers to the commissioned grade he considers that seniority should not entirely be overlooked.

Major-General Birch also thinks that promotion for merit and efficiency should be the great object, but not the only one, as seniority can never be justly disregarded *in toto*, except when unsupported by other claims, when it should be so without hesitation.

The Oude committee are decidedly in favour of promotion for merit and efficiency.

The Commander-in-Chief gives the following answer to the question: " It is very doubtful if this is advisable. From " all I have gathered from officers of experience in the " Company's service we do not know the natives suffi-" ciently, and are more likely to promote a smart rascal " than a good reliable soldier. The promotion should be " by seniority to a certain extent. That is, the senior fit " for promotion should be taken, and only occasionally for " great merit or for distinguished gallantry should a sepoy " far down the list be advanced."

Questions 12 and 13.

12. *Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulations, be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?*
13. *What is the charge to the State of military pensions to native officers and men of the Bengal native infantry?*

The Punjab committee advise, if, as they advocate, a system of pensions for native troops be maintained, that a committee of selected officer be assembled to go carefully into the details, having, as a preliminary, laid before them the actual charge to the State, the ratio in which it had annually accumulated, and the disproportion or otherwise to the object in view and to the revenues of India, of the present system and scale of pensions. The Punjab committee then proceed to remark upon some inequalities in the rates of pensions to regulars and irregulars, and make suggestions with the view of rendering the rates more equitable, and also with the view of removing some restrictions which work prejudicially to the public service. On the subject of family pensions they recommend that the principle of bonuses should be as largely substituted for that of annuities as possible, pointing out that if fairly fixed on the principle of life insurance it should be no loss to Government in aggregate amount, would be a saving of machinery, and a bar against the frauds so largely practised. They then proceed to suggestions regarding graduated scales of pay in every rank of the native army, as calculated to excite emulation, ambition, and satisfaction, and as being consonant with the practice of Runjeet Singh in the Seikh army, and more or less, though not very systematically, in the armies of most Asiatic rulers. The committee base the proposition on the fact that a recruit cannot be worth as much as a veteran soldier, and that no good purpose is answered by putting them on a level as to pay. The committee also advert to the rates of pay and pension of native doctors, which, in proportion to the outlay of time and industry on their education and the importance of their duties, the committee deem unaccountably and unreasonably low; observing that it does not do to raise men's intellectual standard and to keep them down in the social scale, that the sense of justice and of power alike rebel against such a course, and that in the late crisis it has been remarkable how active the native doctors have been against us, having been the very brains of the mutiny in many regiments and stations, a fact which the committee attribute to the feelings above described.

Upon the subject of pensions the opinion of Colonel K. Young, a wholly independent authority, is in close accordance with that of the Punjab committee. He observes, that " the system of pensions in operation in the Bengal " army should undergo a searching examination before any-" thing is decided on the subject, and it should be compared " with the system prevailing in the presidencies of Madras " and Bombay. I know nothing of the former, but in the " latter it is understood to be the practice to invalid in the " army men comparatively young in age and constitution, " and who would be certain of being rejected if sent up " before an invaliding committee in Bengal. No doubt the " pension list in the Bombay presidency is proportionally " much larger than in Bengal, but the Bombay system is, " in my opinion, the correct one, and I may add also, that " it is actually the cheaper of the two, for in Bengal the " worn-out men so frequently seen in our ranks are in fact " pensioners and receiving a higher rate of pay than they " would if invalided. It is true the amount paid them does " not appear under the head of pension, but it ought to be " so included whenever pay is given to men unable to do " longer service. It would be better far to decrease the " strength of your army than keep ineffectives in it."

Sir S. Cotton considers that as the native army will now be considerably reduced, the system of pensions might be maintained with advantage, as the boon is doubtless highly esteemed by the native soldier.

Those who would modify the system of pensions are numerous. Some, like the Punjab committee, admit that the present system has been greatly abused, and that it requires improvement, suggesting the substitution of a bonus where practicable.

Brig. Steel. Brig. Farquharson. Sir J. Hope Grant. Oude Committee. Major Williams.

Major-General Birch observes that the present pension system must needs be religiously kept up in favour of those who are now in the native army, and that it could not be at once swept away without a breach of faith. But in the cases of men newly enlisting he would abolish pensions, except as rewards for rare cases of merit, and for providing maintenance for men wounded in action, and for their heirs. He also remarks upon the necessity of bringing within due bounds the order of merit and the order of British India, both of which, during the late revolt, have been conferred in a manner very different from what their respective rules warrant. Brigadier Troup would also prospectively abolish the existing pension system.

The system proposed by the Commander-in-Chief is different from all the preceding ones. His excellency recommends that men should be enlisted for a certain number of years, ten or twelve, say; and that only good and fit men should be allowed to remain beyond that period, and then as a favour. That the men thus allowed to remain (who should be limited) should be then re-enlisted for ten years more, and so on. After twenty-two years' service, if not allowed to re-enlist owing to physical unfitness or otherwise, and the conduct had been uniformly good, a trifling pension to be given. After thirty years' service, a

well-conducted man might claim pension. His excellency thinks that some such system would encourage the men to good conduct, expedite promotion, and remove the great evil of aged non-commissioned officers.

None of the authorities to whom questions have been forwarded are in a position to state what charge on the finances of the State is due to the pensions to native officers and men of the Bengal army.

Question 14.

Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in courts-martial?

The Punjab committee consider the native officers of the late Bengal army not to have been fit, and that the whole system was a farce. "The native members, as a rule, were "guided by the European superintending officer; and then "went out and told the prisoners they were very sorry for "the sentence, but could not help it. Native officers "selected by merit and not by seniority would be quite "qualified to sit; and, if only to keep up their dignity, we "would advocate their sitting on district courts-martial— "regimental courts being abolished."

The committee pronounce the native officers of the Punjab irregular force as being quite fit mentally to take part in courts-martial, and to pass judgment on most cases brought before them; but from want of moral resolution prone to give up their own judgments to that of the European superior.

On this important question there seems much general unanimity of opinions, and it seems advisable to give *in extenso* those of officers of so much practical experience as Major-General Birch and Colonel Keith Young. The reply of the former officer is as follows:—

Major-Gen. Birch.

"No, the great majority are quite unfit to do so; but "then this is certainly owing in part to "their not comprehending our military "jurisprudence. On the whole, however, and taking into "consideration the weighing of cases on their merits, rather "than any peculiarities of our system, I think the native "officers, with few exceptions, quite unfit to sit at courts "martial. I say this, after having had an experience of "eleven years as a practising judge-advocate, and having "met in courts-martial duty the native officers of certainly "the larger half of the regiments in the service. But I "have met with occasional splendid exceptions, men of "very superior intelligence."

Col. K. Young.

"Native commissioned officers are of use at a court-"martial in sifting the particulars of the "case under trial; but this, I think, is all. "They have a voice in the verdict, but as regards the sen-"tence, they are mostly guided altogether by the European "officers superintending the proceedings; and it is perhaps "as well that it should be so, their ideas and ours of the "punishments required to maintain discipline being very "different. I remember some years ago, when conducting "the proceedings of a native general court-martial upon "the trial of a sepoy charged with wounding a British "officer at Loodianah, that after the man was declared "guilty and the sentence came under the consideration of "the court, the first native officer gave his opinion that a "month or six weeks imprisonment in the quarter-guard "would be a sufficient punishment. The matter was "argued amongst them for some time, and a sentence of "death was at last decided upon, and the man was executed. "But it was a long time before the court arrived at this "decision; and had they been left to themselves, it is pos-"sible enough that the punishment might have been, as "originally proposed, a few weeks imprisonment in the "quarter-guard. I should see no objection to native "officers sitting on courts-martial, so long as they are "under proper control."

The Commander-in-Chief pronounces the native commissioned officers as generally not fit to take part in courts-martial; and as will be seen by the marginal names, many concur in the same view. Sir J. Hearsey designates a native court-martial a farce,—the superintending officer and the interpreter trying the offenders whilst the native officers are often asleep or dosing. Brigadier Steel considers them inclined to severity in cases of disrespect to their own order, but reluctant to punish Brahmins. He thinks they may sometimes prove a screen for the European officer from the revenge of a culprit. Brigadier Farquharson says they either intrigue beforehand, or leave the trial to the superintending officer. Brigadier Coke would, as before stated in the Replies on Military Code and Rules of Discipline, have no courts-martial in the native army.

Sir J. Hearsey.
Oude Committee.
Sir J. Hope Grant.
Sir S. Cotton.
Brig. Troup.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Coke.
Major Williams.

Colonel Burn takes a more favourable view; he says, the questions brought before a court-martial are generally very simple, and have been dealt with by the native officers in a satisfactory manner, under the guidance of the European superintending officer. He remarks that one advantage of a native court is, that they thoroughly understand the native witnesses.

Question 15.

Are native commissioned officers on a par with European sergeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

The reply of the Commander-in-Chief is that native officers are not generally on a par with European sergeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency, but that the latter are usually in the very flower of life, whereas the native officers are usually very old and worn out.

Most of the authorities consulted are of a similar opinion, deeming the native officers not on a par, but inferior, speaking generally; Sir J. Hope Grant remarks that, except in few instances, they cannot be; and Major-General Birch, though he concurs in the generality of native officers being certainly not on par, says that some of them are fully equal to the European serjeants and corporals.

Major-Gen. Birch.
Sir J. Hope Grant.
Sir J. Hearsey.
Sir S. Cotton.
Oude Committee.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Troup.
Col. K. Young.
Col. Burn.
Major Williams.

Brigadier Coke is of the opinion that, taking efficient native officers and efficient sergeants, the former are infinitely superior in efficiency and intelligence in the command of native soldiers, and that inefficient men of both classes are equally useless.

The Punjab committee observe that native commissioned officers, promoted by seniority and worn out, cannot be compared with European sergeants and corporals selected for smartness, without reference to seniority, particularly if these remain with their own regiments, under strict discipline, and among their own countrymen. But European non-commissioned officers transferred to a native regiment are so circumstanced that their smartness and professional intelligence loses more than half its value from their inability to impart it; that knowing little or nothing of the language and feelings of the men, and failing to explain themselves, they become violent and rough, irritating the sepoys with native abuse of which they know not the meaning, and having no longer a rigid discipline to restrain them, being to a great extent their masters, they fall off. The committee, however, is of opinion that, taking the best instances of European non-commissioned officers, they have still no hesitation in saying that they can never be equally useful to the commanding officer in managing native soldiers as selected native commissioned officers.

Question 16.

If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organization for the military corps?

1. *Should they be fully officered with native commissioned grades as well as with European officers;—or,*
2. *Fully officered with European, but have no native commissioned grades;—or,*
3. *Be officered like irregular corps, viz., have the full complement of native commissioned officers with but a few European officers?*

The Punjab committee advocate the Punjab irregular system, which is the third organization enumerated in the question. To secure efficiency in commanding officers they would establish the rule that, on attaining the rank of regimental major, an officer should vacate the command, unless invited by government to remain. The Oude committee, Sir J. Hope Grant, Brigadier Farquharson, Major Williams, and Colonel K. Young also advocate the irregular corps organization, but the last-mentioned officer would have a slight addition of European officers.

Major-General Birch proposes that the military corps should be of two kinds, regular and irregular; the former, officered according to the second, and the irregulars according to the third mode of organization.

Sir J. Hearsey, Sir S. Cotton, and Brigadier Troup are in favour of the second mode of organization. Both Sir J. Hearsey and Brigadier Troup propose having, besides the usual complement of European commissioned officers to each company, a couple of European non-commissioned officers in addition. Brigadier Troup remarks, that "unless "organized in this way, if ever called upon to act against a "disciplined enemy, instead of being of any use as sol-"diers they will become a dangerous, undisciplined, and "disgraceful rabble. In my opinion, infantry soldiers, but "more particularly native ones, cannot have too much "European supervision to render them efficient: and if the "military corps are to be kept separate from the police ones,

" and not broken up and detailed in small parties all over " the country on public duties, far removed from the eye of " the European officer, sometimes for several months " together, as used to be the case, if pains are taken in the " recruiting and training, I will venture to say, the British " soldier excepted, they will be equal to any in the world."

The Commander-in-Chief remarks that the Punjab organization for military corps answers well, but that more European officers than four are needed, and that on service the commanding officers of Punjab regiments generally apply for others to be attached. His excellency considers that there should not be less than eight European officers present with a corps of infantry, and points out that it is often absolutely necessary that detachments of a troop or company should have a European officer.

Brigadier Steel advocates the first mode of organization, viz., that regular corps of native infantry be fully officered both with European and native commissioned officers; and he is of opinion that corps of regular native infantry should be treated as a superior class to those of irregular corps or police, in both rank and pay; as for local service, the same material can be obtained at a less cost.

Colonel Burn proposes to reorganize the infantry of the Bengal army in a manner which embraces a police force. " The European infantry to consist of twenty regiments, " organized in the same manner as the existing European " corps.

" The native army to consist of forty regiments of two " battalions each. These forty corps to be officered as at " present; the first battalion to be the active or service " battalion, and the second to be employed on police duties.

" Recruiting to be confined to the first battalion, and the " second to be completed as vacancies occur by drafts of " the oldest soldiers from the first battalion. The men of " the first battalion would thus be young and active, and " fit for any duty. The second battalion would be com- " posed of old soldiers, well trained for the duties of a " military police.

" Of the forty regiments I would propose to form:—

15 of Seikhs.
5 of Punjab Mahomedans.
10 of Oude men, Hindoos, and Mahomedans.
5 of Behar men, Hindoos, and Mahomedans.
5 of other classes.

40 total.

" Besides these the Goorkhas must be kept up as at " present in distinct regiments and located in the hills. If " this useful body of men could be increased, a few more " regiments might be added to the army with great advan- " tage to the State.

" We should thus have for the new army, as compared " with the old:—

—	Old Army.	New Army.
Europeans - - - -	3	20
Native regiments, regulars -	74	40
Ditto police - - - - -	—	40
Irregular corps that mutinied or been disarmed - - -	24	—
	101	100

" The Punjab irregular force, and all local corps that have " not been disarmed, to be maintained as at present.

" The forty native regiments to be officered as at present, " and the officers to be available for duty with either " battalion. Those attached to the second battalion to be " limited to—

a commandant,
a second in command,
an adjutant,

" with staff salaries as at present in irregular corps.

" The first or service battalion to be always fully officered, " and kept in the highest state of discipline."

He then remarks, that it must not be inferred from the good service rendered during the late crisis by irregular corps with few officers that they are more efficient on service than regular corps with a full complement of European officers; that the irregular corps at Delhi and Lucknow were glad to have an addition; that out of fourteen officers with the fourth Punjab regiment before Lucknow twelve were wounded; and that the Sirmoor battalion, the guides, and the first Punjab infantry, suffered severely in officers before Delhi. That even with one or two European corps the want of officers was greatly felt at Delhi, and not to the men satisfactorily remedied by the appointment of what the men called the " sepoy officers " to do duty with them, as they prefer their own officers.

Colonel Berkeley advocates auxiliary battalions attached to each European corps, officered on the irregular or No. 3 system.

Question 17.

How should the police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades?

The Punjab committee reply, " One European and one " native officer to each battalion, and one subadar and one " jemadar to each company, as in the Punjab police."

The Oude committee propose for the Oude police:—

1 chief of police.
1 assistant ditto.
4 divisional commandants.
4 ditto, second in command.
4 divisional adjutants.
8 district commandants.
8 ditto adjutants.

The Commander-in-Chief considers that a commandant and adjutant should be sufficient European officers for a police corps, with the usual proportion of native officers allowed to irregular infantry and cavalry.

Sir J. Hearsey and Brigadier Steel would have European officers as commandants, second in command, and adjutants, but the grades of native officers to have different designations to the grades in the army.

Colonel K. Young would officer police corps similarly with irregular corps but with fewer European officers, and the commanding officer supreme. So also Brigadier Farquharson, who would have a commandant and deputy commandant, with native commissioned officers as in regiments, but on less pay, with the addition of a native commandant, and an adjutant with superior allowances. Appointments to be granted to men or native officers who distinguished themselves in the military as well as in the police force.

Major Williams observes, adverting evidently to the police of the North-west provinces, that " whilst the police take all " civil and military duties, a full complement of officers and " men are needed. Divisional police battalions of horse " and foot consisting of 2,000 to 2,500, according to the " respective wants of districts, with twelve European officers " have sufficed to restore order; peace and tranquillity once " re-established, the number of officers and men can be " somewhat reduced."

Major-General Birch suggests the employment of unattached commissioned officers with the police as much as possible, as also of uncovenanted persons of the respectable classes, and that native commissioned officers be appointed as in the irregular corps.

Sir S. Cotton, on the proviso that the people of the country are disarmed, would officer police corps by natives, as fully efficient to carry on police duties, and not dangerous from their command being only over policemen armed with swords.

Brigadier Troup, on the other hand, would have no native commissioned officers with police corps, but a European commandant, second in command, adjutant, surgeon, two European sergeants, and two corporals, besides the usual number of native commissioned officers to each company. He observes, " Surely after the fearful warning we have had, " it would be needless for me to impress upon my superiors " the necessity there is for an extended European super- " vision throughout the length and breadth of the land, for " they may rest assured that no native of whatever rank is " worthy of trust without it."

Question 18.

If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned officers, but only good-service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits?

The Punjab committee say in reply, " Certainly not;" and Brigadier Steel the same. The Commander-in-Chief also says, " Naturally not. The corps that are required to " fight alongside of European regiments and to move about " India should be on a more advantageous footing as regards " pay, and on an equal footing at least as respects propor- " tion of officers, and non-commissioned officers with police " corps. In those of the latter now raising, it is believed " the sepoys receive as much as in the regular army, or the " Punjab corps. Of course men will prefer the police for " many reasons." Sir J. Hope Grant also thinks that the regular would not under the supposed circumstances prove

as popular as the irregular and police service. Brigadier Troup, however, thinks it would be so, but he considers it most objectionable and very impolitic, the soldiers being paid by and serving the same government, should have such a difference in their organization. Major-General Birch also thinks that the regular would be as popular as the irregular and police service under the supposed conditions; but if it were doubtful, he deems it another reason for not keeping up military police corps.

Colonel Burn is of opinion that, whichever system is adopted, the recruits will follow their relatives wherever they may be serving; and he does not think that the distinction, if made, of having no native commissioned officers in the regular regiments would render them less popular than police corps organized on a different system.

Question 19.

"In police corps, is there on first admission any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing? Or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades, or on promotion to commissioned grades?

All those consulted concur in stating that there are no such tests. Brigadier Coke deems reading and writing no test of efficiency, and would not insist on it as a qualification for promotion or admission. The Punjab committee observe that when the natives are generally educated, this may be done in police corps; that, at present, it is found impracticable even in irregular infantry corps; and they note that the military police have no detective duties.

Question 20.

Has the distinct organization and the difference of system, regulations, and component races in the then native armies proved favourable to our power in India?

The Commander-in-Chief's reply is, "The distinct organization I believe to have been a benefit; "if we had possessed *one* in 1857 instead "of three (or with the Punjab we may say "four) armies, we should have lost India." The concurrence is very general that the result has proved very favourable to our power; and Sir J. Hope Grant would keep not only the three presidencies, but Punjab distinct.

Punjab Committee.
Oude Committee.
Sir J. Hope Grant.
Sir J. Hearsey.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Coke.
Col. K. Young.
Col. Burn.
Major Williams.

Sir S. Cotton takes a modified view. He regards the distinct nature of the armies of the three presidencies as one of the means which checked the spread of the mutiny; but he ascribes this result solely to the difference of races, and not to distinct organization or system, advancing in support and proof of this opinion the many Bombay regiments which have shown disaffection, and in which men were enlisted from the same class which furnished the mutinous Bengal sepoys.

Major-General Birch does not "think there is any such "difference of system, regulations, and component races "respectively in the three native armies as to admit of any "reply being given to this question. The prestige of the "British soldiery has preserved our power in India, and "not the native army in any considerable degree."

Brigadier Troup is of opinion that the difference in the three armies has not proved favourable to our power in India.

Question 21.

Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate governments, to time, and to local circumstances, be allowed; or should endeavours be made to assimilate, or even to amalgamate, the three armies?

In reply to this question the Commander-in-Chief observes, "To amalgamate, or to assimilate the three armies "would, I believe, be dangerous and impolitic. A craving "for uniformity has already done much mischief in the "native army, What seems to be wanted is *not* uniformity, "but dissimilarity. We should, therefore, have corps of all "races, and under different systems, but all governed by a "few broad general rules."

Those who are opposed to assimilation or amalgamation of the armies of the three presidencies, and in favour of the maintenance of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, are noted in the margin.

Punjab Committee.
Oude Committee.
Sir J. Hearsey.
Major-Gen. Birch.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Coke.
Col. Burn.
Col. K. Young.
Major Williams.

The Oude committee regard assimilation as destructive; and Major-General Birch observes that, "The entire separation of "the three native armies has been of the "most important use to us during the late "mutinies. We have had the native troops of Madras and "Bombay in antagonism with the mutineers and rebels in "Bengal, which, but for the separation of the three armies, "might not have been." He points out the impracticability of sending native regiments to serve for any length of time in other presidencies; that distance, family considerations, and perhaps climate, militate against such a measure. He would leave the administration of each army to the discretion of its own separate government, and keep both the European officers and their men distinct from the native troops of other presidencies.

Those who are in favour of assimilating the three armies as much as possible are Sir S. Cotton, Sir J. Hope Grant, Colonel Berkeley, and Brigadier Troup. The latter notes that the amalgamation of the three armies would be very difficult, if not impossible, but would have every endeavour made to assimilate the system, organization, and composition of all three armies. Colonel Berkeley would amalgamate the three armies under the title of the Royal Indian army under one commander-in-chief, and assimilate and simplify the working of corps and departments. He would divide the army into three or four corps, and remarks that local circumstances might cause a difference in the organization and composition of regiments. Sir J. Hope Grant would not acknowledge caste in any of the three armies, and would assimilate their systems as much as possible.

IV.—Infantry—European Officers.

Question 1.

Within your experience have the powers of commanding officers of native corps been increased or diminished in the Bengal army, and state the orders or measures or changes in the practice of the service to which you attribute such effect?

The Commander-in-Chief's reply is,—"They have been "diminished practically, though not avowedly. Com-"manding officers have been much hampered with regard "to promotions; and courts-martial sentences, approved "and carried out by them, have been constantly upset, "either in consequence of petitions to head quarters, or "owing to flaws discovered in proceedings. The deputy "judge-advocates of divisions are principally employed in "endeavouring to discover mistakes in regimental courts-"martial, in which they are often successful. Then, again, "a commanding officer sees his best officers often with-"drawn for staff employ when he can ill spare them. At "other times the bad officer, who has set him at defiance, "and neglected his duty, is taken away without the com-"manding officer being consulted. All these things tend "to weaken a commanding officer's authority, and are "believed to have increased of late years."

The Punjab committee are of opinion, that "the "powers of commanding officers have certainly been di-"minished for many years, till it had become a standing "complaint in the regular native army; but this seems to "have been effected not so much by actual orders and "measures, as by the changing practice of the service; by "a gradual interference at army head quarters with the "internal economy and discipline of regiments; and the "consequent centralization of influence not in the com-"mandant of the regiment, but in the adjutant-general "and commander-in-chief. Rewards and punishments "are the two great sources of a commanding officer's "influence over his men, and both seem to have been "almost taken out of his hands. The principle of seniority "promotion has been so hedged in, watched, and enforced, "(even by such a professed military reformer as Sir "Charles Napier, whose general order on the subject is, "perhaps, the strongest on record), that practically the "commanding officer had no discretion whatever, and pro-"moted the senior on the roll, rather than enter upon a "vain struggle to prefer a better man. No doubt the "sepoys as a body like this. It gave every man in the "regiment, whether fit or unfit, a vested right in the "upper ranks, to which a system of merit promotion "would only have admitted the most efficient. The one "system only asked them to live, the other would call on "them to exert themselves. The regimental commandant "was interested in superseding the inefficient; and the "inefficient found a readiness at head quarters to believe "injustice had been committed. One or two such unsuc-"cessful struggles after better things disheartened the "most zealous commanding officer, who gradually lapsed "into indifference, leaving the regiment to the undisturbed "enjoyment of its vested rights, its life without emula-"tion, its poor opinion of the colonel, and its reverence "for the central institutions. Nor was more discretion "left to the commandant in the matter of punishments.

" The authority given by him, by Article of War 112, is " altogether inadequate to the control and discipline of a " mercenary regiment. His powers of summary punish- " ment were so small as to be ridiculous. He could " neither flog for insubordination, nor dismiss for general " bad character; he could not give extra duty to the " negligent soldier, nor refuse furlough to an habitual " offender: he could not send a non-commissioned officer " to drill, nor reduce without formal trial; and he was " even prohibited from confining one before trial, and " required to put him simply under arrest. When to " all these restrictions is added the facility of direct ap- " peal through the post office by any sepoy to the " commander-in-chief, and even the reception of anony- " mous petitions, we can understand how such a system " in course of years undermined the legitimate influence " of the commanding officers, and gradually reduced " them to the cyphers which they were found to be in " 1857."

There is great unanimity as to the fact of the gradual diminution of the powers of commanding officers, but the foregoing quotation of the opinion of the Punjab committee comprises so clearly the main points advanced by the other authorities consulted (marginally noted), that it will only be necessary to complement the above summary by adding a few observations on the part of regimental officers of long experience with native troops, and of others whose opportunities of watching the system have also been considerable.

Lt.-Col. Macpherson.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Coke,
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Troup.
Col. Burn.
Major Williams.
Sir S. Cotton.
Sir J. Hearsey.
Sir J. Hope Grant.
Oude Committee.

Lieut.-Colonel Macpherson, after sketching the oscillations of increase and decrease in the powers of commanding officers, remarks, that there can be no doubt that the attempts made to rule and govern the sepoy as if he were a British soldier have caused a great deal of hurtful and unnecessary interference with the commanding officer's authority, even in trivial matters. He quotes a case in which a sepoy of indifferent character had his furlough stopped because he was in debt, and his creditors objected. The man petitioned against this, and Lieut.-Colonel Macpherson states, that it was ruled in the judge-advocate's department that the commanding officer was not justified in stopping mere debtor's leave. Very good law, but a very bad way of ruling a sepoy, in Lieut.-Colonel Macpherson's opinion.

Brigadier Farquharson notes, among other proceedings derogatory to the authority and influence of commanding officers, the promotion of men not recommended by them. Brigadier Steel, noting like others the restrictions as to promotion and punishments considers, like Lieut.-Colonel Macpherson, that general assimilation to the rules in Her Majesty's service proved prejudicial. Brigadier Coke states, that the powers of commanding officers were diminished to such an extent as to have been, in his opinion, one of the principal causes of bringing about the mutiny. After touching on the abolition of corporal punishment, the abrogation of the power to discharge soldiers unfit to remain in the service, of the power to reduce non-commissioned officers to the ranks, and of the discretion to promote, save by seniority, he adds, the having men sent back to them who had been dismissed as unfit men, and even by sentence of regimental courts-martial, on their presenting petitions to head quarters, and the general feeling engendered by these and other similar acts, that the commanding officer was helpless to punish or reward. Sir J. Hearsey dates a constant diminution of the powers of commanding officers since the half-batta question, and considers that government and the commander-in-chief have usurped the powers of commanding officers, who can neither punish nor reward. Sir S. Cotton notes the facilities of appeal given to sepoys, and the notorious manner in which they congregated at Simlah to present petitions to the Commander-in-Chief, and the numerous instances in which sepoys dismissed by regimental courts-martial have subsequently been reinstated; the timidity which has prevented corporal punishment and solitary imprisonment from being really carried out in the native army, and the quickness of the sepoys to take advantage of such indecision; the rigid adherence to promotion by seniority, the incompetency of officers in consequence of old age to command their regiments, observing, that in eight regiments in the Peshawur division he had not three who were able to command their corps efficiently; the lenity with which various acts of misconduct, all more or less bordering on mutiny, were on several occasions dealt with, in consequence of which the sepoy ceased to hold the power of the government, and much less the authority of his military superiors, in dread; unable to appreciate such leniency, men, who under their own systems of government would have been ruled with a rod of iron, lost the awe necessary to the preservation of discipline in a large army. Sir J. Hope Grant likewise admits the gradual reduction of the powers of commanding officers since 1806, and adverts to the sepoys being directly *en rapport* with army head quarters. Brigadier Troup's summary touches on some additional points, and may be given in his own words, where, after noting the almost total abolition of corporal punishment, the abrogation of powers of dismissal, and the almost compulsory seniority promotion, he adds to the catalogue, " the withdrawal of the privilege of granting " letters to soldiers having civil suits, and of leave beyond " that for a month to officers or soldiers, the withdrawal " of the power of franking soldiers' letters, the order " regarding good-conduct pay and badges, by which a bad " man if he showed a clean sheet for one year was neces- " sarily rewarded; the new rules of courts of request, by " which a soldier could get irremediably in debt in de- " fiance of both his captain and commanding officer; the " increased number of detached guards; the constant re- " ferences required on every point; the interference on the " part of the different departments, especially the pay and " audit, all and each rendering the commanding officer and " his captains of companies perfect cyphers, without the " means of rewarding good, or effectually and readily " punishing bad characters." After which he proceeds to observe upon the system of withdrawing officers for staff and civil employment without reference to the commanding officer's opinion, in terms very much like those used by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

Major-General Birch gives an analysis of the past and present powers of commanding officers, under the three heads of punitive powers independently of courts-martial, powers in confirming sentences of courts-martial, and power to reward.

It appears that before 1828 commanding officers exercised discretional powers not authoritatively conferred, such as dismissal of native soldiers, reduction of non-commissioned officers, chastisement with the rattan, extra drill and duty, refusal of furlough. On the 1st September 1828 the standing orders, compiled by order of Lord Combermere, limited the discretion to discharge sepoys, and commanding officers were declared to have no power to dismiss men as a punishment for offences committed. Art. 2 of the Articles of War of 1845 enacted by law that which was before established by regulations of the army, and for upwards of thirty years had been the rule. But the revised code of regulations for the army, published in 1855, take away from commanding officers the power to discharge men physically unfit for the service, which had been left them in 1828.

Major-General Birch states that the old Articles of War (those in force from 1796 to 1845) did not touch the point of the reduction of non-commissioned officers, and that there was no recognized authority for commanding officers inflicting this punishment; one that now (article 110) can only be awarded by sentence of court-martial, or by order of the commander-in-chief of the presidency.

Major-General Birch points out that in the old Articles of 1796, except in one clause empowering commanding officers to punish non-commissioned officers and soldiers not in quarters or camp by beat of retreat, no allusion also was made to minor punishments; the same in the Regulations of 1828. In those of 1855, chastisement with the rattan was strictly prohibited. He then quotes art. 112, which defines the powers of commanding officers in minor punishments, and remarks that the Regulations of 1855 follow up this article by prohibiting extra duty as a punishment, and declaring no punishment to be legal that is not specified in the article. He then adverts to a general order by the Commander-in-Chief, of 16th October 1854, as greatly interfering with the power of commanding officers.

Upon the second subject, the powers of commanding officers in confirming the sentences of courts-martial, it appears from Major-General Birch's analysis that from 1796 to 1818 there was no restriction. That from the 6th November 1818 the supervision of the proceedings of inferior courts-martial by general officers commanding divisions, and registry by the deputy judge advocates general began, that the laxity and irregularity of regimental courts-martial were considerably remedied, and forms of procedure were rendered more exact and uniform; but that, as general officers commanding divisions could set aside for illegality the punishments confirmed by commanding officers, the powers of these officers were weakened.

In 1832 full powers were conferred by the commander-in-chief on commanding officers to execute, to mitigate, or to remit sentences, and the practice was abolished of referring certain sentences previous to execution to the general commanding the division. In February 1835 corporal punishment was abolished, and dismissal substituted;

the latter requires the sanction of the general commanding the division. This took away the powers conferred in 1832. Act XXIII. of 1839 further restricted the powers of commanding officers, who were now not allowed to carry into effect any imprisonment exceeding six months, nor to discharge men so sentenced.

In 1845, the Articles of War, framed by Major-General Birch when Judge Advocate-General, enlarged the powers of confirmation and of commutation of sentences assigned to commanding officers; and the second edition of the articles made in 1847, and now in force, afforded Major-General Birch (in the same capacity) an opportunity, of which he availed himself, still further to enlarge the powers of commanding officers. In advertence to the restoration of corporal punishment by Lord Hardinge and the resolution of Government, dated 30th August 1845, framed in connection with the articles as made in that year, Major-General Birch observes, that if it interferes with the powers of commanding officers, it does the same with that of superior officers, but, in his opinion, in a very reasonable and proper way.

After observing that the present practice of the retention in the service of men flogged for military offences furnishes in his opinion a powerful argument for inflicting corporal punishment as seldom as possible. Major-General Birch concludes his analysis:—"On the whole, the occasional "curtailment of the powers of commanding officers, and "the want of uniformity of system throughout, as exhibited "in the preceding notes, cannot but have had a tendency "to weaken their authority; but matters have been on a "much better footing since the enactment of the Articles "of 1847; and with a few additional powers, which I pro- "pose to suggest in my reply to a subsequent question, "and which have already been noticed in the preceding "sheets, it appears to me that the position of command- "ing officers will be very satisfactory, and the discipline "of regiments will thereby be secured."

Question 2.

During the above period, have the powers of officers of European or native corps been increased or diminished?

The Punjab committee reply that in proportion as the commandants of native corps lost their own power, so they and their adjutants absorbed the power of the officers in charge of companies, who had really less influence than the havildar-major, and ceased to take much interest in the corps. The Commander-in-Chief also considers that the powers of regimental officers have been restricted.

There is much agreement on this point. All noted in the margin hold that the powers of regimental officers have been diminished; the dread of responsibility increased, as remarked by Brigadier Farquharson; and having, as Sir S. Cotton observes, little power to punish and less to reward, the European officers became cyphers and lost their influence.

Oude Committee. Sir S. Cotton. Sir J. H. Grant. Sir J. Hearsey. Brig. Farquharson. Brig. Coke. Brig. Steel. Brig. Troup. Col. Burn. Lt.-Col. Macpherson.

Major-General Birch is of the opinion that the powers of regimental officers have been neither increased nor diminished in any perceptible degree during the period of his experience.

Question 3.

What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers upon the discipline of corps in the native infantry of the Bengal army?

The reply of the Punjab committee is, "A laxity of discipline throughout the native army, which made it ripe "for mutiny on any difficulty. For years the regimental "officers have been driven to coax instead of command "their men. The policy of Government indeed wore the "same appearance, attributable probably to that sense of "weakness which necesssarily sprung from the inadequate "European force in the country. So far, however, from "this being a good reason for weakening the European "officers, and strengthening the sepoys, it was in our "opinion the very reverse."

The Commander-in-Chief says, "The result has been, "I will not say the 'mutiny,' for that is doubtless owing "to many things, but certainly the result has been to "render the commanding officers almost cyphers, and their "position undesirable. The commanding officer being "thus crippled found his only means of getting influence "with the men was by flattering and coaxing them, and "thus discipline was still further shaken. In truth it "was only when it suited the pleasure and convenience of "the sepoy, that he went heartily with (his) commanding "officer."

The Oude committee are of opinion that the 'mutiny' owes much of its extent and virulence to the want of power of commanding officers. Brigadier Farquharson also states that although political causes existed, the system precipitated the mutiny; and both Sir J. Hope Grant and Brigadier Coke regard the diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers as a principal cause of the mutiny.

The working of the system is thus given by Brigadier Troup:—"The result has been most detrimental; the good "officer and man was disgusted at finding that his captain "and commanding officer had not the means of reward- "ing him, and that there was nothing to be gained by "showing his good character, and the smart intelligent "officer and soldier was disgusted, because there was no "opportunity given him of gaining distinction, while the "slothful, careless, or bad knew that the commanding "officer could do them but little harm, and that they might "go to a very great extent without incurring permanent "disgrace, and consequently defied him. Commanding "officers of companies and corps generally lapsed into a "state of indifference, finding that those who followed the "*laissez-faire* system were considered the best officers, as "they gave the least trouble; and the men conducted "themselves according to their natural dispositions, certain "that so long as they were not outrageously slothful or "ill-behaved each had good pay, must see his family in "turn, and at the end of a specified period must get an "increase of pay, or promotion, or transfer to the invalid "establishment, and consequently cared little or nothing "for his officer; the more so that their officers, for these "reasons, seldom mixed with them, and indeed as a rule "cared little about their corps, and were constant and "urgent in their endeavours to get away from it."

Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson, Major Williams, Sir J. Hearsey, and Colonel Burn concur as to the result being to render the sepoy independent of and indifferent to the European officer, and that contempt of the latter loosened necessarily the bonds of discipline. Sir S. Cotton states the result as being no discipline whatever. Colonel Burn advocates the restoration of punitive powers to commanding officers without reference to station and divisional commanders, and that for some time to come we must establish the old and inflexible maxim of Roman discipline, that "a "good soldier should dread his officers far more than the "enemy."

Major-General Birch conceives "that the greatly extended "powers granted to officers commanding regiments by the "Articles of War as now in force, must have had at least a "beneficial tendency on the discipline of regiments, and "that when such has not been the case, the fault lies with "the officers themselves."

Question 4.

What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of captains or officers in charge of companies?

There is a pretty general concurrence that the diminution of the influence of captains or officers in command of companies led to the result that the sepoys lost respect for them, and that the officers lost zeal, so that the effect was necessarily bad. Some observe that the result depended more upon the individual character of the officers than upon anything else, as they had little or no real power. Others that the effect was to convey to the adjutant and havildar-major the authority and influence which officers commanding companies ought to possess; or, that if less affected by the centralization system than commanding officers, it told through the latter on the officers in command of companies. Some say it produced want of sympathy with the men, dislike to the service, and an incessant desire to escape from the irksomeness of regimental duty by leave, staff employ, the invalids, or retirement from the service. Others again assign it as a main cause, among others, of the loss of our army.

Commander-in-Chief. Punjab Committee. Sir S. Cotton. Sir J. Hearsey. Lt.-Col. Macpherson. Major Williams. Brig. Steel. Brig. Farquharson. Brig. Coke. Sir J. H. Grant. Oude Committee.

Colonel Burn observes, that captains and officers commanding companies have complained much of late years of want of power to reward or punish; but that the commanding officer, to be of real use, must be supreme, and should command through the captains of companies, vested with such authority as he may think right to delegate to them.

Major-General Birch does not think that there has been any perceptible alteration in the influence of officers commanding companies.

QUESTION 5.

Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distinct authority of head quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the commanding officer of the regiment?

There is a general assent, that "the discipline of the regiment must mainly depend upon the influence of the commanding officer, and of the officers commanding companies," as stated by the Commander-in-Chief; and Brigadier Coke, after expressing himself to the same effect, observes, that "the reasons that corps have so seldom if ever mutinied on service are, that the pernicious influence of head quarters is then partially in abeyance. Commanding officers then take some of the requisite power into their own hands, and men are punished in a manner commensurate with their offences. Although the powers assumed by the commanding officers when on service are not what they ought to be, still they are sufficient to act as a check, and keep men in order."

Colonel Burn considers that the discipline of a corps on service depends entirely on the capacity for command of a commanding officer.

QUESTION 6.

Should the power of commanding officers and of officers in charge of companies be increased or diminished?

The Commander-in-Chief's reply is, "Rather increased than diminished;" and that of the Punjab committee is, "Certainly increased. There seems to have been in this, as in many other particulars of our military policy, a growing forgetfulness of our real position in India, and of our relations to a large mercenary army, evincing itself in an exaggerated protection of the sepoy, and jealous depression of his European officer. Late events have shown that both cannot command; and we would strongly advocate making our own countrymen the depositories of power, as by far the lesser evil. Trust the European officers with power; train them to its exercise; supersede them unhesitatingly if they prove unequal to the trust; and heavily punish them if they abuse it. We may then hope to hear no more of mutiny."

There is not a dissentient opinion as to the necessity of increasing the powers of commanding officers; some would have them supreme, with a power as nearly absolute as possible. Others would have them much increased, as also those of officers commanding companies, and would allow courts-martial only for grave offences. Major-General Birch would give commanding officers the power to reduce and to appoint non-commissioned officers; to inflict summary chastisement with the rattan, not exceeding three dozen strokes; but would not confer the power of summary discharge, reserving such cases for courts-martial; nor would he relax the Government Resolution of the 30th of August 1845, regarding corporal punishment. Dismissals by courts-martial should not, in his opinion, be set aside by errors in proceedings, deficiency of evidence, and the like; no man thus dismissed should ever be restored to a regiment. Major-General Birch is not in favour of rejecting appeals. He would cancel the general order by the Commander-in-Chief of the 16th October 1854. The powers conferred on commanding officers by G. G. O. of the 19th of May 1857, should not, he thinks, be continued beyond the period of disturbance for which it was specially granted. The recommendations of officers, who had been long enough in charge of companies to know their men, should be strictly attended to; and no leave granted without the concurrence of captains of companies.

Sir J. H. Grant.
Sir J. Hearsey.
Oude Committee.
Brig. Coke.
Brig. Troup.
Col. Burn.
Major Williams.
Lt.-Col. Macpherson.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Farquharson.
Sir S. Cotton.
Major-Gen. Birch.

QUESTION 7.

What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

The Commander-in-Chief suggests enlarged powers being conferred on commanding officers; that they should have authority to discharge a sepoy, to reduce non-commissioned officers, to confine sepoys for days, with stoppages of pay for the days in confinement, as in the Queen's service, always recording offences and punishments in their regimental orders; that they should be able to refuse furlough; but, above all, that in matters of regimental detail they should be as little interfered with as possible by superior authorities. But that if a regiment were in bad order, and the commanding officer obviously inefficient, the commander-in-chief should be able to deprive him of command at once, and to place an efficient officer in his place. To the suggestions they have already made, the Punjab committee add, that "the root of all discipline is efficiency of command; and this can only be secured by a persistent course of selection of European officers for the native army. No irregular regiment can be efficient without picked native officers; but these can only be selected and controlled by a good European commandant. It will behove Government therefore to exercise a close and firm supervision over the selection from the European regiments, or otherwise, of officers for the native army; and at first they should only be appointed on probation." They then express the hope that a really efficient staff may, by the establishment of a military college at each presidency, be secured; and the army kept in working order by an "unemployed list" for inefficient officers; and they further recommend the introduction into the army of a rule limiting the continuance of an officer's service to 35 years; on completion of which every officer, unless invited to serve longer, must retire. Present incumbents to have five years' notice, but a premium of increased pension to be offered them to go at once. Above all, however, the Punjab committee draw the earnest attention of Government to the necessity of selecting efficient brigadiers and generals of division; and of not allowing those commands which demand faculties both mature and unimpaired to be regarded as mere rewards for length of service. They observe, "The army is, in truth, nothing but an organization of mental and physical force; and it is the last institution in the State in which anything weak or worn can be safely left. From the highest to the lowest every link in the chain of discipline must be equal to the strain it is to bear."

They note the daily relief of guards within the distance of a mile; and the discontinuance of petty guards on detached duty.

Major-General Birch is, similarly with the Punjaub committee, of opinion that the main point towards securing improvement of discipline in regiments is that the *commanding officers* should be selected with reference to qualification for command, and that inefficiency should inevitably lead to removal. Also that adjutants should be most carefully selected. Moreover, that majors should be available for the command of other regiments than their own, when the lieutenant-colonels attached to such corps, or their majors, or senior officer present, were unfit to command. Also that it should be in the power of the commander-in-chief to send officers of all ranks from one regiment to another, to do duty, when occasion required.

The Oude committee likewise make a judicious selection of commanding officers, and the investing them with full powers, flogging included, leading measures for the improvement of discipline.

Both Colonel Burn and Brigadier Farquharson advocate giving commanding officers magisterial powers, as also ample powers to promote, dismiss, inflict corporal punishment, reduce to the ranks; but, says Brigadier Farquharson, such commanding officers must be selected men, and all their acts subject to review by inspectors of native troops, who should be appointed at the rate of one to every fifteen regiments, and who should submit periodical reports to commander-in-chief and heads of local government of provinces, in order that the latter may be acquainted with the tone and feeling of native troops in the province. Brigadier Coke would also have the commanding officer invested with magisterial powers to try his men for all crimes, murder excepted; which crime should be committed to the sessions, the commanding officer to have full powers to reward, promote, punish, reduce to ranks, discharge unfit men. He would have no Articles of War, no oath; the standing orders of the army and the field exercise being all that is necessary for drill and discipline; but separate standing orders for Seikhs, Puthans, Hindoostanees. Plain rules for drawing the pay of officers and men, "so as, if possible to protect the army from the injustice of the audit office, which has been the cause of greater disgust to the army than any other establishment in India."

Brigadier Troup observes that a system of discipline should be adopted which would show the soldier that his commanding officer had the confidence of his superiors. He would have rules, few, clear, and simple, altered as seldom as possible, and the same for every regiment, "such as to ensure an uniform rate of pay in all situations, and pensions claimable after prescribed periods of service; certain and speedy punishment awardable by the commanding officer, modified only by his own known good character; leave and promotion given by the regimental roster, except where his bad character or his qualifications should deprive him of the indulgence and reward; instruction in reading, writing, arithmetic, well grounded and not superficial; a clear understanding of all that is required of him; a knowledge that while his conscientious

" scruples would not be interfered with, he must on taking " and while he retains the service of his masters act as a " soldier, and make his prejudices bend to the requisitions " of the service. At present the pay and audit rules are so " complicated that no one understands them; the pensions " are claimable only on the medical opinions of perfect " strangers; punishments and rewards are uncertain; and " from their general ignorance they cannot understand what " is required of them; and find that many of their Euro- " pean officers are quite ignorant of their manners and cus- " toms, and can therefore be easily imposed upon, or demand " of them what they have been told shall never be required, " duties which make them outcasts at their homes."

Sir J. Hearsey advocates full powers to commanding officers to punish and reward, and to captains of companies with consent of the commanding officer.

Sir J. Hope Grant repeats his recommendations that the commanding officer be absolute, seniority system abolished, and caste ignored. Sir S. Cotton is of opinion that real discipline can only be maintained in the native army by the presence of the European soldier, and advises therefore that native corps be always cantoned alongside European corps.

Question 8.

Is the influence of the European officers among native troops greatest in time of peace or in time of war?

There is no difference of opinion upon this point, and all agree that war, which throws men and officers more together, and makes them know each other better, is the time most favourable to the influence of the European officer, and when the latter are most looked to and valued by the sepoy.

Question 9.

What conclusions do you draw as to the course to be pursued with native troops in times of peace, with regard to the strength at which regiments should be maintained, the occupation to be found for them, and the like?

The Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that regiments should not be too strong, that 640 or 700 sepoys is ample for infantry, and 420 or 480 troopers for cavalry; and that if the native army is maintained on such a reduced scale, as is hoped will be the case, the various duties of guards, escorts, and detachments will find it full employment.

The Punjab committee think that 800 privates should be the maximum in time of war for a native infantry regiment; and that in peace it might be gradually reduced to 700 or 600 if the service admitted of it. They note the great political importance of avoiding masses of armed natives, and advocate small corps as best both in the infantry and cavalry. They consider that such corps can only be advantageously employed in instruction drill, regular exercise, guards, and escorts; but would have them constantly handled, and every day under arms, even if only for ten minutes.

Major-General Birch, Brigadier Steel, and Brigadier Coke would employ native corps in time of peace as heretofore, guards, escorts, their own drill and discipline; these occupations will find them enough to do, and save the necessity for enormous establishments. Brigadier Coke does not advocate working native troops at road making or on public works: he is averse to employing soldiers as labourers, except on service. He would have the regiments 800 strong in time of peace, 1000 strong in time of war. Colonel Burn proposes the same strength, and is also opposed to employing native troops on public works, though he considers that in the drilling season the ordinary drill should include the construction of field works, and that no recruit should be dismissed his drill without having gone through a regular course of instruction in the use of the pickaxe and shovel. He thinks that this would remove the prejudice against working in the trenches which existed in the old Bengal army.

Brigadier Troup would never have a native regiment above 800 strong in time of peace; and would employ them in learning or keeping up the knowledge of all the duties required of European soldiers; of reading, writing, and arithmetic in one or other of the vernacular languages; of scaling, and the duties of sappers and miners, and in furnishing military guards; the police taking all civil duties, and guards, and escorts.

The authorities noted in the margin advocate the enlistment with a stipulation to labour and that native troops should, in time of peace, be employed on public works, such as roads, lines, &c. Sir J. H. Grant, Sir J. Hearsey, would have the corps 800 strong in time of peace. Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson, 640 strong and the Oude committee would keep them at a minimum of strength, and work them well. Major Williams would also keep the native corps at a minimum in time of peace, and employ them in duties which European troops cannot undertake. He remarks that the military police, with fewer men, have done double the amount of work the native army formerly accomplished.

Sir J. H. Grant.
Sir J. Hearsey.
Oude Committee.
Brig. Farquharson.
Lt.-Col. Macpherson.

Question 10.

Has the strength of the native infantry of the Bengal army ever been so great in times of peace that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere military duties?

The Commander-in-Chief replies that it is not believed to have been equal to more than the performance of its military duties, but that this arose, not from necessary employment, but from the innumerable and most unnecessary guards and escorts required to be given by regiments.

Major-General Birch considers that the strength of the native infantry has for a long time past been scarcely adequate to the duties required of it. Sir J. H. Grant also holds the opinion that it was never too strong for what it had to perform, and Colonel Burn is of the same opinion. Sir S. Cotton, too, holds that, with due consideration to the efficiency of the army, it could not have been otherwise employed. Brigadier Coke, after giving it as his opinion that the native infantry was not by any means too strong, says:— " I think, as before stated, it might well have been employed " in police duties; but since the extension of our empire, " and the triennial change of station, which I consider un- " necessary, I think our native army has been rather over " than under worked, and that this, to a considerable extent, " rendered the service less popular than it formerly was, " when our empire was of smaller extent. To march a " regiment from Peshawur to Barrackpore is a serious " undertaking, and puts men to a very considerable expense."

Brigadier Farquharson thinks that the men had too little to do at some stations; and Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson is of opinion that at the larger military stations they might have been employed otherwise than on mere military duties. So, too, Brigadier Steel, who would have it a condition of enlistment that men were to work, and who traces reluctance to work to the reduction of the batta, which in our earlier campaigns was given for labour in the trenches. Sir J. Hearsey, like Brigadier Farquharson, adverts to the frequently great strength of the native infantry corps, and considers that men could have been spared for work, but he notes the numerous guards, escorts, &c., detrimental to discipline, and a consequent necessity of perpetual re-drilling of the men returned from detached duty, where they had been neglected.

Of those holding the like opinion, that the native infantry might have been put to other employment, the Punjab committee remarks, that it would have been against the prejudices of the sepoys to do anything but military duty; and Brigadier Troup considers their employment otherwise than on military duties as highly objectionable.

Oude Committee.
Punjab Committee.
Major Williams.
Brig. Troup.

Question 11.

Would it have been practicable to employ the troops upon public works?

The Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that, as the army was constituted, it would not have been practicable, and also that it is not desirable to have a native army of such strength as that it can spare men for public works; and shows, taking a most favourable case, that a regiment of 640 sepoys, without a man on leave, will only have 392 men in the lines to relieve, at least estimate, 90 on guard.

The Punjab committee answer " No; the men would have " mutinied. In time of war they will throw up field works, " but even then they do not like it." Major-General Birch also thinks that it would not have been practicable; and Brigadier Coke states that the late Bengal army would (in his opinion) have mutinied had they been ordered to labour at public works. So, too, Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson, who says, that undoubtedly it would have been practicable had not the Bengal army been in a state of chronic mutiny, and certain to resist any attempt to make them labour. He adverts to a scheme published by Colonel J. Hodgson, for the employment of the native army on public works, one which some few officers might have succeeded in carrying out, but which, according to general conclusion, would have caused an outbreak.

The authorities who are of opinion that, under a proper system, making it a stipulation of enlistment, abolishing existing rules and custom, and working the men under their own officers, the employment of native troops upon public works is a practicable measure, are given in the margin.

Sir J. Hearsey.
Sir S. Cotton.
Sir J. H. Grant.
Oude Committee.
Brig. Troup.
Major Williams.

QUESTION 12.

In apportioning European officers to native troops,—

1. *Should native corps have a full complement of European officers according to the present scale, besides a full complement of native commissioned officers;—or,*
2. *A full complement of European officers and no native commissioned officers;—or,*
3. *A smaller number of European officers than at present, and a full complement of native officers?*

The Commander-in-Chief and the Punjab committee refer to the answers given to No. 16 of the infantry paper, No. 3, on "Organization, Promotions, and Rewards." Major-General Birch also refers to a previously recommended scale, in which the abolition of the grades of native officers and the appointment of two sergeants to each company were conditions, the strength of European officers, besides the field officers, being six captains, six lieutenants, and four ensigns.

Brigadier Steel, Colonel Burn, and Sir J. H. Grant, advocate the first system or scale. Colonel Burn, for his service corps only; his reserve or police battalion being upon No. 3 scale.

Those who advocate No. 2 scale are Sir S. Cotton and Sir J. Hearsey for the regulars; for irregulars they propose No. 3 scale.

The advocates for the third scale are, Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson, with an increase to the number of grades of native officers; Brigadier Farquharson, in connexion with his proposal for auxiliary corps officered from their European battalion; Brigadier Coke, who, in addition to the commandant, second in command, adjutant, and quartermaster, would have from three to five officers doing duty, but all mounted, and would hold the two native officers to each company responsible for the conduct of their men; Major Williams, Colonel Berkeley, and the Oude committee.

QUESTION 13.

If a full complement of European officers, would you attach cadets at once to a native corps, or first to European corps?

In the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, "all cadets "should do duty with a European corps for *at least* a year "before joining native troops. A longer period, perhaps, "would be better."

The Punjab committee would also keep cadets with European corps till they have thoroughly learnt their duty. The authorities who advocate this course are noted in the margin. Among these Sir J. Hearsey says:—"Never, "for the future, allow your cadets or "young European officers to be placed "under the instruction of natives of any "grade. Young officers, on arriving in India, ought to be "attached either to Queen's regiments or to the Honourable Company's regiments of European infantry, and they "should not be allowed to join a native corps until they "were taught, and were *au fait in all the duties required* "*to be attained* by an accomplished subaltern of the army. "A perfect knowledge of company drill, of the use of the "English rifle, sword exercise, fencing, *single-stick*, and "*horsemanship*."

Sir J. H. Grant. Sir J. Hearsey. Col. Berkeley. Col. Burn. Major Williams. Brig. Farquharson. Lt.-Col. Macpherson.

Colonel Burn also proposes a cadet college at Hazareebaugh, or at the nearest hill station, for a European regiment.

Sir S. Cotton would attach cadets to regiments in England, in the Mediterranean, and after a year's training send them on to India. The Oude committee would have no cadets in India, but would train them in England. If, however, in India, would form them with European corps.

Brigadier Coke would send cadets, on first arrival in India, to a college, such as Roorkee, on 200 rupees per mensem, where they should be kept until they passed their examination, whether for the infantry or the cavalry. He notes the nature of the examination and the athletic training that cadets should pass through, and he expresses the opinion that half the young officers of the army, on their first arrival in the country, contract habits of indolence, if not worse, which unfit them for the service of the State in after-life.

In conclusion, with the cavalry training he dwells on the opportunity for drilling the four newly embodied corps of cavalry after the principles laid down in Captain Nolan's book, and the necessity for making these light troopers individually expert horsemen, skilful in the use of their arms, and efficient for long-sustained and destructive pursuits.

Brigadier Steel takes a different view from any of the foregoing, being of opinion that nothing can be more disadvantageous than the attaching cadets for any length of time to European regiments, where they acquire ideas and opinions derogatory to the native army, a thing not desirable when they are to serve with that army. Brigadier Troup is also of opinion that cadets, on arrival, should at once be posted to the native corps to which they are to belong. Major-General Birch advises the same course, and considers that if eventually posted to a European regiment the cadet will not have lost time by doing duty at first with a good native regiment, whilst, if to be at last posted to a native regiment, the sooner he begins to serve with one the better, that he may, as soon as possible, know the men and their language.

QUESTION 14.

If a smaller number of European officers is assigned to native corps, how would you train them for this special employment?

The Commander-in-Chief would have them "learn their "military duty as officers of companies with a European "regiment. Their subsequent complete training should be "with natives."

The Punjab committee would send every cadet for two years to a European regiment. After that time, if an officer wished to qualify himself for a native corps, or any other staff appointment, the would send him, provided he had passed an examination in Hindoostanee, to the military college, there to go through a course of study in vernacular languages and professional knowledge. Two years to be the time allowed for passing through the college, after which the students to return to their regiments, their respective qualifications and fitness being reported to Government; and the latter could then select as many as were wanted for staff employ. Those assigned to native corps to "do duty" on probation for one year, after which they could either be permanently posted, transferred to some other department, or remanded to the European regiment. Should there be no college, there would be no better way than to send an officer, after two years with a European regiment, to do duty with a native corps.

Brigadier Farquharson would, after training with European corps, attach European officers *at their own request*, if competent and selected, to do duty with native battalions. Major Williams the same.

Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson considers that with the professional knowledge they would acquire in European regiments and a knowledge of the languages, the officers would not necessarily require any further special training; and he observes, naming Colonel Edwardes, C.B., the late Major Hodson, Major Daly, and others, that some of our best irregular officers have been drawn from our European regiments.

The Oude committee would select the officers for native corps from full European regiments.

Brigadier Steel and Major-General Birch would train them by attaching them to native troops from the first, as before stated.

Brigadier Troup hopes that the assigning a smaller number of European officers to native corps may never occur.

QUESTION 15.

Is the efficiency of regiments affected by the number of officers taken from corps for staff employment?

In reply to this question, the Commander-in-Chief states that the efficiency of regiments has been grievously affected from this cause; and in this opinion many concur, stating, that the best men were taken and the native officers were useless or worse; that although it is the quality of the European officers, not their numbers, that is of use in *aweing* and *governing* the native mind, yet that under the present system the efficiency is impaired by so many *selected* officers being withdrawn, and by every officer not withdrawn from his regiment being rendered a discontented and dissatisfied man. Others merely remark that efficiency has undoubtedly been very materially affected from the above cause.

Lt.-Col. Macpherson. Brig. Farquharson. Major Williams. Col. Burn. Sir J. Hearsey. Sir J. H. Grant. Sir S. Cotton. Oude Committee. Brig. Troup.

Brigadier Steel is of a different opinion, and thinks that, except in the field, where leaders are required to give native troops confidence, the efficiency of regiments has not suffered.

Major-General Birch also thinks that efficiency is not affected by the withdrawal of officers for staff employ, for that it is a well-known fact that a regiment well commanded will be quite as efficient with a few officers, as a regiment indifferently commanded with a larger number of officers; and he instances the Kelat, Ferozepoor, and Sirmoor battalions.

The Punjab committee reply:—"No, it was not the "paucity of officers, but the bad system which ruined the "regiments. As a general remark, the officers taken for "the staff were not superior (*when taken*) to those left, "though they usually became so by more active employ-

" ment in a sphere which gave more scope for exer-
" tion and discretion. The few officers left with the line
" regiments ought, under any other system, to have found
" more to do, and more call upon their faculties, more
" room for usefulness. But the more companies they got
" charge of, the more they saw that they had no power and
" and that all authority, and hope, and fear centred in the
" adjutant and adjutant-general. Thus they lost heart,
" and retrograded, rather than advanced in zeal and
" efficiency."

Question 16.

Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies, between the conduct of regiments with few, and those with many European officers present?

The Commander-in-Chief replies that the officers generally seemed to have more "esprit du corps" when many were with the regiment; but that the sepoys had made up their minds to rise, and that neither the number of officers nor the efficiency of commanding officers appear to have affected the course they took one way or other. So likewise the Punjab committee answer:—"No; the mutiny " seems to have been quite irrespective of the number of " officers." The opinion of Major-General Birch is to the same effect, and that if the influence of European officers has kept any regiment from mutiny, it has been that of the commanding officer, or the adjutant, or some highly respected and efficient officer in the corps. The unanimous opinion is, in short, that there was no difference whatever; and Brigadier Troup remarks that on the present system the number of officers was quite immaterial, as they had no influence. Sir J. Hearsey points out that all the contingents revolted as well as the regular troops, and that it was a general movement among the soldier class of Hindoostan, intended to have been simultaneous, and to have crushed the British power in India. That the object was to throw off the dominion of a foreign race, and then to sell their services to the highest native bidder; but certainly to a Hindoo ruler. Brigadier Steel observes that until the recent crisis, promotion, allowances, or the infringement of any usage on such points have been the cause of dissatisfaction in the Bengal army. He adverts to a curious circumstance in these words:—"The orders of General Wemyss " for the Bengal volunteers to attend church in Ceylon in " 1805, did not cause any open discord. They attended " twice before the officers got the order cancelled. The " attendance of detachments of 39 corps, each with an " officer, at Umballa, 20 at Sealkote, and 12 at Dum Dum, " for rifle practice, and their dispersal to their several regi- " ments, caused a union of action that could not have " otherwise occurred, combined with the proceedings at " head quarters on the subject."

Oude Committee.
Sir J. Hearsey.
Sir S. Cotton.
Brig. Coke.
Brig. Troup.
Brig. Steel.
Brig. Farquharson.
Major Williams.

Sir S. Cotton, after stating that as the officers had little or no control over their men, the numbers of European officers made no difference, adds, that the case is widely different in action, where there is no comparison, between the conduct of native regiments with few and those with many European officers; a fact that has not only come under his own observation, but has been remarked in all our campaigns; and that without them, in action, a native regiment becomes a disorderly rabble more dangerous than useful.

Question 17.

How can the demand of European officers for staff and detached employment be best provided for, without injuring the efficiency of regiments?

The Punjab committee advocate the general gradation list for the army of each presidency proposed by Brigadier-General Jacob, C.B., (see p. 207,) with some modifications, chiefly in his scale of employed and unemployed pay. The Punjab committee propose considerable lower rates of pay for generals and lieutenant-generals, so as to remove the inducement to remain too long in the country. They also add a third rate, or "subsistence allowance" of exactly one-half the "unemployed" scale; this is proposed for officers who from any reason of incapacity or vice, are thoroughly inefficient, yet cannot be brought under the lash of a court-martial.

After touching upon the status of the medical officers of the army, and proposing a new table of precedence, the Punjab committee signify their dissent from the proposal of Brigadier-General Jacob that "a distinct and separate " civil service be abolished." They also would modify the proposal made by Brigadier-General Jacob, with regard to candidates for the Indian service being educated at a military college in England, by proposing that half the appointments be direct, and that all be obtained by competition, those to the college on entrance, and the direct ones on appointment to the army. They would have a senior military college established in India for completing the military training of staff officers.

In the opinion of the Punjab committee, "the general " gradation list secures that degree of conservatism and " equal promotion which must ever be popular with the " majority of any service. The principles of selection for " employment secures for Government the abilities of its " best servants in the most important posts, and throws " open the highest offices to emulation, industry, and " ambition; while the three gradations of pay enable " Government to deal effectively with delinquents, without " absolutely ruining them, and will thereby carry public " opinion along with such decisions. The junior and " senior military colleges ensure the means of obtaining a " sound professional education to every officer who desires " to acquire it. The modified system of brevet, while in- " creasing the inducements to render gallant service, pro- " vides a check upon the abuse of the prerogative, and " diminishes the risk of unjust supercession. On the whole " a scientific and effective staff will be produced, without " depriving the line of its officers, or the officers of hope."

The Commander-in-Chief proposes having an unattached list for the staff; an expedient in which, under various modifications, the officers noted marginally, also find a remedy for the objections raised to the existing systems.

Sir J. Hope Grant.
Sir S. Cotton.
Sir J. Hearsey.
Brig. Farquharson.
Brig. Steel.
Col. Burn.
Major Williams.
Oude Committee.
Col. Berkeley.

Colonel Burn would have all officers not employed on purely military duty removed on appointment to the staff, and their places in corps filled up in the ordinary manner. He would divide the staff corps into grades like other regiments, and would give promotion in it after fixed periods of service. No officers under any circumstances to remain on the effective branch of the army after 40 years' service. Colonels removed to the non-effective branch to receive a non-effective allowance (in lieu of the colonel's allowance) of 300*l.* a year, this sum to be given in addition to the pension, and to be subscribed for by the officers themselves, by the payment of a fee or donation on promotion to each higher grade, as in the military fund. In order to prevent any undue pressure on the finances of the State, the removals during the first few years to be limited in number. Colonel Burn thinks that this would in time relieve the army "of the old Indian lieutenant-colonels," to whom Sir Charles Napier ascribes the inefficiency of the regular corps of the Bengal army.

Ensign,	3 years.
Lieut.,	8 „
Capt.,	9 „
Major,	5 „
Lt.-Col.,	7 „
Total	32 „

On promotion	Rs.
To Lieut.	100
To Capt.	500
To Major	2,500
To Lt.-Col.	4,400
To Colonel	10,000
Total	17,500

Sir J. H. Grant would have deputy assistant adjutant-generals, deputy judge advocates-general, and majors of brigade filled up by selected regimental officers. All other staff appointments by officers from a staff corps.

Brigadier Steel, besides a staff corps, proposes the alternative of having ten captains with a suitable proportion of lieutenants and ensigns to each regiment. Brigadier Troup also suggests the remedy of adding to each corps. He combines with this that no officer be taken for staff employment until he has served not less than five years, exclusive of absence on leave, with his regiment; and then only with the concurrence of his commanding officer.

Major-General Birch remarks that the question implies an affirmative answer to the 15th question, to which on the contrary he has given an answer in the negative. He is of opinion that the detaching of officers to the extent demanded for staff employment by no means necessarily impairs the efficiency of regiments; that there should be a limited number, below which a regiment should not be allowed to fall; and that with two sergeants per company it would suffice that besides the commanding officer, the adjutant, and the quartermaster, three captains and three subalterns should be present. He is, however, of opinion that much might be done to relieve the pressure on regiments by the employment of uncovenanted persons and of officers who have retired from the service, but would often be too glad to return to India for employment.

Question 18.

Would it be advantageous to the efficiency of the officers of the army, to cut off the inducement which the hope of staff employment affords to young men, to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the State?

The Commander-in-Chief replies:—"No, and it is pre- " sumed the State must have officers for special employ- " ment. There is no other sufficient source of supply open; " certainly not on the same terms."

The Punjab committee are of opinion that nothing could be more depressing and injurious to the officers of the army than to cut off the inducements to study furnished by the hope of staff employ. In this view Major-General Birch's opinion concurs, but he anticipates great service to the army by the establishment of a higher test prior to obtaining commissions in the army. In short, all are unanimous in the disadvantage which must arise to the service from cutting off the hope which frequently forms the inducement to qualify; but at the same time consider that the various schemes and modifications of staff corps proposed do not strike at this source of exertion. Thus, Sir S. Cotton is of the opinion that if the army be reorganized in the way he proposes, and the commands and staff appointments filled by selected officers in the manner he suggests, there should be sufficient inducement in the army itself for officers to acquire a knowledge of languages and of professional studies. He condemns the present system as depriving the army of its best and most intelligent officers for civil and other duties, which he considers totally opposed to their own profession. Sir J. Hearsey, Colonel Burn, Brigadier Troup, Brigadier Coke, all refer to their several suggestions and systems as not open to the objection of removing a spur to study and qualification.

The Oude committee would strike off officers when they left for civil employ.

Question 19.

Would the standard of acquirements amongst the officers of the army at large be lowered by any measure having such a tendency?

The Commander-in-Chief is of opinion that it probably would, as there would then be no inducement for officers to obtain proficiency in many branches of knowledge in which they now qualify themselves. The Punjab committee ask how it could be otherwise, as few men pursue knowledge for its own sake alone. Major-General Birch says it assuredly would; in which view Brigadiers Troup, Steel, and Farquharson and Lieutenant-Colonel Macpherson concur; as also Colonel Burn in nearly the same words as the Punjab committee. So, too, Sir J. H. Grant, Colonel Berkeley, and the Oude committee think the tendency of any such measure unfavourable; and Sir J. Hearsey observes that too much encouragement cannot be held out to officers to qualify themselves for staff situations, and that the opening should be left wide. He adds, "Sir Charles Napier, in conversation with me, said 'the European officers of the 'Bengal army made *the best, most excellent staff officers*, 'but their regiments ought not to be left with such few 'regimental European officers, for it made the native 'officers of opinion they could do just as well *without* '*European officers altogether*,' and I deem the late Sir Charles Napier to have been a most unprejudiced and competent judge on that head."

Brigadier Coke considers that according to his proposed system the general standard of acquirements would be very much raised. Major Williams says:—"Any officer who loves his profession would seek to qualify himself for the higher positions attainable in it. Those who only strive to excel, in hope of gaining staff employ, would not much benefit the State either in that position or with their regiments."

Sir S. Cotton is of opinion, "that the cutting off the hope of employment in the civil departments would improve the standard of military acquirements and general efficiency of officers, whereas he considers that the present encouragement afforded by civil employ to take up appointments for which they are not qualified, unsettles the minds of officers, and unfits them for their ordinary military duties."

Scheme for the Re-organization of the Indian Army, by Brigadier-General John Jacobs, C.B., &c., &c. (referred to in Answer to Q. 17, p. 206.)

The Queen of England formally to assume the style and title of Empress of India, and to be proclaimed accordingly.

The armies of the several Indian Presidencies to be henceforth styled the Royal Armies of India.

In each of these armies, the whole of the European officers of the cavalry and infantry, and the European officers of the artillery and engineers above the rank of colonel, to be formed into one general gradation list, in which, under ordinary circumstances, all will rise by seniority.

Rank in this list to be the only permanent rank, all regimental and other rank being temporary only, and to continue only so long as officers may be serving with regiments, or be otherwise employed in a military capacity.

In case of officers being promoted for good service, &c., by the Queen, they are to take their places in the general gradation list, according to the dates of their promotions, and are to enjoy every advantage exactly as if they had risen to such places by seniority only. This general gradation list to be styled the "unemployed list." All the officers borne on it who may hold no special appointments will reside in India at such places as Government may direct, but will have no public functions to perform.

A fourth presidency, to be styled the North-West Presidency, and a fourth army to be formed; our present Bombay and Bengal armies together being divided into three equal parts for this purpose.

Ultimately, the whole establishment of European officers may probably be somewhat less than at present; but under the proposed arrangements, the number of officers in the whole general list of each army can readily be adjusted in practice to meet the demands of the public service; when these shall have been correctly ascertained, no further changes will probably be requisite.

For an army of the strength of the present army of Bombay, the following establishment might be proper:—

Battalions or Regiments.	Colonels.	Lieutenant-Colonels.	Captains.	Lieutenants.
5 Artillery -	5	10	50	50
4 Engineers -	4	8	40	40
3 Cavalry -	3	6	30	30
33 Infantry -	33	66	330	330
45	45	90	450	450

Generals - - -	5	The ranks of Major and Ensign to be abolished.
Lieut.-Generals - -	10	
Major-Generals - -	15	

The several ranks of officers while unemployed in India, to receive pay as follows:—

	Rs.	
General - - - -	1,500	per mensem.
Lieutenant-General - -	1,200	"
Major-General - - -	1,000	"
Colonel - - - -	600	"
Lieutenant-Colonel - -	400	"
Captain - - - -	300	"
Lieutenant - - - -	200	"

These rates of pay to be allowed to officers wherever residing, by permission, in India, and the like number of pounds per annum to be allowed to each when absent from India on leave to Europe or elsewhere.

The option of retiring on full pay of the rank attained to in the general list to be allowed after 30 years, and on half pay after 20 years.

Leave of absence to be granted at the discretion of the local governments.

Subscriptions to military and all other funds to cease to be compulsory.

A distinct and separate civil service to be prospectively abolished.

Officers while unemployed or employed in civil capacities are not to be in any way subject to the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the army, or to military rule or etiquette.

All candidates appointed to the Indian service to be educated at a military college in England, and to reside at such college for at least two years, and not more than four years.

The minimum age for admission to be fourteen, and the maximum eighteen years.

The course at the college to include full instruction in mechanical and in physical science generally, and in political economy, also riding, rifle practice, and hardy exercises.

The residence at the college to be free of all pecuniary charge to the cadet, unless he decline proceeding to join the service in India in due course, in which case—to cover all cost to the State—he should pay at the rate of 100*l.* per annum for the period during which he has resided at college.

From the general list formed as above mentioned, officers are to be selected for every species of public employment, civil and military.

For each native infantry regiment, the establishment of English officers may be as follows:—

	Pay.	
1 Colonel - - - -	600	Rs. per mensem.
1 Lieutenant-Colonel - -	400	"
2 Captains (to be each Adjutant and Quartermaster) - - -	300	"

The pay assigned to each being in every case staff pay, to be drawn in addition to the pay due to each according to his rank in the general list. But though an officer may hold a lower rank in the general list than that which is assigned to his position in a regiment or other military employment, the temporary rank is always to hold good for precedence and command during the period of employment.

For the cavalry, the like establishment of officers may be allowed, with one hundred rupees extra pay to each rank, to cover the cost of horses and other expenses:

	Staff Pay.	
For a brigade of any strength:—		
1 Major-General - - -	1,000	Rs. per mensem.
1 Captain, Major of Brigade -	400	"
For a Division:—		
1 Lieutenant-General - -	3,000	"
1 Lieut.-Colonel, Adjutant-General	400	"
1 Lieut.-Colonel, Quartermaster-General - - - -	400	"
1 Captain, A.D.C. - - -	300	"
1 Major-General, Adjutant-General of the army - - -	1,500	"
1 Major-General, Quartermaster-General - - -	1,500	"
1 Colonel, Deputy Adjutant-General	500	"
1 Colonel, Deputy Quartermaster-General - - -	500	"

Proper office establishment, &c., to be allowed to commanding and staff officers; company and troop allowances and contracts as usual.

All officers, when absent on leave beyond the division in which they may be serving, are to receive unemployed pay only, and if other officers act for them when absent, even within the division, otherwise than on duty, the officer acting for the absentee is to receive his staff pay in addition to his own.

Officers of the rank of captain in the general list are to be considered eligible for selection to fill any of the regimental ranks or other appointments. Lieutenants on the general list are not to be considered eligible for higher regimental or other military appointments than that of lieutenant-colonel.

At their own request, and with the approval of the regimental commanding officers, any unemployed officers may be attached to do duty with regiments or departments without extra pay.

The recommendations of officers commanding regiments, with respect to the appointment of officers to fill vacancies in their corps, or to their removal therefrom to the unemployed list in consequence of proved incapacity, &c., are to be attended to. All enlistments, discharges, promotions to and reductions from all ranks of native officers and soldiers, are to rest with the colonels of regiments, and are to be signified by them, with reasons, &c., if necessary, in regimental orders.

Articles of War for native Indian troops to be entirely abolished.

Colonels commanding native Indian regiments are to have full magisterial authority over all ranks of natives of India in their regiments, followers as well as soldiers. Such powers to extend to the award and infliction of imprisonment, with hard labour, for a period of seven years, without the confirmation of higher authority being required; to imprisonment for fourteen years, subject to the confirmation of the general officer commanding the brigade; to transportation and capital punishment, subject to the confirmation of the general officer commanding the division.

Regimental lieutenant-colonels and captains are likewise to exercise magisterial powers under the control of the colonels commanding their regiments, and to such extent as he may think proper to authorize.

In all cases involving the award of a graver punishment than three months' imprisonment with hard labour, the infliction of corporal punishment above twenty-five lashes, or of a fine above fifty rupees, regular proceedings of the trials are to be recorded in full, to be laid before the general officer commanding, when required.

Cases of less serious nature may be dealt with summarily, on due investigation by the commanding officer at public regimental orderly room. A record of all such proceedings is to be entered in a proper book kept for that purpose, and preserved among the regimental records, for the inspection of general officers.

Colonels of regiments are to be held strictly and solely responsible to their superior officers and to the State, but not to the native Indian soldiers, for the propriety of all such proceedings.

Permanent head quarters to be established for each native Indian regiment, and complete carriage for every corps to be always kept up ready for a march, at a day's warning.

For the European infantry, the establishment of officers per regiment may be:—

		Rs.	
1	Colonel	600	per mensem
2	Lieut.-Colonels, each	400	„
10	Captains	300	„
1	Adjutant	300	To rank above the
1	Quartermaster	300	Lieutenants.
10	Lieutenants	200	per mensem.

The officers of artillery and of engineers each to be borne in a separate list up to the rank of colonel, inclusive, and thereafter to be incorporated in the general list of the whole army, the senior colonel of artillery or engineers, when senior in the army, being promoted to major-general as vacancies may occur.

Unemployed pay to be the same for all arms.

Employed pay, whether regimental or ordnance, &c., to be allowed as for the cavalry.

Each battalion of artillery to have field officers and staff as for an European regiment, the numbers of captains and lieutenants being adjusted according to circumstances, to the number absent on leave, and the number required for the ordnance department, and other artillery staff duties. All artillery officers in India to be considered as "employed" when not on leave.

In the ordnance department, the rank and pay of the various grades to be adjusted as follows:—

Senior Commissary	as Colonel.
Senior Deputy Commissary	as Lieutenant-Colonel.
Commissaries of Division	as Captains.
Assistant Commissaries	as Lieutenants.

	Rs.	
Commandant of Artillery—Major-General	1,100	per mensem.
Major of Brigade—Captain	500	„

Inclusive of horse allowance.

No difference of pay between horse and foot artillery.

Engineer officers attached to the engineer corps, or holding other military appointments, to be on the same footing as artillery officers; but the duties of engineer officers in India are generally purely civil, and their salaries, &c. should be adjusted specially for each appointment.

In all appointments other than military, officers will receive their unemployed military pay, in addition to such emolument as may be assigned to them in their civil capacities; and when absent on leave, or on any account other than public duty, beyond the range of their immediate superior, they will receive only the unemployed rates of pay.

JOHN JACOB.

APPENDIX No 72.

PRÉCIS OF REPLIES ON SUBJECT OF IRREGULAR CAVALRY.

IRREGULAR CAVALRY, BENGAL ARMY.

I.—RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army is composed?

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. "The irregular cavalry is composed chiefly "of Mahomedans of various tribes and races. "In the early days of its formation, the nobles and "chiefs of tribes brought their retainers into the field, and "thus troops and regiments were raised. Gradually this "has changed, and though the service still has attractions "for men of mark, as all have to pass through the ranks "to position, these have decreased. The Rajpoots were "formerly in greater numbers than now, though there "are still some to be found, and a few Brahmins."

Brig. Christie. "Thaiks, Synds, Moguls, Pathans, Ran-"gurs (Rajpoot Mussulman), Rohillas, Jats, Affghans, "Rajpoots, Brahmins, and Sikhs a few."

Punjab Committee on Punjab Irregular Cavalry. "Hindoostannes from round about Delhi "(like the rest of the irregular cavalry), "Pathans of the Trans-Indus and Affghan-"istan, Punjabee Mahommedans, numerous "Seikhs, and a few hill men."

Sir J. Cotton. "On the 1st May 1857 the 7th Irregular "Cavalry stood as follows:—

Mahomedans, Synds, and Pathans	392
Mahomedan Rajpoots	82
Brahmins	62
Rajpoots	28
Seikhs	20
Hindoos of inferior description	2"

Brigadier-General J. Jacob states that the regiments of the Scinde Irregular Horse are chiefly composed of Hindustanees, mostly Mussulmans of the agricultural and landholding classes of the districts around Delhi, Furruckabad.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from?

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. "Rohilcund has given the best men, per-"haps, Mahomedans (Pathans), the descen-"dants and relatives of the men of Eusofyze. Delhi "supplies many sowars, and the least desirable in "stamp. Jhuggur, Rhotuck, and Kullinore send forth "hundreds, Rajpoots and Ranjhurs, Mahomedan converts, "good soldiers, though they need to be commanded. "Hurrianah gives its share; some of the best horsemen in "the country are found in this district. A great many of "Jhujgier and Rhotuck men go to the Scinde Horse, tempted "by the higher pay."

Brig. Christie. Brig. Bradford. Sir J. Cotton. "Hansi, Hissar, Delhi, Boosbundshur, "Meerut, Moradabad, Kurnaul, Bareilly, "Agra, Bhurtpore, Furruckabad, Myn-"pooree, Shahjehanpore, Putteeala, Loodianah, and a few "from about Jullundur and Hosheearpore and Cawnpore "and Lucknow, but only in a few regiments."

To the foregoing, the Punjab Committee add the Cis and Trans Indus, Affghanistan, the Punjab generally, and the Cis Sutlej, as sending horsemen to the Punjab Irregular Cavalry.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, either by the regulations or the practice of the service?

"Of late years the demand for irregulars has been "such that no man who could manage a horse, and "find good security amongst his comrades, has been "refused service."

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. Brigadier Christie replies, "No, excepting "very low-caste men, who never ask to be "entertained."

Sir J. Cotton. Brigadier Bradford says, "Doubtless low "castes are excluded, such as Bhungees, Chumars, "Bunrahs, and many others."

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. The Jats were, perhaps, neglected on account "of indifferent horsemanship. I am "not aware of the exclusion of any warlike class at all "familiar with horses."

Brig. Christie. "It would be an advantage to a regiment "to have men from Rajpootana Proper, Beekaneer,

" and Shekawatee, and also Mahrattas; but these men " would not take service heretofore, as the pay was so very " small, and consequently preferred the native service, as " there they have plenty of pickings besides their pay."

Brigadier Bradford is not aware that any tribes or castes have been excluded or neglected that could have been enlisted with advantage, and says, it is understood that neither Mahrattas nor Rajpoots of Rajpootana would enlist in our service, as they would not submit to discipline.

Sir S. Cotton thinks that where native Christians can be obtained in sufficient numbers to form a troop, their entertainment would be highly desirable. He states, that sweepers have been tried under the name of Beydur (without fear). The prejudice of the men was too strong, and the "Beydurs" had to be got rid of. Though he does not recommend their being placed with other castes in a regiment, he thinks it might be desirable to have a few regiments of these men, the place of native officers being filled by European serjeants or Europeans of distinction from cavalry corps posted to these native corps as sub-officers.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. " Recruiting has been usually carried on " through the native officers and men of " each corps; they train up their children for the service. " No medium could be more efficient. Any native officer " or man of family could raise a troop, if need be, in his " own district. This was the agency adopted chiefly by " officers to whom the raising of corps has been " entrusted."

Sir S. Cotton. Brigadier Christie states, that Oomadwars came in numbers to their relations in the regiment, and are enrolled as vacancies occur.

6. On enlistment of recruits for irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts.

Sir J. Grant. Major Daly. Men's names are registered in their own districts, but desertion—ordinary desertion—is rare.

Brigadier Christie states that no precautions of registry are taken.

Sir S. Cotton replies, that the roll of the recruits, with a reference to some man of respectability in his village, is sent to the civil authority for verification and registry.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers, or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. " In irregular corps a list of candidates, the " sons and relatives of men who have died " or have been killed, or who are still present, is kept, and " then pass in as vacancies arise. In some corps this is " carried to such an extent that the admission of an out-" sider is unknown. These candidates or Omedwars move " about with the regiment. Doubtless there are many " and great advantages in thus making a corps the home " of a family from generation to generation; but there are " also disadvantages. The circle from which the supply is " drawn is narrow. Class interests obtain to an injurious " extent."

Brigadier Christie states, that in his late regiment, the 9th Irregular Cavalry, he made a recruit always furnish two men in the regiment as securities for his respectability and good conduct before entertaining the recruit.

8. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. " I can suggest no alterations in the mode " of recruiting. The ranks of the irregulars " must be filled up in a great measure for a long time from " the Punjab and the Pathans of Eurofzie and the border. " There is no sympathy between the Pathan and the " Seikh, and the former considers the Punjabee utterly " degenerate. There is a fine race of Pathan about Pindee " Gabe, in the Rawul Pindee district, who has lately " taken service with us."

Brig. Christie. " An increase of pay and pension will bring " a superior class of men into the ranks. As it is, " a man of good family must be very poor before he " takes service on seven rupees a month, which is all a " bhargur gets. On the other hand, if he has two or three " hundred rupees, he finds it more profitable to trade with " it than purchasing an assamee in a regiment of irregular " cavalry, which are in most regiments sold for three or " even four hundred rupees each."

Brigadier General J. Jacob would leave everything to the discretion of the regimental commander.

Sir J. S. Cotton would have recruits enlisted for general service. If irregular corps are kept at their present strength, he recommends preserving the counterpoise of castes by enlisting a distinct race for each squadron. He would prefer reducing the irregular corps to a strength of 300 or 350 men, and having such corps wholly of one caste, taking care that a due proportion of such caste be introduced into the service.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. " Major Daly, C.B., has raised two corps " of irregular cavalry, the 1st Punjab and the " 1st Oude Cavalry, and has augmented the corps of " Guides, yet he never administered an oath."

Brigadier Christie states, that the form of oath was introduced after he had left the irregular cavalry.

Brigadier Bradford remarks, that it is the same as in the regiments of the line.

Sir S. Cotton states that no oath is at present administered to irregular cavalry.

11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army when first enrolled?

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. " I would have no oaths. Oaths have not " served to restrain the native army from the " utmost brutality. No oath could have strengthened " the fidelity of the Guides and Punjab corps; and in " these they are not used."

Brigadier-General J. Jacob deems oaths to have the most pernicious effect.

Brigadier Bradford replies: "No; nor can I, after what " has occurred, consider that any form of oath would be " binding."

Colonel Gall would abolish the custom of administering oaths to recruits.

Sir S. Cotton thinks an oath somewhat similar to that of the infantry might well be introduced for the irregular cavalry.

12. Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

13. Or should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army be recruited over a wide area; in fact, without reference to districts?

14. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be homogeneous as to race or caste?

15. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be composed of rissalahs, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes; or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps?

Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly think that some corps might be raised with advantage in prescribed districts, but that it is of little importance whether corps or troops be of distinct races; that the efficiency of the regiment in either case would depend on the character and disposition of the commandant; that along the Punjab border we have had much experience of this sort. Some officers have endeavoured to make their corps Pathan; others, again, are imbued with a Seikh fancy; companies and troops of races: and in each case the result was good, because the officers were in earnest.

The Punjab Committee refer to their replies to the Infantry Series, as the same principles are equally applicable to the irregular cavalry; and they add, that they do not put forward their views of counterpoising one race of natives with another as any panacea for all the evils of the *old* army. " No one remedy, no one principle, of reform " or organization will meet the case, and to put any one " forward as a charm for ruling native troops would only " be empirical. We want a through revision of all details, " and earnest attention to *all* defects that have been " revealed in the mutiny. Among these defects, unquestionably the worst, and the one which operated most fatally " against us, was the brotherhood or homogeny of the Bengal " army, and for that particular defect the remedy is counter-" poise: 1st. The great counterpoise of Europeans; 2nd. That " of various native races. Had the old Bengal army had all

" the other remedies applied to it ten years ago which we " have recommended in these papers for the improvement " of its discipline, staff, &c., it would doubtless have been " a better army; but if its brotherhood had been left un- " broken, unchecked by any adequate European force, and " in the unsuspected possession of our magazines, posts, " and artillery, it would still have broken bounds like " water, at this one weak point, whenever its common pre- " judices were violently assailed."

Brigadier Bradford observes, that in raising corps from one particular part of the country, and there only, that there is the advantage that it would give the civil authorities greater power to check the enlisting of such corps than they possess at present. He would not have the corps homogeneous, but thinks that the tribes or castes might be kept separate, in rissallahs, for the better arrangement of messing.

Colonel Gall is of opinion that if the men enlisted for a corps be of different religions and different castes, it would be advisable to recruit each corps from a prescribed district, for then there would always exist a certain want of sympathy between regiments composed of men drawn from different districts; and this, added to estrangement produced between man and man by differences of religion and caste, would lessen the probability of combinations for an unlawful object. He would not have the regiments homogenous, nor let caste prove an obstacle to enlistment in any corps. He would have the tribes and castes mixed up together in the rissalahs.

Brigadier Christie also advocates mixture of races and castes, and objects to recruiting for regiments in prescribed districts; he prefers recruiting over a wide area without reference to districts; but considers that rissalahs of different tribes would be desirable, as one can be pitted against the other in case of disturbances.

Sir J. S. Cotton thinks, that if the present strength of irregular corps be reduced each might be so raised in a prescribed district. If the present strength be retained, then each squadron might be so raised and recruited. He considers that the mutiny has proved the evil of amalgamating castes; and he is in favour, therefore, of having numerous corps or squadrons.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob would leave all such matters wholly to the discretion of the regimental commanders.

16. If the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportions should the races, tribes, or castes enter?

Being opposed to homogeneous corps, Brigadier Christie would have the tribes composing the regiments as nearly equal as they can be procured, though he remarks that the Mussulmans will always preponderate.

In like manner, Brigadier Bradford observes that it would be as well to have in each regiment a couple of rissallahs of Hindoos, or, in the case of Punjab corps, a like number of Mahomedan rissallahs. He adds, however, that he has not much faith that this arrangement would prevent their combining against the state, when inclined to do so.

Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly strongly advise that distinction of race should be preserved,—that the Seikh troop be Seikh, and the Pathan, Pathan; and they prefer troops of different races for general service to corps of one race.

The Punjab Committee reply to Question 16:—" With " reference to the peculiar nature of the Punjab frontier " service, we would advocate in the Punjab irregular cavalry " the following proportions of races:—

" 2, Mahomedans,
" 2, Seikhs,
" 2, Hindustanees."

Sir S. Cotton thinks the irregular cavalry might be composed of half Hindoos and half Mussulman. The latter, including Trans-Indus, Pathans, Punjabee, and Hindoostanee Mahomedans, the former class consisting of Seikhs and Hindustanee Rajpoots. If native Christians are attainable, he considers it very desirable to have a proportion of them in the irregular cavalry, as well as all other branches.

17. What agency should be employed for recruiting?
18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Sir J. H. Grant refers to the replies given to Questions 5, 6, 7. The Punjab Committee consider that no change in the present system seems required, all that is necessary being to enforce the existing orders.

Colonel Gall advocates a careful system of registry, not unlike that instituted in the Punjab, and subsequently extended to the Bengal army generally.

Brigadier Christie would make the commanding officer the responsible agent for the recruiting, and advocate registry by the local authorities, and security taken from the head man of the village, if possible.

Sir S. Cotton is of opinion that the irregular cavalry will always be popular as a service, and apprehends no difficulty in recruiting. He considers the present precautions of a verification roll sufficient.

19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Bengal army?
20. If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European cavalry corps, and subject to periodical relief?
21. How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed?
22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?
23. How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed? with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers with whom they would be associated?

The Punjab Committee reply to (Question 19) the question whether a troop or squadron of Europeans should form a component part of the irregular cavalry corps of the Punjab, " No, certainly not, nor of any other regiments " in India. The tendency would be to make the natives " dragoons, so as to correspond with the Europeans, who " would naturally become the model for the whole corps. " It is one of the blessings of this crisis that it affords an " opportunity of getting rid of the regular native cavalry, " which we consider to have been a total misapplication of " the European system, a branch of the old army which " was at once costly and inefficient; and it would be " throwing away all past lessons now deliberately to adopt " a plan which would not only give us native dragoons " again, but rob us of our irregulars. The experiment, as " tried by Sir S. Cotton at Peshawur, was a very valuable " one, for it made a few Europeans go a long way at a " dangerous time; but the natives associated with them " are thorough dragoons, than which nothing can be more " foreign to the Asiatic."

Brigadier Bradford does not recommend a troop or squadron forming a component part of a corps of irregular cavalry, and cannot see any advantage to be gained by such a mixture.

Colonel E. Gall thinks it would be inexpedient to bring such a small body of Europeans into too close proximity with native troopers, familiarized with the weak points of the European soldier's character, and confiding in their numerical superiority, the natives might be disposed to take advantage of the Europeans.

Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly consider that the introduction of a troop or squadron of Europeans would seriously embarrass the moveability and therefore diminish the value of irregular cavalry. In which opinion Brigadier Christie concurs, and deems it unnecessary that a troop or squadron of Europeans form part of a regiment of irregular horse. If the scheme were adopted all three consider that the troop or squadron must be enlisted specially for the purpose.

Sir S. Cotton is also opposed to such a measure, considering it calculated to lead to the deterioration of the European soldier in every respect. He advocates, however, that a squadron of natives be enlisted for service with European corps of cavalry, to save the European soldiers from duties of exposure, such as rear guard on the march, and covering foraging parties.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob replies:—" No. These ques- " tions appear to me to be equivalent to asking whether " each troop of horse artillery should not have a Lancaster " gun of ten tons weight or so attached to it."

24. How should the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be armed?

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. " Every irregular should have a sword, lance, " and carbine. He has much detached duty " to perform, which necessitates the possession of fire- " arms. Picquets, escorts, videttes, moving through hilly " and jungle countries without fire-arms, are at the mercy " of their enemy. This is well understood on both sides. " With their carbine the sowar is treated with respect: " without it he feels helpless. This is the general feeling " amongst the men. I would have it optional to the man " to carry a lance."

Brigadier Bradford and Brigadier Christie would arm the irregular with tulwar and carbine.

Colonel Gall would give native troopers a light carbine loading at the bore; but he would arm one squadron in every corps of irregular cavalry with spears, the shaft of bamboo, the common long hunting-spear called the boar spear. He considers there is no weapon like it in pursuit. He would have Europeans with better fire-arms than those given to the native troopers, and notices the carbine brought out by Her Majesty's 8th Hussars. He advocates wooden scabbards, cased in leather, for the present dragoon sabre.

The Punjab Committee would arm the privates with sword and carbine; native officers and non-commissioned officers with sword and pistol. Picked duffadars and troopers, at the discretion of the commanding officer, might carry spears. Sir S. Cotton thinks nothing can be better than a tulwar and a carbine, the present arms of the irregular cavalry.

26. Do the dress and equipments of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army admit of improvements; if so, state them?

As the Punjab Committee, in reply to this question, touch on the same point to which Colonel Gall adverts, viz., steel scabbards, it is best to give their service-like remarks *in extenso*:—"The Punjab irregular cavalry are "very suitably dressed and equipped in a native chupkun, "with kummerbund and turband, pijamahs, boots; swords "and carbines for privates; and pistols and swords for "officers. This requires no alteration. The saddles, how-"ever, in some cases require changing. At present some "of the men have got charjamuhs, which are excessively "hot, and give the horses sore backs. A light kathee, "admitting of a native seat, should in these instances be "substituted. In the irregular cavalry generally, espe-"cially in Hindostan, where rough and ready work is "seldom seen, the tendency is to polish, and polish the "irregulars into regulars. Few European officers have "the free spirit of the irregular; and they tighten every-"thing in the regiment, discipline and clothes, year by "year. There is one relic of olden times which it is to be "hoped will now be positively forbidden by Government, "the steel scabbard of the regulars, which blunts the "sword, loads the horse, and by clatter and glitter betrays "every movement."

Brigadier Christie, Major Daly, Sir J. H. Grant consider the dress of the irregular cavalry good, though they object to the tendency in some corps to tinsel and trumpery. They recommend that the belts and appointments should be of English manufacture, as those of Indian manufacture fail in the test.

Sir S. Cotton says, that the present dress of the irregular cavalry is not good, taking a long time to put on; and he would substitute the tunic for the akhalik. He remarks, that Nolan's saddle has been tried in the 7th Irregular Cavalry by Colonel Mulcaster, and found to answer well.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob would leave the arms, dress, and equipments to the discretion of the commanding officers.

II.—Rules of Discipline and Military Code.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the Articles of War now in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. I think such alterations necessary in the Articles of War to render them serviceable in the irregular cavalry that I would abolish them altogether, and substitute a few simple rules within the comprehension of all. They have never been used in the Guides and in the Punjab Irregular Force. The general principles only are acted on. In the irregular cavalry a few general rules should suffice, such as the penalties of desertion, disaffection, insubordination, &c. The service is highly popular, and now that the cavalry is likely to be put on a better footing it will become more so. Men riding their own horses give pledges for conduct, and the fear "of discharge has a beneficial effect even on the "lowest. When a sowar begins to require punishment "the best course is to get rid of him."

Brigadier Christie observes, that since the irregular cavalry has been subjected to the Articles of War they have deteriorated very much; and he most earnestly recommends that the old punchayet system be reintroduced, which was invariably found to answer so well.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

He would have nothing to say to the special rules regulating punishment in the regular native army or in the British army either.

Brigadier Bradford considers the Articles of War too complex, and very little understood by native troops, and that offenders not unfrequently escape punishment on mere technicalties. He would therefore substitute a simpler code, and abolish native courts-martial altogether.

The Punjab Committee refer to their corresponding answer in the infantry paper, in which their views and recommendations tally with those of Brigadier Bradford and those preceding.

Colonel Gall would subject native soldiers to all punishments which European soldiers are liable to suffer for grave offences.

Sir S. Cotton recommends the removal of all restrictions, leaving to courts in all cases their full powers, adding 25 lashes to minor punishments (Art. 112), and reduction of non-commissioned officers; also granting to commanding officers power to punish native commissioned officers.

He would have special rules retained, but made much more stringent.

Brigadier General J. Jacob states, that no Articles of War have ever been in use in the Scinde Horse. He would have no special rules, but would leave everything to the discretion of a selected commanding officer.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

The opinion of Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly is, that the system of courts-martial in irregular corps works well in no respect; in which view Brigadier Christie coincides.

Sir S. Cotton is of the same opinion, as native officers will not uphold discipline; and he expects none to exist in the native army as long as native officers sit in court-martial, and commanding officers have not the power to punish native commissioned officers summarily, and reduce non-commissioned officers to the ranks. He would have trials held only by European officers; two being enough to form a court when there is a scarcity, and in case of a less number than two the commanding officer to possess the full power of a court-martial.

Brigadier General J. Jacob replies that courts-martial are not resorted to in Scinde Horse.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the irregular cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed?

5. What proportion of the troopers of the irregular cavalry can read and comprehend the Articles of War in their own vernacular?

Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly reply that portions of the Articles of War are read to the men from time to time. Those who are best acquainted with the articles are generally the scamps, "the lawyers," who boast of their use for evading punishment.

Brigadier Christie states, that in his regiment the old Articles of War which concerned the men were read once a quarter. Very few indeed could read, but all understood them when read and explained to them.

The Punjab Committee state that perhaps 15 per cent. of the Punjab Irregular Cavalry can read.

Sir S. Cotton states, that the Articles of War are read on parade, and that about one man in three can read and comprehend the Articles of War in their vernacular.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob remarks, that the practice in the different irregular cavalry corps of the Bombay army differs very greatly. No code was ever in use in the Scind Irregular Horse since he has commanded the corps, except the regimental orders, and no law thought of except the will of the commander.

III.—Organization, Promotion, and Rewards.

1. In the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

The Punjab Committee state, that in the Punjab irregular cavalry, as in the infantry, the promotion is given to the best men, preference being shown to seniority where possible. They add, "Here we must explain, what should "indeed have been added to the corresponding answer in "the Infantry Paper that an endeavour has been made "though not so steadily persevered in as it might have "been to keep up a proportion of *races* among the native "officers and non-commissioned officers, as well as among "the men of a corps; so that this consideration often de-"cided a promotion."

Sir J. H. Grant believes promotion in the Bengal irregular cavalry was based chiefly on seniority, and remarks,
Major Daly. that in the original corps all the commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers are or were very apt men.

Brigadier Christie, on the contrary, considers that the promotion was based on merit.

Sir S. Cotton remarks, that there is no rule that promotion shall be based on seniority; and that the system varies according to the ideas of the commandant for the time, and of the government in the cases of commanding officers.

" In the Scind Horse promotion by merit alone is the
Brigadier-Gen. S. Jacob. " rule, and the commandant is the sole " judge of such merit."

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army generally intelligent, useful and efficient?

Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly reply, that in the Punjab cavalry, where promotion is based on merit, the officers and non-commissioned officers are remarkable for their intelligence and efficiency. The Punjab Committee also answer, that they are certainly so. Brigadier Christie, referring to the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, replies, " Yes, if they are promoted as above (i. e. by merit), " and it is the commanding officer's own fault if any but " efficient commissioned and non-commissioned officers are " promoted. He is of opinion that no man should be pro- " moted to the grade of kote duffadar who is not fit " to be promoted to a commissioned officer eventually."

3. Are the acquirements usually of a higher grade than those from the troopers from among whom they have arisen?

The Punjab Committee reply, that in the Punjab irregular cavalry the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers are selected on account of their intelligence and efficiency. Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly remark, that the native officers of the Punjab cavalry are chiefly men of family and influence; and that the non-commissioned officers selected from the ranks were certainly, as a rule, the best to be found.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

With reference to Question 4, they state they are not aware of any test or examination being in force prior to promotion, nor do they think it would be advisable that there should be any. Brigadier Christie answers, that he never had any test or examination, having been intimately acquainted with the qualifications of all his officers and non-commissioned officers.

Sir S. Cotton states, that a few native commissioned officers who have had rapid promotion, and are in their prime, are intelligent and efficient, but that generally they are illiterate and bigoted men risen by seniority. In the Scind Horse, Brigadier-General J. Jacob thinks the native commissioned officers of the Scind Horse generally very good, within their own sphere of action, equal in efficiency to the average of captains and subalterns of the regular regiments. He notes the examination in drill, in accounts, &c. of men prior to promotion from the ranks.

6. Has it been found on occasions of a mutiny that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check or quell a mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

The Punjab Commissioners reply, "The only instance " we can recal of mutiny among the Punjab irregular " cavalry was a partial one in the 2nd Punjab Cavalry at " Delhi. It was confined to the Hindostanee section of the corps, and the three Hindostanee native officers were the " ringleaders. The Sikh native officers of the same squa- " dron on this occasion warned the European officers that " something was wrong among the Hindostanees, though " they had not been admitted to their counsel, and could " not say what was meditated. The mutineers made " overtures to a Puthan native officer of a Punjab infantry " regiment, who immediately gave information, and the " ringleaders were hanged on the spot."

Brigadier Christie answers, as a rule, certainly, in the late mutiny, the native officers have not evinced that fidelity which might have been expected from them, nor have they given any information, or aided in quelling the mutiny, and as many, if not more, have gone with the mutineers as have remained faithful.

Brigadier Bradford replies to the same effect.

Sir S. Cotton considers that native officers generally lead and prompt mutineers, pushing the men forward, and keeping in the background themselves.

Brigadier-General Jacob replies, that nothing can have been more noble than the conduct of the men and officers of every grade in the Scinde Irregular Horse, under circumstances of great trial and temptation during the late mutiny and attempted rebellion.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?

Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly reply, that retiring pensions have undoubtedly much attached the people to our service and rule; and they are of opinion that the convulsion from which we are now emerging can hardly be said to prove the contrary. " The swoop was so universal, the presence " of Europeans so rare, that they may well be pardoned for " thinking the rule at an end." They consider that the pension system should undoubtedly be maintained, though the opportunity should not be lost to modify and amend it; in which latter opinion Brigadier Bradford coincides.

Brigadier Christie says, in answer to Questions 10 and 11, " In former days I thought they had, but from the day of " the outbreak they cast all retiring pensions to the winds, " as well as the honours conferred for distinguished conduct " in the field. For the time they were perfectly demented; " but I believe they bitterly repent it now. After the re- " organization of the irregular cavalry, I would recommend " the system of pensions should be retained; moreover, " that the pensions of irregular cavalry should be increased " to the same scale as the regular regiments, because they " are no longer locals, but liable to move from station to " station, the same as the regular troops, and employed in " all warlike operations to a great extent; moreover, it is " a notorious fact that they are far harder worked than the " regular troops, and yet a naick in the latter gets the same " pension as a jemadar in the irregular cavalry, viz., 7 rs. " per mensem."

The Punjab Committee refer to their remarks in the Infantry Paper, in which analogous observations with Brigadier Christie's are made. Sir S. Cotton believes that retiring pensions, though they do not appear to have influenced the native army in the recent mutiny, were effectual in attaching native troopers to our service and rule. He would therefore maintain pensions, modifying the system, placing the irregular cavalry on the same footing as the line, exercising greater care in the selection of recruits, and having repeated inspections by a medical committee until men had been for years in the service.

13. Should the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

Sir J. W. Grant. Major Daly. Merit and efficiency should rule all promotion; without them there can be no reliance on the conduct of corps.

Punjaub Committee. Brig. Christie. " Wherever existing, promotion by seniority, it should be abolished, and merit be " the rule."

Col. Gall. " I would make efficiency, proved by a " test, the rule of promotion, giving the prior " claim to seniority of course; but I would make merit " displayed on the field of battle, or on active service in " the field, an exceptional ground for advancement, and in " these cases dispense with all further proofs of fitness."

Brig. Bradford. " Promotion, in my opinion, should be " based on seniority and merit combined."

Sir S. Cotton would have merit and efficiency the rule.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. The native commissioned officers on courts-martial invariably are guided by the nod and inclination of the superintending officer. They know no higher justice than his wish.

Brigadier Christie deems the native commissioned officers perfectly efficient on punchayets, which he strongly advocates, but not so on courts-martial. Brigadier Bradford would have no native courts-martial.

Sir S. Cotton answers, " No; not the best of them."

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. I think the present system of officers is good. Two subalterns should be attached to each corps, as in the Punjab.

Speaking of the Punjab irregular cavalry, the Punjab Committee answer, "There are now three European officers, "and a fourth doing duty (not including the medical "officer), and this is the complement we would advocate."

Brigadier Christie says, "I consider, as only three "officers are allowed to regiments of irregular cavalry, they "ought to be the best procurable in the army, and selected "with great care, for every thing depends on them. They "ought to be superior horsemen, with great dash, and well "up to their work in every respect."

Brigadier Bradford recommends no alteration, the best plan being to select officers as at present.

Colonel Gall says, "No officer should be allowed to join "an irregular corps until he had proved the possession of "certain acquirements, without which the duties of this "branch of the service cannot be so efficiently performed "as they ought to be. More than activity and zeal should "be required of an officer destined to the command of an "irregular corps. On service he is generally the first to "come in contact with an enemy; he is the first upon "whom the duty of reconnoitering a position devolves. As "the general or other officer commanding a field force may "be guided by the report of a reconnoissance, the informa- "tion furnished by it should not only be most accurate, but "accompanied by a plan of the ground, position, or ex- "ternal defences of the enemy, without which the clearest "reports are imperfect; yet how very few cavalry officers "comparatively have acquired the art of plan-drawing or "sketching ground."

Sir S. Cotton would make it allowable to fill up every third vacancy in the commissioned grades by a direct nomination thereto of a young intelligent man who had not served previously, his first three years' service being on probation.

18. Among the classes which enter the regular and irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, which is the most popular, the regular or irregular; and what reasons are assigned by the natives for the preference?

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. The classes which have hitherto entered the regular and irregular branches are distinct. The latter attracted a class for whom the regular service has no attractions,—men of some money,—fond, too, of the position and importance which belonged to the irregular branch. Oude supplied two thirds of the recruits for the regular cavalry, yet I have never seen an Oude man an irregular.

Brigadier Christie replies, "Decidedly the irregulars, as "it is considered more honourable to ride one's own horse, "and are altogether a more respectable class of men than "those which enter the regular regiments, small zemindars, "&c. Although the regulars are better paid, still the men "that generally compose the irregular cavalry will not take "service in the regular cavalry, disliking the constant "parades, stable duty morning and evening, &c. I made "it a point of never interfering with the men with regard "to their horses, provided they were in good condition, "and up to any amount of work."

"Brigadier Bradford says, "The irregulars are most po- "pular. I have never heard any reason assigned, that I "remember; but I have no doubt that preference is given "them from their being less trammelled with discipline, "and less under the eye of the European officer than the "regular cavalry, and the degree of respectability conferred "by the ownership of a horse."

21. Would it be practicable and advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a body of native irregular horse?

Punjab Committee. None should be mounted by government. Not only does a man take less interest in the government horse, but in critical times the trooper who rides a government horse has a direct inducement to desert. The trooper who rides his own has something to lose.

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. The efficiency and tone of the cavalry would be changed if horses were supplied by government; better that all should remain on the footing which has worked so well.

Brig. Christie. All the native cavalry should be irregular, and ride their own horses. Government mounting men would be much more expensive. Moreover, particularly on detached duties, the horses would not have that care taken of them as if they were the men's own property. They would be nothing more than a corps of bhargeers, and consequently lose that self-respect which they at present possess.

Brig. Bradford. They should, as at present, be mounted on their own horses, which is probably the best part of the system.

Colonel Gall would have none of the irregular cavalry mounted by government.

Sir S. Cotton suggests that irregular corps be allowed to purchase at their chunda rate all stud horses not required for the artillery and dragoons.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob would have the whole on the Silladar principle and arrangements, and details left to the regimental commander. He observes that a regular native Indian cavalry could be formed on the Silladar principle, and that the Scinde Horse is more regular than any of the regulars themselves.

22. What is the average cost to government of the horses on which the troopers of the regular native cavalry of the Bengal army are mounted?
23. Whence are the horses obtained; and of what breeds are they?
24. Whence does the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency draw its horses?
25. What is the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency?
26. Are the requirements of the mounted branch of the Bengal army adequately met by the system pursued for obtaining horses?

The Punjab Committee believes the average cost to government of the horses of the regular cavalry to be about 700 rupees, chiefly drawn from the government studs in India. They state that the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry has not been more hitherto than 125 rupees (though the chunda or horse fund allowed 150 rupees), for which reasons are shown in reply to Question 28. The troopers both of the Punjab irregular cavalry and for that of the Bengal army prefer the mares of Hindostan, failing which they look for horses in the Punjab; and only take northern horses as the last resort, because they cannot stand the heat or quick work, though they are admirable for artillery. The Committee note that there is great and yearly increasing scarcity of horses.

Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly also observe that the requirements of the irregular cavalry were met of late with difficulty. Prior to the mutiny, the average cost of horses reached 175 rupees or even 200 rupees, a gradual rise having taken place since the increase of the irregular branch. The irregular cavalry formerly derived their horses from the zemindars, whose mares were visited by the stud stallions. During the last few years Affghanistan and the countries beyond have contributed greatly to our wants. The fathers and brothers of many of the sowars are large zemindars, who breed especially for the service, and this is represented as having been particularly the case about Bareilly and in Hurrianah.

Brigadier Christie says that a good irregular cavalry horse is not to be had under 200 rupees, but that many are admitted at a lower figure, say 150 rupees; that they are obtained from all parts of Hindostan and Affghanistan, and from the rejected colts and fillies at the government studs. He recommends that all the latter description of cattle be offered in the first instance to regiments of irregular cavalry, previously to being disposed of to other parties by the government stud officers, or sent to Calcutta for sale. Brigadier Christie purchased many horses of this description from the Hanper stud, which he says turned out particularly well. Up to the time of the mutiny he believes that the requirements of the mounted branch of the Bengal army were adequately met from the government studs, but since then foreign horses have been largely imported from the Cape and New South Wales.

Brigadier Bradford states, that the average cost to government of the horses supplied to the cavalry by the government studs was 466 rupees each, for the years 1854–55 and 1855–56, and he is informed that the accounts for the two last years will give a lower average, but the stud officers were unable to furnish it, and referred Brigadier Bradford to Major Newbolt, the auditor of commissariat accounts in Calcutta. Formerly the price of remounts was much higher. He gives the average cost of the horse of the regular trooper at about 175 rupees, and says they were obtained from the country generally.

27. Can you suggest any improvement in the system of obtaining horses for the European cavalry and artillery of the army of the Bengal presidency?
28. Is it advisable that the government studs should be maintained, or should they be abolished, and government rely on the markets of India, of foreign countries, and of British colonies for a supply of horses for the army of India?

The present requirements of the mounted branch of the army Brigadier Bradford considers not adequately met by the government studs, and that in consequence of the late

increased demand for all sorts of horses it could not have been supplied without indenting on Australia and the Cape. He considers the colonial cattle well adapted to artillery purposes, and that that branch should in general be supplied from this source; but still he deems it unadvisable to trust altogether to distant colonies and foreign countries for a supply of horses; he therefore is in favour of maintaining the government studs, which have proved of great use in furnishing remounts to all the mounted branches, including the police force; and he remarks that the country breed, whatever it may have been, has greatly deteriorated, and now supplies but few horses for the artillery and dragoons.

Upon these points the Punjab Committee remark, that for Europeans of light weight and short height there is no horse like the Arab, for he stands heat and exposure, and poor food, in a wonderful manner. But Arabs are too small for such European dragoons as have hitherto been in India; and to mount such men the only horses are, firstly, New South Wales; secondly, Cape; thirdly, stud. For draught the northern horses are excellent, but when taken to Hindostan they fall off in condition, and are rejected. If the artillery in the Punjab, from Peshawar to Umballah, were limited to the northern horses, it would greatly ease the demand upon the government studs and other sources of supply for the cavalry, and when in course of relief the artillery went to Hindostan, the horses should be mutually exchanged between the relieving and relieved troops or batteries, so as to keep the northern horses in a congenial climate, We would also suggest that all stud bred colts should be gelded, and thus admit of mares being used with them in the ranks. The Committee are in favour of maintaining the government studs, as no source of supply can be spared, but would place them on a better and cheaper footing; and note it as a general opinion that the stud colts are pampered, their constitutions made delicate by high feeding, and that the hard work and poor food of a campaign consequently has an undue effect upon them, and this seems proved by the very different result among the fillies, which being rejected from the government service remain with the zemindars, get hard hoofs, tough constitutions, muscular legs, and good wind, and are at last bought cheap by sowars in the irregular cavalry, who prefer them to any other stamp of horse, for their real serviceable qualities.

Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly also advocate the castration of the stallions passed into the service, and the introduction of mares into the ranks. They are likewise in favour of maintaining the Government studs, but would introduce a better system of breeding. They are of opinion that by entering mares into the cavalry service the expense of mounting it would be much diminished, and the state might then be able to afford keeping up a certain number of good brood mares, without which, however good the stallions, the improvement of the stock of horses is impossible. They are in favour of Arab stallions.

Brigadier Christie urges attention to the selection of mares for breeding purposes, as the principal thing to be looked to to insure good stock, and states that it has been little attended to in the breeding districts. He also urges strongly that the greatest care be taken in the selection of stud officers, which in some instances he considers has not been the case. He also recommends that the natives be encouraged again to breed horses such as they furnished in former years for the cavalry for 400 and 450 rs. each.

Colonel Gall also observes, that the want of breeding and size in the country mares is the cause of many defects in the stud produce; but he limits the remark to the Hanper stud. He advocates the abolition of the government studs, and the encouragement in Persia, Arabia, Scinde, Turkistan, the British colonies, and India generally, of the breed of horses for the Indian market.

Sir S. Cotton states the average cost of the irregular trooper's horse to be about 180 rs., and that they are obtained from the government stud districts, large fairs, and the Affghan dealers, and that the mares from the stud districts are the best. He considers that the requirements of the mounted branches of the Bengal army are scarcely adequately met. He suggests no improvement, but thinks that the government studs should undoubtedly be maintained and increased, and quotes the advantage derived from the fact that stud stallions were sent into the Sind Saugor district about five years ago.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob states, that the horses of the Sind Irregular Horse average about 225 rs. each. The horses are chiefly from Beloochistan and Herat. He cannot give the average cost of the horses of other irregular corps of the Bombay army, that of the horses of the regulars averages 500 rs. each. He is strongly in favour of the Arab horse; opposed to the "standard height" for cavalry horses; in favour of government studs, properly managed; and points out what he deems the errors of the English and Indian breeding studs.

29. What is the pay of the troopers of irregular cavalry in the Bengal army?

30. Has that pay proved sufficient to enable the corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field, during a protracted campaign?

30b. Have corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal Army been embarrassed by debt, or free from debt?

31. Should any alteration be made in the pay of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army.

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. The pay of the troopers, prior to the mutiny, was twenty rupees. The pay was insufficient. This has been felt by every one connected with irregulars, and was generally acknowledged. Corps were overwhelmed in debt, and would have been unable, in many instances, to take the field, but for the banker. In many corps the sowar never saw his pay; the whole abstract passed into the hands of the banker, who deducted his per-centage, varying from 24 to 48 per cent., and doled out subsistence money to his patient. Since March last it has been announced in the Punjab that the sowar's pay had been increased to 25 rs. The police generally throughout the kingdom have received the same notification. It has not been made known to the irregulars generally, but we act on the supposition that it is the case.

Brigadier Christie considers the pay of the irregular trooper, twenty rupees a month, most inadequate; and states that corps of irregular horse were generally deeply indebted to the regimental bankers. He thinks the ressaldars and ressaidars are sufficiently paid; that the naib ressaldars should have their pay raised to 55 rs. per mensem, jemadars to 50 rs., kote duffadars to 40s., duffadars to 35 rs., trumpeters and nugarcheis to 30 rs., and sowars to 27 rs.

Brigadier Bradford concurs in the opinion that 20 rs. a month was not sufficient, and that 25 rs., to which the pay has latelely been raised, should ensure men being properly mounted. He also confirms the statement that men of the irregular cavalry are generally embarrassed by debt.

The Punjab Committee observe, that the former rate of 20 rs. had a long and fair trial, and was unquestionably insufficient, and more so the farther the corps were sent up the country. The extra five rupees supply all that was wanted, and ought not to be increased. But they advocate the improvement of the pay of native officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, with other modifications. The increase proposed amounts to 10,760 rs. per annum for an irregular corps.

They state that the irregular cavalry of the Punjab force was free from debt; that bankers were not allowed; and that great attention was paid to this subject. Advances were taken from government for the purchase of horses when any unusual mortality occurred, which saved the men greatly. In the Bengal irregular cavalry, where the system of bankers prevailed, every regiment was in debt from 30,000 to 60,000 rupees. Corps had been known to owe a lac of rupees.

Sir S. Cotton considers that the pay of the irregular trooper, 20 rs. a month, was certainly not sufficient, and that all were necessarily more or less in debt. He states that 25 rs. a month is the lowest sum that will admit of irregular troopers being really efficient, and would have fixed rates for the chunda. The chunda in the 7th Irregular Cavalry is 200 rs., which covers the horse only, arms, clothing, &c. being sold separately.

Brigadier General J. Jacob deems the pay of the Scinde Horse, 30 rs. a month, too low, and would increase it to 45 rs. a month, and that of corps serving in the interior of India to 36 rs. a month.

32. What is the system of the irregular cavalry with respect to assamees, and the market value of the assamee? are there restrictions upon the number which any native officer or capitalist of the corps may hold? Do you advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of such large vested interests, or not? Are they favourable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps in horses and in equipments, and to the conduct of duty?

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. "The assamee system in the light cavalry "differs in corps. Some maintain a fixed "price; others, again, submit them to auction; but the "whole question is in the banker's hands. He sells up "one man, a bad or ruined debtor, and buys for another "whose race is yet to be run; but the system is false. "Anything in excess of the value of the seller's horse

" and appointments is clearly a sale of the position; " a kind of traffic which government could never have " intended to authorize. The regulations lay down the " number of assamees to be held by officers and non-" commissioned officers, and prohibit the possession of " them by outsiders; but what with the smallness of the " pay and the grasp of the banker virtually the majority " are held out of the corps. I would not tie down a " commandant too tightly about bhargeers; something " should be left to discretion and circumstances. Hereto-" fore complaints have been made of the low characters of " the bhargeers. It should be remembered the pay (7 rs.), " with every thing to find, was not sufficient to tempt a " good man, unless attached to or connected with an officer, " or one who had hopes of becoming eventually a khodas-" pah. I think no man should be entitled to claim bhar-" geers; the fact of a man being a duffadar should not give " him a bhargeer; nor would I exclude a man of character " and influence, although but a sowar, from the possession " of an assamee. Bhargeers certainly attach men of posi-" tion to the service, by giving them the importance they " love; they are not unfavourable to discipline, and if " fairly paid would be desirable to some extent."

Brigadier Christie, after detailing the number of bhargeers allowed by regulation, adds, " None beyond this is " allowed; a man not in the regiment cannot hold any " assamee on any terms. Should such, however, be dis-" covered, the assamee is at once forfeited, and given to a " deserving bhargeer. I still advocate bhargeers to the " above extent being allowed, as they much add to the " respectability of the non-commissioned and commissioned " grades, and I have never found any bad effects from " it, under a commanding officer who is well up to his " work."

Brigadier Bradford is of opinion that the bhargeer system is not favourable to the efficiency of a corps in horses or in any other way.

Colonel Gall would limit the number of assamees held by any one man. He considers that a native officer who held a very large number would possess an influence that might be used with effect against the government.

The Punjaub Committee state, that in the Punjaub irregular cavalry the value of an assamee is simply that of the horse, equipments, arms, and accoutrements. The number of assamees held by the native officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, is the same in the Punjaub and Bengal irregular cavalry, amounting to 114 bhargeers per regiment, but that during the crisis of 1858 double the number was sanctioned in the Punjaub, for the sake of raising men. No capitalists out of the corps are allowed to hold assamees. Upon the subject of bhargeers they deliver the following opinion:—" The objection to " bhargeers (or assamees held by native officers, &c., &c.) " are numerous and substantial. They are more the pri-" vate servants of their silladar than the government, and " their silladar constantly favours them in matters of duty, " for the sake of saving his horse, while as constantly " quarrelling and bickering on other points. The settle-" ment of these disputes is very difficult and troublesome. " The bhargeer on a silladar's horse is not of the same use " to government as a khooduspah,* and the aggregate of " all the Bhargheers is no less than one-fifth of the whole " corps. The best commandants in the Punjaub cavalry " advocate the abolition of bhargeers; and on the whole " we decidedly concur with them. The only advantage of " the bhargeer system is that the native officers like it; to " meet which we would propose that the pay of each native " officer be increased by way of compensation. We are " quite certain that if bhargeers were abolished desertions " would be diminished, for the opportunity of acquiring " a horse, arms, and equipments tempts numbers of " this class to desert on service, and join the enemy as a " khooduspah."

Sir S. Cotton considers the bhargeer system the worst possible, the owners of the assamees looking on them as mere investment of capital, out of which they are to make the utmost profit. He would limit ressaldars and ressaidars to two bargeers, the object of the bargeers retained in the Bengal irregular cavalry being only to enable the native officers to be always mounted in case of casualties to their own chargers.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob replies, that the system differs much in different irregular cavalry corps of the Bombay army. The sale of assamees, by open and free auction, is allowed, under permission first obtained from the commanding officer.

* One who owns the horse he rides.

33. What is the pay of the mounted police in the Bengal presidency?
34. What is the organization of the mounted police of the Bengal presidency?
35. Of what races, tribes, or castes is the mounted police of the Bengal presidency composed?
36. How is the mounted police recruited; that is, what is the agency employed; the precautions taken before, or by the local authorities in entertaining men?
37. Where districts are large and duty heavy, has the pay of the mounted police been found adequate, and the police proved well mounted and efficient?
38. Is the difference between the pay of horse police and that of irregular horse such as to insure the latter the superior mounting essential for his peculiar service?

The Punjab Committee state, that in the North Western Provinces the pay of the mounted police varied from 18 to 20 rs. a month, but has now been raised to 25 rs. In the Punjab it was 20 rs., but government has been asked to allow 24 rs. In the Punjab the majority of the mounted police are Sikhs and Punjabee Mahommedans, with a sprinkling of Hindostanees from the south and Pathans from the north some, Beloochees, &c.; always more candidates for the mounted than for the foot police, and little trouble in filling up vacancies, especially before the present war. The pay, 20 rs. a month, was just enough for man and horse to exist on, but left no margin for any emergency or accident to either. " There was no difference before the " late war between the pay of the horse policeman and " that of the irregular trooper; both had 20 rs. a month. " This rate was found quite inadequate to the requirements " of the irregular horse in the Punjab, and it has lately " been raised by Government to 25 rs. The greatest diffi-" culty was experienced previous to this increase in coaxing " Punjabee recruits to the frontier."

Sir J. H. Grant thinks it was a mistake making the pay of the horse police and the irregular cavalry the same, viz., 25 rs. a month; but he is of opinion that 25 rs. a month are sufficient for an irregular horseman.

Brigadier Christie remarks, that the only police corps (mounted) that he is acquainted with is the " Behar Horse," who draw 5 rs. more per mensem than the irregular cavalry did, and yet are not half so well mounted as the 9th Irregular Cavalry were when he left it. The Behar Horse is a new corps; and to say nothing of the great difficulty of procuring suitable horses at the present time, Brigadier Christie says allowances must be made for a new corps.

Brigadier-Gen. J. Jacob. In Scinde there are two classes of mounted police, one on 20 rs. the other on 15 rs. a month; the first chiefly composed of Hindoostan men, the second of Belooch.

IV.—European Officers.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commandants of corps of the light cavalry in the Bengal army or of irregular cavalry been increased or diminished?

The reply of the Punjab Commissioners is, " Diminished " even more than in the infantry. Formerly offences " against discipline in the corps were tried by a punchayet " or jury of native officers, under the guidance of the com-" mandant; but this popular and effective institution has " been abolished. Commandants have been prohibited " from punishing or reducing non-commissioned officers, " except by the forms of court-martial. Discharge of men " has been put a stop to. The commandant has not even " the power to order any man in his regiment to give an " extra allowance of grain to a horse out of condition. All " minor punishments must be dealt out according to regu-" lation. In fact, the thing has been laid down by Pro-" crustean rule, and the 'irregular cavalry' has long been " a misnomer."

Brigadier Christie replies, that within his experience the powers of commandants of irregular cavalry have been most injuriously diminished.

Sir J. Hope Grant, Brigadier Bradford, and Major Daly also state that the powers of commandants have been diminished. Sir S. Cotton also avers that they have been greatly diminished.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob notes the prejudicial effects of the system of centralization.

2. What has been the result upon the discipline of the light cavalry and irregular cavalry of the Bengal army of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps?

The result is represented by the Punjab Committee as having been "to reduce the efficiency of the regiments, and "to render them dangerous to the state."

Brigadier Christie answers, "In former days the men "looked up to the commanding officer, and did everything "in their power to please him. Now matters are greatly "changed, knowing that all power has been taken out of "the hands of commanding officers."

Sir J. H. Grant remarks, "Discipline should tend to "strengthen the powers and influence of commandants; it "has been the tight binding of rules and regulations at "variance with the constitution of the service which has "weakened them."

Brigadier Bradford, who belonged to the regular, and had not served in the irregular cavalry, replies to this question, that he has not observed any difference as to discipline, that of the irregular cavalry having never been very strict.

Sir S. Cotton observes, that the result of the diminution of power in commandants has been to impair discipline.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distant authority of head quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in charge of troops and in command of corps of regular or irregular cavalry?

Punjab Committee. "The discipline mainly depends on the "character and ability of the European and "native officers present, but especially on "that of the commanding officer. At the same time, we "consider that the careful and judicious supervision of a "superior authority is essentially necessary, and that such "authority, so expressed, must do good, and cannot do "harm. We allude here to the supervision of officers com- "manding brigades and divisions, beyond which there "should be no interference, except in extreme cases."

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. "The discipline of an irregular corps "mainly depends on the character of the "commandant. To be effective, it should be so. Possessed "of the authority necessary for his position, a good com- "mandant will have sufficient influence with the officers "commanding troops and squadrons to ensure a proper "tour and the discharge of duty."

Brigadiers Bradford and Christie also regard the discipline of a corps of irregular cavalry as depending upon the influence and authority of the commanding officer, and the way in which he exercises his power.

So also Colonel Gall, who believes "The discipline of a "corps on service to depend mainly on the authority of its "immediate commanding officer; of a native corps espe- "cially, on the understanding that the decisions of a com- "manding officer are final, and that he is the source of "professional honour and advancement. The distant "authority of head quarters involves references and "appeals, and there is no right so liable to be abused by a "native of India as that of appeal. In the native army it "becomes dangerous when it is exercised by ill-disposed "men, as the means of augmenting their own importance, "and weakening their commanding officer's position in the "eyes of their more ignorant comrades. By natives there "is no power more respected than that of exercising "liberality and executing justice, whether in the form "of reward or punishment with promptitude and on the "spot.

"The discipline of a corps on service, as every where else, "depends entirely when the knowledge the men have of "their immediate commander's will, and abi- Sir S. Cotton. "lity to punish breaches of discipline. That "authority which is distant a native always thinks he can "evade, and he holds it in no dread or awe.

Brigadier-Gen. J. Jacob. "The real effective discipline and useful "military power of a corps of Asiatic soldiers "in our service depends wholly on the personal character "and influence of its English officers. The useful power "of the Asiatic soldier depends entirely on what the "English gentleman has instilled into him. If no virtue "has gone out from the English officer, none will be found "in the sepoy."

6. Should the powers of commanding officers and of troop officers be increased or diminished?

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

"To improve the discipline and establish a certain uni- "formity of system in the irregular cavalry, I would put "the body under one head. There should be an inspector- "general, under whom there should be inspectors or "brigadiers of districts or divisions. The powers of com- "mandants should be increased, but subject to the check "and supervision of the inspector-general.

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. "Banks should be prohibited in regiments. "On the first embodiment of corps, debts "for arms and various appointments must be incurred. "Government should here help the sowar. After a "certain period any man found in debt should be dis- "charged. The great object of every commandant "should be to preserve his men from debt. On 20 rs. per "month this was impossible; on 25 rs. it should be made "a sine quâ non of service."

Brigadier Christie would increase the powers of commandants of corps and of troop officers, so also Brigadier Bradford, subject to the supervision of the general officers under whom they serve.

Colonel Gall points out the working of the restrictions on the powers of troop officers.

Sir S. Cotton would both increase the powers and the number of the European officers. He thinks there should be at least three more to each regiment, carefully selected for intelligence and general aptitude, and if not of the cavalry, would send them to a light cavalry corps to pass their drill.

12. If native regular cavalry be kept up with a full complement of European officers, would you attach cavalry cadets at once to native corps, or for a time to dragoon corps?

13. If a few European officers are assigned to native corps of cavalry, whether regular or irregular, how would you select and train them?

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. "I would send no officer on entering the "service direct to an irregular corps. He "should do duty for two years at least with "a corps of the line, infantry or cavalry; after that he "should be appointed 'to do duty,' and thus become "initiated. If an indifferent horseman, or otherwise inca- "pable, the commandmant should have the power of "getting rid of him.

"I would select indifferently from both cavalry and "infantry, taking only those who were good horsemen and "otherwise qualified for the mounted branch of the service. "For regular cavalry, I would attach them for a certain "time to European dragoon regiments, or until they be- "come thoroughly acquainted with their duties. The "system in the irregular cavalry being so different, I would "post them at once to irregular cavalry corps, where, under "a good commanding officer, they would soon be up to "their work."

Brigadier Bradford would select them as hitherto for the irregulars, but for regulars he deprecates the system of only a few officers being attached to a regiment, it being useless to try to carry on the regular system without a full body of officers.

The Punjaub Committee would, after going through the course prescribed, select and appoint on probation the European officers for the irregular cavalry.

Colonel Gall would select them. After an examination before competent judges, he would make them go through a short course of instruction at the European cavalry depôt, or at the head quarters of any European cavalry regiment. He notes the common error, that scientific requirements are only useful to officers of artillery and engineers, and advocates the possession of moderate professional attainments by officers of irregular cavalry.

Brigadier General J. Jacob refers to his scheme for the re-organization of the army as fully providing for all these matters.

15. Speaking from your experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies in the conduct of corps (whether regular or irregular cavalry), whose complement of European officers was short or full?

The Punjaub Committee reply, that no difference was observable during the mutiny in the conduct of corps, whether of short or of full complements of European officers, though they allow that the general qualities of European officers had an effect on the character of a mutiny in its incipient steps.

Brigadiers Bradford and Christie are also of opinion that there was no difference.

"The only corps who can be said to have been staunch, "and to have perilled life and limb for us, with a valour "and heroism unknown in previous wars, have been the

Sir J. H. Grant. Major Daly. " irregular corps with few officers. In " almost all the instances these officers have " been changed by death and casualties; yet the dis- " cipline and loyalty of the regiment have remained. In " the few corps of the line which have refrained from " mutiny, their conduct has been chiefly attributed to the " great influence exercised by one or two native officers. " In no case have I heard it attributable to the presence of " more or less European officers."

Sir S. Cotton considers the power of the European officer to have been so reduced, and the native soldier had so ceased to look upon his officer with awe or respect, that it is immaterial whether the question be answered in the affirmative or negative, as the conduct of corps had no reference to the paucity or the reverse of the European officers.

21. Would it be practicable and advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a body of native irregular horse?

22. If so, what preparation should the native body bear to the European dragoons of the corps? How should it be armed? How mounted? How officered?

The Punjaub Committee are opposed to attaching to each European corps of cavalry a body of irregular horse. They consider it would be reviving in a new phase the old system of regular native cavalry, so costly and useless.

Brigadier Bradford is also opposed to the association of irregular cavalry with European dragoons, except in the customary manner in brigade. If regular native cavalry were to be maintained, he is in favour of their association in alternate squadrons with the European dragoons.

Brigadier Christie, Colonel Gall, and Sir J. H. Grant and Major Daly, deem it advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a squadron (Colonel Gall would have 250 irregular sowars to every 500 dragoons) of irregular horse, armed, equipped, and mounted in all respects like other irregular cavalry.

Sir S. Cotton is of a similar opinion.

Brigadier-General J. Jacob expresses himself as very doubtful of the advantage or propriety of such an association, and indicates that, except under the condition of well-selected European officers to command the native irregulars, a little misunderstanding might lead to fatal mischief.

E. M. DURAND, Col. Eng.,
Special Commissioner from the Governor-General.

IV.—ANSWERS BY THE COMMISSIONERS.

APPENDIX No. 73.

The DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE'S ANSWERS to the NINE QUESTIONS proposed by the COMMISSIONERS, 3rd August 1858.

1. *The proportion of European to native troops to be maintained in the Bengal presidency?*

1. I think that, in the Bengal presidency, irrespective of the police force to be established, one third should be Europeans to two thirds natives. For Bombay and Madras, I am disposed to think that one fourth of the whole force should be Europeans.

2. *What amount of force will be required in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled?*

2. This is a question which it is next to impossible to decide upon in this country, and which must depend upon many local circumstances and considerations, which can only be determined upon in India itself. After, however, hearing the opinion of a vast number of most intelligent evidences, I am disposed to name as an approximate force, 50,000 Europeans of all arms for Bengal, with a proportion of native troops to be decided by the Government of India. For Madras and Bombay 15,000 Europeans each, with a due proportion of natives.

3. *Whether the native force in the Bengal presidency shall have the regular or irregular system, or both combined?*

3. The force should be combined of both regulars and irregulars as regards the infantry, and of irregulars as regards the cavalry.

4. *Whether any native artillery shall be allowed in the Bengal army?*

4. I would have no native artillery in the Bengal army, but I would attach a certain number of gun lascars to every European troop or battery. The Bombay officers give it in evidence that there are certain stations in that presidency which must be garrisoned by natives, no Europeans being able to live in them. An exception might be made in that presidency to these unhealthy stations, but I should make this an exception to the general rule, and I have even a doubt whether this exception should be made.

5. *The same question with regard to sappers and miners?*

5. For all scientific duties Europeans should be employed, and a certain portion of the force should therefore be European; but for all ordinary purposes of work, natives are indispensable, and I would have them formed on the Madras principle of low caste men, who would not object to the performance of the work required of them.

6. *Whether the Bengal native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes; and if so, in what proportion?*

6. The army should be composed of every description of nationalities and castes, and all should be as much as possible mixed up together, care being taken not to allow any special caste or nationality to have the predominance. It appears that some regiments are trying the experiment of having certain nationalities by companies, and it is said that it has been found in practice to answer well. Though I prefer the admixture of all throughout the regiment, I would not object to continue the experiment by companies, but I would not extend that system throughout the army.

7. *Whether the native army of Bengal is to be enlisted under a new code?*

7. I think the code requires considerable alteration. Every soldier should be enlisted for general service, and I would give greater power to commanding officers of regiments, as I feel certain that undue centralization does not suit the native character. The question of caste should never be tolerated as an excuse for the non-performance of military duties. The conditions upon which a man enlists should be carefully and fully explained to him from the outset, and if he does not object to enlist upon the terms proposed, he should be held to his contract afterwards. Strict discipline is essential in all armies, and a laxity of discipline should never be tolerated. The system of petitioning direct to superior authority without doing so in a respectful manner through the authorized channel of the commanding officer should be peremptorily forbidden.

8. *Whether the Bengal army ought not to be divided into two or more armies?*

8. I think the Bengal army should remain as at present, and not be further divided; but I think that the commander-in-chief should have his head-quarters, if practicable, at a more central station than Calcutta; and I would introduce the system of corps d'armées into the Bengal presidency, to be commanded by lieutenant-generals, all being part of the same army, and under the undivided authority of the commander-in-chief.

9. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?*

9. I think a change is required for Bengal, where hitherto the seniority system has prevailed. I would introduce the system of selection, as prevailing in Bombay, and which appears to have answered well. I would not introduce native gentlemen without passing through the ranks. This system would, in my opinion, be very objectionable, and would endanger our position. In the civil service an introduction of more native element may be desirable, but certainly not in the military service, and all the native officers should, as is now done, be promoted from the ranks. The promotion in the non-commissioned grades should be made in companies, on the recommendation of the officer commanding each company; to the commissioned grades, on the recommendation of the commanding officer, by the commander-in-chief.

GEORGE.

Note.—With reference to my answers to questions 1 and 2, I would wish to observe that I have merely given the relative proportions I deem essential for the three presidencies. I have given the number of European troops which I should consider necessary in each presidency, and though I have given the proportion of native troops to European that might be maintained in each presidency, I would wish it to be clearly understood that I do not bind myself to any specified numbers, but would at all times maintain as few native troops as possible.

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM, INDIAN ARMY.

Horse Guards, December 27, 1858.

THE question as to the re-organization of the Indian army, appears to me to be one of such grave importance that in addition to the replies I am prepared to give to the various heads of inquiry, I would desire to record my opinion generally in a separate paper embodying my views on a subject of so much delicacy and difficulty.

There are many points under consideration, which can alone be settled in India, and all details must, more or less, be left to the local authorities.

The object of the Commission should be to lay down general rules and principles of action, with a view to assist Her Majesty's Government in forming their opinion, and which can hereafter be worked out in detail by the various departments to which they may apply.

Commencing with the first heads of inquiry, I am come to the conclusion, backed by very high authority, and in spite of much evidence to the contrary, that the object of our legislation should be to have but one European army for the whole empire including India. On imperial and military grounds I cannot conceive the possibility of two armies co-existing without the gravest injury to the best interests of the country.

I cannot but admire the esprit de corps which animates the officers of the Indian army in general, all leading them to the conclusion, that the army with which they have been associated from boyhood should be retained separate and distinct. But I cannot share their views, regarding the question as I do from a military point of view, and as one vitally affecting the best interests of the State, and I feel the firmest conviction, that nothing but mischief can result from the jealousies, divisions, and heartburnings, which must be inherent in any double army organization.

At the same time I am prepared to admit, that it would be a matter of great difficulty at once to adopt a plan of general service, however desirable such might be, and the feelings and interests of a large body of most efficient and valuable officers must doubtless be considered as well as the financial difficulties which might result from any sudden change of system.

Keeping these objects in view, I think that for the present a middle course must be adopted, which would give

time for effecting the necessary change, would least disturb the present state of things, but would yet ultimately tend to that complete fusion and amalgamation the absolute necessity of which I so strongly advocate.

Artillery.—I would therefore begin by at once forming a second regiment of artillery composed of the artillery of the three presidencies; the battalions and brigades to be kept distinct as at present in their three presidencies, but the whole of the officers being placed in one seniority list and the whole to be considered as one corps, without reference to the different presidencies in which they may be serving. I would let it be understood, that for the present this 2nd regiment would be employed in India only, but all the men to be enlisted henceforth for the corps and all the officers to be appointed to it from the present time, should be so enlisted and appointed for general service, not confined exclusively to India. The officers for the 2nd regiment of royal artillery, to be appointed from the cadets who have passed through the military college of Addiscombe. The various ranks of the officers to be assimilated to those of the royal artillery, and the establishments of men in troops, field batteries, and reserve companies to be identical in both regiments.

Engineers.—I would in like manner deal with the corps of engineers of the three presidencies, forming out of this body a second regiment of royal engineers.

It may be a matter for after consideration, whether this regiment should not have a more permanent local Indian character, as a large portion of this force, as regards the non-commissioned officers and men, must be composed of natives. It might therefore be desirable to look upon the second regiment of engineers as a local corps, but giving the officers of this corps full power to exchange with those of the first regiment of engineers, by which term I designate our present royal corps of this branch of the service.

Should this view be carried out, I would suggest, that only natives should be attached to the second regiment of engineers, with the exception of a large body of European non-commissioned officers who are indispensable as overseers, and I would always maintain in India a few companies of the present regiment of royal engineers, composed exclusively of Europeans, with their own officers attached to them. The non-commissioned officers for the second regiment could easily be obtained by volunteers from the men and non-commissioned officers of the first regiment, and thus the same system would be established in both corps.

Cavalry.—The European cavalry for Bengal should consist, as it appears by the estimates of Lord Canning and Major General Sir William Mansfield, of between 6,000 and 7,000 sabres. At present we have five regiments of cavalry of the line in Bengal, and ten regiments are in the course of formation for local service only.

I observe that a general opinion is expressed in favour of small regiments for local service in preference to the larger ones of the royal establishment. I confess myself opposed to such a plan, as small regiments can never be maintained efficient for service, and are more expensive in consequence of their staff than larger corps.

In deference, however, to the opinion so strongly expressed, I would propose a middle course by forming the ten local regiments of three squadrons each into eight regiments of four squadrons and 500 sabres, leaving the line regiments at their present establishment, though it may be a question for consideration, whether hereafter cavalry regiments should not be sent to India at the same establishment as that now proposed for the local corps, should it be found on trial that the lower establishment answers better for the service required of them. Four regiments of the line, with the eight local corps, would give 6,800 sabres. The local regiments to have three field officers each, one lieutenant-colonel, and two majors.

The local regiments should at once be numbered as regiments of the line, and the men to be enlisted for general service, though it may be clearly understood, that for the present these eight regiments are to be retained for duty in India only, till it is otherwise ordained, or as long as the present generation of officers, all of whom have belonged to the late Company's service, remain in the service. The whole of the officers who have belonged to the native regular regiments of cavalry will, by such an arrangment, be absorbed. Seniority will regulate promotion in these corps; the cadets from Addiscombe may be appointed to them, but exchanges will be allowed between them and the other cavalry regiments of the line.

Infantry.—The local regiments of European infantry at present, 12 in number,—six in Bengal, and three in Madras and Bombay respectively,—should, in like manner, be at once numbered as regiments of the line, but to be employed for the present exclusively in India, though the men to be enlisted from henceforth, should be for general service; the officers to be appointed from the cadets at Addiscombe, and seniority to regulate the promotion in these corps. It is stated in the memorandum by Lord Canning and Sir William Mansfield, that 45 regiments of European infantry will be required for Bengal. There being six local European corps already in existence, the remaining 39 should be all regiments of the line, and if the present number of battalions of the army of the line should not be sufficiently numerous to furnish the corps serving in India and the colonies with adequate reliefs, any additional European corps to be formed, to be officered by the officers of the late Company's service, by which means a considerable number might and would be absorbed. A scheme, giving full details of the measures proposed to carry out these views, shall be annexed to this paper; but I would wish here to remark that the establishment for an infantry regiment might in time of peace consist of 10 service companies of 900 rank and file, with two companies of 100 rank and file as a depôt.* The infantry force would thus amount in Bengal to about 40,000 men. I think it right to point out, that of late great complaints have been made as to the want of officers in regiments in India, consequent on the change established some years ago, when one subaltern per company in all regiments in India was reduced. Possibly a certain number of supernumerary subalterns, say four or six per regiment, might be added to each infantry corps; these to be all taken from the unemployed subalterns of the late Bengal army. By allowing these supernumerary officers to remain on the general army list, to which I shall allude hereafter, their promotion by seniority would go on irrespective of the regiment to which they might be temporarily attached, and thus their rights and privileges would be maintained. It will be observed, that in all the proposals I have made, I have endeavoured to assimilate the establishments of European corps in India, as far as practicable, to those at home. My object in so doing has been to make as little change as possible necessary on the transfer of a corps from the home or colonial establishment to that of India, or, vice versâ, on its return to the mother country after service in the East.

I have thus endeavoured, however imperfectly, to sketch out my views of the future organization of our European forces for service in India. I have not touched upon the presidencies of Madras and Bombay, as, in conformity with my views already expressed, I contemplate that the whole of the European cavalry and infantry of those presidencies, and a portion of the artillery and engineers, should be from the army of the line, with the exception of the six regiments of local infantry, three in each presidency, which already exist, and which I propose to deal with in like manner as the local European corps of the Bengal presidency.

Native Army.—I now proceed to a consideration of the native armies. The experience of the last few years convinces me that the native armies of the three Presidencies should be kept as separate and distinct as possible; and there cannot be a doubt that the suppression of the fearful mutiny from which we are now recovering, may, in a great measure, be attributed to the totally distinct character and feeling of the native armies of each Presidency. These native troops must from henceforth be looked upon in the light of auxiliaries to the European troops. Their number should be kept as low as possible. But, however much we may endeavour to reduce them, a considerable body will still have to be kept up, looking at the vast extent of country to be covered and defended, and the impossibility of the European troops performing many of the necessary duties of stations and cantonments.

A further very important feature presents itself for our consideration. In dealing with the native army of Bengal we have an open field before us, the late Bengal army having ceased to exist, and a new one having to be provided with a view of replacing it. Not so as regards the armies of Madras and Bombay, which still exist, exactly on the same footing, and to the same extent in point of numbers as before the late outbreak. I concur fully in the views expressed by all the Indian authorities, that it would be most dangerous to introduce at once any great changes into these two large bodies. For the present we must confine ourselves to the Bengal presidency only, and leave the armies of Madras and Bombay for future legislation should a change be deemed absolutely necessary in those two perfectly distinct bodies. Doubtless the time may arrive when, should the principle upon which the Bengal army is to be reorganized be found to answer, these may be extended to the two other presidential armies, but certainly that time has not yet come, and the greatest caution is imperatively called for.

* This establishment might be still further reduced to 800 rank and file, if that number be deemed sufficient, as stated in the memoranda of the Governor-General and Sir Wm. Mansfield.

Bengal Native Army.—For the Bengal army, therefore, I would at once place the officers composing it upon one general list of seniority, fixing the numbers of each grade, and allowing them to go up from the ensign to the colonel in regular and unbroken seniority. Cases for selection to higher rank may at times arise and might be sanctioned, but these should be considered the exception to the general rule, which, as heretofore, should be seniority only. From this list the selections should be made for officers to the regular infantry regiments, the irregular cavalry and infantry regiments, the staff, both civil and military, the police corps, in short for all the various employments which have hitherto been open to the officers of the Indian army. I do not mean to confine my selections for irregular or special duties to this general service list; officers will equally have to be selected from the European corps for these various staff duties, but a considerable proportion of them would, as a matter of course, devolve to the officers of the purely local and native service, and these would all be selected from the list above referred to. It is in this list that I would equally place the supernumerary officers of the late Company's army, for whom at present no employment can be found, and whom I propose to attach to the European regiments of the line. Their promotion would be thus ensured, and they would rise in regular gradation with the rest of their brethren.

A staff list or corps has been advocated by many. Such a corps might be formed, but I am myself on the whole rather opposed to it, and I think the general list above advocated will do away with the necessity for it, as a proportional number of officers may be always borne on that list with a view to their being employed on the staff.*

It may be argued that all esprit de corps would be lost by having a general list for the native army. I cannot concur in this view, for in the plan suggested I do not advocate a constant removal of officers from their regiments. I contemplate, that as far as practicable, officers will be retained for duty with the regiment to which they were originally appointed, unless specially selected, from superior qualifications, for service on the staff with irregular corps or with the police. In the royal artillery, where we have 14 battalions, all the officers are posted in the general list for promotion, and are yet appointed to different battalions, and no ill effect is found to arise from such an arrangement. A similar system has been recently introduced into the military train, and it has existed for years in the royal marines and in all regiments of the line having more than one battalion with the best possible results.

Though the mode of distributing the local native forces is a question which must mainly depend on the authorities in India, I cannot but think that it would be very valuable that some native corps should be ordinarily associated with every European regiment, both cavalry and infantry.

The two bodies would form a brigade under a well selected officer. Thus the brigade system which is found so necessary on service, would be permanently established. Two European corps with two or more native corps combined, and having a detail of European artillery attached, would thus form a brigade, and a certain number of brigades thus constituted, and of various arms, would form a division, two or more divisions a corps d'armée, an arrangement which, for purposes of discipline and military organization, I hold to be quite indispensable in a large army such as that of Bengal ever must be. As regards the composition of this native army, it must be as mixed as possible, the cavalry wholly on the irregular principle, the infantry regular and irregular combined; and no native artillery, excepting possibly for a few localities where Europeans could not exist. I should not be disposed to give the Enfield rifles to native corps, but let them have the percussion arms hitherto in use. The police force should be differently armed for their special duties.

As regards the command of the troops, I would leave that much as it is at present. I would not add a fourth army to those of the three existing presidencies, but I would as now make the Commander-in-chief in Bengal Commander-in-chief in India, with the same powers he now exercises over the two other presidential armies, and I would denominate the superior officers at Madras and Bombay, commanders of the forces in those presidencies, in contradistinction to the Commander-in-chief. I would, however, as already stated, divide Bengal into corps d'armée, probably three in number, the officers commanding these corps to have considerable powers, but still all directly under the authority of the Commander-in-chief in Bengal. Such an arrangement would greatly reduce the detail labours of the latter, would give him more time to devote to the many important subjects which are daily brought before him, and would in a great measure get over the difficulties consequent upon the vast distances that separate the various stations from one another, and render constant supervision a matter of so much trouble and inconvenience. I would further suggest, though this again is a purely local subject, that the whole of the stations, whether cantonments or garrisons of Bengal and indeed India, should be carefully revised, that a principle should be laid down not to allow any grand depôt or arsenal for the army to be situated in any locality which will not admit of the constant presence of European troops, and to establish no cantonment without a small work attached as a sort of citadel to contain arms and stores of all description, and to which the European portion of the garrison could at all times resort in the event of mutiny or disaffection amongst the native troops or the inhabitants of the province.

In conclusion I would strongly urge the necessity for appointing a small committee of experienced departmental officers for carrying out the details of the measures now recommended for consideration.

GEORGE.

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1. The terms on which the army of the East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown?

1. This has been already settled by Act of Parliament, and the transfer has been made.

2. The permanent force necessary to be maintained in the Indian provinces respectively after the restoration of tranquillity?

2. This is a local question, and must be settled in India itself. It would appear to me, however, that about 90,000 Europeans—58,000 for Bengal, 19,000 for Madras, and 13,000 for Bombay—would be more than sufficient, with a proportionate number of native troops and police corps, to be decided upon by the local authorities.

3. The proportion which Europeans should bear to native troops of infantry, cavalry, and artillery respectively?

3. The number of Europeans to natives to be at the rate of two Europeans to five natives, inclusive of police, for Bengal; and about one European to three natives in the two other presidencies. These proportions never to be exceeded. No native artillery to be permitted, except in most exceptional cases.

4. How far the European portion of the army should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only?

4. The whole of the Europeans to be prospectively, and as soon as practicable, troops of the line, and the local European corps to be gradually converted into line regiments.

5. In connexion with this question, the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter?

5. As all corps are to be of the line, all would in the course of time be periodically relieved, and the recruiting for all regiments would be provided for in the usual direct manner. On regiments leaving India, they should be called upon to volunteer for regiments remaining in the country.

6. Whether it be possible to consolidate the European force, so as to allow of exchanges from one branch of the service to the other, and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company?

6. The European force of both armies to be consolidated with the least practicable delay, and exchanges to be freely allowed in every branch of the service. The Government to guarantee the military funds, and an actuary to decide the terms upon which the transfer of officers is to be permitted.

7. Whether there should be any admixture of European and native forces, either regimentally or by brigade?

7. The only admixture of the forces can be by brigade, and such an admixture would be most desirable and highly important.

8. Whether the local European force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for as in Great Britain?

8. Having expressed my opinion in favour of one army, this question hardly requires an answer on my part, further than to say I would recruit directly for all regiments.

* In the European regiments the officers employed away from their regiments should be seconded after they have been absent from their corps for six months.

9. Whether it would be possible to raise any regiments in the colonies, either for temporary or permanent service in India?

9. I think decidedly not. All the authorities in India seem to be opposed to it, and I think their arguments are sound, and lead me to the same conclusion.

10. Whether the native forces should be regular or irregular, or both, and if so, in what proportion?

10. This again is a local question, but I would suggest that all native cavalry regiments should be on the irregular system, and the infantry should be partly regular and partly irregular.

11. Whether any native artillery corps should be sanctioned?

11. I think certainly not, excepting in such localities in which Europeans cannot exist for any length of time, from the deadly effect of climate.

12. Whether cadets sent out for service with native troops, should in the first instance be attached to European regiments, to secure uniformity of drill and discipline?

12. Much may be said on both sides, but on the whole I incline to the belief that it would not be desirable so to attach them, though it is open to consideration, whether the young officers or cadets before going out to India should not be thoroughly drilled at the home depôts of Indian regiments.

GEORGE.

MEMORANDUM on the re-formation of the INDIAN ARTILLERY and its amalgamation with the ROYAL ARTILLERY.

Horse Guards, S.W., 9th. Feb., 1859.

THE establishment of the Indian Artillery as well as the Royal Artillery are each so vast that it is essential in the first place to determine what organization can be most readily adapted to both services in order that one uniform system may prevail, and that the many questions of detail and practice may be assimilated, so that the entire corps can with facility be worked under one head, instead of having, as at present, a diversity of custom in carrying on the various duties of the Artillery service, which, if continued, would naturally tend to retard the good effects, which must otherwise inevitably follow the formation of the two Artilleries into one corps, so as to admit of one branch taking up the duties of another, without the many transfers and alterations, both in men and matériel, which are inseparable from a difference in the establishment and equipment of troops and companies.

To effect this it is submitted, that the new brigade system proposed for the Royal Artillery will be the most simple, whilst the assimilation of the present Indian equipments and establishments to those of the Royal Artillery, will render the corps efficient in all its details, without involving any serious change or delaying, even for a day, the duties of the Artillery service.

It is therefore proposed, that the royal and local Artilleries should be formed into one corps consisting of two regiments, the first of which will comprise the present Royal Artillery, with the addition of two brigades, or 17 in all; and the second, the Indian Artillery of the three presidencies, to consist of 16 brigades which will be distributed as follows.—

In Bengal.

	Batteries.
2 brigades of Horse Artillery of 6 batteries each	12
5 brigades of Field Artillery of 8 batteries each	40
2 brigades of Garrison Artillery of 8 batteries each	16
	68

In Madras.

1 brigade of Horse Artillery of 6 batteries	6
2 brigades of Field Artillery of 8 batteries each	16
1 brigade of Garrison Artillery of 8 batteries	8
	30

In Bombay.

1 brigade of Horse Artillery of 6 batteries	6
1 brigade of Field Artillery of 8 batteries	8
1 brigade of Garrison Artillery of 8 batteries	8
	22
Total number of batteries of 2nd regiment in India	120

The present number of troops and companies of the Artillery of the three Presidencies is 104 which leaves 16 to be raised to complete the 2nd regiment, whilst the same number will be required to form the two additional brigades to be raised for the 1st regiment, and the total number of Guns that would be available in India would be as follows:—

Bengal.

	Guns.
1st regiment,—2 batteries of Horse Artillery	12
3 brigades Field Artillery of 8 batteries each	144
2nd regiment,—2 brigades of Horse Artillery, of 6 batteries each	72
5 brigades of Field Artillery, of 8 batteries each	240
2 brigades of Garrison Artillery, of 8 batteries each	—
	468

Madras.

1st regiment, —1 battery of Horse Artillery	6
1 brigade of Field Artillery of 8 batteries	48
2nd regiment,—1 brigade of Horse Artillery of 6 batteries	36
2 brigades of Field Artillery, of 8 batteries each	96
1 brigade of Garrison Artillery of 8 batteries	—
	186

Bombay.

1st regiment, —1 battery of Horse Artillery	6
1 brigade of Field Artillery of 8 batteries	48
2nd regiment,—1 brigade of Horse Artillery of 6 batteries	36
1 brigade of Field Artillery of 8 batteries	48
1 brigade of Garrison Artillery of 8 batteries	—
	138
Total guns	792

As the present establishment of the Indian Artillery, in officers and men, is below that of the Royal Artillery, the greater proportion of the promotion consequent on the augmentation would fall to the former, although the number of batteries to be raised in each is the same.

The establishment of each battery of both regiments serving in India is proposed to be as under:—

Horse or Field Battery.	Ranks.	Garrison or Siege Battery.
2	Staff-serjeants	—
10	Serjeants	6
8	Corporals	4
5	Bombardiers	4
90	Gunners	90
60	Drivers	—
2	Trumpeters	2
1	Farrier	—
6	Shoeing Smiths	—
3	Collar Makers	—
3	Wheeler	—
190	Total	106

It is submitted that all Artillery Cadets should pass through the practical course at Woolwich before joining the corps, whether they are previously educated at the Academies at Woolwich or Addiscombe.

By this arrangement, uniformity of system and instruction will be secured, and a feeling of good fellowship and unanimity will be engendered amongst the officers, by bringing them together at the commencement of their service, and teaching them that they are portions of one vast corps, and that, in whatever part of the globe, or in whichever regiment, they may be called upon to serve, it will be their interest, as well as their duty, to maintain that *esprit de corps*, which now so happily prevails in the Artillery service, and which is so conducive and essential to its well-being and efficiency.

Officers of the two regiments, when serving together, would take precedence for command of the whole according to the dates of their regimental commissions.

It is admitted by all parties that the Artillery, serving in India, should be composed almost entirely of Europeans, and be maintained in a thorough state of efficiency, ready

at all times to undertake the important part they are called upon to sustain in the event of war; and, keeping this fact in view, it will be found that the proposed establishment has been fixed on as low a scale as is consistent with the great end to be attained. Nor should it be forgotten that 30 men per gun has always been admitted as being absolutely requisite for ordinary European service, whilst the Royal Artillery in the Peninsular, and, more recently, in the Crimea, averaged nearly 40 per gun, which was never found to be too great a number.

It may here be observed, that most continental nations adopt the latter average, and the first Napoleon laid it down that no gun should ever take the field with less than that number, whilst the late Sir Alexander Dickson, considered 35 necessary.

General Mansfield strongly exemplifies the danger of undermanning guns and recommends 30, which has been taken as the basis in preparing the new establishment, which will be found less in actual numbers than when the Indian batteries were composed of part Europeans and part Natives.

European artificers are recommended, as, although during the very hot season they are unable to do much work, yet having a few to each battery will ensure to the captains, that whatever requires doing will be properly performed, and they will feel in consequence greater confidence in the efficient state of the whole of their matériel, constituting, as it does, the main strength and thorough usefulness of all Field Artillery.

There is no doubt that every Artillery soldier whether gunner or driver, should be able to assist in working the guns, but, for the present, this would manifestly be impracticable, until the corps is in a more complete state, when officers would be held responsible, that, not only the drivers are instructed in gunners' duties, but that the gunners should be taught to ride and drive, so that every man on an emergency would be available for any duty required of him; and it must be distinctly understood that every battery is to be available at all times for field, siege, or garrison purposes as the Commander-in-chief may think it necessary to order.

MEMORANDUM showing the Present and Proposed ESTABLISHMENT of the ARMY.

—	Cavalry Regiments.	Infantry Regiments.
Present establishment of the army, exclusive of household troops	25	131
8 regiments of local cavalry raised for Bengal, to be numbered 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26	8	—
12 regiments of local infantry raised for India, to be numbered as follows:—	—	12
6 at Bengal, to be numbered 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, and 106.	—	—
3 at Madras, 107, 108, and 109.	—	—
3 at Bombay, 110, 111, and 112.	—	—
The royal army, European, (exclusive of household troops) will then consist of	33	143
To complete the requirements of the service	—	14
	33	157

—	Cavalry Regiments.	Infantry Regiments.
Present Distribution:—		
India — Bengal	5	50
India — Madras	2	7
India — Bombay	5	16
	12	73
Required as detailed below	*10*	*55*
To be withdrawn	*2*	*18*
At home	13	30
Colonies	—	28
	13	58
General total	25	131
The requirements of the Service are—		
As detailed below — Bengal	12	45
As detailed below — Madras	3	13
As detailed below — Bombay	3	9
	18	67
At home	15	52
Colonies	—	38
	15	90
Total	33	157
Present Establishment	26	131
Difference	8	26
At present raised for India	8	12
Remaining to be raised	—	14

The calculation of the number of battalions requiring to be raised is made on the assumption that the requirements of the Indian service will demand the permanent employment of 67 battalions of European infantry. On this point, however, it is clearly impossible at present to form any certain opinion. It may be hoped, as the country becomes thoroughly pacified, and the native population disarmed, admitting of the disbandment of a large portion of the native army, also as the system of railroads becomes developed, that a considerably less European force may be required than is above estimated. In that case it may well be possible to withdraw so many battalions from India that the addition of 14 foot battalions may not become necessary. And with a view to such a contingency, it would therefore be expedient, at all events to suspend for the present the raising of such battalions. The army would thus remain for the time at its present strength, and the Indian finances would be relieved from the necessity of any immediate outlay for the levy of fresh troops,—a consideration of great importance in a financial point of view.

PROPOSED STRENGTH of EUROPEAN TROOPS for INDIA.

Presidency.	Artillery.			Cavalry.		Infantry.			Total at each Presidency.			Presidency.
	Troops and Batteries.	Companies.	Strength.	Regiments.	Strength.	Regiments.	Strength. At 900 each.	Strength. At 800 each.		Infantry reckoned at 900 per Regiment.	Infantry reckoned at 800 per Regiment.	
BENGAL	14 Troops Horse Art. 64 Batteries	— 16	16,516	12 4 Line at 700 8 Local at 600	6,800	45 39 of the Line, 6 Local.	40,500	33,000	Artillery Cavalry Infantry	63,816	59,816	BENGAL.
MADRAS	7 Troops Horse Art. 24 Batteries	— 8	6,738	3 Line at 700	2,100	13 10 Line, 3 Local.	11,700	10,400	Artillery Cavalry Infantry	20,538	19,238	MADRAS.
BOMBAY	7 Troops Horse Art. 16 Batteries	— 8	5,218	3 Line at 700	2,100	9 6 Line, 3 Local.	8,100	7,200	Artillery Cavalry Infantry	15,418	14,518	BOMBAY.
Total in India	132	32	28,472	18	11,000	67	60,300	53,600		99,772	93,572	

N.B. This force of artillery includes the 1st Regiment Royal Artillery, of which there will be five brigades and four troops of horse artillery, completing the number of guns in India as proposed by Lord Canning.

Horse Guards, December 28, 1858. GEORGE.

APPENDIX No. 74.

NOTES on the EVIDENCE taken before the COMMISSIONERS appointed to Inquire into the Organization of the Army, at present Serving in the Pay and under the Control and Management of the Honourable the East India Company.—By the MARQUIS OF TWEEDDALE.

THE experience we have gained of the slight dependence we can place on the faithful services of the Bengal army, composed of high caste men, is a sufficient warning to us for the future, whilst on the other hand, the conduct of the Bombay and Madras armies, composed for the most part of a different class, has shown how necessary it is for the British Government to consider from what class the native army of Bengal should in future be raised.

With such experience, it appears to be our interest to enlist men into our service whose position will be raised in their own estimation, as well as in that of their fellow-countrymen, by serving in the native army on terms of equality as soldiers with those who formerly thought themselves by birth, from their high caste, or any other cause, their superiors. Caste must in future be disavowed in the native army, in all the duties of a soldier, but this disavowal of caste should in no way interfere with the private life of the native soldiers. It will also be necessary to consider what proportion the different nationalities or castes should bear to each other. At present we have too great a proportion of Mahomedans in the Madras army, we have it in evidence, that there is 35 per cent. of Mahomedans in the infantry, and the cavalry are high-class Mahomedans; with few exceptions they are excellent soldiers, but not to be trusted by a Christian government, when the standard of the Prophet or of the descendant of a Mahomedan emperor has been unfurled, as it would be contrary to their own religious faith to act in support of Christians.

The native army cannot be commanded or ruled by conciliatory measures involving concessions, which they will attribute to weakness or timidity, or by favouring one class more than another, but by strict discipline, based on principles of full and ample justice to all. It is not the native, but the European force, which must form the basis of our power in India, and its security ought to be our first consideration, so that it may be a pillar of strength in maintaining the peace of the country, in giving protection to our revenue and judicial officers in the execution of their duties, and in enabling Government to carry out such beneficial measures as will ameliorate the condition, and secure protection to the peaceful and industrious classes of the native population.

To make everything secure for the future, and to impress on the native mind our determination to leave nothing to chance, permanent fortifications must be erected in those parts of the country which contain an excitable, a military, or a lawless population. In selecting positions for these fortifications, consideration must be given to the health of the European force, their site should depend on the nature of the country, the railroad communication, water carriage, and a sufficient space for magazines, arsenal, wells, tanks, casemated barracks, and accommodation for the families of the soldiers. They must be so constructed, that in the event of any portion of the garrison being required for service in the field, the equipments and families, as well as the incumbrances of other troops belonging to the district, may be safely left under a small, but sufficient force for their protection.

The navigation of the principal rivers should also be made safe for the transit of goods, military stores, and all munitions of war. A marine force should be raised and disciplined for the working and management of a river flotilla of gunboats; this marine corps should be enlisted for general service in the East, as recommended by the late Duke of Wellington.

To make railroads generally available for military purposes, short lines to connect the commercial lines of railroad will be found necessary.

A corps of camels and elephants should be attached to each corps of the army, for the rapid transport of light troops within its district. The elephants should be trained to render assistance to the artillery in difficult ground.

With such means and conveniences for the transit of stores, ammunition, and all requisites for military purposes, the armies would at all times be ready to take the field fully equipped.

In order to enable the three armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay to afford each other mutual support, it will be necessary to have a railroad running through the centre of the Peninsula, having one terminus at Ghooty in the Madras presidency, and passing by Hyderabad, Nagpore, and Jubbulpore, having its other terminus at Allahabad. The southern terminus would be on the Madras and Bombay railroad, the line would cross the Bombay and Calcutta railroad at Jubbulpore, and have its terminus on the Calcutta trunk railroad, leading to Agra and the north-west. With such a communication by rail, a large force could be readily thrown into the Nizam's, Nagpore, and Bundelcund territories. In Hyderabad there is a numerous, turbulent, and lawless population of Pathans and other Moslems, and in the interior of the Nizam's country the zemindars live in feudal grandeur, in forts, retaining Arabs as their defenders.

A permanent fortification, to be held by Europeans, near Hyderabad and another near Nagpore, would enable the garrisons to keep the two principal towns in check, and render disposable the greater part of their garrison for occasional service in the field.

In the event of the Madras army occupying the Saugur and Bundelcund territories, it would be well to consider the distance that Madras troops will be from their own presidency and place of enlistment, and whether therefore, Madras corps can be sent for garrison duty to the stations in these districts, without serious inconvenience, as the greatest difficulty will be experienced in carrying out the recruiting, in withdrawing the non-effective men, and in arranging the reliefs. The Madras sepoys, it must be remembered, are generally married men, and when proceeding on field service leave their families in depôt at any convenient station, but when moving from station to station for garrison duty they take their families with them, an arrangement not simply of their own choice, but unavoidable, for when serving in garrison, and consequently without batta, the men have not the means of supporting their families at a distance apart from themselves. This is noticed as a point which must be kept prominently in view in any measure connected with the location and relief of the troops.

The distance from Ghooty, in the north of the Madras presidency, (through which the contemplated railroad from Madras to Bombay will run) to Kamptee is 520 miles, from Kamptee to Jubbulpore 200 miles, from Jubbulpore to the centre of Bundelcund 100 miles, or an average of 800 miles from Ghooty to the cantonments in Bundelcund.

It would appear that if the railroad from Bombay to Calcutta is to pass through Jubbulpore, it would be a more convenient arrangement for the Bombay army to take the Saugur district, and the Madras army the Southern Mahratta country and Doab, unless a railroad is to be made, as I have indicated, from Ghooty to Jubbulpore, which would then place the Madras army on an immediate transit communication with its own presidency.

In peaceable districts, the natives should be made to register their arms, and they should be subject to a heavy penalty in the event of arms being found in their possession unregistered. In districts where the inhabitants have shown a turbulent or unruly disposition, they should be disarmed, as in Malabar, where the moplahs, a fanatical Moslem population, have been disarmed, and regulations and laws enacted empowering the magistrate to punish or restrain this turbulent class.

The uniform of all arms should be more attended to, and made more suitable to men undergoing fatigue in a tropical climate. The European barracks should be made airy, and accommodation should be afforded to married men and their families in barracks suitable for their position.

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1. *The proportion of European to native troops to be employed in Bengal.*

If I am to assume that the population of Bengal, and of those districts where the Bengal army is to be employed, have a deadly feeling of hostility to our rule, it will be a difficult matter to say what amount of force will be required to maintain our superiority in these territories. There may, indeed, be predatory tribes, such as the Gogras and Bheels, or excitable Mahomedans, such as the Wahabees, who will at any time take advantage of any disorganization of our military force; but the experience of others, as well as my own, justifies me in taking a more favourable view of the feeling of the great majority of the inhabitants as well as of the native soldiers; the desire of the former, I believe, is to live under a just and humane government, secure from the scenes of rapine and murder to which the mutiny of the Bengal army has led; and the Bengal army itself, in

former days, when kept under strict discipline, has displayed all the good qualities of soldiers, that have justly given it the reputation of a noble and faithful army.

It does not appear to me that the recent mutiny or revolt had any connexion with the industrious body of the inhabitants, but it had its origin in the widespread influence and organization of the fanatical leaders of a section of Mahomedans, whowere always ready to take advantage of every occasion to assert the supremacy of the Mussulman dynasty and their faith. To accomplish this, they were regardless of the means they took to effect their object. They could not have selected a more opportune occasion than when the discipline of the Bengal native army was so defective and impaired. We have it in evidence (Qu. 3701) that a sepoy who fancied himself aggrieved by any act of his commanding officer, upon a trifling occasion, could appeal against him and make a representation to the commander-in-chief direct (Qu. 3705), without passing through the intermediate authorities. Such an act is contrary to the rules of military service and the maintenance of discipline; the consequence has been, that the regimental officers felt that the sepoy did not care for their authority (Qu. 3706, 3713). As might have been anticipated, this has become more and more apparent during the last twenty years.

It also appears that the commander-in-chief, with the approval of the Governor-General, altered the regulations, so as to limit or circumscribe the powers of commanding officers (Qu. 3716, 3719).

Enough, therefore has been given in evidence during the investigation to establish the necessity of a change in the system of carrying on the discipline of the Bengal army.

In the history of our rule in India it is known that insubordination has not been confined to the native ranks alone, it has been witnessed in the ranks above them, amongst those who ought to have set a better example.

This insubordination is still fresh in the memory of many old native officers. If on no other account, this alone ought to make us lenient in dealing with the sepoy. Even-handed justice requires that we should not treat the sepoy with more severity than we have treated those of our own race.

The superiority of European discipline, the bravery of our officers and soldiers, their endurance under privation and fatigue, and all those high qualities which distinguish the character of the British officer and soldier, have been so manifested of late to the natives as to leave no doubt on my mind that they will be inspired with more and more terror of what they consider our magical power. On this ground, I think we may safely trust the native soldiers to a large extent. At the same time recent experience teaches us that we should be prepared with all those measures of foresight and protection necessary to meet any emergency which may arise in future.

Impressed with these views, and considering that in the reconstruction of the Bengal army natives of mixed caste and creeds will fill the native ranks, it appears to me that one European, of the effective European force, to three natives, is a sufficient balance; at the same time, while I consider a large European force to be necessary, I do not see the necessity for the strength of the native army being kept up to the proportion indicated—three natives to one European,—as I look on it as a mere auxiliary force.

2. *Amount of force which will be required in Bengal hereafter.*

In forming any opinion on the amount of force required for the duties of the Bengal army, there are some considerations of importance which must be well considered. These are as follows:—

Are permanent fortifications, such as I have described, to be erected?

Will railroads and water carriage be made available for moving troops to a general point of rendezvous in the event of an outbreak?

Is the artillery in future to be European, with only a few native batteries for frontier service, or for localities not suited for the European constitution?

Is the regular cavalry to be European in future?

Is there to be a camel or elephant corps for moving small bodies of troops rapidly in case of minor outbreaks?

Are the natives to be disarmed in lawless, turbulent, or fanatical districts?

Are native soldiers to be armed with an inferior class of arms to that of Europeans?

Is there to be a regular effective police establishment?

If these questions are answered in the affirmative, fewer European troops will be required.

Until the fortifications, railroads, &c. are completed, the following is the amount of the *effective* force which I consider necessary for Bengal:—

Europeans.

Artillery	12,040	
Infantry	28,000	
Cavalry	9,000	
Sappers	400	
Total effective European force		49,440
Add for sick and casualties 20 per cent.		9,888
Total Europeans		59,328

Natives.

Regular infantry	37,400	
Irregular infantry	37,400	
Marine corps	8,000	
Sappers	2,000	
Gun lascars	2,100	
Besides such number of irregular cavalry as may be found necessary by the authorities in India. There have hitherto been twenty-four corps of irregular cavalry, I therefore put down	14,000	
Military police force, about which I require further information; in the meantime say	10,000	
Total of natives		110,900
Total of army		170,228

On the completion of the railroads and other works above mentioned, I consider that the following reduction in the strength of the army may be made:—

Europeans (Effectives).

Artillery	2,580	
Infantry	5,600	
Cavalry	1,800	
	9,980	
Casualties, &c., 20 per cent.	1,996	
		11,976

Natives.

Infantry	14,800	
Gun lascars	480	
		15,280
The sappers, marine corps, irregular cavalry, and military police remaining the same.		
Total reduction		27,256

The army would then stand thus:—

Europeans, effective and non-effective	47,352
Natives	95,620
Total	142,972

The above calculations are made on the supposition that a considerable civil police force is to be established. It will be necessary to hear officers experienced in Indian police before an opinion can be formed of the number required.

3. *Whether the native force should be continued on the regular system, as heretofore, or should the irregular be introduced.*

In the Madras presidency there has been little experience of irregular corps of infantry or cavalry. There is a corps of mounted police in Mysore, and another in Kurnoul. They have received a military training, and are efficient for their purpose. The absence of regular troops has been supplied by sebundees or hired peons.

In the Nizam's territory and in Nagpore there are irregular regiments both of cavalry and infantry, as well as artillery. I would dispense with the native artillery and cavalry in both the Nizam's and Nagpore territories.

There should be no irregular cavalry in Madras. The Government have never employed any, as has been done in Bengal and Bombay; at the same time, an extension of the system of the Mysore horse to that presidency in special cases might be advantageous.

The uniform of the native troops should be light and suitable to the country and climate where they are to serve.

Their arms should be a smooth barrel musket, but light, and of the same bore as the European musket. More consideration is required as to the shape of the gunstock for sepoys than is given at present. Their accoutrements should be made conformable to their uniform.

The cantonments of the native troops ought to be more substantial. The allowance for hutting is insufficient, and the inconveniences to which the sepoys of the Madras army, on a change of station, are put by the exorbitant demands for carriage to move their families, ought to be remedied. The sepoys often deprive themselves of sufficient sustenance in order to save money to pay for their carriage on those occasions, and much disease is caused by the fatigue they undergo; for after they have performed their day's march, they are obliged to go back part of the road to render assistance to their families, and to bring them into the encampment.

It appears to be a bad system to allow sepoys to hold farms as ryots; they should have one occupation and one object, that of faithfully performing the duty of a soldier. If they are married, their wives should live with them in the lines, except in cases of foreign service, when their presence would be inconvenient. Arrangements in such a case should be made under the direction of the Government for their comfort and support, as it is done in the Madras army.

When the sepoy is on actual service, he should have daily rations issued by the commissary-general, as regularly as the European.

The difference between officers and men as to batta should be abolished, and all should receive alike half batta, except when marching or on field service.

Such native cavalry as are required for particular local service should be irregulars, and their numbers left to the decision of Indian authorities. This appears to be the prevailing opinion of the witnesses.

The success of the Scinde horse, a corps of irregular cavalry, may be attributed to the selection of the European officers, and to a commanding officer of rare attainments for such service.

This regiment has remained true to the Government when most other regiments of irregular horse have mutinied. If selection is necessary in the choice of officers, from what body are they to be selected? It may be said, a competitive examination on first appointment will secure the efficiency of officers for irregular corps. No doubt a military education may give an officer a military turn of mind, and qualify him by good training ultimately to excel in the higher branches of his profession. To excel as an officer of irregular troops, it requires that the officer should have a very practical mind, be energetic, have a thorough knowledge of human nature, be of very even temper, have abundant ingenuity to make shifts in difficulties, and great confidence in natives.

I am not aware in what branch of competitive examination such qualities as those mentioned will become apparent, and without them an officer would not be likely to arrive at the high standard General Jacob has done in command of irregular horse.

If the selection of officers for the irregular service is to be made, as at present, from the officers of the regular army, it would be to disregard all our late experience, to allow the selection of regimental officers being made for the staff, and irregular regiments of cavalry and infantry, and to leave those of inferior qualifications with the regular regiments. May this not be one of the principal causes to which the falling off in the discipline of the Bengal army might be attributed?

4. *Whether the native artillery should be continued.*

The artillery of the three armies should be Europeans, with the exception of a few companies to serve field guns in localities not suited to the European constitution, and on frontier stations, and the regulation number of gun lascars to each European battery.

The cavalry should also be European light horse, and they should be clothed in a uniform more suitable to the climate.

5. *Whether the native sappers should be continued.*

The sappers of the Madras army, composed of low caste men, have long been a corps of brave and faithful men, in whom the Madras army have the greatest confidence. I had a letter from Lord Saltoun, under whom they served in China, purposely to bring to my notice their conduct as being most exemplary. I had also a letter from Sir Charles Napier, under whom a company fought at the battle of Meeanee, in which he stated that he placed unlimited confidence in their bravery and steadiness. He could only compare them to British troops, and said they were only second to the 22nd regiment of Her Majesty s European infantry. Sir Willoughby Cotton, also, has always spoken to me in the same terms of them during their long service under him in Burmah, in 1824 and 1825.

I do not see how we can avoid employing natives in the scientific branches, such as the making of gunpowder and other parts of arsenal work. These are well known to the natives; they are greater adepts at such works than the European artillerymen, and they can stand the heat of the workshops better.

Any one who has seen a display of fireworks in India must have been impressed with the ability with which they are made, and the talent of the natives for such work.

It appears to me advisable that officers who have been employed in the scientific department, or a conductor who has had experience in an arsenal, should be examined on this point.

It would be well also to call for evidence as to the system of training sappers in the Madras presidency.

6. *Whether the Bengal army should be composed of different nationalties or castes; and if so, in what proportion.*

We commenced the conquest of India with low-caste men; and our experience of the Madras and Bombay armies has proved them to be faithful soldiers to the British Government. We should remember this in the enlistment of our sepoys, and bear in mind, that in the history of native powers, low-caste men, it appears, were formed into élite battalions, which were brought forward to recover the day when the regular army failed and fled.

The native army should be composed of various castes and religions; and when the recruits are enlisted, it should be thoroughly explained to them that no distinction of race or caste will be acknowled in the army, that all sepoys will be considered on an equal footing in their regiment until they attain the rank of non-commissioned or of native officers, and further, that all sepoys equally must work willingly when the service requires it, under the direction of their officers.

Although the fidelity of the Moslems and high-caste men in the Bengal army has of late been shaken by designing persons, yet, when the army has again been recruited by a general mixture of caste, as in the other armies, we may expect to see the same good effects produced as in Bombay and Madras; still, in all mercenary armies, where no national feeling exists between the soldiers and the Government which pays them, strict discipline, an unvaried observance of the rules and regulations of the service, and the regular payment of the troops, are the best modes of ensuring their faithful services. It will prove so with the sepoys.

If discipline be strictly enforced, and a kind feeling shown to the sepoys by their European officers, I do not doubt that those qualities which they so brilliantly displayed as soldiers in former days will become again as conspicuous under the Queen's Government; and the less personal distrust now shown for what has passed, the sooner will the Government regain the confidence of its native soldiers.

I am decidedly of opinion that no material change should take place in the organization of the sepoys of the Madras native infantry, except that they should be enlisted for general service. The sepoys, having had restored to them the advantages of which they had been deprived, are now willing to go on foreign service.

The sepoys of the Madras army have never, I believe, completely regained the confidence they had in the Government previous to Lord William Bentinck altering the pay,

pensions and allowances of the native army, without consulting the Madras Government, or considering the effect it would have on the sepoy, with whom "Mamoul," or usage, is the watchword.

No doubt the large proportion of Mahomedans in the Madras army has, more or less, created an excitement in that army during the late occurrences in Bengal; and the cavalry of the Madras army have been dissatisfied in consequence of the reduction of their pay which took place some years since; they felt this to be a grievance; they are principally composed of a high class of Mussulmans, who are brave soldiers in the field, but entertain strong prejudices against Christians, with which their own faith, founded on the Koran, inspires them.

If we have a sufficient force of Europeans, I see no occasion to have corps of Africans, Malays, or Arabs, as the introduction of these would be apt to create feelings of jealousy and distrust in the native mind. I am also of opinion that the sepoys of one army should not be taken from the population living under the protection of the army of another presidency. At present no sympathy or national feeling exists between the three armies, and nothing should be done to encourage it.

7. Whether the Bengal army is to be enlisted under a new code.

The code of the Madras army has proved sufficient to maintain the discipline of that army when it has been strictly enforced. The Bombay code has had a similar effect. The military codes of these armies have been framed so as to resemble that of the Queen's army, as far as consistent with a native service. I can see no reason against a general uniform code for the native armies, if it is made short, and is thoroughly intelligible to the natives.

Many of the sepoy pensioners are able-bodied men, and are allowed to have their pensions too early in life. After fifteen years' service they receive four rupees a month, and are then often only from thirty-one to thirty-four years of age; something should be done to induce the sepoy to remain longer in the service, and not to leave it in the prime of life, when his soldier-like qualities are at the best.

The native regimental courts-martial should be less complicated; the punchayet system should be much more generally introduced for the punishment of crimes; the sufficiency of the amount of punishment ordered by a punchayet will depend upon the general state of discipline of the army.

The officer commanding a regiment should have power to discharge men of bad character, without a court-martial.

A great inconvenience is felt by the commander-in-chief from not having it in his power to remove majors from one regiment to another, instead of lieutenant-colonels. The practice is as follows:—Majors, on rising to that rank, take their home furlough of three years; on returning, they find their regiment commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, and that junior majors are in command of regiments, and receiving command money. They apply to have the command of their regiment, and if their petition is attended to, the consequence is, that the lieutenant-colonel is removed to a regiment which is commanded by a junior major, and to which he is most probably a perfect stranger. This operates injuriously to the lieutenant-colonel, who may be removed to a regiment hundreds of miles off. This system requires amendment.

The three armies should be enlisted for general service.

8. Whether commanding officers should have more power than they now have to reward or punish.

I answer, most certainly.

If the rules and regulations of the service were carried out *strictly*, it would be found that they give sufficient power to commanding officers of regiments, and this would remedy the defects which have been made apparent in the discipline of the Bengal army. But there is too much English law, not thoroughly understood by the responsible officer, to secure a just administration of it in the native courts-martial. The sepoys do not comprehend it, and a more summary investigation and sentence, would be more satisfactory to the natives.

One of the punishments for high military offences is a sentence of hard labour to work on the roads. This is not a native punishment, it interferes with caste and self-respect, and is very unpopular with high caste men, as it subjects them to a punishment which, on its being carried out, may be the cause of their being worked with a low caste man, while the crime in the eyes of the native may not be a disgraceful one.

The discipline of a native regiment does not depend so much on the number of European officers present with the regiment, as it does on the commanding officer and adjutant, and one officer to each company, being thoroughly masters of their business and able to instruct others. Example and regularity in carrying on duty commands the respect of a native soldier more than any other cause. In the Madras army, many regiments have had their full compliment of officers on the staff, besides sick and those on furlough, but when commanded by an intelligent officer, who took an interest in the personal comfort of the sepoys and their families, such regiments are always in a good state of discipline. The services of the company officers are always of the greatest consequence, more particularly so in the field. On such service all officers are ordered to join, from their staff and other appointments.

9. Whether the Bengal army is to be divided into two armies.

I see no sufficient reason for dividing the Bengal army into two armies.

In the event of its not being so divided, it is obvious, from the military positions which it will occupy, that Calcutta is not a convenient place for the head quarters of the commander-in-chief. Agra appears more centrical.

When the railroads contemplated have been executed, the cantonments occupied by the Bengal army, European and native, will be supplied from the seaports with all the munitions of war. Stores also of every description will be supplied for the wants of the British soldier, and every facility through them afforded for the transport of troops.

10. Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

The advantages expected from the appointment of native officers, as a medium of communication with the European officers, and as affording the means of ascertaining the state of feeling of the sepoys, where any cause for excitement may have arisen in their minds, have not been realized.

The native officers now attain their rank at an advanced age, which unfits them for active service; and it deserves consideration whether they should not be pensioned according to seniority, when vacancies occur in the native officers' list, from the havildars' seniority list, as a reward for long and faithful services. A certain number of native gentlemen might be allowed to enter as volunteers, until they are reported sufficiently instructed in the duties of the lower branches of the service, and have acquired the attainments in English language and literature required of a cadet on first entering the army. After passing an examination, they would then be qualified for the rank of officer, when they should receive an officer's commission and be entered in the regimental list of officers. They should rise in the regiment by seniority until they attain the rank of major, which should be the highest rank they can attain, unless by selection of the Governor-General for superior rank; this, however, is a question of great difficulty and delicacy.

The Order of India should be the reward for energy, gallantry, and good and faithful service in the field.

The selection of naiks in the native army should be left to the commanding officer of the regiment. The naiks, on promotion, should be placed on a seniority list of havildars, and they should be selected by the same authority.

11. As to whether there should be any admixture of European and native forces, either regimentally or by brigade.

The system which obtains at present is suitable for maintaining a sufficient connexion between the European and native troops, viz. one regiment of European infantry brigaded with two of natives.

Police.

The information obtained from the witnesses who have been examined about the formation of a police establishment for India does not enable me to give any well considered opinion in regard to the organization of such a force.

A great deal of information about rural and town police is in the possession of Mr. E. Elliot, late head of the police establishment at Madras, who, after thirty years' service in the police, was sent from Madras home, to

inform himself in regard to the organization of the Metropolitan, Manchester, and Rural police of the United Kingdom, as well as of the Irish constabulary force. He is the only person I know who is master of the whole subject, and he is well qualified to give information to the Commission on every branch of a police establishment, practical, theoretical, and financial.

The following is a summary of my views on the reconstruction of the army for Bengal:—

1. I think that the European force must form the basis of our power in India, and that a large force of Europeans is at present necessary.
2. That the native army should not be so large as heretofore, but considered only as an auxiliary force.
3. That the artillery, with limited exceptions, should be Europeans.
4. That the regular cavalry should be European light horse.
5. That native sappers (composed of low caste men) can be safely and usefully employed under the direction of Europeans.
6. That lower caste men should be enlisted.
7. That there should be an uniform code for the three armies, and that the powers of commanding officers should be enlarged.
8. That there is no sufficient reason for dividing the Bengal army into two armies.
9. That native gentlemen should receive commissions in the army, and that non-commissioned officers should be selected by commanding officers. The question, however, is one of great delicacy.
10. That European and native troops should be brigaded as at present.
11. That further information is required on the question of police.
12. That railroads should be completed and made available for military purposes.
13. That fortified commanding positions should be held in important districts.
14. That a marine force, composed of natives, should be raised for the navigation of the rivers.
15. That the natives should be disarmed, or put under strict regulations.

TWEEDDALE, General.

Yester, Oct. 18, 1858.

ADDITIONAL NOTES on the EVIDENCE taken before the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Organization of the Army in India.

European Troops to belong to the Line, and Local Regiments to be added to the Line.

I agree with those who think that the European portion of the army should be composed of troops of the line,* and that the nine regiments which are now local regiments should be added to the regiments of the line and receive the numbers 101, 102, &c., with the name of the presidency to which they at present belong attached to their number.

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*The following civil and military officers support that opinion:—

Sir G. Clerk, Under-Secretary of State for India.

Sir C. Trevelyan, appointed Governor of Madras.

J. G. Thomas, Esq., late Member of Council of Madras.

Major-General Sir A. Wilson, of the Indian army.

With the undermentioned officers of the line army, combining long Indian with general experience.

Major-General Sir Edward Lugard, 26 years experience in Bengal and Bombay.

Major-General O. Felix, 18 years service in Bengal, Bombay, and Madras.

General Sir W. Cotton, 16 years service in Bengal, Bombay, and commanded the Madras troops in Ava, in 1824, 1825, 1826. Commander-in-chief also at Bombay.

Major-General S. Pratt, 25 years service in Bengal and Madras.

Major-General Sir S. Cotton, 30 years service in Madras and Bengal.

Major-General Sir T. H. Franks, 15 years service in Bombay and Bengal.

Colonel R. Wood, 4 years service in Bengal, and military secretary to Field Marshal Lord Hardinge, Governor-General.

General Lord Cornwallis, Governor-General, recorded his opinion in 1794, by desire of the President of the Board of Control.

Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington recorded his opinion in 1812, by desire of the President of the Board of Control.

Whilst these officers all advocate the employment of troops of the line in preference to a local European force, there are other eminent men, as Sir J. Lawrence, the Governor of Madras, &c. &c., who, although approving a local European force, are in favour nevertheless of always maintaining a proportionably large number of regiments of the line in India, manifesting clearly their view of the necessity of maintaining a large number of regiments of the line in India.

Discipline of European Troops to be under the Supervision of Commander-in-chief at Horse Guards.

In common with many influential parties, both civil and military, I attach the greatest importance to the discipline of the European portion of the Indian army being placed under the supervision of Her Majesty's Commander-in-chief at the Horse Guards, in order to insure uniformity of discipline and the improvement of the *matériel* in all branches of the service, as well as that undivided responsibility should rest on the Commander-in-chief of the British army.

Governor-General to have paramount Authority in every other respect. No Troops to be removed from India without Consent of Governor-General in Council.

Although I think that the Royal European army in India should be moveable, and that its discipline should be under the undivided responsibility of Her Majesty's Commander-in-chief at the Horse Guards, the Governor-General must have paramount authority over the European troops in every other respect, after their landing in India; and I would not allow any portion of them to be removed from under his authority without the consent of the Governor-General in Council.

A great many witnesses have been examined on this point. Colonel Durand quotes Lord Elphinstone's words, as the clearest way of expressing his views on the subject. His opinion is expressed in words most explicit, and any one who has held a high situation in India must agree with his lordship. In no way does he express an opinion adverse to the Commander-in-chief at the Horse Guards giving instructions to the Commander-in-chief in India in regard to promotions in and the discipline of the line regiments.

When I was Commander-in-chief at Madras, the Commander-in-chief at the Horse Guards exercised that power over me in regard to the regiments of the line, without interfering with my authority as Governor in Council, and in my opinion with the very best effect. For various reasons I often wished that he had the same power over the local troops I commanded.

Confirmation of Sentences of Courts-martial to rest with Commander-in-chief in India. All Communications as to Discipline to pass direct between local Commanders-in-chief and Horse Guards.

I am of opinion that there are sufficient grounds for placing the confirmation of sentences of courts-martial passed on officers or soldiers belonging to line regiments, where the sentence is one of dismissal, penal servitude, or death, in the hands of the Commander-in-chief in India. It appears to me, however, that all communications about discipline should pass direct between the commander of each of the three armies and the Horse Guards, in order to save time, and all the more so as the Commander-in-chief in India has no means of personally inspecting the regiments in the other presidencies.

The result of experience has shown that Goverment has diminished the number of troops in India, contrary to the expressed opinion of the Governor-General, It is possible the same thing might in a greater degree be repeated by other governments with dangerous effect. We have seen the country engaged in war, and before its conclusion, instead of the ranks of the army being filled by able and disciplined men, they have been recruited by lads of tender age, in consequence of war being undertaken, and the means of carrying it on not being accurately calculated. We must be more cautious in future. India will prove a great drain on our population in this country.

Discipline of Local Regiments not so good as Line.

I do not look with the same confidence in the feeling and discipline of local European infantry as I do to regiments of the line. The officers do not exercise, nor do they possess the same influence over their men as in corps serving in England. The soldiers are of the same dominant class as the officers, and as they will feel their services essential to

the government, and that they cannot be dispensed with under any circumstances, there will not be the same obedience, nor securities for it, as with the moveable army. Excepting in rare cases, under special commanders, the Company's Europeans are not equal to regiments of the line in discipline and *morale*. If you have local regiments for India they must be enlisted for India. I therefore doubt the possibility of getting the same class of men as for the home army, except in time of war; in general, as a whole, they will be of a lower grade. When they belong to a local army they lose all the ties of home influences; they are for ever separated from parents, relatives, and friends at home, and they lose the independent spirit of the population in which they were brought up. Will there be the same *esprit de corps* in a local regiment? Will a soldier uphold the character of the British army, if he is not one of that army, but only one of a local force? He would never be engaged in general service against men of his own colour and stamina who were commanded by officers of the greatest renown and experience, and consequently he would think less of himself as a British soldier.

It must also be borne in mind, that the Company's European force has been hitherto a small minority, at all times largely out-numbered by the Queen's regiments of the line.

That it is not safe or wise therefore to assume from the very limited experience yet had of such local troops, that when they shall form a large preponderating force, having distinct interests of their own, that they will be found equally loyal and obedient to the Crown with troops of the line.

A local corps, if imbued with a bad or mutinous spirit, cannot be removed or withdrawn from India as a regiment of the line, should that be necessary.

Even in a financial point of view Major-General Tulloch's evidence represents the regiments of the line as not more costly than local corps.

No doubt a local force raised to serve in the East Indies only, would be a wholesome check against the precipitate withdrawal of European troops.

Is there no other check?

And how does this reason agree with the assertion that the administration, responsible to Parliament, will never denude India improperly of Queen's European troops.

It has been asserted that greater security will be obtained, as radical and organic changes are few.

Is it a greater organic change to increase the number of Queen's regiments in India, by adding additional corps to the regiments of the line serving in India?

Or, to change the local corps or army from a small force of a few thousand to a large force of 20,000 or 60,000 men. It has been alleged that the officers of the regiments of the line would neither have time nor inclination to qualify themselves for administrative duty. But it may be fairly urged, that if you throw open valuable offices to qualified men, there will be no want of such men, and past experience does not warrant the supposition that Queen's officers of the line will not be found to qualify themselves where an inducement is held out.

It has been stated in evidence that long residence in India deteriorates the soldier. We should, in time to come, have as little separation as possible from England and English influences, and the more of fresh and purely English feeling and blood that is thrown into our Indian system amongst the officers and soldiers, the more efficiently will the government be served. To a certain extent the higher class of officers of a local army have their English feeling renewed when at home on furlough or on sick certificate. The soldiers belonging to a local army cannot be expected to have the same advantage.

Major-General Sir William Mansfield, chief of the staff to the army commanded by Lord Clyde in India, is of opinion that regiments which have been long in India fight as well as highly disciplined corps just arrived from England.

"And although the men of the former are for a time more "efficient than the latter, as understanding the climate better, "and being more able to take care of themselves; nevertheless, there is by no means the same healthy tone of discipline running through the body in the one as in the other. "It is by no means uncommon to see extraordinary sloth "and debauchery in such old regiments, and the officers "have become so enervated by climate or other causes, that "they are unable to check the one and to do away with the "other."

Indian Press interferes with Discipline.

Nothing interferes so much with the discipline of the army in India as the encouragement given by the Indian press, to officers to bring before the public their imaginary grievances, by the publication of anonymous letters, which are re-printed in the native newspapers, with the worst effect as regards those in authority.

Ten Years to be the Limit of a Regiment's Service in India, and an annual System of Reliefs to be established.

The most experienced officers think that ten years should be the limit of a regiment's service in India. As it will always be of consequence that the greatest amount of force should be in India at the commencement of the cold season, a regular system of annual relief by a transport communication well matured, would place within the power of the Governor-General in Council an additional force, equal in amount to one-tenth of the European army in India at the commencement of the campaigning season, and of which he might avail himself if it was found necessary to do so.

Exchanges between Officers of European and Native Army, Few Officers brought up in Native Regiments are equal to the command of Europeans.

Great caution should be observed in allowing exchanges between officers who have been brought up in European and in native regiments. The natural bravery of a British officer will always command confidence and make him conspicuous on the field of battle in India, and while experience of the climate will teach him to take care of himself, he will always prove superior to a native enemy. Many able and experienced officers think that few officers brought up in native regiments are equal to the command of a British European regiment, and in their opinion I concur; no doubt there are exceptions, and very brilliant exceptions, to the contrary, and Her Majesty has always the power of availing herself of their services.

It is very important that those who are to command British soldiers in the midst of temptation and difficulties, either in India or elsewhere, should acquire a knowledge of their character and habits in early life.

The system of the Company's army was established on the supposition that officers and soldiers were to spend their lives in India, and to look on that country as their permanent domicile or home. I have stated my reasons for thinking why that system should be modified, and that the European branch of the army should be incorporated with regiments of the line.

Native Regiments and Police to be under Governor-General as formerly. Native Troops and Police to be armed with a Percussion Musket, and not to be trained the same as Europeans.

The European officers of the native regiments of infantry, regular and irregular, and of police corps, will in every respect be under the Governor-General as formerly; they will form a corps having special duties to perform, and be trained accordingly. From the evidence adduced regarding native troops it would appear that the general opinion is that the native army, regular and irregular, and the police corps, should be armed with a good musket having a percussion lock, but not with a Minié rifle, and that they should not be trained to the same nicety of movement as the European regiments. With such a difference in the arms and training there cannot now be the same spirit of emulation which was formerly so desirable amongst the officers of the native and European regiments.

Officers should have some inducement to enter Native Regiments.

Officers ought to have some stimulus or inducement to serve in native regiments; their regimental pay is the same as that of officers of the line serving in the colonies or elsewhere, the only difference being that in native corps allowances are made to officers to compensate or indemnify them for the increased expenses incurred in India. I am inclined to think that many officers would prefer serving with native regiments stationary in India, and receiving Indian allowances, than with regiments of the line, which take their tour of duties in the varied service of the British army.

Officers now unemployed to be appointed to new Regiments.

The mutiny of the Bengal army has thrown many officers out of employment. The services of the infantry officers will be required in the new levies of regular and irregular infantry; the officers of the late cavalry regiments will be again employed, either as officers in the new regiments of European light horse or in the irregular cavalry regiments, and the police will require the services of both cavalry and infantry officers. It is not improbable that some officers may wish to retire on their pensions according to the regulations of the East India Company, while others who prefer belonging to a moveable army may desire to serve in regiments of the line, it being understood of course that all officers must conform to the rules and regulations of the service to which their new corps belongs.

Local European Regiments to be continued for a time and gradually reduced.

As it would be inconvenient to make any great change in the organization and constitution of the army until India is more settled, the local European corps might be continued for a time, and as officers and men decrease in numbers, or are otherwise provided for, those who survive or remain should be drafted into one corps until the whole are exhausted, and all future officers appointed to serve in these local corps, so long as they exist, should receive their commissions as officers of the line, on the understanding that they will be transferred to the new European corps to be raised as regiments of the line.

Military Funds.

If it is an object to maintain the same system of funds in the native army as that which now exists, I cannot help thinking that an arrangement could be entered into with a mutual assurance office (on an understanding that the 8 per cent. given by the East India Company was guaranteed by government), which would afford the same advantages to subscribers as those they enjoy from the various funds which now exist.

Officers to command Divisions or Brigades, or for the Staff, to be selected for their Efficiency.

With every disposition to do justice to the claims of senior officers for the command of divisions, or brigades, or to hold other staff appointments, I think there ought to be a thorough understanding that efficiency for the public service will be the paramount consideration with those who exercise the power of making appointments, either civil or military, and it should ever be borne in mind that it is as necessary to maintain the discipline of the army by officers who possess the highest and most varied qualifications for the discharge of their regimental duties, as it is to select and employ those who are capable of undertaking the duties of staff officers or of holding civil positions, from possessing those qualifications which peculiarly fit them for such appointments.

Long experience has taught me that the officer entrusted with the command of an army should be a man of vigorous mind, which has been cultivated and improved by large experience in war and other ways;—possessed alike of coolness and decision of character, fit for every emergency and knowing all the requirements of an army in the field and elsewhere. He ought also to be able to appreciate the qualifications of others, and to employ their scientific acquirements in the service of the army he commands.

Claims of Merit and Seniority to be left to Commanders-in-chief of Army in India.

To estimate the several claims of merit and seniority must be left to the judgment of the Commanders-in-chief of the different armies of India. It is to him that the army looks for a just distribution of patronage, and no one is more interested in keeping up a high tone of feeling in an army than the Commander-in-chief.

In the Madras army it was unimportant whether the Commander-in-chief was called upon on the day he arrived in the country, to name a qualified officer to fill a particular situation. He had only to desire the adjutant-general to supply him with the half-yearly confidential reports on the conduct of the officers and their various attainments. In this way he had no difficulty in selecting an officer possessing the qualifications required.

Education and Examination of Cadets.

It appears to me that the examination which a young gentleman must at present pass before he receives his commission gives no satisfactory proof that he is at heart a soldier, or that he has been grounded in those qualifications which will make him useful in the various appointments open to him in India. The duties which a regimental officer may be called on to perform in Europe, in the colonies, or in India must not be lost sight of, the most intelligent officers are selected for staff and other appointments, leaving with the regiments those of less ability and education, and frequently having no natural taste for the life of a soldier.

The three Military Colleges to be placed under control of Minister of War; and Commander-in-chief and Council of India to nominate young Gentlemen to be educated.

In future, instead of commissions being given for the military service subject to competitive examination, I would place the three military colleges under the control of the Minister for War, with power to Her Majesty's Commander-in-chief and the Council of India to make nominations in favor of young gentlemen who desire to make the army their profession.

They would receive a course of military instruction and of other branches of education, which would develope their military qualities, and lay the foundation of those accomplishments that mark the English gentleman and soldier. Periodical reports of their proficiency in study, in languages, of their moral character, energy, and other military qualifications, would indicate the branch of the service for which their attainments best qualified them, and the services of those proving deficient would be dispensed with. If all young gentlemen had to pass such an ordeal before they received their commissions, a selection from a body of regimental officers, possessing high and varied attainments for civil or military appointments, would never interfere with the efficiency of those who remained with their regiments.

The nominees of the Commander-in-chief and of the Council in India thus receiving their education at the same military college, a sympathy of kindly feeling and emulation would be produced among all ranks which would remove the jealousy and heartburnings which are said to exist under the present system.

Artillery for India to form part of Royal Artillery.

I see no force or weight in the arguments of those who wish to continue the system of local European artillery, on the ground of its being more suited to India than the royal artillery, except that the royal artillery is said to be more expensive from having a greater number of gunners attached to a gun, and that a number of grass-cutters and scices must be added to their establishment in India, in addition to the disadvantage of men unaccustomed to the country, and who cannot speak the languages. The first part of this reasoning is a mere question of detail, and in regard to the languages, they will gradually be learned by the royal artillery after their arrival in India, as they have been by the Company's artillery.

Sir Archdale Wilson, an artillery officer of the highest authority, has answered such objections as he thinks to the point, and his opinion confirms me in thinking, that in a military point of view, the local European artillery of India should be merged in and form part of the royal artillery; the two services when embodied will possess the experience and knowledge peculiar to India, as well as all the modern improvements in artillery which originate in Europe.

The royal artillery which served under Sir A. Wilson, landed at Calcutta, where they were equipped, and having, after a long march, joined him at Delhi, they served to his entire satisfaction during the siege.

It is well known that the natives of India have been awed by the Minié rifles, from the distance they carry with so much precision. The sooner Armstrong's 12 and 32-pounder guns are sent out to be used by the contingent and other forces as a part of their *matériel*, the sooner the natives will be brought under subjection; for nothing could produce more effect on their minds, than seeing a 32 lb. shell setting fire to a town at the distance of four miles.

Barracks.

There are, I have no doubt, healthier localities to be found for European troops at no great distance from the sites of the barracks now occupied. In the Madras presidency, with which I am acquainted, the hill station of Ramadroog, near Bellary, is an example, about which there is no difference of opinion.

Mortality in new and old Barracks at Cannanore.

It is well known that there are healthy localities where disease prevails, in consequence of an inferior or bad construction of barracks being occupied by European troops. The station at Cannanore is an example of this. Her Majesty's 25th regiment was stationed at Cannanore; a portion of the regiment occupied the old European barracks, and the remainder occupied the new barrack. The site of the latter is contiguous to that of the former; the old barracks had low ceilings, while the new barrack had no ceiling at all, but ample space for air, as the roof was high and well ventilated. A return of the mortality in the new and old barracks was prepared for me, signed by the surgeon of the regiment, and countersigned by the deputy inspector-general of Her Majesty's hospitals. From this return it appeared that the ratio of mortality in the old barracks was 34 per 1,000, while in the new barrack it was only 16 per 1,000. The average strength occupying the old barracks was 1,774, and the new 431. The return embraced the period from 1st June 1845 to 30th September 1847.

If proper Barracks are constructed on a healthy Site, Troops will be more healthy on Plains of India than in the West Indies. Sanitariats on Hills would be of great benefit.

There seems to be a wide difference of opinion about the most suitable localities where European troops ought to be stationed. The medical authorities, in expectation that railroads will be made available for the movement of troops, give a preference to the hills from sanitary considerations. It is their opinion that localities situated on high ground above the fever range, and below the level where Europeans are subject to diarrhœa, are more suitable to the European constitution. The positions are not indicated and an opinion is merely expressed of the desirableness of such situations being occupied instead of those previously occupied on the plains.

Other authorities, from considerations of defence, say that the bad effects of long marches to and from the hills, from the troops not being at all times within reach of places where their services may be required, and other inconveniences, would counterbalance the advantages that would be gained by a residence on the hills. Looking at it in the view of meeting a rebellious attack, it is necessary to keep the European troops on the plains (4755). And if a proper consideration be given to the quality of the soil on which barracks are built, as well as to their construction in a district which is free from miasmas, epidemics, or other inconveniences, no bad results would follow. I agree with Sir George Clerk, that the troops will be more healthy on the plains of India than they are in the West Indies, or even in in many of our European stations; at the same time, I think that sanitariats on the hills for European regiments that are suffering from disease would be of great benefit to the army.

It is generally admitted, that the sites of barracks have been ill selected, and their construction imperfect.

Additional Statistics of Mortality desirable.

From all that is given in evidence, it appears to me, that while the statistics of the mortality of European troops in India are based on the experience of the past, it might be well to ascertain whether the example I have given of the new barrack at Cannanore would be supported by the statistics of the mortality in other well-selected localities, and in barracks built on an improved construction. I confess my distrust of all speculative opinions not based on experience, as regards the preservation of health in warm climates. It is too important a matter to be dealt with as a mere speculative question.

Number of Troops required for Madras.

The number of native troops necessary to do the duties of the Madras presidency will depend very much upon the efficiency and numbers of the police under organization. This presidency is far removed from foreign aggression, the inhabitants are naturally peaceable. If the bad feeling caused by the severe and questionable exactions of the revenue and judicial peons from the simple-minded natives, who come to pay their kist at the collector's cutchery, or who are summoned to attend at a judicial court, was overcome by more vigilance on the part of their superior officers than has hitherto been exhibited, much good would result from such a course of action; and if a well organized police be appointed to do the duty of peons, of money escorts, collectors, honorary guards, and such like, fewer native regiments would be required. I agree with the Governor and Commander-in-chief in the number of European regiments required for doing the duty of the presidency proper.

Troops required in Nizam's Territory.

In the Nizam's territory there should at least be two regiments of European infantry, and one of cavalry, six regiments of native infantry, two troops of horse artillery, four horse batteries (9-pounders), and a reserve company of artillery, and three companies of sappers.

A permanent Fortification should be erected near Hyderabad, and new European Barracks.

A permanent fortification should be erected in the vicinity of Hyderabad, where new European barracks, on a healthy site and on the most approved construction, should be built.

Madras Troops should not garrison Posts beyond the Nerbudda.

I have a decided opinion, that the Madras troops should not garrison posts beyond the Nerbudda, for the reasons stated in my notes on the re-organization of the Bengal army. At the same time I see no objection to their serving beyond that river in times of emergency, if their families accompany them, or if they receive batta for foreign service when their families are left behind, in order that the regiments may be able to move in light marching order.

Troops required in Nagpore Territories, and Tennasserim and Pegu Provinces.

The Nagpore territories, if Jubulpore is to be occupied by Madras troops, will require two regiments of British infantry, and two of British cavalry, two troops of horse artillery, three horse batteries, and four regiments of native infantry. If Seetabuldee is fortified one regiment of European infantry will suffice, but a reserve company of artillery should be added.

The organization of the Tennasserim and Pegu provinces is under the consideration of the local authorities, who are most competent to fix the military establishment required for that country.

TWEEDDALE,
Yester, January 1, 1859. General.

APPENDIX No. 75.

Viscount MELVILLE'S ANSWERS to the NINE QUESTIONS proposed by the COMMISSIONERS, 3d August 1858.

1. *The proportion of European to native force to be maintained in the Bengal presidency.*

At present, not less than one third of the whole force.

2. *What amount of force will be required in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled.*

For the Punjaub, Bengal, and North-west Provinces, 100,000 men.

3. *Whether the native force in the Bengal presidency shall be on the regular or irregular system, or both combined.*

Both combined; the irregular system being adopted principally for the cavalry; but the chief portion of the infantry to be regular.

4. *Whether any native artillery shall be allowed in the Bengal army.*

I am of opinion that native artillery cannot be altogether dispensed with, but the number must be limited to the necessity.

5. *The same question with regard to sappers and miners.*

Native sappers and miners, or a corps of pioneers, for the laborious duties, from which it is advisable that Europeans should be relieved as much as possible, will be required.

6. *Whether the Bengal native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion.*

Of all castes, without distinction, where the man is physically fit for service.

7. *Whether the native army of Bengal is to be enlisted under a new code.*

For general service.

8. *Whether the Bengal army ought not to be divided into two or more armies.*

Not unless a fourth presidency is established, when a division of the army would be rendered necessary.

9. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.*

Unquestionably, and should be assimilated to the practice prevailing in the Bombay army, the promotion of non-commissioned officers being left entirely to commanding officers, and who should also select and recommend those they consider the most fit to be promoted to the commissioned rank.

MELVILLE, Major-General.

1st. How far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service; and how far of troops raised for service in India only?

The answer to this question appears to me to involve the whole principle on which the European force to be employed in India should be constituted. Considering that the Government of India is now to be carried on under the direct authority of the crown, there does not seem to be any reason, when the army becomes a royal army, that it should not be made so in reality, and not merely in name, and that two descriptions of European troops should be maintained, the one being the Queen's army, as now constituted, and the other equally the Queen's army, but organised on a different system, under different regulations, and nominally not actually under the crown. This distinction should now be done away with, and the entire European force to be employed in India should be a royal army, all serving under the same rules and regulations, the same Mutiny Act, and articles of war, and under the same system that has hitherto prevailed for her Majesty's troops serving in India. Difficulties have been stated to exist in effecting this incorporation; but they do not appear to be so insuperable as not to make it desirable to overcome them, for the sake of having one army organized and disciplined on one system, and under the same rules and regulations. Little difficulty can be found in incorporating the artillery and engineers of the late Company's service, as the promotion in these corps is the same as in the royal artillery and engineers, the officers retaining all the rights they now enjoy as to pension on retirement; and all other advantages to which they are entitled, which were in force at their entry into the service of the East India Company. The artillery in point of equipment and organization should be the same in all three presidencies, so that, wherever serving, the stores, arsenals, and magazines may be available for batteries moved for service from Madras or Bombay to Bengal, which is not the case now, and much inconvenience results from the system.

In transferring the nine infantry regiments to the line, these regiments might for the present remain in India until the officers now belonging to them are absorbed; all new appointments being made as in other regiments of Her Majesty's service. No appointments to the army in India should now be made by the Council for India, but the name of every candidate for a Commission should be submitted for the approbation of Her Majesty, in the same way as is now done for commissions in the line. It has been recommended, and it is deserving of consideration, whether all cadets should not, in the first instance, be attached to European regiments for the purpose of learning their drill, and being instructed in their duty previous to being posted to a native regiment. Possibly this might be effected by sending all cadets to a garrison town in the same manner as the Company's engineer officers have been sent to Chatham to go through a course of instruction previously to proceeding to India. The more these officers are instructed in the discipline and interior economy of a European regiment the more efficient they will become, notwithstanding the necessarily different system, in the command of native troops, and should exchanges be permitted, under certain regulations, between officers of the European army and officers of the native army, the latter would be more fit to serve with a European regiment, from having once been instructed in all the detail of duty, than is the case now, from service in a native regiment being so different from what it is in a European regiment. No exchanges to be allowed from a European regiment to a native one without passing an examination in the native language, and officers serving entirely with native regiments till they attain the rank of regimental field officers, and who have never served in a European regiment, should not be allowed to exchange, but should be eligible to all other commands to which their standing would entitle them, whether of a brigade or a division. The subscriptions to all military funds to be voluntary, and no longer compulsory, Government guaranteeing to the present subscribers, who will of course continue on the same footing as at present, all the advantages to which they are entitled from these funds on the retirement from the service. All general officers employed on the staff in India to be nominated by the Home authorities, and such other staff officers as it has hitherto been the practice to appoint, but all other appointments to the staff, and brigade commands to be made by the local governments on the recommendation of the Commanders-in-chief in the different Presidencies, subject to the confirmation of the supreme Government.

No officer to be nominated to the staff by the local government, who has not passed in the native language, except to the command of brigades and divisions, as is at present the practice. Much stress has been laid on the necessity of maintaining a European force formed for service only in India, on the ground that on a European war arising, troops might be injudiciously withdrawn from India. As the finances of India can only support a certain number of European troops, it is to be presumed that no greater number will be maintained than are absolutely necessary for the security of that empire, and whatever the strength at which that force may hereafter be fixed, it could never be calculated on by any government as forming any portion of the strength of the force necessary to be maintained for service at home, or in the other dependencies of the British Crown. The force for India must be, in addition to the force to be maintained in Europe and the colonies; and as Her Majesty's Government will be as responsible for the safety of India as for the other parts of Her Majesty's dominions, it is impossible to suppose that any Government, especially without the consent of the Governor-General, would endanger the safety of India by the withdrawal of any portion of a force calculated at the minimum ratio of that which will be required. The supposition is so improbable as in no way to counterbalance the immense advantage that will be gained from the whole of the European force in India being organized, disciplined, and equipped on the same system, and under the same rules and regulations. The new raised European cavalry regiments may likewise be transferred in the same way as the nine infantry regiments; or, if thought more advisable, the men might be allowed to transfer their services to the cavalry regiments now serving in India, the officers remaining on the strength of the regiments they formerly belonged to, and new calvary regiments added to the army at home; formed regiments being sent out to bring up the strength of the cavalry to the number proposed to be maintained in India. All the European officers belonging to native regiments should be required to make themselves acquainted with the Mutiny Act, and Articles of War, and the Queen's Regulations, unless the practice of employing them to sit on courts-martial on European soldiers is discontinued. At present they know nothing about them, and are quite dependent on the Queen's officers who may be on the court for a knowledge of what they ought to do. It is not their fault that they are not acquainted with them, as no copies are ever sent out for their use, and they have very little means of becoming acquainted with them.

In answering the second question, there is but one reply, namely, that the force to be maintained at home shall be of sufficient strength to admit, not only in India, but in all other foreign stations, of a periodical relief every ten years. In the colonies the relief is nominally stated to be every ten years, but it never is; regiments being more frequently 12 or 15 years absent than 10. To give an instance of the period to which the foreign service is extended: the first regiment which I had the honor to command, was 24 years abroad at one time, and in the last 54 years has been exactly ten years in the United Kingdom, and is now in its eleventh year of service in India. The second regiment I commanded has, in the last 34 years, been nine years in the United Kingdom, and is now in its fourteenth year of service in India. No periodical relief can be established unless the force at home is of sufficient strength to enable a certain number of regiments to be constantly in transitu independent of the force which may be required for other duties and emergencies.

The answer to the third and fourth questions are comprised in the foregoing remarks.

MELVILLE,
Major-General.

APPENDIX No. 76.

Lieutenant-General Sir HARRY SMITH'S ANSWERS to the NINE QUESTIONS proposed by the COMMISSIONERS, 3d August 1858.

1. *The proportion of European to native force to be maintained in the Bengal presidency.*

1. One European to two natives.

2. *What amount of force will be required in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled.*

2. Eight regiments European cavalry, at 800 each - - - - - 6,400
Twelve regiments native regular cavalry, at 800 each - - - - - 9,600
Eighteen regiments irregular cavalry, at 800 each - - - - - 14,400

Thirty-five regiments British infantry, at 1,000 each - - - - -	35,000
Sixty regiments native infantry, at 1,000 each - - - - - -	60,000
Four hundred and two field guns, of which—	
120 guns, horse artillery - -	20 troops.
282 guns, horse batteries - -	47 batteries.
Divided into battalions.	
402 guns, *all nine-pounders.*	

This calculation is totally regardless of "battering trains," which must be organized at every great fortification, *not* as a part of the guns mounted on the "works."

3. *Whether the native force in the Bengal presidency shall be on the regular or irregular system, or both combined.*

3. There are localities where irregular infantry may be required at native courts; this must rest with the Governor General.

I am on principle opposed to irregular troops, but in a country like India, so numerous is the population, that irregular troops frequently absorb roving spirits, and turn to good account those who would be against us.

This is exclusive of the police force now embodied, and contemplated to be embodied.

The force I have named appears to me to be adequate, not only for the preservation of tranquillity in Bengal, including the Punjaub, but equal to meet any emergency which may arise on the confines of our territories, its disposition to rest with "*the Governor-General*" and "*the Commander-in-chief.*" But I venture to recommend that, in lieu of the system which has hitherto prevailed in India, of having so many different posts and stations, the troops should be kept together in large and efficient bodies, ready to move in force, when actually required, and the marching establishment to be maintained *for the present.*

Nothing so weakens an army, and impedes its rapidity of movement, as to have it scattered as it were over an extensive province, such as Bengal, to which the Punjaub is now added; and wherever troops are stationed, there should be a "place d'armes" capable to contain stores, treasure, women, children, and the "impedimenta" of war, such "place d'armes" to be so constructed that its defence may be ensured by a very small garrison, *defensive alone.*

Engineers are invariably disposed to construct great fortifications, the expense of which is enormous, while they absorb the troops, and cramp the movements of an army.

All duties of a civil and financial character to be performed by the police.

4. *Whether any native artillery shall be allowed in the Bengal army.*

4. No native artillery, most assuredly, but to each troop and battery of British artillery I would attach forty natives of low caste, for duties of fatigue, &c.

5. *The same question with regard to sappers and miners.*

5. The nucleus of this corps must be British. I see no objection to the labourers being natives.

6. *Whether the Bengal native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion.*

6. There is nothing more important than that the Bengal native army should be composed of different castes and nationalities, from one end of India to the other; and the principle of collecting nationalities in companies is judicious; on the one hand it tends to prevent combination for evil, on the other it creates emulation.

7. *Whether the native army of Bengal is to be enlisted under a "new code."*

7. A very stringent code of military law, or Mutiny Act, and articles of war, to be framed and promulgated, that recruits may be well aware under what law and conditions they take service. "Corporal punishment" to be re-established, and the power of "capital punishment" to be fully provided to punish every act of "mutiny" or "gross "insubordination;" and every power consistent with judgment and discretion should be restored or established for the officers commanding corps and regiments.

Increase of pay to be granted for "good conduct" after years service, and pension on discharge after years service.

The issue in India called "batta" is not to be regarded as a right, but as a donation from the Government, under peculiar circumstances.

Enlist for a period of years for "*general service,*" without reference to "caste," and upon the express understanding that every native soldier must perform *every duty* required of him, as the British soldier does.

The proportion of Mahommedans should be one in four.

8. *Whether the Bengal army ought not to be divided into two or more armies.*

8. I see no advantage whatever in dividing the Bengal army into two; on the contrary, it would add to correspondence, and create obstacles in all combined movements.

9. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.*

9. I am of opinion that the promotion to corporals and to sergeants should be vested entirely in the hands of commanding officers, and on the principle of eligibility.

To a commission, *eligibility* most decidedly, upon the recommendation of the officer commanding, whose power requires to be strengthened in every way, and his authority rendered definite and absolute in all regimental interior economy.

Whenever a sergeant is promoted to a commission over the heads of others on the ground of their ineligibility, these generally worn-out individuals should be invalided, and obliged to retire on pension.

*A staff corps, if practicable, to avoid denuding regiments of their officers, who ought to regard regimental duty as the first and most important. Regimental officers to be eligible for transfer to this corps after years zealous regimental duty. Every effort should tend to attach officers to their regiments, and those accepting service in the staff corps are not to return to their regiments, but must invalid when nearly worn-out, a fair retiring pension being provided.

As to the occupation of Bengal and the Punjaub, this must ever be vested in "the Governor-General" and "the "Commander-in-chief;" but the ordinary rules and science of war, as well as the recent revolts, demand that, in a country of the enormous extent in question, exclusively of the small "places d'armes," I recommend; such posts as—

Peshawur (a strong place d'armes),
Lahore (a strong place d'armes),
Umritsir and Govindghur (already fortified),
Delhi (works to be improved, and large stores erected),
Agra (already a work which may be made formidable),
Gwalior (a citadel to be constructed in the centre of the great fort),
Lucknow (to be fortified),
Calcutta (already Fort William),

should be regular fortifications, as depôts for all military stores, manufactories of arms, tents, saddlery, &c. &c. &c.

Care, however, must be taken in the construction of barracks in these fortifications, for the health of the troops is "*paramount.*"

I name the above on general principles, but there are other places, such as "Cawnpore," "Benares," "Allahabad," "Saugor," &c. &c. &c. where places d'armes are indispensable.

The natives in India hold in high estimation "fortresses" and "works," regarding a country that does not possess them as exposed to irruptions; hence, when they see the territory thus held by "works" garrisoned by British troops, their passiveness is ensured.

H. G. SMITH, Lt.-General.

ADDENDUM.

A question now arises: what is to be done with that portion of the native troops who have stuck to their colours, on terms of service, in Bengal?

There are also to be discussed and acted on,—
Arms for native cavalry.
Clothing for native cavalry.
Horse appointments.
Camp equipage, &c. &c.
The *clothing* for the British troops.
Appointments and camp equipage.
Clothing for native infantry, arms, accoutrements, baggage, &c. &c. &c.

Then come the all-important subjects,—
Medical staff.
Regimental surgeons.
Inspectors.
Hospital and field establishments, &c. &c.; than which, when I served in India, from 1839 to 1847, nothing could be less efficient.
"Commissariat."

H. G. SMITH, Lt.-General.

Manchester, October 3, 1858.

* Evidence subsequently received, induced me to alter this opinion in my Report of the 23d December 1858.

Report of Lieut.-General Sir Harry Smith.

The Commission appointed by Her Majesty's warrant, under date 15th July 1858, for the purpose of inquiring into the organization of the army late in the service of the Hon. the East India Company, and of reporting what changes it may be expedient to make in the system now obtaining in the armies of India and the troops of the line; having assembled from time to time, and having taken the evidence of various officers in the civil and military employ of the late Company, many old hands who served previously to the revolt of the Bengal native army, and very many officers, civil and military, recently returned fresh from the field of operations, and having received minutes upon the subject from the Governor-General (who also sent over his military secretary, Colonel Durand). from the Governors of the respective provinces, from the Committee of Punjaub, from the secretary to Government, and from various other public functionaries high in office, civil and military, came to the decision, on the 9th of December instant, that, on or before the 1st of January 1859 each member of the Commission should transmit, separately, his written opinion previous to a General Report being framed. Sufficient evidence, both oral and documentary, having been taken to enable the Commission to arrive at a conclusive opinion.

I annex my view of this great question, derived from so extensive a field of information, and in some degree sanctioned by military services in India, proceeding to reply seriatim to the "Twelve Questions" embodied in the Order for the Assembly of the Royal Commission on the armies of India of the 15th June 1858.

1. *The terms on which the army of the East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown?*

1. This is comprehensively provided for in sections 30, 56, and 57 of "The Act of Parliament for the better Government of India," under date 2nd of August 1858.

2. *The permanent force necessary to be maintained in the Indian Provinces, after the restoration of tranquillity?*

Bengal.

Eight regiments of European cavalry, at 800 each	6,400
Twelve regiments native regular cavalry, at 800 each	9,600
Eighteen regiments irregular cavalry, at 800 each	14,400
Thirty-five regiments British infantry, at 1,000 each	35,000
Sixty regiments native infantry, at 1,000 each	60,000
Four hundred and two field guns, whereof—	
120 guns, horse artillery, twenty troops	2,420
282 guns, horse batteries, forty-seven batteries divided into battalions.	5,687
402 guns, all nine-pounders.	
Total for Bengal	133,507

This calculation is totally regardless of "battering trains," which must be organized at every great fortification, not as a part of the guns mounted on the "works," and irrespective also of "police."

Madras.

Sir Patrick Grant's Estimate.

Europeans.

Forty-three companies of artillery, averaging 121 of all ranks, (guns, 258),	5,203	
Three regiments of dragoons, each 703 sabres	2,109	
Thirteen regiments of infantry, each 1,152 bayonets	14,976	
Total Europeans,		22,288

Natives.

Four regiments cavalry, each 703 sabres	2,812	
Fifty-five regiments infantry, and two battalions of veterans, amounting in all to, bayonets,	63,920	
Total Natives		66,732
General total for Madras		89,020

Bombay.

Lord Elphinstone's Estimate.

Europeans.

Cavalry	1,492	
Horse artillery (guns, 36)	764	
Foot artillery (guns, 180)	3,600	
Sappers	120	
Infantry	9,630	
Total Europeans		15,606

Natives.

Three companies African artillery	300	
Five companies sappers	620	
Twenty-five regiments regular infantry	28,600	
Nine regiments irregular cavalry	6,930	
Fifteen regiments irregular infantry, including marine battalion	11,000	
Total natives		47,450
General total for Bombay		63,056

Bengal	133,507
Madras	89,020
Bombay	63,056
General total for the three Presidencies	285,583

3. *The proportion which European should bear to native troops, in infantry, cavalry, and artillery, respectively?*

3. Invariably one third European in the armies of the three presidencies.

4. *How far the European portion of the army should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as part of the regular tours of service; and how far of troops raised for service in India only?*

4. Upon all the evidence adduced I found my opinion that *no European local force* should be maintained; the whole to be troops of the line.

The local European regiments now existing in the three presidencies to be at once embodied with or absorbed in Her Majesty's regiments of the line, numbering them from the 100th regiment onwards; every care being taken that strict faith be observed with the officers about to be thus amalgamated; the regiments, as previously stated, being at once absorbed, and numbered with the line.

5. *In connexion with this question, the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter.*

5. Regiments to be relieved every 10 years, generally viâ "The Cape of Good Hope;" the voyage being most beneficial to the troops, reserving the route, viâ "Suez," for cases of peculiar emergency.

6. *Whether it be possible to consolidate the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other, and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company?*

6. There is great difficulty in meeting this question. Some of the best suggestions are those laid before the Commission, in a memorandum by Colonel Wood, its secretary, and formerly military secretary to the late Lord Hardinge, when Governor-General. I allude to the plan he proposes for the transfer of the "European Troops" to the "Line," and that for the general amalgamation of the European and native forces.

7. *Whether there should be any admixture of European and native troops, either regimentally or by brigade?*

7. This is a matter of command; there ought, however, to be no regimental admixture whatever beyond 40 men per troop and company to be attached to the artillery, the operatives attached to the engineers, and the various and absolutely requisite number of camp-followers, in a climate like that of India.

Brigades should always consist of one regiment of the line, and two native regiments.

8. *Whether the local European force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the "Line," or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?*

8. This question is fully answered in the reply to query 4. viz.:—"*No European local force whatever* to be *maintained.*"

9. *Whether it would be possible to raise any regiments in the colonies, either for temporary or permanent service in India?*

9. It is not considered possible to do so, nor does the evidence adduced regard it as expedient, when peace is established.

10. *Whether the native forces should be regular or irregular, or both: and if so, in what proportions?*

10. Both combined; for proportions, vide answer to query No. 2.

11. *Whether any native artillery corps should be sanctioned?*

11. No native artillery whatever, in any locality.

It is advanced in evidence that there are some few localities, so pernicious to the health of Europeans, as to render it absolutely necessary: I say, withdraw artillery from such stations, rather than infringe upon the general principle.

To each troop and battery I would attach 40 natives, of low caste, to relieve the Europeans from duties *of fatigue*.

12. *Whether cadets, sent out for service with native troops, should, in the first instance, be attached to European regiments, to secure uniformity of drill, and discipline?*

12. Assuredly; teach the cadets the duties of soldiers, by attaching them to regiments of the line in the first instance; especially now, as all the troops in India are royal, and to be amalgamated.

General Observations.

1. The European troops, of every description, to be as now as to discipline, organization, interior economy, the regulated reliefs of regiments (which imperatively ought to arrive in India in the month of November), confirmation of promotion, first commissions, &c. &c., under the paramount authority of the Queen, and the orders of the Commander-in-chief at home.

2. The native royal armies to be as now, *three armies, distinct* and *separate* from *each other*. Under the orders of the Governors and Generals commanding of the three presidencies.

3. The native troops, for *the present*, to be armed with the old percussion musket.

4. The Governor-General, and the Commander-in-chief in India to possess the paramount authority over all the troops in the three presidencies, exercising this unlimited power through the Governors and Commanders of the forces of Madras and Bombay.

5. All interior military arrangements during peace in these respective presidencies to rest with the Governors and Commanders of the forces, nor would military discretion and judgment order any body of troops to be withdrawn from the minor presidencies, without previous intimation and reference.

6. The Commander-in-chief in India ought most assuredly to occupy a central position in the "Upper Province of Bengal."

7. The presidencies to remain as now established, viz.:—

Bengal -
Madras -
Bombay - } This, I admit is rather political than military.

8. In Bengal, the Governor-General and the Commander-in-chief of all India.

9. In Madras, the governor of the presidency and a commander of *the forces*, in whom should be vested, under all ordinary and peaceful circumstances, the disposition of regiments, the construction of fortifications, the appointment of staff-officers (confirmed by the Governor), and regimental promotions of the native royal troops.

10. Bombay to be precisely the same.

11. The Generals in supreme command in the three presidences, to hold warrants vesting them with the power to convene and to confirm the sentences of general courts-martial awarding the punishment of death, or its mitigation.

General Staff.

12. The army in India being greatly increased in troops of the line, cavalry, and artillery, the staff of these must be considered accordingly.

13. The appointments of Commander-in-chief, and Commanders of the forces in the minor presidencies, to be made by the Queen, at the recommendation of the Commander-in-chief at home, as also

The adjutant-general - - - - -
The deputy-adjutant-general - - - -
The assistant-adjutant-general (for artillery) - } *Bengal.*
The quartermaster-general - - - -
The deputy-quartermaster-general - -
The deputy-adjutant-general - - - } *Madras.*
The deputy-quartermaster-general - - }
The deputy-adjutant-general - - - } *Bombay.*
The deputy-quartermaster-general - - }

14. The alteration in the composition of the armies of India, reverses the order which previously obtained. *The Queen's army* is now the paramount force of the Indian empire. *The native royal troops* the auxiliaries.

15. Hence it must be clearly understood, that the Queen's staff-officers in the three presidencies are to be at the head of their respective departments, and to move, organize, and maintain the discipline of the troops, *aided* by the staff of the royal native forces.

16. In the former composition of the armies of India this was not the case; the company's adjutant-general and quartermaster-general moved the armies.

17. A considerable staff must be attached to the native royal forces; of these the local authorities are the only competent judges as to number, &c.

18. My present object is to recommend that the heads of departments in India should be appointed by the Queen through the Horse Guards, which authority Her Majesty would exercise so as to ensure the most efficient officers at the head of each department, selected from the army generally, as hereafter to be amalgamated.

19. The Governor-General and the Governors of the presidencies, to appoint such subordinate staff-officers, commandants of fortifications, &c. as they consider requisite, upon the recommendation of the respective generals in superior command.

20. There ought to be two officers of the quartermaster-general's department, viz., an assistant and a deputy-assistant-quartermaster-general at Calcutta.

21. Troops require great assistance upon disembarkation, and equally so upon the embarkation of invalids, which is frequently occurring; and this department should pay all detachments, as a major of brigade now does, who should be discontinued.

22. These staff-officers should be selected from the troops of the line who have served some time in India.

23. A judge-advocate-general at the head-quarters of each presidency, appointed at the recommendation of the respective Commanders of the forces, subject to the confirmation of the respective Governors.

24. The judge-advocates of the different presidencies should be selected for those offices, with reference rather to their common sense than to any legal knowledge they may possess. The subtilties of the law are not required in military matters, the object is to secure a just sentence, conscientiously, and directly attained.

25. The minor staff appointments, viz., assistants, &c. to be equally divided between the troops of the line, and the native royal troops, in the proportion of the numerical strength of each branch of the army.

26. The control of the general resources for the armies, all military establishments, the implements of war, ammunition, gun-carriages, tents, &c. &c. must ever exclusively rest with the authorities in India. The gun-carriages constructed in India are capital.

27. That proportion of divisional commands now nominated by the Queen, at the recommendation of the Commander-in-chief, Horse Guards, to remain as at present established. The remainder of the local commands to be vested in the respective Governors, and Commanders of the forces.

28. *I do not approve of a "staff corps;" I cannot conceive how it could work beneficially, either to the "staff," the "troops," or the "regiments." Our knowledge of duty, our aptitude for certain classes of it, are never developed until tried; a man may be a right good regimental officer, and yet a regular stick as a staff-officer, and your "staff corps" becomes saddled with inefficient men, while the troops suffer, and the regiments lose able officers.

29. I emphatically recommend the staff of the armies of India to be furnished on the system of "seconding;" which preserves regiments effective in officers, (a matter of vital importance,) and does not banish true, and most valuable regimental feelings and associations.

* In my Report of 3rd October, 1858, I stated an opposite opinion; subsequent evidence on this point has induced me to alter that opinion.

Hospitals.

30. Hospitals, both in camp and quarters, require considerable improvement everywhere,

31. There should be continued, as now, an inspector-general of hospitals at each presidency, the senior being with the Commander-in-chief, the others reporting to him.

32. There is an error which necessity, I fear, compels us to commit, viz., the sending our soldiers to India at too early an age; were it practicable, no man should go to India under twenty-two years of age.

33. A system prevailed when I was adjutant-general in India of holding medical boards up the country on soldiers to be invalided. The men thus invalided *should go home:* whereas a second board was held in Calcutta, upon their arrival there, from distances of 100 to 1,400 miles. Many men were rejected as invalids, having improved in health on the march or passage down, and sent back to their corps; their hopes of returning once more to their native land were blighted, and if they reached their regiments 99 out of 100 fell victims to disease; this I assert from experience.

Clothing.

34. The attention of the Government and of the Commander-in-chief is already directed to the clothing in wear by the army in India, and measures to improve it are in progress; formerly, a soldier in India and in Canada was clothed in the same material.

35. It is a difficult question to meet; the seasons of the year vary, the twenty-four hours vary, and a soldier must march all day, and probably sleep in the same clothes at night. Hence, the clothing ought to be of woollen texture, but light, loose, and flexible.

36. The head-dress of the troops in India is ill-adapted to the climate; it should be light, and calculated to protect from the rays of the sun, as well as from the rain.

37. The soldier, upon his arrival in India, ought to be provided, by the respective local governments, with a linen jacket and two pairs of trowsers gratis; and also with a head-dress of some material hereafter to be determined on.

38. Our horse appointments cannot be too light, combined with serviceable utility; and our swords ought to be of the best quality.

Railroads, &c.

39. The construction of railroads in India will undoubtedly facilitate the movement of troops, but no general must place implicit dependence on them; they can be alone regarded as auxiliaries, so simple are the means of their partial destruction.

40. Troops by rail move rapidly it is true, but it must be borne in mind that in India you require elephants, camels, &c., for the transport of camp equipage, provisions, &c. &c. and the rail will bring these with the troops undoubtedly; but must unload them at the station, there to remain till the quartermaster-general's and commissariat departments can collect transport. Hence, rail conveyance becomes, as I state, a dubious auxiliary.

41. It has frequently occurred to me that the navigation of the rivers might be most advantageously improved, and made available.

42. I am on principle opposed to irregular troops; but in a country like India, so numerous is the population, that irregular troops frequently absorb roving spirits, and turn to good account those who would otherwise be opposed to us.

43. The time has not yet arrived when native gentlemen might at once be admitted into the army as officers; many of them have served ably and well with the irregular troops, and as tranquillity is re-established, I see no reason whatever why native gentlemen should not be received into the service, reserving to the Governor-General and the Governors of presidencies the power of immediate dismissal.

44. The force I have named appears to me to be adequate not only for the preservation of tranquility in "Bengal," including the "Punjaub," and the other presidencies; but equal to meet any emergency which may arise on the confines of our territories, its disposition to rest with the "Governor-General," and "the Commander-in-chief;" but I recommend that in lieu of the system which has hitherto prevailed in India, of having so many small and detached posts and stations, the troops should be concentrated in large and efficient bodies, ready to move in force, and the "marching establishment" to be maintained for the present.

45. This is irrespective of the police now embodied, and contemplated to be embodied all over India, of which I make no mention, and which must be *totally separate* and *distinct* from *the* "*Army*" and armed with inferior weapons; and all duties of a civil and financial character should be performed by the "police."

46. An army is weakened and its rapidity of movement impeded by being scattered, as it were, over an extensive province, such as "Bengal," to which "the Penjaub" is now added; and wherever troops are stationed, there should be a "Place d'Armes" capable to contain stores, "treasure," "Women," "Children," and the "Impedimenta of War;" and so constructed that its defence may be ensured by a very small garrison, *defensive alone.*

47. Exclusively of the small "Place d'armes," I recommend that such posts as—

Peshawur	-	(a strong place d'armes),
Lahore	-	(a strong place d'armes),
Umritsir and Govindghur	-	(already fortified),
Delhi	-	(works to be improved and large stores erected),
Agra	-	(already a work which may be made formidable),
Gwalior	-	(a citadel to be constructed in the centre of the great fort),
Lucknow	-	(to be fortified),
Calcutta	-	(Already "Fort William,")

should be regular fortifications, as depôts for all military stores, manufactories of arms, tents, saddlery, &c., &c.

48. Care, however, must be taken in the construction of barracks in these fortifications, for the health of the troops is *paramount.*

49. I name the above on general principles; but there are other places, such as "Cawnpore," "Benares," "Allahabad," "Saugor," &c., &c., where places d'armes are indispensible.

50. The natives in India hold in high estimation "fortresses" and "works," regarding a country that does not possess them, as exposed to irruption. Hence, when they see the territory thus held by "works," garrisoned by British troops, their passiveness is ensured.

51. Engineers are invariably disposed to construct great fortifications, the expense of which is enormous, while they absorb the troops and cramp the movements of an army.

52. It is established generally by evidence, that the royal native armies should be composed of different "castes," and "nationalities," from one end of India to the other; and the principle of collecting nationalities in companies is judicious; on the one hand it tends to prevent combination, on the other it creates emulation.

53. A very stringent "code of military law" or "Mutiny Act and Articles of War," should be framed, that recruits may be well aware under what law and conditions they take service.

54. "Corporal punishment" should be re-established; and the power of "capital punishment" fully provided to punish every act of "mutiny" or "gross insubordination;" and every power, consistent with judgment and discretion, should be restored or established for officers commanding corps and regiments.

55. Courts-martial on natives should hereafter be composed of regimental (instead of native) officers, and detachment courts-martial should be authorized wherever occasion demands.

56. Increase of pay should be granted for "good conduct," after years' service; and "pension on discharge," after years' service.

57. The issue in India called "Batta" should not be regarded as "a right," which has often originated a spirit of mutiny, but as a donation from the Government under peculiar circumstances.

58. Enlist for a period of twenty years for "general service," and upon the express understanding that every native soldier must perform *every duty* required of him, as the British soldier does.

59. The proportion of Mahommedans should be one in four.

60. I am irrevocably opposed to any division of the army in "Bengal;" the strength of all commands consists in the absolute and undivided authority of the General-in-chief, of course under the supreme local authority, "the Governor-General."

61. With reference to regimental promotion, I am of opinion that the promotion to "corporals" and to "serjeants" should be vested entirely in the hands of commanding officers, and on the principle of "eligibility."

62. To "commissions," eligibility most decidedly upon the recommendation of the officer commanding, whose power requires to be strengthened in every way, and his decisions rendered definitive, and without appeal in all regimental interior economy, promotions, &c. Great injury to discipline has arisen from soldiers preferring complaints after the decision of the commanding officer of the regiment has been given.

63. Whenever a serjeant is promoted to a commission over the heads of others, on the ground of their ineligibility, these generally worn out individuals should be invalided and obliged to retire on pension, if the *native officers be continued*, the expediency of which is *very doubtful*.

Treatment of the Royal Native Troops.

64. In a memorandum by Lieutenant-General Sir Patrick Grant, (dated 29th June, 1857,) detailing various causes of the revolt of the Bengal Sepoys, he says:—"Further, these "officers are discontented, only looking forward to leave "their regiments for some more pleasant employment, so "that they perform unwillingly the bare outline of their "duty, and never, as a general rule, mix or converse with "their men; but, on the contrary, too often refuse to listen "to their complaints; at the best telling them to 'go to the "'adjutant,' and not unfrequently to 'go to ———, and "'don't bother me.'"

65. This is so pernicious, so monstrous, so opposed to all discipline and soldier-like feeling, that I cannot avoid to comment upon it.

66. The ruling feelings among colored men throughout the world are "fear" and "self-interest." The influence of these will be brought to bear, by the exercise of judicious, yet *absolute command*, founded on just and equitable principles. The native soldiery should be taught to regard the articles of war as imperative and definitive, ensuring discipline, protecting the good, and coercing the bad.

67. Officers of all ranks should mix with their men, as much as is compatible with discipline; attend to their wants, comforts, &c.; and, in short, make them clearly see and understand that the interest of officers and soldiers is one and the same; and that the great object of the former is the welfare and happiness of the latter, which is to be attained alone by implicit obedience on the one side, and by that fraternal kindness and attention on the other, which elevates military authority.

68. The officers have this part of their duty zealously to perform; but they must ever bear in mind that the native is suspicious and capable of the most profound cunning and dissimulation.

69. No portion of mankind is more susceptible of kindness than the "colored races;" but it must be a manly, judicious, and discriminating kindness, based upon a distinct understanding on the part of the Sepoy, that although the British soldier is a comrade and a brother, he is also his superior as a man of indomitable courage and endurance, and that the Sepoy only approaches his military position by being officered by British officers and associated with troops of the line.

70. Another point I desire to record for the observance of officers, viz., that whatever may be the virtue or otherwise of the religion professed by the natives, it should be scrupulously respected by officers; and nothing but imperative military duty (the service for which they are enlisted) must interfere with either their religion, caste, or prejudices.

71. There is no doubt that the late revolt originated, or was accelerated by a firm belief that the government contemplated their forcible conversion, a feeling for which, *however erroneous*, some ground was afforded by the fanatical zeal of a few individuals in positions of military authority, though far from sanctioned by the government of India.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

72. In the foregoing observations I have avoided detail; the outline of the composition of this vast army is that on which alone I have dwelt (its minutiæ are local matters), desiring to regard India as part and parcel of the British empire, whose interests should be one and undivided, and its defence based upon a general levy of its military resources.

73. Those who apprehend danger to India from the withdrawal of any portion of the troops of the line, should remember this mutual and *inseparable interest*, as well as the energetic manner in which troops were poured into that country during the late crisis, and they must then feel assured that the government of England will ever equally provide for the maintenance of British supremacy in India.

74. Military opinions must be based upon military principles, and no wise government will ever wage two distinct and distant wars at the same period, if avoidable; nor will *any able government attempt to divide its resources for two separate and incongruous objects*, such as England, with all her numerous colonies, and the vast empire of distant India, but will rather rally and concentrate those resources of men, &c. upon which so great a strain is laid, as England has, by recent events, been compelled to sustain.

75. India was won by the sword, and by the sword of its *conquerors* it must be retained. History produces no example where for any *lengthened* period a conquered territory has been maintained in subjection and tranquillity by the agency of troops raised from among its *native inhabitants*; sooner or later they have revolted, as recently in India.

76. Hence, I again advocate the policy which regards India as an integral portion of the British empire with *mutual interests*, mutual sources of improvement, &c. &c., and thus at some future period India, progressing as it now will, more rapidly in civilization, will, however *gradually*, abandon the religion and customs of barbarism.

77. One point, which I have hitherto avoided, I must allude to, viz., the enormous number of Sikhs in our service. Levied at a moment of vast emergency, they have been faithful so far, and their services have been of vital importance to our interests. That they have been so, is well accounted for in the evidence produced before the Commission, in which there is a reply containing this significant observation:—"They hate the Hindoos and the Mussulmen "more than they do us, and the love of plunder has actuated "them."

78. On the restoration of tranquillity this motive will *no longer exist*. It is therefore evident that the sooner we diminish their numbers in our service the better; they carry two-edged swords. The measure was a bold one: *it succeeded!*

79. I conclude this report with an anxious hope that as these great armies are amalgamated, and the service of the Queen pre-eminent, one interest may actuate all classes, the service of our country being paramount to all other considerations, and that the amalgamation may ensure that harmony and unanimity which so essentially contributes to maintain the efficiency of an army, and is ever the prelude to victory.

H. G. SMITH,
Lieut.-General.

Manchester,
December 23, 1858.

APPENDIX No. 77.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir GEORGE WETHERALL'S ANSWERS to the NINE QUESTIONS proposed by the COMMISSIONERS, 3rd August 1858.

Horse Guards, S.W., September 27, 1858.

1. *The proportion of European to native force to be maintained in the Bengal Presidency.*

1. For several years past the army of the East India Company has received many augmentations, but no proportionate increase of Europeans, the proportion of whom has always been below what it ought to be. No cordial union can be expected between the native and European troops serving in Bengal for a long time to come. I am therefore of opinion that the proportion should be one-fourth European.

2. *What amount of force will be required in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled.*

2. This will depend upon local circumstances, and can be better decided by the local Government; but, considering the present extent of the Bengal presidency, I consider that 152,700 is the minimum, viz.:—

Artillery	7,000	European.
Sappers	700	
Cavalry	5,000	
Infantry	30,000	
	42,700	
Cavalry*	10,000	Irregular.
Infantry	100,000	Natives.
	110,000	Natives.
	42,700	European.
	152,700	

* In twenty regiments of 500.

Half-castes (topee-wallahs) who did good service under Clive, and native Christians should be encouraged to enlist.

3. *Whether the native force in the Bengal presidency shall be on the regular or the irregular system, or combined.*

3. The only native force to be of cavalry and infantry. The cavalry to be irregular, and the infantry regular. Although proposing that the infantry should be on the

regular system, it is worthy of consideration whether a multiplication of European officers tends to promote the efficiency of a native corps.

For all purposes, excepting actual field-service, a native regiment is not improved by a multiplicity of officers. Many of them are unavoidably young and inexperienced, and ignorant of the native languages. Like all other youths, they are for some time idle and thoughtless; the climate is adverse to mental or bodily exertion; they congregate in mess houses, and are absorbed in pursuits exclusively of European character. The greater the number of officers in a regiment, the more are they estranged from intercourse with the soldiery; personal influence or attachment necessarily declines; obedience is not cordial. The more subalterns, the slower the promotion; and slow promotion is one of the evils of the service.

It was the opinion of Sir Thomas Munro:—

"So far from thinking the efficiency of native troops "increased in proportion to the increased number of "European officers, I think the number of officers may be "too great, and that when this is the case, it injures the "discipline of the corps, and lessens the respect of the "natives for their European officers."

"One to a company is quite enough for every useful "purpose."*

The great expense of a regiment is the pay of European officers.

According to Mr. Grant's minute, the present amount of military expenditure cannot be exceeded; and as the increase of European troops is indispensable, so must the expense of native regiments be diminished.

Mr. Grant states:—"I have never heard it denied that "it is a waste of money and strength to use up the services of a score of European gentlemen to officer a battalion of natives."

I quite agree to this.

4. *Whether any native artillery shall be allowed in the Bengal army?*

4. None, as trained gunners.

5. *The same question as regards sappers and miners?*

5. A corps of 700 trained Europeans, as before stated, as superintendents; but all working men to be Coolies, hired as required, or low caste men embodied as pioneers.

6. *Whether the Bengal army should be composed of different nationalities, or castes, and, if so, in what proportion?*

6. Not to consist of separate nationalities or castes. The more nationalities and castes are blended in the same battalion, the greater the security. No class or caste should be excluded, but not more than 30 per cent. of Musslumen should be admitted into the same corps.

This observation applies to the Bengal army.

7. *Whether the native army is to be enlisted under a new code?*

7. Sepoys should be enlisted for general service, and be given distinctly to understand that they are liable to perform every duty, whether of arms or fatigue, to which a soldier is subject. It is in evidence, that, in the better regulated armies of Madras and Bombay, no duty is objected to by the native soldiery.

8. *Whether the Bengal army ought to be divided into two or more armies?*

8. Not into distinct armies, but into distinct corps d'armeé—each commanded by a Lieutenant-General—the whole comprising one army under a commander-in-chief.*

This would essentially destroy the present system of centralization, by which all subjects are referred to headquarters, to the injustice of individuals, and the destruction of discipline, by depriving commanding officers of that respect which is indispensable to the maintenance of their authority.

"The authority they once possessed has, with the view "of checking abuses, been so much divided, that there is "too little left anywhere to command respect."†

9. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.*

9. A radical change is required.

The establishment of native officers, under the existing seniority system of promotion, is shown by the evidence to be useless; and so long as commanding officers are forbidden to select the active, intelligent, and trustworthy for the rank of jemadar and subadar, the sooner those ranks are abolished the better.

The sudden subversion of old customs is, however, dangerous,—not as regards the mode of promotion, but whether there should be such ranks as native officers. There must be a connecting link between the native soldier and the European officer; the familiar intercourse, so indispensable to mutual confidence and support, can never be maintained without it. There is no other channel through which a commanding officer, whether of a battalion or a company, can become familiar with the character and conduct of the sepoy under his command, and through which those little services can be rendered which bind the soldier to his officer. Such intercourse is, moreover, necessary, as the best means of acquiring the colloquial dialects of the natives,—more valuable than all the knowledge imparted by books or moonshies.

The fact that, during the whole course of the late mutiny in Bengal, not a single native officer gave any information, invests this subject with a peculiar and painful interest.

I do not agree with those who consider that native officers are useless, but they must be selected for merit, &c., as before stated,—not promoted for length of service, or as matter of right. A different system would produce trustworthiness and confidence, a new impulse would be given to the native soldier, emulation excited, and the service benefited.

We cannot expect to establish a bond of fidelity between the native army of India and ourselves, but we can improve their discipline and better their condition. They consider us as a foreign people, whom their necessities oblige them to serve. They have no bond to each other; the army consists of all classes and creeds. They are mercenaries; but they should be attached to our service by the hope of reward, by present promotion, and future pension.

The rank of native officer should therefore be maintained, their promotion depending on their commanding officer, but necessarily confirmed by Government in the name of the Queen.

Non-commissioned officers to be entirely promoted at the discretion of commanding officers, without reference to higher authority.

G. A. WETHERALL, Adjutant-General.

OPINION on the General Subject of transferring the ARMY of the EAST INDIA COMPANY to The CROWN.

Horse Guards, S.W., Dec. 31, 1858.

THE whole army, European and native, to be incorporated with, and become part of, the army of the Crown.

ARTILLERY.

The artillery to form a second regiment of royal artillery, and to consist as follows:—

Bengal - - -	Batteries or	Battns.
Madras - - -	Do.	do.
Bombay - - -	Do.	do.

ENGINEERS.

The engineers to form a second regiment of royal engineers in like manner.

The whole to be recruited and trained in Great Britain under one system, as now in force with those corps.

The recruiting and depôt staff to be provided by the second regiments respectively.

The depôts of artillery to be at Woolwich, that of the engineers to be at Chatham, where all will perform the same course of instruction as now. Cadets of the East India Company are now instructed at Chatham.

No reserve companies of either artillery or engineers in India: they are receptacles for the idle and unprofitable officers and men.

EUROPEAN CAVALRY.

The European cavalry to have its depôts at Maidstone and Warley, or Canterbury; all to be recruited and trained alike. No recruit to be sent to India until dismissed from drill: the same rule to apply to newly appointed officers.

EUROPEAN INFANTRY.

The European infantry to follow the same rules, and be recruited and trained in depôt battalions, according to the present system in the Queen's army.

The cavalry and infantry to be in all respects regiments of the line, and numbered accordingly.

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* Minute, 21st January 1823.
† Sir Thomas Munro.

Native Regiments.

The native regiments to be numbered as are colonial corps, viz. :—

1st, 2nd, 3rd, &c., Bengal regiments.
1st, 2nd, 3rd, &c., Madras regiments.
1st, 2nd, 3rd, &c., Bombay regiments.

Irregular regiments, although placed in the army list, to have their several local denominations, and to be officered from the regular regiments.

Irregular regiments may be composed of various tribes and nationalities. No officer to be appointed to such who has not a competent knowledge of the language and habits of those over whom he is placed. Such appointments to be considered as staff appointments, and to be paid accordingly. If found fit after one year's probation, the officers to be seconded in their own corps, and be eligible for promotion in them.

Officers in civil employment to be in like manner seconded; but, if continued in employment more than two years, to be placed on the non-effective list.

Permanent European Force.

The permanent European force to be maintained in India has been defined by the Governor-General and the Governors of Presidencies as follows :—

For Bengal alone.

Artillery,—78 batteries for siege, ordnance, garrison, and other duties		11,180
Cavalry,— 3 regiments of line	}	6,398
10 local		
Infantry,—15 regiments of line		15,000
30 local		24,000
		56,578

This force of artillery is very inadequate for the required purpose. 78 batteries, at 180 men per battery, require 14,040.

Madras (Lord Harris).

Artillery,— 6 batteries	1,080
19 companies	1,900
11 reserve companies	550
Cavalry,— 4 regiments	2,664
Infantry,—14 regiments	14,000
	20,194

Lord Canning considers that 26 batteries are necessary, and that the Madras artillery should consist of 5,160.

Bombay (Sir H. Somerset).

Artillery,—24 batteries and troops	4,320
9 companies reserve	450
Cavalry,— 3 regiments	1,998
Infantry,—15 regiments	15,000
	21,768

The Governor-General considers this force of artillery unnecessarily large.

Lord Elphinstone proposes :—

Cavalry (2)	1,492
Horse artillery	764
Field artillery	3,600
Infantry	9,630
	15,486

N.B. Military trains, and sappers, are not included in the above estimates.

Total Europeans.

Artillery	19,480
Cavalry	11,960
Infantry	68,000
	98,540
Add sappers	2,000
	100,540

The estimate of the Commander-in-chief at Bombay has not been adopted in the artillery for that presidency, as he proposes 1,000 native artillery; and as the opinion is unanimous that all artillery should be European, the batteries have all been calculated at 6 guns and 180 men.

No horse artillery has been calculated for, it has only been proposed in the Bombay command.

Native Force, Regular or of the Line.

(The 30 irregular corps are here included as they are for purely military purposes.)

Lord Canning is of opinion that when peace is restored, 50 native battalions will be sufficient for *purely military purposes*,

20 to be regular,
30 to be irregular.

	Bengal.	
50 battalions at 700		35,000 infantry.
	Madras.	
No specification	60,000	,,
	Bombay.	
	39,000	,,
Total	134,000	,,

Proportion of European and Native Troops.

If to these 134,000 regular native infantry be added the irregular cavalry, infantry, and armed police of the three Presidencies, the number of which is not known, but which may be reckoned at 150,000, the proportion of Europeans to natives will be nearly 1 to 3.

Relief of Europeans, and Maintenance of Efficiency.

Assuming that 100,000 will be the amount of European troops in India, 10,000 will be required annually to maintain the number efficient; it being proved by statistics of years, that the wear and tear by death, invaliding, and discharge is 10 per cent., or that a regiment of 1,000 is renewed every ten years. This may possibly be increased in consequence of the Ten Years' Enlistment Act, which will soon be in active operation, having been passed in 1847. This number will be necessary, whether the European regiments are local, or of the line, all being enlisted for the same period, and subject to the same casualties. As the services of a soldier enlisted for ten years may be prolonged, on foreign service, for two years more, and assuming that he will not be sent to India until he is trained and habituated to a soldier's life, the amount of his services in India may be reckoned at eleven years.

By sending out ten per cent. of the establishment annually, regiments may be kept up to an indefinite period; and as the men are thus perpetually renewed, there would be no great hardship, as regards them individually, to keep regiments in India for long periods. The officers would be the chief sufferers. Many regiments have been kept more than 20 years in India, but no murmur or complaint was ever heard on that account.

It is, however, considered desirable that every regiment should be relieved every 14 or 15 years.

There are now in India—

1 regiment,	14th Dragoons	18 years in May next.
,,	9th Lancers	17 ,, ,,
5 regiments	infantry	17 ,, ,,
1 ,,	,,	15 years in August next.
2 ,,	,,	14 ,, ,,

When peace is restored, these regiments will probably return home without relief; three of them are now under orders.

After these, there remain—

3 regiments of infantry,		13 years in May next, of which one is under orders for home.
5 ,,	,,	10 years in May next.
4 ,,	,,	6 ,, ,,
2 ,,	,,	4 ,, ,,
46 ,,	,,	2 ,, ,,
12 ,,	,,	1 ,, ,,

So that, when the regiments named have returned home, there will be no reliefs for several years, and then after long intervals, viz. :—

1861	1864	1870
3	5	2

After which the relief of those that went to India in 1857 will require consideration.

Absorption of Officers of the late Bengal Army.

An important question in the re-construction of the Bengal army remains to be considered; how are the officers to be provided for?

By the latest East Indian Army List there were, exclusive of artillery and European line regiments, the following officers to be posted :—

	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Colonels	10	73
Lieut.-Colonels	10	71*
Majors	10	74†
Captains	69‡	508§
Lieutenants	74	750‖ Subs.
Cornets	3	

If, as proposed by Lord Canning, ten regiments of European cavalry are raised, all the unattached officers of that arm will be provided for.

But following up his lordship's scheme, of forming only twenty regiments of regular and thirty regiments of irregular native infantry, there will be a considerable remainder of the higher ranks unprovided for.

The colonels, who are all non-effective as regimental officers, may be permitted to draw their off-reckonings, or colonel's pay, although not posted to regiments.

Deducting those on civil and staff employ, there will remain, of infantry,

Lieut-Colonels	63
Majors	55
Captains	305
Subalterns	589

Regimental Rank.

	Colonels.	Lieut.-Cols.	Majors.	Captains.	Subalterns.
Three Regiments, in course of formation, will absorb	3	6	6	42	96
20 Native Regiments	20	20	20	140	320
	23	26	26	182	416
Leaving for Irregular Regiments and Police Corps	—	37	29	123	173
	23	63	55	305	589

A number inadequate to the demand, if, as Lord Canning proposes, thirty battalions of irregular infantry be raised, and the irregular cavalry be kept up on its present scale.

It will be observed, that all officers employed on civil or staff duty are seconded, as proposed in a former part of this minute.

The twenty-four European regiments proposed by Lord Canning to be raised for local service in Bengal are not included in the above calculation.

Having proposed the amalgamation of the East India Company's army with the line, it remains to remark on the supposed difficulty, if not impracticability, of that measure.

The objections are :—

That one is a seniority service, and the other not.

The adjustment of the funds, supported by the compulsory subscriptions of officers in the one service, in which they have a vested interest, and which do not exist in the Queen's army.

The superior retiring allowance of the East India Company's service.

The danger to India of withdrawing troops in the event of war in Europe, or pressure at home.

The Queen's service is one of regimental seniority, as much as that of the East India Company, indeed more so, since the latter are promoted regimentally until they attain the rank of major only, when they are placed on a *general* list, and promoted according to seniority, a system fraught with disadvantages, by estranging commanding officers from regiments in which they have been brought up, and subjecting them to great inconvenience and expense, by removing them to distant stations, and which has driven many from the service. Lieutenant-colonels are never sure of remaining with a regiment. Transfers from one regiment to another are by no means unfrequent in the East India Company's service, and exchanges, it is believed, are also sanctioned.

It is difficult to imagine that any personal disadvantage could accrue from the exchange or transfer of officers from one service to the other, if both parties consider it for their mutual convenience. It would, on the contrary, be beneficial for many reasons; would weaken local habits, local prejudices, and interests, take away the provincial character of a local force, expand the minds of officers, and improve them by enlarged intercourse with the world, and afford relief to many whose constitutions and efficiency are impaired by climate.

The same arguments apply to purchase. It is well known that purchase accelerates the promotion of those who do not purchase, and there are many examples of officers, unable to do so, who would never have obtained high rank in the army but for the promotion of their juniors as well as their seniors.

A vicious system of purchase now exists in the service of the East India Company, a system well known to the controlling authorities, and tacitly, though not officially, encouraged.

In every corps a fund is formed from the monthly subscription of all the officers for the purpose of purchasing out the seniors, by which the juniors gain no more immediate advantage than an advance of one step in the general list. This tax, in addition to the compulsory subscription to military funds, loads the junior ranks with debt which is often ruinous; the advantage they hope to derive is distant and prospective, and often never attained; the immediate advantage is derived by others.

To admit the direct purchase of commissions would be a boon to the service, generally and individually.

Exchange would be made by the mutual agreement of parties, and an actuary would calculate the value of the advantages which the one derives from retiring allowance and assistance from the military fund, as compared with those of the other service.

The minute calculation of the respective advantages cannot be entered into in this minute, the scope of which is confined to opinions on general principles; but, as regards the effect on the military fund, one example taken at random may suffice.

Two captains wish to exchange. He of the East India Company's service has been fifteen years in it, and has paid as follows to the military fund, the benefits of which he forfeits on exchange, and the other does not acquire :—

	Rs. a.	Rs.	
As ensign, on appointment	135 0		Unmarried.
„ three years' subscription	162 0		
		297	
As lieutenant, on promotion	67 8		
„ on joining	202 8		
„ eight years' subscription	540 0		
		810	
		1,107	
As captain, on promotion	135 0		
„ on joining	337 0		
„ four years' subscription	432 0		
		904	
		Rs. 2,011	

So that an ensign wishing to exchange would be reimbursed for his subscription to the military fund by Rs. 297, or 29*l.*; a lieutenant, by Rs. 1,107, or 110*l.*; a captain, by Rs. 2,011, or 201*l.*

These sums might either be paid by the contracting party, or be repaid by the fund itself, which would be relieved from all claims upon it from that party.

It is understood that the Bengal government has taken upon itself the responsibility of all claims on the military fund of that presidency, and that the fund is not solvent. If so, the government will gladly relieve itself from future claims by such small payments.

In order to carry out more effectually the amalgamation of the two services, all subscriptions from new appointments should cease, and the Indian government take upon itself the management of the funds, which, in the presidencies of Madras and Bombay, are supposed to be solvent, and capable of securing to all subscribers their vested interests.

The future retiring allowances of officers must be a matter for the consideration of the highest authorities. Those who have really served a given number of years in India, whether of the local or line force, may be chargeable to the Indian revenue.

The danger of withdrawing troops from India is so purely a ministerial question, that it cannot be entertained by individuals.

The withdrawal of two cavalry regiments during the Crimean war is instanced as a reason for not more promptly suppressing the late revolt. This cannot be supported, one having been withdrawn from Madras and the other from Bombay; and one had returned and the other been replaced before the revolt took place. There were at no time fewer European troops in India than by law permitted.

* 8 of these on civil or staff employ.
† 19 „ „ „
‡ 22 „ „
§ 293 „ „
‖ 161 „ „

SUMMARY.

The summary of these opinions is,—

That the army of India should be one and indivisible, as regards its relation to the Crown.

That the armies of the three presidencies should remain, as at present, distinct commands, with well defined limits.

That the officers in chief command of the troops at Madras and Bombay should be styled commanders of the forces.

That the proportion of European to native forces, according to the scales of the authorities quoted, is not too great—being nearly one European to three natives.

That all native infantry should be regular, and all the native cavalry irregular.

No native artillery at either presidency.

A corps of European sappers at each presidency, as superintendents of public works, and corps of native pioneers as workmen.

That the native army be composed of all castes and nationalities—the more the better.

The native army to be enlisted on the same terms at al presidencies, and governed by one and the same code; having for its text the Queen's regulations, as is now the case at Madras and Bombay.

That the Bengal army, although of one body, under one commander-in-chief, should be composed of three or four *corps d'armée*.

That commanding officers should have the power to promote non-commissioned officers without reference to higher authority, and to recommend for promotion to officers (native), and to exercise the same authority, in their regiments, as is accorded to commanding officers in regiments of the line.

That the European portion of the army should be numbered regiments of the line, taking India as a part of their tour of duty.

That their efficiency can be maintained by periodical reinforcements of ten per cent. on their established strength, and for an indefinite period.

The periodical relief of regiments to take place after service in India of fifteen years.

That there is no insuperable obstacle to the gradual amalgamation of the whole army, so as to allow the exchange from one branch to the other.

G. A. WETHERALL,
Lieut.-General.

APPENDIX No. 78.

General MONTGOMERIE'S ANSWERS to the NINE QUESTIONS proposed by the COMMISSIONERS, 3rd August 1858.

1. *The proportion of European to native force to be maintained in the Bengal presidency.*

1. I consider one European to three natives should be about the proportion.

2. *What amount of force will be required in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled.*

2. On the supposition that Saugor, and the greater part of Bundelcund, shall hereafter be occupied by Madras troops, as recommended by Sir George Clerk, in his evidence before this Commission, Q. 1180, and by Lieut.-General Sir Patrick Grant, in his memorandum dated 29th June 1857, that Rajpootanah, Malwa and Scinde, which geographically belong to Bombay, shall also be provided with troops from that presidency, there will then remain the countries bordering on the Ganges and Jumnah, and the Punjaub to be furnished with troops from Bengal. I estimate the troops required for this purpose at about 36,000 Europeans of all arms, and about 96,000 natives, regular and irregular, exclusive of police.

By the Return from the India House, dated April 1858, laid before this Commission, the Bengal army stood as follows, on an average of the six years prior to the mutiny.

AVERAGE STRENGH of the Bengal Army from 1852 to 1857.

—	Europeans, non-commissioned, Rank and File.	Natives, commissioned, non-commissioned, Rank and File.
Cavalry	1,500	5,000 Regulars. 14,000 Irregulars,
Infantry	16,800	84,000 Regulars. 28,000 Irregulars.
Artillery	3,330	3,200
Sappers	80	1,200
Total	21,710	135,400

ESTABLISHMENT of the Bengal Army as now proposed.

—	Europeans, non-commissioned, Rank and File.	Natives, non-commissioned, Rank and File.
Cavalry	3,000	12,000 Regular and Irregular.
Infantry	27,000	80,000 Regular and Irregular.
Artillery	6,000	2,600
Sappers	300	1,000
Total	36,300	95,600

The European infantry I suppose to be located as follows:—

In the lower provinces, including Allahabad and Gorruckpore	8,000
In Central India, including Gwalior	8,000
In the Punjaub	11,000
Total European infantry	27,000

The regular troops to be massed in strong brigades and divisions, with a fortified post at each station.

When the country is perfectly settled, and the Punjaub considered in a satisfactory condition, I think it will be found that a portion of the European troops may be reduced, and the native troops increased, till the ratio of one to three is established.

3. *Whether the native force in the Bengal presidency shall be on the regular or irregular system, or both combined.*

3. A combination of both, but the majority of the infantry to be regulars.

4. *Whether any native artillery shall be allowed in the Bengal army.*

4. The general tenor of the evidence before the Commission is to the effect, that the fewer natives employed in the artillery the better. My own judgment does not lead me to the same conclusion, at least, not to the same extent as that expressed by most of the evidence before us; yet in deference to the opinion so generally maintained, I would, in the re-organization of the Bengal army, confine the native portion of the artillery, to the manning some of the batteries in the Punjaub, to the duty of gun lascars, and to that of drivers to some of the batteries, as recommended by Sir John Lawrence, *vide* Lord Canning's Minute of the 9th of August 1858.

In computing the strength of the artillery, as I have proposed in paragraph 2, I have been guided by Lord Canning's Minute of the 9th August 1858, on the organization of the Bengal artillery, in which it is reckoned, that the same number of field guns will be required as before the mutiny, viz., 36 field batteries, which, at the rate of six guns a battery, gives 216 field guns. His Lordship further states that in addition to the foregoing, field guns will require to be provided to replace the guns hitherto supplied by contingents, viz.:—

Gwalior	5	Carried over	8
Malwa	1	Oude	4
Bhopal	1	Punjaub	5
Goudpore	½	Hydrabad	4
Kotah	½	Nagpoor	2
	8	Total batteries	23

One half, however, of the above or 12 batteries only, fall to be provided for from the Bengal artillery, viz.:—

Gwalior	2	Lord Canning in his Minute, proposes an increase to the guns for Oude, and a decrease for Gwalior, which I have followed here.
Oude	5	
Punjaub	5	
Total batteries	12	

The other contingents named above, fall within the geographical limits I have supposed in paragraph 2, to be provided with troops from Bombay and Madras. Indeed, Hydrabad never has, and Nagpoor has not, for the last 35 years, been dependent on Bengal for military occupation or defence.

There will, therefore, be, by my calculation, the following field batteries to be provided for from Bengal.

36 field batteries as before the mutiny, at six guns each, makes	216 field guns.
12 field batteries as above	72 ,,
Total	288

Thirty men a gun for each field piece, will I reckon allow a proper proportion of men of all classes, European and native, for all artillery duties, including arsenals, reserves, &c., and that will amount to a total of 8,640 men, of whom I propose Europeans, 6,000; natives, 2,600, as in paragraph 2.

The following Table will show the strength of the artillery in Bengal before the mutiny, taken from the return dated India House, April 1858.

AVERAGE STRENGTH of the Bengal Artillery from 1852 to 1857.

—	Europeans, non-commissioned, Rank and File.	Natives.			Total of all Classes.
		Non-commissioned, Rank and File.	Drivers.	Gun Lascars.	
Horse Artillery	1,030	459	—	351	
Foot Artillery	3,300	1,860	550	—	
Total . .	3,330	2,319	550	351	6,555

The total of all ranks, European and native, as shown above, gives 6,550, which divided by 216, the number of field guns is nearly 27 men a gun before the mutiny; I have allowed 30 men in my calculation.

5. *The same question with regard to sappers and miners.*

5. With respect to the sappers, I think about one-fourth should be European, or about 300 Europeans to 1,000 natives.

6. *Whether the Bengal native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion.*

6. The greater the diversity of castes in a regiment, and the nearer equality in point of numbers, one caste bears to another the better. But on the question of different nationalities in the formation of a battalion, I wish to record my opinion, that I am strongly in favour of forming some regiments, with European companies as their basis, say two flank companies of Europeans, and the remainder natives of any part of India, who might choose to enlist, knowing that European companies formed the basis of the corps, a regiment so formed would, in my opinion, possess many advantages:—

1st. The real security against anything resembling the disasters which have lately occurred.

2nd. The spirit of emulation, likely to exist in a regiment so formed, as has been shown by the distinguished services performed of late by certain Punjaub corps composed of different classes.

3rd. The stricter discipline and more constant supervision that would be required from individual officers in such a regiment than has hitherto prevailed in our native regiments in general. In many regiments, the commanding officer and adjutant did the greater part of the work, and the consequence was, that the regimental officers did not take that interest in the internal economy of the corps, that t was desirable they should have done.

This is not an idea I have taken up in consequence of the late mutiny, though that disastrous event has greatly strengthened my former opinion. I some years ago visited the island of Java, and had an opportunity of seeing a portion of the Dutch colonial army in that island, and was much struck with finding that they had battalions composed of two companies of Europeans, two of African negroes, and the remainder of Javanese.

The plan was found to have answered well, and I may add was *first adopted after the great insurrection in that island in* 1825-26-27.

I would appeal to those most doubtful of the trustworthiness of the sepoys, if an organization such as I propose, would not have afforded a safeguard, if not a perfect security, against the terrible disasters of 1857.

The barracks and hospital of the Europeans of a mixed regiment should be judiciously built for defence.

We have something analogous in our own service in the horse artillery, both of Bengal and Madras. In the Madras horse artillery, of which I can speak from personal knowledge, there are four European troops, and two of natives in the brigade. There are almost always an European troop and a native one quartered together at Bangalore, without our experiencing any of the inconveniences or jealousies, apprehended by some of the evidences examined before the Commission, by such mingling of Europeans and natives.

7. *Whether the native army of Bengal is to be enlisted under a new code.*

7. The code, in my opinion, requires revision, especially as regards pensions to sepoys. I think a man should have a right to retire on a pension, after a certain period of service, say 25 or 30 years, without reference to his bodily strength, but before that period his pension should depend on wounds or illness contracted on service, or injury sustained in the actual discharge of duty.

8. *Whether the Bengal army ought not to be divided into two or more armies.*

8. I think if the Bengal army were divided into two, that it would be advantageous in many respects, but I confess there are many practical difficulties to the carrying out such a change.

9. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.*

9. I am of opinion that naiques should be chosen from the most intelligent men, without reference to length of service; and that the havildar major, also a selected man, should be considered first for promotion to be a native officer. If to this were added employment in the police, with higher pay for deserving native officers, and the power of removing the less efficient ones to the pension or a half-pay list, such a system would, I consider, secure an efficient class of non-commissioned and commissioned native officers.

P. MONTGOMERIE,
October 11, 1858. Major-General.

MEMORANDUM by Major-General MONTGOMERIE on the TWELVE HEADS of INQUIRY laid before the Commission.

1. The terms on which the army of the East India Company are to be transferred to the Crown?

All that it appears necessary to do on this head, in my opinion, is to declare to the troops, that the well-being and interests of officers and men will be looked after and guarded by Her Majesty's Government, as hitherto under the rule of the Company.

2. The permanent force necessary to be maintained in the Indian provinces respectively, after the restoration of tranquillity?

The opinions of the highest authority laid before the Commission concur in recommending a great addition to the European force hitherto maintained in India, especially in Bengal. My own opinion is, that the number now called for is considerably higher than will be thought necessary when tranquillity prevails, when railways and river steam navigation are more advanced, and fortified posts established. I would therefore say for some years, rather than for a permanency, the force to be maintained in the Indian provinces respectively should be as follows:—

In Bengal—About 40,000 European troops of all arms.
„ About 100,000 Native troops of all arms.
In Madras—About 20,000 European troops of all arms.
„ About 60,000 Native troops of all arms.
In Bombay—About 18,000 European troops of all arms.
„ About 40,000 Native troops of all arms.

3. The proportion which European should bear to Native troops, in infantry, cavalry, and artillery respectively?

In Bengal—
One European to two Natives in the Infantry.
One „ three „ „ Cavalry.
Three „ one „ „ Artillery.
In Madras—
One „ three „ „ Infantry.
One „ three „ „ Cavalry.
Three „ one „ „ Artillery.
In Bombay—
One „ three „ „ Infantry.
One „ three „ „ Cavalry.
Three „ one „ „ Artillery.

4. How far the European portion of the army should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as parts of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only.

My opinion is that the troops of the line should bear the proportion of one to two of the European local army.

5. In connection with this question, the best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and of securing the efficiency of the latter?

The periodical relief of regiments of the line should, I think, as a general rule, be by the Cape of Good Hope.

If the local European army is much increased, the recruiting depôts must of necessity have much enlarged barrack accommodation and increased establishments.

Officers from India, whose leave of absence has expired, should, in my opinion, as a rule, do duty at the recruiting depôts, and take charge of drafts proceeding to India.

6. Whether it be possible to consolidate the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other; and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to all officers now in the service of the East India Company?

I do not consider it practicable to effect the object proposed on this head with perfect justice to the officers of the Company's service.

7. Whether there should be any admixture of Europeans and native forces, either regimentally or by brigade?

My opinion is strongly in favour of an admixture of Europeans with natives regimentally in a portion of the regiments to be raised in Bengal, both in the cavalry and infantry. I have given my reasons for this opinion in my memorandum dated October 11th, under the 6th head; and I still feel convinced that no measure we could adopt would tend more to the efficiency of the Indian army, and to our security against any recurrence of a Sepoy revolt, than a judicious admixture of Europeans with Natives in the same regiment.

8. Whether the local European force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?

I think by both means. When regiments of the line are ordered home, the men might, under proper restrictions, be allowed to volunteer for local regiments.

9. Whether it would be possible to raise any regiments in the colonies, either for temporary or permanent service in India?

I do not think it would be advisable to raise regiments of coloured men for service in India in any of the colonies.

10. Whether the native forces should be regular or irregular, or both, and if so, in what proportion?

In Bengal, in my opinion, there should be a considerable number of irregular regiments, and the proportion of them to regular regiments may be much greater than in either of the other presidencies. Neither in Madras nor in Bombay have there been hitherto many irregular regiments, and I can see no necessity for increasing them now. Both in policy and in justice we should leave these presidencies as much as possible as they are. We should not lose sight of the fact that the armies of Madras and Bombay, as a whole, have stood staunch, and have taken a faithful part in putting down the revolt, and that India has been saved to us by their loyalty.

Sir James Outram, in his minute of the 7th of September, so forcibly expresses my ideas on this head that I will quote his own words:—

"Most thoroughly do I concur in the opinion expressed " by his lordship, that it would be a great error to forget " that, in prudence as well as justice, the native armies of " Madras and Bombay, which are still standing at their full " numbers, and have shown themselves, on the whole, loyal, " must be treated continuously and considerately in the " introduction of changes. Not merely do I say, with the " Governor-General, 'that before any change which will " 'introduce discontent in these armies. the new Bengal " 'army ought to be well in hand;' but I go further. I " consider that no change should be attempted, nor should " it be allowed to appear that any such is contemplated, so " long as those armies evince no symptoms of disloyalty.

"The system and discipline maintained in those armies is " in a great measure freer from the blemishes which pro- " duced the revolt of the Bengal army, and I doubt whether " any great change could be introduced for many years to " come. Certainly no change could be attempted, espe- " cially such as would entail the disbandment of large " bodies of troops, without causing discontent and excite- " ment, which might lead to disastrous consequences. Nor " would I introduce even trifling changes just now in any " branch of the armies of those presidencies, for any such " would excite mistrust and suspicion that greater changes " were about to follow. On the contrary, I would proclaim " to those armies how deeply Her Majesty appreciated the " loyalty they have evinced throughout the late trying crisis, " in consideration for which they are assured that no altera- " tion whatever shall be made in their organization, and that " their constitution and privileges will be maintained, so long " as they continue loyal, pointing to the utter extinction of " the Bengal army as the consequence of disloyalty. Some " such assurance is, I think, necessary, and should not be " delayed, for our native troops throughout India cannot " otherwise than feel anxiety lest the misconduct of the " sepoys of Bengal may cause us to discard from our service " all of their caste and creed in other parts of India, as soon " as we conveniently can do so."

11. Whether any native artillery corps should be sanctioned?

In this respect, in my opinion, a marked differenc should be shown between the Bengal Artillery and that o the other presidencies. In Bengal there need be very few natives taught to work the guns, though I see no good reason why a portion of native drivers and gun Lascars should not be employed. With respect to the other presidencies, for the reasons given in the last paragraph, every favour should be shown to the native artillerymen, their pay should be raised to what it was before 1837, when a private golundange received nearly two rupees a month (or, say three half-pence a day) more than an infantry sepoy; this among a small body of men, was no burden on the public purse, but it was sufficient to make the artillery a favourite service, and gave the State a body of men, which within my own knowledge stood loyal, when the cavalry and infantry in the same cantonment showed a mutinous disposition. And only last year, when a body of Mahomedan fanatics from the city attacked the residency at Hyderabad, a detachment of Madras Native Horse Artillery stood staunch, and instead of wavering in their duty, opened their guns on the insurgents, although men of their own creed; had this detachment not stood firm at this critical moment, it is perhaps not too much to say, that the whole of the Nizam's territories might have been in revolt, and the south of India from Cape Comorin to the Nerbuddah in a blaze. The services of these men should not be ignored.

12. Whether cadets sent out for service with native troops, should in the first instance be attached to European regiments, to secure uniformity of drill and discipline?

Whatever training cadets undergo before joining their native regiment, would in my opinion, be better acquired in a military seminary or doing duty at a depôt in England, than with a European regiment in India, to which they are not to be permanently posted. I have observed, that in many cases, neither the commanding officer nor the regimental officers take the same interest in a cadet doing duty with a regiment, that they do in a youth posted permanently to it. I therefore think that a cadet should join the regiment he is ultimately to belong to as soon as possible after his arrival in India.

P. MONTGOMERIE,
January 3, 1859. Major-General.

APPENDIX No. 79.

Col. BURLTON'S ANSWERS to the NINE QUESTIONS proposed by the COMMISSIONERS, 3rd August 1858.

1. *The proportion of Europeans to natives to be maintained in the Bengal presidency.*

1. First: Artillery.—To be all European.

Second: Cavalry.—One European to three native regiments.

Third: Infantry.—Equal numbers of regiments, European and native; but the former might be of smaller numerical strength than the latter. The moral effect of the presence of an European regiment at any post is very considerable on the native mind, without reference to, or knowledge of its strength; and financial considerations should also be allowed to have some weight. It would seem, therefore, the best policy to have a large number of small regiments rather than a small number of large ones.

2. *The amount of force for the Bengal presidency when the country is settled.*

2. First: Artillery.—Admitting the very great importance of this arm, I am disposed to think, assuming that it is to

be entirely European (except as regards a few gun lascars for every battery), that the former strength of the Bengal artillery will be nearly sufficient for the fixed establishment hereafter. It consisted previous to the mutiny of 13 batteries of horse, and 23 (including a small mountain battery) of foot artillery; and I should think if these were increased to 16 or 18 troops of the former, and 25 or 26 of the latter, there would be enough for all purposes. For siege trains and garrison duties 24 companies should be maintained, being an increase of, I think, five companies to the former establishment.

Second: Cavalry.—Twelve regiments of European cavalry and 36 of irregular horse, would, I think, be sufficient. The former should consist of four squadrons, of not less than 160 rank and file each, to allow of their division into good and efficient wings, if it should be desirable at any time to detach a portion of the corps on any emergency.

The irregular horse should be corps of 1,000 strong, as at present.

Third: Infantry.—Forty regiments of European infantry, and the same number of native regiments should be sufficient for all purposes of defence against aggression from without, (save in the most improbable contingency of an European invasion,) or broad rebellion within our territories; provided, as is understood to be the intention, the preservation of ordinary tranquillity, the suppression of dacoitee, and the quasi police duties of various kinds, which have heretofore been assigned to the regular native army, are henceforward to be entrusted entirely to an armed and organized police, supported by local corps, such as have hitherto been maintained in particular districts, and of which I believe few or none have joined in the recent mutiny. I may add here, as regards the composition of the European force, that I would have one half of it, of all arms, supplied from the regular army of England (as heretofore with a certain portion of it), and the other half to be a strictly local force, raised especially for the army of India, as has hitherto been the case with the European regiments of the East India Company. This, and many other points connected with the organization, discipline, dress, &c., both European and native, as well as the disposal of the vast numbers of irregular troops we have at present on our hands do not come within the legitimate scope of the question to which I am now replying, and may therefore be left for future consideration and discussion.

3. *Whether the native troops should be regular or irregular, or both combined?*

3. The whole of the cavalry, I think, should be irregular.

As regards the infantry, there is much to be said on both sides of the question, and on the whole I am inclined to think it would be desirable in the first instance, if only experimentally, to have one half of the native infantry on the regular, and the other half on the irregular system; but any how, whatever number of regulars may be kept up, it would be highly desirable that there should be much less adherence to European costume, and the minutiæ of drill and equipment than has prevailed of late years, to the great disgust, as well as discomfort, of the native soldier. A larger proportion of European officers should also be allowed to the irregular regiments, not less, I should say, than five (exclusive of the medical officer), as well as two carefully selected European non-commissioned officers for each company, both in the regular and irregular regiments, in lieu of the native commissioned officers by whom our regiments have hitherto been uselessly encumbered. These last might be allowed gradually to die off or retire to the pension establishment. I do not expect that native gentlemen of family and influence could be found, in any considerable numbers, willing to accept commissions in our regular regiments of infantry, but many might very probably be induced and happy to join the irregular branch, as commissioned officers, and I would give them every possible encouragement to do so. This, however, is not the place to enter on that question.

4. *Whether any native artillery shall be allowed?*

4. Not a man beyond the necessary number of gun lascars for cleaning the guns and such like duties, except at a few outposts where Europeans cannot live with safety.

5. *The same question as regards sappers and miners.*

5. We must have some natives for rough day-work, but I would not admit or employ them in laboratories, magazines, &c., and all those we enlist should be low caste men.

6. *Whether the native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, &c.*

6. By all means. The more the better. Mix them up promiscuously in general, but I should be inclined to have a few national regiments also, say, some all Seikhs, some all Goorkhas, and so on. Some of the finest classes of men in India, for soldiers, have never yet taken to our service, from their utter dislike to our clothing, discipline, &c. If they could be enlisted for our irregular regiments they would make splendid soldiers. I allude to the real native Rajpoots, Rathores, &c. of Rajpootana, as well as to Jhats, Rajcoomars, and various others, few, if any, of whom have ever yet been induced to enter our service, for the reason stated.

7. *Whether the native army should be enlisted under a new code?*

7. The evidence on this subject has been almost unanimous in favour of enlistment for general service, but I confess I am not satisfied that such a condition would, on the whole, be a desirable one to exact. I have no doubt whatever that if such a rule existed, it would have either one or the other of these results,—either it would deprive us of very many of our best recruits, or it would lead to numerous and most inconvenient desertions whenever a regiment was called on to embark on board ship. Lord Ellenborough's opinion on this point seems to me to be exceedingly well founded, and deserving of the most careful consideration. It is so seldom that native troops are required to serve beyond sea (and then they can only be withdrawn to a comparatively limited extent), that I think the old plan of having only a certain number of regiments enlisted specially for general service, and keeping them more than heretofore on the sea-board frontier, would be greatly preferable to the exaction of one universal engagement to serve beyond sea, on the part of our recruits, most of whom would enter into it with great repugnance, if not with the full intention of violating it on the first occasion of being called to its performance. I do not perceive any other points in the present code or terms of enlistment that require alteration, but if we abolish the rank of native commissioned officers we must also abolish native courts-martial, a measure of which the expediency is open to some doubt, at all events.

8. *Whether the Bengal army ought not to be divided into two or more armies?*

8. I should answer this question most decidedly in the negative. I see no one advantage that could be derived from such a measure, but I do see very great objections to it. Our Commission has not to deal with financial considerations, perhaps, but still I may point to the great additional expense which the division of the army must necessarily entail in a duplication of all departments nearly, of the general staff, as well as in the salaries and allowances of a second commander-in-chief and his personal staff. I look on this, however, as a secondary consideration compared with others; and more especially I would advert to the great discontent which such a measure would assuredly create amongst the officers of the army, to some of whom it would, of necessity, be fraught with hardship, if not injustice. This remark, I would observe, applies not only to the question of their comparative standing and promotion, as adverted to in Lord Ellenborough's reply, but to other circumstances also, which must not be lost sight of. We must bear in mind that the officers of the Bengal army have entered the service, and have lived, in the expectation of serving alternately, or occasionally, in the fine climate of the north-west provinces, or the Punjab, as well as in the generally less congenial climate of Bengal. That portion of the army which might, in the proposed division, be allotted to the latter, would surely have fair ground of complaint, if they found themselves doomed to spend so much larger a proportion of their lives than they had calculated on, in the swamps of Bengal, a province, where they could scarcely ever hope to see any service more exciting than the suppression of some disturbance, perhaps, amongst the Coles or other wild races of the jungles, or of some petty outbreak of a refractory zumeendar. On the other hand, it is by no means improbable, that many who might find themselves permanently located beyond the Sutlege or the Indus, might, for reasons of their own, be equally dissatisfied at being shut out, as it were, for the whole period of their service from the upper provinces of Hindostan; and, as they might possibly deem them, the pleasant and ever verdant plains of Bengal Proper. It has been supposed that the division of the army would have a beneficial tendency in preventing extensive combinations amongst the native troops in future, and the fact of the Madras and Bombay armies not having coalesced with the Bengal sepoys, to any extent, during the recent revolt, has been adduced as a case in support of the argument; but there is no analogy whatever between the two cases. With exception of the comparatively few Hindostanee sepoys in the Madras and Bombay armies, the ranks of both are filled by men differing *toto cœlo* from those of Bengal; their customs, habits, and ideas are greatly different, and their feelings towards the Bengal sepoys are

those of marked enmity rather than of sympathy. It is no wonder, therefore, that they did not join in the frantic outbreak of the latter. But how would the case stand if the present Bengal army were to be divided? The men in the one division, or army, would almost of necessity be of the same classes, castes, and countries, as the other; the two armies must continue to draw their recruits from the same localities (Bengal proper does not supply a single man to our ranks, and never will); and if, as doubtless will be the case in future, all nationalities, and castes are to be mixed up freely in the ranks of both, there can scarcely be a shade of difference in their general composition; nor could the mere interposition of a river, as the boundary line between the two, cut off their communications, or frustrate their combinations. Another argument that has been adduced in favour of the division of the Bengal army, is founded on the great extent of territory which it holds, and which has been assumed to be too vast to be thoroughly and efficiently supervised by one Commander-in-Chief. The weakness of this proposition requires no proof. We have only to look to the British army, to its dispersion in nearly all parts of the world, under one Commander-in-Chief, and the argument at once falls to the ground. I conclude, moreover, that a considerable portion of the territory held at various times by the Bengal army, in Central India and Rajpootana, will hereafter be occupied by troops from the Madras and Bombay presidencies, a measure which would at once annihilate the last vestige of argument that has been brought forward, in support of the proposed dismemberment of the army of Bengal.

9. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers?*

9. There can be no doubt, I presume, in any quarter, that the system of promotion by selection of the best men, must be the most effectual in securing a body of smart and efficient officers in all ranks. All that is of any great importance in giving effect to such a system is, that commanding officers should be men above all suspicion of undue partialities, and of fair discriminating judgment; and it should be carefully explained to every recruit that he will have to look to merit only for his future advancement.

WILLIAM BURLTON, Colonel.

October 11, 1858.

MINUTE by Colonel BURL N.

1. IN compliance with the request of our Chairman, I beg to submit the following observations in elucidation of my opinions, on the nature and tenor of the Report which the Commission has now to prepare for submission to Her Majesty the Queen.

2. I conclude it may be assumed that our Report will be fashioned in the shape of seriatim replies, more or less amplified, to the thirteen principal questions on which evidence has been taken before us; with such general remarks, in addition, as may appear desirable, or called for.

3. On nine of these questions the Commissioners have already recorded their individual opinions; and Resolutions, founded thereon, were framed, and adopted by a majority of the members, at the meeting on the 21st of October last.

4. It would seem unnecessary, therefore, for any member to revert to the subject-matter of these questions, in the present instance, unless he may since have seen reasons for modifying the opinions he formerly recorded, or should be strongly opposed to any of the resolutions which have been agreed to by the majority.

5. Taking this view of the case, and, with one exception, acquiescing generally in the spirit of those resolutions, I do not now propose to enter into a renewed discussion of any of them, save the one of which I have made exception, and to which I entertain strong and serious objections.

6. That resolution is the first, on "the proportion of European to Native force to be maintained in India." It affirms that the proportion should be, "exclusive of Police Corps,"

In Bengal,	1	European to	2	Natives.
In Madras	1	„ „	3	„
In Bombay	1	„ „	3	„

7. To this proportion, as regards the Bengal presidency, I would wish to record my strong objections; and if my colleagues would reconsider the question, and, more especially advert to the amount of police force proposed to be kept up, and the nature of its armament and organization, as developed in the evidence before us, and in information mainly brought to our knowledge since the adoption of the Resolutions of the 21st of October, I cannot but think that they would concur with me in the opinion, that such a body of armed, disciplined, and semi-disciplined Natives, as the proposed proportion would give, would be not only unnecessary, but fraught with extreme peril.

8. Let us first consider what will be the aggregate amount of armed Natives (regulars, irregulars and police) which this proposed proportion would give us, for the Bengal presidency alone. By our second resolution, we recommend that the minimum amount of permanent European force to be maintained in that presidency, after tranquillity is restored, shall be 50,000 men. That would give us 100,000 Native troops, exclusive of the armed police. The latter force cannot be so accurately estimated, but, I believe, we shall be under, rather than over the mark, if we calculate it at 80,000 men. It may surely be considered, that this latter force would be amply sufficient for the preservation of the public peace and tranquillity, within our territories; and with 50,000 Europeans in hand, we could unquestionably and securely bid defiance to all aggression from without, without encumbering ourselves with so large a body as 100,000 Native troops, on whose fidelity we could place no reliance, and who would be greatly more dangerous to us than any foreign enemy whom we are at all likely to encounter.

9. Again, supposing the police force to be sufficient, as it ought to be, for the preservation of order and tranquillity within our territories, and also for the performance of the various quasi-civil duties (such as treasure escorts, jail guards, &c.,) on which the Sepoy army has heretofore been so largly employed, what occupation could be found for the latter in times of peace? How could they be kept free from the dreary stagnation of idleness, and the unsettled state of feeling,—the morbid brooding over imaginary, if not real, grievances, which idleness so commonly engenders in the Native mind?

10. It is true, an European force will always hold double its number of Native troops in check, and effectively and instantly, if properly handled, put down any attempt at outbreak or revolt, but it is obvious that the larger is the number of the latter, the larger must be the European force to overawe them; and in the proportions proposed, it seems to me, that we should, in fact, be keeping up a large and untrustworthy army, whose services we do not require, and then have to maintain, of necessity, an European force to prevent their turning their arms once more against us.

11. If, then, we find that a large Native army (beyond what is positively indispensable) is not only an useless expense, but a machine entailing a farther heavy outlay in the maintenance of additional European troops for its surveillance even in times of peace, let us consider also, the dangers that might, not unreasonably, be apprehended from it in case of war.

12. Can any one, with the events of 1857 before his eyes, again feel confidence in the fidelity of a Native army, if circumstances should at any time arise, giving them, what might appear, in their short sightedness, a fair chance of successful revolt? What security should we have, in the event of an insurrection within our territories, or of an invasion from without, (say from Affghanistan, or Nepaul for instance) that our Native troops would not march off and swell the ranks of our enemies at the first opportunity? "Quis custodiet custodes ipsos?" Who could stay or stop them, if they selected a moment for their departure, when our Europeans were engaged with an enemy? Or who can calculate what might be the consequences, if, at such a moment, instead of taking to flight, in the hope of another Meerut paralysis or Dinapore lethargy to favor their escape, they were to turn upon us, in the field of battle? Great numerical strength will give confidence even to cowards, at times, to do what smaller numbers would not dare to contemplate.

13. Another consideration arises here—In estimating our proportion of European to Native troops, it must be remembered we have altogether ignored the police force, or left it out of our calculations, as though it could work no mischief, or would necessarily remain loyal in the event of another outbreak of the Native army; but I can see no good foundation on which to rest this very dangerous assumption. The men composing the police force, which will, in fact, be nothing more or less than a very large, but not highly disciplined, body of troops, will, of necessity, comprise all castes, tribes and nationalities, precisely as will the ranks of the army itself—their feelings, both religious and political, will be the same as those of the latter—their power of combination will even be greater, for they will be diffused over the whole country, in one continuous unbroken chain, through which, whilst the right hand, as it were, of any one or every district, grasps the left hand of its adjoining neighbour on the North, and *vice versâ*, on its South, the electric shock of preconcerted or acceptable rebellion would travel with the rapidity of the fiery cross, (far quicker than circulated cocoa-nut, or Chapatties) from Chittagong to Peshawar. It is scarcely necessary to add,

that a rising of the police, if, as is most probable, they could also raise the population against us, would be infinitely more dangerous, and more difficult to deal with, than a revolt of the largest Sepoy army. What are the practical lessons these considerations should teach us?

1st. To maintain not one Native soldier more than is positively and indispensably necessary.

2nd. To disarm the population, as far as can be possibly done.

3rd. To arm the police with weapons sufficient merely to deal with unarmed or badly armed mobs (a few ordinary carbines, swords, spears, and bludgeons, for instance) but altogether inferior, as should be those of our Sepoys, to the arms of the European force; so that the superiority of the latter, in this, as in all other respects may be ever patent, palpable, to the comprehension of the natives of all classes, and lead them to feel in their hearts, that opposition or conflict must ever be hopeless.

14. In my former minute I advocated the maintenance of equal numbers of European and Native regiments of Infantry, and of three regiments of Native to one of European Cavalry, for the Bengal army, and I would still earnestly uphold an equality in the former branch. I would, however, modify my former opinion, so far as to recommend, that the Native force of Cavalry should not exceed the European in a greater ratio than two, instead of three, to one, and consequently that twelve of the thirty-six regiments of Irregular Cavalry, which I formerly recommended, might be dispensed with. I feel a thorough conviction that with 50,000 European troops (including the Artillery) 40,000 Native Infantry, and 24,000 Native Cavalry, the Bengal Presidency would be securely and safely provided for, as far as human foresight can provide for any thing. Any increase to that number of Natives, would be but an increase of danger instead of safety—the larger the Native force, the larger as I have before said, would be their confidence in their own strength, and the greater would be the chance of their again trying that strength against us. I need not dwell on the financial importance of my proposition, but the saving that would result from the maintenance of sixty-four, instead of one hundred thousand men is a matter of no trifling consideration.

Europeans, in round Numbers, thus:—

40 regiments Infantry, say at 800 - -	32,000
12 regiments Cavalry, say at 700 - -	8,400
Artillery - -	10,000
	50,400

15. There is another of the resolutions adopted on the 21st of October on which I should wish to make a brief remark. I allude to the 7th, and the question of Enlistment for General Service. The evidence in favor of this is so nearly unanimous, that it would indicate a larger share of self-complacency and *opiniâtreté*, than I wish to have credit for, were I to persist in upholding my own views on the subject; but at the same time I cannot but confess, that I am still very much in the position of

"The man convinced against his will,"—who,
"Is of the same opinion still,"

and I cannot, even now, help thinking that it would be the better plan (for the Bengal army, at all events) to have, as I before recommended, only a certain number of regiments raised expressly for general service, including service on ship-board, instead of exacting from every recruit, an engagement so generally repugnant, not merely to his prejudices, but, in the case of most of them, to his legitimate and honest feelings. I have a very strong opinion indeed, that the Government General Order of the 25th of July 1856, directing that all recruits thereafter enlisted, should be attested for general service, including embarkation on board ship whenever required to do so, was one, and by no means one of the least, of the exciting causes of distrust and dissatisfaction, which finally resulted in the great revolt of the army.

16. I will now proceed to the consideration of the four remaining questions, on which the Commissioners have as yet recorded no written opinions. On the first of these, viz:—how far the European portion of the army in India should be composed of troops of the line, and how far of troops raised for service in India only, the Commission came to a verbal resolution at our last meeting, that it was necessary to maintain a local European army; but, with a reservation on the part of some of the members, that this was to be considered a temporary decision only, and that their opinions were to be considered open to modification hereafter.

17. My own opinion on this subject, is so strong, and is supported by so powerful a phalanx of evidence, of the highest ability and most extended experience, that I am desirous of at once placing it on record, in case the question should be again agitated in the Commission.

18. It would be both unprofitable and tedious, were I to enter, in any detail, into the reasons which lead me to advocate as a permanent measure, the establishment of a strictly local European force, in every presidency in India.

The question has been so fully discussed, its advantages and supposed disadvantages have been so fully dwelt upon, and the arguments on both sides are so clearly exhibited in our minutes of evidence, that when I express my entire concurrence in the opinion of the great majority of eminent men, Statesmen, Commanders, and Civilians of extensive Indian experience (some of whom are enumerated in the margin*), who have pronounced so strongly in favor of a local European army, I feel it would be superfluous to say more; and will content myself with adopting the words of the Earl of Ellenborough, that, "it is necessary to preserve this state "of things; it affords the only "security for the continued "maintenance of the dependence of India upon England," words full of importance, and abounding in foresight and truth.

*Governor-General of India.
Governor of Madras.
Earl of Ellenborough.
Commander-in-Chief, Madras
Do. do. Bombay.
Sir W. Mansfield,
Military Secretary to Government of India.
Adjut. General, Bengal Army.
Sir J. Outram.
Sir J. Lawrence and fellow Commissioners.
Sir R. Vivian,
Sir Frederick Abbott,
J. P. Willoughby, Esq.
J. R. Martin, Esq.
Colonel Holland.
Colonel Durand.
&c. &c.

19. The second and fourth of the questions to which I am now replying, are very closely allied, and scarcely demand any detailed observations. As regards the Line regiments, I should strongly recommend their being relieved, if practicable, every ten or twelve years; and I am disposed to think the long sea-route by the Cape, as a general rule, would be preferable to the overland route through Egypt, when no urgent demand exists for the early presence of the troops in India. I anticipate no particular difficulty in obtaining recruits in sufficient numbers for the local force in India, if drafts or volunteers from the Line regiments returning home, are allowed to enter it.

20. I come now to the third question, as to the practicability of consolidating the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other, and the regulations that would be necessary and practicable to effect this object with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now, (or rather, who recently were) in the service of the East India Company.

21. I confess I do not see that any particular benefit would accrue to the public service from the proposed consolidation of the European forces in India, in view to the introduction of the system of exchanges between the officers of the Line and the local army, whilst, on the other hand, it seems almost, if not entirely, impossible to effect such an arrangement consistently with a due regard to the rights and claims of the officers at present in the latter service.

22. If only the interests of the two individual officers who proposed to exchange were involved in the question, it would be simply a matter to be settled by themselves; but it is obvious that in a seniority service, the interest of every individual, junior to the exchanging officer, must be affected, for better or for worse, by every exchange that took place; unless, which is next to impossible, the ages, or rather the exact value of the lives of the two parties could be ascertained, and proved to be precisely the same. If, for instance, my senior officer, who may be aged and shattered in constitution from long residence in India, should exchange with another from the Line,—in all probability a younger and a stronger man,—it is clear that my chances of promotion, as well as those of every other man in the regiment junior to the exchanging officer, would be damaged, and our advancement unfairly retarded. I can see no means of averting this sort of injustice, except by rendering it a condition imperative on all exchanges, that they should first be acquiesced in by every officer of the local regiment, junior to him who wished to quit; and this would be so objectionable in principle, as well as difficult to carry out in practice, that I would not for a moment think of recommending its adoption, even though there were advantages to be gained by the introduction of the exchange system, which I do not at present perceive. In the lowest Commissioned ranks, (those of second lieutenants, cornets, and ensigns) perhaps there need be no objection to exchanges being made, as any one of these who might do so, would of course, come in as junior of his rank and regiment, and thus no injustice would be done to the prospects of any one, whilst every junior of the officer who went out, would rejoice in the step so gained.

23. Another obstacle that presents itself, if not to the introduction, certainly to the working of the proposed system of exchange, is the difference in the nature of the pensions or full pay retirements, in the Indian army (as now established for all actual incumbents) as compared with those of the Line. In the former, every officer, after serving a certain

number of years, becomes entitled, of right, to the full pay of a specified rank. Twenty years' service in India gives the full pay pension of captain, or 10*s.* 6*d.* a day; 24 years' service that of major, 292*l.* per annum; 28 years' service that of lieutenant-colonel, 365*l.* per annum; 32 years' service that of colonel, 456*l.* 5*s.* So also all lieutenant-colonels, majors, and captains, who from ill-health are unable to serve longer in India, can retire, whatever be the length of their service, on half-pay pensions as follows:—

Captains at	£127	15	0	per annum.
Majors at	173	7	6	„
Lieut.-Colonels at	200	15	0	„

Similar proportionate advantages are also granted to subaltern officers, who, (lieutenants after ten, ensigns after six years) are unable from ill-health to serve longer in India, their pensions in such cases being—

Lieutenants,	£73	0*s.*	per annum.
Ensigns	54	3	„

Lieutenants, after even six years' service, can also retire on ensigns' half-pay, if unable, from ill health, to remain in India; whilst all officers who may be compelled to retire, by wounds or ill health contracted on duty, after only three years' service, are allowed the half-pay of whatever rank they may have attained. Lastly comes the great prize of the Indian service, the rank of regimental colonel, with a share of off reckonings, or a commuted allowance in lieu, which enables the recipient to live at home at ease as long as he pleases, on an income of about 1,100*l.* or 1,200*l.* per annum.

24. The advantages above enumerated are those which the officer of the Indian army receives from the Government he has hitherto served. They are vested rights, as far as the officers now in the service are concerned, and could not be violated, or interfered with, without flagrant injustice and breach of faith. In addition to these, the Indian officer has also private rights and interests in the funds, to which he has been obliged, by the terms of his service, to contribute by donations and subscriptions from the date of his first commission. From these he derives the heartfelt gratification of knowing, that, whenever he may die, his widow and children will not only be provided for, to a certain extent, but that they will be indebted for their comfort to his own pecuniary sacrifices during life.

25. Taking these circumstances into consideration, and there are other advantages from the funds to which I have not adverted (such as passage money, income allowance, and outfit, in certain cases), it is difficult to suppose that many officers would be found willing to exchange into the Line, even if the system were permitted; in all probability, few or none, save the very young, or the thoughtless and improvident, tempted perhaps by a pecuniary consideration, would be likely to forego the advantages I have enumerated, and of which they know they cannot well be deprived.

26. There is yet another difficulty to be taken into account ere the system of exchanges can be fairly introduced. Supposing that such exchanges were sanctioned, and that officers could be found in both services ready and wishing to make them, and that the difficulties attendant on doing so without injustice to others could by any means be overcome, it will still be necessary to consider the question again, and to ascertain what would be its effects on the funds themselves, and how far those noble institutions could be protected from the damage or peril to which the system, unless carefully guarded against, would assuredly subject them.

27. The first question that arises, in considering the subject, is whether an officer exchanging from the Indian army into the Line, should or could, carry with him the advantages derivable from the funds which he had already fairly purchased by his donations and subscriptions: or whether, divesting himself of all claims thereupon, he could transfer them to the Line officer with whom he exchanges, supposing the latter were able and willing to purchase them. There could, of course, be no objection to any officer forfeiting at once all he had ever paid, as well as all his claims, present or prospective, on the funds, if he thought proper to do so; but if it be proposed, or expected, that officers who might come into the Indian army, by means of exchange, should step into the place of those with whom they exchange, as regards their position in the funds, the case would assume a very different aspect, and the committee of management, of the funds, having due regard to the interests entrusted to them, might find it necessary to require the payment of so large a sum in the shape of donations and arrears of subscription, perhaps (consequent on differences in the value of lives,—in the respective ages of the husband and wife,—in the comparative health of the parties,—and other causes), as would in most cases, in all probability, operate as a bar to the exchange contemplated. The adjustment of the amount to be so paid by incoming members, would be a matter of great complexity and much nicety, and could scarcely be effected without the assistance of a professional actuary. As regards the case of officers transferred to the Line, by exchange, they might perhaps be permitted (and I see no objection to such an arrangement) to continue subscribing members of the funds, and to retain all their rights and claims as such, if they wished to do so. The payment of their subscriptions, &c., as they became due, could easily be effected through the paymasters of their new regiments, wherever they might be stationed; the difficulty, however, is not, as I before said, with those who leave, but with those coming into the Indian army by exchange.

28. On the whole question I have arrived at this conclusion, that in the lowest commissioned ranks only (second lieutenants, cornets, and ensigns) could the exchange system be introduced, without the chance, I might almost say the certainty, of its bringing hardship and injustice in its train. At the same time I see no objection to the officers of the Indian local force being transferred, if they wished, and could effect it, by purchase or otherwise, to fill vacancies in Line regiments at the pleasure of the Commander-in-chief; leaving their places to be filled up in their former corps, in regular seniority succession as at present. I believe a similar system is now permitted in the Royal army, in which an artillery officer may be transferred to a Line regiment, though no officer from the latter can take his place by exchange in the former.

29. It is scarcely necessary to add, that the difficulties which seem to interpose in the way of the regular exchange system being introduced between the two armies, are only applicable to the case of the present officers of the Indian service, who have the pledge of their Government that their rise shall be strictly by regimental seniority; of course, if it be deemed advisable, new rules may be introduced in the case of all future appointments to the service.

30. I would wish to add a few words on the subject of those admirable institutions, the Funds (Military and Orphan) of the Indian army; by which, at no cost to the Government, beyond the liberal assistance which it affords to their support, the widows and orphans of all officers are provided for in a state of comparative comfort; and assistance is rendered in the form of passage money, outfit, and income allowance to officers returning to or from Europe, on sick leave, &c.

31. It is only by making it obligatory on all young officers entering the service to become members of these funds that they can be upheld; and I most sincerely hope, that the present regulations to that effect may not, on any consideration be relaxed. If subscription were left optional, it is but too probable, that the proverbial thoughtlessness and improvidence of the young would operate to prevent many from joining institutions, of which they can scarcely appreciate the eventual inestimable value; and it is, I fear, almost if not quite certain, that if the present rule of compulsory subscription were departed from, the insolvency of the funds would, after a certain term of years, be the inevitable result, bringing penury and misery to the hundreds of widows and orphans, who might at the time be subsisting, and entirely dependent on its pensions. It would indeed be not only a short-sighted policy, but a gross injustice to the officers of the service, if the Government were to sanction any modification of the present rule, by which alone the stability of these institutions is maintained.

32. In support of this view, it is only necessary to bear in mind, that all officers who have entered the Indian army, for many years past, have been compelled to contribute to the funds, on the full understanding that they were thereby securing certain benefits to themselves, personally, whilst living, as well as to their widows and orphans, after death; so that these benefits were, in fact, guaranteed to them by the Government; Government was, no doubt, fully alive to the great advantages which it derived from being thus released from all obligation to support or pension the widows and orphans of its officers; and having compelled the latter to join in supporting the funds, and pledged itself that all who subsequently entered the service should do the same, it would clearly be a palpable and flagrant injustice were it to depart from that pledge, and thereby imperil the solvency of the institutions,

33. The importance of these funds, and the magnitude of their operations, is not, I believe, much understood in this country; but it may give some of my colleagues useful information, perhaps, in helping them to a correct judgment on the question, if I mention some particulars connected

with the one of them with which I happen to be best acquainted, the Military Fund of Bengal.

At the date of the last annual report (October, 1858), the capital of this institution amounted to	£567,988
Of which was invested in the treasury notes of the Government	£558,527
The contributions of the officers of the army amount annually to upwards of	£75,000
There are now widows, annuitants on its books	666
Whose pensions amount to, per annum	£106,905
The actuary's value of its liabilities, as estimated by Mr. Neison, is	£871,185
From which if the amount of capital shown above be deducted	567,988
There will remain a deficiency of capital	£203,197

This deficiency of capital to meet liabilities, would be amply covered, if the fund could realize a claim it has against the Indian Government, for losses sustained through erroneous computations, during many years past, in adjusting its accounts at the India House. About four years since, the eminent actuary, Mr. Neison, estimated these losses at 437,913*l*.; but the managers and officers of the fund, I apprehend, would be quite satisfied if they could compromise the claim for one-half the amount.

34. I fear I have been led rather too far into a subject, not, perhaps, exactly within the legitimate scope of our inquiries. but as the question of compulsory subscription may come under the consideration of the Commission, I am anxious to put my colleagues in possession of the fact, that this fund (and I believe all the others are the same) was originally framed on correct principles, and would be in a perfectly prosperous and solvent state, as well as quite self-supporting (with the aid it receives from the Government) at the present moment, if its resources had not been curtailed, by the erroneous rules of computation of interest, exchanges, &c., above adverted to, as adopted at the India House. I believe the Bengal Military Orphan Fund and the Military Funds of Madras and Bombay are in a highly flourishing condition, dispensing their blessings on many hundreds of widows and orphans ; and it is, I repeat, of the greatest importance, that nothing should be done, which can tend in the slightest degree to shake their stability, or check their beneficial action.

35. In conclusion, I will only add, that throughout this minute, I have abstained, purposely, from touching on matters connected with the Madras and Bombay armies, (with reference to either their present or their future) deeming it best to leave the question to be dealt with, by my colleagues from those presidencies, whose acquaintance with the subject must necessarily be much greater than my own. There are numerous other matters of detail, connected with the organization, armament, clothing, &c., of the army in India which will have to be entered into in our Report, but I am disposed to think they may be more conveniently discussed and settled in verbal conference at our Board, than in written minutes; and I have therefore contented myself with dealing with generalities, and confined myself principally to the important and distinct questions on which we have been particularly required to report, rather than weary the patience of my colleagues with a more extended exposition of my views and opinions on points of minor importance.

WILLIAM BURLTON,
Bath, December 30, 1858. Colonel.

APPENDIX No. 8.

Colonel TAIT'S ANSWERS to the NINE QUESTIONS proposed by the COMMISSIONERS, August 3, 1858.

As the only officer on the present strength of the Bengal army who has the honour of being a member of this Royal Commission, I cannot but deeply regret having been detained abroad by a severe illness, which has hitherto prevented my attendance, and I beg to express to the President and members my regret at my unavoidable absence.

After an attentive consideration of the proceedings and evidence already elicited, and as the only officer of that army, and one who has recently returned from India, being in England on medical certificate, I trust to be permitted to offer a few observations on certain statements which have been made before the Commission, which, if uncontradicted by me, will go forth to the world in the proceedings as facts, although several of these assertions appear to have been founded entirely on hearsay evidence, and, in some instances, are to my own personal knowledge quite erroneous.

Colonel Skeffington Poole, Bombay Light Cavalry, Friday, 27th August 1858, page 23, states that,—"At "Mooltan one evening a naik's (native corporal's) party of "the Bengal army was going past; when they passed on "I asked what was the matter, and one of my native "officers said, 'The naik is a lower class man of that party "'than one of the privates, and the private has just said, "'"We have left our lines, I intend to take command, and "'"you go into the ranks, and you will obey me."' I was "informed by native officers in my own regiment that it "was not a solitary instance."

"This arises," says Colonel Skeffington Poole, "from the "difference of system and the difference of discipline "throughout the army." "Everything appears to be by "caste there."

I should account for the above entirely in a different manner, by supposing that the colonel's own people were imposing upon him; as, from my thirty-three years' experience in the Bengal army, I know that what they told him was simply impossible.

Colonel Poole goes on to detail some circumstances of a Bengal sentry at Mooltan taking "dustoorie, *i. e.*, a few "sticks out of every bundle of fire-wood at one of the gate-"ways, &c." This, of course, was simple robbery, and the man ought to have been handed over to the provost marshal. The discipline at Mooltan must have been lax indeed when such conduct was passed over without being reported.

Again, Saturday, 28th August, Major-General Capon, Bombay army, pages 10 and 11, states some "irregularities "regarding the sentry of a guard at Mooltan," who had his clothes only partly on, &c., while "he lounged about "unlike a soldier," and, on this, founds the assertion of the laxity of discipline in the Bengal army generally.

Major-General Capon, when questioned afterwards, in answer to Colonel Burlton, admits, "I have no experience "in the Bengal army, I only speak from what I have "heard. I have certainly seen the native officers unfit from "old age, &c. &c."

Major-General Robert Alexander, Adjutant-General, Madras presidency, in proceedings dated 25th August, at page 28, reflects on the discipline of the Bengal army, stating, "We never allow caste to be put forward for not "performing any military duty in the Madras army. The "same men as those who have mutinied in Bengal do pre-"cisely the same duty in our army from the difference of "discipline," &c. &c.

I have known no cases of "caste" being permitted to interfere with the duties of a soldier. There always must be some little difficulty on board ship regarding the food of the men. However, this can be got over with management.

They only cook once during the twenty-four hours, and two hours are usually required for that purpose, should there be no pressure of service; otherwise they can live for days together on parched grain and sweetmeats, which require no cooking. This seemingly, too, without losing their strength; for they are a most frugal and abstemious race. Each man cooks his own simple food, giving less trouble to the commissariat than the cooking of any description of soldier I have yet served with; but the inhabitants of the Bengal presidencies, whom we can alone look to for soldiers in any number, will not cook in messes, and so far their "caste" must be respected, whatever may be the case with the 1,500 or 2,000 Hindostanees in the Madras army. These men, being so small a proportion in a vast army, may have adopted the customs of the majority; but, however desirable, it will be years before the inhabitants of Bengal adopt this habit.

Again, at page 29 Major-General Alexander states under the same head, "want of discipline in the Bengal army," "It is a very common custom for the Bengal sepoy to get "deeply into debt, and to be constantly brought up before "Courts of Requests; the officers themselves (Madras?) "felt that it was lowering the tone of discipline, and "injuring the men in several ways;" and a representation would appear to have been "made by the officers com-"manding the regiments, that they would not be respon-"sible for the duties done if they remained under the "discipline in which they were placed." On this representation, "a brigadier was sent up to command their own "troops at Saugor."

This is the first time I have heard it was "a common "custom in Bengal for the sepoys to get deeply into debt, "and to be continually brought up before the Courts of

" Requests." I have usually found the very reverse during my experience of the Bengal sepoy; whatever his other faults may have been, getting into debt is the exception. They are much more given to hoard up money, and to stint themselves of their proper food, should food be dear, than to spend too much. Courts of Requests are ordered to be held monthly throughout the whole of India at every station of the army. During the thirteen or fourteen years I commanded the 3rd Bengal Irregular Cavalry, I never had one single man brought before this Court, although my men were nearly all Mahomedans, a race much more given to extravagance than Hindoo sepoys, who are notorious for being penurious in their habits, and who remit more than half their pay every month to their families, a fact well known to every civilian throughout Bengal.

Again, page 34, Major-General Alexander states "the " Bengal army was ill-composed, ill-disciplined, and " demoralized, and to this I simply attribute the general " mutiny of the Bengal army. The whole army was badly " disciplined, including the European officers and all. " I think that the whole system was bad." The example given is:—"The moment our troops got into the Saugor " division, the officers thought nothing of leaving their " detachments. There were others again (a thing very un- " usual with us) who were brought up before Courts of " Requests. Another thing is, that there was not a large " station in the Bengal army in which there was not a " committee of officers; and if another wanted to run in " debt, they would sit in judgment on his character, and " inform the Bank whether he was in good credit or not." " All these things are injurious and ruinous to military " discipline."

In answer to a question, "Have you any personal " knowledge on which you found these statements?" General Alexander replies only, "that they are notorious." And again:—"If any one will contradict them, I will say " that I have been misinformed." And again, in answer to a question, "Do you not know from your experience of " the Bengal army, that the European officers in that army " actually considered it no disgrace to be brought before a " Court of Requests in order to oblige them to pay the " wages of their servants, when, in the Madras presidency, " an officer would have been turned out of his regiment for " such conduct?" "I believe that it was a very general " circumstance (I am speaking of what is notorious) that " such officers were brought up before the Courts of " Requests. It is a rare thing in Madras. We have had " some instances of debt and demoralizing consequences in " the Madras army, but they were exceptional, &c. &c."

I beg to contradict the above most distinctly as applying to the officers of the Bengal army as a body. Individuals of bad character no doubt there may be in any army, but I can confidently state that it was ever, in the Bengal presidency, considered disgraceful to any officer, whether of Her Majesty's or of the Company's service, "to be forced to pay " his just debts by the award of a Court of Requests." Such a man becomes a marked man, and all chance of advancement in India is utterly destroyed. But, as any one may be summoned before a Court of Requests by any native servant or shop-keeper on the most false and fraudulent grounds, and the case must be given against an officer (be his rank what it may) if he does not attend to defend it, the most scrupulously honourable man might be forced to appear before a Court of Requests, even as a duty to himself and others; I know not how any officer of any presidency could ever be brought to a court-martial for simply appearing before a Court of Requests, as his doing so might only be to resist what he believed to be a grossly exorbitant or altogether fraudulent claim, and it is within my own knowledge that such false claims are occasionally preferred by natives of India.

In regard to committees of officers sitting in every station on the part of the Banks, I can only state that neither have I myself, nor any of my numerous military friends, ever heard of such proceedings in the Bengal presidency. I beg most distinctly to deny the imputations cast upon the officers of the Bengal army, than whom, I am proud to feel, a more honourable body does not exist.

On perusing the evidence of Lieutenant-Colonel John Hill, Bombay Engineers, page 26 of proceedings, dated 26th August, I find it thus stated:—"I have seen a Bengal " cavalry regiment on the line of march within two miles " of the enemy's guns, and every horse was led by a horse- " keeper, the arms and accoutrements of the men were on " the horses, camels, and horsekeepers, and the men were " plundering in the fields, and paddling in water at the " wells."

This statement it is out of my power to account for, as the Bengal cavalry have only one horsekeeper to every two horses; and in general, these men are barely sufficient to lead the horses of the sick and absent troopers. I have marched, during my time of service, through most parts of Hindostan, both during war and peace, with cavalry regiments, regular and irregular, and I never saw or heard of such undisciplined conduct as described by the Lieutenant-Colonel, more especially within two miles of the presence of an enemy.

During a long and fatiguing pursuit, such as that by Sir Walter Gilbert to Peshawur, I have known commandants cause their troopers to dismount and lead their horses, in order to cool their backs, and save them as much as possible; but, beyond this, I never witnessed any relaxation of proper discipline in the line of march. In Sir Walter Gilbert's celebrated pursuit, when the Bengal column distinguished itself, of course a commander would deem it his imperative duty to save his horses in every possible manner; and Lieutenant-Colonel Hill, if present on that occasion, may have witnessed the laxity of which he has made mention; but in such a case the reason ought to have been obvious, viz., that of saving and relieving both horses and men.

1. *The proportion of European to native force to be maintained in the Bengal presidency.*

1. The present police force, under the denomination of " burkundauze," must be abolished throughout the Bengal presidency as utterly useless, and the police duties of every part of India taken in future by well paid and properly organized irregular native soldiers, under selected European commissioned and non-commissioned officers, on a system somewhat similar to that recommended by Mr. Charles Raikes, late civil commissioner with Sir Colin Campbell, and of the Sudder Court at Agra. The present strength of native police under this denomination of burkundauze chuprassies, &c. &c. is perfectly incredible, and, from their numbers, the cost to the state must be very great indeed, although they are so badly paid. Such a force has proved utterly inefficient, except to extort money from the community, and add to the general confusion during the late outbreak.

Excluding from the estimate a properly organized police irregular force for all the internal arrangements and peace of the country, I am of opinion that one European to two native soldiers of regular and irregular infantry ought to be ample, and, of the native portion, probably one half or two thirds might be irregular. This is a point, however, which can best be determined by the local government of India on the spot; and calculating the regular police force at 100,000 more, actually required, which are in reality native infantry soldiers, will make one European to four native soldiers.

When tranquillity is once effectually restored throughout the country, and this revolt has been sufficiently punished by the removal of every mutineer from the soil of India, no doubt it may be possible to reduce the proportion of Europeans. This must, however, entirely depend upon the manner in which our insulted authority is vindicated in the punishment of every soldier who has joined in the late rebellion. In my belief, the European prestige can alone be sufficiently restored by the transportation of every single mutineer. This is a punishment more dreaded than even death itself, and our future security, in a great measure, will depend on the manner in which this punishment is carried out. Should every mutineer be hunted down throughout the length and breadth of the land, the word mutiny will be held in such terror for hundreds of years to come by the natives of India, that there will be little danger of any future outbreak. There must be no half measures; it ought to be done thoroughly and completely, as "the thugs" have been put down; and there will now be little difficulty, in my opinion, as the Government holds a minute descriptive roll of each individual; and all who have done good service ought in like manner to be rewarded.

As to the proportion of cavalry, I am inclined to think that the same ought to hold good in that branch, but this will depend upon circumstances; and possibly, with reference to the number of mounted men required for the police duties, it may be necessary to have even a larger proportion of native horsemen than four to one European.

2. *What amount of force will be required in the Bengal presidency after the country is settled.*

This must be determined by circumstances, and it is impossible to hazard an opinion, but no doubt, when once peace and quietness is thoroughly established throughout India, and all the mutineers have been made a sufficient example of, the number of our European army may be very greatly diminished; and as the native troops increase in

efficiency for the police and other internal duties of the country, so ought their numbers to be kept under control.

With a country the size of the Bengal presidency, extending some 1,800 miles from Calcutta to Peshawur, and from the borders of Nepaul across to Oudeypore and Mount Aboo,—probably some 1,200 miles more,—of course the number of troops that can be spared for foreign service must always be small, and the army will rarely be able to furnish men for other parts of the world, and at the same time hold India secure. This must be kept in mind in organizing the Indian army. We shall require that army for the duties of India, call them local if you will, and any great proportion cannot be spared to send beyond seas without risking the loss of India.

I coincide with Sir George Clerk and with General Tucker, that from 40,000 to 50,000 European troops will be required for years to come in the Bengal presidency.

3. *Whether the native force in the Bengal presidency shall be on the regular or irregular system, or both combined.*

The native force in Bengal must be partly regular and partly irregular. Of the infantry, the proportion of regular troops would probably be one third to two thirds irregulars; and of the native cavalry, I would have them all on the irregular system, but the irregular cavalry soldier must be properly and adequately paid; not, as the system has hitherto been in the Bengal presidency, paying the men so miserably that it was almost impossible to keep them efficient upon the pittance allowed by Government (viz. 20 rupees, or 2*l.* sterling a month) to cover every expense of arms, clothes, horses, tents, foragers, carriage, &c. &c.

Having served in the irregular cavalry ever since 1831, and, for very many years, commanded one of the oldest regiments in the service, I have the more confidence in speaking on this subject, and I entirely concur with Sir Patrick Grant in what he states regarding the Bengal irregular cavalry.

The constant intermeddling with all their regimental institutions and customs;—the insane desire seemingly to turn them into regulars;—curtailing the power of commanding officers, and depriving both native officers and men of the inducements they formerly had to enter the service; and the constant desire of assimilating them in every way to the regular native army, whom they had always most cordially looked down upon, and detested with a most thorough hatred;—the above alterations in their customs and institutions; the abolishing trial by punchait, and substitution of courts-martial on all occasions; and the feeling they had gradually imbibed that they were being turned into regulars in spite of all they could do;—these things have mainly contributed to the disgust of that branch, and the old description of irregulars have mostly left the army, being unable to live, and subsist their families, and keep their horses and followers in an efficient state under the new regime introduced of late years. For years past this has been the cause of the deterioration of this most important branch of the service, and was frequently urged upon Government by Sir Charles Napier, Lord Gough, and all the officers commanding regiments of irregular cavalry: and I took the liberty myself of pointing it also out to the late Governor-General, as well as to the late General Anson, in a written statement showing the altered circumstances under which the Bengal irregular army were now placed, and the impossibility of their existing on 20 rupees a month with the increased expenses they were subjected to in order to maintain themselves, families, and horses.

These facts have, to my knowledge, been frequently urged on the Government, and the only reply apparently was, "We get men at the present rates." We got them, it is true, but not "the men;" only an inferior class would take service at such rates,—not the good sturdy yeomen of old days, who used to supply our ranks from Rohilcund, men of family and substance, holding lands and villages, and mounted on their own family horses,—their own breeding, —whose position was in a great measure a security for their good conduct and fidelity to the state. The old men still in the service (I speak of my own old corps, the 3rd Bengal Irregular Cavalry, the old "Rohillah or Roberts' Horse," which was raised in 1814,) nearly all appear to have been faithful to their salt, and throughout the late insurrection have done good and faithful service, and were the means at Saugor, in a great measure, of saving the lives of all the Europeans, men, women, and children, as well as the guns and treasure, by escorting them to the old fort of Saugor, some miles distance from the cantonments, when no infantry sepoy could be depended upon; and throughout the whole of the late rebellion these men have invariably done good service, although there was only a small body at head quarters. The 3rd Irregular Cavalry, joined by the 31st Bengal Native Infantry, without a single European officer, attacked the mutineers and drove them out of the station, following them up for miles, and capturing the only gun which the enemy had attempted to carry off, together with the colours of the 42nd Native Infantry and standards, as detailed to me in a Persian letter received from one of the native officers of the regiment, and forwarded by the commanding officer.

As an instance of the changes which have taken place since I entered the service, and which have gradually led to increased expenses to the men, I may mention that originally the irregular cavalry were local to particular districts, and were employed in the collection of the revenue, for which they received extra allowances in the shape of one rupee (two shillings) a day per man while so employed, and enjoyed other advantages in their horses being fed. Now they have lost all such advantages, the rupee being duly collected, but carried to the credit of Government; and the men being strictly prohibited from taking forage for their horses without payment, under all sorts of pains and penalties, when sent out on such duties. They have entirely lost all such perquisites and advantages, and are put to the expense of "general service;" and, in fact, the whole condition of the irregular horsemen of Bengal has been materially altered for the worse, while his pay of 20 rupees per mensem, to cover every expense, has been allowed to remain the same. This is utterly inadequate to meet their monthly expenditure and keep them in a creditable way. On such terms, and with no permanent nominal head-quarters from which to draw their supplies, which might be laid in cheaply for them by their friends and relations at the proper seasons, as in the case of the Scinde Horse, who have a fixed head-quarters, it may well be understood what difficulties commanding officers of Bengal irregular cavalry have laboured under. The Scinde Horse, comparatively in a cheap country, with fixed and permanent head-quarters, get 30 rupees a month; while our men, liable to move to the other end of the world at a moment's warning, get only 20 rupees. I have perused the standing orders of Brigadier-General Jacob's Scinde Horse, which have been published and sent to the members of the Commission, and which I cannot but approve of, being almost word for word, in every particular, the old and original standing regulations of my own corps 'the 3rd Bengal Irregular Cavalry," raised in 1814 on the system of Skinner's Horse, and which regulations and customs have been invariably the regulations ever since the 3rd Irregular Cavalry was first raised, while the Scinde Horse was only raised in 1839, or even later; so that these regulations were most probably derived from my regiment, as I had a detachment for fourteen months in Scinde in 1839–40, or they may have been taken from the Poonah Horse, which went originally from Skinner's, I have understood.

I would have no regular native cavalry whatever. They have been most expensive, costing, on an average of ten years, 85 rupees, or 8*l.* 10*s.* per mounted trooper per mensem, and without any adequate result.

4. *Whether any native artillery should be allowed in the Bengal army.*

4. I would have the whole of the artillery Europeans, or as nearly so as possible. For particular purposes it may be necessary to have a few native artillerymen, on account of the nature of the climate where the guns may be required to be located, but the number need be very small, and even for such purposes, there could be little difficulty in mixing all classes so as to prevent any danger.

I would gradually introduce the European element into every troop and battery throughout the three presidencies.

5. *The same question with regard to sappers and miners.*

5. You must have natives for the manual labour, but there need be no difficulty or danger from employing natives thus, and the different classes and races can be so mixed as to render combination, among so small a body as the sappers, utterly impossible.

6. *Whether the Bengal native army should be composed of different nationalites or castes, and if so, in what proportions.*

6. Certainly; it must be composed of all nationalities, castes, and classes,—Sikhs, Rajpoots, Gwallahs, Mahomedans, and a small proportion, if any, of the Brahmin class; but there can be no difficulty in finding men of inferior castes, fitted for the duties of a soldier.

We can get no real Goorkahs, but "hill men from the "lower ranges" may be had in diminished numbers. I

would here beg to remark, however, that throughout the entire length and breadth of the Bengal presidency, it is a mistake to suppose that men fit for military duties can be got who are altogether devoid of caste feelings, and prejudices; such men are not to be had in the Bengal presidency. With all due deference to those who, from their knowledge of the inhabitants of other parts of India, expect to find similar races in the Bengal presidency, I beg to point out, as my experience, that we have no races of men in Bengal who are without caste, and at the same time fitted for the duties of a soldier. Certain attention must always be paid to caste, if you expect to get men to enlist for the Bengal army. There is, however, no caste, high or low, which should be permitted in any way to interfere with military duty.

It will be most desirable that in the reconstruction of the Bengal army, all variety of castes should be intermingled as much as possible, and that no large proportion of priestly and intriguing Brahmins should be admitted. After what has occurred, there is little danger on this head, and every soldier in the regular army ought to be enlisted for general service, with the distinct understanding that proper arrangements would be made on board ship in regard to food and water, and their caste duly respected in such matters.

7. *Whether the native army of Bengal is to be enlisted under a new code.*

7. Under a new state of things in the Bengal army, of course; the old code of regulations for the natives must be entirely revised, and, in my opinion, the less the discretion of commanding officers is limited the better, they being held duly responsible to head-quarters. I believe that the limitations placed on their power of late years have been greatly instrumental in causing an entire separation between the native soldiery and their European officers, from whom they had nothing to hope or fear.

8. *Whether the Bengal army ought to be divided into two or more armies.*

8. I quite agree with those who have, in evidence, set forth the inexpediency of dividing the Bengal army.

9. *Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regards native commissioned and non-commissioned officers.*

9. There is no doubt in my mind that the present system of promotion in the native commissioned and non-commissioned grades must be entirely changed in the Bengal army, and proper men selected to fill those ranks. The system of promotion by seniority has worked extremely ill.

I believe we must have native officers, and the object ought to be to select those best qualified.

THO. F. TAIT,
Colonel.

Fulham Palace,
October 20, 1858.

Colonel TAIT'S ANSWER to the FOUR QUESTIONS, suggested Heads of Inquiry proposed by the Commissioners.

Fulham Palace, January 1, 1859.

1. How far the European portion of the army of India should be composed of troops of the line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service; and how far of troops raised for service in India only.

1. The Indian Government must have at its command a body of officers experienced in all the usages, habits, and customs of the country, and qualified to fill all those situations which can only be taken by persons who have acquired a thorough and complete knowledge of India; it therefore appears a necessity that the army, as well as the civil service, should be composed chiefly of troops raised for duty in that portion of the empire, and the requirements of the Indian Government, for such a number of officers can only be met by a force local to India. The officers of Her Majesty's regiments of the line, looking upon India merely as a tour of duty, cannot be expected to take the same interest in the country, which those belonging to an exclusively local service must naturally feel. With very rare exceptions, nearly all officers and men of the line will always consider themselves as mere birds of passage in India, and it is not to be expected that it should be otherwise. Officers of the local service who, from early youth, have devoted their whole lives and prospects to making "India their profession," as has hitherto proved the case with the East India Company's officers, both civil and military, are no doubt the sort of men whom any Government would prefer. It takes a long servitude in that country before men acquire that experience and knowledge of the language, habits, and customs of the East, which are so essential towards making a really efficient Indian employé. It is no mere smattering that will prove sufficient in filling such important situations as the Indian Government have constantly to fill up in all parts of the empire, and officers belonging to regiments of the line will rarely be found who have qualified themselves sufficiently for such duties. When such men are to be found, their services are not likely to be overlooked, for really efficient men are in demand in India, to whatever branch they may belong. Such duties, however, require real efficiency, combined with thorough local knowledge and capability for hard work. To obtain such officers and men, who will be content to make India their homes for the greater portion of their lives, as has hitherto been the case with the East India Company's civil and military servants, and to ensure a constant command of such men of character, respectability and integrity, must be the object of Government, for otherwise it will be impossible to carry on the duties of the country with proper efficiency, and no English officers, however clever, who go to India only for a few years, will ever effectively supply the places of the officers of the late East India Company's service, who have hitherto devoted their lives to that country.

I am the more urgent on this head, as there appears to be great danger lest a mere smattering of native languages and the passing some petty examinations, should be considered sufficient qualification to enable an officer to hold an Indian appointment, however responsible it may be, without reference to any peculiar knowledge of the people and of the requirements of the country.

It will, however, be impossible to insure such a body of officers as the India government has a right to look for, unless the local service of India be maintained on a footing of perfect equality with the rest of the British army, and, perhaps, in order to further this object, a limited power of exchange from one branch of the service to the other might be admitted with advantage to both services.

Lord Canning recommends that the number of local European regiments of infantry for the Bengal presidency should be raised to thirty. Taking everything into consideration, I hold to the same opinion:—The officers being drafted, as his Lordship proposes, from the different native battalions which have mutinied.

The remaining European troops required for that presidency will be furnished by the line, and as circumstances admit, such regiments in excess as may happen to be in India, can gradually be withdrawn to Europe.

It is to be hoped that no very long period will elapse before the state of the country may admit of a very considerable reduction in the present number of regiments now employed in that presidency, so that twenty (20) of Her Majesty's regiments of the line may be found ample, with the thirty (30) local corps, making up fifty (50) European infantry regiments for the Bengal presidency alone.

The question as to the artillery appears to be simple. The Company's European artillery has always proved itself most efficient in every respect:—There can be no necessity for keeping any of the Royal Artillery in India after peace is restored to the country. The local artillery has been proved to be much less expensive and quite equal to the requirements of the service, and there can be no difficulty in increasing that branch to any extent that may be necessary. I, therefore, am, of opinion that, as a matter of finance, which must be considered, all the Royal Artillery may safely, in a very short time, be withdrawn, and, as a simple matter of cost, it appears to be absolutely necessary that this measure should be carried out as soon as the requisite increase has been made to the local artillery of India. This increase, it appears to me, can best be carried out in the most economical manner, as recommended by Lord Clyde and General Mansfield, by increasing all the horse artillery and horse field batteries to eight guns each, so as to admit of half troops and half batteries of four guns each being detached when requisite,—second captains, subalterns, and additional gunners and European drivers being added to each, so as to give the complement required for eight instead of six guns, and, at the same time, replacing with Europeans all the native drivers now in the Indian artillery.

Hitherto there have been of late years three of Her Majesty's European cavalry regiments in the Bengal Presidency, and no other European cavalry whatever. Now that five strong local European light cavalry regiments have been raised for Bengal, there can be no necessity for continuing always these three dragoon cavalry regiments belonging to Her Majesty's general army. The men who have been raised for the new local European cavalry corps,

are understood to be much smaller than any light dragoons ever raised before for Her Majesty's service, and such men are required in European war. There cannot be a doubt that on account of the perpetual difficulty of mounting heavy large men in India, it will be a great matter that all the European cavalry to be employed for the future in India should be small and active, and raised especially for that peculiar service; such fine, heavy cavalry as the royal dragoons, although called light and dressed as such, are not requisite for Indian warfare; and in time these three cavalry regiments, as well as the two in Madras and Bombay, might be withdrawn altogether, and the saving, in point of horses alone, ought to be very considerable. It is almost impossible to mount our present English royal dragoons; and, in fact, that description of European cavalry is not requisite in such a country, unless you retain one or two regiments for mere show, and to keep up the spirit of emulation between the two services.

2. In connection with this question, "The best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion; viz., the troops of the line; and of securing the efficiency of the latter, viz., the local Indian army?"

2. It has been pointed out to the Commission that troops from the Cape and Australia stand the climate of India better than regiments direct from England. If thought advisable, a depôt (as suggested by Sir George Clerk) might be established at the Cape, where all European regiments and all recruits for India, might be usefully employed in the duties of that colony for a year or two before being forwarded on to India; but, by taking advantage of the different sanatory hill-stations throughout India, I consider such precaution would hardly be requisite. When hill stations at an elevation of from 1,500 to 4,000 feet have once been fixed upon in different parts of India, all Europeans of the army might have their tour of such climate, and all invalids might at once be sent to the nearest hill depôts of the regiment. Each corps having a depôt of its own would enable commanding officers, on the recommendation of the surgeon, to send off at once all sickly or weakly men, and thus be the means of saving many lives; but such minor details can best be worked out in India. I feel convinced that thus you would, in a great measure, obviate the necessity of sending your European soldiers to Europe until their service in India was at an end, and this would be a great saving of cost in transporting men backwards and forwards.

3. Whether it be possible to consolidate the European forces so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other, and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company?

3. In my opinion it will be impossible to consolidate the European forces so as to admit of free exchange from one branch of the service to the other, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company, nor does such appear advisable for the public service. I have no hesitation in giving my opinion that a separate local service for India is absolutely necessary, but there would be a decided advantage in a limited power of exchange from one branch of Her Majesty's service to the other, as in the Ceylon rifles, the Cape mounted rifles, and other branches of the army; although, excepting in the junior grades, it is rarely that much advantage would be taken of this permission. It would, however, be a decided advantage to both services that such an arrangement should be permitted, and it is just possible that hereafter it might be found a very great boon, and found to work well; and there is no doubt, in the meantime, it would be so esteemed by the local army of India as the arrangement best calculated to uphold the honour of the service, and to prevent any feeling of jealousy.

4. Whether the local European force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain?

4. The local European force may be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, as well as by separate recruits in Great Britain, as at present. The buildings at Haileybury (late the Civil College of the East India Company) are now available for the home depôts, and a trifling increase to the present home Indian recruiting establishments would easily enable the officers to complete the requirements for the Indian service.

Smaller and lighter men are required for the Indian European cavalry. It would greatly facilitate the recruiting generally for the Indian service were the standard of the infantry recruits also fixed a trifle lower than for the line. For Indian service the European soldier is required, but height is of little consequence. Goorkahs and other hill tribes, who are very much smaller than the Bengal sepahis, are sufficient proof that it is pluck, not height or weight, which carries the day in India, as indeed, in most parts of the world, but there more especially.

T. F. Tait, Colonel.

APPENDIX No. 81.

Correspondence between Major-General Hancock and The Secretary.

1.—The Secretary to Major-General Hancock.

Indian Army Commission,
Sir, January 24, 1859.

I have the honour to inform you that the Royal Commission on the Indian Army will hold its next meeting on Friday, the 28th January, at 11 o'clock.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. B. Wood,
Major-General Hancock. Secretary.

2.—Major-General Hancock to the Secretary.

Sir, Tunbridge Wells, January 25, 1859.

With reference to your letter of yesterday's date, I have the honour to request you will submit to the Chairman of the Royal Commission on the Re-organization of the Indian Army, that as the meeting to be held on Friday next is merely for the purpose of completing the Report of the majority of the Commissioners, to which, in consequence of my considering it my duty to make a separate report, I should be unable to attach my signature, I presume my attendance will not be required.

I have, &c.
Colonel R. B. Wood, C.B., (Signed) Henry Hancock.
Secretary to the Royal Commission, &c.

3.—The Secretary to Major-General Hancock.

Indian Army Commission,
Sir, January 26, 1859.

In reply to your letter of yesterday's date, I am directed by the Chairman of the Royal Commission on the Re-organization of the Indian Army to state that you must exercise your own discretion as to attending the meeting of the Commissioners on Friday next.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. B. Wood
Major-General Hancock. Colonel and Secretary.

4.—The Secretary to Major-General Hancock.

Indian Army Commission,
Sir, March 1, 1859.

By direction of the Chairman, Major-General Peel, I have the honour to inform you that it was unanimously decided at the meeting of the Commissioners this day, that before the Commissioners close their proceedings, you should be requested to favour them, by Saturday next, with your separate report. The Commissioners not being aware of the points on which you dissent from their opinions, as expressed in the draft report which has been sent to you, and to which the Commissioners have this day agreed, they are anxious to have the opportunity of considering and discussing them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. B. Wood,
Major-General Hancock. Secretary.

5.—Major-General HANCOCK to the SECRETARY.

SIR, London, March 2, 1859.

IN reply to your letter of yesterday's date, I have the honour to request you will inform the Chairman, Major-General Peel, that being satisfied, from the opinions expressed by himself and Lord Stanley on more than one occasion on which the subject thereof was discussed at previous meetings of the Commissioners, that in following the precedent of the Army Purchase Commission, and transmitting my Report direct to the Secretary-at-War, I should adopt a correct course, I must adhere to my determination then communicated to the Commissioners so to forward it, and regret being unable, therefore, to comply with the request conveyed in your letter under acknowledgment.

With respect to your remark that the Commissioners are not aware of the points on which I dissent from their opinions as expressed in the draft report which has been sent to me, I beg to observe that those points were made known to them by me at the time the votes were taken upon the resolutions on which the draft report has been framed; they are also shown in my written replies to the questions under each head of the inquiry, which are on the Commissioners' table, and which I have already informed them verbally, and through you in writing, would form the basis of my separate report. I have, &c.

(Signed) H. HANCOCK,
Major-General, Bombay Army.

Colonel Wood, C.B.,
Secretary to the Royal
Commission, &c. &c.

6.—Major-General HANCOCK to the SECRETARY.

Tunbridge Wells,
SIR, March 8, 1859.

WITH reference to the second paragraph of your note of yesterday's date, extracted in the margin, I request the favour of your submitting to the Chairman, Major-General Peel, my opinion that the fact of the decision of the Commissioners, that I should be requested to favour them with my separate Report, having been passed on the 1st instant, after the Major-General and myself had left the meeting, and in the absence of Lord Stanley and Sir Henry Smith, who did not attend it; and of a proposal to the same effect having been disposed of before Major-General Peel left the chair, (which is not shown in the correspondence,) should be published.

"The Commissioners have decided that my letter to you of the 1st instant and your reply are to be inserted at the end of the Appendix."

I therefore request the sanction of the Chairman to the insertion of this letter also in the Appendix to the Report.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. HANCOCK,
Major-General.

Colonel Wood, C.B.,
Secretary to the Royal
Commission, &c. &c.

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